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| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 04:43:17 -0700 |
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| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 04:43:17 -0700 |
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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/13940-0.txt b/13940-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5fe23b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/13940-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7608 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13940 *** + +THE PROBLEM OF CHINA + +BY + +BERTRAND RUSSELL + +O.M., F.K.S. + +_London_ +GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD +RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET +FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1922 +SECOND IMPRESSION 1966 + +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN +BY PHOTOLITHOGRAPHY +UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED +WOKING AND LONDON + + + + +CONTENTS + +CHAPTER + + FOREWORD + I. QUESTIONS + II. CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + III. CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS + IV. MODERN CHINA + V. JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION + VI. MODERN JAPAN + VII. JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 +VIII. JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR + IX. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE + X. PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST + XI. CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED + XII. THE CHINESE CHARACTER +XIII. HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA + XIV. INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA + XV. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA + APPENDIX + INDEX + + + The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shû (Heedless), the Ruler of + the Northern Ocean was Hû (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre + was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of + Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how + they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven + orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and + breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try + and make them for him." Accordingly they dug one orifice in him + every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.--[_Chuang + Tze_, Legge's translation.] + + + + +The Problem of China + + + + +CHAPTER I + +QUESTIONS + + +A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and +reflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very +puzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe +will not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important +affinities with those of China, but they have also important +differences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, +even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, +since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the +human race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by +the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive +factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it +important, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there +should be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, +even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give. + +The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally +into three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these +groups, however, can be considered in isolation, because each is +intimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the +cultural questions are the most important, both for China and for +mankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less +equanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that +end. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for +practical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations +as for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed +business community has long been a commonplace of novelists and +moralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up +the pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded +as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the +artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to +oneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to +survive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause +misery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all +foreign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of +us? + +China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid +process of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed +in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits +quite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to +strike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the +whole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the +Celestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would +venture to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in +which we are better than old China, and to other respects in which we +are worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be +fruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a +superior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to +exploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior" +race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior +to ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate +knowledge of China, would take the same view. + +In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask +oneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard +to home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I +ultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more +desirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see +realized in the world? Different people will answer these questions +differently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade +a man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be +content merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that +the reader may feel likewise. + +The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not +merely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive +happiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of +knowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry +lists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no +appreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, +incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a +thing which is good and delightful on its own account. The same may be +said, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on +this topic would, however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak +of art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do +not mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of +course these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the +almost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian +peasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates +folk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the +Puritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy +of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we +have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of +us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of +Chinese civilization. + +In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of +good or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has +in promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good +things which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, +also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we +endeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread +oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not +strong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy +by means of their own merits and exertions alone. + +These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in +considering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and +commercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of +certain more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in +China one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a +society which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, +upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for +example, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come +under Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have +secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we +brought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a +life full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite +achievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and +unless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the +less familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed +always make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to +take as a matter of course. + +The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change +is needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable +ultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our +economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if +the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our +civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able +to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a +very splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, +however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The +first danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining +nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more +to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations +which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that +they may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, +into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except +armaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in +China. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with +political and economic questions; and it is through their influence that +dangers arise. + +China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on +the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering +the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan +must count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for +Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. +Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has +ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore +distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or +more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China +may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth +possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may +control China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese +will be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I +believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the +Japanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the +nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and unneighbourly. I +shall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the +relations of China and Japan. + +To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of +Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then +something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, +it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic +relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of +1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of +1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is +possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, +and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan +had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant +foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to +understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation +they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence +the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made +people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to +apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done. + +Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain +what is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost +more important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly +the most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the +resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the +white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only +the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power +in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the +chances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced +nations. + +The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the +conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have +guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it +far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far +Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China +preserve any shadow of independence without a great development of +nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate +nationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say to +patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found +only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world; +it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is +essentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized" +nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their +bombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other +within the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism +has kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being +goaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and +leave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and +rapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a +slender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than +despair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some +tolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that +are worse. + +Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a +psychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, +our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our +imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from +a superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its +own sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has +become somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have +never taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more +indolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally +accepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have +been aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like +China, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has +been governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to +introduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might +have had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not +many) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that +Western push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot +now take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me +far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than +those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of +Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with +our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe +that those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The +Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way of +life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the +world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, +exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency +directed to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this +consummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some +of that wisdom for which it despises the East. + +It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how +profound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks +are attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as +Japan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day after +day, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, +gay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of +everything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understand +and no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us lay +at death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the +indifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of +loud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a +great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed +that none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so +insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the +endless information of the well-informed. + +One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there +were no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of +poplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, and +found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads, +wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled +together surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, others +silently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted up +gnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, +and children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human beings they +undoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to grow +intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knew +that they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a +boat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had +heard--falsely perhaps--that the earth was more generous than in the +country they had left. Some would die by the way, all would suffer +hunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferings +would be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, +unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of +Westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia +is so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planet +are lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the +theorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force them +into actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could not +believe that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of +industrialism and forced labour. + +Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions +of the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a truly +popular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen the +sleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seen +them, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that +patient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely and +unspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiar +intellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics are +inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to +torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or +theory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants, +protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what we +had to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I +heard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the +sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a +terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale. + +It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + + +Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early +history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon +the question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not +composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of +princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or +warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, +whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age +of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age" +mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the +Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks +of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a +fairly high level of civilization--much higher than that of any other +part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, +too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon +its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly +alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive +torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have +inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human +sacrifice; in the Shu-King, however, there is little trace of +superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were all +occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of +the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state +of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows +what was expected of an Emperor:-- + + He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and + thoughtful--naturally and without effort. He was sincerely + courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these + qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and + extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and + virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the + nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also + regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became + brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the + myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were + transformed. The result was universal concord.[1] + +The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history +is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.[2] There is no reason to +doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier +times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the +Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in +1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of +nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this +time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of +France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at +its lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, each +strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over +subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting +for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which +temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians +always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of +eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention. + +What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which +fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious +prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven +at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous +with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Giles +maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct +translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word +"Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the +latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means +"Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both +terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the +God of the Old Testament.[4] + +As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven" +remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The +Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites +continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in +1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven in +Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual +sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official +survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be +called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never +had any connection with the State. + +The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C., +because with this year begins Confucius' _Springs and Autumns_, which is +a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official. + +One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the +Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one +comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He +acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221 +B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable +for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, +the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The +destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by +many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up +again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang +Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all +China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his +son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China" +is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chinese +put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with +what is now China proper. + +The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as +appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being +reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore +history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong +force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of +the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a +vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not +of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and +radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that-- + + All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own + family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office + of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit + themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian + classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go + before the local civil and military authorities so that they may + be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the + Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses + exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity + to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their + relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, + those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent + to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are + those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture + and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws + and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, + op. cit. i. p. 203.) + +It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The +Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other +hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of +old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to +destroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6] +says:-- + + No radical change can take place in China without encountering + the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then + than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical + change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the + worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was + good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their + children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to + support their contention and these they freely quoted to show + that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the + government to such an extent that something had to be done to + silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on + the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any + rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as + were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or + Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature + under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not + of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, + this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a + number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was + subsequently buried alive. + +This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is +anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship +of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has +a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have +excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, +which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made +progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with +a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary +pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has come +down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was +somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two +years, in 191. B.C. + +After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit +his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206 +B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism--exactly +coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in +Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact +with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.[7] Their +relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well +as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. +Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, +and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little +importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164 +a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.[8] +Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which +stands for Antoninus. + +It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense +prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European +armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to +think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as +ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military +superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are +tempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a mere +delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of +the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,[9] dealing with +the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han +dynasty, says:-- + + The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the + history of the world when they have grouped around the people of + Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the + expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these + voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of + these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the + Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same + time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that + of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who + wrote the history of their little world while they believed that + they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole. + +In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is +liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the +civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if +we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion. + +After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of +disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this +dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest +extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.[10] The Empire +of Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained a +great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis +and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in +China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis +destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When +Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people +were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the +corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, +shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have +their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one +of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have +escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill +any that might emerge.[11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and +Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these +massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of +Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of +causing death were more merciful than those that have been employed +since the Armistice. + +Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through +Marco Polo and Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the +first Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the +Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat +abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital +from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which +still surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory +which is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical +instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this +observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the +suppression of the Boxers.[12] I understand they have been restored in +accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If +so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty +secured to the world. + +Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in +the history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two +successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by +storms, and partly by Japanese valour. + +After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, +and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, +and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until +the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways, +and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having +contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the +pigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution. + +The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be +attributed to any military skill; on the contrary, considering its +extent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and +incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and +were less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a +barren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a +very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after +centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, +conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose +their ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and +went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived +the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of +barbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved +from this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the +white men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is +lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national +independence. + +In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese +civilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of +Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as +long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the +world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with +an almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the +eighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50 +millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is +said to have sunk to about 17 millions.[13] A census has been taken at +various times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of +individuals. From the number of houses the population is computed by a +more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different +methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons +between different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam +Weale[14] says:-- + + The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the + restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million + persons, which is less than the number given in the first census + of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai + Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably + a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the + amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the + toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was + so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the + population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less + stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now, + however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of + the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population + had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the + no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145 + millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, + and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) + it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) + it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk + to 261 millions. + +I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year +Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):-- + + The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations + has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates + of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. + The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the + census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910, + the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the + Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a + Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is + pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as + approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not + individuals were counted. + +The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is +given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population +of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at +various other dates are given as follows (p. 2): + +A.D. A.D. +1381 59,850,000 / 143,125,225 +1412 66,377,000 1760--203,916,477 +1580 60,692,000 1761 205,293,053 +1662 21,068,000 1762 198,214,553 +1668 25,386,209 1790 155,249,897 + / 23,312,200 / 307,467,200 +1710 --27,241,129 1792- 333,000,000 +1711 28,241,129 / 362,467,183 +1736 125,046,245 1812--360,440,000 + / 157,343,975 1842 413,021,000 +1743 149,332,730 1868 404,946,514 + \ 150,265,475 1881 380,000,000 +1753 103,050,600 1882 381,309,000 + 1885 377,636,000 + +These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population +of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year +(_e.g._ 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. +Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21 +millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But +no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increased +from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and +1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or +diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or +any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. +What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than +guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be +about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As +for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume +that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely +that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed +can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former +times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to +be distrusted. + +There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization +which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select +as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet +in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion +among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by +examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system +distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a +stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which is +therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I +have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other +countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each +of the three. + +1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but +symbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: it +means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of +different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no +such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, +catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible; +that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be +written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be +represented by some elaborate device.[15] For these reasons, there is a +movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers; +and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to +take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that +they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other +argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where +reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to +decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the +movement for phonetic writing deserves support. + +There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, +which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which +something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably +traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a +sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the +Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can +be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different +sounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese +characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of +dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, +without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in +Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an +Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the +spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from +Latin. + +The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which +enables it to be a means of communication between different places and +different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to +place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is +more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing +spoken sounds than by one which does. + +Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method +of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably +passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a +symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian +hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic +writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of +the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced +civilization--a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact +that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of +homonyms. + +As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the +mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in +an article published in the _Chinese Students' Monthly_ (Baltimore), +for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological +Problems of China." He says (p. 327):-- + + Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as + a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something + inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The + accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental + formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world + culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a + fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical + users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own + virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical + civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and + inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized + portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the + most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the + same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; + up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient + Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and + their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks + and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially + explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language + which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any + solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened + to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No + other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would + give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do.... + + The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the + alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in + the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final + truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already + protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries. + It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it + represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this + language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the + spirit remains to be determined. + +Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which +is impregnated with Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that +the Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization" +as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to +judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the +distinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt +that this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind +indicated in the above quotation. + +2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social +influence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions +and on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of +Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature. +Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about +whose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have +been less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes +him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics, +which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little +religious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in +the countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and +administered the Empire. + +Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than +to that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical +statesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues +he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed +to secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a +peaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was +essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former +ages. He accepted the existing religion--a rather unemphatic +monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved +a shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to +render as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress +upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the +following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards +our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining +always a due reserve."[16] But reverence for spiritual beings was not an +_active_ part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship, +which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's +neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when +he was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right--for the Chinese, unlike +the Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was +justified if he governed very badly. The following passage from +Professor Giles[17] illustrates this point:-- + + The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by + adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a + punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in + his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his + divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an + example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under + the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the + feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of + the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps + the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... + If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits + are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and + what can the people do but get rid of him?" + +This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout +Chinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent. + +Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the +weakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the system +departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated +against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the +tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted +with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the +Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and +accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China +praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to +construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which +Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit +is illustrated by the following story:[18] + + One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high + level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us + here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has + stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my + part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different + standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will + shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found." + +It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus +and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up. + +Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary to +filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the +indigence of one's aged parents.[19] This form of sin, however, is rare +in China as in other countries. + +The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without +children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no +descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has +made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great +biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to +China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this +respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the +preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization +had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the +Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family +became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen +until our own day. + +Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is +certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, +of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to +the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's +loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a +very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to +militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the +interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing +the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore +family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out +by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe. + +Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code +of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It +taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral +code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that +only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with +personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It +was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more +imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he +must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control--an extension +of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He +must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must +"save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries; +he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love +or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all +his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, +but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the +guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have +occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them +less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not +immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack +your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and +won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette; +so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and +fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in +China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the +scourge it is with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian +ethics.[20] + +Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century +A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust +aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,[21] whose interpretation of +Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall +of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured +Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were +struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and +appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of +drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists +of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but +the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were +ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many +centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion +but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and +practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the +belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all +others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be +very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic +lingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there was +religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable +that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding +ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe. + +3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive +examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and +unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its +hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the +present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book +on _China after the War_, pp. 59-60.[22] After considering the +educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues: + + In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of + moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during + the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the + Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was + composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was + considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that + in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who + were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total + enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high + as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of + "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended + by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public + offices. College training and local elections supplemented each + other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest + emphasis. + + Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never + been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the + introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system, + must be held responsible. The "election" system furnished no + fixed standard for the recommendation of public service + candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic + class from which alone were to be found eligible men. + Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the + elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the + competitive examination system in their place. The examinations + were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they + were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the + introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and + stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some + useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese + education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite + of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary + attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in + family education and in private schools. + +Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in +examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, +such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the +Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful +through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was +purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. +The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu +(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects +of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23] +says: + + In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit + of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form + of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This + was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of + Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs," + which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature, + was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, + because after the introduction of the theme the writer was + required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two + members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The + theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five + Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or + any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his + school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of + Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity + with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as + passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. + To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a + man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time + qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was + absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to + recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was + not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect + or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary + development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago + reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely + on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this + rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have + been so long venerated. + +These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no +doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things +that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one +considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was +probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, +the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. +Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the +possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of +administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the +preservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest. +But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away +to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to +perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce +and cruel system which they miscall civilization. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: Legge's _Shu-King,_ p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, _Ancient +History of China_, Columbia University Press, 1911--a book which gives +much useful critical information about early China.] + +[Footnote 2: Hirth, op. cit. p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.] + +[Footnote 3: See Hirth, op. cit., p. 100 ff.] + +[Footnote 4: On this subject, see Professor Giles's _Confucianism and +its Rivals,_ Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.] + +[Footnote 5: Cf. Henri Cordier, _Histoire Générale de la Chine_, Paris, +1920, vol. i. p. 213.] + +[Footnote 6: _Outlines of Chinese History_ (Shanghai, Commercial Press, +1914), p. 61.] + +[Footnote 7: See Hirth, _China and the Roman Orient_ (Leipzig and +Shanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are +allusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. cit., i. +p. 271.] + +[Footnote 8: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 281.] + +[Footnote 9: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 237.] + +[Footnote 10: Murdoch, in his _History of Japan_ (vol. i. p. 146), thus +describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire: + +"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the +illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes +of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign +of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung +(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever +seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of +civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the +most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on +the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines +of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along +these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the +inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the +Hindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and +Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the +Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia."] + +[Footnote 11: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.] + +[Footnote 12: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.] + +[Footnote 13: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.] + +[Footnote 14: _The Truth About China and Japan_. George Allen & Unwin, +Ltd., pp. 13, 14.] + +[Footnote 15: For example, the nearest approach that could be made in +Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word +"Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of +characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.] + +[Footnote 16: Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, _à propos_ +of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following +footnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be +equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to +have meant 'no familiarity.'"] + +[Footnote 17: Op. cit., p. 21.] + +[Footnote 18: Giles, op. cit. p. 86.] + +[Footnote 19: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.] + +[Footnote 20: As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even +more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight." +(Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.] + +[Footnote 21: Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, +and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident +occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles +are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above +the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered +father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are +impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and +the son-in-law's faith revived.] + +[Footnote 22: Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking, +1920.] + +[Footnote 23: Op. cit. p. 233.] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS + + +In order to understand the international position of China, some facts +concerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was +for many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and +fertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. +Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the +beginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of +officials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as +in England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly +religious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was +imported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that +country to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, +but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey +practically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the +seventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. +(What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument +discovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth +centuries Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at +Court, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in +rectifying the irregularities and confusions of the Chinese +calendar.[24] Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the +walls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels +between different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both +China and Japan. + +In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in +China, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a +permanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time +was Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a +patron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens +of his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King +George III is given by Backhouse and Bland.[25] I wish I could quote it +all, but some extracts must suffice. It begins: + + You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, + impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our + civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing + your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent + offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: + the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful + humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. + +He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing +with an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be +gratified. An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for: + + If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills + you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and + code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if + your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our + civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and + customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy + might become, nothing would be gained thereby. + + Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to + maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the + State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... have + no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O + King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater + devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission + to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your + country hereafter. + +He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels +that they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange: + +"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and +lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to +import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own +produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire +produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to +yourselves," the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to +continue. + +He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forget +the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by +intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of +the usages of our Celestial Empire." He concludes with the injunction: +"Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!" + +What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this +document has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the +world, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The +Empire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger +population; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had +not fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by +absorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the +Japanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. +The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the +Great, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of +China, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty +years. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything +needed for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade +upon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things +which they would do better without. + +Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, +namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at +least the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would +not have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is +a museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be +seen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to +impress him with the splendour of _Le Roi Soleil_. Compared to the +Chinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact +that Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and +all the other men who have adorned literature and the arts, does not +make us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and +Robert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by +giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an +Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. +Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung +is absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to +demonstrate this proposition. + +Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese +Government endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with +the cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, +as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and +Scandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on +China, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,[26] a building whose +artistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been +about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that +of Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the +superiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the +river Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at +Hong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British +diplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an +indemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the +French took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under +Chinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to +Japan's complete victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions +would have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany +and Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support +of Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between +China and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the +important rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the +Russo-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution. + +The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in +Shantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of +it; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few +converts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in +Christian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval +base there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, +which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with +the Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese +possession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its +restitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did +not, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the +German Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, +since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. +Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and +to hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the +Boxer rising, which is said to have begun as a movement against the +Germans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in +every respect, the Russians by creating a naval base at Port Arthur, +the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the +Yangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the +policy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door. + +The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans +know about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of +Peking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of +Peking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, +filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a +bare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is +administered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no +powers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and +traitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the +Japanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their +crimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the +Americans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of +communicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of +Chien Lung is completed. + +Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The +Americans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they +still had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on +higher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, +partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. +The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the +friendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is +incalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any +signs of following suit. + +To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is +faced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, +China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which +have been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no +experience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in +later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps +of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers--a +prerogative which every single one of them exercises. + +The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.[27] At +the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty +which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports +and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the +whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a +schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be +calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only +been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.[28] Revision of the +schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in +the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is +practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties +involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with +twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the +tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers. + +When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it +must be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese +the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign +States.[29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no +time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other +commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to +find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no +motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised +free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we +forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But +no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have +abandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act. + +The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for +the sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all +exports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, +and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is +desperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should +consider the tax indispensable. + +There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time +of the Taiping rebellion, namely the erection of internal customs +barriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with +the internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending +goods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the +payment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is +generally less than the internal tariff charges, this provision favours +foreign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of +internal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the +ground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal +customs in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export +tariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But +there were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all +could be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not +chiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should +be added that internal customs are collected by the provincial +authorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies +and civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong +enough to stop these abuses. + +The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the +Chinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the +service, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of +any other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials +is in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures) +there were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000 +were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, +by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties +exceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the +present system. The Chinese have the appointment of the +Inspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to +their country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, +so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern +bureaucracy. So long as the foreign officials are responsible to the +Chinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful +educative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an +efficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical +and intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their +slaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs +has much to recommend it during the early stages.[30] + +At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence +in the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact +that the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue +derivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, +so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of +Chinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the +Customs administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese +politics by recognizing or not recognizing a given _de facto_ +Government. (There is no Government _de jure_, at any rate in the +North.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an +artificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary +instincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal +reform. It means that no Government which is in earnest in attempting +to introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, +which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of +reconstruction. + +There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was +accepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the +security acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the +employment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the +Customs, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, +and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards +the Customs. + +The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to +China. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities +of interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. +The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three +telegrams in _The Times_ which appeared during January of this year. + +On January 14, 1922, _The Times_ published the following in a telegram +from its Peking correspondent: + + It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be + rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a + substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, + while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and + simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the + Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all + records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the + Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to + liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very + few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the + Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a + Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible + prospect of the removal of this difficulty. + +I venture to think _The Times_ would regard the difficulty as removed +if the Manchu Empire were restored. + +As to the "splendid salt surplus," there are two telegrams from the +Peking correspondent to _The Times_ (of January 12th and 23rd, +respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government +artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as +follows:-- + + Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is + happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the + Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet + faithful to the Central Government--the better half went over to + the Canton Government long ago--has dispatched a squadron of + gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if + $3,000,000 (about £400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately + forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the + revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has + been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic + Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for + immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the + traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate. + +The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:-- + + The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a + serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in + my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near + Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of + Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in + the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate + the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and + Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the + Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do + not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The + Reorganization Loan of £25,000,000 is secured on the salt + revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the + department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In + various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, + the local _Tuchuns_ (military governors) impound the collections + and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the + foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so + large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have + considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points + on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is + another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the + amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers + would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any + active form of intervention in this country. In view of the + extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present + interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000 + (£11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been + dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on + January 28th remains unsolved. + +It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting +punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the +Washington Conference should attempt to interfere! + +It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon +themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. +This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a +man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is +expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore +can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the +family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China +realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of +honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe--no +very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with +Western nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese +nationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will +begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for +the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, +but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power for +good in China will be at an end. + +I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did +to China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in +modern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. +Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of +modern Japan--a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is +not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But +before passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social +and political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in +China would be unintelligible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 24: In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining +his attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: +"As to the western doctrine which glorifies _Tien Chu_, the Lord of the +Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly +conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them--a point +which you soldiers and people should understand." (Giles, op. cit. p. +252.)] + +[Footnote 25: _Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking_, pp. 322 ff.] + +[Footnote 26: The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly +built by the Empress Dowager.] + +[Footnote 27: There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. +vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's _Modern China_, Clarendon Press, 1919.] + +[Footnote 28: A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington +Conference.] + +[Footnote 29: If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained +possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the +policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly +satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.] + +[Footnote 30: _The Times_ of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on +Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be +allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did +not deal with the Customs _administration_, nevertheless _The Times_ +assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of +the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption +which it would afford. I wrote to _The Times_ pointing out that they had +confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was +dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not +print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to +conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +MODERN CHINA + + +The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, +because in population and potential strength China is the greatest +nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of +the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been +brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington +Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it +is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts +and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try +to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which +it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, +though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic +development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as +our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we +shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon +China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses +have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason +has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the +Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst +is Japan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own larger +interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan +and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America +stands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. +Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination +by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers +become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very +essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, +internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be +a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only +ultimate solution. + +After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, +namely, the present internal condition of China. + +As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, +decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many +causes led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of +Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a +warlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon +the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails +and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike +compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were +rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This +characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in +common. + +The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but +differences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from the +more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained +inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous +foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, +destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful +people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which +lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have +diminished the population by 150 millions,[31] and was almost as +terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful +whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded +(by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China +by Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising +(1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for +a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. +But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after +the Boxer movement that the revolution broke out. + +The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit +to ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the +Canton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected +provisional President. But the Nothern Army remained faithful to the +dynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its +Commander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better scheme. +He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on +condition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. +Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the Legations, being what is +called a "strong man," _i.e._ a believer in blood and iron, not likely +to be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North +has always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan +Shih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in +the way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he +had every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic +corps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must +be admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of +his policy and methods. + +A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave +place to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine +the permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the +Parliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament +wished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but +he had the preponderance in military strength. Under these +circumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon +overthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament +(which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by +unconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to +a revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After +this, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of +China. He appointed his army lieutenants military governors of +provinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His régime might +have lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, +and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916--of a broken heart, +it was said. + +Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military +governors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government +when his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the +populations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been +civil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to +determine which of various rival generals should govern various groups +of provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but +this has lost most of its constitutional significance. + +The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are +called Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit +depredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. +They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and +administered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally +appointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the +soldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, +and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such +portions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to +surrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the +Japanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be +prolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met +there for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely +civil to the President and the Prime Minister, who still officially +represent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal +Government was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt +treasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, +to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to +Chang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool +of Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to +Mongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he +would undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at +Mukden ever since.[32] + +In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government +of a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. +Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, +succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its +Northern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government +under the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two +provinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a +moment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has +been checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the +neighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes +designs of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.[33] +In all ascertainable respects it is a Government which deserves the +support of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the +_New Republic_, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity +which it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This +opposition is partly on general principles, because we dislike radical +reform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement--of a +common type in China--would have given us a virtual monopoly of the +railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded +with the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the +change of Government has made ratification impossible. The new +Government, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of +them, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or +less similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The +American Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the +British Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have +lost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because +we, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is +vigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement +lapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital. + +The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend +of China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a +mistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in +magnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to +a single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In _The Times_ of +November 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article headed: "The Peril of +China. A dozen rival Governments." But in Europe there are much more +than a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those +of China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in +China, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of +destruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has +been incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. +You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that +you will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being +fought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which +they are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the +inhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the +average, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole. + +It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes +possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing +a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into +provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the +revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was +attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful +working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population +without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in +Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now +favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not +much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty +of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The +Central Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find +the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad +enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But +it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan +without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese +independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find +a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign +assistance. + +It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, +and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of +consolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has +great weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite +possibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, +at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the +others. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been +already mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in +Japanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. +Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is +an able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he +established his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a +blow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to +terms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself +with Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his +authority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see +Appendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a +breathing-space is all that is needed. + +The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few +regions where there are mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking +has nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to +the fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built +round a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far +as I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in +the whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government +employment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and +the work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long +and the pay infinitesimal. + +Seventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in +agriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while +wheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.[34] +The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only +just sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived +in China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to +drought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, +as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned, +foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the +Chinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those +who died of it shared this view. + +Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide +their holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely +sufficient to support himself and his family. Consequently, when the +rainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It +would of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more +scientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by +afforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly +improved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. +But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually +supposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their +families continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of +population, according to many writers, finds full scope.[35] If so, the +good done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of +more children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the +end, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher +standard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And +popular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there +is a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these +difficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of +competent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary +education. + +Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional +life of China takes two forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. +Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have +opened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we +had not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our +intercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background; +one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners +as such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that +intercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but +apparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where +unreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. +The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable +intellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum +of common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether +privately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of +enriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets. + +In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, +with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops +full of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese +part of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the +rich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through +a gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered +beauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and +Sunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, +half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, +spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and +disease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always +made me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life +would not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for +the poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life +brings more happiness to the Chinese than English life does to us. At +any rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do +not think it would be true. + +Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of +Shanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there +is so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of +which is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over +China, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, +is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are +divided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route +from Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which +has long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From +Peking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned +by the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern +bank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it +only runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of +the railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the +importance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong. + +In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower +Yangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of +industrialism. China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are +mostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number +of cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the +employer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern +China the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is +an inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long +hours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it +literally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is +not the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China +will not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and +education enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in +China, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid +and cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible +method by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is +in sight. + +The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that +which it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been +practically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many +centuries the country has been governed by the successful candidates in +competitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of +prestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the +old traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now +teaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and +public opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have +intellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including +Chang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,[36] are, of course, mostly +too stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes +their régime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China--_i.e._ of +those who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at +home--is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for +learning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, +because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their +outlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will +probably be strong enough to regenerate China--if only the Powers will +allow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action. + +It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of +Young China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a +modern education, and I should like to give some idea of their +mentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two +generations: the older men, who had fought their way with great +difficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian +prejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and +colleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded +people ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight +against the family. The older men--men varying in age from 30 to +50--have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of +the rationalists of Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, +painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the +beliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science +and a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and +miraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will give you +some idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in +becoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, +their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. +But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they +have achieved in their own minds. + +It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our +culture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate +Chinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen +among the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization +even when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal +candour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the +industrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When +they become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to +spread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire +the front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings +along the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best." In all this they +differ greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from +America; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were +soaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling +activity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the +prejudices in which they were brought up, they have not taken on a new +set, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to +consider any proposition honestly on its merits. + +The younger men, however, have something more than the first generation +of modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have +retained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the +pioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This +may be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more +than that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with +Western ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them +without a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without +being torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn +Western knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made +the process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still +have reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their +predecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing +practically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese +reverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I +see the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them +practical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in +the directions in which it ought to move. + +There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that +is the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important then +detailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the +Confucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial +society. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and +broadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, +have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical +efficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be +taken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of +some new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can +exterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to +be horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our +god; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee." And +so it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the +opposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing +really necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee, +Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the +British Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestry +in China."[37] In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of +forestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are +suitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (_e.g_. for +railway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that +the floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely +prevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were +reafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most +reforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject +for ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because +Confucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will +be cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory +as it is taught in our universities, and despise such humble questions +as the utility of trees. After learning all about (say) the proper +relations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find that +some Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not +considered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in +the West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally true +everywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students are +most eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial +processes might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our +theoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industry +is already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginning +to be a marked improvement. + +It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook +and that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most +modern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maxims +to replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men's +morals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they +dare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference +of morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, because +we are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes _per diem_. +What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about +government, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the +Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring +the mechanistic outlook. + +Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." I mean +something which exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the +Y.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes all these from the Chinese +outlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean is +the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our +scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. +The essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual who +has this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense of +perception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other +people to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual +is not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously +assailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or other of which he is +too apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the +class-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the +mystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in +their Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind except +as potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the +spread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a +life against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, is +as old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulent +forms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to +protest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a +fable[38]:-- + + Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to + protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, + and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the real + nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them. + + One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of + horses." + + So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and + put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them + by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that + two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and + thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and + trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the + fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them + were dead. + + The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it + round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square." + + The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it + curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line." + + But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and + wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and + line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in + managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with + clay and wood. Those who _govern_ the Empire make the same + mistake. + +Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the +chief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this +fable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane and +tolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of the +West. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to +see whether they "drink water and fling up their heels over the +champaign," and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. +Unlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the +foreigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into +trousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as +a rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of +cutting off the Emperor's head, as other nations do, they left him his +title, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about £600,000), and +he remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his +etiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with +a Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter +you or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature +or a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate +perception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of +pictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk +swooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his +claws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All +these pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one +feels also in their dealings with human beings--something which I can +perhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, +unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing +their best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of +which our Western world has far too little. Together with their +exquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite +extraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton +and cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake +of the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems +translated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley[39] is called _Business Men_, +and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects +in which the Chinese are our superiors:-- + + Business men boast of their skill and cunning + But in philosophy they are like little children. + Bragging to each other of successful depredations + They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body. + What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth + Who saw the wide world in a jade cup, + By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth: + On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability? + +I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth" +would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as +that is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of +solving the Far Eastern question. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 31: _The Truth about China and Japan_, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. +14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (_Modern China_, p. 13) says that +it "killed twenty million people," which is the more usual estimate, cf. +_China of the Chinese_ by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the +population was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt +that 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.] + +[Footnote 32: In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more +subservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by +Wu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 33: The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to +have made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton +Government was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng +Chiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (_The Times_, +April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See +Appendix.] + +[Footnote 34: The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, +especially in Manchuria.] + +[Footnote 35: There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the +birth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether +the birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet +by my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union +Medical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the +average number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while +the infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show +that the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of +statistics, generalizations about the population question in China must +be received with extreme caution.] + +[Footnote 36: I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. +Bland, _per contra_, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. +Contrast p. 104 of his _China, Japan and Korea_ with pp. 143, 146 of +Coleman's _The Far East Unveiled_, which gives the view of everybody +except Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin +reported in _The Times_ recently, but he was, of course, unable to +estimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.] + +[Footnote 37: Printed in _China in 1918_, published by the _Peking +Leader_.] + +[Footnote 38: _Musings of a Chinese Mystic_, by Lionel Giles (Murray), +p. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his _Texts of +Taoism_ in _Sacred Books of the East_, Vol. XXXIX.] + +[Footnote 39: Waley, 170 _Chinese Poems_, p. 96.] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION + + +For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order +to understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know +something of that country, to which we must now turn our attention. + +In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the +persistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the +centuries. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" by +no means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from +Korea in 552 A.D.[40] At the same time and from the same source Chinese +civilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through +the occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won +favour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to +China in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The +Japanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism +nationally they ordered one or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, +with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the +adherents of the traditional Shinto religion.[41] After some +vicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign +religion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than +Shinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief +religion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable +to find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of +peasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods" +(which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism.[42] Probably the +revival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing belief +in that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of the +population. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned, +Buddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto. + +The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to +restore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of +645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the +good old days. What the object was of those who established the +government of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that +may be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and +internal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low +ebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great +feudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government +fell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made +intelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved +imitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. The Chinese +Emperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from +the Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a +vigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so. + +The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of +645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is +set forth by Murdoch[43] as follows:-- + + In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled + on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends + who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for + purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some + of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the + British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they + certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the + four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization + with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the + sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye--for they + were two of this venturesome quartette--have often told of their + rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these + despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan + they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their + effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place + Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world. + +The two students who went to China in 608 A.D. "rendered even more +illustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have +done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked +back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, +and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two +National Doctors." + +Politically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately +following was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and +Richelieu--curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the +sovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. +The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably +with about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, +there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, +but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, +in 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, +but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just +the opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious +mixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies. + +Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems +to see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, +namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China +on the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, +and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which +went on in mediæval Europe between the Church, which represented ideas +derived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to +preserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, +Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization +over rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in +Japan. + +After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, +but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So +long as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power) +it continued to represent what was most civilized in Japan: the study +of Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve +respect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who +remained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were +so degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it +would have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them +and the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly +from the mediæval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, +although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even +greater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the +secular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado +and his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of +the Restoration. + +The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the +nominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of +power to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of +their infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some +monastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented +the military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of +the Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title of +the people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun," which means +"Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being the +Ainus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the +form which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto +Yoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But +before long the Shogun became nearly as much of a figure-head as the +Mikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the +actual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This +lasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened +that Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the +Minamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun +himself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished +at the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the +practice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister +and his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, +but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their +successors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter. + +What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the +Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, +originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming +at the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both +ignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted +the future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions +of peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to +undergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of +warlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching +doctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism +became national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became +important feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was +ready to fight on the slightest provocation. Sieges of monasteries and +battles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history. + +The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years' +experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country +completely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and +closely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the +Portuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final +expulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is +instructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought +with them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated +the former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually +no Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were +engaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, +Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed +than were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island +(containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and +were throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing +merchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their +larger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread +of Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and +their guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The +Portuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to +make converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese +began to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the +Portuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping +the Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese had +been able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a +Papal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit +monopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards +from Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican +and Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the +Jesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled +furiously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the +Japanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought +against the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the +extent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their +national independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the _San +Felipe_, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast +of Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his +harbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, +which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000 +crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in +Japan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had +the Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after +trying reason in vain, attempted intimidation. + + He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast + extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him + how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the + sway of a single man.... "Our Kings," said this outspoken seaman, + "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer + _religieux_ who induce the people to embrace our religion, and + when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who + combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not + much trouble in accomplishing the rest."[44] + +As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the +Portuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. +Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with +Japan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, +Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, +Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally +gave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the +Japanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, +they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian +nations. + +Meanwhile, a succession of three great men--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and +Iyeyasu--had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the +quasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of +internal peace which lasted until the Restoration--period of nearly two +and a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central +Government to enforce whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to +the foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between +them had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about +300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to +be subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account +of their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical +position. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began +in 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, has had +great power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during +its rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to +Christianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the +movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may +be, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible +without losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more +anti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in +1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in +the most vigorous terms:-- + + So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold + as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip + himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great + Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with + their heads.[45] + +The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly +cruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political +motives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with +the King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no +foreign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of +Christians against the newly established central power. Economic +exploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart +from political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if +there had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the +power of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese +armies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; the +Japanese had learnt the use of fire-arms; and their knowledge of +strategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest +cities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population +of Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would +therefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any +expedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have +been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. +But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world +showing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. +Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, +where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the +inmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of +European Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their +reports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The +Japanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the +white men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel +convinced that it was unwise. + +For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry's +squadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace +and almost complete stagnation--the only period of either in Japanese +history, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of +fire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy +until they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see +another period of isolation. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 40: The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's +_History of Japan_, The volume dealing with the earlier period is +published by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was +published earlier; its title is: _A History of Japan during the Century +of Early Foreign Intercourse_ (1542--1651), by James Murdoch M.A. in +collaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the _Japan Chronicle_, +1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II +respectively.] + +[Footnote 41: Murdoch I. pp. 113 ff.] + +[Footnote 42: Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.] + +[Footnote 43: Murdoch I. p. 147.] + +[Footnote 44: Murdoch, II, p. 288.] + +[Footnote 45: Murdoch II, p. 667.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +MODERN JAPAN + + +The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the +history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would +have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan +to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is +almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration +in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has +risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great +War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading +statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the +beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with +ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders +and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To +realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining +the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time +of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific +knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in +the Book of Joshua. + +The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have been +duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an +immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so +little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has +brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to +that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to +tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has +synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most +anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for +social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily +interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been +effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than +appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends +to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and +Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people +suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but +this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon. + +Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two +separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially +pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more +analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is +no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to +give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that +country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good +books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative +is McLaren's _Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era_ +1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared +in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course +invaluable; his book _Japan, An Interpretation_ shows his dawning +realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the +cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to +say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan. + +Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the +Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of +his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful +of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at +various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been +in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during +its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, +except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era +was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the +country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the +Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed +Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics +and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces +and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore +first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which +Japan has played in international affairs. + +What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to +power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end +of the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems to +have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy +personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with +contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was +often kept in great poverty. + + Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of + early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the + Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a + Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no + aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were + in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on + their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the + Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to + examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the + Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was + regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the + autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of + the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western + Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing + with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the + throne. + + In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the + relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be + sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by + Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, + throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the + Heavenly Gods.[46] + +What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very +different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado +had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the +ancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogun +for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial +treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never +willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren +once more (p. 33):-- + + The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of + Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the + expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! + Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in + enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific + attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not + be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was + directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, + but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general + unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in + armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years + previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had + been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising + gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the + students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those + men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. + +This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan +down to the present day. + +The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the +West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, +in his authoritative _History of Japan,_[47] says:-- + + + + In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development + most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at + fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the + solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and + facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain + their own unit of social organization, which is not the + individual, as with us, but the _family_. Furthermore, the + resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central + and local, to certain European systems is not the result of + imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is + merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who + overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal + system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new + equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe + for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or + twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the + administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan + by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 + A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding + fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten + Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of + officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from + China and established in the seventh century.... The present + administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was + neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor + adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity + that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies. + +The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of +the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the +foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and +secured the support of the country by being the champions of +nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted +which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan +from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the +greatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the Central +Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, +China and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and a +protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and +commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and +worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and +by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation +of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern +Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of +preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little +pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese +and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few +Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called _The Invention of a New +Religion_, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He +points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, +to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very +ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on +obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto +has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as +to suit modern requirements.[48] It is, of course, preferable to +Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not +one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has +been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado. + +Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the +Mikado until some time after the Restoration:-- + + The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its + sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the + beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of + living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been + assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was + the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have + been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long + centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the + Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, + generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. + At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of + the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the + Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling + their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest + against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign + (that of Meiji)--the most glorious in Japanese history--there + have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was + set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in + another. + +This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely +credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of +superstition has gone _pari passu_ with the spread of education, and a +revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the +midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and +instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there +is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler--as absolute as any sovereign +ever has been. + +The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. +Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied +from Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D., +whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to +somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese +pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that +the Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain +again:-- + + The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the + fifth century _after_ Christ, and even the accounts of what + happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. + Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the + certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy + does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient + circumstance. While granting a dispensation _re_ the national + mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of + the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who + strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in + Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will + starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading _Commentary + on the Japanese Constitution_ down to school compendiums, the + absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon. + +This question of fictitious early history might be considered +unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to +believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of +the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought +and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:-- + + Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, + was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it + is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the + popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where + they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change + all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado + descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, + and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims + the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and + constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense + popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and + low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as + public servants, but rather as executants of supreme--one might + say supernatural--authority. Shinto, because connected with the + Imperial family, is to be alone honoured. + +All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese +politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of +the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, +and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented +politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes +miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no +constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of +the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are +omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them +the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have +invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the +Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves +take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and +Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The +Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so +until the Mikado is captured by some other clique. + +From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom +in the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan were +a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists +of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there +is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to +dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly +there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and +making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the +Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and +the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy +in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. +There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and +anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese +industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as +Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed +there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has +saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed +if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of +these occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after +the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of +Japanese politics.[50] + +In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to +impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, +and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The Russian +Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated +men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the +Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it +had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it +would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a +prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed +secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the +restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations +to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, +faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse +the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of +neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, +led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to +alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the +peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they +would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact +resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was +known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The +Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the +indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese +demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed +up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese +announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted +the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus +the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, +because they had been tricked--the former in the belief that it could +yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter +in the belief that the Government would never give way about the +indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, +furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government--of the +nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the +real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision +of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view; +there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could +not have been made without trickery. + +Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in +which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as +democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that +Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, +took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all +their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great +Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the +Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin +with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japan +there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about +25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter +compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than +that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from +pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the +Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not +collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine +must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, +but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of +course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the +Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet +refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be +applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted +temporarily by Imperial decree--a provision which had no analogue in the +German Constitution. + +The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, +it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, +since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. +To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in +conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was +issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the +Constitution as follows[51]:-- + + Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire + of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors + unbroken for ages eternal." + + "By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his + _Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan_, "it is meant that + the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of + the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects." + + Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred + and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is + peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established + at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The + Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent + above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. + He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no + power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no + irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither + be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion." + + Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises + the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary + power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, + prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not + sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The + Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, + makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and + commutation of punishments. + + As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article + 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their + advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." + + Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in + framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of + his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities + belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a + Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the + Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of + State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included + by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is + only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to + the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But + the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open + answers from them before the public, and it may also present + addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions. + + "The Minister President of State is to make representations to + the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to + His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, + every branch of the administration being under control of the + said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his + responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the + other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for + the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint + responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the + Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike + personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one + of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the + Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of + control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the + latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some + countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate + body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct + of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint + responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the + power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme + power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be + approved of according to our Constitution." + +In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first +four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the +Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by +Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen +of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with +introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished +to preserve Japanese independence _vis-à -vis_ the Western Powers, but +did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own +account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. +Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of +the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. +But when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to an +earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The +Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous +at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by +glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and +France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war +against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the +hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government +has never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as the +Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant +international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. +Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was +afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was +powerless to prevent it.[52] His opposition, however, was tiresome, +until at last he was murdered in Korea. + +Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a +consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The +nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two +chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed +towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant +as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the +present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. +An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing +system, but the whole unity and _morale_ of the nation; I do not believe +that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be. +Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal +regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive +element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan +to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact +everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, +industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot +emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the +mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore +the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into +industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing +food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because +Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot +obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with +America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong +navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very +similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy +requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets +requires--or rather, is thought to require--starvation wages and long +hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, most +of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day +and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.[53] Labour organization +is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain to +spread if the number of industrial workers increases without a very +marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of +the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable +of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are +vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism +and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of +myth upon which the Japanese State depends.[55] There is therefore a +likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence--assuming a peaceful and +prosperous development in the meantime--of a very bitter class conflict +between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and +bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with +agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue. + +The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for +the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop +industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control +Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic +interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a +large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for +wage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners +means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial +piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a +continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which +the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with +the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, +there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution. + +From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a +diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent +to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is +fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which +patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to +emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, +involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but +ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be free +thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. +Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that +remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 46: McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.] + +[Footnote 47: Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.] + +[Footnote 48: "What _popular_ Shinto, as expounded by its village +priests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully +selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true +aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of +Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which +disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight." (Murdoch, I, +p. 173 n.)] + +[Footnote 49: The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. +Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office and +Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. +When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on +tho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to +regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme of +party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of +the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but +are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial +Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are +titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments +showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the +great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military +man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom +policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, +albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."] + +[Footnote 50: The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit. +chaps, xii. and xiii.] + +[Footnote 51: _The Far East Unveiled_, pp. 252-58.] + +[Footnote 52: See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.] + +[Footnote 53: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.] + +[Footnote 54: See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour +Movements in Japan," published by the _Japan Chronicle_, 1921, for an +account of what is happening in this direction.] + +[Footnote 55: _The Times_ of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from +its correspondent in Tokyo, _à propos_ of the funeral of Prince +Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:-- + +"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of +expenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which +was introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as +the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last +year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not +render true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the +highest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic +institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that +the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the +resolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the +incident."] + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 + + +Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is +necessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking +of the "Yellow Races," as though China and Japan formed some kind of +unity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead +one to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in +comparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the +Chinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities; +but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very +small. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in the +scale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a +hairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit +the Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan +descent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest +importance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and +Chinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more +important than a common racial origin. + +It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived +from China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as +Chinese, and Buddhism, which is still the religion of the people, is of +the sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which +are the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported +along with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the +irruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different +histories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar +had developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of +the First Emperor (_c._ 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land +empire, having much contact with foreign nations--Annamese, Burmese, +Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an +island kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea +and occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at +war with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal +chivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative +problems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines +of Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China +was still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in +one of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But +naturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that +which befel them in their own country. + +In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue +one finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, +which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised +where conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were +in feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on +the contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire was so vast and +immemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a +different set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and +compromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves +plunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in +developing the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the +situation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been +schooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal +anarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated +the previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like +our thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our +mechanism but dislike our thought. + +From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a +unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and +India contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are +easily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with +modern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely +than in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and +invulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong +as to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if +Russia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German +organizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of +possibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for +power and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal +mentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon +Asiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it +conflicts with China and Russia, which the present weakness of those +Powers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both +are likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the +essential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent. + +It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two +somewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as +the champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the +other hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, +and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are +inefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to +China and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has +inspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of +Korea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a +member of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of +the Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great +Powers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in +Asia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who +happen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in +the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred million +natives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of Great +Britain."[56] While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable +Englishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived +from the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply +an intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates the +intensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may +be, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before +the Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley[57] +quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the +following list of white men's sins:-- + + (1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that + all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization. + + (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, + but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors. + + (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession + is made to them they demand and take more. + + (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races + in greatness and wickedness. + + (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of + everything, will adopt any measures to gain it. + +This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have +supposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be +unlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They +argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as +possible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed +by Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been +equalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his +wildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he +wants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards +Japan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is +to be above the whites, not merely equal with them. Count Okuma put the +matter very simply in an address given in 1913:-- + + The white races regard the world as their property and all other + races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the + rôle of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they + please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, + and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white + races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, + and woe to them.[58] + +It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that +Japan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the +eminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the +Japanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us. + +The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal +affairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without +first consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had +infringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war +caused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and +decisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to +oppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the +Boxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the +fruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and +France, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for +themselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans +presumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow +Peril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese +war inevitable. It would not have mattered much to Japan if the Chinese +had established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have +constituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for +nothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called +Dairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the +Chinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting +Port Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having +accomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The +Russo-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this +Alliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the +corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, +when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided +that, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, +the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally +inspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the +Russian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from +calling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and +Russia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of +Portsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance +served its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese +war. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to +acquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus +curbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an +Entente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded +with France in 1904 would have been useless, and the alliance which +defeated Germany could not have been created. + +Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia +alone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her +strength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to +greatness was due to our support. + +The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all +interference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called +Dairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. +This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then been +called the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437 +miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen +as the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely +naval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to +Western models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a +treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910 +they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists +with every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be +fully the equals of the white men. + +The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a +monopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was +practically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China +by means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. +Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,[59] which shows how +the South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:-- + +"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed a contract with Messrs +Pauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways +northwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for +the work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan +protested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol +annexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that +'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the +neighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any +branch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that +railway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and +Russia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without +Russian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the +Russian rights, the projected line could not be built without her +consent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in +tone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was +obviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task! + +"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the +clause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to +Hsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to +build the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, +although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were +specificially excluded from participation in railway construction north +of the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British +Note the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and +Chinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the +agreement. + +"Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in +Manchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902 +and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of +the bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from +seeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. +Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but +with no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State +Department at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her +action was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which +assigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway +(South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining +thereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III +and IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is +declared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or +exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty +or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the +second is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct +any general measures common to all countries which China may take for +the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.' + +"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to +build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of +Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not +a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of +Manchuria.' + +"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling +in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such +flagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and +pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since +recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its +subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as +the protest from Tokio.... + +"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men +railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other +projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the +important Antung-Mukden line.[60] The same alleged secret protocol was +used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the +Newchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in +1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with +Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was +construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration +within the railway zone.'" + +Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover +the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung--though the latter has +been nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or +by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired +vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and +have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the +provinces through which they run. + +After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and +agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting +Manchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. +Russia had entered into extensive obligations to support Japan's claims +at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. +Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the +support of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the Far +Eastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international +questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party +aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They +have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, +as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China +politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several +times in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was +obtaining financial support from some Japanese.[61] When the revolution +actually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was +prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems +that the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the +union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. +Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor +of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, +though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of +some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions +of Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation +gives the gist[62]:-- + + It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on + December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, + with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East." + This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese + Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd + categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances + would Japan recognize a republican form of government in + China.... In connection with the peace conference held at + Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a + trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to + Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the + dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the + Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with + the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria + against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by + Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese + protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining + concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. + Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian + Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of + day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied + their authenticity. + +The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the +Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the +day. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was +strongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as +strongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the +influence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to +make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would +doubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war +came, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told +in a separate chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 56: Quoted by A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policy_, Allen & +Unwin, 1920, p. 18.] + +[Footnote 57: Op. cit. p. 16 n.] + +[Footnote 58: Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.] + +[Footnote 59: A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 48-51.] + +[Footnote 60: This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.] + +[Footnote 61: Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.] + +[Footnote 62: Page 66.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR + + +The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is +Japanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but +after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach +in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their +new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The +Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to +have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at +issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time +there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one +side rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely +victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure +possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in +Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending +China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by +the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of +Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse +after the Great War. + +The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have +the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. +But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, +the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military +control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were +displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. +(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung. + +Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China +could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to +turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, +who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese +remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they +presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the +Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented +in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with +Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms +Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese +province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain +specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be +opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted +to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria +and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a +protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for +Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial +enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron +and steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze,[63] where we claim +a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, +that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except +Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that +Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed +by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be +administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely +Japanese in _personnel_; that China should purchase from Japan at least +50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese +arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and +employing Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to +construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan +should have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and +finally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda +in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics. + +These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chinese +independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and +industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British +position in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we +had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands +constituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an +uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action +against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were +explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.[64] He had no +time to find out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret +agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan +wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.[65] By the +terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the +Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan +communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus +definitely breaking the treaty;[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr. +Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles. + +China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured +certain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by an +ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on +the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth +group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.[67] In +this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United +States immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the +agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore +still able to do something to further the objects for which we were +supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In +1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, +it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the +Ishii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the +United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, +particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The +rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.[68] + +I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.[69] +In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing +diplomatic relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the +declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off +diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all +neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in +Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He +induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of +expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, +on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of +declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected +with these events deserve some study. + +In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese +had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, +French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for +reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been +some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should +participate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. +These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of +Japan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear +that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. +When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in +Tokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, +Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as of +paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan +could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient +Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in +the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of +the economic activities of 400,000,000 people."[70] Accordingly the +proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the +Japanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their +sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they +filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing +them of cowardice and military incompetence.[71] + +But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the +situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience +to Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had +always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing +to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic +relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no +_promises_ to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American +Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was +ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were +bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged +China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and +Great Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continued +support of Japan. + +In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was +inviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan +concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. +This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the +assistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital +interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China +from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having +hostile designs against Russia or Japan." The last article provided that +"the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of +the High Contracting Parties."[72] That is to say, the treaty was not +communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of +Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The High +Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting +the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the +prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement," +one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all +Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese +Empire. + +On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to +sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with +Japan containing the following words:-- + + His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the + request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they + will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of + Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north + of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being + understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual + peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims + to the German islands south of the equator. + +The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by +Notes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo.[73] On February +19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian +Ambassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial Japanese +Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace +negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special +interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands +belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." +The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:-- + + The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the + Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the + Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung + and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It + also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese + Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed + before the war in this Chinese province and these islands. + + M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support + to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations + with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. + The consequences in China should be the following: + + First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and + consuls; + + Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave + Chinese territory; + + Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the + ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the + disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and + Portugal; + + Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in + China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she + possesses in certain ports of China. + +The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian +Ambassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:-- + + In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is + charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it + can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of + Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual + surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung + and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in + the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.[74] + +It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no +_quid pro quo_, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the +previous year. + +After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's +participation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the +hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope +being realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest +ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the +Chinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last +days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished +by the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917. + +Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into +the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has +been one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the +revolutionary movement.[75] If the Chinese had not been interfered with +at this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding in +establishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his +successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine +constitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had +dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was +resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, +and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan +Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his +Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese +Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic +relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue. + +On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It +was President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking +off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; +but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented +a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of +national unity was more important than entry into the war, and +suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What +had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never +have become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by +the Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to +instigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat +Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration +of war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd +George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.[76] The Cabinet, on +May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration +of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to +coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved +impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to +compel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the +Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act +as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of +constitutional government. After these various illegalities, the +military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their +number, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu +Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more +agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, +sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient +unconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to +declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and +against militarism. + +Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the +war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of +the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We +wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living +in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German +trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was +duly carried out--not only public property, but private property also, +so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to +the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till +after the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics in +overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of +hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities +insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew +to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the +Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took +upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the merciless +persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have +been much greater. + +The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of +Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the +belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side +two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to +the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our +operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with +proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be +fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, +after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for +ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet +get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law +and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of +German-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that."[77] The +European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to +enter the war for righteousness. + +We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration +of war. What Japan gained was somewhat different. + +The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, +was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist +Japanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the +war, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality--for +Japan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of +Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal +elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the +Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were +concluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially +published, is given by Millard.[78] By these agreements the Japanese +were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and +Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of +the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and +generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the +excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient. + +After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they +placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,[79] _i.e.,_ +about £25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were +as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of +victory. Unfortunately for Japan, the side on which Japan was fighting +in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies +of Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For +various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until +after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace +negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were +compelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed +everything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have +joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on +this subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the +most interesting in his book.[80] By Article 156 of the Treaty of +Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, +title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung.[81] Although +President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, +America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise +the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles +resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, +encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,[82] refused to sign +the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province +as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to +a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we had +annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in +the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext. + +Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public +opinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 +was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly +ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the +Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu +leaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking +Government has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always +for American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her +position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America might +re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference +was announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a +view to having the question settled before the opening of the +Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory +concessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional +evacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of +England and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the +American Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I +understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with +America. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount +to much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. +On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington +Conference. + +There is a question with which the Washington Conference determined not +to concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great +importance in the Far East--I mean the question of Russia. It was +considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, +to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, +with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. +Their existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in a +quarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselves +in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russia +has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the +Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after +a time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake +Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern +Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is +practically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have +launched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks--Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, +etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in military +occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, +though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire. + +In the early days of the Bolshevik régime the Russians lost Northern +Manchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly +of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of +the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects +with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail +between Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme +annoyance to European business men in the Far East, since it means that +letters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead +of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with +the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is +the reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, +various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and +endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which +led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon +all Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a +war with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the +opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former position +in Manchuria. Already, according to _The Times_ correspondent in Peking, +Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany +combined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda. + +The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger +Chinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have +a good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in +Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As +they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the +agreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset +impartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America.[83] For +America, no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are +economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far +East, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political +freedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage +beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may +become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, +however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, +because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is +treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But +what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet +impossible to say. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 63: On this subject George Gleason, _What Shall I Think of +Japan?_ pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel +mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the +Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people. +The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty +miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. +The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 +feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 +years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained +from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand +miners dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is +capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five +centuries.... + +"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart +of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special +trade domain." + +Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this +matter is given by Mr. Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chaps. x.-xiv. +See below, pp. 232-3.] + +[Footnote 64: See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, _Japan Weekly Chronicle_, +October 20, 1921.] + +[Footnote 65: The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, +_Japan's Foreign Policies_, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.] + +[Footnote 66: On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to +the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China +a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what +purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only +contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was +directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. +Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably +foolish" (_The Far East Unveiled_, p. 73).] + +[Footnote 67: The demands in their original and revised forms, with the +negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of _Democracy +and the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.] + +[Footnote 68: The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung +question are printed in S.G. Cheng's _Modern China_, Appendix ii, iii +and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp. +214-6.] + +[Footnote 69: Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and +official history of this matter. They are: _An American Diplomat in +China_, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; _Democracy and +the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and +_China, Captive or Free?_ by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director +of International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.] + +[Footnote 70: Millard, p. 99.] + +[Footnote 71: See Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 23 ff; +Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chap, v., and Millard, chap. iii.] + +[Footnote 72: Millard, pp. 64-66.] + +[Footnote 73: Reid, op. cit. pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. cit., pp. 343-6.] + +[Footnote 74: See Appendix III of Cheng's _Modern China_, which contains +this note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to the +negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal of +the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea +Islands north of the Equator."] + +[Footnote 75: The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration +of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.] + +[Footnote 76: Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.] + +[Footnote 77: Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, +"Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who +still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything +except money-grubbing.] + +[Footnote 78: Appendix C, pp. 421-4.] + +[Footnote 79: A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an +article on "China's Finances in 1918" in _China in_ 1918, published +early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the +comments appear also in Putnam Weale's _The Truth about China and +Japan_.] + +[Footnote 80: Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese +questions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. +Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case," League of +Nations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's +arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.] + +[Footnote 81: See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's +_Modern China_, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.] + +[Footnote 82: This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's +_China Awakened_ (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix., "The Student Movement."] + +[Footnote 83: "Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest +against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China +Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares +that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel +due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make +demands consistent with those rights" (_Daily Herald_, December 22, +1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian +labouring masses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What +Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the +Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs +of the capitalists.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE + + +The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at +Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the +Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be +dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual +decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their +effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia. + +In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been +brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact +between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general +alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of +America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing +for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The +situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as +regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in +the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem +to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. +It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more +liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of +Wei-hai-wei--a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive +but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, +and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the +terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as +Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that +date. + +One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement +not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified +exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between +America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. +Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring +naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of +the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a +first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo +this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve +the peace with Japan. + +Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision +of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The +foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have +insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the +Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they +desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, +though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one +of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put +their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as +they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels +sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese +importation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy +in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature +of their penetration of China.[84] + +Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and +integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these +are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning. + +From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was +the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end +of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of +Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the +Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, +they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings +in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and +through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse +was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, +and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the +resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of +Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The +Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the +question afresh. + +At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all +their own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the +Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation +with China. This point was important, because, ever since the +Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to +recognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese +Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary +to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered +with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to +the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before +the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between +the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, +was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a +deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, +of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no +longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old +days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some +disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was +roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution +more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would +probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work +of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly +urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less +strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between +China and Japan. + +By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the +private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as +regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the +negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they +would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back +the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of +a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese +refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were +compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid +in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway +was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs +or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be +handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. +Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese +retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic +manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the +other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President. + +It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years +hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years +hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both +Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to +this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have +some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that +case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete +control of the Shantung railway. + +On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than +might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new +international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with +them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary +to consider certain Far Eastern questions _not_ discussed at Washington, +since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form. + +The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at +Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is +secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both +together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will +not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See +Appendix.) + +The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions +in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain +unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check +them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the +Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any +near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have +decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A +conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place +at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the +effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. +But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. _The +Times_ of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian official +accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in _The +Times_ as follows:-- + + The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given + out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen + Conference. + + It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly + expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government + decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place + on August 26th last year. + + The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic + principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of + Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military + establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in + Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on + foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that + the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as + possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. + Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of + the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the + Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis + agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair + Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and + territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be + speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the + affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of + property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be + met. + + The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be + relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had + progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, + would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita + that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable + period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed + the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that + the preparations for the relief of the said division might be + dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate + despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the + withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should + fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops. + + Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out + within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed + arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the + same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by + Japan. + + Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a + sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely + ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought + up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not + only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but + declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to + Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the + Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring + the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government + instructed its delegates to quit Dairen. + +The Russian official account is given by _The Times_ immediately below +the above. It is as follows:-- + + On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with + the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. + Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian + Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, + but when the question of military evacuation was reached the + Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued + Japanese intervention. + + Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the + negotiations _re_ military convention, reproaching the Far + Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The + Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be + signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese + military evacuation. + + On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum + demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an + hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement + with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far + Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far + Eastern territory. _Re_ evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note + promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen + circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. + On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken + up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops + remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th. + +Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according +to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial +will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, +I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqué +it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese +unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all +that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, +which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to +evacuate Egypt. + +It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the +Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese +felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with +at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will +naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of +the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. +This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the +assembled peacemakers.[85] + +It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. +This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. +Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic +capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. +Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their +armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America +look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to +compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent +years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed +coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation +from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending +to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the +authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, +believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that +France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become +anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa +have sown the seeds of future wars--unless, by some miracle, the +"civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 84: See _e.g._ chap. viii. of Millard's _Democracy and the +Eastern Question._] + +[Footnote 85: I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of +the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic +mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more +high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were +communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they +showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies +have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.] + + + + +CHAPTER X + +PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST + + +The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to +guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, +and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will +endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying +the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I +regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively +the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an +attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests +and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86] + +I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the +dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of +peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise +and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The +pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the +optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American +public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, +athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main +ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the +Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, +whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to +explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious +hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western +Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength +of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. +Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his +sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. +This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been +somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard +Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as +it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an +attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England +of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment +than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from +Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors +is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development +is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to +estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United +States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of +idealism. + +Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It +is apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of +live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less +pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the +contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical +philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle +of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are +useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by +any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort +of world. + +All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington +Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the +friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, +hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst +enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power +to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if +there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to +see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the +militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done +in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the +future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state +Japan's case, although, _for the present_, I think it weaker than +America's. + +It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American +policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while +clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American +interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal +to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand +that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that +America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in +having.[87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very +pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the +seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the +cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of +American interests. To take next the question of China: American +ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country +should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The +policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so +rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of +the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal +policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting +a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest. + +In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices +are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight +whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In +the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to +discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed +by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a +discrimination in favour of American shipping. Even if the President +ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least +two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view +of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the +way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and +to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against +"shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is +_always_ honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that +America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial +interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases. + +I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself +with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American +weekly, The _Freeman_ (November 23, 1921, p. 244):-- + + On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an + obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large + banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated + the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in + fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an + emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with + intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious + effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese + Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new + international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese + Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, + together with other obligations already in arrears, and still + others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had + also received the full and energetic support of the Department of + State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were + at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; + having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they + came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to + save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government + would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus + prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American + financial protectorate. + +It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated +negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the +terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very +adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the _Freeman_ +concludes:-- + + If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the + consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, + those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to + take full advantage of the situation. + +There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington +Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the +connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to +establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international +control over China. In the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_ for November 17, +1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I +find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish +international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the +_Philadelphia Public Ledger_: "We suspect the motives which led to the +suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly +oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: +"International control will not do. China must be given time and +opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or +exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing +through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China +must agree. In the same issue of the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_--which, by +the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world--I find the +following (p. 728):-- + + Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The + international bankers have a scheme for the international control + of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a + sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese + Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the + Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the + Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing + this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's + statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks + about resisting the control of the international banks he is + fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the + Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full + opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny." + +Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be +due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had +nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and +one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson." + +I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, +and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European +radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control +reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a +Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, +for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would +be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic +as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, +although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though +this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the +Chinese. + +In the _New Republic_ for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. +Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is +prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was +written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far +East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign +commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good +substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually +increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the +chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the +spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization +for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such +_objets d'art_ as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the +gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one +day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man +throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret +society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. +It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be +told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The +definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good +government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat +dividends to capitalists. + +The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They +have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human +happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if +they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce +something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that +we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will +be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul +of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her +salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When +America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of +intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained. +Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans +recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with +blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is +that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank +God that they are not as this publican. + +So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of +Japan. + +Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that +Japan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not +suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United +States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of +Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only +two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to +fight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and +developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled +on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern +morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was +horrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began +to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured +Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with +the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by +the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good +qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers." + +People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the +intensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought +into contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the +highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy +white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke +would venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated +in this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that +white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese, +is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured +races in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from +retaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general +will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be +re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the +survival of civilizations of a different type from that of the +industrial West. + +The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of +the West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in +its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the +Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine being, +is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular +support for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely +economic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediæval way. The +morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic. +Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado +is the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of +superstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century +theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe +the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels +promoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in +one sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt. + +Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a +proposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until +it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view +that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially +nationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the +State religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,[88] and +propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto +religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is +not a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism, +Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to +appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is +believed by the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites for +marriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is +considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a +universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,[89] like +the Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples +the priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of +English Archdeacons. + +The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their +sense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but +they have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to +industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful +as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has +hitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any +nation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves our +gratitude. + +The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard +working, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them +have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and +incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means +universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of +quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a +whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest +respect. + +The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of +Socialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are +often theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour +organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In +Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety +of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, +if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a +political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists +resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the +national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but +not so much as Socialists in America--so at least I am informed by an +American who is in a position to judge. + +The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. +By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly +responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They +therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the +Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the +evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to +keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. +Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable +in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real +Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless +the existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the +Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung +but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal +government of Japan would probably have been excellent. + +The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that +the Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that the +Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The +argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States +will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in +the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented +with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then +Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield +in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi, +as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will +lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be +incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, +of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and +the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A +war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of +Japan. + +One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany +in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial +empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the +Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners; +so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused +our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with +America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by +our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, +similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French +sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has +brought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors +largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it +is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons +are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them +further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case +of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed +at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in +Eastern Asia. + +The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, +as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper +passions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; America +believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to +persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an +extension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt +futile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and +culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a +delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, +profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve +their own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and +in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice +is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese +are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the +white man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. +Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic +conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the +Americans. + +Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong +through impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China +the same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then +they could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the +champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, +and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to +them. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do; +they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only +to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore +behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this +same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the +worst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, +they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, +they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible +for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best +Americans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese +policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not +achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a +great misfortune for mankind. + +A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in +itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would +destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to +Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide +militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. +If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will +only become more liberal if the present régime is discredited by +failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the +interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint +diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only +Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate +neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of +actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance +with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an +encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan +has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only +permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese +at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our +Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the +ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform. + +We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency +in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, +millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not +mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still +able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the +Japanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik +propaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the +effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from +Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except +the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of +developing industry without passing through the stage of private +capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are +more and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as +it has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, +for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State, +whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to +federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very +great deal of government, and more control of individual lives by the +authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed +personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all +others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful +practical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is +the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these +reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much +progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the +same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved +successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were +probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. +The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively +Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, +carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less +corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, like +the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of +mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, +adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and +gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon +spent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régime +under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his +life. + +It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation +develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain +Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control +of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be +useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, +but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America +or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the +supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, +recover the position which she held in relation to China before the +Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an +instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for +centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the +last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long. + +The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way +regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as +much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, +the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be +able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with +Asiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking +nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong +for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, +on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be +desirable In the interests of mankind as a whole. + +What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for +China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. +The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end +some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending +of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of +some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably +quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in +the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in +the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through +years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their +development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference +without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. +Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but +have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. +The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult +one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the +Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we +do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution +suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution +slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely +imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable. + +There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the +Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable +chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the _status quo_ +is to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have made +concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four +Powers--America, Great Britain, France, and Japan--have agreed to +exploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortium +as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will +therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only +people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As +they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set +to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers +are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must +be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish +colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth +of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China +for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of +America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust +magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of +radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by +some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom. + +But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace +and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, +France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so +far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the +peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no +means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous +competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing +the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the +domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the +strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's +interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese +interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for +the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable +government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, +and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will +not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own +railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic +independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the +form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will +keep a _dossier_ of every student educated in colleges under American +control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or +Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard +of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the +United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In +short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to +"God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the +wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give +to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that +which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination +of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be +perfect. + +The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy +competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive +competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeeded +in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced +industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between +workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow +races.[92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap +Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to +white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of +industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an +obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any +person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every +other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per +head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who +either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the +others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an +opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of +the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British +Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial +conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole +question of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble for +centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since +Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this +matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world. + +The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by +means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is +obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except +through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, +China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands +of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into +submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, +attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot +see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result +of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect +that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the +Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and +the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as +the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be +fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive +civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, +the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any +sort would survive it. + +To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big +financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. +No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due +to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But +not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a +few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the +interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic +immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social +interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system +makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to +the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also +to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is +seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by +accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the +present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the +weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of +Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little +freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the +present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is +production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation +produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. +Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in +internal labour problems and in international relations. The development +of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the +Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the +things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs +for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply +these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish +pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will +be regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of the +consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will +cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to +exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not +possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present +American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not +secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only +international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of +revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure +until international Socialism is established throughout the world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 86: The interests of England, apart from the question of +India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, +British interests are allied with American finance, as against the +pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.] + +[Footnote 87: It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington +Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there +agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the +navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy +is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government +has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of +reluctant taxpayers. See _The Times'_ New York Correspondent's telegram +in _The Times_ of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22.] + +[Footnote 88: See Chamberlain, _The Invention of a New Religion_, +published by the Rationalist Press Association.] + +[Footnote 89: See Murdoch, _History of Japan_, I. pp. 500 ff.] + +[Footnote 90: An excellent account of these is given in _The Socialist +and Labour Movement in Japan_, by an American Sociologist, published by +the _Japan Chronicle_.] + +[Footnote 91: Author of a book called _If Japan and America Fight_.] + +[Footnote 92: The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is +illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in _The Times_ for +April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of +shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime +Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp +instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by +black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation +reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and +turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to +blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from +the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not +generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I +deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, +assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a +blessing.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED + + +There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a +close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the +Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact +will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or +whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that +of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the +past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, +Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediæval Europe from +the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these +cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of +China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case +again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from +us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the +Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear +we are unteachable. + +I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of +the questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three +following chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning the internal +condition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the +hopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult +situation. + +With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I +cannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact +after such a long period of separate development as has marked those of +China and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is +surprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is +not more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth +while to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two +civilizations. + +Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, +which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish +religion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an +outcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and +Galileo as representing these three elements, which have remained +singularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive +literature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more +urbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical +belief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with the +conception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our +nationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power +and the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly +be, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive +also the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been +acquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our +mentality. + +No one of these three elements has had any appreciable part in the +development of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese +painting, sculpture, and music.[93] China belongs, in the dawn of its +history, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia +contributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the +Greeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by +the rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so +the original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow +River. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch +far either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this +similarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little +in common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the +Egyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze[94] and Confucius, who both belong to +the sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should +regard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute +everything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the +differences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and +Babylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do +not think science can, at present, account wholly for national +character. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not +the whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant +individuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, +Mahomet, and Confucius. + +The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the founder of Taoism. "Lao +Tze" is not really a proper name, but means merely "the old +philosopher." He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of +Confucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He +held that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way +or manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that +we ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to +conform to it. "Tao" means "way," but used in a more or less mystical +sense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life." I +think he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way," and +that if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, +like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere +magic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. +But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist +philosophy from the first. + +Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but +his ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more +interesting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one +of freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences +with Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they +contrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the pure +men of old." There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, +because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some +sense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife +in the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of +humour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by +Chuang-Tze's account of Po-Lo who "understood the management of +horses," and trained them till five out of every ten died.[95] Their +restraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with +Western mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature +and art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present +day. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance +of a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so +that Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the +Chinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in +Peking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in +the theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement +at its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor +of a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. +In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due +to the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man +should always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments +(being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate +them in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, +which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue +in their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, +makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at +being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration +for the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of +passion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first +all the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually the beauty and +dignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who +have lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best. + +The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from +the favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that +I am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are +largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern +is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When +one compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of +some other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even +if they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, +is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to +a powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly +has succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners +and perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is +quite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been +provided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the +humblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of +white men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot +demean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard +this as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the +Chinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors. + +There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional +civilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from +India in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a +definite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant +outlook which we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man +adopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity +and Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man +can accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man +may be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is +incompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both +Buddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental +difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any +individual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. +Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It +has mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a +message to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as +natural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive +pessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of +all this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, +wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at +all. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or +religious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of +these two religions in China has been that the more religious and +contemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active +administrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the +official teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were +examined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has +been in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been +lacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western +nations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have conformed very +closely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the +population has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that +subject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations +have had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and +resources. + +Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in +China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other +two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is +practically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but +throughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it +is not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin." +Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been no +science and no industrialism. + +What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization +with the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, +but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to +dissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural +contact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political +and economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural +question as far as I can in isolation. + +There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not +simply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist +Western aggression, but because a very large number of people consider +learning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a +high value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only +of the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that +Western knowledge is more useful. Many students go every year to +universities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or +economics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to +China, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or +politicians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, +especially in the educated classes. + +The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had +ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This +was not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack +of new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the +stimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily +keen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of +libraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human +material. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in +science, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore +the spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the +Church put in its way in Europe. I have no doubt that if the Chinese +could get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within +the next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It +is quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with +fresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the +enthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the +renaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy. + +It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, +that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring +wealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an +ethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. They are +not by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me +that they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them +think there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The +habit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and +some of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they +were looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and +before long they will realize that they must work out their own +salvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults +and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will +make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours. + +The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the +scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just +conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to +see gradually uniting. + +Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production without +possession, action without self-assertion, development without +domination." I think one could derive from these words a conception of +the ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted +that they are very different from the ends which most white men set +before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly +sought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a +philosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to +Germany. + +But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with +Chinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese +practice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, +of course, a great deal of truth in this. Possession, which is one of +the three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to +the heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of +money--not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the +English or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful +men make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny. + +Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and +domination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese +practice. There is much less desire than among the white races to +tyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is +quite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on +which are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the +world could ever be "too proud to fight," that nation would be China. +The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, +showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they +could be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire +freedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may +compel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their +virtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have +been an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is +extraordinarily slight. + +Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the +Chinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a +poet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by +Mr. Waley, called by him _The Old Man with the Broken Arm_, to make a +hero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. Their +pacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that +they do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure--as +their pictures show--in observing characteristic manifestations of +different kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a +preconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which +dominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our +active impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with +us; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The +cultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their +earliest sages write. If one points out to them that this shows how +little progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress when +you already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seems +to a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own +wisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call +progress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable +goal. + +It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West +with what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek +knowledge, in the hope--which I fear is usually vain--that knowledge may +prove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three +motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our +religion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, +and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and +the missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the +world; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese +have no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions are +many, but reason is one," and with that they are content to let us go +our way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different +from those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking +concessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get +their claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good +soldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not +worth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their +reasonableness. + +I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that +Europeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine +ourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we +still practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we +are firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are +immeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation +like the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to +them is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound +mistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is +miserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier +because the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook +than our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, +but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of +beauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In +this respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. +I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but +for that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to +be fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us the indispensable +minimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of +that contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all +the other nations of antiquity have perished. + +When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I +thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn +from them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found +this attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who +go only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese +do not excel in the things we really value--military prowess and +industrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the +simple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than +in the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where +such things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for +our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance +and contemplative peace of mind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 93: See Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 368, and Giles, op. cit. p. +187.] + +[Footnote 94: With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is +of doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three +centuries after his death. Cf. Giles, op. cit., Lecture V.] + +[Footnote 95: Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.] + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE CHINESE CHARACTER + + +There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, +full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be +that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this +opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I +was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have +talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people +would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not +wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle +Oriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an +Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as +many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the +game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is +deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in +London. + +One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of +securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, +both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many +years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a +single Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the +Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their +outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils: +the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the +anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at +first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to +be reformed. + +But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable +misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the +foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of +soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the +bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt +all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really +wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to +lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that +may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a +mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit? + +The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have +to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for +these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the +capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure +in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, +are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted; +they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened +by a joke. + +I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in +chairs--the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies very +severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes +to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their +pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in +the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, +they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order +to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying +whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. +Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the +universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they +might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows +_complete_ self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own +interest. + +One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion +that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten +what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in +Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are +places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging +up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing +poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in +_Whitaker's Almanac_. A European, in recommending a place of residence, +will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can +conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a +Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will +tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an +ancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of the +world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook +that strikes the Westerner as barbaric. + +The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet +dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. +They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their +pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military +weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider +efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. +I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the +greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A +Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on +traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to +feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, +the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical +Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his +environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as +delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the +contrast between China and the English-speaking world. + +We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical +camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, +for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the +question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and +therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is +really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the +feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of +this pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time he +has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, +compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the +feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the +thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may +suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations +"progressive." + +There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common +than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form--not a +better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. +It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread +failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore +money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a +means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, +are often content to remain poor. In China, the _tuchuns_ (military +governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole +purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a +suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life +quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose +power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that +such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed +to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin +whole continents in order to win an election campaign. + +The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than +one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the +Great Powers--especially Japan--the harm would be much less than is +done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities +of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are +performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, +and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been +wholly lost in the rest of the world. + +The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign +pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he +might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a +rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech +and a free Press.[96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow the +herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men +still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the +conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the +West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. +Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in +China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few +leading financiers. + +The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China +as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity +in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest +beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if +you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a +Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because +your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute +an offence. + +Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as +industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words +that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. +But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, +which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the +most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are +accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what +is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I +were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer +from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful. +Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall +not venture to decide. + +The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in +their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to +its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be +taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it +is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to +cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his +title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of +several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably +in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was +nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, +without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put. + +Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It +was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu +party in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was +accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most +widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the +students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great +preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when +they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. +In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking +and change the Government almost without firing a shot. + +The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers' +strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The +Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left +its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce +payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, +accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and +police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely +wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in +China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for +revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in +corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to +extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing +the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated +in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the +interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public +feeling. + +Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. +The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize +acutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are +aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to +naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. +They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy +eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its +coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by +developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new +reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts +of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit +tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in +centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and +then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. +Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations +the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects. + +Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for +colonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for their +surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the +Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status +of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be +recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese +derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of +their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their +unrivalled national cohesiveness--in spite of the civil wars, which +merely ruffle the surface--that they can afford to despise military +methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall +have exhausted itself in internecine combats. + +China is much less a political entity than a civilization--the only one +that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the +Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have +perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There +have been foreign influences--first Buddhism, and now Western science. +But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science +will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as +much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had +not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. +What is bad in the West--its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness +to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims--they +see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its +science, they do wish to adopt. + +The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and +literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the +spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who +have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is +needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization +to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like +ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are +not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new +civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to +create. + +So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese +character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad +sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced +so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should +prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as +well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is +less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the +balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, +and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the +Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer +pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. +With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and +callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, +admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible +remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of +China's greatest virtues. + +The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. +They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one +per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other +ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the +Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw +materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those +whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese +would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the +philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions +were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few +dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by +white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and +that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the +efforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their own +consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present +birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are +bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive +through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next. + +Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of +agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. +Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts +to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness +has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of +the problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so +explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, +nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. +The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain +in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. +Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show +that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty; +but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be +said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an +extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy. + +Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that +they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between +rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that +first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the +Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is +involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a +serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese +are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. +Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, +the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous +people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure +torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races +would find insufficient--for example, to conceal the hiding-place of +stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of _active_ courage, +they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their +readiness to commit suicide. + +Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is +hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all +except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. +For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk +of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the +fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I +think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an +honest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as +economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China +than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any +Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more +corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that +changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we +are--which is not saying much. + +I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, when +they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat +sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are +capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of +this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was +a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But +their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this +element in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it +impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of +them becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or +devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I +suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite +of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And +many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic +love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the +West. + +To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the +foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient +civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, +under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American +financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude +imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who +have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty +in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not +obey the laws of perspective. + +The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved; +it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something may +be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is +supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these +qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle +disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be +seen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will force +it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to +which Japan has been driven. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 96: This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish +a very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed +Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, _Review of the Far East,_ April 16, +1922.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA + + +China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of +culture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient +beauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is content +to be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tend +to be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European +tourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is +apt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctive +and non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one who +regards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a +country with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do +not view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquire +what is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interesting +survival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the +first step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher +education, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use and +appreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Western +follies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and +one of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch. + +There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of +the classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a more +intelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditional +study of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in +the eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have +secured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learning +reading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still form +the majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given. +Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the +classical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at +the same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one of +these schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people who +are taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns +one finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which +is very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probably +those who can both read and write form about five per cent, of the +population. + +The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on +modern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old +examination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, has +done much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementary +education. The following statistics showing the increase in the number +of schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's +_China Awakened_, p. 4:-- + + 1910 1914 1917 1919 + +Number of Schools 42,444 59,796 128,048 134,000 +Number of Teachers 185,566 200,000 326,417 326,000 +Number of Students 1,625,534 3,849,554 4,269,197 4,500,000 + +Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil +war, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is +very remarkable. + +There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing +to the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has +been impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small +scale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable +government. + +The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be +only elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the +older texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, +within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest +renaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China +for many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, +even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the +innocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one +almost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the +Vacation--learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern +world, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some +eleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and +against the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the +same as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one +is driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of +specialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that +the ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more +account of modern needs, and give more instruction in science, modern +languages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, +so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China. + +The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the +missionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As +everyone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired +through the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their +own account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual +loss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded +(and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the +surplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American +universities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, +both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts +in China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have +come to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the +Great Powers. + +One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I +saw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), +the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller +Hospital), and the so-called Peking University. + +Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western +hills, with a number of fine solid buildings,[97] in a good American +style, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. It has +an atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a +(Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the +American College President. The teachers are partly American, partly +Chinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the +latter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of +every virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, +exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the +teaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was +thorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American +institutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. +Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the +most skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot +understand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European +language is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful +throughout the Far East. + +The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and +philosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is +commonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards +to America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China +they become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute +greatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty +and technical intelligence. + +The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing +an interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty with +European utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese, +but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy, +though perhaps not wholly successful. The hospital has all the most +modern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the +Standard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use to +anyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical College +teaches many things besides medicine--English literature, for +example--and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order +to produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the European +level, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessary +for medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a sound +knowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to +China, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent. + +The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have +to suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so +at least I was told) had already established a university in Peking, +fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But the +Methodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" to +their schools, so the already existing university had to alter its name +to "Government University." The case is exactly as if a collection of +old-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach the +doctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to +abandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question +of extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can be +abandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it +sometimes gives rise. + +Returned students (_i.e._ students who have been at foreign +universities) form a definite set in China.[98] There is in Peking a +"Returned Students' Club," a charming place. It is customary among +Europeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. +There are occasionally disagreements between different sections; in +particular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite as +equals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression was +that America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other +country; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than +those returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinaman +who wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem +romantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions which +conservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to +those of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it +is useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One is +reminded of the conversation in _Eothen_ between the English country +gentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England to the +refrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels," while +the Englishman keeps saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is +still, thank God, the British yeoman." + +Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole +admirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the +needs of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a national +temperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeans +ultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always +missionaries--not of Christianity, though they often think that is what +they are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Clean +living, clean thinking, and pep," I think an American would reply. This +means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness +for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as +being easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy for +the leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire--that hardened +old cynic--laid it down that the true ends of life are "_aimer et +penser_." Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with +"pep." The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate +both. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save the +lives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worth +saving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether +satisfactory. + +The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established +schools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. +In these, a certain proportion of the teachers are European or +American, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One +can never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by +white men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously +in the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration +of China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. +Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they +are not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other +country, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, +and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility +to exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really +beautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used +to have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking +Government University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for +keenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the +Science Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came +across them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire +Western knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. +They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not +capitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best +among their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, +but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely +Chinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government +University, leave much to be desired from the point of view of +instruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is +not sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough mental discipline. +But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the +profoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. +Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the +Government--loved by the Powers on account of its weakness--has to part +with all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and +plunder the country, as in Europe--for China must be compared with +Europe, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is +unhappily divided. + +The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a +powerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in +1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. +Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement." And what they did was not +merely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):-- + + Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the + Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the + Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to + the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. + For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures + showing them the real situation, internally as well as + externally; but especially by establishing free schools and + maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too + high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also + teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with + the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that + fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. + +One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards +modern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality +between men and women. The position of women in Peking Government +University is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to +examinations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the +university. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective +women teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive +institution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would +horrify most British head mistresses. + +There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary +education, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls +tend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as +the boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet +in Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner +speeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt +co-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter +should receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not +ripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the +sphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having +imagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I +realized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried +out in China. + +Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot +give what Young China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions +of centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European +superstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. +It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that +there is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and +for that free spirit of sceptical inquiry by which they are seeking to +build a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its +best days. + +While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher +pay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many +months. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation +to the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who +clubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The +incident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a +revolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the +teachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them +all that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of +bandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and +European intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may +say broadly that the old traditional education, with the military +governors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for +Conservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions +stand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically +though not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone +stands for intellectual freedom. + +The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by +foreigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire +military strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to +advance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who +quite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That +is why the West regards them as uncivilized. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 97: It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in +purely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and +Nanking Teachers' Training College.] + +[Footnote 98: Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from _Who's Who of +American Returned Students_, a classification of the occupations of 596 +Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items +are: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in +Government service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three +members of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical +practitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and +religious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese +holding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400 +_(ib.)._ This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America +in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese +university students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a +classification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are: +Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22; +natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified +separately), 19.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA + + +China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial +possibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as +nearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the +next few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this +development as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties +are very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will +therefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the +possibilities of the near future. + +We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's +industrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then +the mines, before going on to other matters. + +When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of +Oxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to +them, and did all it could to keep them at a distance.[99] In 1875 a +short line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the +Central Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In +1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was +accomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then +thought that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for +concessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important +line from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a +Hankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far +as Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with +the Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung +Railway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the +south. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the +Yangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and +managed by foreign officials of the respective countries which had +obtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware +that some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated +beyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the +Chinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of +most of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to +realize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem +was how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow +line and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by the +help of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the +hands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow +line was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was +constructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the +big main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the +Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. +The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be +regarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong +enough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more +or less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the +agreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China--five +years hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost +to China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important +railways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of +the situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity. + +Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges--quite rightly, as I +think--the great importance of nationalizing _all_ Chinese railways. At +Washington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and +to concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early +in 1919, he said[100]:-- + + _The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of + the new Republican State is the railway key_.... The revolution + of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of + popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being + carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left + behind a more subtle weapon. _This weapon is the railway_. Russia + with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. + Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited + the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put + into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted + economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this + grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all + intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign _enclave_, + subversive of the Chinese State. _The especial evil to-day is + that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new + technique,_ which ... she will eventually extend into the very + heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and + Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) unless she is summarily + arrested. _At all costs this must be stopped._ The method of + doing so is easy: _It is to have it laid down categorically, and + accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on + Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must + be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; + that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese + citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; + and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered + simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section + by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board_. + +If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this +reform--as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale--will +have been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect +Japan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her +promises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of +Japanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. +Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the +Shantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it. + +It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan +Railway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by +foreigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably +managed. I quote from Mr. Tyau[101] the following statistics, which +refer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027 +kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial +railways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres. +Total, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are +mainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which the first must be +regarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably +recovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer +the importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign +railway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. +Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in +1918:-- + +Name of Line. Kilometres Year Per cent, earned + Operated. Completed. on Investment. + +Peking-Mukden 987 1897 22.7 +Peking-Hankow 1306 1905 15.8 +Shanghai-Nanking 327 1908 6.2 +Tientsin-Pukow 1107 1912 6.2 +Peking-Suiyuan 490 1915 5.6 + +Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less +prosperous. + +I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway +administration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the +evils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed +by different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was +no uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to +another. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially +to open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of +which would probably be enormous. + +Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows +foreign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its +industries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent +of foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far +from satisfactory. Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché at +Peking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards +China's mineral resources:-- + + China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good + supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial + development. To indicate how little China has developed its + marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, + 14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now + 20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer + resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, + produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that + China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an + additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native + methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of + pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel + industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence + it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished + steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony + and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable + progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores + during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its + mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's + welfare.[102] + +The _China Year Book_ for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of +coal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons.[103] +Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000 +tons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident +that great progress was made during those three years, and there is +every reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been +maintained. The main problem for China, however, is not _rapid_ +development, but _national_ development. Japan is poor in minerals, and +has set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of +China. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, +that only industrial development can support the growing population, +which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the +mainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for +imperialism. + +The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at +Shanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for +shipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each +for the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng[104] says:-- + + For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly + supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from + America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited + in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by + virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home + consumption). + +Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs +explanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to +understand modern politics. + +The _China Year Book_ for 1919[105] (a work as little concerned with +politics as _Whitaker's Almanack_) gives a list of the five principal +iron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and +most important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and +Coal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of +the third group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in +sight is estimated by the _China Year Book_ at 50,000,000 tons, derived +chiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per cent. of +iron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as +603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The _Year Book_ +proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the +agreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which +enforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government +undertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to +compel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources." It should +be added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical +adviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be +sold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, +leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.[106] + +The second item in the _China Year Book's_ list is the Tungkuan Shan +mines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district on +the Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work +these mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in +1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of £52,000, and the mines were +transferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation." +These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their +capacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were +sold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. is +$20,000,000, which is considerably more than £52,000. This was the only +one of the five iron mines mentioned in the _Year Book_ which was not +in Japanese hands at the time when the _Year Book_ was published. + +Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession which +was granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be +worked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain +60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan +of operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of +170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of +steel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000 +tons a year." + +The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunction +with the Hengshan Colliery by the railway." I presume it is to be sold +back to China along with the railway. + +The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the most +promising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the +Japanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and +Japanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. +The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of +Penhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine." It will be +observed that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result +of the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The _Year Book_ adds: +"The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka +ironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at +Osaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron." + +It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have +allowed the Japanese to acquire a position of vantage from which they +can only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely +imperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of +their own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their +national independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that +make them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that +the chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order +to be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, +says nothing about iron mines;[107] therefore the old-fashioned Chinese +did not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are +awake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later +to the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue +our survey of facts. + +It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly +agricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are +crops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the +third country in the world, India being the first and the United States +the second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, +but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, +and it is industry that is our present topic. + +To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was +officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since +then no official returns for the whole country have been published ... +but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for the +present number of factory operatives and mine workers."[108] Of course, +the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as +specially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the +wages range from 15 to 45 cents a day.[109] (The cent varies in value, +but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as +industry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. +Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, +the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. +Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent +to which he has come under American influence, as well as that of +conservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young +Chinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped +that the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will +make the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of +America and Japan. + +There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. +There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise +is needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire. + +Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably +develop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in +native hands. + +The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200,000,000 +(630,000,000 taels), and the total imports slightly larger. It is +better, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency +fluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The +tael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its +value fluctuates with the value of silver. The _China Year Book_ gives +imports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and +214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as +577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in +pounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124 +millions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the +foreign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is +increasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how +little the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as +revolutions and civil wars. + +Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways +and mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national +independence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is +obviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new +lines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, +in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire +a power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope +that the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act +upon it. + +In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, +since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and +development by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It +should therefore be enacted that, in future, no sale of mines or of any +interest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the +security of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of +extra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to +accept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its +validity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, +such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear +China, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if +not, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, +it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It +would be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely +Chinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological +and mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the +right (_a_) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (_b_) to +work minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in +spite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers +should be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point +compatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, +except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is +clear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as +opportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible +to say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established +in China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign +aggression. This is a point to which, along with other general questions +connected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last +chapter. + +It is said by Europeans who have business experience in China that the +Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as +modern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially +honest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But +their successful businesses--so one gathers--do not usually extend +beyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or +later through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from +my own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very +quickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with +Confucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in +business methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung +and other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the +highest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The +Chinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to +commerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly +introducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, +every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, +that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout +the next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development +should be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But +that is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese +independence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 99: For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit. +pp. 183 ff.] + +[Footnote 100: _China in_ 1918. Published by the _Peking Leader_, pp. +45-6.] + +[Footnote 101: Op. cit. chap. xi.] + +[Footnote 102: _China in_ 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in +the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated +by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. p. +51.] + +[Footnote 103: Page 63. The 1922 _Year Book_ gives 19,500,000 tons of +coal production.] + +[Footnote 104: _Modern China,_ p, 265.] + +[Footnote 105: Pages 74-5.] + +[Footnote 106: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xiv.] + +[Footnote 107: It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is +nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine +pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure +where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. +Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and +steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton +Sinclair, _The Profits of Religion_, 1918, p. 175.] + +[Footnote 108: Page 237.] + +[Footnote 109: Page 218.] + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA + + +In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint +of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, +in what order, I should advocate in that case. + +To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, +and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China +has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, +because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist +Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of +Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, +because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own +economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was +fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, +though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the +long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing +to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China +becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned +ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to +China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the +Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, +in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of +Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their +own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power. + +The problem is not merely one of _political_ independence; a certain +cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in +this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it +would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had +to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a +nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they +adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and +they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must +be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with +safety. + +First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary--not, of course, the +bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude +which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow +them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated +Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal +tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has +proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to +foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is +capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United +States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong +enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong +enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too +strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. +But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely +necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, +not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western +skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, +political independence will have little value. + +The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of +an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; +(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued +concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the +above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have +to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the +political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are +also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good +government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and +education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the +priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, +unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have +acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to +oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought +to be taken in the above order. + +1. _The establishment of an orderly government_.--At the moment of +writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A +battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is +usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, +the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though _The Times_ calls +him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than +"Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he +wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all +China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, +to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to +depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive +elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force. + +So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best +thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint +programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of +military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice +of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which +all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in +public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, +sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some +powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere +military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in +favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the +scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such +a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous +propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, +and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded +soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the +financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will +not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of +Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not +accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from +them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may +not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it +would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to +raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese +merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich +Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the +Government. + +When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt +that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of +autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few +things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. +Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally +recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more +scope. + +While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed +upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of +Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will +be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country +to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective +decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. +This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very +rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest +failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The +society must make itself obviously the champion of the national +interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to +foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or +condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in +the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and +honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the +respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is +organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political +problems with which China is faced. + +Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign +rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty +Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves +from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was +in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the +Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of +Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in +general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet +Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by +the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's +resources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions +by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable +opportunity. + +2. _Industrial development._--On this subject I have already written in +Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to +consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought +to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to +be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not +State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to +be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not +be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly +government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to +lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. +Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a +monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans. + +Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be +desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State +Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country +which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, +it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the +second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the +foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in +the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital +industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is +perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by +undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent +the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can +acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop +Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening +power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both +oppressed and misled. + +But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change +in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family +ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which +already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at +present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these +requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize +that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State +Socialism must fail. + +For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should +learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I +think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards +the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import +skilled workmen--say from Germany--and cause them to give instruction to +Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be +desired to develop. + +3. _Education._--If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive +Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the +population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a +good in itself, but is also essential for developing political +consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. +The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state +of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary +education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, +in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses +cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, +it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast +population could be borne by the nation without a considerable +industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is +mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for +the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American +millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese +education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why +industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of +education. + +For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be +sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There +is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are +being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed +a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese +educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears. + +Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education +as in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to +have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will +soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too +numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and +mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission +schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to +become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western +civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national +life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes +them more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and +women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans +in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese +are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of +course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates +against national self-respect in those whom they teach. + +Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some +time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American +university. But for the great majority of university students it is far +better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned +students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from +which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A +society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all +really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, +as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students +returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this +difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university +education, but at present the difficulty would be serious. + +To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring +leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be +aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As +regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have +enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill +could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the +requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example +personally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide +culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his +writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. +He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but +by no means a slavish admirer of our ways. + +The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be +needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an +intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be +combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl +Marx. + +The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the +world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is +possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to +develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. +This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the +preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific +temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a +knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical +problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one +due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its +international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, +the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of +famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong +government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties +and the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a +model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to +defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand +Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western +philosophy of life. + +If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, +as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, +embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the +campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps +emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their +material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at +home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the +West achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by +the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but +would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great +military nations of the modern world will bring about their own +destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, +with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If +China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if +Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made +China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of +foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn +aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and +devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better +economic system--then China will have played the part in the world for +which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope +in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see +inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is +realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover +of mankind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 110: An account of a portion of his work will be found in +Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.] + + + + +APPENDIX + + +While the above pages were going through the Press, some important +developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated +Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated +towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of +Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to +be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not +unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in +Chinese politics. + +For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his +intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, +befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in +our newspapers. According to _The Times_, he has pronounced in favour of +the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the +restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the +South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it +in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. _The Times_ Peking +correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares +that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national +interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any +obstructionists." + +On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending +his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground +for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and +is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to +conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. +The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in +the same telegram as follows: + + Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall + be elected by the people; District police shall be created under + District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil + governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to + the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and + paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and + _gendarmerie_, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible + for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall + agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the + Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes + shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a + stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, + the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under + the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries + established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the + people on the land. + +This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of +it will ever be carried out. + +Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been +stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and +Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. +Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that +Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation +than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate +Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a +past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the +Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our +newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely +unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in _The Times_ of May +15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect: + + I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, + which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. + Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms + are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and + opium-smoking are rife. + +Nevertheless, on May 30, _The Times_ had to confess that this army had +won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in +Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions. + +The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived +by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the +victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will +be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped +also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not +be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of +that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, +there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with +him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more +likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There +is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang +for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But +it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still +problematical. + +_June_ 21, 1922. + + + + +INDEX + +Academy, Imperial, 44 +Adams, Will, 94 +Afghanistan, 175 +Ainu, 117 +America, 17, 54, 63, 69, 134, 136, 145 ff., 159 ff + and naval policy, 161-2 + and trade with Russia, 162-3 + and Chinese finance, 163-5, 244 + and Japan, 167 ff. +Americanism, 221 +Ancestor-worship, 39 +An Fu Party, 145, 205, 243 +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 120, 123, 133, 137, 149, 175 +Annam, 52 +Arnold, Julean, 231 +Art, 11, 12, 28, 189 +Australia, 181 + +Backhouse, 49 +Balfour, 152, 153 +Benthamites, 80 +Birth-rate-- + in China, 73 + in Japan, 116 +Bismarck, 112, 130 +Bland, 49, 77 n, 107 +Bolsheviks, 17, 18, 128, 136, 143, 146 ff., 175 ff., 245 +Bolshevism, 82 + in China, 175, 194, 204 +Books, burning of, 24 ff. +Boxer rising, 53, 54, 227 + indemnity, 54, 217 +Brailsford, 166 +Buddhism, 27, 31, 48, 190 + in Japan, 86 ff., 91, 105, 169 +Burma, 52 +Bushido, 172 + +Canada, 181 +Canton, 50, 68, 71, 75, 207 +Capitalism, 179 +Cassel agreement, 69 +Chamberlain, Prof. B.H., 103, 105 +Changchun, 124 +Chang-tso-lin, 68, 71, 77,242, 253 +Chao Ki, 40 +Chen Chiung Ming, 68, 253-5 +Chen, Eugene, 133 n. +Cheng, S.G., 55 n., 65, 134 n., 139 n., 232 +Chien Lung, Emperor, 49 ff. +Chi Li, Mr., 37 +China-- + early history, 21 S ff. + derivation of name, 24 + population, 31-4 + Year Book, 32 + produce, 72 + influence on Japan, 86 ff.,104 + and the war, 134 ff. + Post Offices, 150 +Chinese-- + character of, 199-213 + love of laughter, 188-9, 200 + dignity, 202 + pacifism, 195, 213 + callousness, 209 + cowardice, 210 + avarice, 211 + patience, 206 + excitability, 212 +Chingkiang, 60 +Chinlingchen mine, 234 +Chita, 146, 154 +Choshu, 99, 101, 102, 106 +Chou dynasty, 22 +Christianity in Japan, 92 ff. +Chuang Tze, 8, 82, 188, 192 +Chu Fu Tze, 43 +Chu Hsi, 46 +Civilization-- + alphabetical, 37 + Chinese, 187 ff. + European, 186 +Coal in China, 132 n., 231 ff. +Coleman, 77 n., 110, 132 n., 133 n. +Colour prejudice, 168, 173 + and labour, 181 ff. +Confucius, 21, 22, 24, 38, 187, 208 +Confucianism, 34, 38 ff., 190 + in Japan, 118 +Consortium, 14, 163 ff., 179, 244 +Cordier, Henri, 24 n., 25, 27 n., 28, 30 n., 31 n., 187 n. +Cotton, 76, 235 + industry in Osaka, 114 +Customs-- + Chinese, 55 ff., + on exports, 56 + internal, 56-7 + +Dairen, 123 + Conference at, 154 ff. +Denison, 129 +Dewey, Professor, 69, 224 + Mrs., 224 +Diet, Japanese, 109 ff. +Dutch in Japan, 94 ff., 100 + +Education, 44 ff., 76 ff., 193, 214-225, 247 ff. + statistics of, 215 + classical, 215-7 + European and American, 217-21 + modern Chinese, 221 ff. + of women, 223-4 +Efficiency, creed of, 17 +"Eight Legs," 45, 46 +Emperor of China 22 ff, 39, 83, 88, 205 + "First," 24 ff. +Empress Dowager, 52 n. +Examination, competitive, 34, 44 ff, 76 + +"Face," 204 +Famines in China, 72, 210 +Far Eastern Republic, 140, 154 +Federalism in China, 70, 244 +Feudalism-- + in China, 24, 26 + in Japan, 89 ff. +Filial Piety, 39 ff., 61 + and patriotism, 41 + in Japan, 118, 169 +Foreign Trade statistics, 236-7 +Forestry, 80 +Fourteen Points, 53 +France, 52, 53, 123 + and Shantung, 137-8 + and Japan, 157 +Fukien, 132 + +Galileo, 186 +Genoa Conference, 146 +Genro, the, 91, 106 ff., 128 +George III, 49 +Germany, 30, 53, 109, 138, 172 + property in China during war, 141 ff. +Giles, Lionel, 82 n. +Giles, Professor, 23, 39, 43 n., 49 n., 187 n. +Gladstone, 157, 160 +Gleason, 132 n., 134 n. +Gobi desert, 31 +Gompers, 163 +Great Britain-- + and China, 52 ff. + and Shantung, 137 +Great Wall, 24 +Greeks, 186 +Guam, 150 + +Han dynasty, 27 +Hanyehping Co., 132 n., 232-3 +Hart, Sir Robert, 57 +Hayashi, 133 n. +Hearn, Lafcadio, 99 +Heaven (in Chinese religion), 23, 43 + Temple of, 23, 24 +Hideyoshi, 87, 93, 94 +Hirth, 22 n., 23 n., 27 n. +Hong Kong, 52, 69, 75, 207 +Hsu Shi-chang, President, 44 +Hughes, Premier, 181 n. +Hughes, Secretary, 152, 153 +Hung Wu, Emperor, 45 +Huns, 24, 27, 31 +Hu Suh, 250 + +Ichimura, Dr., 121 +Ideograms, 34 ff. +Immigration, Asiatic, 181 ff. +Imperialism. 82 +India, 27, 29, 48, 119, 120 +Industrialism, 186 + in China, 75, 76, 212, + 226-39, 245 ff. + in Japan, 114 +Inouye, 88 +Intelligentsia in China, 76 +Iron in China, 131, 132 n., 231 ff. + Japanese control of, 232 ff. +Ishii, 135. _See_ also Lansing-Ishii + Agreement. +Ito, 88. 109 ff +lyeyasu, 91, 94, 95 + +Japan, 14, 15, 27, 30, 52, 53, 62, 63, 86-175 + early history, 86 ff. + constitution, 109 ff. + war with China, 113, 122, 130 + war with Russia, 108, 123, 130 + clan loyalty, 118 + loyalty to Allies, 136 + hegemony in Asia, 120 + loans to China in 1918, 143 + Socialism in, 114, 170 +Jenghis Khan, 28 ff. +Jews, 186 + +Kang Hsi, Emperor, 49 n. +Kara Korum, 30 +Kato, 133 n. +Kiangnan Dock, 232 +Kiaochow, 53, 131, 151 +Kieff, 29 +Koo, Mr. Wellington, 58 n., 164 +Korea, 53, 86, 120, 122, 124 +Kublai Khan, 29, 30 +Kyoto, 96 +Kyushu, 92, 94 + +Lama Religion, 43 +Lamont, 165 +Lansing, 144 +Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 134, 139, 151 +Lao-Tze, 43, 82, 187, 194 +Legge, 22 n., 39 n., 82 n. +Lenin, 180, 250, +Lennox, Dr., 73 n. +Literati, 25, 26, 38 ff. +Li Ung Bing, 26, 45 +Li Yuan Hung, President, 140 ff. +Li Yuen, 28 n. +Lloyd George, 133, 140, 157 +Louis XIV., 51 +Louis, Saint, 29 + +Macao, 62 +Macartney, 49 +Malthus, 73 +Manchu dynasty, 30, 31, 43, 64 +Manchuria, 53, 68, 120, 123, 127, 130, 146, 154, 177, 178, 207 +Manila, 93 +Marco Polo, 29 +Marcus Aurelius, 27 +Marx, 250 +Masuda, 93 +McLaren, 98, 103 n. +Mechanistic Outlook, 81 ff. +Merv, 29 +Mikado, 87, 99, 106 + worship of, 98, 103, 168-9 +Militarism, 16, 42, 43 n. +Millard, 134 n., 143, 151 n. +Minamoto Yoritomo, 90 +Mines, 230 ff. +Ming dynasty, 30 +Missionaries, 196 + Roman Catholic, 48, 49 n. + in Japan, 92 ff. +Mongol dynasty, 28 ff., 43 +Mongolia, 29, 43, 120, 147, 154 +Morgan, J.P., 157, 165 +Morphia, 150 +Moscow, 29 +Mukden, 130 +Murdoch, 28 n., 86 n., 101, 107 n. + +Nationalism, 16 +Nestorianism, 48 +Nicolaievsk, 155 +Nietzsche, 84, 194 +Nishapur, 29 +Nobunaga, 94 +Northcliffe, Lord, 77 n. + +Observatory, Peking, 30, 49 +Okuma, 120, 122 +Open Door, 55, 162, 179 +Opium, 52 + +Panama Tolls, 162 +Peking, 30, 34, 52, 72 + Legation Quarter, 54 + Union Medical College, 73, 219 + Government University, 217 n., 222 + Girls' High Normal School, 224 +Penhsihu mine, 234 +Perry, Commodore, 96, 100, 167 +Persia, 27, 29, 175 +Phonetic writing, 35 +Plato, 186 +Po Chui, 195 +Po Lo, 83 +Pooley, 120 n., 121, 124, 128, 133 n. +Pope, The, 29, 169 +Port Arthur, 54, 123, 130, 150, 175 +Portsmouth, Treaty of, 108-9, 125 +Portuguese, 92 ff. +Progress, 13, 196, 202 +Putnam Weale, 32, 33, 65, 143 n., 165, 228 + +Railways, 226 ff. + nationalization of, 228 ff. + statistics of, 230 + Chinese Eastern, 123, 126, 143, 146, 227 + Fa-ku-Men, 124 + Hankow-Canton, 227 + Peking-Kalgan, 227, 229 + Peking-Hankow, 227 + Shantung, 151 ff., 227 + Siberian, 146, 227 + South Manchurian, 124, 125, 126 + Tientsin-Pukow, 227 +Reid, Rev. Gilbert, 134 n., 139 n. 142 +Reinsch, 134 n., 135, 136 +Restoration in Japan, 87, 97 8. +Revolution of 1911, 30, 65 ff. + and Japan, 128 ff. +Rockefeller Hospital, 218 +Rome, 27, 51 +Roosevelt, 108 +Rousseau, 42 +Russia, 15, 18-20, 29, 53, 108, 119, 127, 146 ff., 175 ff. + war with Japan, 108,123, 130 + secret treaty with Japan, 136 + and Shantung, 138-9 + +Salt tax, 59, 60 +_San Felipe_, 93 +Sato, Admiral, 172 +Satsuma, 94, 99, 101, 102, 106 +Science, 51, 80, 81, 186, 193 +Shank, Mr., 69 +Shantung, 53, 127, 131 ff., 178 + secret treaties concerning, 137 + in Versailles Treaty, 144 + and Washington Conference, 145, 151 ff. +Shaw, Bernard, 160 +Sherfesee, 80 +Shih Huang Ti, _See_ Emperor, "First" +Shi-King, 25 +Shinto, 87 ff., 103, 105, 169 +Shogun, The, 90, 99 ff. +Shu-King, 21, 22 n., 25 +Simpson, Lennox. _See_ Putnam Weale +Socialism, 64, 181 ff. + State, 180, 246 + in Japan, 114, 170 + in China, 222, 236 +Soyeda, 144 n. +Spaniards in Japan, 93 +Student Movement, 223, 243 +Students-- + returned, 17, 193, 219 + statistics of, 220 n. +Summer Palace, 52 +Sung dynasty, 30, 45 +Sun Yat Sen, 65, 68, 128, 140, 253-6 +Supreme Ruler. _See_ Heaven + +Taiping Rebellion, 32, 56, 65 +Tai-tsung, 28 n. +Tang dynasty, 28, 44 +Taochung iron mine, 234 +Taoism, 43, 187 ff. +Tartars, 27, 31 +Tayeh mines, 231 n., 232-3 +Teachers' strike, 206, 225 +Tenny, Raymond P., 33 +Tibet, 31, 43 +Ting, Mr. V.K., 73 n. +Tokugawa, 99 +Tong, Hollington K., 143 n., 204 n. +Trade Unionism, 180-1 + in Japan, 114-5 +Treaty Ports, 74 +Tsing-hua College, 217 +Tsing-tau, 131, 151 +Tuan Chih-jui, 140 ff. +Tuangkuan Shan mines, 233 +Tuchuns, 61, 67, 71, 76, 203, 206 +Twenty-one Demands, 131 ff., 233, 234 +Tyau, M.T.Z., 144 n., 215, 220 n., 223, 226 n., 230, 235 + +United States. _See_ America. + +Versailles Treaty, 53, 142, 144,151 +Vladivostok, 146, 154 +Volga, 18 +Voltaire, 221 + +Waley, 84, 195 +War, Great, idealistic aims of, 141 ff. +Washington Conference, 16, 55 n., 61, 63, 127, 145, 149 ff., 178 +Wei-hai-wei, 54, 149 +White men, virtues of, 121 +William II., 122 +Wilson, President, 140, 142 +Women, position of, in China, 223-4 +Woosung College, 239 +Wu-Pei-Fu, 42, 60, 68, 71, 242, 253-3 + +Yamagata, Prince, 115 n. +Yangtze, 52, 132 +Yao and Shun, 21, 22 +Yellow River, 21, 187 +Y.M.C.A., 82, 83, 222 +Young China, 26, 61, 77 ff., 144, 145, 167, 193, 247, 250 +Yü, 22 +Yuan Shi-k'ai, 65 ff., 129, 135 + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13940 *** diff --git a/13940-h/13940-h.htm b/13940-h/13940-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3557c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/13940-h/13940-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,7703 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=UTF-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Problem Of China, by Bertrand Russell</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + + P { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + } + HR { width: 33%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + } + BODY{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + .linenum {position: absolute; top: auto; left: 4%;} /* poetry number */ + .note {margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} /* footnote */ + .blkquot {margin-left: 4em; margin-right: 4em;} /* block indent */ + .pagenum {position: absolute; left: 92%; font-size: smaller; text-align: right;} /* page numbers */ + .sidenote {width: 20%; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-top: 1em; padding-left: 1em; font-size: smaller; float: right; clear: right;} + + .list {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .rom {list-style-type: upper-roman;} + + .poem {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; text-align: left;} + .poem br {display: none;} + .poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .poem span {display: block; margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .poem span.i2 {display: block; margin-left: 2em;} + .poem span.i4 {display: block; margin-left: 4em;} + + </style> + </head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13940 ***</div> + +<h1><a name="Page_5"></a>THE PROBLEM OF CHINA</h1> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h2>BERTRAND RUSSELL</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>O.M., F.K.S.<br /> +<i>London</i><br /> +GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD<br /> +RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET<br /> +<a name="Page_6"></a>FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1922<br /> +SECOND IMPRESSION 1966<br /></p> + +<p style="text-align: center;">PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN<br /> +BY PHOTOLITHOGRAPHY<br /> +UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED<br /> +WOKING AND LONDON</p> + +<h2><a name="Page_7"></a>CONTENTS</h2> + +<div class="list"> +<ol class="rom"> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_I">QUESTIONS</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">MODERN CHINA</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_V">JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">MODERN JAPAN</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE</a> </li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_X">PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST</a> </li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">THE CHINESE CHARACTER</a> </li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA</a></li> +</ol> +<ul> +<li><a href="#APPENDIX">APPENDIX</a></li> +<li><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a> </li> +</ul> +</div> + +<p><br /></p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<div class="blkquot"><p><a name="Page_8"></a>The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shû (Heedless), the Ruler of + the Northern Ocean was Hû (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre + was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of + Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how + they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven + orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and + breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try + and make them for him." Accordingly they dug one orifice in him + every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.—[<i>Chuang + Tze</i>, Legge's translation.] </p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="The_Problem_of_China"></a><a name="Page_9"></a>The Problem of China</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>QUESTIONS<br /></p> + + +<p>A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and +reflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very +puzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe +will not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important +affinities with those of China, but they have also important +differences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, +even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, +since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the +human race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by +the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive +factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it +important, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there +should be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, +even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give.</p> + +<p>The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally +into three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these +groups, however, can be considered in isolation, because <a name="Page_10"></a>each is +intimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the +cultural questions are the most important, both for China and for +mankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less +equanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that +end. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for +practical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations +as for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed +business community has long been a commonplace of novelists and +moralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up +the pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded +as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the +artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to +oneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to +survive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause +misery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all +foreign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of +us?</p> + +<p>China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid +process of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed +in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits +quite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to +strike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the +whole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the +Celestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would +venture to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in +which we are better than <a name="Page_11"></a>old China, and to other respects in which we +are worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be +fruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a +superior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to +exploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior" +race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior +to ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate +knowledge of China, would take the same view.</p> + +<p>In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask +oneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard +to home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I +ultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more +desirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see +realized in the world? Different people will answer these questions +differently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade +a man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be +content merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that +the reader may feel likewise.</p> + +<p>The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not +merely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive +happiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of +knowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry +lists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no +appreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, +incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a +thing which is good and delightful on its own account. <a name="Page_12"></a>The same may be +said, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on +this topic would, however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak +of art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do +not mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of +course these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the +almost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian +peasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates +folk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the +Puritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy +of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we +have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of +us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of +Chinese civilization.</p> + +<p>In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of +good or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has +in promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good +things which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, +also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we +endeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread +oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not +strong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy +by means of their own merits and exertions alone.</p> + +<p>These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in +considering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and +commercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of +certain <a name="Page_13"></a>more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in +China one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a +society which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, +upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for +example, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come +under Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have +secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we +brought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a +life full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite +achievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and +unless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the +less familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed +always make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to +take as a matter of course.</p> + +<p>The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change +is needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable +ultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our +economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if +the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our +civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able +to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a +very splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, +however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The +first danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining +nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more +to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic <a name="Page_14"></a>nations +which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that +they may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, +into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except +armaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in +China. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with +political and economic questions; and it is through their influence that +dangers arise.</p> + +<p>China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on +the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering +the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan +must count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for +Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. +Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has +ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore +distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or +more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China +may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth +possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may +control China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese +will be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I +believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the +Japanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the +nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and unneighbourly. I +shall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the +relations of China and Japan.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_15"></a>To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of +Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then +something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, +it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic +relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of +1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of +1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is +possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, +and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan +had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant +foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to +understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation +they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence +the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made +people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to +apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done.</p> + +<p>Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain +what is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost +more important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly +the most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the +resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the +white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only +the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power +in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the +chances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced +nations.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_16"></a>The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the +conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have +guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it +far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far +Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China +preserve any shadow of independence without a great development of +nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate +nationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say to +patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found +only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world; +it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is +essentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized" +nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their +bombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other +within the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism +has kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being +goaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and +leave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and +rapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a +slender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than +despair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some +tolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that +are worse.</p> + +<p>Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a +psychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, +our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our +imperialism, <a name="Page_17"></a>our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from +a superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its +own sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has +become somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have +never taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more +indolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally +accepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have +been aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like +China, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has +been governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to +introduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might +have had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not +many) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that +Western push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot +now take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me +far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than +those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of +Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with +our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe +that those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The +Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way of +life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the +world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, +exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency +directed to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this +consummation <a name="Page_18"></a>that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some +of that wisdom for which it despises the East.</p> + +<p>It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how +profound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks +are attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as +Japan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day after +day, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, +gay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of +everything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understand +and no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us lay +at death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the +indifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of +loud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a +great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed +that none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so +insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the +endless information of the well-informed.</p> + +<p>One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there +were no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of +poplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, and +found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads, +wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled +together surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, others +silently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted up +gnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, +and children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human <a name="Page_19"></a>beings they +undoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to grow +intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knew +that they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a +boat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had +heard—falsely perhaps—that the earth was more generous than in the +country they had left. Some would die by the way, all would suffer +hunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferings +would be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, +unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of +Westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia +is so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planet +are lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the +theorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force them +into actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could not +believe that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of +industrialism and forced labour.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions +of the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a truly +popular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen the +sleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seen +them, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that +patient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely and +unspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiar +intellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics are +inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to +torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or +<a name="Page_20"></a>theory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants, +protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what we +had to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I +heard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the +sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a +terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale.</p> + +<p>It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II"></a><a name="Page_21"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY<br /></p> + + +<p>Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early +history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon +the question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not +composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of +princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or +warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, +whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age +of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age" +mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the +Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks +of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a +fairly high level of civilization—much higher than that of any other +part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, +too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon +its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly +alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive +torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have +inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human +sacrifice; in the Shu-King, <a name="Page_22"></a>however, there is little trace of +superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were all +occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of +the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state +of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows +what was expected of an Emperor:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and + thoughtful—naturally and without effort. He was sincerely + courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these + qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and + extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and + virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the + nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also + regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became + brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the + myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were + transformed. The result was universal concord.<a name="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history +is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.<a name="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> There is no reason to +doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier +times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the +Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in +1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of +nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this +time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of +France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at +its lowest ebb. Chinese history <a name="Page_23"></a>consists of a series of dynasties, each +strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over +subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting +for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which +temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians +always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of +eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention.</p> + +<p>What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which +fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious +prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven +at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous +with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;<a name="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> indeed Professor Giles +maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct +translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word +"Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the +latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means +"Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both +terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the +God of the Old Testament.<a name="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven" +remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The +Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites +continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in +1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven <a name="Page_24"></a>in +Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual +sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official +survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be +called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never +had any connection with the State.</p> + +<p>The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C., +because with this year begins Confucius' <i>Springs and Autumns</i>, which is +a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official.</p> + +<p>One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the +Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one +comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He +acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221 +B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable +for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, +the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The +destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by +many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up +again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang +Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all +China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his +son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China" +is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin<a name="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a>. (The Chinese +put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with +what is now China proper.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_25"></a>The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as +appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being +reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore +history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong +force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of +the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a +vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not +of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and +radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own + family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office + of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit + themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian + classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go + before the local civil and military authorities so that they may + be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the + Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses + exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity + to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their + relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, + those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent + to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are + those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture + and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws + and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, + op. cit. i. p. 203.) </p></div> + +<p>It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The +Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other +hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of +old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to +destroy the <a name="Page_26"></a>innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing<a name="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>No radical change can take place in China without encountering + the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then + than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical + change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the + worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was + good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their + children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to + support their contention and these they freely quoted to show + that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the + government to such an extent that something had to be done to + silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on + the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any + rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as + were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or + Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature + under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not + of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, + this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a + number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was + subsequently buried alive. </p></div> + +<p>This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is +anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship +of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has +a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have +excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, +which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made +progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with +a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary +pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has <a name="Page_27"></a>come +down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was +somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two +years, in 191. B.C.</p> + +<p>After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit +his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206 +B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism—exactly +coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in +Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact +with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.<a name="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> Their +relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well +as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. +Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, +and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little +importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164 +a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.<a name="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> +Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which +stands for Antoninus.</p> + +<p>It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense +prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European +armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to +think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as +ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military +superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are +tempted to think; and our <a name="Page_28"></a>superiority in civilization is a mere +delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of +the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,<a name="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> dealing with +the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han +dynasty, says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the + history of the world when they have grouped around the people of + Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the + expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these + voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of + these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the + Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same + time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that + of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who + wrote the history of their little world while they believed that + they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole. </p></div> + +<p>In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is +liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the +civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if +we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion.</p> + +<p>After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of +disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this +dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest +extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.<a name="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> The Empire +of Jenghis Khan (died <a name="Page_29"></a>1227) was considerably greater, and contained a +great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis +and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in +China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis +destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When +Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people +were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the +corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, +shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have +their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one +of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have +escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill +any that might emerge.<a name="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and +Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these +massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of +Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of +causing death were more merciful than those that have been employed +since the Armistice.</p> + +<p>Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through +Marco Polo and Coleridge; was <a name="Page_30"></a>the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the +first Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the +Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat +abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital +from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which +still surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory +which is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical +instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this +observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the +suppression of the Boxers.<a name="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> I understand they have been restored in +accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If +so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty +secured to the world.</p> + +<p>Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in +the history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two +successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by +storms, and partly by Japanese valour.</p> + +<p>After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, +and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, +and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until +the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways, +and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having +contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the +pigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution.</p> + +<p>The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be +attributed to any military skill; <a name="Page_31"></a>on the contrary, considering its +extent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and +incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and +were less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a +barren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a +very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after +centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, +conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose +their ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and +went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived +the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of +barbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved +from this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the +white men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is +lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national +independence.</p> + +<p>In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese +civilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of +Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as +long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the +world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with +an almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the +eighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50 +millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is +said to have sunk to about 17 millions.<a name="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> A census has been taken at +various times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of +individuals. <a name="Page_32"></a>From the number of houses the population is computed by a +more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different +methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons +between different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam +Weale<a name="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the + restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million + persons, which is less than the number given in the first census + of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai + Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably + a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the + amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the + toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was + so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the + population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less + stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now, + however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of + the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population + had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the + no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145 + millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, + and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) + it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) + it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk + to 261 millions. </p></div> + +<p>I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year +Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations + has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates + of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. + The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the + census taken by the Minchengpu <a name="Page_33"></a>(Ministry of Interior) in 1910, + the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the + Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a + Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is + pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as + approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not + individuals were counted. </p></div> + +<p>The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is +given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population +of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at +various other dates are given as follows (p. 2):</p> + +<table border="1" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="1" summary="year and population"> +<tr><th>Year A.D.</th><th>Population</th><th>Year A.D.</th><th>Population</th></tr> +<tr><td>1381</td><td>59,850,000</td> <td>1761</td><td>205,293,053</td></tr> +<tr><td>1412</td><td>66,377,000</td> <td>1762</td><td>198,214,553</td></tr> +<tr><td>1580</td><td>60,692,000</td> <td>1790</td><td>155,249,897</td></tr> +<tr><td>1662</td><td>21,068,000</td> <td>1792</td><td>307,467,200<br />333,000,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1668</td><td>25,386,209</td> <td>1812</td><td>362,467,183<br />360,440,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1710</td><td>23,312,200 <br />27,241,129</td> <td>1842</td><td>413,021,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1711</td><td>28,241,129 </td> <td>1868</td><td>404,946,514</td></tr> +<tr><td>1736</td><td>125,046,245</td> <td>1881</td><td>380,000,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1743</td><td>157,343,975<br />149,332,730<br />150,265,475</td><td>1882</td><td>381,309,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1753</td><td>103,050,600</td> <td>1885</td><td>377,636,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1760</td><td>143,125,225<br />203,916,477</td><td><br /></td><td><br /></td></tr> +</table> + +<p>These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population +of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year +(<i>e.g.</i> 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. +Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21 +millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But +no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the <a name="Page_34"></a>population increased +from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and +1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or +diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or +any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. +What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than +guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be +about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As +for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume +that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely +that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed +can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former +times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to +be distrusted.</p> + +<p>There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization +which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select +as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet +in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion +among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by +examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system +distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a +stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which is +therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I +have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other +countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each +of the three.</p> + +<p>1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but +symbols for whole words. This <a name="Page_35"></a>has, of course, many inconveniences: it +means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of +different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no +such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, +catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible; +that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be +written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be +represented by some elaborate device.<a name="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> For these reasons, there is a +movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers; +and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to +take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that +they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other +argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where +reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to +decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the +movement for phonetic writing deserves support.</p> + +<p>There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, +which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which +something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably +traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a +sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the +Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can +be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different +sounds, <a name="Page_36"></a>but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese +characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of +dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, +without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in +Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an +Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the +spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from +Latin.</p> + +<p>The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which +enables it to be a means of communication between different places and +different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to +place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is +more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing +spoken sounds than by one which does.</p> + +<p>Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method +of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably +passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a +symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian +hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic +writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of +the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced +civilization—a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact +that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of +homonyms.</p> + +<p>As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the +mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in +an article published in the <i>Chinese Students' Monthly</i> <a name="Page_37"></a>(Baltimore), +for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological +Problems of China." He says (p. 327):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as + a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something + inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The + accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental + formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world + culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a + fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical + users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own + virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical + civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and + inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized + portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the + most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the + same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; + up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient + Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and + their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks + and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially + explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language + which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any + solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened + to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No + other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would + give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do....</p> + +<p> The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the + alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in + the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final + truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already + protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries. + It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it + represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this + language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the + spirit remains to be determined. </p></div> + +<p>Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which +is impregnated with Chinese <a name="Page_38"></a>patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that +the Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization" +as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to +judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the +distinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt +that this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind +indicated in the above quotation.</p> + +<p>2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social +influence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions +and on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of +Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature. +Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about +whose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have +been less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes +him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics, +which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little +religious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in +the countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and +administered the Empire.</p> + +<p>Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than +to that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical +statesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues +he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed +to secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a +peaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was +essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former +ages. He accepted the existing <a name="Page_39"></a>religion—a rather unemphatic +monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved +a shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to +render as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress +upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the +following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards +our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining +always a due reserve."<a name="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> But reverence for spiritual beings was not an +<i>active</i> part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship, +which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's +neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when +he was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right—for the Chinese, unlike +the Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was +justified if he governed very badly. The following passage from +Professor Giles<a name="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> illustrates this point:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by + adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a + punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in + his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his + divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an + example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under + the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the + feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of + the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps + the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... + If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits + <a name="Page_40"></a>are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and + what can the people do but get rid of him?" </p></div> + +<p>This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout +Chinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent.</p> + +<p>Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the +weakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the system +departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated +against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the +tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted +with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the +Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and +accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China +praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to +construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which +Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit +is illustrated by the following story:<a name="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18"><sup>[18]</sup></a></p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high + level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us + here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has + stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my + part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different + standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will + shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found." </p></div> + +<p>It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus +and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up.</p> + +<p>Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says <a name="Page_41"></a>it is contrary to +filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the +indigence of one's aged parents.<a name="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> This form of sin, however, is rare +in China as in other countries.</p> + +<p>The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without +children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no +descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has +made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great +biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to +China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this +respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the +preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization +had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the +Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family +became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen +until our own day.</p> + +<p>Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is +certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, +of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to +the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's +loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a +very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to +militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the +interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing +the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore +family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out +by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_42"></a>Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code +of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It +taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral +code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that +only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with +personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It +was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more +imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he +must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control—an extension +of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He +must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must +"save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries; +he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love +or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all +his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, +but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the +guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have +occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them +less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not +immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack +your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and +won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette; +so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and +fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in +China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the +scourge it is <a name="Page_43"></a>with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian +ethics.<a name="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20"><sup>[20]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century +A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust +aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,<a name="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> whose interpretation of +Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall +of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured +Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were +struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and +appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of +drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists +of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but +the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were +ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many +centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion +but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and +practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the +belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all +others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be +very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic +lingers on among the uneducated. At all <a name="Page_44"></a>times, even when there was +religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable +that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding +ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe.</p> + +<p>3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive +examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and +unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its +hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the +present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book +on <i>China after the War</i>, pp. 59-60.<a name="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> After considering the +educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of + moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during + the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the + Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was + composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was + considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that + in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who + were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total + enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high + as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of + "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended + by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public + offices. College training and local elections supplemented each + other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest + emphasis.</p> + +<p> Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never + been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the + introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system, + must be held responsible. The "election" <a name="Page_45"></a>system furnished no + fixed standard for the recommendation of public service + candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic + class from which alone were to be found eligible men. + Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the + elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the + competitive examination system in their place. The examinations + were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they + were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the + introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and + stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some + useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese + education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite + of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary + attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in + family education and in private schools. </p></div> + +<p>Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in +examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, +such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the +Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful +through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was +purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. +The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu +(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects +of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing<a name="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> +says:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit + of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form + of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This + was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of + Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs," + which, for the first time in the history <a name="Page_46"></a>of Chinese literature, + was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, + because after the introduction of the theme the writer was + required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two + members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The + theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five + Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or + any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his + school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of + Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity + with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as + passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. + To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a + man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time + qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was + absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to + recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was + not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect + or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary + development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago + reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely + on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this + rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have + been so long venerated. </p></div> + +<p>These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no +doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things +that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one +considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was +probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, +the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. +Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the +possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of +administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the +preservation of Chinese civiliza<a name="Page_47"></a>tion in spite of barbarian conquest. +But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away +to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to +perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce +and cruel system which they miscall civilization.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1">[1]</a><p> Legge's <i>Shu-King,</i> p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, <i>Ancient +History of China</i>, Columbia University Press, 1911—a book which gives +much useful critical information about early China.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2">[2]</a><p> Hirth, op. cit. p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3">[3]</a><p> See Hirth, op. cit., p. 100 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4">[4]</a><p> On this subject, see Professor Giles's <i>Confucianism and +its Rivals,</i> Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5">[5]</a><p> Cf. Henri Cordier, <i>Histoire Générale de la Chine</i>, Paris, +1920, vol. i. p. 213.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6">[6]</a><p> <i>Outlines of Chinese History</i> (Shanghai, Commercial Press, +1914), p. 61.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7">[7]</a><p> See Hirth, <i>China and the Roman Orient</i> (Leipzig and +Shanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are +allusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. cit., i. +p. 271.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8">[8]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 281.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9">[9]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 237.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10">[10]</a><p> Murdoch, in his <i>History of Japan</i> (vol. i. p. 146), thus +describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire: +</p><p> +"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the +illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes +of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign +of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung +(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever +seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of +civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the +most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on +the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines +of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along +these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the +inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the +Hindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and +Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the +Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11">[11]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12">[12]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13">[13]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14">[14]</a><p> <i>The Truth About China and Japan</i>. George Allen & Unwin, +Ltd., pp. 13, 14.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15">[15]</a><p> For example, the nearest approach that could be made in +Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word +"Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of +characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16">[16]</a><p> Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, <i>à propos</i> +of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following +footnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be +equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to +have meant 'no familiarity.'"</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17">[17]</a><p> Op. cit., p. 21.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18">[18]</a><p> Giles, op. cit. p. 86.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19">[19]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20">[20]</a><p> As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even +more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight." +(Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21">[21]</a><p> Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, +and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident +occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles +are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above +the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered +father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are +impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and +the son-in-law's faith revived.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22">[22]</a><p> Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking, +1920.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23">[23]</a><p> Op. cit. p. 233.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III"></a><a name="Page_48"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS<br /></p> + + +<p>In order to understand the international position of China, some facts +concerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was +for many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and +fertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. +Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the +beginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of +officials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as +in England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly +religious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was +imported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that +country to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, +but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey +practically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the +seventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. +(What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument +discovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth +centuries Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at +Court, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in +rectifying the irregularities <a name="Page_49"></a>and confusions of the Chinese +calendar.<a name="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the +walls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels +between different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both +China and Japan.</p> + +<p>In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in +China, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a +permanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time +was Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a +patron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens +of his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King +George III is given by Backhouse and Bland.<a name="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> I wish I could quote it +all, but some extracts must suffice. It begins:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, + impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our + civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing + your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent + offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: + the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful + humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. </p></div> + +<p>He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing +with an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be +gratified. <a name="Page_50"></a>An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills + you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and + code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if + your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our + civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and + customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy + might become, nothing would be gained thereby.</p> + +<p> Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to + maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the + State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... have + no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O + King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater + devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission + to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your + country hereafter. </p></div> + +<p>He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels +that they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange:</p> + +<p>"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and +lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to +import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own +produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire +produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to +yourselves," the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to +continue.</p> + +<p>He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forget +the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by +intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of +the usages of our Celestial Empire." He concludes with the injunction: +"Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!"</p> + +<p><a name="Page_51"></a>What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this +document has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the +world, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The +Empire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger +population; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had +not fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by +absorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the +Japanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. +The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the +Great, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of +China, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty +years. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything +needed for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade +upon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things +which they would do better without.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, +namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at +least the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would +not have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is +a museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be +seen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to +impress him with the splendour of <i>Le Roi Soleil</i>. Compared to the +Chinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact +that Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and +all the other men who have adorned literature and the <a name="Page_52"></a>arts, does not +make us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and +Robert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by +giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an +Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. +Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung +is absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to +demonstrate this proposition.</p> + +<p>Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese +Government endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with +the cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, +as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and +Scandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on +China, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,<a name="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> a building whose +artistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been +about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that +of Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the +superiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the +river Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at +Hong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British +diplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an +indemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the +French took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under +Chinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to +Japan's complete <a name="Page_53"></a>victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions +would have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany +and Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support +of Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between +China and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the +important rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the +Russo-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution.</p> + +<p>The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in +Shantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of +it; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few +converts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in +Christian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval +base there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, +which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with +the Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese +possession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its +restitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did +not, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the +German Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, +since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. +Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and +to hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the +Boxer rising, which is said to have begun as a movement against the +Germans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in +every respect, the Russians by creating a naval base <a name="Page_54"></a>at Port Arthur, +the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the +Yangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the +policy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door.</p> + +<p>The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans +know about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of +Peking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of +Peking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, +filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a +bare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is +administered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no +powers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and +traitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the +Japanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their +crimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the +Americans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of +communicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of +Chien Lung is completed.</p> + +<p>Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The +Americans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they +still had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on +higher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, +partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. +The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the +friendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is +incalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any +signs of following suit.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_55"></a>To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is +faced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, +China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which +have been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no +experience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in +later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps +of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers—a +prerogative which every single one of them exercises.</p> + +<p>The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.<a name="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> At +the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty +which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports +and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the +whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a +schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be +calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only +been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.<a name="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> Revision of the +schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in +the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is +practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties +involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with +twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the +tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers.</p> + +<p>When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it +must be remembered that <a name="Page_56"></a>the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese +the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign +States.<a name="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29"><sup>[29]</sup></a> The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no +time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other +commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to +find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no +motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised +free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we +forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But +no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have +abandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act.</p> + +<p>The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for +the sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all +exports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, +and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is +desperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should +consider the tax indispensable.</p> + +<p>There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time +of the Taiping rebellion, namely the erection of internal customs +barriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with +the internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending +goods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the +payment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is +generally less than the internal <a name="Page_57"></a>tariff charges, this provision favours +foreign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of +internal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the +ground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal +customs in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export +tariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But +there were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all +could be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not +chiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should +be added that internal customs are collected by the provincial +authorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies +and civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong +enough to stop these abuses.</p> + +<p>The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the +Chinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the +service, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of +any other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials +is in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures) +there were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000 +were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, +by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties +exceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the +present system. The Chinese have the appointment of the +Inspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to +their country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, +so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern +bureaucracy. So long as the <a name="Page_58"></a>foreign officials are responsible to the +Chinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful +educative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an +efficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical +and intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their +slaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs +has much to recommend it during the early stages.<a name="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30"><sup>[30]</sup></a></p> + +<p>At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence +in the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact +that the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue +derivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, +so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of +Chinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the +Customs administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese +politics by recognizing or not recognizing a given <i>de facto</i> +Government. (There is no Government <i>de jure</i>, at any rate in the +North.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an +artificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary +instincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal +reform. It means <a name="Page_59"></a>that no Government which is in earnest in attempting +to introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, +which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of +reconstruction.</p> + +<p>There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was +accepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the +security acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the +employment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the +Customs, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, +and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards +the Customs.</p> + +<p>The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to +China. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities +of interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. +The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three +telegrams in <i>The Times</i> which appeared during January of this year.</p> + +<p>On January 14, 1922, <i>The Times</i> published the following in a telegram +from its Peking correspondent:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be + rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a + substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, + while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and + simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the + Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all + records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the + Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to + liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very + few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the + Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a + Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible + prospect of the removal of this difficulty. </p></div> + +<p><a name="Page_60"></a>I venture to think <i>The Times</i> would regard the difficulty as removed +if the Manchu Empire were restored.</p> + +<p>As to the "splendid salt surplus," there are two telegrams from the +Peking correspondent to <i>The Times</i> (of January 12th and 23rd, +respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government +artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as +follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is + happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the + Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet + faithful to the Central Government—the better half went over to + the Canton Government long ago—has dispatched a squadron of + gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if + $3,000,000 (about £400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately + forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the + revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has + been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic + Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for + immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the + traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate. </p></div> + +<p>The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a + serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in + my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near + Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of + Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in + the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate + the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and + Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the + Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do + not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The + Reorganization Loan of £25,000,000 is secured on the salt + revenues, and <a name="Page_61"></a>interference with the foreign control of the + department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In + various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, + the local <i>Tuchuns</i> (military governors) impound the collections + and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the + foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so + large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have + considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points + on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is + another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the + amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers + would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any + active form of intervention in this country. In view of the + extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present + interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000 + (£11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been + dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on + January 28th remains unsolved. </p></div> + +<p>It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting +punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the +Washington Conference should attempt to interfere!</p> + +<p>It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon +themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. +This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a +man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is +expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore +can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the +family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China +realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of +honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe—no +very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with +Western <a name="Page_62"></a>nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese +nationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will +begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for +the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, +but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power for +good in China will be at an end.</p> + +<p>I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did +to China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in +modern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. +Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of +modern Japan—a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is +not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But +before passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social +and political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in +China would be unintelligible.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24">[24]</a><p> In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining +his attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: +"As to the western doctrine which glorifies <i>Tien Chu</i>, the Lord of the +Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly +conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them—a point +which you soldiers and people should understand." (Giles, op. cit. p. +252.)</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25">[25]</a><p> <i>Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking</i>, pp. 322 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26">[26]</a><p> The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly +built by the Empress Dowager.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27">[27]</a><p> There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. +vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's <i>Modern China</i>, Clarendon Press, 1919.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28">[28]</a><p> A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington +Conference.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29">[29]</a><p> If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained +possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the +policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly +satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30">[30]</a><p> <i>The Times</i> of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on +Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be +allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did +not deal with the Customs <i>administration</i>, nevertheless <i>The Times</i> +assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of +the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption +which it would afford. I wrote to <i>The Times</i> pointing out that they had +confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was +dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not +print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to +conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV"></a><a name="Page_63"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>MODERN CHINA<br /></p> + + +<p>The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, +because in population and potential strength China is the greatest +nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of +the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been +brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington +Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it +is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts +and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try +to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which +it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, +though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic +development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as +our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we +shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon +China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses +have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason +has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the +Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst +is Japan; in the interests <a name="Page_64"></a>of China, as well as in our own larger +interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan +and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America +stands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. +Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination +by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers +become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very +essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, +internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be +a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only +ultimate solution.</p> + +<p>After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, +namely, the present internal condition of China.</p> + +<p>As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, +decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many +causes led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of +Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a +warlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon +the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails +and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike +compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were +rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This +characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in +common.</p> + +<p>The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but +differences of dress and manners <a name="Page_65"></a>kept the Manchus distinct from the +more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained +inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous +foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, +destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful +people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which +lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have +diminished the population by 150 millions,<a name="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31"><sup>[31]</sup></a> and was almost as +terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful +whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded +(by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China +by Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising +(1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for +a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. +But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after +the Boxer movement that the revolution broke out.</p> + +<p>The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit +to ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the +Canton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected +provisional President. But the Nothern Army remained faithful to the +dynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its +Commander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better <a name="Page_66"></a>scheme. +He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on +condition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. +Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the Legations, being what is +called a "strong man," <i>i.e.</i> a believer in blood and iron, not likely +to be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North +has always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan +Shih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in +the way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he +had every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic +corps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must +be admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of +his policy and methods.</p> + +<p>A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave +place to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine +the permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the +Parliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament +wished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but +he had the preponderance in military strength. Under these +circumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon +overthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament +(which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by +unconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to +a revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After +this, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of +China. He appointed his army lieutenants <a name="Page_67"></a>military governors of +provinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His régime might +have lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, +and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916—of a broken heart, +it was said.</p> + +<p>Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military +governors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government +when his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the +populations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been +civil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to +determine which of various rival generals should govern various groups +of provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but +this has lost most of its constitutional significance.</p> + +<p>The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are +called Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit +depredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. +They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and +administered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally +appointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the +soldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, +and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such +portions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to +surrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the +Japanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be +prolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met +there for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely +civil to the President and the <a name="Page_68"></a>Prime Minister, who still officially +represent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal +Government was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt +treasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, +to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to +Chang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool +of Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to +Mongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he +would undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at +Mukden ever since.<a name="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32"><sup>[32]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government +of a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. +Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, +succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its +Northern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government +under the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two +provinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a +moment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has +been checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the +neighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes +designs of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.<a name="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33"><sup>[33]</sup></a> +In all ascertainable respects <a name="Page_69"></a>it is a Government which deserves the +support of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the +<i>New Republic</i>, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity +which it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This +opposition is partly on general principles, because we dislike radical +reform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement—of a +common type in China—would have given us a virtual monopoly of the +railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded +with the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the +change of Government has made ratification impossible. The new +Government, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of +them, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or +less similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The +American Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the +British Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have +lost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because +we, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is +vigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement +lapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital.</p> + +<p>The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend +of China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a +mistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in +magnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to +a single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In <i>The Times</i> of +November 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article <a name="Page_70"></a>headed: "The Peril of +China. A dozen rival Governments." But in Europe there are much more +than a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those +of China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in +China, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of +destruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has +been incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. +You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that +you will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being +fought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which +they are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the +inhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the +average, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole.</p> + +<p>It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes +possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing +a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into +provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the +revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was +attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful +working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population +without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in +Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now +favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not +much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty +of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The +Central Govern<a name="Page_71"></a>ment cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find +the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad +enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But +it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan +without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese +independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find +a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign +assistance.</p> + +<p>It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, +and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of +consolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has +great weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite +possibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, +at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the +others. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been +already mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in +Japanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. +Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is +an able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he +established his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a +blow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to +terms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself +with Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his +authority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see +Appendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a +breathing-space is all that is needed.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_72"></a>The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few +regions where there are mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking +has nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to +the fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built +round a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far +as I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in +the whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government +employment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and +the work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long +and the pay infinitesimal.</p> + +<p>Seventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in +agriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while +wheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.<a name="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34"><sup>[34]</sup></a> +The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only +just sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived +in China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to +drought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, +as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned, +foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the +Chinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those +who died of it shared this view.</p> + +<p>Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide +their holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely +sufficient to support himself and his family. Conse<a name="Page_73"></a>quently, when the +rainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It +would of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more +scientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by +afforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly +improved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. +But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually +supposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their +families continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of +population, according to many writers, finds full scope.<a name="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35"><sup>[35]</sup></a> If so, the +good done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of +more children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the +end, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher +standard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And +popular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there +is a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these +difficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of +competent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary +education.</p> + +<p>Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional +life of China takes two <a name="Page_74"></a>forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. +Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have +opened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we +had not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our +intercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background; +one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners +as such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that +intercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but +apparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where +unreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. +The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable +intellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum +of common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether +privately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of +enriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets.</p> + +<p>In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, +with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops +full of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese +part of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the +rich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through +a gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered +beauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and +Sunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, +half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, +spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and +<a name="Page_75"></a>disease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always +made me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life +would not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for +the poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life +brings more happiness to the Chinese than English life does to us. At +any rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do +not think it would be true.</p> + +<p>Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of +Shanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there +is so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of +which is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over +China, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, +is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are +divided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route +from Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which +has long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From +Peking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned +by the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern +bank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it +only runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of +the railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the +importance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong.</p> + +<p>In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower +Yangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of +industrialism. <a name="Page_76"></a>China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are +mostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number +of cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the +employer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern +China the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is +an inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long +hours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it +literally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is +not the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China +will not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and +education enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in +China, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid +and cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible +method by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is +in sight.</p> + +<p>The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that +which it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been +practically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many +centuries the country has been governed by the successful candidates in +competitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of +prestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the +old traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now +teaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and +public opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have +intellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including +<a name="Page_77"></a>Chang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,<a name="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36"><sup>[36]</sup></a> are, of course, mostly +too stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes +their régime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China—<i>i.e.</i> of +those who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at +home—is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for +learning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, +because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their +outlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will +probably be strong enough to regenerate China—if only the Powers will +allow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action.</p> + +<p>It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of +Young China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a +modern education, and I should like to give some idea of their +mentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two +generations: the older men, who had fought their way with great +difficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian +prejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and +colleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded +people ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight +against the family. The older men—men varying in age from 30 to +50—have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of +the rationalists of <a name="Page_78"></a>Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, +painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the +beliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science +and a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and +miraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will give you +some idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in +becoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, +their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. +But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they +have achieved in their own minds.</p> + +<p>It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our +culture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate +Chinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen +among the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization +even when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal +candour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the +industrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When +they become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to +spread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire +the front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings +along the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best." In all this they +differ greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from +America; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were +soaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling +activity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the +prejudices in which they were brought up, they <a name="Page_79"></a>have not taken on a new +set, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to +consider any proposition honestly on its merits.</p> + +<p>The younger men, however, have something more than the first generation +of modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have +retained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the +pioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This +may be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more +than that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with +Western ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them +without a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without +being torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn +Western knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made +the process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still +have reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their +predecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing +practically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese +reverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I +see the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them +practical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in +the directions in which it ought to move.</p> + +<p>There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that +is the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important then +detailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the +Confucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial +society. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and +<a name="Page_80"></a>broadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, +have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical +efficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be +taken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of +some new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can +exterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to +be horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our +god; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee." And +so it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the +opposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing +really necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee, +Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the +British Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestry +in China."<a name="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37"><sup>[37]</sup></a> In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of +forestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are +suitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (<i>e.g</i>. for +railway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that +the floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely +prevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were +reafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most +reforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject +for ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because +Confucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will +be cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory +as it is taught <a name="Page_81"></a>in our universities, and despise such humble questions +as the utility of trees. After learning all about (say) the proper +relations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find that +some Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not +considered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in +the West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally true +everywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students are +most eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial +processes might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our +theoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industry +is already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginning +to be a marked improvement.</p> + +<p>It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook +and that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most +modern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maxims +to replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men's +morals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they +dare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference +of morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, because +we are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes <i>per diem</i>. +What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about +government, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the +Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring +the mechanistic outlook.</p> + +<p>Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." I mean +something which <a name="Page_82"></a>exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the +Y.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes all these from the Chinese +outlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean is +the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our +scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. +The essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual who +has this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense of +perception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other +people to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual +is not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously +assailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or other of which he is +too apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the +class-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the +mystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in +their Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind except +as potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the +spread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a +life against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, is +as old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulent +forms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to +protest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a +fable<a name="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38"><sup>[38]</sup></a>:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to + protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, + and fling up their heels over the champaign. <a name="Page_83"></a>Such is the real + nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them.</p> + +<p> One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of + horses."</p> + +<p> So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and + put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them + by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that + two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and + thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and + trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the + fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them + were dead.</p> + +<p> The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it + round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square."</p> + +<p> The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it + curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line."</p> + +<p> But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and + wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and + line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in + managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with + clay and wood. Those who <i>govern</i> the Empire make the same + mistake. </p></div> + +<p>Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the +chief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this +fable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane and +tolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of the +West. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to +see whether they "drink water and fling up their heels over the +champaign," and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. +Unlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the +foreigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into +trousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as +a rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of +cutting off the Emperor's <a name="Page_84"></a>head, as other nations do, they left him his +title, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about £600,000), and +he remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his +etiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with +a Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter +you or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature +or a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate +perception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of +pictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk +swooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his +claws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All +these pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one +feels also in their dealings with human beings—something which I can +perhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, +unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing +their best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of +which our Western world has far too little. Together with their +exquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite +extraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton +and cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake +of the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems +translated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley<a name="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> is called <i>Business Men</i>, +and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects +in which the Chinese are our superiors:—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span>Business men boast of their skill and cunning<br /></span> +<span>But in philosophy they are like little children.<br /></span> +<span><a name="Page_85"></a>Bragging to each other of successful depredations<br /></span> +<span>They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body.<br /></span> +<span>What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth<br /></span> +<span>Who saw the wide world in a jade cup,<br /></span> +<span>By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth:<br /></span> +<span>On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability?<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth" +would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as +that is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of +solving the Far Eastern question.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31">[31]</a><p> <i>The Truth about China and Japan</i>, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. +14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (<i>Modern China</i>, p. 13) says that +it "killed twenty million people," which is the more usual estimate, cf. +<i>China of the Chinese</i> by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the +population was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt +that 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32">[32]</a><p> In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more +subservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by +Wu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33">[33]</a><p> The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to +have made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton +Government was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng +Chiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (<i>The Times</i>, +April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See +Appendix.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34">[34]</a><p> The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, +especially in Manchuria.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35">[35]</a><p> There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the +birth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether +the birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet +by my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union +Medical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the +average number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while +the infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show +that the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of +statistics, generalizations about the population question in China must +be received with extreme caution.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36">[36]</a><p> I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. +Bland, <i>per contra</i>, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. +Contrast p. 104 of his <i>China, Japan and Korea</i> with pp. 143, 146 of +Coleman's <i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, which gives the view of everybody +except Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin +reported in <i>The Times</i> recently, but he was, of course, unable to +estimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37">[37]</a><p> Printed in <i>China in 1918</i>, published by the <i>Peking +Leader</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38">[38]</a><p> <i>Musings of a Chinese Mystic</i>, by Lionel Giles (Murray), +p. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his <i>Texts of +Taoism</i> in <i>Sacred Books of the East</i>, Vol. XXXIX.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39">[39]</a><p> Waley, 170 <i>Chinese Poems</i>, p. 96.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V"></a><a name="Page_86"></a>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION<br /></p> + + +<p>For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order +to understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know +something of that country, to which we must now turn our attention.</p> + +<p>In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the +persistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the +centuries. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" by +no means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from +Korea in 552 A.D.<a name="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> At the same time and from the same source Chinese +civilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through +the occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won +favour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to +China in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The +Japanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism +nationally they ordered one <a name="Page_87"></a>or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, +with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the +adherents of the traditional Shinto religion.<a name="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41"><sup>[41]</sup></a> After some +vicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign +religion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than +Shinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief +religion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable +to find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of +peasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods" +(which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism.<a name="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42"><sup>[42]</sup></a> Probably the +revival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing belief +in that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of the +population. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned, +Buddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto.</p> + +<p>The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to +restore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of +645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the +good old days. What the object was of those who established the +government of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that +may be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and +internal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low +ebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great +feudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government +fell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made +intelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved +imitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. <a name="Page_88"></a>The Chinese +Emperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from +the Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a +vigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so.</p> + +<p>The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of +645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is +set forth by Murdoch<a name="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43"><sup>[43]</sup></a> as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled + on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends + who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for + purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some + of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the + British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they + certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the + four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization + with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the + sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye—for they + were two of this venturesome quartette—have often told of their + rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these + despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan + they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their + effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place + Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world. </p></div> + +<p>The two students who went to China in 608 A.D. "rendered even more +illustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have +done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked +back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, +and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two +National Doctors."</p> + +<p><a name="Page_89"></a>Politically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately +following was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and +Richelieu—curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the +sovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. +The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably +with about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, +there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, +but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, +in 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, +but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just +the opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious +mixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies.</p> + +<p>Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems +to see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, +namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China +on the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, +and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which +went on in mediæval Europe between the Church, which represented ideas +derived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to +preserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, +Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization +over rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in +Japan.</p> + +<p>After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, +but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So +long as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power) +it continued to represent what was <a name="Page_90"></a>most civilized in Japan: the study +of Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve +respect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who +remained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were +so degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it +would have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them +and the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly +from the mediæval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, +although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even +greater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the +secular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado +and his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of +the Restoration.</p> + +<p>The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the +nominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of +power to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of +their infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some +monastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented +the military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of +the Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title of +the people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun," which means +"Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being the +Ainus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the +form which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto +Yoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But +before long the Shogun became nearly as <a name="Page_91"></a>much of a figure-head as the +Mikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the +actual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This +lasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened +that Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the +Minamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun +himself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished +at the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the +practice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister +and his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, +but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their +successors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter.</p> + +<p>What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the +Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, +originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming +at the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both +ignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted +the future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions +of peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to +undergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of +warlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching +doctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism +became national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became +important feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was +ready to fight on the slightest provocation. <a name="Page_92"></a>Sieges of monasteries and +battles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history.</p> + +<p>The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years' +experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country +completely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and +closely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the +Portuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final +expulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is +instructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought +with them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated +the former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually +no Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were +engaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, +Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed +than were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island +(containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and +were throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing +merchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their +larger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread +of Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and +their guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The +Portuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to +make converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese +began to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the +Portuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping +the Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese <a name="Page_93"></a>had +been able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a +Papal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit +monopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards +from Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican +and Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the +Jesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled +furiously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the +Japanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought +against the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the +extent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their +national independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the <i>San +Felipe</i>, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast +of Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his +harbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, +which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000 +crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in +Japan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had +the Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after +trying reason in vain, attempted intimidation.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast + extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him + how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the + sway of a single man.... "Our Kings," said this outspoken seaman, + "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer + <i>religieux</i> who induce the people to embrace our religion, and + when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who + combine with the new <a name="Page_94"></a>Christians, and then our Kings have not + much trouble in accomplishing the rest."<a name="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44"><sup>[44]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the +Portuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. +Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with +Japan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, +Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, +Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally +gave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the +Japanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, +they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian +nations.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, a succession of three great men—Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and +Iyeyasu—had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the +quasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of +internal peace which lasted until the Restoration—period of nearly two +and a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central +Government to enforce whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to +the foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between +them had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about +300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to +be subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account +of their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical +position. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began +in 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, <a name="Page_95"></a>has had +great power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during +its rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to +Christianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the +movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may +be, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible +without losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more +anti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in +1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in +the most vigorous terms:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold + as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip + himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great + Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with + their heads.<a name="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45"><sup>[45]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly +cruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political +motives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with +the King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no +foreign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of +Christians against the newly established central power. Economic +exploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart +from political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if +there had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the +power of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese +armies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; the +Japanese had learnt the use of fire-<a name="Page_96"></a>arms; and their knowledge of +strategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest +cities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population +of Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would +therefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any +expedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have +been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. +But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world +showing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. +Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, +where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the +inmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of +European Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their +reports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The +Japanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the +white men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel +convinced that it was unwise.</p> + +<p>For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry's +squadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace +and almost complete stagnation—the only period of either in Japanese +history, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of +fire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy +until they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see +another period of isolation.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40">[40]</a><p> The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's +<i>History of Japan</i>, The volume dealing with the earlier period is +published by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was +published earlier; its title is: <i>A History of Japan during the Century +of Early Foreign Intercourse</i> (1542—1651), by James Murdoch M.A. in +collaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the <i>Japan Chronicle</i>, +1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II +respectively.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41">[41]</a><p> Murdoch I. pp. 113 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42">[42]</a><p> Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43">[43]</a><p> Murdoch I. p. 147.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44">[44]</a><p> Murdoch, II, p. 288.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45">[45]</a><p> Murdoch II, p. 667.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI"></a><a name="Page_97"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>MODERN JAPAN<br /></p> + + +<p>The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the +history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would +have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan +to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is +almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration +in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has +risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great +War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading +statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the +beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with +ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders +and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To +realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining +the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time +of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific +knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in +the Book of Joshua.</p> + +<p>The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, <a name="Page_98"></a>and people have been +duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an +immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so +little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has +brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to +that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to +tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has +synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most +anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for +social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily +interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been +effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than +appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends +to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and +Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people +suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but +this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon.</p> + +<p>Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two +separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially +pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more +analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is +no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to +give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that +country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good +books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative +is McLaren's <i>Political History of <a name="Page_99"></a>Japan during the Meiji Era</i> +1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared +in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course +invaluable; his book <i>Japan, An Interpretation</i> shows his dawning +realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the +cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to +say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan.</p> + +<p>Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the +Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of +his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful +of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at +various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been +in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during +its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, +except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era +was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the +country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the +Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed +Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics +and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces +and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore +first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which +Japan has played in international affairs.</p> + +<p>What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to +power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end +of <a name="Page_100"></a>the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems to +have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy +personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with +contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was +often kept in great poverty.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of + early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the + Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a + Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no + aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were + in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on + their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the + Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to + examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the + Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was + regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the + autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of + the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western + Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing + with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the + throne.</p> + +<p> In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the + relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be + sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by + Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, + throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the + Heavenly Gods.<a name="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46"><sup>[46]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very +different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado +had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the +ancient customs. There were patriots <a name="Page_101"></a>who were annoyed with the Shogun +for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial +treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never +willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren +once more (p. 33):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of + Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the + expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! + Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in + enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific + attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not + be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was + directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, + but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general + unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in + armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years + previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had + been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising + gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the + students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those + men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. </p></div> + +<p>This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan +down to the present day.</p> + +<p>The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the +West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, +in his authoritative <i>History of Japan,</i><a name="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47"><sup>[47]</sup></a> says:—</p> + + + +<div class="blkquot"><p>In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development + most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at + fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the + solution of this portentous enigma in the very <a name="Page_102"></a>superficial and + facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain + their own unit of social organization, which is not the + individual, as with us, but the <i>family</i>. Furthermore, the + resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central + and local, to certain European systems is not the result of + imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is + merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who + overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal + system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new + equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe + for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or + twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the + administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan + by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 + A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding + fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten + Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of + officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from + China and established in the seventh century.... The present + administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was + neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor + adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity + that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies. </p></div> + +<p>The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of +the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the +foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and +secured the support of the country by being the champions of +nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted +which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan +from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the +greatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the Central +Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, +China and Russia were successively <a name="Page_103"></a>defeated, Korea was annexed and a +protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and +commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and +worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and +by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation +of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern +Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of +preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little +pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese +and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few +Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called <i>The Invention of a New +Religion</i>, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He +points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, +to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very +ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on +obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto +has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as +to suit modern requirements.<a name="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48"><sup>[48]</sup></a> It is, of course, preferable to +Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not +one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has +been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_104"></a>Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the +Mikado until some time after the Restoration:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its + sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the + beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of + living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been + assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was + the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have + been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long + centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the + Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, + generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. + At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of + the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the + Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling + their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest + against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign + (that of Meiji)—the most glorious in Japanese history—there + have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was + set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in + another. </p></div> + +<p>This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely +credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of +superstition has gone <i>pari passu</i> with the spread of education, and a +revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the +midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and +instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there +is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler—as absolute as any sovereign +ever has been.</p> + +<p>The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. +Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied +from Chinese <a name="Page_105"></a>models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D., +whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to +somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese +pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that +the Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain +again:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the + fifth century <i>after</i> Christ, and even the accounts of what + happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. + Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the + certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy + does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient + circumstance. While granting a dispensation <i>re</i> the national + mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of + the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who + strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in + Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will + starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading <i>Commentary + on the Japanese Constitution</i> down to school compendiums, the + absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon. </p></div> + +<p>This question of fictitious early history might be considered +unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to +believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of +the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought +and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, + was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it + is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the + popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where + they buried their dead. The governing <a name="Page_106"></a>class determined to change + all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado + descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, + and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims + the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and + constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense + popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and + low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as + public servants, but rather as executants of supreme—one might + say supernatural—authority. Shinto, because connected with the + Imperial family, is to be alone honoured. </p></div> + +<p>All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese +politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of +the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, +and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented +politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes +miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no +constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of +the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are +omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them +the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have +invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the +Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves +take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and +Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The +Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so +until the Mikado is captured by some other clique.</p> + +<p>From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom +in the conduct of affairs. <a name="Page_107"></a>There is reason to think that if Japan were +a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists +of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there +is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to +dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly +there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and +making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the +Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and +the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.<a name="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49"><sup>[49]</sup></a> But democracy +in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. +There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and +anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese +industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as +Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed +there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has +saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed +if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of +these occasions was <a name="Page_108"></a>the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after +the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of +Japanese politics.<a name="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50"><sup>[50]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to +impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, +and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The Russian +Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated +men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the +Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it +had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it +would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a +prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed +secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the +restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations +to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, +faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse +the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of +neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, +led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to +alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the +peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they +would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact +resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was +known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The +Russians, believing that the Japanese would <a name="Page_109"></a>not give way about the +indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese +demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed +up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese +announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted +the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus +the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, +because they had been tricked—the former in the belief that it could +yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter +in the belief that the Government would never give way about the +indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, +furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government—of the +nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the +real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision +of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view; +there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could +not have been made without trickery.</p> + +<p>Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in +which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as +democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that +Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, +took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all +their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great +Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the +Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin +with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, <a name="Page_110"></a>whereas in Japan +there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about +25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter +compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than +that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from +pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the +Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not +collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine +must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, +but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of +course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the +Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet +refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be +applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted +temporarily by Imperial decree—a provision which had no analogue in the +German Constitution.</p> + +<p>The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, +it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, +since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. +To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in +conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was +issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the +Constitution as follows<a name="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51"><sup>[51]</sup></a>:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire + of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors + unbroken for ages eternal."</p> + +<p> "By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his + <i>Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan</i>, "it is meant <a name="Page_111"></a>that + the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of + the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects."</p> + +<p> Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred + and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is + peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established + at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The + Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent + above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. + He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no + power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no + irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither + be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion."</p> + +<p> Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises + the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary + power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, + prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not + sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The + Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, + makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and + commutation of punishments.</p> + +<p> As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article + 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their + advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it."</p> + +<p> Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in + framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of + his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities + belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a + Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the + Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of + State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included + by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is + only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to + the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But + the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open + answers from them before the public, and it may also present + addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions.</p> + +<p> "The Minister President of State is to make representations to + the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, <a name="Page_112"></a>according to + His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, + every branch of the administration being under control of the + said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his + responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the + other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for + the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint + responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the + Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike + personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one + of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the + Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of + control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the + latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some + countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate + body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct + of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint + responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the + power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme + power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be + approved of according to our Constitution." </p></div> + +<p>In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first +four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the +Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by +Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen +of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with +introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished +to preserve Japanese independence <i>vis-à-vis</i> the Western Powers, but +did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own +account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. +Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of +the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. +But when the Diet proved <a name="Page_113"></a>difficult to manage, they reverted to an +earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The +Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous +at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by +glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and +France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war +against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the +hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government +has never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as the +Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant +international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. +Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was +afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was +powerless to prevent it.<a name="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52"><sup>[52]</sup></a> His opposition, however, was tiresome, +until at last he was murdered in Korea.</p> + +<p>Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a +consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The +nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two +chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed +towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant +as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the +present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. +An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing +system, but the whole unity and <i>morale</i> of the nation; I do not believe +that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has <a name="Page_114"></a>proved to be. +Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal +regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive +element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan +to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact +everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, +industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot +emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the +mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore +the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into +industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing +food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because +Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot +obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with +America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong +navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very +similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy +requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets +requires—or rather, is thought to require—starvation wages and long +hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, most +of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day +and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.<a name="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53"><sup>[53]</sup></a> Labour organization +is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;<a name="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54"><sup>[54]</sup></a> but both are certain to +spread if the number of industrial workers increases without <a name="Page_115"></a>a very +marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of +the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable +of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are +vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism +and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of +myth upon which the Japanese State depends.<a name="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55"><sup>[55]</sup></a> There is therefore a +likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence—assuming a peaceful and +prosperous development in the meantime—of a very bitter class conflict +between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and +bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with +agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue.</p> + +<p>The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for +the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop +industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control +Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic +interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a +large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for +wage-earners. And ex<a name="Page_116"></a>panding industry with poverty for wage-earners +means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial +piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a +continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which +the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with +the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, +there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution.</p> + +<p>From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a +diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent +to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is +fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which +patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to +emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, +involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but +ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be free +thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. +Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that +remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46">[46]</a><p> McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47">[47]</a><p> Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48">[48]</a><p> "What <i>popular</i> Shinto, as expounded by its village +priests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully +selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true +aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of +Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which +disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight." (Murdoch, I, +p. 173 n.)</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49">[49]</a><p> The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. +Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office and +Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. +When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on +tho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to +regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme of +party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of +the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but +are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial +Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are +titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments +showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the +great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military +man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom +policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, +albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50">[50]</a><p> The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit. +chaps, xii. and xiii.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51">[51]</a><p> <i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, pp. 252-58.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52">[52]</a><p> See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53">[53]</a><p> Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54">[54]</a><p> See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour +Movements in Japan," published by the <i>Japan Chronicle</i>, 1921, for an +account of what is happening in this direction.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55">[55]</a><p> <i>The Times</i> of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from +its correspondent in Tokyo, <i>à propos</i> of the funeral of Prince +Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:— +</p><p> +"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of +expenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which +was introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as +the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last +year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not +render true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the +highest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic +institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that +the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the +resolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the +incident."</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII"></a><a name="Page_117"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914<br /></p> + + +<p>Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is +necessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking +of the "Yellow Races," as though China and Japan formed some kind of +unity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead +one to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in +comparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the +Chinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities; +but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very +small. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in the +scale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a +hairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit +the Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan +descent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest +importance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and +Chinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more +important than a common racial origin.</p> + +<p>It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived +from China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as +Chinese, and Buddhism, <a name="Page_118"></a>which is still the religion of the people, is of +the sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which +are the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported +along with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the +irruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different +histories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar +had developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of +the First Emperor (<i>c.</i> 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land +empire, having much contact with foreign nations—Annamese, Burmese, +Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an +island kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea +and occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at +war with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal +chivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative +problems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines +of Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China +was still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in +one of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But +naturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that +which befel them in their own country.</p> + +<p>In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue +one finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, +which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised +where conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were +in feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on +the contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire <a name="Page_119"></a>was so vast and +immemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a +different set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and +compromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves +plunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in +developing the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the +situation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been +schooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal +anarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated +the previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like +our thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our +mechanism but dislike our thought.</p> + +<p>From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a +unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and +India contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are +easily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with +modern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely +than in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and +invulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong +as to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if +Russia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German +organizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of +possibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for +power and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal +mentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon +Asiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it +conflicts with China and Russia, which the <a name="Page_120"></a>present weakness of those +Powers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both +are likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the +essential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent.</p> + +<p>It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two +somewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as +the champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the +other hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, +and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are +inefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to +China and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has +inspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of +Korea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a +member of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of +the Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great +Powers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in +Asia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who +happen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in +the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred million +natives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of Great +Britain."<a name="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56"><sup>[56]</sup></a> While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable +Englishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived +from the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply +an intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates <a name="Page_121"></a>the +intensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may +be, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before +the Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley<a name="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57"><sup>[57]</sup></a> +quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the +following list of white men's sins:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>(1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that + all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization.</p> + +<p> (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, + but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors.</p> + +<p> (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession + is made to them they demand and take more.</p> + +<p> (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races + in greatness and wickedness.</p> + +<p> (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of + everything, will adopt any measures to gain it. </p></div> + +<p>This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have +supposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be +unlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They +argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as +possible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed +by Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been +equalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his +wildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he +wants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards +Japan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is +to be above the whites, not merely <a name="Page_122"></a>equal with them. Count Okuma put the +matter very simply in an address given in 1913:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The white races regard the world as their property and all other + races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the + rôle of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they + please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, + and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white + races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, + and woe to them.<a name="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58"><sup>[58]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that +Japan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the +eminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the +Japanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us.</p> + +<p>The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal +affairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without +first consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had +infringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war +caused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and +decisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to +oppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the +Boxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the +fruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and +France, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for +themselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans +presumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow +Peril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese +war inevitable. It would not have mattered much to <a name="Page_123"></a>Japan if the Chinese +had established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have +constituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for +nothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called +Dairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the +Chinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting +Port Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having +accomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The +Russo-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this +Alliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the +corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, +when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided +that, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, +the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally +inspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the +Russian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from +calling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and +Russia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of +Portsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance +served its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese +war. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to +acquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus +curbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an +Entente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded +with France in 1904 <a name="Page_124"></a>would have been useless, and the alliance which +defeated Germany could not have been created.</p> + +<p>Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia +alone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her +strength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to +greatness was due to our support.</p> + +<p>The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all +interference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called +Dairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. +This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then been +called the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437 +miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen +as the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely +naval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to +Western models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a +treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910 +they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists +with every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be +fully the equals of the white men.</p> + +<p>The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a +monopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was +practically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China +by means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. +Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,<a name="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59"><sup>[59]</sup></a> which shows how +the South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:—</p> + +<p>"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed <a name="Page_125"></a>a contract with Messrs +Pauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways +northwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for +the work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan +protested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol +annexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that +'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the +neighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any +branch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that +railway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and +Russia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without +Russian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the +Russian rights, the projected line could not be built without her +consent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in +tone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was +obviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task!</p> + +<p>"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the +clause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to +Hsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to +build the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, +although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were +specificially excluded from participation in railway construction north +of the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British +Note the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and +Chinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the +agreement.</p> + +<p>"<a name="Page_126"></a>Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in +Manchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902 +and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of +the bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from +seeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. +Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but +with no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State +Department at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her +action was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which +assigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway +(South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining +thereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III +and IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is +declared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or +exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty +or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the +second is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct +any general measures common to all countries which China may take for +the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.'</p> + +<p>"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to +build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of +Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not +a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of +Manchuria.'</p> + +<p>"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling +in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such +flagrant <a name="Page_127"></a>dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and +pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since +recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its +subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as +the protest from Tokio....</p> + +<p>"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men +railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other +projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the +important Antung-Mukden line.<a name="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60"><sup>[60]</sup></a> The same alleged secret protocol was +used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the +Newchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in +1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with +Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was +construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration +within the railway zone.'"</p> + +<p>Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover +the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung—though the latter has +been nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or +by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired +vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and +have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the +provinces through which they run.</p> + +<p>After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and +agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting +Manchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. +Russia had entered into extensive obligations to <a name="Page_128"></a>support Japan's claims +at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. +Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the +support of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the Far +Eastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international +questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party +aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They +have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, +as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China +politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several +times in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was +obtaining financial support from some Japanese.<a name="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61"><sup>[61]</sup></a> When the revolution +actually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was +prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems +that the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the +union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. +Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor +of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, +though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of +some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions +of Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation +gives the gist<a name="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62"><sup>[62]</sup></a>:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on + December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, + with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East." + This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese + Minister in Peking, where<a name="Page_129"></a>under the latter on December 23rd + categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances + would Japan recognize a republican form of government in + China.... In connection with the peace conference held at + Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a + trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to + Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the + dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the + Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with + the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria + against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by + Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese + protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining + concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. + Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian + Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of + day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied + their authenticity. </p></div> + +<p>The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the +Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the +day. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was +strongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as +strongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the +influence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to +make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would +doubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war +came, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told +in a separate chapter.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56">[56]</a><p> Quoted by A.M. Pooley, <i>Japan's Foreign Policy</i>, Allen & +Unwin, 1920, p. 18.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57">[57]</a><p> Op. cit. p. 16 n.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58">[58]</a><p> Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59">[59]</a><p> A.M. Pooley, <i>Japan's Foreign Policies</i>, pp. 48-51.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60">[60]</a><p> This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61">[61]</a><p> Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62">[62]</a><p> Page 66.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII"></a><a name="Page_130"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR<br /></p> + + +<p>The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is +Japanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but +after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach +in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their +new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The +Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to +have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at +issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time +there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one +side rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely +victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure +possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in +Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending +China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by +the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of +Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse +after the Great War.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_131"></a>The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have +the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. +But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, +the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military +control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were +displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. +(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung.</p> + +<p>Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China +could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to +turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, +who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese +remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they +presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the +Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented +in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with +Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms +Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese +province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain +specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be +opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted +to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria +and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a +protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for +Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial +enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron +and steel works in a certain <a name="Page_132"></a>region of the Yangtze,<a name="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63"><sup>[63]</sup></a> where we claim +a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, +that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except +Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that +Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed +by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be +administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely +Japanese in <i>personnel</i>; that China should purchase from Japan at least +50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese +arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and +employing Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to +construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan +should have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and +finally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda +in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics.</p> + +<p>These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete <a name="Page_133"></a>loss of Chinese +independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and +industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British +position in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we +had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands +constituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an +uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action +against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were +explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.<a name="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64"><sup>[64]</sup></a> He had no +time to find out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret +agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan +wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.<a name="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65"><sup>[65]</sup></a> By the +terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the +Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan +communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus +definitely breaking the treaty;<a name="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66"><sup>[66]</sup></a> but this also, one must suppose, Mr. +Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles.</p> + +<p>China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured +certain modifications, but <a name="Page_134"></a>was finally compelled to yield by an +ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on +the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth +group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.<a name="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67"><sup>[67]</sup></a> In +this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United +States immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the +agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore +still able to do something to further the objects for which we were +supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In +1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, +it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the +Ishii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the +United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, +particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The +rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.<a name="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68"><sup>[68]</sup></a></p> + +<p>I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.<a name="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69"><sup>[69]</sup></a> +In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing +diplomatic <a name="Page_135"></a>relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the +declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off +diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all +neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in +Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He +induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of +expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, +on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of +declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected +with these events deserve some study.</p> + +<p>In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese +had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, +French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for +reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been +some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should +participate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. +These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of +Japan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear +that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. +When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in +Tokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, +Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as of +paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan +could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient +Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in +the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation <a name="Page_136"></a>of +the economic activities of 400,000,000 people."<a name="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70"><sup>[70]</sup></a> Accordingly the +proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the +Japanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their +sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they +filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing +them of cowardice and military incompetence.<a name="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71"><sup>[71]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the +situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience +to Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had +always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing +to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic +relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no +<i>promises</i> to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American +Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was +ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were +bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged +China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and +Great Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continued +support of Japan.</p> + +<p>In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was +inviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan +concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. +This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the +assistance of <a name="Page_137"></a>the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital +interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China +from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having +hostile designs against Russia or Japan." The last article provided that +"the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of +the High Contracting Parties."<a name="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72"><sup>[72]</sup></a> That is to say, the treaty was not +communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of +Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The High +Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting +the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the +prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement," +one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all +Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese +Empire.</p> + +<p>On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to +sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with +Japan containing the following words:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the + request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they + will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of + Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north + of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being + understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual + peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims + to the German islands south of the equator. </p></div> + +<p>The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by +Notes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo.<a name="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73"><sup>[73]</sup></a> On February +19th, <a name="Page_138"></a>Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian +Ambassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial Japanese +Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace +negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special +interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands +belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." +The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the + Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the + Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung + and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It + also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese + Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed + before the war in this Chinese province and these islands.</p> + +<p> M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support + to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations + with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. + The consequences in China should be the following:</p> + +<p> First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and + consuls;</p> + +<p> Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave + Chinese territory;</p> + +<p> Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the + ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the + disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and + Portugal;</p> + +<p> Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in + China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she + possesses in certain ports of China. </p></div> + +<p>The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian +Ambassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p><a name="Page_139"></a>In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is + charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it + can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of + Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual + surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung + and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in + the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.<a name="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74"><sup>[74]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no +<i>quid pro quo</i>, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the +previous year.</p> + +<p>After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's +participation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the +hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope +being realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest +ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the +Chinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last +days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished +by the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into +the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has +been one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the +revolutionary movement.<a name="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75"><sup>[75]</sup></a> If the Chinese had not been interfered with +at this time, there was <a name="Page_140"></a>some prospect of their succeeding in +establishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his +successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine +constitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had +dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was +resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, +and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan +Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his +Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese +Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic +relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue.</p> + +<p>On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It +was President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking +off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; +but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented +a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of +national unity was more important than entry into the war, and +suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What +had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never +have become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by +the Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to +instigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat +Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration +of war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd +George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.<a name="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76"><sup>[76]</sup></a> <a name="Page_141"></a>The Cabinet, on +May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration +of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to +coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved +impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to +compel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the +Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act +as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of +constitutional government. After these various illegalities, the +military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their +number, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu +Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more +agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, +sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient +unconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to +declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and +against militarism.</p> + +<p>Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the +war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of +the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We +wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living +in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German +trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was +duly carried out—not only public property, but private property also, +so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to +the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till +after the Armistice. They <a name="Page_142"></a>were sent home through the Tropics in +overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of +hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities +insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew +to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the +Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took +upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the merciless +persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have +been much greater.</p> + +<p>The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of +Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the +belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side +two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to +the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our +operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with +proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be +fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, +after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for +ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet +get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law +and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of +German-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that."<a name="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77"><sup>[77]</sup></a> The +European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to +enter the war for righteousness.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_143"></a>We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration +of war. What Japan gained was somewhat different.</p> + +<p>The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, +was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist +Japanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the +war, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality—for +Japan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of +Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal +elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the +Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were +concluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially +published, is given by Millard.<a name="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78"><sup>[78]</sup></a> By these agreements the Japanese +were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and +Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of +the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and +generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the +excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient.</p> + +<p>After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they +placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,<a name="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79"><sup>[79]</sup></a> <i>i.e.,</i> +about £25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were +as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of +victory. Unfortunately for Japan, <a name="Page_144"></a>the side on which Japan was fighting +in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies +of Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For +various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until +after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace +negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were +compelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed +everything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have +joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on +this subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the +most interesting in his book.<a name="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80"><sup>[80]</sup></a> By Article 156 of the Treaty of +Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, +title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung.<a name="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81"><sup>[81]</sup></a> Although +President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, +America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise +the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles +resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, +encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,<a name="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82"><sup>[82]</sup></a> refused to sign +the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province +as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to +a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would <a name="Page_145"></a>have been if we had +annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in +the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public +opinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 +was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly +ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the +Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu +leaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking +Government has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always +for American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her +position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America might +re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference +was announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a +view to having the question settled before the opening of the +Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory +concessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional +evacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of +England and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the +American Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I +understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with +America. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount +to much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. +On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington +Conference.</p> + +<p>There is a question with which the Washington <a name="Page_146"></a>Conference determined not +to concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great +importance in the Far East—I mean the question of Russia. It was +considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, +to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, +with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. +Their existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in a +quarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselves +in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russia +has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the +Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after +a time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake +Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern +Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is +practically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have +launched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks—Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, +etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in military +occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, +though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire.</p> + +<p>In the early days of the Bolshevik régime the Russians lost Northern +Manchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly +of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of +the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects +with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail +between Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme +annoyance to European business <a name="Page_147"></a>men in the Far East, since it means that +letters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead +of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with +the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is +the reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, +various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and +endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which +led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon +all Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a +war with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the +opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former position +in Manchuria. Already, according to <i>The Times</i> correspondent in Peking, +Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany +combined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda.</p> + +<p>The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger +Chinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have +a good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in +Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As +they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the +agreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset +impartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America.<a name="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83"><sup>[83]</sup></a> For +America, <a name="Page_148"></a>no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are +economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far +East, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political +freedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage +beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may +become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, +however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, +because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is +treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But +what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet +impossible to say.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63">[63]</a><p> On this subject George Gleason, <i>What Shall I Think of +Japan?</i> pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel +mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the +Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people. +The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty +miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. +The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 +feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 +years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained +from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand +miners dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is +capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five +centuries.... +</p><p> +"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart +of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special +trade domain." +</p><p> +Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this +matter is given by Mr. Coleman, <i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, chaps. x.-xiv. +See below, pp. 232-3.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64">[64]</a><p> See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, <i>Japan Weekly Chronicle</i>, +October 20, 1921.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65">[65]</a><p> The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, +<i>Japan's Foreign Policies</i>, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66">[66]</a><p> On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to +the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China +a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what +purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only +contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was +directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. +Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably +foolish" (<i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, p. 73).</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67">[67]</a><p> The demands in their original and revised forms, with the +negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of <i>Democracy +and the Eastern Question</i>, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68">[68]</a><p> The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung +question are printed in S.G. Cheng's <i>Modern China</i>, Appendix ii, iii +and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp. +214-6.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69">[69]</a><p> Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and +official history of this matter. They are: <i>An American Diplomat in +China</i>, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; <i>Democracy and +the Eastern Question</i>, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and +<i>China, Captive or Free?</i> by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director +of International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70">[70]</a><p> Millard, p. 99.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71">[71]</a><p> See Pooley, <i>Japan's Foreign Policies</i>, pp. 23 ff; +Coleman, <i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, chap, v., and Millard, chap. iii.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72">[72]</a><p> Millard, pp. 64-66.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73">[73]</a><p> Reid, op. cit. pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. cit., pp. 343-6.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74">[74]</a><p> See Appendix III of Cheng's <i>Modern China</i>, which contains +this note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to the +negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal of +the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea +Islands north of the Equator."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75">[75]</a><p> The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration +of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76">[76]</a><p> Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77">[77]</a><p> Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, +"Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who +still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything +except money-grubbing.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78">[78]</a><p> Appendix C, pp. 421-4.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79">[79]</a><p> A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an +article on "China's Finances in 1918" in <i>China in</i> 1918, published +early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the +comments appear also in Putnam Weale's <i>The Truth about China and +Japan</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80">[80]</a><p> Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese +questions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. +Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case," League of +Nations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's +arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81">[81]</a><p> See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's +<i>Modern China</i>, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82">[82]</a><p> This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's +<i>China Awakened</i> (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix., "The Student Movement."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83">[83]</a><p> "Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest +against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China +Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares +that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel +due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make +demands consistent with those rights" (<i>Daily Herald</i>, December 22, +1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian +labouring masses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What +Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the +Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs +of the capitalists.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX"></a><a name="Page_149"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE<br /></p> + + +<p>The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at +Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the +Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be +dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual +decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their +effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia.</p> + +<p>In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been +brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact +between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general +alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of +America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing +for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The +situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as +regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in +the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem +to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. +It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more +liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of +Wei-hai-wei—a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive +<a name="Page_150"></a>but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, +and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the +terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as +Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that +date.</p> + +<p>One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement +not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified +exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between +America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. +Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring +naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of +the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a +first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo +this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve +the peace with Japan.</p> + +<p>Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision +of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The +foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have +insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the +Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they +desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, +though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one +of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put +their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as +they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels +sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese +importation of morphia into China, as well as the <a name="Page_151"></a>growth of the poppy +in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature +of their penetration of China.<a name="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84"><sup>[84]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and +integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these +are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning.</p> + +<p>From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was +the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end +of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of +Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the +Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, +they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings +in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and +through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse +was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, +and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the +resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of +Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The +Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the +question afresh.</p> + +<p>At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all +their own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the +Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation +with China. This point was important, because, ever since the +Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to +recognize, <a name="Page_152"></a>in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese +Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary +to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered +with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to +the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before +the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between +the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, +was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a +deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, +of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no +longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old +days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some +disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was +roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution +more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would +probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work +of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly +urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less +strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between +China and Japan.</p> + +<p>By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the +private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as +regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the +negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they +would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back +the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result <a name="Page_153"></a>of +a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese +refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were +compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid +in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway +was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs +or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be +handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. +Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese +retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic +manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the +other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President.</p> + +<p>It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years +hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years +hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both +Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to +this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have +some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that +case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete +control of the Shantung railway.</p> + +<p>On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than +might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new +international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with +them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary +to consider certain Far Eastern questions <i>not</i> discussed at Washington, +since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_154"></a>The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at +Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is +secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both +together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will +not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See +Appendix.)</p> + +<p>The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions +in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain +unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check +them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the +Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any +near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have +decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A +conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place +at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the +effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. +But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. <i>The +Times</i> of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian official +accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in <i>The +Times</i> as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given + out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen + Conference.</p> + +<p> It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly + expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government + decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place + on August 26th last year.</p> + +<p> The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic + principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of + Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of <a name="Page_155"></a>menacing military + establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in + Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on + foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that + the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as + possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. + Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of + the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the + Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis + agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair + Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and + territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be + speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the + affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of + property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be + met.</p> + +<p> The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be + relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had + progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, + would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita + that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable + period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed + the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that + the preparations for the relief of the said division might be + dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate + despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the + withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should + fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops.</p> + +<p> Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out + within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed + arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the + same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by + Japan.</p> + +<p> Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a + sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely + ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought + up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not + only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but + declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to + Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the + Chita Government is <a name="Page_156"></a>that they lacked a sincere effort to bring + the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government + instructed its delegates to quit Dairen. </p></div> + +<p>The Russian official account is given by <i>The Times</i> immediately below +the above. It is as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with + the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. + Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian + Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, + but when the question of military evacuation was reached the + Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued + Japanese intervention.</p> + +<p> Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the + negotiations <i>re</i> military convention, reproaching the Far + Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The + Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be + signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese + military evacuation.</p> + +<p> On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum + demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an + hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement + with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far + Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far + Eastern territory. <i>Re</i> evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note + promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen + circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. + On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken + up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops + remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th. </p></div> + +<p>Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according +to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial +will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, +I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqué +it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese +<a name="Page_157"></a>unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all +that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, +which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to +evacuate Egypt.</p> + +<p>It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the +Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese +felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with +at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will +naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of +the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. +This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the +assembled peacemakers.<a name="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85"><sup>[85]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. +This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. +Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic +capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. +Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their +armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America +look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to +compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent +years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed +<a name="Page_158"></a>coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation +from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending +to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the +authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, +believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that +France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become +anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa +have sown the seeds of future wars—unless, by some miracle, the +"civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84">[84]</a><p> See <i>e.g.</i> chap. viii. of Millard's <i>Democracy and the +Eastern Question.</i></p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85">[85]</a><p> I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of +the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic +mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more +high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were +communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they +showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies +have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X"></a><a name="Page_159"></a>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST<br /></p> + + +<p>The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to +guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, +and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will +endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying +the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I +regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively +the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an +attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests +and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.<a name="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86"><sup>[86]</sup></a></p> + +<p>I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the +dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of +peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise +and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The +pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the +optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, <a name="Page_160"></a>American +public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, +athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main +ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the +Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, +whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to +explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious +hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western +Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength +of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. +Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his +sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. +This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been +somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard +Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as +it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an +attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England +of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment +than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from +Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors +is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development +is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to +estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United +States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of +idealism.</p> + +<p>Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It +is apt to be incompatible with <a name="Page_161"></a>tolerance, with the practice of +live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less +pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the +contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical +philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle +of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are +useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by +any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort +of world.</p> + +<p>All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington +Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the +friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, +hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst +enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power +to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if +there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to +see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the +militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done +in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the +future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state +Japan's case, although, <i>for the present</i>, I think it weaker than +America's.</p> + +<p>It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American +policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while +clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American +interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal +to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand +that it <a name="Page_162"></a>is out of the question to go to war with America, so that +America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in +having.<a name="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87"><sup>[87]</sup></a> The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very +pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the +seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the +cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of +American interests. To take next the question of China: American +ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country +should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The +policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so +rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of +the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal +policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting +a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest.</p> + +<p>In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices +are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight +whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In +the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to +discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed +by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a +discrimination in favour of American <a name="Page_163"></a>shipping. Even if the President +ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least +two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view +of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the +way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and +to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against +"shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is +<i>always</i> honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that +America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial +interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases.</p> + +<p>I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself +with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American +weekly, The <i>Freeman</i> (November 23, 1921, p. 244):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an + obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large + banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated + the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in + fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an + emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with + intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious + effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese + Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new + international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese + Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, + together with other obligations already in arrears, and still + others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had + also received the full and energetic support of the Department of + State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were + at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; + having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they + came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an <a name="Page_164"></a>offer to + save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government + would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus + prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American + financial protectorate. </p></div> + +<p>It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated +negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the +terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very +adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the <i>Freeman</i> +concludes:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the + consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, + those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to + take full advantage of the situation. </p></div> + +<p>There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington +Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the +connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to +establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international +control over China. In the <i>Japan Weekly Chronicle</i> for November 17, +1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I +find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish +international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the +<i>Philadelphia Public Ledger</i>: "We suspect the motives which led to the +suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly +oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: +"International control will not do. China must be given time and +opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or +exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now <a name="Page_165"></a>passing +through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China +must agree. In the same issue of the <i>Japan Weekly Chronicle</i>—which, by +the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world—I find the +following (p. 728):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The + international bankers have a scheme for the international control + of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a + sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese + Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the + Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the + Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing + this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's + statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks + about resisting the control of the international banks he is + fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the + Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full + opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny." </p></div> + +<p>Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be +due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had +nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and +one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson."</p> + +<p>I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, +and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European +radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control +reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a +Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, +for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would +be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic +as not to care <a name="Page_166"></a>whether they get any interest on their money or not, +although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though +this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the +Chinese.</p> + +<p>In the <i>New Republic</i> for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. +Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is +prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was +written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far +East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign +commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good +substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually +increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the +chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the +spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization +for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such +<i>objets d'art</i> as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the +gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one +day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man +throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret +society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. +It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be +told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The +definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good +government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat +dividends to capitalists.</p> + +<p>The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They +have a civilization <a name="Page_167"></a>superior to ours in all that makes for human +happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if +they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce +something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that +we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will +be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul +of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her +salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When +America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of +intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained. +Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans +recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with +blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is +that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank +God that they are not as this publican.</p> + +<p>So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of +Japan.</p> + +<p>Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that +Japan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not +suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United +States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of +Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only +two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to +fight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and +developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled +on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern +<a name="Page_168"></a>morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was +horrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began +to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured +Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with +the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by +the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good +qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers."</p> + +<p>People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the +intensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought +into contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the +highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy +white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke +would venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated +in this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that +white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese, +is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured +races in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from +retaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general +will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be +re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the +survival of civilizations of a different type from that of the +industrial West.</p> + +<p>The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of +the West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in +its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the +Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, <a name="Page_169"></a>as an actually divine being, +is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular +support for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely +economic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediæval way. The +morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic. +Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado +is the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of +superstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century +theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe +the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels +promoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in +one sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt.</p> + +<p>Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a +proposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until +it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view +that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially +nationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the +State religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,<a name="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88"><sup>[88]</sup></a> and +propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto +religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is +not a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism, +Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to +appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is +believed by the same people. It is customary to adopt <a name="Page_170"></a>Shinto rites for +marriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is +considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a +universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,<a name="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89"><sup>[89]</sup></a> like +the Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples +the priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of +English Archdeacons.</p> + +<p>The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their +sense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but +they have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to +industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful +as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has +hitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any +nation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves our +gratitude.</p> + +<p>The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard +working, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them +have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and +incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means +universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of +quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a +whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest +respect.</p> + +<p>The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of +Socialism and the Labour movement.<a name="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90"><sup>[90]</sup></a> In China, the intellectuals are +often theoretical <a name="Page_171"></a>Socialists, but in the absence of Labour +organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In +Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety +of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, +if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a +political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists +resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the +national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but +not so much as Socialists in America—so at least I am informed by an +American who is in a position to judge.</p> + +<p>The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. +By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly +responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They +therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the +Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the +evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to +keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. +Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable +in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real +Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless +the existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the +Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung +but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal +government of Japan would probably have been excellent.</p> + +<p>The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that +the Americana are their implacable <a name="Page_172"></a>foes. One gathers that the +Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The +argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States +will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in +the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented +with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then +Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield +in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato<a name="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91"><sup>[91]</sup></a> (the Japanese Bernhardi, +as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will +lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be +incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, +of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and +the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A +war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of +Japan.</p> + +<p>One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany +in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial +empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the +Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners; +so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused +our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with +America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by +our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, +similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French +sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has +brought us over to their side. The Germans <a name="Page_173"></a>at last, impelled by terrors +largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it +is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons +are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them +further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case +of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed +at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in +Eastern Asia.</p> + +<p>The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, +as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper +passions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; America +believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to +persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an +extension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt +futile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and +culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a +delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, +profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve +their own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and +in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice +is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese +are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the +white man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. +Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic +conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the +Americans.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_174"></a>Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong +through impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China +the same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then +they could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the +champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, +and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to +them. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do; +they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only +to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore +behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this +same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the +worst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, +they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, +they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible +for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best +Americans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese +policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not +achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a +great misfortune for mankind.</p> + +<p>A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in +itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would +destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to +Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide +militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. +If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will +<a name="Page_175"></a>only become more liberal if the present régime is discredited by +failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the +interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint +diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only +Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate +neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of +actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance +with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an +encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan +has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only +permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese +at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our +Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the +ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform.</p> + +<p>We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency +in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, +millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not +mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still +able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the +Japanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik +propaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the +effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from +Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except +the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of +developing industry without passing through the stage of private +<a name="Page_176"></a>capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are +more and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as +it has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, +for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State, +whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to +federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very +great deal of government, and more control of individual lives by the +authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed +personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all +others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful +practical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is +the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these +reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much +progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the +same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved +successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were +probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. +The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively +Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, +carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less +corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, like +the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of +mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, +adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and +gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon +spent, unless there <a name="Page_177"></a>is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régime +under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his +life.</p> + +<p>It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation +develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain +Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control +of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be +useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, +but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America +or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the +supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, +recover the position which she held in relation to China before the +Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an +instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for +centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the +last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long.</p> + +<p>The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way +regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as +much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, +the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be +able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with +Asiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking +nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong +for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, +on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be +desirable In the interests of mankind as a whole.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_178"></a>What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for +China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. +The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end +some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending +of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of +some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably +quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in +the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in +the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through +years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their +development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference +without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. +Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but +have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. +The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult +one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the +Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we +do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution +suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution +slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely +imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable.</p> + +<p>There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the +Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable +chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the <i>status quo</i> +is to be maintained, while in Shantung the <a name="Page_179"></a>Japanese have made +concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four +Powers—America, Great Britain, France, and Japan—have agreed to +exploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortium +as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will +therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only +people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As +they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set +to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers +are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must +be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish +colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth +of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China +for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of +America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust +magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of +radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by +some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom.</p> + +<p>But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace +and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, +France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so +far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the +peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no +means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous +competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing +the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the +<a name="Page_180"></a>domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the +strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's +interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese +interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for +the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable +government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, +and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will +not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own +railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic +independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the +form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will +keep a <i>dossier</i> of every student educated in colleges under American +control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or +Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard +of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the +United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In +short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to +"God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the +wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give +to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that +which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination +of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be +perfect.</p> + +<p>The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy +competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive +competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism <a name="Page_181"></a>has succeeded +in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced +industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between +workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow +races.<a name="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92"><sup>[92]</sup></a> Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap +Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to +white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of +industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an +obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any +person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every +other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per +head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who +either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the +others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an +opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of +the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British +Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial +conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole +question of Asiatic immigration, which <a name="Page_182"></a>is liable to cause trouble for +centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since +Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this +matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world.</p> + +<p>The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by +means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is +obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except +through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, +China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands +of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into +submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, +attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot +see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result +of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect +that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the +Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and +the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as +the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be +fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive +civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, +the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any +sort would survive it.</p> + +<p>To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big +financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. +No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due +to popular pressure, and is against <a name="Page_183"></a>the interests of big finance. But +not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a +few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the +interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic +immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social +interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system +makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to +the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also +to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is +seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by +accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the +present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the +weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of +Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little +freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the +present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is +production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation +produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. +Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in +internal labour problems and in international relations. The development +of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the +Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the +things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs +for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply +these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish +pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will +be regulated by <a name="Page_184"></a>the same authority which represents the needs of the +consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will +cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to +exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not +possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present +American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not +secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only +international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of +revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure +until international Socialism is established throughout the world.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86">[86]</a><p> The interests of England, apart from the question of +India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, +British interests are allied with American finance, as against the +pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87">[87]</a><p> It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington +Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there +agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the +navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy +is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government +has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of +reluctant taxpayers. See <i>The Times'</i> New York Correspondent's telegram +in <i>The Times</i> of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88">[88]</a><p> See Chamberlain, <i>The Invention of a New Religion</i>, +published by the Rationalist Press Association.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89">[89]</a><p> See Murdoch, <i>History of Japan</i>, I. pp. 500 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90">[90]</a><p> An excellent account of these is given in <i>The Socialist +and Labour Movement in Japan</i>, by an American Sociologist, published by +the <i>Japan Chronicle</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91">[91]</a><p> Author of a book called <i>If Japan and America Fight</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92">[92]</a><p> The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is +illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in <i>The Times</i> for +April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of +shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime +Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp +instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by +black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation +reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and +turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to +blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from +the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not +generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I +deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, +assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a +blessing.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI"></a><a name="Page_185"></a>CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED<br /></p> + + +<p>There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a +close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the +Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact +will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or +whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that +of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the +past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, +Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediæval Europe from +the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these +cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of +China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case +again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from +us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the +Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear +we are unteachable.</p> + +<p>I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of +the questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three +following chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning <a name="Page_186"></a>the internal +condition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the +hopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult +situation.</p> + +<p>With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I +cannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact +after such a long period of separate development as has marked those of +China and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is +surprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is +not more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth +while to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two +civilizations.</p> + +<p>Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, +which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish +religion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an +outcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and +Galileo as representing these three elements, which have remained +singularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive +literature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more +urbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical +belief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with the +conception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our +nationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power +and the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly +be, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive +also the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been +acquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our +mentality.</p> + +<p>No one of these three elements has had any <a name="Page_187"></a>appreciable part in the +development of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese +painting, sculpture, and music.<a name="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93"><sup>[93]</sup></a> China belongs, in the dawn of its +history, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia +contributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the +Greeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by +the rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so +the original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow +River. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch +far either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this +similarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little +in common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the +Egyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze<a name="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94"><sup>[94]</sup></a> and Confucius, who both belong to +the sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should +regard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute +everything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the +differences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and +Babylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do +not think science can, at present, account wholly for national +character. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not +the whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant +individuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, +Mahomet, and Confucius.</p> + +<p>The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the <a name="Page_188"></a>founder of Taoism. "Lao +Tze" is not really a proper name, but means merely "the old +philosopher." He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of +Confucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He +held that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way +or manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that +we ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to +conform to it. "Tao" means "way," but used in a more or less mystical +sense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life." I +think he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way," and +that if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, +like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere +magic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. +But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist +philosophy from the first.</p> + +<p>Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but +his ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more +interesting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one +of freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences +with Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they +contrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the pure +men of old." There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, +because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some +sense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife +in the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of +humour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by +Chuang-Tze's account of <a name="Page_189"></a>Po-Lo who "understood the management of +horses," and trained them till five out of every ten died.<a name="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95"><sup>[95]</sup></a> Their +restraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with +Western mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature +and art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present +day. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance +of a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so +that Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the +Chinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in +Peking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in +the theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement +at its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor +of a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. +In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due +to the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man +should always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments +(being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate +them in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, +which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue +in their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, +makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at +being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration +for the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of +passion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first +all the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually <a name="Page_190"></a>the beauty and +dignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who +have lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best.</p> + +<p>The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from +the favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that +I am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are +largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern +is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When +one compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of +some other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even +if they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, +is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to +a powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly +has succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners +and perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is +quite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been +provided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the +humblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of +white men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot +demean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard +this as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the +Chinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors.</p> + +<p>There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional +civilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from +India in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a +definite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant +outlook which <a name="Page_191"></a>we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man +adopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity +and Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man +can accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man +may be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is +incompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both +Buddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental +difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any +individual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. +Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It +has mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a +message to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as +natural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive +pessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of +all this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, +wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at +all. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or +religious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of +these two religions in China has been that the more religious and +contemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active +administrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the +official teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were +examined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has +been in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been +lacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western +nations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have <a name="Page_192"></a>conformed very +closely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the +population has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that +subject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations +have had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and +resources.</p> + +<p>Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in +China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other +two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is +practically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but +throughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it +is not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin." +Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been no +science and no industrialism.</p> + +<p>What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization +with the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, +but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to +dissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural +contact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political +and economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural +question as far as I can in isolation.</p> + +<p>There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not +simply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist +Western aggression, but because a very large number of people consider +learning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a +high value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only +of the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that +Western knowledge is more useful. <a name="Page_193"></a>Many students go every year to +universities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or +economics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to +China, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or +politicians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, +especially in the educated classes.</p> + +<p>The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had +ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This +was not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack +of new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the +stimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily +keen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of +libraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human +material. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in +science, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore +the spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the +Church put in its way in Europe. I have no doubt that if the Chinese +could get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within +the next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It +is quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with +fresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the +enthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the +renaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy.</p> + +<p>It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, +that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring +wealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an +ethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. <a name="Page_194"></a>They are +not by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me +that they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them +think there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The +habit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and +some of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they +were looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and +before long they will realize that they must work out their own +salvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults +and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will +make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours.</p> + +<p>The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the +scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just +conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to +see gradually uniting.</p> + +<p>Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production without +possession, action without self-assertion, development without +domination." I think one could derive from these words a conception of +the ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted +that they are very different from the ends which most white men set +before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly +sought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a +philosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to +Germany.</p> + +<p>But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with +Chinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese +practice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, +of course, a great deal of truth in this. <a name="Page_195"></a>Possession, which is one of +the three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to +the heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of +money—not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the +English or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful +men make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and +domination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese +practice. There is much less desire than among the white races to +tyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is +quite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on +which are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the +world could ever be "too proud to fight," that nation would be China. +The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, +showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they +could be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire +freedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may +compel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their +virtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have +been an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is +extraordinarily slight.</p> + +<p>Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the +Chinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a +poet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by +Mr. Waley, called by him <i>The Old Man with the Broken Arm</i>, to make a +hero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. <a name="Page_196"></a>Their +pacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that +they do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure—as +their pictures show—in observing characteristic manifestations of +different kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a +preconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which +dominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our +active impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with +us; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The +cultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their +earliest sages write. If one points out to them that this shows how +little progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress when +you already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seems +to a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own +wisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call +progress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable +goal.</p> + +<p>It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West +with what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek +knowledge, in the hope—which I fear is usually vain—that knowledge may +prove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three +motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our +religion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, +and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and +the missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the +world; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese +have no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions <a name="Page_197"></a>are +many, but reason is one," and with that they are content to let us go +our way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different +from those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking +concessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get +their claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good +soldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not +worth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their +reasonableness.</p> + +<p>I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that +Europeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine +ourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we +still practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we +are firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are +immeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation +like the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to +them is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound +mistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is +miserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier +because the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook +than our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, +but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of +beauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In +this respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. +I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but +for that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to +be fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us <a name="Page_198"></a>the indispensable +minimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of +that contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all +the other nations of antiquity have perished.</p> + +<p>When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I +thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn +from them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found +this attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who +go only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese +do not excel in the things we really value—military prowess and +industrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the +simple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than +in the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where +such things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for +our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance +and contemplative peace of mind.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93">[93]</a><p> See Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 368, and Giles, op. cit. p. +187.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94">[94]</a><p> With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is +of doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three +centuries after his death. Cf. Giles, op. cit., Lecture V.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95">[95]</a><p> Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII"></a><a name="Page_199"></a>CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>THE CHINESE CHARACTER<br /></p> + + +<p>There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, +full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be +that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this +opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I +was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have +talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people +would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not +wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle +Oriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an +Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as +many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the +game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is +deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in +London.</p> + +<p>One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of +securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, +both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many +years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a +single <a name="Page_200"></a>Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the +Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their +outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils: +the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the +anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at +first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to +be reformed.</p> + +<p>But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable +misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the +foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of +soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the +bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt +all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really +wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to +lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that +may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a +mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit?</p> + +<p>The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have +to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for +these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the +capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure +in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, +are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted; +they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened +by a joke.</p> + +<p>I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in +chairs—the way was rough <a name="Page_201"></a>and very steep, the work for the coolies very +severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes +to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their +pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in +the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, +they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order +to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying +whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. +Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the +universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they +might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows +<i>complete</i> self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own +interest.</p> + +<p>One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion +that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten +what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in +Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are +places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging +up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing +poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in +<i>Whitaker's Almanac</i>. A European, in recommending a place of residence, +will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can +conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a +Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will +tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an +ancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars <a name="Page_202"></a>weary of the +world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook +that strikes the Westerner as barbaric.</p> + +<p>The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet +dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. +They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their +pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military +weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider +efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. +I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the +greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A +Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on +traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to +feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, +the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical +Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his +environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as +delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the +contrast between China and the English-speaking world.</p> + +<p>We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical +camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, +for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the +question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and +therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is +really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the +feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of +this pleasure, a young <a name="Page_203"></a>American will work so hard that, by the time he +has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, +compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the +feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the +thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may +suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations +"progressive."</p> + +<p>There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common +than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form—not a +better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. +It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread +failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore +money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a +means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, +are often content to remain poor. In China, the <i>tuchuns</i> (military +governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole +purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a +suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life +quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose +power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that +such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed +to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin +whole continents in order to win an election campaign.</p> + +<p>The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than +one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the +Great <a name="Page_204"></a>Powers—especially Japan—the harm would be much less than is +done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities +of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are +performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, +and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been +wholly lost in the rest of the world.</p> + +<p>The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign +pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he +might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a +rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech +and a free Press.<a name="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96"><sup>[96]</sup></a> The individual does not feel obliged to follow the +herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men +still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the +conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the +West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. +Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in +China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few +leading financiers.</p> + +<p>The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China +as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity +in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest +beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if +you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a +Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because +your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute +an offence.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_205"></a>Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as +industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words +that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. +But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, +which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the +most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are +accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what +is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I +were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer +from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful. +Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall +not venture to decide.</p> + +<p>The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in +their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to +its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be +taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it +is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to +cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his +title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of +several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably +in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was +nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, +without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put.</p> + +<p>Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It +was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu +party <a name="Page_206"></a>in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was +accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most +widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the +students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great +preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when +they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. +In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking +and change the Government almost without firing a shot.</p> + +<p>The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers' +strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The +Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left +its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce +payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, +accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and +police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely +wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in +China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for +revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in +corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to +extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing +the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated +in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the +interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public +feeling.</p> + +<p>Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. +The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize +acutely <a name="Page_207"></a>what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are +aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to +naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. +They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy +eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its +coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by +developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new +reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts +of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit +tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in +centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and +then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. +Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations +the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects.</p> + +<p>Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for +colonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for their +surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the +Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status +of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be +recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese +derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of +their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their +unrivalled national cohesiveness—in spite of the civil wars, which +merely ruffle the surface—that they can afford to despise military +methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall +have exhausted itself in internecine combats.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_208"></a>China is much less a political entity than a civilization—the only one +that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the +Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have +perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There +have been foreign influences—first Buddhism, and now Western science. +But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science +will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as +much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had +not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. +What is bad in the West—its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness +to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims—they +see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its +science, they do wish to adopt.</p> + +<p>The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and +literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the +spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who +have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is +needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization +to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like +ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are +not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new +civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to +create.</p> + +<p>So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese +character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad +sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced +<a name="Page_209"></a>so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should +prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as +well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is +less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the +balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, +and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the +Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer +pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. +With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and +callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, +admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible +remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of +China's greatest virtues.</p> + +<p>The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. +They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one +per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other +ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the +Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw +materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those +whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese +would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the +philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions +were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few +dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by +white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and +that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the +efforts of the white <a name="Page_210"></a>men were more effective in soothing their own +consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present +birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are +bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive +through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next.</p> + +<p>Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of +agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. +Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts +to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness +has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of +the problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so +explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, +nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. +The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain +in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. +Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show +that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty; +but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be +said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an +extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy.</p> + +<p>Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that +they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between +rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that +first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the +Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is +<a name="Page_211"></a>involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a +serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese +are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. +Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, +the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous +people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure +torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races +would find insufficient—for example, to conceal the hiding-place of +stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of <i>active</i> courage, +they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their +readiness to commit suicide.</p> + +<p>Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is +hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all +except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. +For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk +of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the +fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I +think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an +honest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as +economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China +than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any +Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more +corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that +changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we +are—which is not saying much.</p> + +<p>I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are <a name="Page_212"></a>in ordinary life, when +they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat +sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are +capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of +this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was +a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But +their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this +element in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it +impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of +them becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or +devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I +suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite +of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And +many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic +love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the +West.</p> + +<p>To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the +foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient +civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, +under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American +financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude +imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who +have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty +in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not +obey the laws of perspective.</p> + +<p>The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved; +it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something <a name="Page_213"></a>may +be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is +supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these +qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle +disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be +seen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will force +it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to +which Japan has been driven.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96">[96]</a><p> This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish +a very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed +Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, <i>Review of the Far East,</i> April 16, +1922.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII"></a><a name="Page_214"></a>CHAPTER XIII</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA<br /></p> + + +<p>China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of +culture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient +beauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is content +to be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tend +to be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European +tourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is +apt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctive +and non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one who +regards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a +country with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do +not view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquire +what is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interesting +survival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the +first step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher +education, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use and +appreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Western +follies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and +one of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_215"></a>There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of +the classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a more +intelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditional +study of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in +the eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have +secured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learning +reading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still form +the majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given. +Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the +classical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at +the same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one of +these schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people who +are taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns +one finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which +is very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probably +those who can both read and write form about five per cent, of the +population.</p> + +<p>The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on +modern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old +examination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, has +done much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementary +education. The following statistics showing the increase in the number +of schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's +<i>China Awakened</i>, p. 4:—</p> +<pre> + 1910 1914 1917 1919<br /> +Number of Schools 42,444 59,796 128,048 134,000 +Number of Teachers 185,566 200,000 326,417 326,000 +Number of Students 1,625,534 3,849,554 4,269,197 4,500,000 +</pre> +<p><a name="Page_216"></a>Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil +war, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is +very remarkable.</p> + +<p>There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing +to the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has +been impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small +scale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable +government.</p> + +<p>The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be +only elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the +older texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, +within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest +renaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China +for many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, +even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the +innocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one +almost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the +Vacation—learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern +world, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some +eleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and +against the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the +same as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one +is driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of +specialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that +the ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more +account of modern needs, and give more <a name="Page_217"></a>instruction in science, modern +languages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, +so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China.</p> + +<p>The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the +missionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As +everyone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired +through the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their +own account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual +loss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded +(and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the +surplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American +universities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, +both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts +in China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have +come to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the +Great Powers.</p> + +<p>One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I +saw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), +the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller +Hospital), and the so-called Peking University.</p> + +<p>Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western +hills, with a number of fine solid buildings,<a name="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97"><sup>[97]</sup></a> in a good American +style, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. <a name="Page_218"></a>It has +an atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a +(Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the +American College President. The teachers are partly American, partly +Chinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the +latter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of +every virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, +exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the +teaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was +thorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American +institutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. +Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the +most skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot +understand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European +language is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful +throughout the Far East.</p> + +<p>The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and +philosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is +commonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards +to America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China +they become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute +greatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty +and technical intelligence.</p> + +<p>The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing +an interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty with +European utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese, +but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy, +though perhaps not <a name="Page_219"></a>wholly successful. The hospital has all the most +modern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the +Standard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use to +anyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical College +teaches many things besides medicine—English literature, for +example—and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order +to produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the European +level, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessary +for medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a sound +knowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to +China, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent.</p> + +<p>The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have +to suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so +at least I was told) had already established a university in Peking, +fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But the +Methodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" to +their schools, so the already existing university had to alter its name +to "Government University." The case is exactly as if a collection of +old-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach the +doctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to +abandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question +of extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can be +abandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it +sometimes gives rise.</p> + +<p>Returned students (<i>i.e.</i> students who have been <a name="Page_220"></a>at foreign +universities) form a definite set in China.<a name="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98"><sup>[98]</sup></a> There is in Peking a +"Returned Students' Club," a charming place. It is customary among +Europeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. +There are occasionally disagreements between different sections; in +particular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite as +equals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression was +that America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other +country; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than +those returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinaman +who wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem +romantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions which +conservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to +those of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it +is useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One is +reminded of the conversation in <i>Eothen</i> between the English country +gentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England <a name="Page_221"></a>to the +refrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels," while +the Englishman keeps saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is +still, thank God, the British yeoman."</p> + +<p>Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole +admirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the +needs of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a national +temperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeans +ultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always +missionaries—not of Christianity, though they often think that is what +they are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Clean +living, clean thinking, and pep," I think an American would reply. This +means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness +for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as +being easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy for +the leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire—that hardened +old cynic—laid it down that the true ends of life are "<i>aimer et +penser</i>." Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with +"pep." The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate +both. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save the +lives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worth +saving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether +satisfactory.</p> + +<p>The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established +schools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. +In these, a certain proportion of the teachers are European <a name="Page_222"></a>or +American, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One +can never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by +white men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously +in the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration +of China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. +Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they +are not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other +country, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, +and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility +to exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really +beautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used +to have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking +Government University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for +keenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the +Science Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came +across them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire +Western knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. +They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not +capitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best +among their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, +but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely +Chinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government +University, leave much to be desired from the point of view of +instruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is +not sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough <a name="Page_223"></a>mental discipline. +But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the +profoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. +Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the +Government—loved by the Powers on account of its weakness—has to part +with all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and +plunder the country, as in Europe—for China must be compared with +Europe, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is +unhappily divided.</p> + +<p>The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a +powerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in +1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. +Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement." And what they did was not +merely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the + Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the + Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to + the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. + For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures + showing them the real situation, internally as well as + externally; but especially by establishing free schools and + maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too + high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also + teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with + the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that + fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. </p></div> + +<p>One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards +modern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality +between men and women. The position of women in Peking <a name="Page_224"></a>Government +University is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to +examinations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the +university. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective +women teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive +institution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would +horrify most British head mistresses.</p> + +<p>There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary +education, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls +tend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as +the boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet +in Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner +speeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt +co-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter +should receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not +ripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the +sphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having +imagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I +realized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried +out in China.</p> + +<p>Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot +give what Young China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions +of centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European +superstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. +It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that +there is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and +for that free spirit of sceptical <a name="Page_225"></a>inquiry by which they are seeking to +build a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its +best days.</p> + +<p>While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher +pay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many +months. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation +to the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who +clubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The +incident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a +revolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the +teachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them +all that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of +bandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and +European intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may +say broadly that the old traditional education, with the military +governors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for +Conservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions +stand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically +though not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone +stands for intellectual freedom.</p> + +<p>The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by +foreigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire +military strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to +advance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who +quite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That +is why the West regards them as uncivilized.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97">[97]</a><p> It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in +purely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and +Nanking Teachers' Training College.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98">[98]</a><p> Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from <i>Who's Who of +American Returned Students</i>, a classification of the occupations of 596 +Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items +are: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in +Government service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three +members of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical +practitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and +religious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese +holding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400 +<i>(ib.).</i> This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America +in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese +university students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a +classification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are: +Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22; +natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified +separately), 19.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV"></a><a name="Page_226"></a>CHAPTER XIV</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA<br /></p> + + +<p>China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial +possibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as +nearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the +next few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this +development as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties +are very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will +therefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the +possibilities of the near future.</p> + +<p>We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's +industrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then +the mines, before going on to other matters.</p> + +<p>When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of +Oxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to +them, and did all it could to keep them at a distance.<a name="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99"><sup>[99]</sup></a> In 1875 a +short line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the +Central Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In +1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was +accomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then +thought <a name="Page_227"></a>that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for +concessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important +line from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a +Hankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far +as Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with +the Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung +Railway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the +south. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the +Yangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and +managed by foreign officials of the respective countries which had +obtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware +that some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated +beyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the +Chinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of +most of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to +realize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem +was how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow +line and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by the +help of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the +hands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow +line was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was +constructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the +big main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the +Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. +The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be +<a name="Page_228"></a>regarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong +enough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more +or less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the +agreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China—five +years hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost +to China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important +railways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of +the situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity.</p> + +<p>Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges—quite rightly, as I +think—the great importance of nationalizing <i>all</i> Chinese railways. At +Washington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and +to concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early +in 1919, he said<a name="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100"><sup>[100]</sup></a>:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p><i>The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of + the new Republican State is the railway key</i>.... The revolution + of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of + popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being + carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left + behind a more subtle weapon. <i>This weapon is the railway</i>. Russia + with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. + Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited + the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put + into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted + economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this + grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all + intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign <i>enclave</i>, + subversive of the Chinese State. <i>The especial evil to-day is + that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new + technique,</i> which ... she will eventually extend into the very + heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and + Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) <a name="Page_229"></a>unless she is summarily + arrested. <i>At all costs this must be stopped.</i> The method of + doing so is easy: <i>It is to have it laid down categorically, and + accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on + Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must + be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; + that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese + citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; + and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered + simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section + by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board</i>. </p></div> + +<p>If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this +reform—as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale—will +have been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect +Japan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her +promises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of +Japanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. +Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the +Shantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it.</p> + +<p>It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan +Railway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by +foreigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably +managed. I quote from Mr. Tyau<a name="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101"><sup>[101]</sup></a> the following statistics, which +refer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027 +kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial +railways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres. +Total, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are +mainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which <a name="Page_230"></a>the first must be +regarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably +recovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer +the importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign +railway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. +Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in +1918:—</p> + +<pre> +Name of Line. Kilometres Year Per cent. earned +Operated. Completed. on Investment.<br /> +Peking-Mukden 987 1897 22.7 +Peking-Hankow 1306 1905 15.8 +Shanghai-Nanking 327 1908 6.2 +Tientsin-Pukow 1107 1912 6.2 +Peking-Suiyuan 490 1915 5.6 +</pre> +<p>Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less +prosperous.</p> + +<p>I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway +administration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the +evils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed +by different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was +no uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to +another. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially +to open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of +which would probably be enormous.</p> + +<p>Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows +foreign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its +industries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent +of foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far +from satisfactory. <a name="Page_231"></a>Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché at +Peking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards +China's mineral resources:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good + supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial + development. To indicate how little China has developed its + marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, + 14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now + 20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer + resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, + produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that + China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an + additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native + methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of + pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel + industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence + it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished + steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony + and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable + progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores + during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its + mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's + welfare.<a name="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102"><sup>[102]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>The <i>China Year Book</i> for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of +coal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons.<a name="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103"><sup>[103]</sup></a> +Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000 +tons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident +that great progress was made during those three years, and there is +every reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been +maintained. The main problem <a name="Page_232"></a>for China, however, is not <i>rapid</i> +development, but <i>national</i> development. Japan is poor in minerals, and +has set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of +China. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, +that only industrial development can support the growing population, +which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the +mainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for +imperialism.</p> + +<p>The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at +Shanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for +shipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each +for the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng<a name="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104"><sup>[104]</sup></a> says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly + supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from + America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited + in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by + virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home + consumption). </p></div> + +<p>Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs +explanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to +understand modern politics.</p> + +<p>The <i>China Year Book</i> for 1919<a name="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105"><sup>[105]</sup></a> (a work as little concerned with +politics as <i>Whitaker's Almanack</i>) gives a list of the five principal +iron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and +most important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and +Coal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of +the third <a name="Page_233"></a>group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in +sight is estimated by the <i>China Year Book</i> at 50,000,000 tons, derived +chiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per cent. of +iron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as +603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The <i>Year Book</i> +proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the +agreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which +enforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government +undertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to +compel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources." It should +be added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical +adviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be +sold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, +leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.<a name="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106"><sup>[106]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The second item in the <i>China Year Book's</i> list is the Tungkuan Shan +mines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district on +the Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work +these mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in +1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of £52,000, and the mines were +transferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation." +These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their +capacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were +sold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. is +$20,000,000, which is considerably more than £52,000. This was the only +one of the five iron mines mentioned in the <i>Year Book</i> <a name="Page_234"></a>which was not +in Japanese hands at the time when the <i>Year Book</i> was published.</p> + +<p>Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession which +was granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be +worked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain +60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan +of operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of +170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of +steel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000 +tons a year."</p> + +<p>The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunction +with the Hengshan Colliery by the railway." I presume it is to be sold +back to China along with the railway.</p> + +<p>The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the most +promising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the +Japanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and +Japanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. +The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of +Penhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine." It will be +observed that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result +of the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The <i>Year Book</i> adds: +"The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka +ironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at +Osaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron."</p> + +<p>It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have +allowed the Japanese to acquire <a name="Page_235"></a>a position of vantage from which they +can only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely +imperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of +their own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their +national independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that +make them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that +the chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order +to be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, +says nothing about iron mines;<a name="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107"><sup>[107]</sup></a> therefore the old-fashioned Chinese +did not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are +awake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later +to the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue +our survey of facts.</p> + +<p>It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly +agricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are +crops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the +third country in the world, India being the first and the United States +the second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, +but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, +and it is industry that is our present topic.</p> + +<p>To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was +officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since +<a name="Page_236"></a>then no official returns for the whole country have been published ... +but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for the +present number of factory operatives and mine workers."<a name="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108"><sup>[108]</sup></a> Of course, +the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as +specially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the +wages range from 15 to 45 cents a day.<a name="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109"><sup>[109]</sup></a> (The cent varies in value, +but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as +industry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. +Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, +the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. +Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent +to which he has come under American influence, as well as that of +conservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young +Chinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped +that the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will +make the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of +America and Japan.</p> + +<p>There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. +There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise +is needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire.</p> + +<p>Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably +develop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in +native hands.</p> + +<p>The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200,000,000 +(630,000,000 taels), and the <a name="Page_237"></a>total imports slightly larger. It is +better, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency +fluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The +tael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its +value fluctuates with the value of silver. The <i>China Year Book</i> gives +imports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and +214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as +577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in +pounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124 +millions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the +foreign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is +increasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how +little the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as +revolutions and civil wars.</p> + +<p>Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways +and mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national +independence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is +obviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new +lines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, +in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire +a power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope +that the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act +upon it.</p> + +<p>In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, +since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and +development by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It +should therefore be enacted that, in <a name="Page_238"></a>future, no sale of mines or of any +interest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the +security of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of +extra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to +accept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its +validity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, +such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear +China, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if +not, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, +it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It +would be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely +Chinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological +and mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the +right (<i>a</i>) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (<i>b</i>) to +work minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in +spite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers +should be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point +compatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, +except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is +clear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as +opportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible +to say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established +in China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign +aggression. This is a point to which, along with other general questions +connected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last +chapter.</p> + +<p>It is said by Europeans who have business <a name="Page_239"></a>experience in China that the +Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as +modern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially +honest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But +their successful businesses—so one gathers—do not usually extend +beyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or +later through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from +my own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very +quickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with +Confucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in +business methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung +and other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the +highest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The +Chinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to +commerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly +introducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, +every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, +that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout +the next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development +should be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But +that is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese +independence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99">[99]</a><p> For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit. +pp. 183 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100">[100]</a><p> <i>China in</i> 1918. Published by the <i>Peking Leader</i>, pp. +45-6.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101">[101]</a><p> Op. cit. chap. xi.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102">[102]</a><p> <i>China in</i> 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in +the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated +by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. p. +51.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103">[103]</a><p> Page 63. The 1922 <i>Year Book</i> gives 19,500,000 tons of +coal production.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104">[104]</a><p> <i>Modern China,</i> p, 265.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105">[105]</a><p> Pages 74-5.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106">[106]</a><p> Coleman, op. cit. chap. xiv.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107">[107]</a><p> It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is +nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine +pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure +where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. +Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and +steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton +Sinclair, <i>The Profits of Religion</i>, 1918, p. 175.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108">[108]</a><p> Page 237.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109">[109]</a><p> Page 218.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV"></a><a name="Page_240"></a>CHAPTER XV</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA<br /></p> + + +<p>In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint +of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, +in what order, I should advocate in that case.</p> + +<p>To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, +and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China +has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, +because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist +Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of +Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, +because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own +economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was +fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, +though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the +long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing +to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China +becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned +ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to +China; and one or other of these is very likely <a name="Page_241"></a>to come about. All the +Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, +in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of +Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their +own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power.</p> + +<p>The problem is not merely one of <i>political</i> independence; a certain +cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in +this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it +would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had +to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a +nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they +adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and +they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must +be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with +safety.</p> + +<p>First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary—not, of course, the +bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude +which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow +them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated +Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal +tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has +proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to +foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is +capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United +States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong +enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong +enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. <a name="Page_242"></a>It cannot be too +strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. +But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely +necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, +not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western +skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, +political independence will have little value.</p> + +<p>The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of +an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; +(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued +concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the +above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have +to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the +political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are +also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good +government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and +education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the +priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, +unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have +acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to +oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought +to be taken in the above order.</p> + +<p>1. <i>The establishment of an orderly government</i>.—At the moment of +writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A +battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is +usually considered, though falsely accord<a name="Page_243"></a>ing to some good authorities, +the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though <i>The Times</i> calls +him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than +"Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he +wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all +China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, +to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to +depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive +elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force.</p> + +<p>So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best +thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint +programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of +military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice +of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which +all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in +public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, +sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some +powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere +military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in +favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the +scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such +a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous +propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, +and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded +soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the +financial <a name="Page_244"></a>problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will +not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of +Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not +accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from +them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may +not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it +would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to +raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese +merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich +Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the +Government.</p> + +<p>When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt +that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of +autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few +things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. +Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally +recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more +scope.</p> + +<p>While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed +upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of +Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will +be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country +to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective +decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. +This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very +rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the <a name="Page_245"></a>slightest +failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The +society must make itself obviously the champion of the national +interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to +foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or +condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in +the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and +honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the +respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is +organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political +problems with which China is faced.</p> + +<p>Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign +rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty +Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves +from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was +in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the +Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of +Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in +general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet +Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by +the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's +resources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions +by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable +opportunity.</p> + +<p>2. <i>Industrial development.</i>—On this subject I have already written in +Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to +consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all <a name="Page_246"></a>railways ought +to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to +be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not +State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to +be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not +be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly +government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to +lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. +Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a +monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans.</p> + +<p>Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be +desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State +Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country +which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, +it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the +second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the +foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in +the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital +industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is +perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by +undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent +the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can +acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop +Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening +power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both +oppressed and misled.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_247"></a>But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change +in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family +ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which +already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at +present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these +requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize +that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State +Socialism must fail.</p> + +<p>For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should +learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I +think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards +the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import +skilled workmen—say from Germany—and cause them to give instruction to +Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be +desired to develop.</p> + +<p>3. <i>Education.</i>—If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive +Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the +population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a +good in itself, but is also essential for developing political +consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. +The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state +of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary +education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, +in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses +cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, +it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating <a name="Page_248"></a>such a vast +population could be borne by the nation without a considerable +industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is +mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for +the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American +millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese +education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why +industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of +education.</p> + +<p>For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be +sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There +is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are +being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed +a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese +educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears.</p> + +<p>Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education +as in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to +have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will +soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too +numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and +mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission +schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to +become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western +civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national +life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes +them more conservative in purely Chinese <a name="Page_249"></a>matters than the young men and +women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans +in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese +are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of +course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates +against national self-respect in those whom they teach.</p> + +<p>Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some +time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American +university. But for the great majority of university students it is far +better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned +students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from +which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A +society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all +really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, +as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students +returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this +difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university +education, but at present the difficulty would be serious.</p> + +<p>To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring +leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be +aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As +regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have +enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill +could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the +requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example +personally known to <a name="Page_250"></a>me, Dr. Hu Suh.<a name="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110"><sup>[110]</sup></a> He has great learning, wide +culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his +writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. +He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but +by no means a slavish admirer of our ways.</p> + +<p>The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be +needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an +intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be +combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl +Marx.</p> + +<p>The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the +world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is +possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to +develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. +This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the +preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific +temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a +knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical +problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one +due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its +international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, +the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of +famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong +government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties +and the <a name="Page_251"></a>recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a +model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to +defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand +Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western +philosophy of life.</p> + +<p>If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, +as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, +embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the +campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps +emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their +material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at +home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the +West achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by +the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but +would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great +military nations of the modern world will bring about their own +destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, +with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If +China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if +Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made +China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of +foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn +aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and +devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better +economic system—then China will have played the <a name="Page_252"></a>part in the world for +which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope +in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see +inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is +realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover +of mankind.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110">[110]</a><p> An account of a portion of his work will be found in +Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="APPENDIX"></a><a name="Page_253"></a>APPENDIX<br /></h2> + + +<p>While the above pages were going through the Press, some important +developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated +Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated +towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of +Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to +be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not +unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in +Chinese politics.</p> + +<p>For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his +intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, +befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in +our newspapers. According to <i>The Times</i>, he has pronounced in favour of +the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the +restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the +South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it +in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. <i>The Times</i> Peking +correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares +that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national +interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any +obstructionists."</p> + +<p>On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending +his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground +for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and +is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to +<a name="Page_254"></a>conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. +The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in +the same telegram as follows:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall + be elected by the people; District police shall be created under + District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil + governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to + the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and + paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and + <i>gendarmerie</i>, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible + for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall + agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the + Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes + shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a + stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, + the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under + the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries + established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the + people on the land. </p></div> + +<p>This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of +it will ever be carried out.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been +stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and +Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. +Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that +Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation +than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate +Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a +past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the +Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our +newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely +<a name="Page_255"></a>unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in <i>The Times</i> of May +15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, + which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. + Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms + are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and + opium-smoking are rife. </p></div> + +<p>Nevertheless, on May 30, <i>The Times</i> had to confess that this army had +won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in +Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions.</p> + +<p>The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived +by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the +victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will +be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped +also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not +be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of +that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, +there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with +him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more +likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There +is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang +for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But +it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still +problematical.</p> + +<p><i>June</i> 21, 1922.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="INDEX"></a><a name="Page_256"></a>INDEX</h2> + + +<ul><li>Academy, Imperial, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> +<li>Adams, Will, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> +<li>Afghanistan, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> +<li>Ainu, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a></li> +<li><a name="america"></a>America, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a> ff., <a href='#Page_159'>159</a> ff +<ul><li> and naval policy, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>-<a href='#Page_162'>162</a></li> +<li> and trade with Russia, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>-<a href='#Page_163'>163</a></li> +<li> and Chinese finance, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>-<a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> +<li> and Japan, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Americanism, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a></li> +<li>Ancestor-worship, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a></li> +<li>An Fu Party, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a></li> +<li>Anglo-Japanese Alliance, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> +<li>Annam, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> +<li>Arnold, Julean, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a></li> +<li>Art, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a></li> +<li>Australia, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Backhouse, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> +<li>Balfour, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a></li> +<li>Benthamites, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></li> +<li>Birth-rate— +<ul><li> in China, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a></li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Bismarck, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li>Bland, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> n, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> +<li>Bolsheviks, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> ff., <a href='#Page_175'>175</a> ff., <a href='#Page_245'>245</a></li> +<li>Bolshevism, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a> +<ul><li> in China, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Books, burning of, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> ff.</li> +<li>Boxer rising, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a> +<ul><li> indemnity, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Brailsford, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a></li> +<li>Buddhism, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a> +<ul><li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a> ff., <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Burma, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a><a name="Page_257"></a></li> +<li>Bushido, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Canada, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a></li> +<li>Canton, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> +<li>Capitalism, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a></li> +<li>Cassel agreement, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a></li> +<li>Chamberlain, Prof. B.H., <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a></li> +<li>Changchun, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a></li> +<li>Chang-tso-lin, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>,242, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a></li> +<li>Chao Ki, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a></li> +<li>Chen Chiung Ming, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page_255'>255</a></li> +<li>Chen, Eugene, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Cheng, S.G., <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> n., <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n., <a href='#Page_139'>139</a> n., <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> +<li>Chien Lung, Emperor, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> ff.</li> +<li>Chi Li, Mr., <a href='#Page_37'>37</a></li> +<li>China— +<ul><li> early history, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a> ff.</li> +<li> derivation of name, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> +<li> population, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>-<a href='#Page_34'>34</a></li> +<li> Year Book, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></li> +<li> produce, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a></li> +<li> influence on Japan, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a> ff.,104</li> +<li> and the war, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> ff.</li> +<li> Post Offices, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Chinese— +<ul><li> character of, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>-<a href='#Page_213'>213</a></li> +<li> love of laughter, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>-<a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a></li> +<li> dignity, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a></li> +<li> pacifism, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a></li> +<li> callousness, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a></li> +<li> cowardice, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> +<li> avarice, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> +<li> patience, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> +<li> excitability, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Chingkiang, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a></li> +<li>Chinlingchen mine, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> +<li>Chita, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a><a name="Page_258"></a></li> +<li>Choshu, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a></li> +<li>Chou dynasty, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> +<li>Christianity in Japan, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a> ff.</li> +<li>Chuang Tze, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a></li> +<li>Chu Fu Tze, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> +<li>Chu Hsi, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a></li> +<li>Civilization— +<ul><li> alphabetical, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a></li> +<li> Chinese, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a> ff.</li> +<li> European, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Coal in China, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> ff.</li> +<li>Coleman, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> n., <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Colour prejudice, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a> +<ul><li> and labour, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Confucius, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></li> +<li>Confucianism, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a> ff., <a href='#Page_190'>190</a> +<ul><li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Consortium, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> ff., <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> +<li>Cordier, Henri, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> n., <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a> n., <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a> n., <a href='#Page_31'>31</a> n., <a href='#Page_187'>187</a> n.</li> +<li>Cotton, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a> +<ul><li> industry in Osaka, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Customs— +<ul><li> Chinese, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> ff.,</li> +<li> on exports, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a></li> +<li> internal, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>-<a href='#Page_57'>57</a></li></ul></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Dairen, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a> +<ul><li> Conference at, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Denison, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a></li> +<li>Dewey, Professor, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a> +<ul><li> Mrs., <a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Diet, Japanese, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a> ff.</li> +<li>Dutch in Japan, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a> ff., <a href='#Page_100'>100</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Education, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> ff., <a href='#Page_76'>76</a> ff., <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>-<a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a> ff. +<ul><li> statistics of, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a></li> +<li> classical, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>-<a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li> +<li> European and American, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>-<a href='#Page_221'>221</a></li> +<li> modern Chinese, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a> ff.</li> +<li> of women, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>-<a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Efficiency, creed of, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></li> +<li>"Eight Legs," <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a></li> +<li>Emperor of China <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> ff, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a> +<ul><li> "First," <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Empress Dowager, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a> n.</li> +<li>Examination, competitive, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> ff, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a><a name="Page_259"></a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>"Face," <a href='#Page_204'>204</a></li> +<li>Famines in China, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> +<li>Far Eastern Republic, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> +<li>Federalism in China, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> +<li>Feudalism— +<ul><li> in China, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a></li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Filial Piety, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a> ff., <a href='#Page_61'>61</a> +<ul><li> and patriotism, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a></li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Foreign Trade statistics, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>-<a href='#Page_237'>237</a></li> +<li>Forestry, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></li> +<li>Fourteen Points, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a></li> +<li>France, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a> +<ul><li> and Shantung, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>-<a href='#Page_138'>138</a></li> +<li> and Japan, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Fukien, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Galileo, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> +<li>Genoa Conference, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a></li> +<li>Genro, the, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a> ff., <a href='#Page_128'>128</a></li> +<li>George III, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> +<li>Germany, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a> +<ul><li> property in China during war, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Giles, Lionel, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a> n.</li> +<li>Giles, Professor, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a> n., <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> n., <a href='#Page_187'>187</a> n.</li> +<li>Gladstone, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> +<li>Gleason, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n.</li> +<li>Gobi desert, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> +<li>Gompers, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a></li> +<li>Great Britain— +<ul><li> and China, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a> ff.</li> +<li> and Shantung, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Great Wall, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> +<li>Greeks, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> +<li>Guam, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Han dynasty, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></li> +<li>Hanyehping Co., <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> +<li>Hart, Sir Robert, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a></li> +<li>Hayashi, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Hearn, Lafcadio, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a></li> +<li><a name="heaven"></a>Heaven (in Chinese religion), <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a> +<ul><li> Temple of, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Hideyoshi, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> +<li>Hirth, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> n., <a href='#Page_23'>23</a> n., <a href='#Page_27'>27</a> n.</li> +<li>Hong Kong, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a><a name="Page_260"></a></li> +<li>Hsu Shi-chang, President, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> +<li>Hughes, Premier, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a> n.</li> +<li>Hughes, Secretary, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a></li> +<li>Hung Wu, Emperor, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> +<li>Huns, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> +<li>Hu Suh, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Ichimura, Dr., <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> +<li>Ideograms, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a> ff.</li> +<li>Immigration, Asiatic, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a> ff.</li> +<li>Imperialism. <a href='#Page_82'>82</a></li> +<li>India, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></li> +<li>Industrialism, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a> +<ul><li> in China, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>,</li> +<li> <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>-<a href='#Page_239'>239</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a> ff.</li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Inouye, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a></li> +<li>Intelligentsia in China, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a></li> +<li>Iron in China, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> ff. +<ul><li> Japanese control of, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Ishii, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>. <i>See</i> also <a href="#lansing">Lansing-Ishii</a> +<ul><li> Agreement.</li></ul></li> +<li>Ito, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a> ff</li> +<li>Iyeyasu, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Japan, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>-<a href='#Page_175'>175</a> +<ul><li> early history, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a> ff.</li> +<li> constitution, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a> ff.</li> +<li> war with China, <a href='#Page_113'>113</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li> war with Russia, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li> clan loyalty, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></li> +<li> loyalty to Allies, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a></li> +<li> hegemony in Asia, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></li> +<li> loans to China in 1918, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a></li> +<li> Socialism in, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Jenghis Khan, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> ff.</li> +<li>Jews, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Kang Hsi, Emperor, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> n.</li> +<li>Kara Korum, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a></li> +<li>Kato, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Kiangnan Dock, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> +<li>Kiaochow, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> +<li>Kieff, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Koo, Mr. Wellington, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> n., <a href='#Page_164'>164</a></li> +<li>Korea, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a></li> +<li>Kublai Khan, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a></li> +<li>Kyoto, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a></li> +<li>Kyushu, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Lama Religion, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a><a name="Page_261"></a></li> +<li>Lamont, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a></li> +<li>Lansing, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a></li> +<li><a name="lansing"></a>Lansing-Ishii Agreement, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> +<li>Lao-Tze, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a></li> +<li>Legge, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> n., <a href='#Page_39'>39</a> n., <a href='#Page_82'>82</a> n.</li> +<li>Lenin, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>,</li> +<li>Lennox, Dr., <a href='#Page_73'>73</a> n.</li> +<li>Literati, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a> ff.</li> +<li>Li Ung Bing, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> +<li>Li Yuan Hung, President, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a> ff.</li> +<li>Li Yuen, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> n.</li> +<li>Lloyd George, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></li> +<li>Louis XIV., <a href='#Page_51'>51</a></li> +<li>Louis, Saint, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Macao, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a></li> +<li>Macartney, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> +<li>Malthus, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a></li> +<li>Manchu dynasty, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a></li> +<li>Manchuria, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> +<li>Manila, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> +<li>Marco Polo, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Marcus Aurelius, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></li> +<li>Marx, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> +<li>Masuda, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> +<li>McLaren, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a> n.</li> +<li>Mechanistic Outlook, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a> ff.</li> +<li>Merv, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Mikado, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a> +<ul><li> worship of, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>-<a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Militarism, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a> n.</li> +<li>Millard, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n., <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> n.</li> +<li>Minamoto Yoritomo, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a></li> +<li>Mines, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a> ff.</li> +<li>Ming dynasty, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a></li> +<li>Missionaries, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a> +<ul><li> Roman Catholic, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> n.</li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Mongol dynasty, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> ff., <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> +<li>Mongolia, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> +<li>Morgan, J.P., <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a></li> +<li>Morphia, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li> +<li>Moscow, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Mukden, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li>Murdoch, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> n., <a href='#Page_86'>86</a> n., <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a> n.</li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Nationalism, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> +<li>Nestorianism, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a></li> +<li>Nicolaievsk, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a><a name="Page_262"></a></li> +<li>Nietzsche, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a></li> +<li>Nishapur, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Nobunaga, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> +<li>Northcliffe, Lord, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> n.</li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Observatory, Peking, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> +<li>Okuma, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a></li> +<li>Open Door, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a></li> +<li>Opium, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Panama Tolls, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a></li> +<li>Peking, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a> +<ul><li> Legation Quarter, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a></li> +<li> Union Medical College, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> +<li> Government University, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a> n., <a href='#Page_222'>222</a></li> +<li> Girls' High Normal School, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Penhsihu mine, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> +<li>Perry, Commodore, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a></li> +<li>Persia, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> +<li>Phonetic writing, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a></li> +<li>Plato, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> +<li>Po Chui, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a></li> +<li>Po Lo, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a></li> +<li>Pooley, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a> n., <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Pope, The, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> +<li>Port Arthur, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> +<li>Portsmouth, Treaty of, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>-<a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a></li> +<li>Portuguese, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a> ff.</li> +<li>Progress, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a></li> +<li><a name="putnam"></a>Putnam Weale, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a> n., <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Railways, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a> ff. +<ul><li> nationalization of, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a> ff.</li> +<li> statistics of, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> +<li> Chinese Eastern, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> Fa-ku-Men, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a></li> +<li> Hankow-Canton, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> Peking-Kalgan, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a></li> +<li> Peking-Hankow, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> Shantung, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> ff., <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> Siberian, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> South Manchurian, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a></li> +<li> Tientsin-Pukow, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Reid, Rev. Gilbert, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n., <a href='#Page_139'>139</a> n. <a href='#Page_142'>142</a><a name="Page_263"></a></li> +<li>Reinsch, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n., <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a></li> +<li>Restoration in Japan, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a> 8.</li> +<li>Revolution of 1911, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a> ff. +<ul><li> and Japan, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Rockefeller Hospital, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a></li> +<li>Rome, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a></li> +<li>Roosevelt, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a></li> +<li>Rousseau, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a></li> +<li>Russia, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> ff., <a href='#Page_175'>175</a> ff. +<ul><li> war with Japan, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>,123, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li> secret treaty with Japan, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a></li> +<li> and Shantung, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>-<a href='#Page_139'>139</a></li></ul></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Salt tax, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a></li> +<li><i>San Felipe</i>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> +<li>Sato, Admiral, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a></li> +<li>Satsuma, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a></li> +<li>Science, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></li> +<li>Shank, Mr., <a href='#Page_69'>69</a></li> +<li>Shantung, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a> ff., <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> +<ul><li> secret treaties concerning, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li> +<li> in Versailles Treaty, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a></li> +<li> and Washington Conference, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Shaw, Bernard, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> +<li>Sherfesee, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></li> +<li>Shih Huang Ti, <i>See</i> Emperor, "First"</li> +<li>Shi-King, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> +<li>Shinto, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a> ff., <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> +<li>Shogun, The, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a> ff.</li> +<li>Shu-King, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> n., <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> +<li>Simpson, Lennox. <i>See</i> <a href="#putnam">Putnam Weale</a></li> +<li>Socialism, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a> ff. +<ul><li> State, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a></li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li> +<li> in China, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Soyeda, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a> n.</li> +<li>Spaniards in Japan, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> +<li>Student Movement, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a></li> +<li>Students— +<ul><li> returned, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> +<li> statistics of, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a> n.</li></ul></li> +<li>Summer Palace, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> +<li>Sung dynasty, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> +<li>Sun Yat Sen, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page_256'>256</a></li> +<li>Supreme Ruler. <i>See</i> <a href="#heaven">Heaven</a>.</li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Taiping Rebellion, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a><a name="Page_264"></a></li> +<li>Tai-tsung, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> n.</li> +<li>Tang dynasty, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> +<li>Taochung iron mine, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> +<li>Taoism, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a> ff.</li> +<li>Tartars, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> +<li>Tayeh mines, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> n., <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> +<li>Teachers' strike, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a></li> +<li>Tenny, Raymond P., <a href='#Page_33'>33</a></li> +<li>Tibet, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> +<li>Ting, Mr. V.K., <a href='#Page_73'>73</a> n.</li> +<li>Tokugawa, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a></li> +<li>Tong, Hollington K., <a href='#Page_143'>143</a> n., <a href='#Page_204'>204</a> n.</li> +<li>Trade Unionism, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>-<a href='#Page_181'>181</a> +<ul><li>in Japan, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>-<a href='#Page_115'>115</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Treaty Ports, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a></li> +<li>Tsing-hua College, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li> +<li>Tsing-tau, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> +<li>Tuan Chih-jui, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a> ff.</li> +<li>Tuangkuan Shan mines, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> +<li>Tuchuns, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> +<li>Twenty-one Demands, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a> ff., <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> +<li>Tyau, M.T.Z., <a href='#Page_144'>144</a> n., <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a> n., <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a> n., <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>United States. <i>See</i> <a href="#america">America</a>.</li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Versailles Treaty, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>,151<a name="Page_265"></a></li> +<li>Vladivostok, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> +<li>Volga, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a></li> +<li>Voltaire, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Waley, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a></li> +<li>War, Great, idealistic aims of, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a> ff.</li> +<li>Washington Conference, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> n., <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a> ff., <a href='#Page_178'>178</a></li> +<li>Wei-hai-wei, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a></li> +<li>White men, virtues of, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> +<li>William II., <a href='#Page_122'>122</a></li> +<li>Wilson, President, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a></li> +<li>Women, position of, in China, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>-<a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li> +<li>Woosung College, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></li> +<li>Wu-Pei-Fu, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page_255'>255</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Yamagata, Prince, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a> n.</li> +<li>Yangtze, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a></li> +<li>Yao and Shun, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> +<li>Yellow River, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a></li> +<li>Y.M.C.A., <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a></li> +<li>Young China, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> ff., <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> +<li>Yü, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> +<li>Yuan Shi-k'ai, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a> ff., <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a></li> +</ul> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13940 ***</div> +</body> +</html> + + + diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac26cb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #13940 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13940) diff --git a/old/13940-0.txt b/old/13940-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f94ee50 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/13940-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7984 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Problem of China, by Bertrand Russell + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you +will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before +using this eBook. + +Title: The Problem of China + +Author: Bertrand Russell + +Release Date: November 3, 2004 [eBook #13940] +[Most recently updated: October 6, 2021] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +Produced by: Brendan Lane and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF CHINA *** + + + + +THE PROBLEM OF CHINA + +BY + +BERTRAND RUSSELL + +O.M., F.K.S. + +_London_ +GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD +RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET +FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1922 +SECOND IMPRESSION 1966 + +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN +BY PHOTOLITHOGRAPHY +UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED +WOKING AND LONDON + + + + +CONTENTS + +CHAPTER + + FOREWORD + I. QUESTIONS + II. CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + III. CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS + IV. MODERN CHINA + V. JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION + VI. MODERN JAPAN + VII. JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 +VIII. JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR + IX. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE + X. PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST + XI. CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED + XII. THE CHINESE CHARACTER +XIII. HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA + XIV. INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA + XV. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA + APPENDIX + INDEX + + + The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shû (Heedless), the Ruler of + the Northern Ocean was Hû (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre + was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of + Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how + they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven + orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and + breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try + and make them for him." Accordingly they dug one orifice in him + every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.--[_Chuang + Tze_, Legge's translation.] + + + + +The Problem of China + + + + +CHAPTER I + +QUESTIONS + + +A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and +reflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very +puzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe +will not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important +affinities with those of China, but they have also important +differences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, +even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, +since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the +human race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by +the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive +factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it +important, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there +should be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, +even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give. + +The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally +into three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these +groups, however, can be considered in isolation, because each is +intimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the +cultural questions are the most important, both for China and for +mankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less +equanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that +end. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for +practical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations +as for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed +business community has long been a commonplace of novelists and +moralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up +the pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded +as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the +artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to +oneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to +survive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause +misery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all +foreign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of +us? + +China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid +process of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed +in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits +quite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to +strike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the +whole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the +Celestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would +venture to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in +which we are better than old China, and to other respects in which we +are worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be +fruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a +superior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to +exploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior" +race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior +to ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate +knowledge of China, would take the same view. + +In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask +oneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard +to home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I +ultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more +desirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see +realized in the world? Different people will answer these questions +differently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade +a man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be +content merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that +the reader may feel likewise. + +The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not +merely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive +happiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of +knowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry +lists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no +appreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, +incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a +thing which is good and delightful on its own account. The same may be +said, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on +this topic would, however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak +of art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do +not mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of +course these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the +almost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian +peasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates +folk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the +Puritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy +of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we +have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of +us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of +Chinese civilization. + +In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of +good or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has +in promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good +things which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, +also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we +endeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread +oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not +strong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy +by means of their own merits and exertions alone. + +These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in +considering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and +commercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of +certain more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in +China one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a +society which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, +upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for +example, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come +under Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have +secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we +brought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a +life full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite +achievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and +unless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the +less familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed +always make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to +take as a matter of course. + +The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change +is needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable +ultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our +economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if +the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our +civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able +to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a +very splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, +however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The +first danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining +nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more +to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations +which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that +they may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, +into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except +armaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in +China. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with +political and economic questions; and it is through their influence that +dangers arise. + +China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on +the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering +the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan +must count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for +Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. +Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has +ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore +distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or +more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China +may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth +possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may +control China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese +will be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I +believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the +Japanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the +nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and unneighbourly. I +shall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the +relations of China and Japan. + +To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of +Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then +something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, +it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic +relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of +1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of +1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is +possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, +and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan +had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant +foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to +understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation +they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence +the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made +people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to +apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done. + +Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain +what is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost +more important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly +the most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the +resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the +white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only +the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power +in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the +chances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced +nations. + +The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the +conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have +guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it +far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far +Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China +preserve any shadow of independence without a great development of +nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate +nationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say to +patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found +only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world; +it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is +essentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized" +nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their +bombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other +within the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism +has kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being +goaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and +leave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and +rapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a +slender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than +despair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some +tolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that +are worse. + +Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a +psychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, +our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our +imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from +a superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its +own sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has +become somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have +never taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more +indolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally +accepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have +been aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like +China, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has +been governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to +introduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might +have had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not +many) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that +Western push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot +now take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me +far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than +those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of +Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with +our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe +that those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The +Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way of +life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the +world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, +exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency +directed to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this +consummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some +of that wisdom for which it despises the East. + +It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how +profound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks +are attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as +Japan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day after +day, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, +gay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of +everything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understand +and no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us lay +at death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the +indifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of +loud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a +great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed +that none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so +insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the +endless information of the well-informed. + +One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there +were no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of +poplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, and +found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads, +wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled +together surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, others +silently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted up +gnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, +and children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human beings they +undoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to grow +intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knew +that they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a +boat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had +heard--falsely perhaps--that the earth was more generous than in the +country they had left. Some would die by the way, all would suffer +hunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferings +would be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, +unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of +Westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia +is so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planet +are lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the +theorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force them +into actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could not +believe that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of +industrialism and forced labour. + +Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions +of the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a truly +popular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen the +sleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seen +them, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that +patient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely and +unspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiar +intellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics are +inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to +torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or +theory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants, +protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what we +had to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I +heard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the +sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a +terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale. + +It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + + +Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early +history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon +the question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not +composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of +princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or +warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, +whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age +of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age" +mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the +Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks +of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a +fairly high level of civilization--much higher than that of any other +part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, +too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon +its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly +alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive +torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have +inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human +sacrifice; in the Shu-King, however, there is little trace of +superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were all +occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of +the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state +of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows +what was expected of an Emperor:-- + + He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and + thoughtful--naturally and without effort. He was sincerely + courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these + qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and + extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and + virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the + nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also + regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became + brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the + myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were + transformed. The result was universal concord.[1] + +The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history +is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.[2] There is no reason to +doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier +times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the +Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in +1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of +nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this +time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of +France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at +its lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, each +strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over +subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting +for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which +temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians +always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of +eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention. + +What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which +fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious +prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven +at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous +with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Giles +maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct +translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word +"Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the +latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means +"Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both +terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the +God of the Old Testament.[4] + +As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven" +remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The +Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites +continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in +1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven in +Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual +sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official +survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be +called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never +had any connection with the State. + +The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C., +because with this year begins Confucius' _Springs and Autumns_, which is +a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official. + +One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the +Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one +comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He +acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221 +B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable +for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, +the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The +destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by +many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up +again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang +Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all +China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his +son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China" +is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chinese +put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with +what is now China proper. + +The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as +appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being +reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore +history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong +force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of +the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a +vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not +of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and +radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that-- + + All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own + family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office + of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit + themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian + classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go + before the local civil and military authorities so that they may + be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the + Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses + exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity + to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their + relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, + those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent + to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are + those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture + and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws + and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, + op. cit. i. p. 203.) + +It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The +Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other +hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of +old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to +destroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6] +says:-- + + No radical change can take place in China without encountering + the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then + than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical + change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the + worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was + good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their + children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to + support their contention and these they freely quoted to show + that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the + government to such an extent that something had to be done to + silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on + the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any + rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as + were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or + Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature + under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not + of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, + this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a + number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was + subsequently buried alive. + +This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is +anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship +of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has +a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have +excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, +which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made +progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with +a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary +pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has come +down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was +somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two +years, in 191. B.C. + +After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit +his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206 +B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism--exactly +coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in +Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact +with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.[7] Their +relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well +as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. +Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, +and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little +importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164 +a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.[8] +Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which +stands for Antoninus. + +It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense +prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European +armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to +think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as +ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military +superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are +tempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a mere +delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of +the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,[9] dealing with +the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han +dynasty, says:-- + + The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the + history of the world when they have grouped around the people of + Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the + expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these + voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of + these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the + Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same + time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that + of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who + wrote the history of their little world while they believed that + they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole. + +In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is +liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the +civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if +we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion. + +After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of +disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this +dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest +extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.[10] The Empire +of Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained a +great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis +and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in +China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis +destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When +Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people +were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the +corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, +shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have +their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one +of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have +escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill +any that might emerge.[11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and +Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these +massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of +Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of +causing death were more merciful than those that have been employed +since the Armistice. + +Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through +Marco Polo and Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the +first Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the +Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat +abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital +from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which +still surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory +which is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical +instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this +observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the +suppression of the Boxers.[12] I understand they have been restored in +accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If +so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty +secured to the world. + +Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in +the history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two +successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by +storms, and partly by Japanese valour. + +After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, +and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, +and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until +the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways, +and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having +contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the +pigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution. + +The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be +attributed to any military skill; on the contrary, considering its +extent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and +incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and +were less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a +barren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a +very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after +centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, +conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose +their ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and +went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived +the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of +barbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved +from this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the +white men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is +lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national +independence. + +In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese +civilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of +Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as +long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the +world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with +an almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the +eighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50 +millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is +said to have sunk to about 17 millions.[13] A census has been taken at +various times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of +individuals. From the number of houses the population is computed by a +more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different +methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons +between different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam +Weale[14] says:-- + + The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the + restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million + persons, which is less than the number given in the first census + of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai + Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably + a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the + amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the + toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was + so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the + population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less + stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now, + however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of + the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population + had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the + no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145 + millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, + and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) + it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) + it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk + to 261 millions. + +I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year +Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):-- + + The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations + has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates + of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. + The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the + census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910, + the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the + Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a + Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is + pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as + approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not + individuals were counted. + +The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is +given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population +of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at +various other dates are given as follows (p. 2): + +A.D. A.D. +1381 59,850,000 / 143,125,225 +1412 66,377,000 1760--203,916,477 +1580 60,692,000 1761 205,293,053 +1662 21,068,000 1762 198,214,553 +1668 25,386,209 1790 155,249,897 + / 23,312,200 / 307,467,200 +1710 --27,241,129 1792- 333,000,000 +1711 28,241,129 / 362,467,183 +1736 125,046,245 1812--360,440,000 + / 157,343,975 1842 413,021,000 +1743 149,332,730 1868 404,946,514 + \ 150,265,475 1881 380,000,000 +1753 103,050,600 1882 381,309,000 + 1885 377,636,000 + +These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population +of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year +(_e.g._ 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. +Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21 +millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But +no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increased +from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and +1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or +diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or +any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. +What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than +guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be +about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As +for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume +that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely +that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed +can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former +times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to +be distrusted. + +There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization +which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select +as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet +in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion +among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by +examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system +distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a +stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which is +therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I +have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other +countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each +of the three. + +1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but +symbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: it +means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of +different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no +such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, +catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible; +that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be +written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be +represented by some elaborate device.[15] For these reasons, there is a +movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers; +and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to +take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that +they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other +argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where +reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to +decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the +movement for phonetic writing deserves support. + +There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, +which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which +something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably +traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a +sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the +Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can +be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different +sounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese +characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of +dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, +without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in +Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an +Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the +spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from +Latin. + +The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which +enables it to be a means of communication between different places and +different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to +place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is +more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing +spoken sounds than by one which does. + +Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method +of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably +passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a +symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian +hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic +writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of +the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced +civilization--a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact +that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of +homonyms. + +As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the +mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in +an article published in the _Chinese Students' Monthly_ (Baltimore), +for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological +Problems of China." He says (p. 327):-- + + Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as + a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something + inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The + accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental + formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world + culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a + fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical + users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own + virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical + civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and + inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized + portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the + most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the + same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; + up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient + Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and + their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks + and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially + explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language + which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any + solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened + to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No + other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would + give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do.... + + The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the + alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in + the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final + truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already + protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries. + It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it + represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this + language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the + spirit remains to be determined. + +Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which +is impregnated with Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that +the Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization" +as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to +judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the +distinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt +that this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind +indicated in the above quotation. + +2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social +influence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions +and on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of +Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature. +Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about +whose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have +been less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes +him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics, +which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little +religious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in +the countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and +administered the Empire. + +Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than +to that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical +statesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues +he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed +to secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a +peaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was +essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former +ages. He accepted the existing religion--a rather unemphatic +monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved +a shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to +render as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress +upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the +following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards +our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining +always a due reserve."[16] But reverence for spiritual beings was not an +_active_ part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship, +which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's +neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when +he was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right--for the Chinese, unlike +the Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was +justified if he governed very badly. The following passage from +Professor Giles[17] illustrates this point:-- + + The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by + adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a + punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in + his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his + divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an + example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under + the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the + feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of + the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps + the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... + If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits + are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and + what can the people do but get rid of him?" + +This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout +Chinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent. + +Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the +weakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the system +departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated +against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the +tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted +with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the +Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and +accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China +praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to +construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which +Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit +is illustrated by the following story:[18] + + One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high + level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us + here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has + stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my + part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different + standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will + shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found." + +It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus +and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up. + +Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary to +filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the +indigence of one's aged parents.[19] This form of sin, however, is rare +in China as in other countries. + +The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without +children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no +descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has +made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great +biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to +China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this +respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the +preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization +had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the +Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family +became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen +until our own day. + +Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is +certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, +of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to +the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's +loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a +very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to +militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the +interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing +the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore +family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out +by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe. + +Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code +of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It +taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral +code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that +only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with +personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It +was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more +imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he +must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control--an extension +of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He +must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must +"save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries; +he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love +or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all +his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, +but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the +guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have +occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them +less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not +immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack +your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and +won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette; +so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and +fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in +China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the +scourge it is with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian +ethics.[20] + +Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century +A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust +aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,[21] whose interpretation of +Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall +of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured +Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were +struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and +appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of +drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists +of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but +the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were +ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many +centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion +but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and +practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the +belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all +others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be +very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic +lingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there was +religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable +that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding +ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe. + +3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive +examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and +unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its +hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the +present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book +on _China after the War_, pp. 59-60.[22] After considering the +educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues: + + In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of + moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during + the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the + Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was + composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was + considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that + in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who + were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total + enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high + as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of + "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended + by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public + offices. College training and local elections supplemented each + other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest + emphasis. + + Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never + been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the + introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system, + must be held responsible. The "election" system furnished no + fixed standard for the recommendation of public service + candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic + class from which alone were to be found eligible men. + Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the + elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the + competitive examination system in their place. The examinations + were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they + were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the + introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and + stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some + useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese + education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite + of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary + attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in + family education and in private schools. + +Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in +examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, +such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the +Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful +through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was +purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. +The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu +(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects +of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23] +says: + + In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit + of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form + of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This + was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of + Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs," + which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature, + was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, + because after the introduction of the theme the writer was + required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two + members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The + theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five + Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or + any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his + school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of + Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity + with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as + passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. + To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a + man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time + qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was + absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to + recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was + not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect + or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary + development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago + reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely + on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this + rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have + been so long venerated. + +These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no +doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things +that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one +considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was +probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, +the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. +Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the +possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of +administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the +preservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest. +But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away +to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to +perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce +and cruel system which they miscall civilization. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: Legge's _Shu-King,_ p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, _Ancient +History of China_, Columbia University Press, 1911--a book which gives +much useful critical information about early China.] + +[Footnote 2: Hirth, op. cit. p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.] + +[Footnote 3: See Hirth, op. cit., p. 100 ff.] + +[Footnote 4: On this subject, see Professor Giles's _Confucianism and +its Rivals,_ Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.] + +[Footnote 5: Cf. Henri Cordier, _Histoire Générale de la Chine_, Paris, +1920, vol. i. p. 213.] + +[Footnote 6: _Outlines of Chinese History_ (Shanghai, Commercial Press, +1914), p. 61.] + +[Footnote 7: See Hirth, _China and the Roman Orient_ (Leipzig and +Shanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are +allusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. cit., i. +p. 271.] + +[Footnote 8: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 281.] + +[Footnote 9: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 237.] + +[Footnote 10: Murdoch, in his _History of Japan_ (vol. i. p. 146), thus +describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire: + +"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the +illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes +of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign +of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung +(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever +seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of +civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the +most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on +the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines +of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along +these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the +inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the +Hindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and +Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the +Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia."] + +[Footnote 11: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.] + +[Footnote 12: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.] + +[Footnote 13: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.] + +[Footnote 14: _The Truth About China and Japan_. George Allen & Unwin, +Ltd., pp. 13, 14.] + +[Footnote 15: For example, the nearest approach that could be made in +Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word +"Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of +characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.] + +[Footnote 16: Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, _à propos_ +of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following +footnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be +equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to +have meant 'no familiarity.'"] + +[Footnote 17: Op. cit., p. 21.] + +[Footnote 18: Giles, op. cit. p. 86.] + +[Footnote 19: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.] + +[Footnote 20: As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even +more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight." +(Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.] + +[Footnote 21: Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, +and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident +occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles +are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above +the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered +father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are +impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and +the son-in-law's faith revived.] + +[Footnote 22: Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking, +1920.] + +[Footnote 23: Op. cit. p. 233.] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS + + +In order to understand the international position of China, some facts +concerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was +for many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and +fertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. +Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the +beginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of +officials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as +in England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly +religious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was +imported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that +country to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, +but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey +practically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the +seventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. +(What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument +discovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth +centuries Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at +Court, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in +rectifying the irregularities and confusions of the Chinese +calendar.[24] Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the +walls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels +between different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both +China and Japan. + +In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in +China, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a +permanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time +was Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a +patron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens +of his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King +George III is given by Backhouse and Bland.[25] I wish I could quote it +all, but some extracts must suffice. It begins: + + You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, + impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our + civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing + your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent + offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: + the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful + humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. + +He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing +with an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be +gratified. An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for: + + If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills + you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and + code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if + your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our + civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and + customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy + might become, nothing would be gained thereby. + + Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to + maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the + State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... have + no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O + King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater + devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission + to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your + country hereafter. + +He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels +that they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange: + +"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and +lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to +import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own +produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire +produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to +yourselves," the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to +continue. + +He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forget +the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by +intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of +the usages of our Celestial Empire." He concludes with the injunction: +"Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!" + +What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this +document has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the +world, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The +Empire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger +population; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had +not fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by +absorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the +Japanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. +The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the +Great, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of +China, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty +years. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything +needed for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade +upon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things +which they would do better without. + +Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, +namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at +least the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would +not have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is +a museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be +seen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to +impress him with the splendour of _Le Roi Soleil_. Compared to the +Chinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact +that Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and +all the other men who have adorned literature and the arts, does not +make us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and +Robert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by +giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an +Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. +Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung +is absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to +demonstrate this proposition. + +Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese +Government endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with +the cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, +as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and +Scandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on +China, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,[26] a building whose +artistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been +about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that +of Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the +superiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the +river Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at +Hong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British +diplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an +indemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the +French took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under +Chinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to +Japan's complete victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions +would have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany +and Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support +of Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between +China and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the +important rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the +Russo-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution. + +The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in +Shantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of +it; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few +converts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in +Christian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval +base there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, +which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with +the Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese +possession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its +restitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did +not, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the +German Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, +since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. +Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and +to hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the +Boxer rising, which is said to have begun as a movement against the +Germans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in +every respect, the Russians by creating a naval base at Port Arthur, +the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the +Yangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the +policy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door. + +The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans +know about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of +Peking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of +Peking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, +filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a +bare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is +administered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no +powers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and +traitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the +Japanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their +crimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the +Americans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of +communicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of +Chien Lung is completed. + +Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The +Americans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they +still had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on +higher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, +partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. +The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the +friendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is +incalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any +signs of following suit. + +To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is +faced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, +China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which +have been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no +experience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in +later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps +of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers--a +prerogative which every single one of them exercises. + +The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.[27] At +the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty +which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports +and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the +whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a +schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be +calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only +been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.[28] Revision of the +schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in +the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is +practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties +involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with +twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the +tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers. + +When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it +must be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese +the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign +States.[29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no +time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other +commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to +find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no +motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised +free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we +forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But +no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have +abandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act. + +The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for +the sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all +exports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, +and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is +desperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should +consider the tax indispensable. + +There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time +of the Taiping rebellion, namely the erection of internal customs +barriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with +the internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending +goods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the +payment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is +generally less than the internal tariff charges, this provision favours +foreign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of +internal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the +ground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal +customs in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export +tariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But +there were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all +could be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not +chiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should +be added that internal customs are collected by the provincial +authorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies +and civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong +enough to stop these abuses. + +The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the +Chinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the +service, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of +any other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials +is in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures) +there were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000 +were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, +by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties +exceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the +present system. The Chinese have the appointment of the +Inspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to +their country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, +so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern +bureaucracy. So long as the foreign officials are responsible to the +Chinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful +educative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an +efficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical +and intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their +slaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs +has much to recommend it during the early stages.[30] + +At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence +in the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact +that the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue +derivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, +so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of +Chinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the +Customs administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese +politics by recognizing or not recognizing a given _de facto_ +Government. (There is no Government _de jure_, at any rate in the +North.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an +artificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary +instincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal +reform. It means that no Government which is in earnest in attempting +to introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, +which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of +reconstruction. + +There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was +accepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the +security acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the +employment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the +Customs, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, +and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards +the Customs. + +The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to +China. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities +of interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. +The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three +telegrams in _The Times_ which appeared during January of this year. + +On January 14, 1922, _The Times_ published the following in a telegram +from its Peking correspondent: + + It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be + rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a + substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, + while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and + simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the + Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all + records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the + Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to + liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very + few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the + Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a + Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible + prospect of the removal of this difficulty. + +I venture to think _The Times_ would regard the difficulty as removed +if the Manchu Empire were restored. + +As to the "splendid salt surplus," there are two telegrams from the +Peking correspondent to _The Times_ (of January 12th and 23rd, +respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government +artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as +follows:-- + + Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is + happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the + Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet + faithful to the Central Government--the better half went over to + the Canton Government long ago--has dispatched a squadron of + gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if + $3,000,000 (about £400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately + forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the + revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has + been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic + Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for + immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the + traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate. + +The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:-- + + The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a + serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in + my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near + Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of + Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in + the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate + the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and + Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the + Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do + not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The + Reorganization Loan of £25,000,000 is secured on the salt + revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the + department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In + various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, + the local _Tuchuns_ (military governors) impound the collections + and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the + foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so + large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have + considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points + on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is + another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the + amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers + would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any + active form of intervention in this country. In view of the + extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present + interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000 + (£11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been + dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on + January 28th remains unsolved. + +It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting +punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the +Washington Conference should attempt to interfere! + +It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon +themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. +This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a +man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is +expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore +can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the +family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China +realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of +honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe--no +very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with +Western nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese +nationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will +begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for +the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, +but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power for +good in China will be at an end. + +I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did +to China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in +modern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. +Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of +modern Japan--a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is +not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But +before passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social +and political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in +China would be unintelligible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 24: In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining +his attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: +"As to the western doctrine which glorifies _Tien Chu_, the Lord of the +Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly +conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them--a point +which you soldiers and people should understand." (Giles, op. cit. p. +252.)] + +[Footnote 25: _Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking_, pp. 322 ff.] + +[Footnote 26: The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly +built by the Empress Dowager.] + +[Footnote 27: There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. +vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's _Modern China_, Clarendon Press, 1919.] + +[Footnote 28: A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington +Conference.] + +[Footnote 29: If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained +possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the +policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly +satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.] + +[Footnote 30: _The Times_ of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on +Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be +allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did +not deal with the Customs _administration_, nevertheless _The Times_ +assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of +the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption +which it would afford. I wrote to _The Times_ pointing out that they had +confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was +dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not +print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to +conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +MODERN CHINA + + +The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, +because in population and potential strength China is the greatest +nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of +the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been +brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington +Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it +is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts +and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try +to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which +it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, +though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic +development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as +our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we +shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon +China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses +have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason +has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the +Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst +is Japan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own larger +interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan +and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America +stands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. +Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination +by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers +become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very +essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, +internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be +a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only +ultimate solution. + +After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, +namely, the present internal condition of China. + +As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, +decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many +causes led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of +Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a +warlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon +the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails +and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike +compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were +rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This +characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in +common. + +The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but +differences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from the +more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained +inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous +foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, +destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful +people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which +lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have +diminished the population by 150 millions,[31] and was almost as +terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful +whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded +(by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China +by Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising +(1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for +a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. +But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after +the Boxer movement that the revolution broke out. + +The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit +to ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the +Canton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected +provisional President. But the Nothern Army remained faithful to the +dynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its +Commander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better scheme. +He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on +condition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. +Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the Legations, being what is +called a "strong man," _i.e._ a believer in blood and iron, not likely +to be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North +has always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan +Shih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in +the way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he +had every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic +corps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must +be admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of +his policy and methods. + +A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave +place to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine +the permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the +Parliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament +wished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but +he had the preponderance in military strength. Under these +circumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon +overthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament +(which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by +unconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to +a revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After +this, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of +China. He appointed his army lieutenants military governors of +provinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His régime might +have lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, +and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916--of a broken heart, +it was said. + +Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military +governors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government +when his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the +populations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been +civil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to +determine which of various rival generals should govern various groups +of provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but +this has lost most of its constitutional significance. + +The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are +called Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit +depredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. +They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and +administered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally +appointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the +soldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, +and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such +portions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to +surrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the +Japanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be +prolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met +there for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely +civil to the President and the Prime Minister, who still officially +represent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal +Government was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt +treasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, +to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to +Chang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool +of Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to +Mongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he +would undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at +Mukden ever since.[32] + +In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government +of a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. +Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, +succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its +Northern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government +under the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two +provinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a +moment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has +been checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the +neighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes +designs of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.[33] +In all ascertainable respects it is a Government which deserves the +support of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the +_New Republic_, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity +which it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This +opposition is partly on general principles, because we dislike radical +reform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement--of a +common type in China--would have given us a virtual monopoly of the +railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded +with the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the +change of Government has made ratification impossible. The new +Government, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of +them, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or +less similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The +American Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the +British Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have +lost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because +we, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is +vigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement +lapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital. + +The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend +of China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a +mistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in +magnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to +a single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In _The Times_ of +November 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article headed: "The Peril of +China. A dozen rival Governments." But in Europe there are much more +than a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those +of China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in +China, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of +destruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has +been incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. +You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that +you will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being +fought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which +they are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the +inhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the +average, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole. + +It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes +possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing +a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into +provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the +revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was +attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful +working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population +without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in +Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now +favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not +much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty +of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The +Central Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find +the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad +enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But +it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan +without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese +independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find +a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign +assistance. + +It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, +and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of +consolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has +great weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite +possibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, +at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the +others. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been +already mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in +Japanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. +Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is +an able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he +established his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a +blow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to +terms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself +with Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his +authority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see +Appendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a +breathing-space is all that is needed. + +The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few +regions where there are mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking +has nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to +the fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built +round a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far +as I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in +the whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government +employment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and +the work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long +and the pay infinitesimal. + +Seventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in +agriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while +wheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.[34] +The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only +just sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived +in China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to +drought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, +as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned, +foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the +Chinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those +who died of it shared this view. + +Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide +their holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely +sufficient to support himself and his family. Consequently, when the +rainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It +would of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more +scientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by +afforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly +improved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. +But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually +supposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their +families continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of +population, according to many writers, finds full scope.[35] If so, the +good done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of +more children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the +end, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher +standard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And +popular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there +is a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these +difficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of +competent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary +education. + +Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional +life of China takes two forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. +Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have +opened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we +had not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our +intercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background; +one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners +as such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that +intercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but +apparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where +unreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. +The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable +intellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum +of common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether +privately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of +enriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets. + +In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, +with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops +full of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese +part of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the +rich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through +a gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered +beauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and +Sunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, +half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, +spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and +disease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always +made me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life +would not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for +the poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life +brings more happiness to the Chinese than English life does to us. At +any rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do +not think it would be true. + +Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of +Shanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there +is so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of +which is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over +China, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, +is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are +divided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route +from Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which +has long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From +Peking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned +by the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern +bank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it +only runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of +the railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the +importance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong. + +In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower +Yangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of +industrialism. China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are +mostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number +of cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the +employer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern +China the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is +an inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long +hours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it +literally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is +not the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China +will not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and +education enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in +China, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid +and cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible +method by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is +in sight. + +The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that +which it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been +practically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many +centuries the country has been governed by the successful candidates in +competitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of +prestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the +old traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now +teaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and +public opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have +intellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including +Chang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,[36] are, of course, mostly +too stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes +their régime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China--_i.e._ of +those who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at +home--is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for +learning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, +because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their +outlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will +probably be strong enough to regenerate China--if only the Powers will +allow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action. + +It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of +Young China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a +modern education, and I should like to give some idea of their +mentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two +generations: the older men, who had fought their way with great +difficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian +prejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and +colleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded +people ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight +against the family. The older men--men varying in age from 30 to +50--have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of +the rationalists of Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, +painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the +beliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science +and a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and +miraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will give you +some idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in +becoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, +their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. +But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they +have achieved in their own minds. + +It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our +culture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate +Chinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen +among the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization +even when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal +candour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the +industrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When +they become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to +spread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire +the front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings +along the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best." In all this they +differ greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from +America; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were +soaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling +activity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the +prejudices in which they were brought up, they have not taken on a new +set, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to +consider any proposition honestly on its merits. + +The younger men, however, have something more than the first generation +of modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have +retained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the +pioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This +may be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more +than that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with +Western ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them +without a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without +being torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn +Western knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made +the process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still +have reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their +predecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing +practically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese +reverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I +see the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them +practical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in +the directions in which it ought to move. + +There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that +is the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important then +detailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the +Confucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial +society. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and +broadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, +have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical +efficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be +taken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of +some new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can +exterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to +be horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our +god; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee." And +so it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the +opposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing +really necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee, +Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the +British Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestry +in China."[37] In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of +forestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are +suitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (_e.g_. for +railway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that +the floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely +prevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were +reafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most +reforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject +for ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because +Confucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will +be cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory +as it is taught in our universities, and despise such humble questions +as the utility of trees. After learning all about (say) the proper +relations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find that +some Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not +considered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in +the West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally true +everywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students are +most eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial +processes might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our +theoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industry +is already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginning +to be a marked improvement. + +It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook +and that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most +modern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maxims +to replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men's +morals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they +dare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference +of morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, because +we are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes _per diem_. +What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about +government, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the +Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring +the mechanistic outlook. + +Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." I mean +something which exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the +Y.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes all these from the Chinese +outlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean is +the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our +scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. +The essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual who +has this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense of +perception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other +people to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual +is not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously +assailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or other of which he is +too apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the +class-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the +mystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in +their Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind except +as potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the +spread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a +life against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, is +as old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulent +forms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to +protest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a +fable[38]:-- + + Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to + protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, + and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the real + nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them. + + One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of + horses." + + So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and + put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them + by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that + two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and + thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and + trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the + fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them + were dead. + + The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it + round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square." + + The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it + curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line." + + But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and + wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and + line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in + managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with + clay and wood. Those who _govern_ the Empire make the same + mistake. + +Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the +chief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this +fable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane and +tolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of the +West. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to +see whether they "drink water and fling up their heels over the +champaign," and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. +Unlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the +foreigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into +trousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as +a rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of +cutting off the Emperor's head, as other nations do, they left him his +title, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about £600,000), and +he remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his +etiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with +a Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter +you or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature +or a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate +perception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of +pictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk +swooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his +claws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All +these pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one +feels also in their dealings with human beings--something which I can +perhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, +unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing +their best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of +which our Western world has far too little. Together with their +exquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite +extraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton +and cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake +of the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems +translated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley[39] is called _Business Men_, +and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects +in which the Chinese are our superiors:-- + + Business men boast of their skill and cunning + But in philosophy they are like little children. + Bragging to each other of successful depredations + They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body. + What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth + Who saw the wide world in a jade cup, + By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth: + On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability? + +I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth" +would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as +that is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of +solving the Far Eastern question. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 31: _The Truth about China and Japan_, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. +14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (_Modern China_, p. 13) says that +it "killed twenty million people," which is the more usual estimate, cf. +_China of the Chinese_ by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the +population was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt +that 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.] + +[Footnote 32: In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more +subservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by +Wu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 33: The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to +have made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton +Government was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng +Chiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (_The Times_, +April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See +Appendix.] + +[Footnote 34: The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, +especially in Manchuria.] + +[Footnote 35: There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the +birth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether +the birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet +by my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union +Medical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the +average number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while +the infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show +that the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of +statistics, generalizations about the population question in China must +be received with extreme caution.] + +[Footnote 36: I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. +Bland, _per contra_, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. +Contrast p. 104 of his _China, Japan and Korea_ with pp. 143, 146 of +Coleman's _The Far East Unveiled_, which gives the view of everybody +except Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin +reported in _The Times_ recently, but he was, of course, unable to +estimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.] + +[Footnote 37: Printed in _China in 1918_, published by the _Peking +Leader_.] + +[Footnote 38: _Musings of a Chinese Mystic_, by Lionel Giles (Murray), +p. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his _Texts of +Taoism_ in _Sacred Books of the East_, Vol. XXXIX.] + +[Footnote 39: Waley, 170 _Chinese Poems_, p. 96.] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION + + +For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order +to understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know +something of that country, to which we must now turn our attention. + +In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the +persistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the +centuries. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" by +no means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from +Korea in 552 A.D.[40] At the same time and from the same source Chinese +civilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through +the occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won +favour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to +China in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The +Japanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism +nationally they ordered one or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, +with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the +adherents of the traditional Shinto religion.[41] After some +vicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign +religion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than +Shinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief +religion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable +to find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of +peasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods" +(which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism.[42] Probably the +revival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing belief +in that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of the +population. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned, +Buddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto. + +The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to +restore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of +645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the +good old days. What the object was of those who established the +government of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that +may be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and +internal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low +ebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great +feudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government +fell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made +intelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved +imitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. The Chinese +Emperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from +the Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a +vigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so. + +The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of +645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is +set forth by Murdoch[43] as follows:-- + + In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled + on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends + who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for + purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some + of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the + British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they + certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the + four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization + with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the + sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye--for they + were two of this venturesome quartette--have often told of their + rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these + despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan + they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their + effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place + Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world. + +The two students who went to China in 608 A.D. "rendered even more +illustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have +done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked +back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, +and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two +National Doctors." + +Politically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately +following was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and +Richelieu--curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the +sovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. +The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably +with about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, +there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, +but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, +in 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, +but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just +the opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious +mixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies. + +Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems +to see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, +namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China +on the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, +and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which +went on in mediæval Europe between the Church, which represented ideas +derived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to +preserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, +Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization +over rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in +Japan. + +After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, +but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So +long as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power) +it continued to represent what was most civilized in Japan: the study +of Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve +respect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who +remained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were +so degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it +would have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them +and the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly +from the mediæval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, +although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even +greater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the +secular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado +and his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of +the Restoration. + +The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the +nominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of +power to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of +their infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some +monastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented +the military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of +the Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title of +the people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun," which means +"Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being the +Ainus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the +form which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto +Yoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But +before long the Shogun became nearly as much of a figure-head as the +Mikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the +actual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This +lasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened +that Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the +Minamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun +himself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished +at the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the +practice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister +and his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, +but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their +successors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter. + +What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the +Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, +originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming +at the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both +ignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted +the future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions +of peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to +undergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of +warlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching +doctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism +became national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became +important feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was +ready to fight on the slightest provocation. Sieges of monasteries and +battles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history. + +The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years' +experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country +completely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and +closely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the +Portuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final +expulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is +instructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought +with them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated +the former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually +no Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were +engaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, +Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed +than were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island +(containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and +were throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing +merchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their +larger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread +of Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and +their guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The +Portuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to +make converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese +began to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the +Portuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping +the Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese had +been able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a +Papal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit +monopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards +from Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican +and Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the +Jesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled +furiously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the +Japanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought +against the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the +extent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their +national independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the _San +Felipe_, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast +of Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his +harbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, +which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000 +crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in +Japan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had +the Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after +trying reason in vain, attempted intimidation. + + He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast + extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him + how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the + sway of a single man.... "Our Kings," said this outspoken seaman, + "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer + _religieux_ who induce the people to embrace our religion, and + when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who + combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not + much trouble in accomplishing the rest."[44] + +As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the +Portuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. +Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with +Japan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, +Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, +Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally +gave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the +Japanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, +they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian +nations. + +Meanwhile, a succession of three great men--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and +Iyeyasu--had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the +quasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of +internal peace which lasted until the Restoration--period of nearly two +and a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central +Government to enforce whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to +the foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between +them had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about +300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to +be subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account +of their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical +position. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began +in 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, has had +great power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during +its rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to +Christianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the +movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may +be, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible +without losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more +anti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in +1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in +the most vigorous terms:-- + + So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold + as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip + himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great + Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with + their heads.[45] + +The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly +cruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political +motives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with +the King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no +foreign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of +Christians against the newly established central power. Economic +exploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart +from political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if +there had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the +power of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese +armies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; the +Japanese had learnt the use of fire-arms; and their knowledge of +strategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest +cities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population +of Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would +therefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any +expedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have +been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. +But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world +showing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. +Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, +where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the +inmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of +European Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their +reports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The +Japanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the +white men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel +convinced that it was unwise. + +For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry's +squadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace +and almost complete stagnation--the only period of either in Japanese +history, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of +fire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy +until they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see +another period of isolation. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 40: The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's +_History of Japan_, The volume dealing with the earlier period is +published by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was +published earlier; its title is: _A History of Japan during the Century +of Early Foreign Intercourse_ (1542--1651), by James Murdoch M.A. in +collaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the _Japan Chronicle_, +1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II +respectively.] + +[Footnote 41: Murdoch I. pp. 113 ff.] + +[Footnote 42: Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.] + +[Footnote 43: Murdoch I. p. 147.] + +[Footnote 44: Murdoch, II, p. 288.] + +[Footnote 45: Murdoch II, p. 667.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +MODERN JAPAN + + +The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the +history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would +have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan +to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is +almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration +in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has +risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great +War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading +statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the +beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with +ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders +and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To +realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining +the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time +of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific +knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in +the Book of Joshua. + +The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have been +duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an +immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so +little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has +brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to +that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to +tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has +synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most +anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for +social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily +interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been +effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than +appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends +to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and +Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people +suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but +this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon. + +Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two +separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially +pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more +analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is +no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to +give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that +country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good +books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative +is McLaren's _Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era_ +1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared +in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course +invaluable; his book _Japan, An Interpretation_ shows his dawning +realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the +cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to +say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan. + +Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the +Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of +his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful +of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at +various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been +in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during +its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, +except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era +was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the +country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the +Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed +Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics +and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces +and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore +first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which +Japan has played in international affairs. + +What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to +power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end +of the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems to +have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy +personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with +contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was +often kept in great poverty. + + Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of + early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the + Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a + Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no + aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were + in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on + their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the + Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to + examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the + Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was + regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the + autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of + the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western + Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing + with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the + throne. + + In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the + relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be + sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by + Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, + throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the + Heavenly Gods.[46] + +What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very +different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado +had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the +ancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogun +for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial +treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never +willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren +once more (p. 33):-- + + The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of + Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the + expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! + Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in + enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific + attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not + be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was + directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, + but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general + unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in + armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years + previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had + been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising + gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the + students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those + men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. + +This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan +down to the present day. + +The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the +West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, +in his authoritative _History of Japan,_[47] says:-- + + + + In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development + most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at + fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the + solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and + facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain + their own unit of social organization, which is not the + individual, as with us, but the _family_. Furthermore, the + resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central + and local, to certain European systems is not the result of + imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is + merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who + overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal + system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new + equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe + for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or + twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the + administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan + by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 + A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding + fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten + Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of + officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from + China and established in the seventh century.... The present + administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was + neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor + adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity + that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies. + +The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of +the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the +foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and +secured the support of the country by being the champions of +nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted +which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan +from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the +greatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the Central +Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, +China and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and a +protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and +commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and +worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and +by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation +of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern +Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of +preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little +pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese +and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few +Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called _The Invention of a New +Religion_, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He +points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, +to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very +ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on +obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto +has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as +to suit modern requirements.[48] It is, of course, preferable to +Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not +one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has +been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado. + +Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the +Mikado until some time after the Restoration:-- + + The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its + sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the + beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of + living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been + assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was + the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have + been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long + centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the + Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, + generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. + At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of + the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the + Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling + their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest + against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign + (that of Meiji)--the most glorious in Japanese history--there + have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was + set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in + another. + +This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely +credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of +superstition has gone _pari passu_ with the spread of education, and a +revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the +midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and +instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there +is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler--as absolute as any sovereign +ever has been. + +The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. +Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied +from Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D., +whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to +somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese +pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that +the Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain +again:-- + + The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the + fifth century _after_ Christ, and even the accounts of what + happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. + Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the + certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy + does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient + circumstance. While granting a dispensation _re_ the national + mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of + the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who + strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in + Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will + starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading _Commentary + on the Japanese Constitution_ down to school compendiums, the + absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon. + +This question of fictitious early history might be considered +unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to +believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of +the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought +and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:-- + + Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, + was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it + is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the + popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where + they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change + all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado + descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, + and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims + the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and + constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense + popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and + low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as + public servants, but rather as executants of supreme--one might + say supernatural--authority. Shinto, because connected with the + Imperial family, is to be alone honoured. + +All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese +politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of +the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, +and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented +politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes +miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no +constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of +the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are +omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them +the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have +invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the +Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves +take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and +Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The +Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so +until the Mikado is captured by some other clique. + +From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom +in the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan were +a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists +of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there +is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to +dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly +there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and +making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the +Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and +the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy +in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. +There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and +anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese +industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as +Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed +there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has +saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed +if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of +these occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after +the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of +Japanese politics.[50] + +In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to +impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, +and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The Russian +Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated +men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the +Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it +had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it +would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a +prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed +secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the +restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations +to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, +faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse +the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of +neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, +led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to +alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the +peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they +would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact +resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was +known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The +Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the +indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese +demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed +up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese +announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted +the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus +the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, +because they had been tricked--the former in the belief that it could +yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter +in the belief that the Government would never give way about the +indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, +furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government--of the +nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the +real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision +of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view; +there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could +not have been made without trickery. + +Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in +which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as +democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that +Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, +took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all +their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great +Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the +Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin +with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japan +there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about +25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter +compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than +that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from +pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the +Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not +collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine +must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, +but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of +course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the +Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet +refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be +applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted +temporarily by Imperial decree--a provision which had no analogue in the +German Constitution. + +The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, +it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, +since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. +To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in +conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was +issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the +Constitution as follows[51]:-- + + Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire + of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors + unbroken for ages eternal." + + "By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his + _Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan_, "it is meant that + the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of + the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects." + + Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred + and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is + peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established + at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The + Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent + above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. + He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no + power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no + irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither + be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion." + + Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises + the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary + power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, + prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not + sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The + Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, + makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and + commutation of punishments. + + As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article + 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their + advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." + + Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in + framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of + his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities + belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a + Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the + Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of + State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included + by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is + only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to + the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But + the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open + answers from them before the public, and it may also present + addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions. + + "The Minister President of State is to make representations to + the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to + His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, + every branch of the administration being under control of the + said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his + responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the + other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for + the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint + responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the + Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike + personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one + of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the + Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of + control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the + latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some + countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate + body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct + of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint + responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the + power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme + power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be + approved of according to our Constitution." + +In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first +four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the +Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by +Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen +of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with +introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished +to preserve Japanese independence _vis-à -vis_ the Western Powers, but +did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own +account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. +Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of +the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. +But when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to an +earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The +Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous +at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by +glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and +France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war +against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the +hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government +has never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as the +Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant +international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. +Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was +afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was +powerless to prevent it.[52] His opposition, however, was tiresome, +until at last he was murdered in Korea. + +Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a +consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The +nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two +chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed +towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant +as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the +present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. +An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing +system, but the whole unity and _morale_ of the nation; I do not believe +that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be. +Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal +regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive +element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan +to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact +everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, +industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot +emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the +mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore +the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into +industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing +food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because +Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot +obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with +America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong +navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very +similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy +requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets +requires--or rather, is thought to require--starvation wages and long +hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, most +of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day +and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.[53] Labour organization +is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain to +spread if the number of industrial workers increases without a very +marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of +the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable +of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are +vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism +and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of +myth upon which the Japanese State depends.[55] There is therefore a +likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence--assuming a peaceful and +prosperous development in the meantime--of a very bitter class conflict +between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and +bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with +agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue. + +The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for +the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop +industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control +Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic +interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a +large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for +wage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners +means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial +piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a +continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which +the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with +the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, +there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution. + +From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a +diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent +to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is +fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which +patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to +emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, +involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but +ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be free +thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. +Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that +remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 46: McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.] + +[Footnote 47: Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.] + +[Footnote 48: "What _popular_ Shinto, as expounded by its village +priests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully +selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true +aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of +Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which +disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight." (Murdoch, I, +p. 173 n.)] + +[Footnote 49: The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. +Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office and +Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. +When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on +tho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to +regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme of +party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of +the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but +are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial +Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are +titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments +showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the +great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military +man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom +policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, +albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."] + +[Footnote 50: The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit. +chaps, xii. and xiii.] + +[Footnote 51: _The Far East Unveiled_, pp. 252-58.] + +[Footnote 52: See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.] + +[Footnote 53: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.] + +[Footnote 54: See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour +Movements in Japan," published by the _Japan Chronicle_, 1921, for an +account of what is happening in this direction.] + +[Footnote 55: _The Times_ of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from +its correspondent in Tokyo, _à propos_ of the funeral of Prince +Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:-- + +"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of +expenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which +was introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as +the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last +year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not +render true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the +highest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic +institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that +the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the +resolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the +incident."] + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 + + +Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is +necessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking +of the "Yellow Races," as though China and Japan formed some kind of +unity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead +one to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in +comparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the +Chinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities; +but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very +small. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in the +scale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a +hairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit +the Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan +descent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest +importance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and +Chinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more +important than a common racial origin. + +It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived +from China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as +Chinese, and Buddhism, which is still the religion of the people, is of +the sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which +are the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported +along with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the +irruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different +histories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar +had developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of +the First Emperor (_c._ 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land +empire, having much contact with foreign nations--Annamese, Burmese, +Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an +island kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea +and occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at +war with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal +chivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative +problems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines +of Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China +was still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in +one of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But +naturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that +which befel them in their own country. + +In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue +one finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, +which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised +where conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were +in feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on +the contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire was so vast and +immemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a +different set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and +compromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves +plunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in +developing the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the +situation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been +schooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal +anarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated +the previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like +our thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our +mechanism but dislike our thought. + +From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a +unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and +India contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are +easily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with +modern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely +than in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and +invulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong +as to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if +Russia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German +organizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of +possibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for +power and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal +mentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon +Asiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it +conflicts with China and Russia, which the present weakness of those +Powers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both +are likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the +essential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent. + +It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two +somewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as +the champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the +other hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, +and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are +inefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to +China and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has +inspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of +Korea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a +member of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of +the Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great +Powers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in +Asia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who +happen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in +the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred million +natives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of Great +Britain."[56] While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable +Englishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived +from the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply +an intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates the +intensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may +be, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before +the Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley[57] +quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the +following list of white men's sins:-- + + (1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that + all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization. + + (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, + but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors. + + (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession + is made to them they demand and take more. + + (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races + in greatness and wickedness. + + (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of + everything, will adopt any measures to gain it. + +This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have +supposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be +unlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They +argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as +possible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed +by Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been +equalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his +wildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he +wants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards +Japan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is +to be above the whites, not merely equal with them. Count Okuma put the +matter very simply in an address given in 1913:-- + + The white races regard the world as their property and all other + races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the + rôle of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they + please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, + and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white + races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, + and woe to them.[58] + +It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that +Japan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the +eminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the +Japanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us. + +The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal +affairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without +first consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had +infringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war +caused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and +decisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to +oppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the +Boxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the +fruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and +France, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for +themselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans +presumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow +Peril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese +war inevitable. It would not have mattered much to Japan if the Chinese +had established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have +constituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for +nothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called +Dairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the +Chinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting +Port Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having +accomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The +Russo-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this +Alliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the +corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, +when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided +that, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, +the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally +inspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the +Russian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from +calling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and +Russia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of +Portsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance +served its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese +war. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to +acquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus +curbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an +Entente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded +with France in 1904 would have been useless, and the alliance which +defeated Germany could not have been created. + +Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia +alone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her +strength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to +greatness was due to our support. + +The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all +interference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called +Dairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. +This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then been +called the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437 +miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen +as the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely +naval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to +Western models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a +treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910 +they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists +with every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be +fully the equals of the white men. + +The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a +monopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was +practically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China +by means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. +Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,[59] which shows how +the South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:-- + +"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed a contract with Messrs +Pauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways +northwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for +the work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan +protested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol +annexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that +'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the +neighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any +branch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that +railway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and +Russia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without +Russian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the +Russian rights, the projected line could not be built without her +consent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in +tone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was +obviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task! + +"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the +clause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to +Hsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to +build the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, +although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were +specificially excluded from participation in railway construction north +of the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British +Note the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and +Chinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the +agreement. + +"Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in +Manchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902 +and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of +the bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from +seeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. +Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but +with no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State +Department at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her +action was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which +assigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway +(South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining +thereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III +and IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is +declared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or +exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty +or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the +second is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct +any general measures common to all countries which China may take for +the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.' + +"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to +build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of +Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not +a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of +Manchuria.' + +"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling +in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such +flagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and +pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since +recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its +subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as +the protest from Tokio.... + +"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men +railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other +projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the +important Antung-Mukden line.[60] The same alleged secret protocol was +used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the +Newchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in +1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with +Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was +construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration +within the railway zone.'" + +Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover +the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung--though the latter has +been nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or +by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired +vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and +have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the +provinces through which they run. + +After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and +agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting +Manchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. +Russia had entered into extensive obligations to support Japan's claims +at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. +Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the +support of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the Far +Eastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international +questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party +aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They +have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, +as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China +politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several +times in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was +obtaining financial support from some Japanese.[61] When the revolution +actually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was +prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems +that the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the +union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. +Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor +of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, +though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of +some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions +of Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation +gives the gist[62]:-- + + It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on + December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, + with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East." + This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese + Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd + categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances + would Japan recognize a republican form of government in + China.... In connection with the peace conference held at + Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a + trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to + Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the + dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the + Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with + the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria + against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by + Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese + protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining + concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. + Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian + Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of + day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied + their authenticity. + +The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the +Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the +day. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was +strongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as +strongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the +influence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to +make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would +doubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war +came, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told +in a separate chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 56: Quoted by A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policy_, Allen & +Unwin, 1920, p. 18.] + +[Footnote 57: Op. cit. p. 16 n.] + +[Footnote 58: Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.] + +[Footnote 59: A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 48-51.] + +[Footnote 60: This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.] + +[Footnote 61: Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.] + +[Footnote 62: Page 66.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR + + +The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is +Japanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but +after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach +in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their +new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The +Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to +have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at +issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time +there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one +side rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely +victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure +possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in +Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending +China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by +the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of +Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse +after the Great War. + +The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have +the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. +But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, +the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military +control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were +displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. +(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung. + +Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China +could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to +turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, +who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese +remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they +presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the +Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented +in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with +Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms +Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese +province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain +specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be +opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted +to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria +and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a +protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for +Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial +enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron +and steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze,[63] where we claim +a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, +that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except +Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that +Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed +by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be +administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely +Japanese in _personnel_; that China should purchase from Japan at least +50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese +arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and +employing Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to +construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan +should have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and +finally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda +in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics. + +These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chinese +independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and +industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British +position in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we +had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands +constituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an +uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action +against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were +explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.[64] He had no +time to find out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret +agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan +wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.[65] By the +terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the +Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan +communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus +definitely breaking the treaty;[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr. +Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles. + +China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured +certain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by an +ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on +the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth +group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.[67] In +this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United +States immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the +agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore +still able to do something to further the objects for which we were +supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In +1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, +it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the +Ishii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the +United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, +particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The +rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.[68] + +I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.[69] +In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing +diplomatic relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the +declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off +diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all +neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in +Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He +induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of +expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, +on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of +declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected +with these events deserve some study. + +In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese +had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, +French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for +reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been +some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should +participate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. +These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of +Japan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear +that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. +When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in +Tokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, +Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as of +paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan +could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient +Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in +the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of +the economic activities of 400,000,000 people."[70] Accordingly the +proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the +Japanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their +sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they +filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing +them of cowardice and military incompetence.[71] + +But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the +situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience +to Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had +always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing +to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic +relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no +_promises_ to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American +Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was +ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were +bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged +China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and +Great Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continued +support of Japan. + +In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was +inviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan +concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. +This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the +assistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital +interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China +from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having +hostile designs against Russia or Japan." The last article provided that +"the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of +the High Contracting Parties."[72] That is to say, the treaty was not +communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of +Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The High +Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting +the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the +prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement," +one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all +Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese +Empire. + +On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to +sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with +Japan containing the following words:-- + + His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the + request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they + will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of + Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north + of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being + understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual + peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims + to the German islands south of the equator. + +The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by +Notes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo.[73] On February +19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian +Ambassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial Japanese +Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace +negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special +interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands +belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." +The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:-- + + The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the + Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the + Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung + and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It + also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese + Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed + before the war in this Chinese province and these islands. + + M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support + to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations + with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. + The consequences in China should be the following: + + First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and + consuls; + + Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave + Chinese territory; + + Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the + ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the + disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and + Portugal; + + Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in + China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she + possesses in certain ports of China. + +The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian +Ambassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:-- + + In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is + charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it + can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of + Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual + surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung + and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in + the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.[74] + +It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no +_quid pro quo_, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the +previous year. + +After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's +participation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the +hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope +being realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest +ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the +Chinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last +days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished +by the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917. + +Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into +the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has +been one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the +revolutionary movement.[75] If the Chinese had not been interfered with +at this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding in +establishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his +successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine +constitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had +dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was +resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, +and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan +Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his +Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese +Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic +relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue. + +On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It +was President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking +off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; +but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented +a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of +national unity was more important than entry into the war, and +suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What +had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never +have become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by +the Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to +instigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat +Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration +of war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd +George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.[76] The Cabinet, on +May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration +of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to +coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved +impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to +compel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the +Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act +as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of +constitutional government. After these various illegalities, the +military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their +number, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu +Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more +agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, +sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient +unconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to +declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and +against militarism. + +Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the +war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of +the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We +wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living +in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German +trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was +duly carried out--not only public property, but private property also, +so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to +the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till +after the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics in +overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of +hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities +insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew +to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the +Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took +upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the merciless +persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have +been much greater. + +The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of +Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the +belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side +two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to +the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our +operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with +proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be +fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, +after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for +ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet +get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law +and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of +German-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that."[77] The +European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to +enter the war for righteousness. + +We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration +of war. What Japan gained was somewhat different. + +The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, +was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist +Japanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the +war, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality--for +Japan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of +Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal +elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the +Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were +concluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially +published, is given by Millard.[78] By these agreements the Japanese +were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and +Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of +the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and +generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the +excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient. + +After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they +placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,[79] _i.e.,_ +about £25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were +as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of +victory. Unfortunately for Japan, the side on which Japan was fighting +in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies +of Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For +various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until +after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace +negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were +compelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed +everything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have +joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on +this subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the +most interesting in his book.[80] By Article 156 of the Treaty of +Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, +title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung.[81] Although +President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, +America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise +the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles +resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, +encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,[82] refused to sign +the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province +as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to +a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we had +annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in +the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext. + +Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public +opinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 +was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly +ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the +Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu +leaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking +Government has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always +for American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her +position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America might +re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference +was announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a +view to having the question settled before the opening of the +Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory +concessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional +evacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of +England and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the +American Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I +understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with +America. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount +to much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. +On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington +Conference. + +There is a question with which the Washington Conference determined not +to concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great +importance in the Far East--I mean the question of Russia. It was +considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, +to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, +with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. +Their existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in a +quarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselves +in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russia +has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the +Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after +a time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake +Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern +Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is +practically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have +launched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks--Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, +etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in military +occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, +though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire. + +In the early days of the Bolshevik régime the Russians lost Northern +Manchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly +of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of +the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects +with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail +between Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme +annoyance to European business men in the Far East, since it means that +letters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead +of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with +the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is +the reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, +various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and +endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which +led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon +all Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a +war with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the +opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former position +in Manchuria. Already, according to _The Times_ correspondent in Peking, +Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany +combined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda. + +The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger +Chinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have +a good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in +Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As +they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the +agreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset +impartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America.[83] For +America, no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are +economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far +East, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political +freedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage +beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may +become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, +however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, +because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is +treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But +what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet +impossible to say. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 63: On this subject George Gleason, _What Shall I Think of +Japan?_ pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel +mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the +Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people. +The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty +miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. +The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 +feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 +years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained +from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand +miners dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is +capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five +centuries.... + +"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart +of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special +trade domain." + +Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this +matter is given by Mr. Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chaps. x.-xiv. +See below, pp. 232-3.] + +[Footnote 64: See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, _Japan Weekly Chronicle_, +October 20, 1921.] + +[Footnote 65: The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, +_Japan's Foreign Policies_, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.] + +[Footnote 66: On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to +the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China +a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what +purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only +contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was +directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. +Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably +foolish" (_The Far East Unveiled_, p. 73).] + +[Footnote 67: The demands in their original and revised forms, with the +negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of _Democracy +and the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.] + +[Footnote 68: The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung +question are printed in S.G. Cheng's _Modern China_, Appendix ii, iii +and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp. +214-6.] + +[Footnote 69: Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and +official history of this matter. They are: _An American Diplomat in +China_, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; _Democracy and +the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and +_China, Captive or Free?_ by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director +of International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.] + +[Footnote 70: Millard, p. 99.] + +[Footnote 71: See Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 23 ff; +Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chap, v., and Millard, chap. iii.] + +[Footnote 72: Millard, pp. 64-66.] + +[Footnote 73: Reid, op. cit. pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. cit., pp. 343-6.] + +[Footnote 74: See Appendix III of Cheng's _Modern China_, which contains +this note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to the +negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal of +the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea +Islands north of the Equator."] + +[Footnote 75: The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration +of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.] + +[Footnote 76: Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.] + +[Footnote 77: Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, +"Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who +still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything +except money-grubbing.] + +[Footnote 78: Appendix C, pp. 421-4.] + +[Footnote 79: A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an +article on "China's Finances in 1918" in _China in_ 1918, published +early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the +comments appear also in Putnam Weale's _The Truth about China and +Japan_.] + +[Footnote 80: Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese +questions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. +Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case," League of +Nations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's +arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.] + +[Footnote 81: See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's +_Modern China_, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.] + +[Footnote 82: This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's +_China Awakened_ (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix., "The Student Movement."] + +[Footnote 83: "Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest +against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China +Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares +that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel +due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make +demands consistent with those rights" (_Daily Herald_, December 22, +1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian +labouring masses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What +Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the +Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs +of the capitalists.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE + + +The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at +Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the +Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be +dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual +decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their +effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia. + +In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been +brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact +between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general +alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of +America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing +for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The +situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as +regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in +the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem +to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. +It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more +liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of +Wei-hai-wei--a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive +but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, +and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the +terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as +Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that +date. + +One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement +not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified +exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between +America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. +Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring +naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of +the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a +first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo +this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve +the peace with Japan. + +Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision +of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The +foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have +insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the +Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they +desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, +though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one +of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put +their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as +they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels +sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese +importation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy +in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature +of their penetration of China.[84] + +Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and +integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these +are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning. + +From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was +the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end +of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of +Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the +Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, +they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings +in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and +through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse +was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, +and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the +resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of +Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The +Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the +question afresh. + +At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all +their own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the +Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation +with China. This point was important, because, ever since the +Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to +recognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese +Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary +to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered +with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to +the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before +the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between +the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, +was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a +deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, +of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no +longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old +days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some +disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was +roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution +more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would +probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work +of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly +urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less +strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between +China and Japan. + +By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the +private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as +regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the +negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they +would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back +the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of +a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese +refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were +compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid +in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway +was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs +or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be +handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. +Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese +retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic +manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the +other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President. + +It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years +hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years +hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both +Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to +this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have +some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that +case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete +control of the Shantung railway. + +On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than +might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new +international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with +them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary +to consider certain Far Eastern questions _not_ discussed at Washington, +since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form. + +The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at +Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is +secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both +together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will +not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See +Appendix.) + +The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions +in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain +unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check +them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the +Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any +near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have +decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A +conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place +at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the +effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. +But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. _The +Times_ of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian official +accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in _The +Times_ as follows:-- + + The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given + out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen + Conference. + + It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly + expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government + decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place + on August 26th last year. + + The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic + principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of + Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military + establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in + Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on + foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that + the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as + possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. + Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of + the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the + Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis + agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair + Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and + territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be + speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the + affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of + property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be + met. + + The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be + relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had + progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, + would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita + that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable + period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed + the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that + the preparations for the relief of the said division might be + dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate + despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the + withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should + fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops. + + Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out + within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed + arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the + same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by + Japan. + + Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a + sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely + ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought + up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not + only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but + declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to + Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the + Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring + the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government + instructed its delegates to quit Dairen. + +The Russian official account is given by _The Times_ immediately below +the above. It is as follows:-- + + On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with + the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. + Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian + Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, + but when the question of military evacuation was reached the + Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued + Japanese intervention. + + Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the + negotiations _re_ military convention, reproaching the Far + Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The + Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be + signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese + military evacuation. + + On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum + demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an + hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement + with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far + Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far + Eastern territory. _Re_ evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note + promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen + circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. + On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken + up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops + remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th. + +Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according +to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial +will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, +I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqué +it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese +unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all +that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, +which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to +evacuate Egypt. + +It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the +Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese +felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with +at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will +naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of +the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. +This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the +assembled peacemakers.[85] + +It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. +This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. +Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic +capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. +Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their +armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America +look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to +compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent +years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed +coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation +from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending +to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the +authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, +believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that +France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become +anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa +have sown the seeds of future wars--unless, by some miracle, the +"civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 84: See _e.g._ chap. viii. of Millard's _Democracy and the +Eastern Question._] + +[Footnote 85: I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of +the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic +mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more +high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were +communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they +showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies +have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.] + + + + +CHAPTER X + +PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST + + +The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to +guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, +and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will +endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying +the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I +regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively +the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an +attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests +and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86] + +I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the +dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of +peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise +and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The +pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the +optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American +public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, +athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main +ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the +Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, +whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to +explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious +hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western +Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength +of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. +Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his +sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. +This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been +somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard +Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as +it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an +attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England +of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment +than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from +Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors +is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development +is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to +estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United +States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of +idealism. + +Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It +is apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of +live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less +pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the +contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical +philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle +of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are +useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by +any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort +of world. + +All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington +Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the +friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, +hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst +enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power +to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if +there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to +see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the +militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done +in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the +future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state +Japan's case, although, _for the present_, I think it weaker than +America's. + +It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American +policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while +clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American +interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal +to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand +that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that +America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in +having.[87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very +pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the +seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the +cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of +American interests. To take next the question of China: American +ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country +should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The +policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so +rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of +the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal +policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting +a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest. + +In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices +are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight +whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In +the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to +discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed +by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a +discrimination in favour of American shipping. Even if the President +ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least +two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view +of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the +way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and +to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against +"shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is +_always_ honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that +America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial +interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases. + +I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself +with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American +weekly, The _Freeman_ (November 23, 1921, p. 244):-- + + On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an + obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large + banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated + the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in + fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an + emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with + intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious + effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese + Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new + international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese + Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, + together with other obligations already in arrears, and still + others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had + also received the full and energetic support of the Department of + State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were + at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; + having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they + came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to + save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government + would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus + prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American + financial protectorate. + +It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated +negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the +terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very +adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the _Freeman_ +concludes:-- + + If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the + consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, + those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to + take full advantage of the situation. + +There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington +Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the +connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to +establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international +control over China. In the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_ for November 17, +1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I +find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish +international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the +_Philadelphia Public Ledger_: "We suspect the motives which led to the +suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly +oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: +"International control will not do. China must be given time and +opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or +exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing +through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China +must agree. In the same issue of the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_--which, by +the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world--I find the +following (p. 728):-- + + Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The + international bankers have a scheme for the international control + of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a + sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese + Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the + Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the + Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing + this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's + statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks + about resisting the control of the international banks he is + fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the + Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full + opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny." + +Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be +due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had +nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and +one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson." + +I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, +and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European +radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control +reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a +Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, +for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would +be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic +as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, +although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though +this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the +Chinese. + +In the _New Republic_ for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. +Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is +prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was +written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far +East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign +commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good +substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually +increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the +chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the +spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization +for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such +_objets d'art_ as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the +gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one +day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man +throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret +society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. +It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be +told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The +definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good +government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat +dividends to capitalists. + +The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They +have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human +happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if +they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce +something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that +we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will +be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul +of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her +salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When +America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of +intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained. +Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans +recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with +blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is +that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank +God that they are not as this publican. + +So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of +Japan. + +Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that +Japan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not +suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United +States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of +Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only +two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to +fight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and +developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled +on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern +morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was +horrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began +to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured +Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with +the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by +the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good +qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers." + +People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the +intensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought +into contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the +highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy +white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke +would venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated +in this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that +white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese, +is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured +races in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from +retaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general +will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be +re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the +survival of civilizations of a different type from that of the +industrial West. + +The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of +the West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in +its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the +Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine being, +is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular +support for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely +economic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediæval way. The +morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic. +Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado +is the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of +superstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century +theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe +the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels +promoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in +one sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt. + +Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a +proposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until +it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view +that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially +nationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the +State religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,[88] and +propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto +religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is +not a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism, +Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to +appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is +believed by the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites for +marriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is +considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a +universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,[89] like +the Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples +the priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of +English Archdeacons. + +The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their +sense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but +they have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to +industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful +as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has +hitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any +nation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves our +gratitude. + +The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard +working, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them +have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and +incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means +universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of +quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a +whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest +respect. + +The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of +Socialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are +often theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour +organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In +Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety +of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, +if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a +political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists +resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the +national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but +not so much as Socialists in America--so at least I am informed by an +American who is in a position to judge. + +The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. +By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly +responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They +therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the +Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the +evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to +keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. +Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable +in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real +Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless +the existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the +Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung +but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal +government of Japan would probably have been excellent. + +The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that +the Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that the +Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The +argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States +will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in +the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented +with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then +Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield +in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi, +as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will +lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be +incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, +of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and +the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A +war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of +Japan. + +One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany +in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial +empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the +Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners; +so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused +our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with +America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by +our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, +similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French +sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has +brought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors +largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it +is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons +are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them +further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case +of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed +at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in +Eastern Asia. + +The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, +as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper +passions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; America +believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to +persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an +extension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt +futile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and +culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a +delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, +profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve +their own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and +in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice +is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese +are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the +white man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. +Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic +conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the +Americans. + +Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong +through impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China +the same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then +they could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the +champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, +and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to +them. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do; +they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only +to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore +behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this +same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the +worst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, +they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, +they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible +for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best +Americans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese +policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not +achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a +great misfortune for mankind. + +A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in +itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would +destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to +Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide +militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. +If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will +only become more liberal if the present régime is discredited by +failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the +interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint +diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only +Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate +neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of +actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance +with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an +encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan +has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only +permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese +at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our +Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the +ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform. + +We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency +in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, +millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not +mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still +able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the +Japanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik +propaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the +effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from +Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except +the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of +developing industry without passing through the stage of private +capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are +more and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as +it has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, +for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State, +whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to +federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very +great deal of government, and more control of individual lives by the +authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed +personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all +others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful +practical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is +the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these +reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much +progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the +same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved +successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were +probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. +The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively +Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, +carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less +corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, like +the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of +mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, +adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and +gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon +spent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régime +under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his +life. + +It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation +develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain +Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control +of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be +useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, +but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America +or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the +supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, +recover the position which she held in relation to China before the +Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an +instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for +centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the +last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long. + +The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way +regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as +much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, +the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be +able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with +Asiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking +nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong +for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, +on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be +desirable In the interests of mankind as a whole. + +What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for +China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. +The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end +some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending +of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of +some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably +quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in +the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in +the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through +years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their +development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference +without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. +Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but +have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. +The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult +one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the +Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we +do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution +suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution +slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely +imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable. + +There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the +Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable +chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the _status quo_ +is to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have made +concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four +Powers--America, Great Britain, France, and Japan--have agreed to +exploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortium +as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will +therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only +people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As +they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set +to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers +are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must +be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish +colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth +of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China +for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of +America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust +magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of +radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by +some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom. + +But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace +and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, +France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so +far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the +peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no +means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous +competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing +the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the +domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the +strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's +interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese +interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for +the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable +government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, +and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will +not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own +railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic +independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the +form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will +keep a _dossier_ of every student educated in colleges under American +control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or +Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard +of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the +United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In +short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to +"God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the +wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give +to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that +which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination +of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be +perfect. + +The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy +competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive +competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeeded +in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced +industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between +workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow +races.[92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap +Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to +white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of +industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an +obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any +person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every +other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per +head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who +either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the +others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an +opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of +the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British +Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial +conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole +question of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble for +centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since +Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this +matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world. + +The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by +means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is +obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except +through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, +China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands +of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into +submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, +attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot +see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result +of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect +that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the +Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and +the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as +the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be +fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive +civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, +the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any +sort would survive it. + +To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big +financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. +No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due +to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But +not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a +few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the +interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic +immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social +interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system +makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to +the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also +to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is +seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by +accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the +present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the +weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of +Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little +freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the +present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is +production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation +produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. +Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in +internal labour problems and in international relations. The development +of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the +Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the +things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs +for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply +these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish +pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will +be regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of the +consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will +cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to +exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not +possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present +American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not +secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only +international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of +revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure +until international Socialism is established throughout the world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 86: The interests of England, apart from the question of +India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, +British interests are allied with American finance, as against the +pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.] + +[Footnote 87: It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington +Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there +agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the +navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy +is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government +has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of +reluctant taxpayers. See _The Times'_ New York Correspondent's telegram +in _The Times_ of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22.] + +[Footnote 88: See Chamberlain, _The Invention of a New Religion_, +published by the Rationalist Press Association.] + +[Footnote 89: See Murdoch, _History of Japan_, I. pp. 500 ff.] + +[Footnote 90: An excellent account of these is given in _The Socialist +and Labour Movement in Japan_, by an American Sociologist, published by +the _Japan Chronicle_.] + +[Footnote 91: Author of a book called _If Japan and America Fight_.] + +[Footnote 92: The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is +illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in _The Times_ for +April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of +shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime +Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp +instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by +black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation +reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and +turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to +blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from +the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not +generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I +deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, +assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a +blessing.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED + + +There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a +close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the +Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact +will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or +whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that +of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the +past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, +Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediæval Europe from +the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these +cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of +China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case +again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from +us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the +Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear +we are unteachable. + +I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of +the questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three +following chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning the internal +condition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the +hopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult +situation. + +With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I +cannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact +after such a long period of separate development as has marked those of +China and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is +surprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is +not more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth +while to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two +civilizations. + +Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, +which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish +religion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an +outcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and +Galileo as representing these three elements, which have remained +singularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive +literature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more +urbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical +belief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with the +conception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our +nationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power +and the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly +be, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive +also the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been +acquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our +mentality. + +No one of these three elements has had any appreciable part in the +development of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese +painting, sculpture, and music.[93] China belongs, in the dawn of its +history, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia +contributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the +Greeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by +the rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so +the original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow +River. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch +far either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this +similarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little +in common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the +Egyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze[94] and Confucius, who both belong to +the sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should +regard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute +everything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the +differences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and +Babylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do +not think science can, at present, account wholly for national +character. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not +the whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant +individuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, +Mahomet, and Confucius. + +The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the founder of Taoism. "Lao +Tze" is not really a proper name, but means merely "the old +philosopher." He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of +Confucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He +held that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way +or manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that +we ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to +conform to it. "Tao" means "way," but used in a more or less mystical +sense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life." I +think he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way," and +that if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, +like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere +magic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. +But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist +philosophy from the first. + +Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but +his ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more +interesting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one +of freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences +with Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they +contrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the pure +men of old." There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, +because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some +sense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife +in the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of +humour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by +Chuang-Tze's account of Po-Lo who "understood the management of +horses," and trained them till five out of every ten died.[95] Their +restraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with +Western mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature +and art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present +day. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance +of a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so +that Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the +Chinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in +Peking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in +the theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement +at its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor +of a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. +In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due +to the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man +should always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments +(being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate +them in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, +which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue +in their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, +makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at +being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration +for the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of +passion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first +all the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually the beauty and +dignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who +have lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best. + +The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from +the favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that +I am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are +largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern +is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When +one compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of +some other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even +if they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, +is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to +a powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly +has succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners +and perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is +quite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been +provided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the +humblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of +white men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot +demean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard +this as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the +Chinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors. + +There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional +civilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from +India in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a +definite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant +outlook which we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man +adopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity +and Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man +can accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man +may be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is +incompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both +Buddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental +difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any +individual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. +Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It +has mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a +message to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as +natural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive +pessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of +all this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, +wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at +all. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or +religious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of +these two religions in China has been that the more religious and +contemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active +administrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the +official teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were +examined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has +been in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been +lacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western +nations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have conformed very +closely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the +population has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that +subject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations +have had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and +resources. + +Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in +China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other +two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is +practically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but +throughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it +is not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin." +Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been no +science and no industrialism. + +What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization +with the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, +but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to +dissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural +contact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political +and economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural +question as far as I can in isolation. + +There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not +simply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist +Western aggression, but because a very large number of people consider +learning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a +high value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only +of the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that +Western knowledge is more useful. Many students go every year to +universities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or +economics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to +China, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or +politicians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, +especially in the educated classes. + +The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had +ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This +was not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack +of new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the +stimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily +keen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of +libraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human +material. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in +science, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore +the spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the +Church put in its way in Europe. I have no doubt that if the Chinese +could get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within +the next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It +is quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with +fresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the +enthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the +renaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy. + +It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, +that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring +wealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an +ethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. They are +not by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me +that they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them +think there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The +habit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and +some of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they +were looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and +before long they will realize that they must work out their own +salvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults +and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will +make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours. + +The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the +scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just +conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to +see gradually uniting. + +Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production without +possession, action without self-assertion, development without +domination." I think one could derive from these words a conception of +the ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted +that they are very different from the ends which most white men set +before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly +sought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a +philosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to +Germany. + +But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with +Chinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese +practice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, +of course, a great deal of truth in this. Possession, which is one of +the three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to +the heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of +money--not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the +English or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful +men make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny. + +Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and +domination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese +practice. There is much less desire than among the white races to +tyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is +quite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on +which are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the +world could ever be "too proud to fight," that nation would be China. +The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, +showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they +could be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire +freedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may +compel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their +virtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have +been an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is +extraordinarily slight. + +Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the +Chinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a +poet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by +Mr. Waley, called by him _The Old Man with the Broken Arm_, to make a +hero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. Their +pacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that +they do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure--as +their pictures show--in observing characteristic manifestations of +different kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a +preconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which +dominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our +active impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with +us; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The +cultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their +earliest sages write. If one points out to them that this shows how +little progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress when +you already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seems +to a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own +wisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call +progress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable +goal. + +It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West +with what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek +knowledge, in the hope--which I fear is usually vain--that knowledge may +prove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three +motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our +religion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, +and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and +the missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the +world; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese +have no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions are +many, but reason is one," and with that they are content to let us go +our way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different +from those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking +concessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get +their claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good +soldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not +worth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their +reasonableness. + +I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that +Europeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine +ourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we +still practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we +are firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are +immeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation +like the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to +them is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound +mistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is +miserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier +because the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook +than our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, +but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of +beauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In +this respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. +I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but +for that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to +be fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us the indispensable +minimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of +that contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all +the other nations of antiquity have perished. + +When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I +thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn +from them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found +this attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who +go only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese +do not excel in the things we really value--military prowess and +industrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the +simple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than +in the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where +such things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for +our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance +and contemplative peace of mind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 93: See Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 368, and Giles, op. cit. p. +187.] + +[Footnote 94: With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is +of doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three +centuries after his death. Cf. Giles, op. cit., Lecture V.] + +[Footnote 95: Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.] + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE CHINESE CHARACTER + + +There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, +full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be +that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this +opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I +was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have +talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people +would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not +wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle +Oriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an +Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as +many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the +game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is +deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in +London. + +One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of +securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, +both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many +years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a +single Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the +Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their +outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils: +the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the +anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at +first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to +be reformed. + +But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable +misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the +foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of +soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the +bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt +all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really +wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to +lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that +may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a +mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit? + +The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have +to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for +these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the +capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure +in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, +are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted; +they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened +by a joke. + +I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in +chairs--the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies very +severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes +to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their +pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in +the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, +they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order +to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying +whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. +Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the +universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they +might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows +_complete_ self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own +interest. + +One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion +that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten +what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in +Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are +places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging +up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing +poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in +_Whitaker's Almanac_. A European, in recommending a place of residence, +will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can +conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a +Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will +tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an +ancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of the +world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook +that strikes the Westerner as barbaric. + +The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet +dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. +They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their +pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military +weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider +efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. +I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the +greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A +Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on +traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to +feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, +the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical +Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his +environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as +delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the +contrast between China and the English-speaking world. + +We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical +camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, +for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the +question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and +therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is +really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the +feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of +this pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time he +has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, +compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the +feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the +thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may +suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations +"progressive." + +There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common +than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form--not a +better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. +It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread +failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore +money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a +means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, +are often content to remain poor. In China, the _tuchuns_ (military +governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole +purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a +suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life +quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose +power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that +such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed +to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin +whole continents in order to win an election campaign. + +The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than +one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the +Great Powers--especially Japan--the harm would be much less than is +done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities +of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are +performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, +and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been +wholly lost in the rest of the world. + +The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign +pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he +might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a +rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech +and a free Press.[96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow the +herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men +still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the +conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the +West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. +Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in +China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few +leading financiers. + +The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China +as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity +in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest +beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if +you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a +Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because +your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute +an offence. + +Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as +industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words +that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. +But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, +which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the +most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are +accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what +is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I +were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer +from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful. +Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall +not venture to decide. + +The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in +their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to +its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be +taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it +is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to +cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his +title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of +several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably +in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was +nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, +without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put. + +Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It +was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu +party in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was +accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most +widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the +students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great +preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when +they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. +In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking +and change the Government almost without firing a shot. + +The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers' +strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The +Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left +its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce +payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, +accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and +police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely +wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in +China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for +revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in +corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to +extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing +the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated +in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the +interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public +feeling. + +Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. +The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize +acutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are +aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to +naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. +They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy +eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its +coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by +developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new +reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts +of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit +tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in +centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and +then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. +Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations +the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects. + +Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for +colonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for their +surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the +Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status +of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be +recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese +derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of +their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their +unrivalled national cohesiveness--in spite of the civil wars, which +merely ruffle the surface--that they can afford to despise military +methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall +have exhausted itself in internecine combats. + +China is much less a political entity than a civilization--the only one +that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the +Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have +perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There +have been foreign influences--first Buddhism, and now Western science. +But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science +will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as +much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had +not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. +What is bad in the West--its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness +to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims--they +see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its +science, they do wish to adopt. + +The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and +literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the +spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who +have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is +needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization +to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like +ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are +not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new +civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to +create. + +So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese +character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad +sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced +so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should +prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as +well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is +less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the +balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, +and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the +Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer +pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. +With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and +callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, +admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible +remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of +China's greatest virtues. + +The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. +They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one +per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other +ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the +Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw +materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those +whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese +would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the +philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions +were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few +dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by +white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and +that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the +efforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their own +consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present +birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are +bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive +through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next. + +Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of +agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. +Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts +to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness +has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of +the problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so +explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, +nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. +The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain +in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. +Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show +that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty; +but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be +said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an +extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy. + +Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that +they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between +rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that +first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the +Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is +involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a +serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese +are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. +Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, +the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous +people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure +torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races +would find insufficient--for example, to conceal the hiding-place of +stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of _active_ courage, +they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their +readiness to commit suicide. + +Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is +hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all +except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. +For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk +of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the +fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I +think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an +honest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as +economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China +than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any +Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more +corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that +changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we +are--which is not saying much. + +I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, when +they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat +sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are +capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of +this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was +a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But +their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this +element in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it +impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of +them becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or +devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I +suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite +of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And +many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic +love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the +West. + +To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the +foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient +civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, +under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American +financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude +imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who +have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty +in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not +obey the laws of perspective. + +The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved; +it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something may +be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is +supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these +qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle +disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be +seen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will force +it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to +which Japan has been driven. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 96: This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish +a very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed +Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, _Review of the Far East,_ April 16, +1922.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA + + +China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of +culture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient +beauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is content +to be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tend +to be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European +tourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is +apt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctive +and non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one who +regards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a +country with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do +not view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquire +what is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interesting +survival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the +first step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher +education, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use and +appreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Western +follies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and +one of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch. + +There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of +the classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a more +intelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditional +study of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in +the eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have +secured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learning +reading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still form +the majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given. +Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the +classical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at +the same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one of +these schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people who +are taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns +one finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which +is very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probably +those who can both read and write form about five per cent, of the +population. + +The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on +modern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old +examination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, has +done much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementary +education. The following statistics showing the increase in the number +of schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's +_China Awakened_, p. 4:-- + + 1910 1914 1917 1919 + +Number of Schools 42,444 59,796 128,048 134,000 +Number of Teachers 185,566 200,000 326,417 326,000 +Number of Students 1,625,534 3,849,554 4,269,197 4,500,000 + +Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil +war, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is +very remarkable. + +There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing +to the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has +been impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small +scale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable +government. + +The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be +only elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the +older texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, +within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest +renaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China +for many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, +even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the +innocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one +almost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the +Vacation--learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern +world, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some +eleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and +against the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the +same as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one +is driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of +specialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that +the ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more +account of modern needs, and give more instruction in science, modern +languages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, +so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China. + +The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the +missionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As +everyone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired +through the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their +own account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual +loss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded +(and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the +surplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American +universities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, +both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts +in China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have +come to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the +Great Powers. + +One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I +saw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), +the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller +Hospital), and the so-called Peking University. + +Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western +hills, with a number of fine solid buildings,[97] in a good American +style, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. It has +an atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a +(Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the +American College President. The teachers are partly American, partly +Chinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the +latter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of +every virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, +exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the +teaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was +thorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American +institutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. +Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the +most skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot +understand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European +language is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful +throughout the Far East. + +The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and +philosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is +commonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards +to America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China +they become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute +greatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty +and technical intelligence. + +The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing +an interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty with +European utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese, +but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy, +though perhaps not wholly successful. The hospital has all the most +modern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the +Standard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use to +anyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical College +teaches many things besides medicine--English literature, for +example--and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order +to produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the European +level, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessary +for medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a sound +knowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to +China, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent. + +The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have +to suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so +at least I was told) had already established a university in Peking, +fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But the +Methodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" to +their schools, so the already existing university had to alter its name +to "Government University." The case is exactly as if a collection of +old-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach the +doctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to +abandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question +of extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can be +abandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it +sometimes gives rise. + +Returned students (_i.e._ students who have been at foreign +universities) form a definite set in China.[98] There is in Peking a +"Returned Students' Club," a charming place. It is customary among +Europeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. +There are occasionally disagreements between different sections; in +particular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite as +equals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression was +that America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other +country; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than +those returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinaman +who wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem +romantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions which +conservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to +those of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it +is useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One is +reminded of the conversation in _Eothen_ between the English country +gentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England to the +refrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels," while +the Englishman keeps saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is +still, thank God, the British yeoman." + +Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole +admirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the +needs of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a national +temperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeans +ultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always +missionaries--not of Christianity, though they often think that is what +they are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Clean +living, clean thinking, and pep," I think an American would reply. This +means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness +for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as +being easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy for +the leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire--that hardened +old cynic--laid it down that the true ends of life are "_aimer et +penser_." Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with +"pep." The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate +both. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save the +lives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worth +saving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether +satisfactory. + +The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established +schools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. +In these, a certain proportion of the teachers are European or +American, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One +can never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by +white men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously +in the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration +of China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. +Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they +are not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other +country, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, +and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility +to exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really +beautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used +to have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking +Government University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for +keenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the +Science Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came +across them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire +Western knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. +They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not +capitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best +among their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, +but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely +Chinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government +University, leave much to be desired from the point of view of +instruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is +not sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough mental discipline. +But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the +profoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. +Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the +Government--loved by the Powers on account of its weakness--has to part +with all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and +plunder the country, as in Europe--for China must be compared with +Europe, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is +unhappily divided. + +The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a +powerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in +1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. +Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement." And what they did was not +merely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):-- + + Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the + Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the + Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to + the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. + For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures + showing them the real situation, internally as well as + externally; but especially by establishing free schools and + maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too + high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also + teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with + the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that + fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. + +One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards +modern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality +between men and women. The position of women in Peking Government +University is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to +examinations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the +university. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective +women teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive +institution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would +horrify most British head mistresses. + +There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary +education, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls +tend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as +the boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet +in Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner +speeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt +co-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter +should receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not +ripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the +sphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having +imagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I +realized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried +out in China. + +Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot +give what Young China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions +of centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European +superstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. +It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that +there is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and +for that free spirit of sceptical inquiry by which they are seeking to +build a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its +best days. + +While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher +pay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many +months. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation +to the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who +clubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The +incident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a +revolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the +teachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them +all that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of +bandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and +European intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may +say broadly that the old traditional education, with the military +governors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for +Conservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions +stand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically +though not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone +stands for intellectual freedom. + +The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by +foreigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire +military strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to +advance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who +quite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That +is why the West regards them as uncivilized. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 97: It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in +purely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and +Nanking Teachers' Training College.] + +[Footnote 98: Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from _Who's Who of +American Returned Students_, a classification of the occupations of 596 +Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items +are: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in +Government service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three +members of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical +practitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and +religious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese +holding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400 +_(ib.)._ This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America +in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese +university students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a +classification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are: +Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22; +natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified +separately), 19.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA + + +China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial +possibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as +nearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the +next few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this +development as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties +are very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will +therefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the +possibilities of the near future. + +We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's +industrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then +the mines, before going on to other matters. + +When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of +Oxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to +them, and did all it could to keep them at a distance.[99] In 1875 a +short line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the +Central Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In +1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was +accomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then +thought that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for +concessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important +line from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a +Hankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far +as Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with +the Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung +Railway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the +south. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the +Yangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and +managed by foreign officials of the respective countries which had +obtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware +that some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated +beyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the +Chinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of +most of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to +realize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem +was how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow +line and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by the +help of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the +hands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow +line was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was +constructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the +big main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the +Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. +The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be +regarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong +enough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more +or less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the +agreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China--five +years hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost +to China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important +railways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of +the situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity. + +Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges--quite rightly, as I +think--the great importance of nationalizing _all_ Chinese railways. At +Washington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and +to concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early +in 1919, he said[100]:-- + + _The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of + the new Republican State is the railway key_.... The revolution + of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of + popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being + carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left + behind a more subtle weapon. _This weapon is the railway_. Russia + with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. + Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited + the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put + into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted + economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this + grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all + intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign _enclave_, + subversive of the Chinese State. _The especial evil to-day is + that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new + technique,_ which ... she will eventually extend into the very + heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and + Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) unless she is summarily + arrested. _At all costs this must be stopped._ The method of + doing so is easy: _It is to have it laid down categorically, and + accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on + Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must + be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; + that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese + citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; + and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered + simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section + by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board_. + +If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this +reform--as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale--will +have been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect +Japan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her +promises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of +Japanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. +Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the +Shantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it. + +It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan +Railway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by +foreigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably +managed. I quote from Mr. Tyau[101] the following statistics, which +refer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027 +kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial +railways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres. +Total, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are +mainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which the first must be +regarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably +recovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer +the importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign +railway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. +Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in +1918:-- + +Name of Line. Kilometres Year Per cent, earned + Operated. Completed. on Investment. + +Peking-Mukden 987 1897 22.7 +Peking-Hankow 1306 1905 15.8 +Shanghai-Nanking 327 1908 6.2 +Tientsin-Pukow 1107 1912 6.2 +Peking-Suiyuan 490 1915 5.6 + +Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less +prosperous. + +I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway +administration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the +evils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed +by different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was +no uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to +another. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially +to open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of +which would probably be enormous. + +Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows +foreign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its +industries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent +of foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far +from satisfactory. Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché at +Peking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards +China's mineral resources:-- + + China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good + supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial + development. To indicate how little China has developed its + marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, + 14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now + 20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer + resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, + produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that + China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an + additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native + methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of + pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel + industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence + it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished + steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony + and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable + progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores + during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its + mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's + welfare.[102] + +The _China Year Book_ for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of +coal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons.[103] +Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000 +tons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident +that great progress was made during those three years, and there is +every reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been +maintained. The main problem for China, however, is not _rapid_ +development, but _national_ development. Japan is poor in minerals, and +has set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of +China. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, +that only industrial development can support the growing population, +which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the +mainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for +imperialism. + +The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at +Shanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for +shipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each +for the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng[104] says:-- + + For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly + supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from + America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited + in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by + virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home + consumption). + +Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs +explanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to +understand modern politics. + +The _China Year Book_ for 1919[105] (a work as little concerned with +politics as _Whitaker's Almanack_) gives a list of the five principal +iron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and +most important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and +Coal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of +the third group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in +sight is estimated by the _China Year Book_ at 50,000,000 tons, derived +chiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per cent. of +iron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as +603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The _Year Book_ +proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the +agreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which +enforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government +undertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to +compel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources." It should +be added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical +adviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be +sold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, +leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.[106] + +The second item in the _China Year Book's_ list is the Tungkuan Shan +mines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district on +the Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work +these mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in +1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of £52,000, and the mines were +transferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation." +These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their +capacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were +sold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. is +$20,000,000, which is considerably more than £52,000. This was the only +one of the five iron mines mentioned in the _Year Book_ which was not +in Japanese hands at the time when the _Year Book_ was published. + +Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession which +was granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be +worked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain +60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan +of operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of +170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of +steel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000 +tons a year." + +The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunction +with the Hengshan Colliery by the railway." I presume it is to be sold +back to China along with the railway. + +The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the most +promising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the +Japanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and +Japanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. +The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of +Penhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine." It will be +observed that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result +of the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The _Year Book_ adds: +"The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka +ironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at +Osaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron." + +It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have +allowed the Japanese to acquire a position of vantage from which they +can only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely +imperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of +their own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their +national independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that +make them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that +the chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order +to be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, +says nothing about iron mines;[107] therefore the old-fashioned Chinese +did not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are +awake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later +to the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue +our survey of facts. + +It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly +agricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are +crops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the +third country in the world, India being the first and the United States +the second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, +but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, +and it is industry that is our present topic. + +To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was +officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since +then no official returns for the whole country have been published ... +but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for the +present number of factory operatives and mine workers."[108] Of course, +the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as +specially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the +wages range from 15 to 45 cents a day.[109] (The cent varies in value, +but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as +industry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. +Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, +the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. +Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent +to which he has come under American influence, as well as that of +conservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young +Chinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped +that the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will +make the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of +America and Japan. + +There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. +There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise +is needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire. + +Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably +develop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in +native hands. + +The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200,000,000 +(630,000,000 taels), and the total imports slightly larger. It is +better, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency +fluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The +tael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its +value fluctuates with the value of silver. The _China Year Book_ gives +imports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and +214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as +577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in +pounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124 +millions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the +foreign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is +increasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how +little the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as +revolutions and civil wars. + +Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways +and mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national +independence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is +obviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new +lines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, +in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire +a power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope +that the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act +upon it. + +In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, +since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and +development by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It +should therefore be enacted that, in future, no sale of mines or of any +interest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the +security of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of +extra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to +accept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its +validity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, +such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear +China, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if +not, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, +it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It +would be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely +Chinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological +and mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the +right (_a_) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (_b_) to +work minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in +spite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers +should be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point +compatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, +except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is +clear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as +opportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible +to say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established +in China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign +aggression. This is a point to which, along with other general questions +connected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last +chapter. + +It is said by Europeans who have business experience in China that the +Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as +modern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially +honest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But +their successful businesses--so one gathers--do not usually extend +beyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or +later through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from +my own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very +quickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with +Confucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in +business methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung +and other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the +highest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The +Chinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to +commerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly +introducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, +every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, +that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout +the next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development +should be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But +that is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese +independence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 99: For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit. +pp. 183 ff.] + +[Footnote 100: _China in_ 1918. Published by the _Peking Leader_, pp. +45-6.] + +[Footnote 101: Op. cit. chap. xi.] + +[Footnote 102: _China in_ 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in +the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated +by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. p. +51.] + +[Footnote 103: Page 63. The 1922 _Year Book_ gives 19,500,000 tons of +coal production.] + +[Footnote 104: _Modern China,_ p, 265.] + +[Footnote 105: Pages 74-5.] + +[Footnote 106: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xiv.] + +[Footnote 107: It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is +nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine +pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure +where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. +Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and +steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton +Sinclair, _The Profits of Religion_, 1918, p. 175.] + +[Footnote 108: Page 237.] + +[Footnote 109: Page 218.] + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA + + +In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint +of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, +in what order, I should advocate in that case. + +To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, +and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China +has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, +because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist +Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of +Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, +because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own +economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was +fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, +though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the +long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing +to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China +becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned +ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to +China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the +Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, +in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of +Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their +own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power. + +The problem is not merely one of _political_ independence; a certain +cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in +this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it +would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had +to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a +nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they +adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and +they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must +be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with +safety. + +First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary--not, of course, the +bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude +which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow +them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated +Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal +tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has +proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to +foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is +capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United +States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong +enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong +enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too +strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. +But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely +necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, +not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western +skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, +political independence will have little value. + +The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of +an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; +(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued +concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the +above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have +to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the +political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are +also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good +government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and +education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the +priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, +unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have +acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to +oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought +to be taken in the above order. + +1. _The establishment of an orderly government_.--At the moment of +writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A +battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is +usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, +the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though _The Times_ calls +him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than +"Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he +wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all +China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, +to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to +depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive +elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force. + +So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best +thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint +programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of +military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice +of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which +all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in +public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, +sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some +powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere +military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in +favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the +scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such +a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous +propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, +and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded +soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the +financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will +not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of +Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not +accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from +them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may +not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it +would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to +raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese +merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich +Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the +Government. + +When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt +that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of +autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few +things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. +Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally +recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more +scope. + +While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed +upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of +Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will +be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country +to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective +decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. +This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very +rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest +failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The +society must make itself obviously the champion of the national +interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to +foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or +condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in +the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and +honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the +respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is +organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political +problems with which China is faced. + +Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign +rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty +Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves +from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was +in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the +Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of +Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in +general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet +Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by +the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's +resources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions +by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable +opportunity. + +2. _Industrial development._--On this subject I have already written in +Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to +consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought +to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to +be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not +State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to +be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not +be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly +government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to +lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. +Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a +monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans. + +Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be +desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State +Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country +which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, +it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the +second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the +foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in +the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital +industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is +perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by +undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent +the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can +acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop +Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening +power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both +oppressed and misled. + +But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change +in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family +ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which +already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at +present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these +requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize +that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State +Socialism must fail. + +For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should +learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I +think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards +the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import +skilled workmen--say from Germany--and cause them to give instruction to +Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be +desired to develop. + +3. _Education._--If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive +Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the +population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a +good in itself, but is also essential for developing political +consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. +The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state +of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary +education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, +in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses +cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, +it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast +population could be borne by the nation without a considerable +industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is +mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for +the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American +millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese +education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why +industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of +education. + +For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be +sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There +is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are +being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed +a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese +educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears. + +Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education +as in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to +have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will +soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too +numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and +mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission +schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to +become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western +civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national +life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes +them more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and +women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans +in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese +are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of +course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates +against national self-respect in those whom they teach. + +Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some +time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American +university. But for the great majority of university students it is far +better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned +students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from +which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A +society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all +really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, +as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students +returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this +difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university +education, but at present the difficulty would be serious. + +To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring +leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be +aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As +regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have +enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill +could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the +requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example +personally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide +culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his +writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. +He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but +by no means a slavish admirer of our ways. + +The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be +needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an +intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be +combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl +Marx. + +The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the +world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is +possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to +develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. +This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the +preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific +temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a +knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical +problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one +due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its +international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, +the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of +famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong +government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties +and the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a +model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to +defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand +Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western +philosophy of life. + +If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, +as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, +embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the +campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps +emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their +material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at +home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the +West achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by +the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but +would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great +military nations of the modern world will bring about their own +destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, +with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If +China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if +Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made +China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of +foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn +aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and +devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better +economic system--then China will have played the part in the world for +which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope +in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see +inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is +realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover +of mankind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 110: An account of a portion of his work will be found in +Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.] + + + + +APPENDIX + + +While the above pages were going through the Press, some important +developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated +Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated +towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of +Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to +be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not +unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in +Chinese politics. + +For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his +intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, +befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in +our newspapers. According to _The Times_, he has pronounced in favour of +the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the +restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the +South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it +in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. _The Times_ Peking +correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares +that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national +interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any +obstructionists." + +On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending +his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground +for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and +is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to +conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. +The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in +the same telegram as follows: + + Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall + be elected by the people; District police shall be created under + District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil + governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to + the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and + paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and + _gendarmerie_, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible + for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall + agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the + Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes + shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a + stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, + the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under + the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries + established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the + people on the land. + +This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of +it will ever be carried out. + +Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been +stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and +Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. +Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that +Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation +than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate +Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a +past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the +Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our +newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely +unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in _The Times_ of May +15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect: + + I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, + which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. + Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms + are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and + opium-smoking are rife. + +Nevertheless, on May 30, _The Times_ had to confess that this army had +won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in +Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions. + +The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived +by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the +victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will +be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped +also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not +be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of +that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, +there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with +him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more +likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There +is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang +for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But +it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still +problematical. + +_June_ 21, 1922. + + + + +INDEX + +Academy, Imperial, 44 +Adams, Will, 94 +Afghanistan, 175 +Ainu, 117 +America, 17, 54, 63, 69, 134, 136, 145 ff., 159 ff + and naval policy, 161-2 + and trade with Russia, 162-3 + and Chinese finance, 163-5, 244 + and Japan, 167 ff. +Americanism, 221 +Ancestor-worship, 39 +An Fu Party, 145, 205, 243 +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 120, 123, 133, 137, 149, 175 +Annam, 52 +Arnold, Julean, 231 +Art, 11, 12, 28, 189 +Australia, 181 + +Backhouse, 49 +Balfour, 152, 153 +Benthamites, 80 +Birth-rate-- + in China, 73 + in Japan, 116 +Bismarck, 112, 130 +Bland, 49, 77 n, 107 +Bolsheviks, 17, 18, 128, 136, 143, 146 ff., 175 ff., 245 +Bolshevism, 82 + in China, 175, 194, 204 +Books, burning of, 24 ff. +Boxer rising, 53, 54, 227 + indemnity, 54, 217 +Brailsford, 166 +Buddhism, 27, 31, 48, 190 + in Japan, 86 ff., 91, 105, 169 +Burma, 52 +Bushido, 172 + +Canada, 181 +Canton, 50, 68, 71, 75, 207 +Capitalism, 179 +Cassel agreement, 69 +Chamberlain, Prof. B.H., 103, 105 +Changchun, 124 +Chang-tso-lin, 68, 71, 77,242, 253 +Chao Ki, 40 +Chen Chiung Ming, 68, 253-5 +Chen, Eugene, 133 n. +Cheng, S.G., 55 n., 65, 134 n., 139 n., 232 +Chien Lung, Emperor, 49 ff. +Chi Li, Mr., 37 +China-- + early history, 21 S ff. + derivation of name, 24 + population, 31-4 + Year Book, 32 + produce, 72 + influence on Japan, 86 ff.,104 + and the war, 134 ff. + Post Offices, 150 +Chinese-- + character of, 199-213 + love of laughter, 188-9, 200 + dignity, 202 + pacifism, 195, 213 + callousness, 209 + cowardice, 210 + avarice, 211 + patience, 206 + excitability, 212 +Chingkiang, 60 +Chinlingchen mine, 234 +Chita, 146, 154 +Choshu, 99, 101, 102, 106 +Chou dynasty, 22 +Christianity in Japan, 92 ff. +Chuang Tze, 8, 82, 188, 192 +Chu Fu Tze, 43 +Chu Hsi, 46 +Civilization-- + alphabetical, 37 + Chinese, 187 ff. + European, 186 +Coal in China, 132 n., 231 ff. +Coleman, 77 n., 110, 132 n., 133 n. +Colour prejudice, 168, 173 + and labour, 181 ff. +Confucius, 21, 22, 24, 38, 187, 208 +Confucianism, 34, 38 ff., 190 + in Japan, 118 +Consortium, 14, 163 ff., 179, 244 +Cordier, Henri, 24 n., 25, 27 n., 28, 30 n., 31 n., 187 n. +Cotton, 76, 235 + industry in Osaka, 114 +Customs-- + Chinese, 55 ff., + on exports, 56 + internal, 56-7 + +Dairen, 123 + Conference at, 154 ff. +Denison, 129 +Dewey, Professor, 69, 224 + Mrs., 224 +Diet, Japanese, 109 ff. +Dutch in Japan, 94 ff., 100 + +Education, 44 ff., 76 ff., 193, 214-225, 247 ff. + statistics of, 215 + classical, 215-7 + European and American, 217-21 + modern Chinese, 221 ff. + of women, 223-4 +Efficiency, creed of, 17 +"Eight Legs," 45, 46 +Emperor of China 22 ff, 39, 83, 88, 205 + "First," 24 ff. +Empress Dowager, 52 n. +Examination, competitive, 34, 44 ff, 76 + +"Face," 204 +Famines in China, 72, 210 +Far Eastern Republic, 140, 154 +Federalism in China, 70, 244 +Feudalism-- + in China, 24, 26 + in Japan, 89 ff. +Filial Piety, 39 ff., 61 + and patriotism, 41 + in Japan, 118, 169 +Foreign Trade statistics, 236-7 +Forestry, 80 +Fourteen Points, 53 +France, 52, 53, 123 + and Shantung, 137-8 + and Japan, 157 +Fukien, 132 + +Galileo, 186 +Genoa Conference, 146 +Genro, the, 91, 106 ff., 128 +George III, 49 +Germany, 30, 53, 109, 138, 172 + property in China during war, 141 ff. +Giles, Lionel, 82 n. +Giles, Professor, 23, 39, 43 n., 49 n., 187 n. +Gladstone, 157, 160 +Gleason, 132 n., 134 n. +Gobi desert, 31 +Gompers, 163 +Great Britain-- + and China, 52 ff. + and Shantung, 137 +Great Wall, 24 +Greeks, 186 +Guam, 150 + +Han dynasty, 27 +Hanyehping Co., 132 n., 232-3 +Hart, Sir Robert, 57 +Hayashi, 133 n. +Hearn, Lafcadio, 99 +Heaven (in Chinese religion), 23, 43 + Temple of, 23, 24 +Hideyoshi, 87, 93, 94 +Hirth, 22 n., 23 n., 27 n. +Hong Kong, 52, 69, 75, 207 +Hsu Shi-chang, President, 44 +Hughes, Premier, 181 n. +Hughes, Secretary, 152, 153 +Hung Wu, Emperor, 45 +Huns, 24, 27, 31 +Hu Suh, 250 + +Ichimura, Dr., 121 +Ideograms, 34 ff. +Immigration, Asiatic, 181 ff. +Imperialism. 82 +India, 27, 29, 48, 119, 120 +Industrialism, 186 + in China, 75, 76, 212, + 226-39, 245 ff. + in Japan, 114 +Inouye, 88 +Intelligentsia in China, 76 +Iron in China, 131, 132 n., 231 ff. + Japanese control of, 232 ff. +Ishii, 135. _See_ also Lansing-Ishii + Agreement. +Ito, 88. 109 ff +lyeyasu, 91, 94, 95 + +Japan, 14, 15, 27, 30, 52, 53, 62, 63, 86-175 + early history, 86 ff. + constitution, 109 ff. + war with China, 113, 122, 130 + war with Russia, 108, 123, 130 + clan loyalty, 118 + loyalty to Allies, 136 + hegemony in Asia, 120 + loans to China in 1918, 143 + Socialism in, 114, 170 +Jenghis Khan, 28 ff. +Jews, 186 + +Kang Hsi, Emperor, 49 n. +Kara Korum, 30 +Kato, 133 n. +Kiangnan Dock, 232 +Kiaochow, 53, 131, 151 +Kieff, 29 +Koo, Mr. Wellington, 58 n., 164 +Korea, 53, 86, 120, 122, 124 +Kublai Khan, 29, 30 +Kyoto, 96 +Kyushu, 92, 94 + +Lama Religion, 43 +Lamont, 165 +Lansing, 144 +Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 134, 139, 151 +Lao-Tze, 43, 82, 187, 194 +Legge, 22 n., 39 n., 82 n. +Lenin, 180, 250, +Lennox, Dr., 73 n. +Literati, 25, 26, 38 ff. +Li Ung Bing, 26, 45 +Li Yuan Hung, President, 140 ff. +Li Yuen, 28 n. +Lloyd George, 133, 140, 157 +Louis XIV., 51 +Louis, Saint, 29 + +Macao, 62 +Macartney, 49 +Malthus, 73 +Manchu dynasty, 30, 31, 43, 64 +Manchuria, 53, 68, 120, 123, 127, 130, 146, 154, 177, 178, 207 +Manila, 93 +Marco Polo, 29 +Marcus Aurelius, 27 +Marx, 250 +Masuda, 93 +McLaren, 98, 103 n. +Mechanistic Outlook, 81 ff. +Merv, 29 +Mikado, 87, 99, 106 + worship of, 98, 103, 168-9 +Militarism, 16, 42, 43 n. +Millard, 134 n., 143, 151 n. +Minamoto Yoritomo, 90 +Mines, 230 ff. +Ming dynasty, 30 +Missionaries, 196 + Roman Catholic, 48, 49 n. + in Japan, 92 ff. +Mongol dynasty, 28 ff., 43 +Mongolia, 29, 43, 120, 147, 154 +Morgan, J.P., 157, 165 +Morphia, 150 +Moscow, 29 +Mukden, 130 +Murdoch, 28 n., 86 n., 101, 107 n. + +Nationalism, 16 +Nestorianism, 48 +Nicolaievsk, 155 +Nietzsche, 84, 194 +Nishapur, 29 +Nobunaga, 94 +Northcliffe, Lord, 77 n. + +Observatory, Peking, 30, 49 +Okuma, 120, 122 +Open Door, 55, 162, 179 +Opium, 52 + +Panama Tolls, 162 +Peking, 30, 34, 52, 72 + Legation Quarter, 54 + Union Medical College, 73, 219 + Government University, 217 n., 222 + Girls' High Normal School, 224 +Penhsihu mine, 234 +Perry, Commodore, 96, 100, 167 +Persia, 27, 29, 175 +Phonetic writing, 35 +Plato, 186 +Po Chui, 195 +Po Lo, 83 +Pooley, 120 n., 121, 124, 128, 133 n. +Pope, The, 29, 169 +Port Arthur, 54, 123, 130, 150, 175 +Portsmouth, Treaty of, 108-9, 125 +Portuguese, 92 ff. +Progress, 13, 196, 202 +Putnam Weale, 32, 33, 65, 143 n., 165, 228 + +Railways, 226 ff. + nationalization of, 228 ff. + statistics of, 230 + Chinese Eastern, 123, 126, 143, 146, 227 + Fa-ku-Men, 124 + Hankow-Canton, 227 + Peking-Kalgan, 227, 229 + Peking-Hankow, 227 + Shantung, 151 ff., 227 + Siberian, 146, 227 + South Manchurian, 124, 125, 126 + Tientsin-Pukow, 227 +Reid, Rev. Gilbert, 134 n., 139 n. 142 +Reinsch, 134 n., 135, 136 +Restoration in Japan, 87, 97 8. +Revolution of 1911, 30, 65 ff. + and Japan, 128 ff. +Rockefeller Hospital, 218 +Rome, 27, 51 +Roosevelt, 108 +Rousseau, 42 +Russia, 15, 18-20, 29, 53, 108, 119, 127, 146 ff., 175 ff. + war with Japan, 108,123, 130 + secret treaty with Japan, 136 + and Shantung, 138-9 + +Salt tax, 59, 60 +_San Felipe_, 93 +Sato, Admiral, 172 +Satsuma, 94, 99, 101, 102, 106 +Science, 51, 80, 81, 186, 193 +Shank, Mr., 69 +Shantung, 53, 127, 131 ff., 178 + secret treaties concerning, 137 + in Versailles Treaty, 144 + and Washington Conference, 145, 151 ff. +Shaw, Bernard, 160 +Sherfesee, 80 +Shih Huang Ti, _See_ Emperor, "First" +Shi-King, 25 +Shinto, 87 ff., 103, 105, 169 +Shogun, The, 90, 99 ff. +Shu-King, 21, 22 n., 25 +Simpson, Lennox. _See_ Putnam Weale +Socialism, 64, 181 ff. + State, 180, 246 + in Japan, 114, 170 + in China, 222, 236 +Soyeda, 144 n. +Spaniards in Japan, 93 +Student Movement, 223, 243 +Students-- + returned, 17, 193, 219 + statistics of, 220 n. +Summer Palace, 52 +Sung dynasty, 30, 45 +Sun Yat Sen, 65, 68, 128, 140, 253-6 +Supreme Ruler. _See_ Heaven + +Taiping Rebellion, 32, 56, 65 +Tai-tsung, 28 n. +Tang dynasty, 28, 44 +Taochung iron mine, 234 +Taoism, 43, 187 ff. +Tartars, 27, 31 +Tayeh mines, 231 n., 232-3 +Teachers' strike, 206, 225 +Tenny, Raymond P., 33 +Tibet, 31, 43 +Ting, Mr. V.K., 73 n. +Tokugawa, 99 +Tong, Hollington K., 143 n., 204 n. +Trade Unionism, 180-1 + in Japan, 114-5 +Treaty Ports, 74 +Tsing-hua College, 217 +Tsing-tau, 131, 151 +Tuan Chih-jui, 140 ff. +Tuangkuan Shan mines, 233 +Tuchuns, 61, 67, 71, 76, 203, 206 +Twenty-one Demands, 131 ff., 233, 234 +Tyau, M.T.Z., 144 n., 215, 220 n., 223, 226 n., 230, 235 + +United States. _See_ America. + +Versailles Treaty, 53, 142, 144,151 +Vladivostok, 146, 154 +Volga, 18 +Voltaire, 221 + +Waley, 84, 195 +War, Great, idealistic aims of, 141 ff. +Washington Conference, 16, 55 n., 61, 63, 127, 145, 149 ff., 178 +Wei-hai-wei, 54, 149 +White men, virtues of, 121 +William II., 122 +Wilson, President, 140, 142 +Women, position of, in China, 223-4 +Woosung College, 239 +Wu-Pei-Fu, 42, 60, 68, 71, 242, 253-3 + +Yamagata, Prince, 115 n. +Yangtze, 52, 132 +Yao and Shun, 21, 22 +Yellow River, 21, 187 +Y.M.C.A., 82, 83, 222 +Young China, 26, 61, 77 ff., 144, 145, 167, 193, 247, 250 +Yü, 22 +Yuan Shi-k'ai, 65 ff., 129, 135 + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF CHINA *** + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the +United States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The Problem of China</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Bertrand Russell</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: November 3, 2004 [eBook #13940]<br /> +[Most recently updated: October 6, 2021]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Brendan Lane and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF CHINA ***</div> + +<h1><a name="Page_5"></a>THE PROBLEM OF CHINA</h1> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h2>BERTRAND RUSSELL</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>O.M., F.K.S.<br /> +<i>London</i><br /> +GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD<br /> +RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET<br /> +<a name="Page_6"></a>FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1922<br /> +SECOND IMPRESSION 1966<br /></p> + +<p style="text-align: center;">PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN<br /> +BY PHOTOLITHOGRAPHY<br /> +UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED<br /> +WOKING AND LONDON</p> + +<h2><a name="Page_7"></a>CONTENTS</h2> + +<div class="list"> +<ol class="rom"> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_I">QUESTIONS</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">MODERN CHINA</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_V">JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">MODERN JAPAN</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE</a> </li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_X">PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST</a> </li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">THE CHINESE CHARACTER</a> </li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA</a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA</a></li> +</ol> +<ul> +<li><a href="#APPENDIX">APPENDIX</a></li> +<li><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a> </li> +</ul> +</div> + +<p><br /></p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<div class="blkquot"><p><a name="Page_8"></a>The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shû (Heedless), the Ruler of + the Northern Ocean was Hû (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre + was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of + Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how + they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven + orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and + breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try + and make them for him." Accordingly they dug one orifice in him + every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.—[<i>Chuang + Tze</i>, Legge's translation.] </p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="The_Problem_of_China"></a><a name="Page_9"></a>The Problem of China</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>QUESTIONS<br /></p> + + +<p>A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and +reflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very +puzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe +will not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important +affinities with those of China, but they have also important +differences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, +even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, +since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the +human race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by +the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive +factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it +important, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there +should be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, +even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give.</p> + +<p>The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally +into three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these +groups, however, can be considered in isolation, because <a name="Page_10"></a>each is +intimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the +cultural questions are the most important, both for China and for +mankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less +equanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that +end. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for +practical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations +as for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed +business community has long been a commonplace of novelists and +moralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up +the pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded +as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the +artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to +oneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to +survive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause +misery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all +foreign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of +us?</p> + +<p>China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid +process of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed +in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits +quite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to +strike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the +whole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the +Celestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would +venture to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in +which we are better than <a name="Page_11"></a>old China, and to other respects in which we +are worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be +fruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a +superior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to +exploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior" +race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior +to ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate +knowledge of China, would take the same view.</p> + +<p>In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask +oneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard +to home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I +ultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more +desirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see +realized in the world? Different people will answer these questions +differently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade +a man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be +content merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that +the reader may feel likewise.</p> + +<p>The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not +merely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive +happiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of +knowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry +lists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no +appreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, +incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a +thing which is good and delightful on its own account. <a name="Page_12"></a>The same may be +said, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on +this topic would, however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak +of art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do +not mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of +course these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the +almost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian +peasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates +folk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the +Puritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy +of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we +have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of +us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of +Chinese civilization.</p> + +<p>In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of +good or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has +in promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good +things which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, +also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we +endeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread +oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not +strong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy +by means of their own merits and exertions alone.</p> + +<p>These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in +considering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and +commercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of +certain <a name="Page_13"></a>more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in +China one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a +society which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, +upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for +example, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come +under Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have +secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we +brought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a +life full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite +achievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and +unless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the +less familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed +always make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to +take as a matter of course.</p> + +<p>The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change +is needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable +ultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our +economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if +the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our +civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able +to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a +very splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, +however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The +first danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining +nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more +to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic <a name="Page_14"></a>nations +which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that +they may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, +into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except +armaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in +China. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with +political and economic questions; and it is through their influence that +dangers arise.</p> + +<p>China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on +the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering +the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan +must count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for +Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. +Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has +ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore +distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or +more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China +may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth +possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may +control China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese +will be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I +believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the +Japanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the +nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and unneighbourly. I +shall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the +relations of China and Japan.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_15"></a>To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of +Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then +something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, +it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic +relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of +1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of +1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is +possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, +and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan +had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant +foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to +understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation +they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence +the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made +people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to +apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done.</p> + +<p>Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain +what is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost +more important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly +the most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the +resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the +white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only +the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power +in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the +chances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced +nations.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_16"></a>The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the +conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have +guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it +far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far +Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China +preserve any shadow of independence without a great development of +nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate +nationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say to +patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found +only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world; +it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is +essentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized" +nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their +bombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other +within the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism +has kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being +goaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and +leave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and +rapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a +slender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than +despair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some +tolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that +are worse.</p> + +<p>Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a +psychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, +our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our +imperialism, <a name="Page_17"></a>our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from +a superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its +own sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has +become somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have +never taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more +indolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally +accepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have +been aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like +China, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has +been governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to +introduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might +have had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not +many) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that +Western push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot +now take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me +far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than +those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of +Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with +our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe +that those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The +Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way of +life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the +world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, +exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency +directed to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this +consummation <a name="Page_18"></a>that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some +of that wisdom for which it despises the East.</p> + +<p>It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how +profound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks +are attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as +Japan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day after +day, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, +gay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of +everything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understand +and no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us lay +at death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the +indifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of +loud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a +great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed +that none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so +insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the +endless information of the well-informed.</p> + +<p>One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there +were no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of +poplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, and +found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads, +wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled +together surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, others +silently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted up +gnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, +and children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human <a name="Page_19"></a>beings they +undoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to grow +intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knew +that they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a +boat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had +heard—falsely perhaps—that the earth was more generous than in the +country they had left. Some would die by the way, all would suffer +hunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferings +would be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, +unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of +Westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia +is so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planet +are lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the +theorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force them +into actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could not +believe that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of +industrialism and forced labour.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions +of the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a truly +popular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen the +sleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seen +them, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that +patient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely and +unspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiar +intellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics are +inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to +torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or +<a name="Page_20"></a>theory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants, +protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what we +had to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I +heard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the +sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a +terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale.</p> + +<p>It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II"></a><a name="Page_21"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY<br /></p> + + +<p>Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early +history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon +the question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not +composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of +princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or +warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, +whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age +of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age" +mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the +Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks +of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a +fairly high level of civilization—much higher than that of any other +part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, +too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon +its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly +alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive +torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have +inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human +sacrifice; in the Shu-King, <a name="Page_22"></a>however, there is little trace of +superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were all +occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of +the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state +of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows +what was expected of an Emperor:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and + thoughtful—naturally and without effort. He was sincerely + courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these + qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and + extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and + virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the + nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also + regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became + brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the + myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were + transformed. The result was universal concord.<a name="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history +is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.<a name="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> There is no reason to +doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier +times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the +Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in +1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of +nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this +time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of +France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at +its lowest ebb. Chinese history <a name="Page_23"></a>consists of a series of dynasties, each +strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over +subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting +for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which +temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians +always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of +eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention.</p> + +<p>What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which +fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious +prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven +at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous +with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;<a name="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> indeed Professor Giles +maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct +translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word +"Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the +latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means +"Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both +terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the +God of the Old Testament.<a name="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven" +remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The +Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites +continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in +1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven <a name="Page_24"></a>in +Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual +sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official +survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be +called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never +had any connection with the State.</p> + +<p>The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C., +because with this year begins Confucius' <i>Springs and Autumns</i>, which is +a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official.</p> + +<p>One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the +Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one +comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He +acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221 +B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable +for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, +the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The +destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by +many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up +again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang +Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all +China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his +son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China" +is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin<a name="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a>. (The Chinese +put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with +what is now China proper.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_25"></a>The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as +appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being +reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore +history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong +force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of +the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a +vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not +of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and +radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own + family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office + of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit + themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian + classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go + before the local civil and military authorities so that they may + be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the + Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses + exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity + to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their + relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, + those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent + to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are + those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture + and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws + and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, + op. cit. i. p. 203.) </p></div> + +<p>It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The +Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other +hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of +old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to +destroy the <a name="Page_26"></a>innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing<a name="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>No radical change can take place in China without encountering + the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then + than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical + change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the + worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was + good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their + children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to + support their contention and these they freely quoted to show + that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the + government to such an extent that something had to be done to + silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on + the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any + rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as + were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or + Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature + under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not + of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, + this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a + number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was + subsequently buried alive. </p></div> + +<p>This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is +anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship +of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has +a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have +excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, +which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made +progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with +a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary +pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has <a name="Page_27"></a>come +down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was +somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two +years, in 191. B.C.</p> + +<p>After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit +his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206 +B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism—exactly +coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in +Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact +with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.<a name="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> Their +relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well +as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. +Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, +and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little +importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164 +a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.<a name="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> +Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which +stands for Antoninus.</p> + +<p>It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense +prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European +armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to +think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as +ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military +superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are +tempted to think; and our <a name="Page_28"></a>superiority in civilization is a mere +delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of +the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,<a name="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> dealing with +the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han +dynasty, says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the + history of the world when they have grouped around the people of + Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the + expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these + voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of + these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the + Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same + time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that + of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who + wrote the history of their little world while they believed that + they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole. </p></div> + +<p>In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is +liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the +civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if +we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion.</p> + +<p>After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of +disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this +dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest +extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.<a name="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> The Empire +of Jenghis Khan (died <a name="Page_29"></a>1227) was considerably greater, and contained a +great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis +and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in +China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis +destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When +Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people +were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the +corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, +shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have +their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one +of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have +escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill +any that might emerge.<a name="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and +Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these +massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of +Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of +causing death were more merciful than those that have been employed +since the Armistice.</p> + +<p>Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through +Marco Polo and Coleridge; was <a name="Page_30"></a>the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the +first Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the +Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat +abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital +from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which +still surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory +which is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical +instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this +observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the +suppression of the Boxers.<a name="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> I understand they have been restored in +accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If +so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty +secured to the world.</p> + +<p>Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in +the history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two +successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by +storms, and partly by Japanese valour.</p> + +<p>After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, +and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, +and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until +the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways, +and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having +contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the +pigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution.</p> + +<p>The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be +attributed to any military skill; <a name="Page_31"></a>on the contrary, considering its +extent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and +incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and +were less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a +barren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a +very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after +centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, +conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose +their ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and +went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived +the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of +barbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved +from this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the +white men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is +lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national +independence.</p> + +<p>In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese +civilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of +Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as +long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the +world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with +an almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the +eighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50 +millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is +said to have sunk to about 17 millions.<a name="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> A census has been taken at +various times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of +individuals. <a name="Page_32"></a>From the number of houses the population is computed by a +more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different +methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons +between different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam +Weale<a name="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the + restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million + persons, which is less than the number given in the first census + of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai + Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably + a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the + amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the + toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was + so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the + population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less + stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now, + however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of + the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population + had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the + no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145 + millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, + and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) + it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) + it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk + to 261 millions. </p></div> + +<p>I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year +Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations + has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates + of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. + The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the + census taken by the Minchengpu <a name="Page_33"></a>(Ministry of Interior) in 1910, + the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the + Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a + Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is + pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as + approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not + individuals were counted. </p></div> + +<p>The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is +given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population +of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at +various other dates are given as follows (p. 2):</p> + +<table border="1" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="1" summary="year and population"> +<tr><th>Year A.D.</th><th>Population</th><th>Year A.D.</th><th>Population</th></tr> +<tr><td>1381</td><td>59,850,000</td> <td>1761</td><td>205,293,053</td></tr> +<tr><td>1412</td><td>66,377,000</td> <td>1762</td><td>198,214,553</td></tr> +<tr><td>1580</td><td>60,692,000</td> <td>1790</td><td>155,249,897</td></tr> +<tr><td>1662</td><td>21,068,000</td> <td>1792</td><td>307,467,200<br />333,000,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1668</td><td>25,386,209</td> <td>1812</td><td>362,467,183<br />360,440,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1710</td><td>23,312,200 <br />27,241,129</td> <td>1842</td><td>413,021,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1711</td><td>28,241,129 </td> <td>1868</td><td>404,946,514</td></tr> +<tr><td>1736</td><td>125,046,245</td> <td>1881</td><td>380,000,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1743</td><td>157,343,975<br />149,332,730<br />150,265,475</td><td>1882</td><td>381,309,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1753</td><td>103,050,600</td> <td>1885</td><td>377,636,000</td></tr> +<tr><td>1760</td><td>143,125,225<br />203,916,477</td><td><br /></td><td><br /></td></tr> +</table> + +<p>These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population +of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year +(<i>e.g.</i> 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. +Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21 +millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But +no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the <a name="Page_34"></a>population increased +from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and +1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or +diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or +any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. +What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than +guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be +about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As +for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume +that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely +that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed +can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former +times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to +be distrusted.</p> + +<p>There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization +which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select +as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet +in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion +among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by +examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system +distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a +stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which is +therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I +have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other +countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each +of the three.</p> + +<p>1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but +symbols for whole words. This <a name="Page_35"></a>has, of course, many inconveniences: it +means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of +different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no +such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, +catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible; +that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be +written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be +represented by some elaborate device.<a name="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> For these reasons, there is a +movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers; +and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to +take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that +they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other +argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where +reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to +decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the +movement for phonetic writing deserves support.</p> + +<p>There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, +which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which +something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably +traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a +sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the +Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can +be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different +sounds, <a name="Page_36"></a>but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese +characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of +dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, +without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in +Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an +Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the +spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from +Latin.</p> + +<p>The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which +enables it to be a means of communication between different places and +different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to +place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is +more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing +spoken sounds than by one which does.</p> + +<p>Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method +of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably +passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a +symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian +hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic +writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of +the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced +civilization—a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact +that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of +homonyms.</p> + +<p>As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the +mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in +an article published in the <i>Chinese Students' Monthly</i> <a name="Page_37"></a>(Baltimore), +for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological +Problems of China." He says (p. 327):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as + a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something + inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The + accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental + formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world + culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a + fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical + users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own + virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical + civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and + inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized + portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the + most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the + same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; + up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient + Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and + their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks + and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially + explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language + which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any + solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened + to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No + other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would + give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do....</p> + +<p> The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the + alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in + the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final + truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already + protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries. + It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it + represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this + language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the + spirit remains to be determined. </p></div> + +<p>Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which +is impregnated with Chinese <a name="Page_38"></a>patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that +the Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization" +as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to +judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the +distinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt +that this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind +indicated in the above quotation.</p> + +<p>2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social +influence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions +and on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of +Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature. +Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about +whose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have +been less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes +him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics, +which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little +religious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in +the countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and +administered the Empire.</p> + +<p>Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than +to that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical +statesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues +he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed +to secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a +peaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was +essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former +ages. He accepted the existing <a name="Page_39"></a>religion—a rather unemphatic +monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved +a shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to +render as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress +upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the +following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards +our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining +always a due reserve."<a name="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> But reverence for spiritual beings was not an +<i>active</i> part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship, +which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's +neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when +he was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right—for the Chinese, unlike +the Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was +justified if he governed very badly. The following passage from +Professor Giles<a name="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> illustrates this point:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by + adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a + punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in + his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his + divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an + example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under + the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the + feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of + the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps + the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... + If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits + <a name="Page_40"></a>are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and + what can the people do but get rid of him?" </p></div> + +<p>This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout +Chinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent.</p> + +<p>Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the +weakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the system +departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated +against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the +tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted +with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the +Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and +accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China +praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to +construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which +Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit +is illustrated by the following story:<a name="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18"><sup>[18]</sup></a></p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high + level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us + here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has + stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my + part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different + standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will + shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found." </p></div> + +<p>It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus +and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up.</p> + +<p>Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says <a name="Page_41"></a>it is contrary to +filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the +indigence of one's aged parents.<a name="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> This form of sin, however, is rare +in China as in other countries.</p> + +<p>The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without +children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no +descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has +made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great +biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to +China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this +respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the +preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization +had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the +Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family +became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen +until our own day.</p> + +<p>Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is +certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, +of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to +the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's +loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a +very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to +militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the +interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing +the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore +family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out +by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_42"></a>Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code +of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It +taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral +code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that +only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with +personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It +was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more +imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he +must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control—an extension +of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He +must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must +"save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries; +he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love +or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all +his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, +but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the +guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have +occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them +less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not +immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack +your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and +won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette; +so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and +fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in +China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the +scourge it is <a name="Page_43"></a>with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian +ethics.<a name="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20"><sup>[20]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century +A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust +aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,<a name="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> whose interpretation of +Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall +of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured +Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were +struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and +appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of +drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists +of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but +the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were +ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many +centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion +but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and +practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the +belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all +others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be +very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic +lingers on among the uneducated. At all <a name="Page_44"></a>times, even when there was +religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable +that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding +ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe.</p> + +<p>3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive +examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and +unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its +hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the +present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book +on <i>China after the War</i>, pp. 59-60.<a name="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> After considering the +educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of + moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during + the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the + Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was + composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was + considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that + in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who + were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total + enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high + as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of + "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended + by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public + offices. College training and local elections supplemented each + other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest + emphasis.</p> + +<p> Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never + been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the + introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system, + must be held responsible. The "election" <a name="Page_45"></a>system furnished no + fixed standard for the recommendation of public service + candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic + class from which alone were to be found eligible men. + Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the + elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the + competitive examination system in their place. The examinations + were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they + were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the + introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and + stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some + useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese + education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite + of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary + attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in + family education and in private schools. </p></div> + +<p>Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in +examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, +such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the +Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful +through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was +purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. +The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu +(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects +of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing<a name="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> +says:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit + of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form + of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This + was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of + Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs," + which, for the first time in the history <a name="Page_46"></a>of Chinese literature, + was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, + because after the introduction of the theme the writer was + required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two + members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The + theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five + Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or + any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his + school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of + Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity + with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as + passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. + To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a + man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time + qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was + absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to + recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was + not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect + or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary + development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago + reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely + on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this + rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have + been so long venerated. </p></div> + +<p>These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no +doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things +that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one +considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was +probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, +the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. +Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the +possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of +administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the +preservation of Chinese civiliza<a name="Page_47"></a>tion in spite of barbarian conquest. +But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away +to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to +perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce +and cruel system which they miscall civilization.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1">[1]</a><p> Legge's <i>Shu-King,</i> p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, <i>Ancient +History of China</i>, Columbia University Press, 1911—a book which gives +much useful critical information about early China.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2">[2]</a><p> Hirth, op. cit. p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3">[3]</a><p> See Hirth, op. cit., p. 100 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4">[4]</a><p> On this subject, see Professor Giles's <i>Confucianism and +its Rivals,</i> Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5">[5]</a><p> Cf. Henri Cordier, <i>Histoire Générale de la Chine</i>, Paris, +1920, vol. i. p. 213.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6">[6]</a><p> <i>Outlines of Chinese History</i> (Shanghai, Commercial Press, +1914), p. 61.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7">[7]</a><p> See Hirth, <i>China and the Roman Orient</i> (Leipzig and +Shanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are +allusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. cit., i. +p. 271.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8">[8]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 281.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9">[9]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 237.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10">[10]</a><p> Murdoch, in his <i>History of Japan</i> (vol. i. p. 146), thus +describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire: +</p><p> +"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the +illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes +of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign +of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung +(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever +seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of +civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the +most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on +the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines +of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along +these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the +inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the +Hindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and +Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the +Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11">[11]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12">[12]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13">[13]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14">[14]</a><p> <i>The Truth About China and Japan</i>. George Allen & Unwin, +Ltd., pp. 13, 14.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15">[15]</a><p> For example, the nearest approach that could be made in +Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word +"Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of +characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16">[16]</a><p> Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, <i>à propos</i> +of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following +footnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be +equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to +have meant 'no familiarity.'"</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17">[17]</a><p> Op. cit., p. 21.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18">[18]</a><p> Giles, op. cit. p. 86.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19">[19]</a><p> Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20">[20]</a><p> As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even +more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight." +(Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21">[21]</a><p> Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, +and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident +occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles +are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above +the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered +father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are +impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and +the son-in-law's faith revived.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22">[22]</a><p> Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking, +1920.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23">[23]</a><p> Op. cit. p. 233.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III"></a><a name="Page_48"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS<br /></p> + + +<p>In order to understand the international position of China, some facts +concerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was +for many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and +fertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. +Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the +beginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of +officials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as +in England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly +religious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was +imported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that +country to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, +but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey +practically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the +seventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. +(What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument +discovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth +centuries Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at +Court, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in +rectifying the irregularities <a name="Page_49"></a>and confusions of the Chinese +calendar.<a name="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the +walls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels +between different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both +China and Japan.</p> + +<p>In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in +China, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a +permanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time +was Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a +patron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens +of his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King +George III is given by Backhouse and Bland.<a name="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> I wish I could quote it +all, but some extracts must suffice. It begins:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, + impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our + civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing + your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent + offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: + the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful + humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. </p></div> + +<p>He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing +with an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be +gratified. <a name="Page_50"></a>An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills + you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and + code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if + your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our + civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and + customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy + might become, nothing would be gained thereby.</p> + +<p> Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to + maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the + State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... have + no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O + King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater + devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission + to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your + country hereafter. </p></div> + +<p>He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels +that they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange:</p> + +<p>"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and +lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to +import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own +produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire +produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to +yourselves," the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to +continue.</p> + +<p>He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forget +the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by +intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of +the usages of our Celestial Empire." He concludes with the injunction: +"Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!"</p> + +<p><a name="Page_51"></a>What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this +document has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the +world, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The +Empire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger +population; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had +not fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by +absorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the +Japanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. +The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the +Great, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of +China, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty +years. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything +needed for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade +upon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things +which they would do better without.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, +namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at +least the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would +not have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is +a museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be +seen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to +impress him with the splendour of <i>Le Roi Soleil</i>. Compared to the +Chinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact +that Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and +all the other men who have adorned literature and the <a name="Page_52"></a>arts, does not +make us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and +Robert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by +giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an +Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. +Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung +is absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to +demonstrate this proposition.</p> + +<p>Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese +Government endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with +the cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, +as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and +Scandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on +China, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,<a name="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> a building whose +artistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been +about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that +of Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the +superiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the +river Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at +Hong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British +diplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an +indemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the +French took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under +Chinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to +Japan's complete <a name="Page_53"></a>victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions +would have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany +and Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support +of Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between +China and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the +important rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the +Russo-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution.</p> + +<p>The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in +Shantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of +it; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few +converts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in +Christian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval +base there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, +which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with +the Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese +possession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its +restitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did +not, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the +German Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, +since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. +Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and +to hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the +Boxer rising, which is said to have begun as a movement against the +Germans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in +every respect, the Russians by creating a naval base <a name="Page_54"></a>at Port Arthur, +the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the +Yangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the +policy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door.</p> + +<p>The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans +know about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of +Peking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of +Peking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, +filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a +bare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is +administered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no +powers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and +traitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the +Japanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their +crimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the +Americans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of +communicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of +Chien Lung is completed.</p> + +<p>Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The +Americans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they +still had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on +higher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, +partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. +The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the +friendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is +incalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any +signs of following suit.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_55"></a>To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is +faced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, +China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which +have been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no +experience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in +later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps +of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers—a +prerogative which every single one of them exercises.</p> + +<p>The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.<a name="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> At +the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty +which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports +and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the +whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a +schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be +calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only +been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.<a name="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> Revision of the +schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in +the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is +practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties +involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with +twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the +tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers.</p> + +<p>When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it +must be remembered that <a name="Page_56"></a>the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese +the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign +States.<a name="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29"><sup>[29]</sup></a> The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no +time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other +commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to +find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no +motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised +free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we +forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But +no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have +abandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act.</p> + +<p>The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for +the sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all +exports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, +and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is +desperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should +consider the tax indispensable.</p> + +<p>There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time +of the Taiping rebellion, namely the erection of internal customs +barriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with +the internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending +goods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the +payment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is +generally less than the internal <a name="Page_57"></a>tariff charges, this provision favours +foreign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of +internal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the +ground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal +customs in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export +tariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But +there were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all +could be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not +chiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should +be added that internal customs are collected by the provincial +authorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies +and civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong +enough to stop these abuses.</p> + +<p>The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the +Chinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the +service, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of +any other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials +is in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures) +there were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000 +were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, +by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties +exceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the +present system. The Chinese have the appointment of the +Inspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to +their country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, +so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern +bureaucracy. So long as the <a name="Page_58"></a>foreign officials are responsible to the +Chinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful +educative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an +efficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical +and intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their +slaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs +has much to recommend it during the early stages.<a name="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30"><sup>[30]</sup></a></p> + +<p>At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence +in the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact +that the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue +derivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, +so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of +Chinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the +Customs administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese +politics by recognizing or not recognizing a given <i>de facto</i> +Government. (There is no Government <i>de jure</i>, at any rate in the +North.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an +artificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary +instincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal +reform. It means <a name="Page_59"></a>that no Government which is in earnest in attempting +to introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, +which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of +reconstruction.</p> + +<p>There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was +accepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the +security acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the +employment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the +Customs, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, +and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards +the Customs.</p> + +<p>The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to +China. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities +of interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. +The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three +telegrams in <i>The Times</i> which appeared during January of this year.</p> + +<p>On January 14, 1922, <i>The Times</i> published the following in a telegram +from its Peking correspondent:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be + rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a + substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, + while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and + simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the + Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all + records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the + Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to + liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very + few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the + Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a + Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible + prospect of the removal of this difficulty. </p></div> + +<p><a name="Page_60"></a>I venture to think <i>The Times</i> would regard the difficulty as removed +if the Manchu Empire were restored.</p> + +<p>As to the "splendid salt surplus," there are two telegrams from the +Peking correspondent to <i>The Times</i> (of January 12th and 23rd, +respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government +artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as +follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is + happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the + Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet + faithful to the Central Government—the better half went over to + the Canton Government long ago—has dispatched a squadron of + gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if + $3,000,000 (about £400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately + forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the + revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has + been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic + Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for + immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the + traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate. </p></div> + +<p>The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a + serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in + my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near + Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of + Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in + the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate + the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and + Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the + Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do + not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The + Reorganization Loan of £25,000,000 is secured on the salt + revenues, and <a name="Page_61"></a>interference with the foreign control of the + department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In + various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, + the local <i>Tuchuns</i> (military governors) impound the collections + and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the + foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so + large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have + considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points + on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is + another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the + amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers + would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any + active form of intervention in this country. In view of the + extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present + interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000 + (£11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been + dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on + January 28th remains unsolved. </p></div> + +<p>It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting +punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the +Washington Conference should attempt to interfere!</p> + +<p>It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon +themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. +This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a +man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is +expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore +can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the +family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China +realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of +honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe—no +very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with +Western <a name="Page_62"></a>nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese +nationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will +begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for +the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, +but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power for +good in China will be at an end.</p> + +<p>I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did +to China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in +modern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. +Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of +modern Japan—a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is +not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But +before passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social +and political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in +China would be unintelligible.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24">[24]</a><p> In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining +his attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: +"As to the western doctrine which glorifies <i>Tien Chu</i>, the Lord of the +Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly +conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them—a point +which you soldiers and people should understand." (Giles, op. cit. p. +252.)</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25">[25]</a><p> <i>Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking</i>, pp. 322 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26">[26]</a><p> The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly +built by the Empress Dowager.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27">[27]</a><p> There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. +vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's <i>Modern China</i>, Clarendon Press, 1919.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28">[28]</a><p> A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington +Conference.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29">[29]</a><p> If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained +possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the +policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly +satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30">[30]</a><p> <i>The Times</i> of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on +Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be +allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did +not deal with the Customs <i>administration</i>, nevertheless <i>The Times</i> +assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of +the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption +which it would afford. I wrote to <i>The Times</i> pointing out that they had +confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was +dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not +print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to +conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV"></a><a name="Page_63"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>MODERN CHINA<br /></p> + + +<p>The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, +because in population and potential strength China is the greatest +nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of +the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been +brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington +Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it +is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts +and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try +to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which +it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, +though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic +development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as +our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we +shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon +China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses +have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason +has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the +Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst +is Japan; in the interests <a name="Page_64"></a>of China, as well as in our own larger +interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan +and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America +stands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. +Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination +by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers +become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very +essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, +internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be +a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only +ultimate solution.</p> + +<p>After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, +namely, the present internal condition of China.</p> + +<p>As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, +decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many +causes led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of +Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a +warlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon +the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails +and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike +compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were +rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This +characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in +common.</p> + +<p>The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but +differences of dress and manners <a name="Page_65"></a>kept the Manchus distinct from the +more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained +inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous +foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, +destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful +people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which +lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have +diminished the population by 150 millions,<a name="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31"><sup>[31]</sup></a> and was almost as +terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful +whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded +(by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China +by Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising +(1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for +a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. +But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after +the Boxer movement that the revolution broke out.</p> + +<p>The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit +to ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the +Canton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected +provisional President. But the Nothern Army remained faithful to the +dynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its +Commander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better <a name="Page_66"></a>scheme. +He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on +condition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. +Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the Legations, being what is +called a "strong man," <i>i.e.</i> a believer in blood and iron, not likely +to be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North +has always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan +Shih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in +the way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he +had every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic +corps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must +be admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of +his policy and methods.</p> + +<p>A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave +place to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine +the permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the +Parliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament +wished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but +he had the preponderance in military strength. Under these +circumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon +overthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament +(which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by +unconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to +a revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After +this, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of +China. He appointed his army lieutenants <a name="Page_67"></a>military governors of +provinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His régime might +have lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, +and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916—of a broken heart, +it was said.</p> + +<p>Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military +governors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government +when his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the +populations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been +civil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to +determine which of various rival generals should govern various groups +of provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but +this has lost most of its constitutional significance.</p> + +<p>The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are +called Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit +depredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. +They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and +administered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally +appointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the +soldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, +and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such +portions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to +surrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the +Japanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be +prolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met +there for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely +civil to the President and the <a name="Page_68"></a>Prime Minister, who still officially +represent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal +Government was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt +treasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, +to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to +Chang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool +of Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to +Mongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he +would undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at +Mukden ever since.<a name="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32"><sup>[32]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government +of a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. +Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, +succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its +Northern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government +under the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two +provinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a +moment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has +been checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the +neighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes +designs of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.<a name="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33"><sup>[33]</sup></a> +In all ascertainable respects <a name="Page_69"></a>it is a Government which deserves the +support of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the +<i>New Republic</i>, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity +which it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This +opposition is partly on general principles, because we dislike radical +reform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement—of a +common type in China—would have given us a virtual monopoly of the +railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded +with the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the +change of Government has made ratification impossible. The new +Government, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of +them, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or +less similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The +American Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the +British Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have +lost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because +we, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is +vigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement +lapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital.</p> + +<p>The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend +of China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a +mistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in +magnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to +a single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In <i>The Times</i> of +November 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article <a name="Page_70"></a>headed: "The Peril of +China. A dozen rival Governments." But in Europe there are much more +than a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those +of China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in +China, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of +destruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has +been incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. +You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that +you will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being +fought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which +they are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the +inhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the +average, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole.</p> + +<p>It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes +possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing +a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into +provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the +revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was +attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful +working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population +without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in +Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now +favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not +much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty +of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The +Central Govern<a name="Page_71"></a>ment cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find +the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad +enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But +it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan +without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese +independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find +a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign +assistance.</p> + +<p>It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, +and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of +consolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has +great weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite +possibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, +at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the +others. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been +already mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in +Japanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. +Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is +an able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he +established his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a +blow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to +terms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself +with Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his +authority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see +Appendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a +breathing-space is all that is needed.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_72"></a>The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few +regions where there are mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking +has nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to +the fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built +round a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far +as I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in +the whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government +employment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and +the work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long +and the pay infinitesimal.</p> + +<p>Seventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in +agriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while +wheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.<a name="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34"><sup>[34]</sup></a> +The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only +just sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived +in China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to +drought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, +as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned, +foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the +Chinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those +who died of it shared this view.</p> + +<p>Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide +their holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely +sufficient to support himself and his family. Conse<a name="Page_73"></a>quently, when the +rainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It +would of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more +scientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by +afforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly +improved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. +But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually +supposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their +families continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of +population, according to many writers, finds full scope.<a name="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35"><sup>[35]</sup></a> If so, the +good done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of +more children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the +end, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher +standard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And +popular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there +is a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these +difficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of +competent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary +education.</p> + +<p>Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional +life of China takes two <a name="Page_74"></a>forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. +Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have +opened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we +had not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our +intercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background; +one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners +as such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that +intercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but +apparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where +unreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. +The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable +intellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum +of common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether +privately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of +enriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets.</p> + +<p>In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, +with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops +full of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese +part of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the +rich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through +a gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered +beauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and +Sunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, +half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, +spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and +<a name="Page_75"></a>disease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always +made me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life +would not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for +the poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life +brings more happiness to the Chinese than English life does to us. At +any rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do +not think it would be true.</p> + +<p>Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of +Shanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there +is so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of +which is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over +China, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, +is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are +divided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route +from Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which +has long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From +Peking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned +by the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern +bank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it +only runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of +the railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the +importance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong.</p> + +<p>In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower +Yangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of +industrialism. <a name="Page_76"></a>China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are +mostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number +of cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the +employer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern +China the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is +an inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long +hours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it +literally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is +not the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China +will not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and +education enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in +China, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid +and cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible +method by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is +in sight.</p> + +<p>The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that +which it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been +practically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many +centuries the country has been governed by the successful candidates in +competitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of +prestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the +old traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now +teaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and +public opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have +intellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including +<a name="Page_77"></a>Chang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,<a name="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36"><sup>[36]</sup></a> are, of course, mostly +too stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes +their régime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China—<i>i.e.</i> of +those who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at +home—is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for +learning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, +because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their +outlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will +probably be strong enough to regenerate China—if only the Powers will +allow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action.</p> + +<p>It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of +Young China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a +modern education, and I should like to give some idea of their +mentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two +generations: the older men, who had fought their way with great +difficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian +prejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and +colleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded +people ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight +against the family. The older men—men varying in age from 30 to +50—have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of +the rationalists of <a name="Page_78"></a>Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, +painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the +beliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science +and a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and +miraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will give you +some idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in +becoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, +their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. +But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they +have achieved in their own minds.</p> + +<p>It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our +culture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate +Chinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen +among the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization +even when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal +candour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the +industrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When +they become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to +spread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire +the front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings +along the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best." In all this they +differ greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from +America; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were +soaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling +activity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the +prejudices in which they were brought up, they <a name="Page_79"></a>have not taken on a new +set, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to +consider any proposition honestly on its merits.</p> + +<p>The younger men, however, have something more than the first generation +of modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have +retained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the +pioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This +may be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more +than that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with +Western ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them +without a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without +being torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn +Western knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made +the process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still +have reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their +predecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing +practically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese +reverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I +see the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them +practical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in +the directions in which it ought to move.</p> + +<p>There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that +is the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important then +detailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the +Confucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial +society. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and +<a name="Page_80"></a>broadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, +have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical +efficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be +taken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of +some new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can +exterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to +be horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our +god; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee." And +so it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the +opposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing +really necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee, +Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the +British Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestry +in China."<a name="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37"><sup>[37]</sup></a> In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of +forestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are +suitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (<i>e.g</i>. for +railway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that +the floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely +prevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were +reafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most +reforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject +for ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because +Confucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will +be cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory +as it is taught <a name="Page_81"></a>in our universities, and despise such humble questions +as the utility of trees. After learning all about (say) the proper +relations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find that +some Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not +considered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in +the West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally true +everywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students are +most eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial +processes might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our +theoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industry +is already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginning +to be a marked improvement.</p> + +<p>It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook +and that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most +modern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maxims +to replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men's +morals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they +dare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference +of morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, because +we are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes <i>per diem</i>. +What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about +government, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the +Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring +the mechanistic outlook.</p> + +<p>Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." I mean +something which <a name="Page_82"></a>exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the +Y.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes all these from the Chinese +outlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean is +the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our +scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. +The essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual who +has this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense of +perception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other +people to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual +is not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously +assailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or other of which he is +too apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the +class-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the +mystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in +their Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind except +as potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the +spread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a +life against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, is +as old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulent +forms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to +protest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a +fable<a name="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38"><sup>[38]</sup></a>:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to + protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, + and fling up their heels over the champaign. <a name="Page_83"></a>Such is the real + nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them.</p> + +<p> One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of + horses."</p> + +<p> So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and + put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them + by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that + two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and + thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and + trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the + fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them + were dead.</p> + +<p> The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it + round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square."</p> + +<p> The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it + curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line."</p> + +<p> But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and + wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and + line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in + managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with + clay and wood. Those who <i>govern</i> the Empire make the same + mistake. </p></div> + +<p>Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the +chief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this +fable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane and +tolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of the +West. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to +see whether they "drink water and fling up their heels over the +champaign," and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. +Unlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the +foreigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into +trousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as +a rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of +cutting off the Emperor's <a name="Page_84"></a>head, as other nations do, they left him his +title, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about £600,000), and +he remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his +etiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with +a Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter +you or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature +or a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate +perception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of +pictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk +swooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his +claws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All +these pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one +feels also in their dealings with human beings—something which I can +perhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, +unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing +their best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of +which our Western world has far too little. Together with their +exquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite +extraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton +and cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake +of the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems +translated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley<a name="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> is called <i>Business Men</i>, +and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects +in which the Chinese are our superiors:—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span>Business men boast of their skill and cunning<br /></span> +<span>But in philosophy they are like little children.<br /></span> +<span><a name="Page_85"></a>Bragging to each other of successful depredations<br /></span> +<span>They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body.<br /></span> +<span>What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth<br /></span> +<span>Who saw the wide world in a jade cup,<br /></span> +<span>By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth:<br /></span> +<span>On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability?<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth" +would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as +that is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of +solving the Far Eastern question.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31">[31]</a><p> <i>The Truth about China and Japan</i>, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. +14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (<i>Modern China</i>, p. 13) says that +it "killed twenty million people," which is the more usual estimate, cf. +<i>China of the Chinese</i> by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the +population was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt +that 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32">[32]</a><p> In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more +subservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by +Wu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33">[33]</a><p> The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to +have made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton +Government was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng +Chiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (<i>The Times</i>, +April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See +Appendix.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34">[34]</a><p> The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, +especially in Manchuria.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35">[35]</a><p> There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the +birth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether +the birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet +by my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union +Medical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the +average number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while +the infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show +that the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of +statistics, generalizations about the population question in China must +be received with extreme caution.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36">[36]</a><p> I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. +Bland, <i>per contra</i>, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. +Contrast p. 104 of his <i>China, Japan and Korea</i> with pp. 143, 146 of +Coleman's <i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, which gives the view of everybody +except Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin +reported in <i>The Times</i> recently, but he was, of course, unable to +estimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37">[37]</a><p> Printed in <i>China in 1918</i>, published by the <i>Peking +Leader</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38">[38]</a><p> <i>Musings of a Chinese Mystic</i>, by Lionel Giles (Murray), +p. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his <i>Texts of +Taoism</i> in <i>Sacred Books of the East</i>, Vol. XXXIX.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39">[39]</a><p> Waley, 170 <i>Chinese Poems</i>, p. 96.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V"></a><a name="Page_86"></a>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION<br /></p> + + +<p>For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order +to understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know +something of that country, to which we must now turn our attention.</p> + +<p>In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the +persistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the +centuries. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" by +no means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from +Korea in 552 A.D.<a name="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> At the same time and from the same source Chinese +civilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through +the occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won +favour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to +China in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The +Japanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism +nationally they ordered one <a name="Page_87"></a>or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, +with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the +adherents of the traditional Shinto religion.<a name="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41"><sup>[41]</sup></a> After some +vicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign +religion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than +Shinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief +religion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable +to find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of +peasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods" +(which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism.<a name="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42"><sup>[42]</sup></a> Probably the +revival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing belief +in that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of the +population. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned, +Buddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto.</p> + +<p>The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to +restore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of +645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the +good old days. What the object was of those who established the +government of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that +may be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and +internal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low +ebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great +feudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government +fell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made +intelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved +imitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. <a name="Page_88"></a>The Chinese +Emperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from +the Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a +vigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so.</p> + +<p>The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of +645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is +set forth by Murdoch<a name="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43"><sup>[43]</sup></a> as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled + on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends + who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for + purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some + of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the + British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they + certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the + four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization + with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the + sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye—for they + were two of this venturesome quartette—have often told of their + rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these + despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan + they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their + effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place + Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world. </p></div> + +<p>The two students who went to China in 608 A.D. "rendered even more +illustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have +done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked +back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, +and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two +National Doctors."</p> + +<p><a name="Page_89"></a>Politically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately +following was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and +Richelieu—curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the +sovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. +The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably +with about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, +there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, +but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, +in 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, +but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just +the opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious +mixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies.</p> + +<p>Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems +to see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, +namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China +on the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, +and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which +went on in mediæval Europe between the Church, which represented ideas +derived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to +preserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, +Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization +over rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in +Japan.</p> + +<p>After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, +but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So +long as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power) +it continued to represent what was <a name="Page_90"></a>most civilized in Japan: the study +of Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve +respect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who +remained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were +so degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it +would have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them +and the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly +from the mediæval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, +although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even +greater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the +secular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado +and his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of +the Restoration.</p> + +<p>The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the +nominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of +power to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of +their infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some +monastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented +the military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of +the Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title of +the people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun," which means +"Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being the +Ainus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the +form which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto +Yoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But +before long the Shogun became nearly as <a name="Page_91"></a>much of a figure-head as the +Mikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the +actual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This +lasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened +that Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the +Minamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun +himself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished +at the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the +practice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister +and his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, +but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their +successors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter.</p> + +<p>What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the +Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, +originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming +at the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both +ignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted +the future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions +of peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to +undergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of +warlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching +doctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism +became national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became +important feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was +ready to fight on the slightest provocation. <a name="Page_92"></a>Sieges of monasteries and +battles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history.</p> + +<p>The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years' +experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country +completely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and +closely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the +Portuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final +expulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is +instructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought +with them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated +the former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually +no Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were +engaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, +Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed +than were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island +(containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and +were throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing +merchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their +larger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread +of Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and +their guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The +Portuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to +make converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese +began to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the +Portuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping +the Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese <a name="Page_93"></a>had +been able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a +Papal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit +monopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards +from Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican +and Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the +Jesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled +furiously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the +Japanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought +against the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the +extent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their +national independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the <i>San +Felipe</i>, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast +of Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his +harbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, +which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000 +crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in +Japan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had +the Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after +trying reason in vain, attempted intimidation.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast + extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him + how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the + sway of a single man.... "Our Kings," said this outspoken seaman, + "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer + <i>religieux</i> who induce the people to embrace our religion, and + when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who + combine with the new <a name="Page_94"></a>Christians, and then our Kings have not + much trouble in accomplishing the rest."<a name="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44"><sup>[44]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the +Portuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. +Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with +Japan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, +Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, +Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally +gave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the +Japanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, +they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian +nations.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, a succession of three great men—Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and +Iyeyasu—had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the +quasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of +internal peace which lasted until the Restoration—period of nearly two +and a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central +Government to enforce whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to +the foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between +them had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about +300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to +be subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account +of their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical +position. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began +in 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, <a name="Page_95"></a>has had +great power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during +its rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to +Christianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the +movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may +be, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible +without losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more +anti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in +1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in +the most vigorous terms:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold + as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip + himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great + Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with + their heads.<a name="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45"><sup>[45]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly +cruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political +motives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with +the King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no +foreign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of +Christians against the newly established central power. Economic +exploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart +from political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if +there had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the +power of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese +armies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; the +Japanese had learnt the use of fire-<a name="Page_96"></a>arms; and their knowledge of +strategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest +cities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population +of Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would +therefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any +expedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have +been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. +But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world +showing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. +Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, +where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the +inmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of +European Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their +reports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The +Japanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the +white men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel +convinced that it was unwise.</p> + +<p>For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry's +squadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace +and almost complete stagnation—the only period of either in Japanese +history, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of +fire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy +until they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see +another period of isolation.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40">[40]</a><p> The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's +<i>History of Japan</i>, The volume dealing with the earlier period is +published by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was +published earlier; its title is: <i>A History of Japan during the Century +of Early Foreign Intercourse</i> (1542—1651), by James Murdoch M.A. in +collaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the <i>Japan Chronicle</i>, +1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II +respectively.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41">[41]</a><p> Murdoch I. pp. 113 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42">[42]</a><p> Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43">[43]</a><p> Murdoch I. p. 147.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44">[44]</a><p> Murdoch, II, p. 288.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45">[45]</a><p> Murdoch II, p. 667.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI"></a><a name="Page_97"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>MODERN JAPAN<br /></p> + + +<p>The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the +history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would +have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan +to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is +almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration +in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has +risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great +War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading +statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the +beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with +ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders +and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To +realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining +the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time +of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific +knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in +the Book of Joshua.</p> + +<p>The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, <a name="Page_98"></a>and people have been +duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an +immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so +little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has +brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to +that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to +tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has +synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most +anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for +social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily +interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been +effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than +appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends +to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and +Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people +suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but +this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon.</p> + +<p>Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two +separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially +pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more +analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is +no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to +give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that +country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good +books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative +is McLaren's <i>Political History of <a name="Page_99"></a>Japan during the Meiji Era</i> +1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared +in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course +invaluable; his book <i>Japan, An Interpretation</i> shows his dawning +realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the +cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to +say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan.</p> + +<p>Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the +Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of +his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful +of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at +various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been +in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during +its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, +except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era +was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the +country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the +Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed +Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics +and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces +and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore +first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which +Japan has played in international affairs.</p> + +<p>What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to +power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end +of <a name="Page_100"></a>the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems to +have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy +personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with +contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was +often kept in great poverty.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of + early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the + Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a + Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no + aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were + in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on + their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the + Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to + examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the + Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was + regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the + autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of + the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western + Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing + with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the + throne.</p> + +<p> In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the + relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be + sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by + Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, + throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the + Heavenly Gods.<a name="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46"><sup>[46]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very +different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado +had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the +ancient customs. There were patriots <a name="Page_101"></a>who were annoyed with the Shogun +for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial +treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never +willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren +once more (p. 33):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of + Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the + expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! + Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in + enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific + attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not + be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was + directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, + but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general + unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in + armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years + previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had + been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising + gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the + students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those + men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. </p></div> + +<p>This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan +down to the present day.</p> + +<p>The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the +West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, +in his authoritative <i>History of Japan,</i><a name="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47"><sup>[47]</sup></a> says:—</p> + + + +<div class="blkquot"><p>In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development + most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at + fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the + solution of this portentous enigma in the very <a name="Page_102"></a>superficial and + facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain + their own unit of social organization, which is not the + individual, as with us, but the <i>family</i>. Furthermore, the + resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central + and local, to certain European systems is not the result of + imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is + merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who + overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal + system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new + equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe + for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or + twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the + administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan + by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 + A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding + fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten + Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of + officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from + China and established in the seventh century.... The present + administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was + neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor + adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity + that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies. </p></div> + +<p>The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of +the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the +foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and +secured the support of the country by being the champions of +nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted +which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan +from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the +greatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the Central +Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, +China and Russia were successively <a name="Page_103"></a>defeated, Korea was annexed and a +protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and +commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and +worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and +by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation +of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern +Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of +preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little +pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese +and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few +Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called <i>The Invention of a New +Religion</i>, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He +points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, +to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very +ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on +obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto +has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as +to suit modern requirements.<a name="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48"><sup>[48]</sup></a> It is, of course, preferable to +Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not +one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has +been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_104"></a>Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the +Mikado until some time after the Restoration:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its + sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the + beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of + living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been + assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was + the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have + been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long + centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the + Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, + generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. + At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of + the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the + Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling + their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest + against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign + (that of Meiji)—the most glorious in Japanese history—there + have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was + set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in + another. </p></div> + +<p>This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely +credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of +superstition has gone <i>pari passu</i> with the spread of education, and a +revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the +midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and +instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there +is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler—as absolute as any sovereign +ever has been.</p> + +<p>The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. +Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied +from Chinese <a name="Page_105"></a>models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D., +whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to +somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese +pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that +the Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain +again:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the + fifth century <i>after</i> Christ, and even the accounts of what + happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. + Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the + certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy + does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient + circumstance. While granting a dispensation <i>re</i> the national + mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of + the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who + strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in + Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will + starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading <i>Commentary + on the Japanese Constitution</i> down to school compendiums, the + absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon. </p></div> + +<p>This question of fictitious early history might be considered +unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to +believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of +the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought +and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, + was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it + is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the + popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where + they buried their dead. The governing <a name="Page_106"></a>class determined to change + all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado + descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, + and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims + the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and + constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense + popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and + low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as + public servants, but rather as executants of supreme—one might + say supernatural—authority. Shinto, because connected with the + Imperial family, is to be alone honoured. </p></div> + +<p>All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese +politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of +the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, +and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented +politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes +miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no +constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of +the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are +omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them +the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have +invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the +Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves +take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and +Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The +Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so +until the Mikado is captured by some other clique.</p> + +<p>From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom +in the conduct of affairs. <a name="Page_107"></a>There is reason to think that if Japan were +a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists +of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there +is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to +dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly +there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and +making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the +Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and +the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.<a name="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49"><sup>[49]</sup></a> But democracy +in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. +There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and +anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese +industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as +Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed +there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has +saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed +if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of +these occasions was <a name="Page_108"></a>the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after +the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of +Japanese politics.<a name="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50"><sup>[50]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to +impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, +and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The Russian +Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated +men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the +Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it +had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it +would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a +prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed +secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the +restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations +to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, +faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse +the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of +neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, +led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to +alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the +peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they +would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact +resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was +known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The +Russians, believing that the Japanese would <a name="Page_109"></a>not give way about the +indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese +demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed +up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese +announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted +the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus +the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, +because they had been tricked—the former in the belief that it could +yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter +in the belief that the Government would never give way about the +indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, +furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government—of the +nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the +real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision +of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view; +there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could +not have been made without trickery.</p> + +<p>Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in +which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as +democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that +Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, +took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all +their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great +Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the +Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin +with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, <a name="Page_110"></a>whereas in Japan +there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about +25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter +compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than +that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from +pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the +Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not +collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine +must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, +but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of +course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the +Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet +refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be +applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted +temporarily by Imperial decree—a provision which had no analogue in the +German Constitution.</p> + +<p>The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, +it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, +since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. +To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in +conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was +issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the +Constitution as follows<a name="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51"><sup>[51]</sup></a>:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire + of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors + unbroken for ages eternal."</p> + +<p> "By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his + <i>Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan</i>, "it is meant <a name="Page_111"></a>that + the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of + the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects."</p> + +<p> Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred + and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is + peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established + at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The + Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent + above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. + He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no + power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no + irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither + be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion."</p> + +<p> Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises + the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary + power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, + prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not + sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The + Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, + makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and + commutation of punishments.</p> + +<p> As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article + 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their + advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it."</p> + +<p> Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in + framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of + his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities + belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a + Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the + Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of + State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included + by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is + only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to + the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But + the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open + answers from them before the public, and it may also present + addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions.</p> + +<p> "The Minister President of State is to make representations to + the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, <a name="Page_112"></a>according to + His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, + every branch of the administration being under control of the + said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his + responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the + other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for + the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint + responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the + Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike + personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one + of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the + Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of + control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the + latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some + countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate + body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct + of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint + responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the + power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme + power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be + approved of according to our Constitution." </p></div> + +<p>In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first +four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the +Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by +Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen +of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with +introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished +to preserve Japanese independence <i>vis-à-vis</i> the Western Powers, but +did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own +account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. +Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of +the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. +But when the Diet proved <a name="Page_113"></a>difficult to manage, they reverted to an +earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The +Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous +at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by +glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and +France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war +against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the +hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government +has never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as the +Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant +international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. +Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was +afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was +powerless to prevent it.<a name="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52"><sup>[52]</sup></a> His opposition, however, was tiresome, +until at last he was murdered in Korea.</p> + +<p>Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a +consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The +nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two +chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed +towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant +as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the +present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. +An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing +system, but the whole unity and <i>morale</i> of the nation; I do not believe +that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has <a name="Page_114"></a>proved to be. +Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal +regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive +element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan +to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact +everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, +industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot +emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the +mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore +the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into +industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing +food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because +Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot +obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with +America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong +navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very +similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy +requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets +requires—or rather, is thought to require—starvation wages and long +hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, most +of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day +and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.<a name="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53"><sup>[53]</sup></a> Labour organization +is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;<a name="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54"><sup>[54]</sup></a> but both are certain to +spread if the number of industrial workers increases without <a name="Page_115"></a>a very +marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of +the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable +of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are +vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism +and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of +myth upon which the Japanese State depends.<a name="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55"><sup>[55]</sup></a> There is therefore a +likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence—assuming a peaceful and +prosperous development in the meantime—of a very bitter class conflict +between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and +bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with +agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue.</p> + +<p>The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for +the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop +industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control +Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic +interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a +large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for +wage-earners. And ex<a name="Page_116"></a>panding industry with poverty for wage-earners +means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial +piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a +continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which +the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with +the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, +there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution.</p> + +<p>From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a +diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent +to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is +fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which +patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to +emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, +involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but +ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be free +thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. +Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that +remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46">[46]</a><p> McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47">[47]</a><p> Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48">[48]</a><p> "What <i>popular</i> Shinto, as expounded by its village +priests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully +selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true +aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of +Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which +disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight." (Murdoch, I, +p. 173 n.)</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49">[49]</a><p> The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. +Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office and +Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. +When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on +tho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to +regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme of +party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of +the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but +are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial +Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are +titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments +showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the +great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military +man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom +policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, +albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50">[50]</a><p> The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit. +chaps, xii. and xiii.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51">[51]</a><p> <i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, pp. 252-58.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52">[52]</a><p> See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53">[53]</a><p> Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54">[54]</a><p> See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour +Movements in Japan," published by the <i>Japan Chronicle</i>, 1921, for an +account of what is happening in this direction.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55">[55]</a><p> <i>The Times</i> of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from +its correspondent in Tokyo, <i>à propos</i> of the funeral of Prince +Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:— +</p><p> +"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of +expenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which +was introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as +the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last +year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not +render true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the +highest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic +institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that +the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the +resolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the +incident."</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII"></a><a name="Page_117"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914<br /></p> + + +<p>Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is +necessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking +of the "Yellow Races," as though China and Japan formed some kind of +unity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead +one to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in +comparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the +Chinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities; +but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very +small. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in the +scale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a +hairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit +the Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan +descent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest +importance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and +Chinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more +important than a common racial origin.</p> + +<p>It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived +from China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as +Chinese, and Buddhism, <a name="Page_118"></a>which is still the religion of the people, is of +the sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which +are the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported +along with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the +irruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different +histories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar +had developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of +the First Emperor (<i>c.</i> 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land +empire, having much contact with foreign nations—Annamese, Burmese, +Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an +island kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea +and occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at +war with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal +chivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative +problems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines +of Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China +was still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in +one of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But +naturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that +which befel them in their own country.</p> + +<p>In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue +one finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, +which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised +where conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were +in feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on +the contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire <a name="Page_119"></a>was so vast and +immemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a +different set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and +compromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves +plunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in +developing the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the +situation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been +schooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal +anarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated +the previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like +our thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our +mechanism but dislike our thought.</p> + +<p>From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a +unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and +India contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are +easily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with +modern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely +than in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and +invulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong +as to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if +Russia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German +organizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of +possibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for +power and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal +mentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon +Asiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it +conflicts with China and Russia, which the <a name="Page_120"></a>present weakness of those +Powers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both +are likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the +essential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent.</p> + +<p>It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two +somewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as +the champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the +other hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, +and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are +inefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to +China and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has +inspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of +Korea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a +member of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of +the Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great +Powers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in +Asia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who +happen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in +the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred million +natives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of Great +Britain."<a name="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56"><sup>[56]</sup></a> While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable +Englishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived +from the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply +an intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates <a name="Page_121"></a>the +intensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may +be, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before +the Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley<a name="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57"><sup>[57]</sup></a> +quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the +following list of white men's sins:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>(1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that + all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization.</p> + +<p> (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, + but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors.</p> + +<p> (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession + is made to them they demand and take more.</p> + +<p> (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races + in greatness and wickedness.</p> + +<p> (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of + everything, will adopt any measures to gain it. </p></div> + +<p>This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have +supposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be +unlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They +argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as +possible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed +by Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been +equalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his +wildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he +wants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards +Japan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is +to be above the whites, not merely <a name="Page_122"></a>equal with them. Count Okuma put the +matter very simply in an address given in 1913:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The white races regard the world as their property and all other + races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the + rôle of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they + please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, + and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white + races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, + and woe to them.<a name="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58"><sup>[58]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that +Japan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the +eminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the +Japanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us.</p> + +<p>The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal +affairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without +first consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had +infringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war +caused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and +decisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to +oppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the +Boxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the +fruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and +France, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for +themselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans +presumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow +Peril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese +war inevitable. It would not have mattered much to <a name="Page_123"></a>Japan if the Chinese +had established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have +constituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for +nothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called +Dairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the +Chinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting +Port Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having +accomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The +Russo-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this +Alliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the +corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, +when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided +that, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, +the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally +inspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the +Russian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from +calling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and +Russia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of +Portsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance +served its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese +war. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to +acquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus +curbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an +Entente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded +with France in 1904 <a name="Page_124"></a>would have been useless, and the alliance which +defeated Germany could not have been created.</p> + +<p>Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia +alone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her +strength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to +greatness was due to our support.</p> + +<p>The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all +interference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called +Dairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. +This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then been +called the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437 +miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen +as the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely +naval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to +Western models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a +treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910 +they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists +with every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be +fully the equals of the white men.</p> + +<p>The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a +monopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was +practically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China +by means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. +Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,<a name="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59"><sup>[59]</sup></a> which shows how +the South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:—</p> + +<p>"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed <a name="Page_125"></a>a contract with Messrs +Pauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways +northwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for +the work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan +protested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol +annexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that +'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the +neighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any +branch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that +railway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and +Russia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without +Russian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the +Russian rights, the projected line could not be built without her +consent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in +tone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was +obviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task!</p> + +<p>"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the +clause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to +Hsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to +build the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, +although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were +specificially excluded from participation in railway construction north +of the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British +Note the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and +Chinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the +agreement.</p> + +<p>"<a name="Page_126"></a>Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in +Manchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902 +and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of +the bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from +seeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. +Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but +with no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State +Department at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her +action was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which +assigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway +(South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining +thereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III +and IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is +declared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or +exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty +or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the +second is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct +any general measures common to all countries which China may take for +the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.'</p> + +<p>"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to +build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of +Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not +a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of +Manchuria.'</p> + +<p>"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling +in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such +flagrant <a name="Page_127"></a>dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and +pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since +recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its +subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as +the protest from Tokio....</p> + +<p>"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men +railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other +projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the +important Antung-Mukden line.<a name="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60"><sup>[60]</sup></a> The same alleged secret protocol was +used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the +Newchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in +1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with +Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was +construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration +within the railway zone.'"</p> + +<p>Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover +the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung—though the latter has +been nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or +by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired +vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and +have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the +provinces through which they run.</p> + +<p>After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and +agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting +Manchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. +Russia had entered into extensive obligations to <a name="Page_128"></a>support Japan's claims +at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. +Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the +support of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the Far +Eastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international +questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party +aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They +have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, +as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China +politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several +times in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was +obtaining financial support from some Japanese.<a name="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61"><sup>[61]</sup></a> When the revolution +actually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was +prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems +that the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the +union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. +Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor +of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, +though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of +some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions +of Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation +gives the gist<a name="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62"><sup>[62]</sup></a>:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on + December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, + with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East." + This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese + Minister in Peking, where<a name="Page_129"></a>under the latter on December 23rd + categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances + would Japan recognize a republican form of government in + China.... In connection with the peace conference held at + Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a + trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to + Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the + dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the + Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with + the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria + against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by + Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese + protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining + concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. + Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian + Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of + day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied + their authenticity. </p></div> + +<p>The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the +Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the +day. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was +strongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as +strongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the +influence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to +make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would +doubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war +came, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told +in a separate chapter.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56">[56]</a><p> Quoted by A.M. Pooley, <i>Japan's Foreign Policy</i>, Allen & +Unwin, 1920, p. 18.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57">[57]</a><p> Op. cit. p. 16 n.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58">[58]</a><p> Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59">[59]</a><p> A.M. Pooley, <i>Japan's Foreign Policies</i>, pp. 48-51.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60">[60]</a><p> This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61">[61]</a><p> Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62">[62]</a><p> Page 66.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII"></a><a name="Page_130"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR<br /></p> + + +<p>The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is +Japanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but +after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach +in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their +new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The +Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to +have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at +issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time +there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one +side rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely +victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure +possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in +Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending +China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by +the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of +Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse +after the Great War.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_131"></a>The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have +the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. +But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, +the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military +control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were +displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. +(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung.</p> + +<p>Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China +could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to +turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, +who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese +remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they +presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the +Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented +in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with +Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms +Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese +province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain +specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be +opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted +to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria +and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a +protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for +Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial +enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron +and steel works in a certain <a name="Page_132"></a>region of the Yangtze,<a name="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63"><sup>[63]</sup></a> where we claim +a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, +that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except +Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that +Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed +by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be +administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely +Japanese in <i>personnel</i>; that China should purchase from Japan at least +50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese +arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and +employing Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to +construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan +should have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and +finally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda +in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics.</p> + +<p>These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete <a name="Page_133"></a>loss of Chinese +independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and +industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British +position in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we +had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands +constituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an +uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action +against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were +explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.<a name="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64"><sup>[64]</sup></a> He had no +time to find out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret +agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan +wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.<a name="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65"><sup>[65]</sup></a> By the +terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the +Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan +communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus +definitely breaking the treaty;<a name="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66"><sup>[66]</sup></a> but this also, one must suppose, Mr. +Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles.</p> + +<p>China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured +certain modifications, but <a name="Page_134"></a>was finally compelled to yield by an +ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on +the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth +group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.<a name="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67"><sup>[67]</sup></a> In +this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United +States immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the +agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore +still able to do something to further the objects for which we were +supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In +1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, +it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the +Ishii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the +United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, +particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The +rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.<a name="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68"><sup>[68]</sup></a></p> + +<p>I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.<a name="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69"><sup>[69]</sup></a> +In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing +diplomatic <a name="Page_135"></a>relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the +declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off +diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all +neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in +Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He +induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of +expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, +on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of +declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected +with these events deserve some study.</p> + +<p>In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese +had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, +French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for +reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been +some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should +participate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. +These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of +Japan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear +that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. +When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in +Tokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, +Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as of +paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan +could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient +Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in +the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation <a name="Page_136"></a>of +the economic activities of 400,000,000 people."<a name="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70"><sup>[70]</sup></a> Accordingly the +proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the +Japanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their +sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they +filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing +them of cowardice and military incompetence.<a name="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71"><sup>[71]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the +situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience +to Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had +always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing +to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic +relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no +<i>promises</i> to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American +Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was +ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were +bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged +China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and +Great Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continued +support of Japan.</p> + +<p>In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was +inviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan +concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. +This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the +assistance of <a name="Page_137"></a>the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital +interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China +from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having +hostile designs against Russia or Japan." The last article provided that +"the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of +the High Contracting Parties."<a name="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72"><sup>[72]</sup></a> That is to say, the treaty was not +communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of +Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The High +Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting +the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the +prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement," +one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all +Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese +Empire.</p> + +<p>On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to +sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with +Japan containing the following words:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the + request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they + will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of + Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north + of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being + understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual + peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims + to the German islands south of the equator. </p></div> + +<p>The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by +Notes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo.<a name="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73"><sup>[73]</sup></a> On February +19th, <a name="Page_138"></a>Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian +Ambassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial Japanese +Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace +negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special +interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands +belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." +The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the + Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the + Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung + and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It + also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese + Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed + before the war in this Chinese province and these islands.</p> + +<p> M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support + to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations + with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. + The consequences in China should be the following:</p> + +<p> First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and + consuls;</p> + +<p> Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave + Chinese territory;</p> + +<p> Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the + ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the + disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and + Portugal;</p> + +<p> Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in + China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she + possesses in certain ports of China. </p></div> + +<p>The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian +Ambassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p><a name="Page_139"></a>In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is + charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it + can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of + Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual + surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung + and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in + the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.<a name="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74"><sup>[74]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no +<i>quid pro quo</i>, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the +previous year.</p> + +<p>After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's +participation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the +hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope +being realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest +ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the +Chinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last +days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished +by the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into +the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has +been one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the +revolutionary movement.<a name="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75"><sup>[75]</sup></a> If the Chinese had not been interfered with +at this time, there was <a name="Page_140"></a>some prospect of their succeeding in +establishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his +successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine +constitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had +dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was +resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, +and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan +Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his +Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese +Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic +relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue.</p> + +<p>On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It +was President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking +off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; +but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented +a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of +national unity was more important than entry into the war, and +suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What +had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never +have become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by +the Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to +instigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat +Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration +of war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd +George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.<a name="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76"><sup>[76]</sup></a> <a name="Page_141"></a>The Cabinet, on +May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration +of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to +coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved +impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to +compel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the +Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act +as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of +constitutional government. After these various illegalities, the +military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their +number, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu +Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more +agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, +sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient +unconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to +declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and +against militarism.</p> + +<p>Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the +war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of +the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We +wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living +in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German +trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was +duly carried out—not only public property, but private property also, +so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to +the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till +after the Armistice. They <a name="Page_142"></a>were sent home through the Tropics in +overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of +hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities +insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew +to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the +Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took +upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the merciless +persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have +been much greater.</p> + +<p>The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of +Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the +belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side +two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to +the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our +operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with +proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be +fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, +after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for +ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet +get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law +and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of +German-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that."<a name="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77"><sup>[77]</sup></a> The +European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to +enter the war for righteousness.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_143"></a>We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration +of war. What Japan gained was somewhat different.</p> + +<p>The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, +was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist +Japanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the +war, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality—for +Japan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of +Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal +elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the +Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were +concluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially +published, is given by Millard.<a name="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78"><sup>[78]</sup></a> By these agreements the Japanese +were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and +Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of +the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and +generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the +excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient.</p> + +<p>After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they +placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,<a name="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79"><sup>[79]</sup></a> <i>i.e.,</i> +about £25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were +as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of +victory. Unfortunately for Japan, <a name="Page_144"></a>the side on which Japan was fighting +in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies +of Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For +various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until +after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace +negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were +compelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed +everything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have +joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on +this subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the +most interesting in his book.<a name="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80"><sup>[80]</sup></a> By Article 156 of the Treaty of +Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, +title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung.<a name="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81"><sup>[81]</sup></a> Although +President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, +America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise +the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles +resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, +encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,<a name="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82"><sup>[82]</sup></a> refused to sign +the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province +as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to +a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would <a name="Page_145"></a>have been if we had +annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in +the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public +opinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 +was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly +ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the +Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu +leaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking +Government has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always +for American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her +position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America might +re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference +was announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a +view to having the question settled before the opening of the +Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory +concessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional +evacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of +England and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the +American Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I +understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with +America. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount +to much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. +On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington +Conference.</p> + +<p>There is a question with which the Washington <a name="Page_146"></a>Conference determined not +to concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great +importance in the Far East—I mean the question of Russia. It was +considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, +to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, +with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. +Their existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in a +quarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselves +in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russia +has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the +Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after +a time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake +Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern +Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is +practically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have +launched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks—Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, +etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in military +occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, +though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire.</p> + +<p>In the early days of the Bolshevik régime the Russians lost Northern +Manchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly +of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of +the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects +with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail +between Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme +annoyance to European business <a name="Page_147"></a>men in the Far East, since it means that +letters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead +of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with +the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is +the reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, +various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and +endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which +led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon +all Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a +war with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the +opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former position +in Manchuria. Already, according to <i>The Times</i> correspondent in Peking, +Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany +combined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda.</p> + +<p>The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger +Chinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have +a good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in +Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As +they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the +agreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset +impartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America.<a name="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83"><sup>[83]</sup></a> For +America, <a name="Page_148"></a>no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are +economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far +East, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political +freedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage +beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may +become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, +however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, +because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is +treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But +what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet +impossible to say.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63">[63]</a><p> On this subject George Gleason, <i>What Shall I Think of +Japan?</i> pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel +mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the +Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people. +The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty +miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. +The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 +feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 +years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained +from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand +miners dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is +capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five +centuries.... +</p><p> +"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart +of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special +trade domain." +</p><p> +Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this +matter is given by Mr. Coleman, <i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, chaps. x.-xiv. +See below, pp. 232-3.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64">[64]</a><p> See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, <i>Japan Weekly Chronicle</i>, +October 20, 1921.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65">[65]</a><p> The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, +<i>Japan's Foreign Policies</i>, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66">[66]</a><p> On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to +the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China +a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what +purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only +contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was +directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. +Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably +foolish" (<i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, p. 73).</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67">[67]</a><p> The demands in their original and revised forms, with the +negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of <i>Democracy +and the Eastern Question</i>, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68">[68]</a><p> The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung +question are printed in S.G. Cheng's <i>Modern China</i>, Appendix ii, iii +and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp. +214-6.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69">[69]</a><p> Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and +official history of this matter. They are: <i>An American Diplomat in +China</i>, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; <i>Democracy and +the Eastern Question</i>, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and +<i>China, Captive or Free?</i> by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director +of International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70">[70]</a><p> Millard, p. 99.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71">[71]</a><p> See Pooley, <i>Japan's Foreign Policies</i>, pp. 23 ff; +Coleman, <i>The Far East Unveiled</i>, chap, v., and Millard, chap. iii.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72">[72]</a><p> Millard, pp. 64-66.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73">[73]</a><p> Reid, op. cit. pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. cit., pp. 343-6.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74">[74]</a><p> See Appendix III of Cheng's <i>Modern China</i>, which contains +this note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to the +negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal of +the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea +Islands north of the Equator."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75">[75]</a><p> The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration +of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76">[76]</a><p> Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77">[77]</a><p> Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, +"Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who +still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything +except money-grubbing.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78">[78]</a><p> Appendix C, pp. 421-4.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79">[79]</a><p> A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an +article on "China's Finances in 1918" in <i>China in</i> 1918, published +early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the +comments appear also in Putnam Weale's <i>The Truth about China and +Japan</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80">[80]</a><p> Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese +questions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. +Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case," League of +Nations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's +arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81">[81]</a><p> See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's +<i>Modern China</i>, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82">[82]</a><p> This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's +<i>China Awakened</i> (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix., "The Student Movement."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83">[83]</a><p> "Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest +against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China +Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares +that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel +due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make +demands consistent with those rights" (<i>Daily Herald</i>, December 22, +1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian +labouring masses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What +Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the +Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs +of the capitalists.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX"></a><a name="Page_149"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE<br /></p> + + +<p>The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at +Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the +Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be +dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual +decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their +effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia.</p> + +<p>In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been +brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact +between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general +alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of +America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing +for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The +situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as +regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in +the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem +to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. +It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more +liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of +Wei-hai-wei—a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive +<a name="Page_150"></a>but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, +and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the +terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as +Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that +date.</p> + +<p>One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement +not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified +exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between +America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. +Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring +naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of +the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a +first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo +this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve +the peace with Japan.</p> + +<p>Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision +of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The +foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have +insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the +Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they +desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, +though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one +of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put +their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as +they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels +sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese +importation of morphia into China, as well as the <a name="Page_151"></a>growth of the poppy +in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature +of their penetration of China.<a name="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84"><sup>[84]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and +integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these +are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning.</p> + +<p>From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was +the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end +of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of +Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the +Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, +they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings +in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and +through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse +was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, +and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the +resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of +Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The +Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the +question afresh.</p> + +<p>At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all +their own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the +Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation +with China. This point was important, because, ever since the +Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to +recognize, <a name="Page_152"></a>in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese +Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary +to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered +with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to +the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before +the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between +the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, +was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a +deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, +of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no +longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old +days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some +disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was +roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution +more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would +probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work +of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly +urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less +strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between +China and Japan.</p> + +<p>By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the +private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as +regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the +negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they +would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back +the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result <a name="Page_153"></a>of +a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese +refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were +compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid +in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway +was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs +or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be +handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. +Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese +retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic +manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the +other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President.</p> + +<p>It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years +hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years +hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both +Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to +this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have +some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that +case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete +control of the Shantung railway.</p> + +<p>On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than +might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new +international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with +them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary +to consider certain Far Eastern questions <i>not</i> discussed at Washington, +since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_154"></a>The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at +Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is +secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both +together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will +not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See +Appendix.)</p> + +<p>The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions +in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain +unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check +them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the +Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any +near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have +decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A +conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place +at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the +effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. +But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. <i>The +Times</i> of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian official +accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in <i>The +Times</i> as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given + out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen + Conference.</p> + +<p> It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly + expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government + decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place + on August 26th last year.</p> + +<p> The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic + principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of + Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of <a name="Page_155"></a>menacing military + establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in + Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on + foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that + the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as + possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. + Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of + the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the + Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis + agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair + Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and + territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be + speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the + affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of + property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be + met.</p> + +<p> The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be + relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had + progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, + would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita + that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable + period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed + the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that + the preparations for the relief of the said division might be + dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate + despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the + withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should + fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops.</p> + +<p> Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out + within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed + arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the + same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by + Japan.</p> + +<p> Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a + sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely + ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought + up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not + only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but + declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to + Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the + Chita Government is <a name="Page_156"></a>that they lacked a sincere effort to bring + the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government + instructed its delegates to quit Dairen. </p></div> + +<p>The Russian official account is given by <i>The Times</i> immediately below +the above. It is as follows:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with + the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. + Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian + Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, + but when the question of military evacuation was reached the + Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued + Japanese intervention.</p> + +<p> Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the + negotiations <i>re</i> military convention, reproaching the Far + Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The + Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be + signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese + military evacuation.</p> + +<p> On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum + demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an + hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement + with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far + Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far + Eastern territory. <i>Re</i> evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note + promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen + circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. + On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken + up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops + remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th. </p></div> + +<p>Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according +to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial +will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, +I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqué +it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese +<a name="Page_157"></a>unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all +that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, +which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to +evacuate Egypt.</p> + +<p>It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the +Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese +felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with +at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will +naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of +the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. +This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the +assembled peacemakers.<a name="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85"><sup>[85]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. +This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. +Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic +capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. +Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their +armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America +look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to +compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent +years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed +<a name="Page_158"></a>coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation +from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending +to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the +authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, +believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that +France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become +anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa +have sown the seeds of future wars—unless, by some miracle, the +"civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84">[84]</a><p> See <i>e.g.</i> chap. viii. of Millard's <i>Democracy and the +Eastern Question.</i></p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85">[85]</a><p> I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of +the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic +mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more +high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were +communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they +showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies +have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X"></a><a name="Page_159"></a>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST<br /></p> + + +<p>The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to +guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, +and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will +endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying +the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I +regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively +the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an +attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests +and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.<a name="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86"><sup>[86]</sup></a></p> + +<p>I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the +dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of +peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise +and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The +pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the +optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, <a name="Page_160"></a>American +public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, +athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main +ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the +Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, +whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to +explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious +hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western +Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength +of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. +Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his +sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. +This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been +somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard +Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as +it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an +attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England +of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment +than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from +Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors +is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development +is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to +estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United +States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of +idealism.</p> + +<p>Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It +is apt to be incompatible with <a name="Page_161"></a>tolerance, with the practice of +live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less +pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the +contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical +philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle +of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are +useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by +any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort +of world.</p> + +<p>All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington +Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the +friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, +hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst +enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power +to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if +there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to +see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the +militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done +in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the +future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state +Japan's case, although, <i>for the present</i>, I think it weaker than +America's.</p> + +<p>It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American +policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while +clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American +interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal +to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand +that it <a name="Page_162"></a>is out of the question to go to war with America, so that +America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in +having.<a name="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87"><sup>[87]</sup></a> The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very +pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the +seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the +cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of +American interests. To take next the question of China: American +ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country +should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The +policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so +rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of +the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal +policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting +a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest.</p> + +<p>In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices +are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight +whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In +the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to +discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed +by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a +discrimination in favour of American <a name="Page_163"></a>shipping. Even if the President +ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least +two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view +of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the +way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and +to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against +"shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is +<i>always</i> honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that +America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial +interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases.</p> + +<p>I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself +with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American +weekly, The <i>Freeman</i> (November 23, 1921, p. 244):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an + obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large + banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated + the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in + fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an + emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with + intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious + effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese + Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new + international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese + Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, + together with other obligations already in arrears, and still + others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had + also received the full and energetic support of the Department of + State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were + at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; + having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they + came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an <a name="Page_164"></a>offer to + save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government + would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus + prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American + financial protectorate. </p></div> + +<p>It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated +negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the +terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very +adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the <i>Freeman</i> +concludes:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the + consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, + those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to + take full advantage of the situation. </p></div> + +<p>There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington +Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the +connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to +establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international +control over China. In the <i>Japan Weekly Chronicle</i> for November 17, +1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I +find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish +international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the +<i>Philadelphia Public Ledger</i>: "We suspect the motives which led to the +suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly +oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: +"International control will not do. China must be given time and +opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or +exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now <a name="Page_165"></a>passing +through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China +must agree. In the same issue of the <i>Japan Weekly Chronicle</i>—which, by +the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world—I find the +following (p. 728):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The + international bankers have a scheme for the international control + of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a + sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese + Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the + Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the + Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing + this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's + statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks + about resisting the control of the international banks he is + fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the + Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full + opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny." </p></div> + +<p>Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be +due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had +nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and +one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson."</p> + +<p>I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, +and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European +radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control +reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a +Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, +for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would +be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic +as not to care <a name="Page_166"></a>whether they get any interest on their money or not, +although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though +this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the +Chinese.</p> + +<p>In the <i>New Republic</i> for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. +Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is +prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was +written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far +East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign +commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good +substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually +increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the +chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the +spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization +for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such +<i>objets d'art</i> as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the +gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one +day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man +throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret +society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. +It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be +told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The +definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good +government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat +dividends to capitalists.</p> + +<p>The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They +have a civilization <a name="Page_167"></a>superior to ours in all that makes for human +happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if +they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce +something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that +we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will +be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul +of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her +salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When +America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of +intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained. +Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans +recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with +blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is +that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank +God that they are not as this publican.</p> + +<p>So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of +Japan.</p> + +<p>Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that +Japan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not +suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United +States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of +Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only +two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to +fight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and +developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled +on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern +<a name="Page_168"></a>morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was +horrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began +to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured +Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with +the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by +the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good +qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers."</p> + +<p>People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the +intensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought +into contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the +highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy +white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke +would venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated +in this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that +white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese, +is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured +races in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from +retaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general +will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be +re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the +survival of civilizations of a different type from that of the +industrial West.</p> + +<p>The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of +the West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in +its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the +Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, <a name="Page_169"></a>as an actually divine being, +is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular +support for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely +economic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediæval way. The +morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic. +Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado +is the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of +superstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century +theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe +the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels +promoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in +one sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt.</p> + +<p>Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a +proposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until +it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view +that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially +nationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the +State religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,<a name="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88"><sup>[88]</sup></a> and +propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto +religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is +not a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism, +Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to +appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is +believed by the same people. It is customary to adopt <a name="Page_170"></a>Shinto rites for +marriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is +considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a +universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,<a name="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89"><sup>[89]</sup></a> like +the Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples +the priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of +English Archdeacons.</p> + +<p>The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their +sense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but +they have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to +industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful +as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has +hitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any +nation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves our +gratitude.</p> + +<p>The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard +working, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them +have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and +incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means +universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of +quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a +whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest +respect.</p> + +<p>The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of +Socialism and the Labour movement.<a name="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90"><sup>[90]</sup></a> In China, the intellectuals are +often theoretical <a name="Page_171"></a>Socialists, but in the absence of Labour +organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In +Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety +of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, +if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a +political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists +resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the +national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but +not so much as Socialists in America—so at least I am informed by an +American who is in a position to judge.</p> + +<p>The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. +By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly +responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They +therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the +Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the +evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to +keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. +Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable +in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real +Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless +the existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the +Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung +but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal +government of Japan would probably have been excellent.</p> + +<p>The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that +the Americana are their implacable <a name="Page_172"></a>foes. One gathers that the +Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The +argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States +will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in +the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented +with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then +Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield +in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato<a name="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91"><sup>[91]</sup></a> (the Japanese Bernhardi, +as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will +lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be +incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, +of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and +the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A +war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of +Japan.</p> + +<p>One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany +in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial +empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the +Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners; +so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused +our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with +America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by +our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, +similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French +sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has +brought us over to their side. The Germans <a name="Page_173"></a>at last, impelled by terrors +largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it +is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons +are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them +further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case +of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed +at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in +Eastern Asia.</p> + +<p>The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, +as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper +passions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; America +believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to +persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an +extension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt +futile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and +culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a +delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, +profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve +their own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and +in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice +is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese +are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the +white man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. +Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic +conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the +Americans.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_174"></a>Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong +through impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China +the same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then +they could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the +champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, +and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to +them. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do; +they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only +to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore +behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this +same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the +worst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, +they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, +they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible +for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best +Americans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese +policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not +achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a +great misfortune for mankind.</p> + +<p>A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in +itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would +destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to +Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide +militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. +If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will +<a name="Page_175"></a>only become more liberal if the present régime is discredited by +failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the +interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint +diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only +Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate +neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of +actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance +with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an +encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan +has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only +permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese +at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our +Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the +ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform.</p> + +<p>We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency +in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, +millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not +mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still +able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the +Japanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik +propaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the +effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from +Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except +the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of +developing industry without passing through the stage of private +<a name="Page_176"></a>capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are +more and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as +it has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, +for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State, +whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to +federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very +great deal of government, and more control of individual lives by the +authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed +personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all +others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful +practical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is +the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these +reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much +progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the +same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved +successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were +probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. +The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively +Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, +carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less +corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, like +the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of +mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, +adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and +gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon +spent, unless there <a name="Page_177"></a>is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régime +under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his +life.</p> + +<p>It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation +develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain +Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control +of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be +useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, +but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America +or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the +supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, +recover the position which she held in relation to China before the +Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an +instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for +centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the +last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long.</p> + +<p>The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way +regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as +much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, +the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be +able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with +Asiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking +nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong +for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, +on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be +desirable In the interests of mankind as a whole.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_178"></a>What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for +China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. +The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end +some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending +of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of +some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably +quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in +the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in +the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through +years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their +development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference +without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. +Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but +have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. +The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult +one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the +Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we +do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution +suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution +slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely +imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable.</p> + +<p>There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the +Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable +chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the <i>status quo</i> +is to be maintained, while in Shantung the <a name="Page_179"></a>Japanese have made +concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four +Powers—America, Great Britain, France, and Japan—have agreed to +exploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortium +as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will +therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only +people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As +they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set +to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers +are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must +be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish +colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth +of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China +for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of +America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust +magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of +radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by +some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom.</p> + +<p>But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace +and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, +France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so +far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the +peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no +means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous +competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing +the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the +<a name="Page_180"></a>domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the +strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's +interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese +interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for +the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable +government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, +and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will +not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own +railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic +independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the +form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will +keep a <i>dossier</i> of every student educated in colleges under American +control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or +Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard +of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the +United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In +short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to +"God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the +wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give +to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that +which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination +of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be +perfect.</p> + +<p>The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy +competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive +competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism <a name="Page_181"></a>has succeeded +in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced +industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between +workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow +races.<a name="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92"><sup>[92]</sup></a> Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap +Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to +white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of +industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an +obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any +person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every +other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per +head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who +either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the +others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an +opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of +the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British +Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial +conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole +question of Asiatic immigration, which <a name="Page_182"></a>is liable to cause trouble for +centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since +Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this +matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world.</p> + +<p>The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by +means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is +obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except +through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, +China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands +of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into +submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, +attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot +see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result +of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect +that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the +Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and +the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as +the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be +fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive +civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, +the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any +sort would survive it.</p> + +<p>To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big +financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. +No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due +to popular pressure, and is against <a name="Page_183"></a>the interests of big finance. But +not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a +few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the +interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic +immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social +interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system +makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to +the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also +to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is +seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by +accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the +present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the +weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of +Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little +freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the +present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is +production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation +produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. +Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in +internal labour problems and in international relations. The development +of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the +Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the +things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs +for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply +these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish +pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will +be regulated by <a name="Page_184"></a>the same authority which represents the needs of the +consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will +cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to +exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not +possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present +American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not +secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only +international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of +revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure +until international Socialism is established throughout the world.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86">[86]</a><p> The interests of England, apart from the question of +India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, +British interests are allied with American finance, as against the +pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87">[87]</a><p> It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington +Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there +agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the +navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy +is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government +has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of +reluctant taxpayers. See <i>The Times'</i> New York Correspondent's telegram +in <i>The Times</i> of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88">[88]</a><p> See Chamberlain, <i>The Invention of a New Religion</i>, +published by the Rationalist Press Association.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89">[89]</a><p> See Murdoch, <i>History of Japan</i>, I. pp. 500 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90">[90]</a><p> An excellent account of these is given in <i>The Socialist +and Labour Movement in Japan</i>, by an American Sociologist, published by +the <i>Japan Chronicle</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91">[91]</a><p> Author of a book called <i>If Japan and America Fight</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92">[92]</a><p> The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is +illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in <i>The Times</i> for +April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of +shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime +Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp +instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by +black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation +reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and +turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to +blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from +the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not +generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I +deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, +assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a +blessing.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI"></a><a name="Page_185"></a>CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED<br /></p> + + +<p>There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a +close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the +Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact +will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or +whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that +of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the +past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, +Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediæval Europe from +the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these +cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of +China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case +again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from +us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the +Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear +we are unteachable.</p> + +<p>I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of +the questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three +following chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning <a name="Page_186"></a>the internal +condition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the +hopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult +situation.</p> + +<p>With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I +cannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact +after such a long period of separate development as has marked those of +China and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is +surprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is +not more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth +while to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two +civilizations.</p> + +<p>Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, +which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish +religion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an +outcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and +Galileo as representing these three elements, which have remained +singularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive +literature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more +urbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical +belief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with the +conception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our +nationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power +and the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly +be, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive +also the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been +acquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our +mentality.</p> + +<p>No one of these three elements has had any <a name="Page_187"></a>appreciable part in the +development of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese +painting, sculpture, and music.<a name="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93"><sup>[93]</sup></a> China belongs, in the dawn of its +history, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia +contributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the +Greeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by +the rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so +the original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow +River. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch +far either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this +similarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little +in common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the +Egyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze<a name="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94"><sup>[94]</sup></a> and Confucius, who both belong to +the sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should +regard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute +everything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the +differences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and +Babylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do +not think science can, at present, account wholly for national +character. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not +the whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant +individuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, +Mahomet, and Confucius.</p> + +<p>The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the <a name="Page_188"></a>founder of Taoism. "Lao +Tze" is not really a proper name, but means merely "the old +philosopher." He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of +Confucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He +held that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way +or manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that +we ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to +conform to it. "Tao" means "way," but used in a more or less mystical +sense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life." I +think he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way," and +that if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, +like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere +magic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. +But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist +philosophy from the first.</p> + +<p>Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but +his ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more +interesting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one +of freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences +with Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they +contrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the pure +men of old." There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, +because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some +sense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife +in the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of +humour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by +Chuang-Tze's account of <a name="Page_189"></a>Po-Lo who "understood the management of +horses," and trained them till five out of every ten died.<a name="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95"><sup>[95]</sup></a> Their +restraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with +Western mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature +and art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present +day. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance +of a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so +that Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the +Chinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in +Peking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in +the theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement +at its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor +of a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. +In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due +to the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man +should always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments +(being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate +them in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, +which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue +in their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, +makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at +being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration +for the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of +passion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first +all the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually <a name="Page_190"></a>the beauty and +dignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who +have lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best.</p> + +<p>The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from +the favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that +I am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are +largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern +is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When +one compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of +some other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even +if they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, +is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to +a powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly +has succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners +and perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is +quite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been +provided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the +humblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of +white men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot +demean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard +this as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the +Chinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors.</p> + +<p>There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional +civilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from +India in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a +definite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant +outlook which <a name="Page_191"></a>we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man +adopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity +and Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man +can accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man +may be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is +incompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both +Buddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental +difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any +individual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. +Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It +has mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a +message to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as +natural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive +pessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of +all this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, +wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at +all. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or +religious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of +these two religions in China has been that the more religious and +contemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active +administrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the +official teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were +examined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has +been in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been +lacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western +nations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have <a name="Page_192"></a>conformed very +closely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the +population has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that +subject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations +have had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and +resources.</p> + +<p>Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in +China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other +two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is +practically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but +throughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it +is not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin." +Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been no +science and no industrialism.</p> + +<p>What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization +with the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, +but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to +dissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural +contact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political +and economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural +question as far as I can in isolation.</p> + +<p>There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not +simply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist +Western aggression, but because a very large number of people consider +learning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a +high value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only +of the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that +Western knowledge is more useful. <a name="Page_193"></a>Many students go every year to +universities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or +economics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to +China, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or +politicians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, +especially in the educated classes.</p> + +<p>The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had +ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This +was not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack +of new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the +stimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily +keen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of +libraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human +material. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in +science, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore +the spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the +Church put in its way in Europe. I have no doubt that if the Chinese +could get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within +the next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It +is quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with +fresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the +enthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the +renaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy.</p> + +<p>It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, +that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring +wealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an +ethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. <a name="Page_194"></a>They are +not by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me +that they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them +think there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The +habit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and +some of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they +were looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and +before long they will realize that they must work out their own +salvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults +and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will +make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours.</p> + +<p>The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the +scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just +conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to +see gradually uniting.</p> + +<p>Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production without +possession, action without self-assertion, development without +domination." I think one could derive from these words a conception of +the ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted +that they are very different from the ends which most white men set +before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly +sought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a +philosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to +Germany.</p> + +<p>But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with +Chinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese +practice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, +of course, a great deal of truth in this. <a name="Page_195"></a>Possession, which is one of +the three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to +the heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of +money—not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the +English or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful +men make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and +domination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese +practice. There is much less desire than among the white races to +tyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is +quite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on +which are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the +world could ever be "too proud to fight," that nation would be China. +The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, +showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they +could be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire +freedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may +compel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their +virtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have +been an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is +extraordinarily slight.</p> + +<p>Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the +Chinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a +poet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by +Mr. Waley, called by him <i>The Old Man with the Broken Arm</i>, to make a +hero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. <a name="Page_196"></a>Their +pacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that +they do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure—as +their pictures show—in observing characteristic manifestations of +different kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a +preconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which +dominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our +active impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with +us; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The +cultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their +earliest sages write. If one points out to them that this shows how +little progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress when +you already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seems +to a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own +wisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call +progress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable +goal.</p> + +<p>It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West +with what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek +knowledge, in the hope—which I fear is usually vain—that knowledge may +prove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three +motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our +religion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, +and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and +the missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the +world; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese +have no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions <a name="Page_197"></a>are +many, but reason is one," and with that they are content to let us go +our way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different +from those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking +concessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get +their claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good +soldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not +worth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their +reasonableness.</p> + +<p>I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that +Europeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine +ourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we +still practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we +are firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are +immeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation +like the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to +them is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound +mistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is +miserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier +because the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook +than our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, +but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of +beauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In +this respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. +I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but +for that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to +be fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us <a name="Page_198"></a>the indispensable +minimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of +that contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all +the other nations of antiquity have perished.</p> + +<p>When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I +thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn +from them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found +this attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who +go only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese +do not excel in the things we really value—military prowess and +industrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the +simple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than +in the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where +such things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for +our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance +and contemplative peace of mind.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93">[93]</a><p> See Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 368, and Giles, op. cit. p. +187.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94">[94]</a><p> With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is +of doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three +centuries after his death. Cf. Giles, op. cit., Lecture V.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95">[95]</a><p> Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII"></a><a name="Page_199"></a>CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>THE CHINESE CHARACTER<br /></p> + + +<p>There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, +full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be +that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this +opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I +was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have +talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people +would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not +wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle +Oriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an +Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as +many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the +game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is +deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in +London.</p> + +<p>One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of +securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, +both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many +years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a +single <a name="Page_200"></a>Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the +Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their +outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils: +the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the +anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at +first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to +be reformed.</p> + +<p>But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable +misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the +foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of +soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the +bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt +all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really +wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to +lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that +may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a +mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit?</p> + +<p>The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have +to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for +these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the +capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure +in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, +are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted; +they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened +by a joke.</p> + +<p>I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in +chairs—the way was rough <a name="Page_201"></a>and very steep, the work for the coolies very +severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes +to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their +pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in +the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, +they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order +to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying +whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. +Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the +universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they +might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows +<i>complete</i> self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own +interest.</p> + +<p>One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion +that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten +what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in +Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are +places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging +up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing +poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in +<i>Whitaker's Almanac</i>. A European, in recommending a place of residence, +will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can +conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a +Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will +tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an +ancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars <a name="Page_202"></a>weary of the +world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook +that strikes the Westerner as barbaric.</p> + +<p>The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet +dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. +They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their +pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military +weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider +efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. +I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the +greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A +Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on +traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to +feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, +the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical +Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his +environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as +delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the +contrast between China and the English-speaking world.</p> + +<p>We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical +camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, +for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the +question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and +therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is +really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the +feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of +this pleasure, a young <a name="Page_203"></a>American will work so hard that, by the time he +has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, +compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the +feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the +thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may +suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations +"progressive."</p> + +<p>There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common +than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form—not a +better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. +It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread +failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore +money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a +means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, +are often content to remain poor. In China, the <i>tuchuns</i> (military +governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole +purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a +suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life +quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose +power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that +such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed +to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin +whole continents in order to win an election campaign.</p> + +<p>The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than +one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the +Great <a name="Page_204"></a>Powers—especially Japan—the harm would be much less than is +done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities +of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are +performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, +and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been +wholly lost in the rest of the world.</p> + +<p>The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign +pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he +might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a +rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech +and a free Press.<a name="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96"><sup>[96]</sup></a> The individual does not feel obliged to follow the +herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men +still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the +conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the +West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. +Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in +China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few +leading financiers.</p> + +<p>The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China +as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity +in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest +beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if +you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a +Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because +your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute +an offence.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_205"></a>Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as +industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words +that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. +But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, +which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the +most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are +accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what +is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I +were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer +from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful. +Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall +not venture to decide.</p> + +<p>The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in +their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to +its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be +taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it +is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to +cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his +title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of +several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably +in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was +nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, +without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put.</p> + +<p>Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It +was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu +party <a name="Page_206"></a>in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was +accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most +widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the +students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great +preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when +they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. +In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking +and change the Government almost without firing a shot.</p> + +<p>The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers' +strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The +Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left +its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce +payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, +accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and +police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely +wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in +China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for +revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in +corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to +extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing +the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated +in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the +interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public +feeling.</p> + +<p>Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. +The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize +acutely <a name="Page_207"></a>what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are +aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to +naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. +They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy +eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its +coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by +developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new +reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts +of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit +tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in +centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and +then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. +Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations +the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects.</p> + +<p>Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for +colonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for their +surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the +Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status +of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be +recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese +derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of +their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their +unrivalled national cohesiveness—in spite of the civil wars, which +merely ruffle the surface—that they can afford to despise military +methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall +have exhausted itself in internecine combats.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_208"></a>China is much less a political entity than a civilization—the only one +that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the +Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have +perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There +have been foreign influences—first Buddhism, and now Western science. +But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science +will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as +much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had +not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. +What is bad in the West—its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness +to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims—they +see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its +science, they do wish to adopt.</p> + +<p>The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and +literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the +spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who +have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is +needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization +to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like +ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are +not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new +civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to +create.</p> + +<p>So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese +character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad +sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced +<a name="Page_209"></a>so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should +prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as +well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is +less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the +balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, +and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the +Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer +pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. +With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and +callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, +admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible +remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of +China's greatest virtues.</p> + +<p>The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. +They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one +per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other +ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the +Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw +materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those +whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese +would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the +philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions +were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few +dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by +white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and +that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the +efforts of the white <a name="Page_210"></a>men were more effective in soothing their own +consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present +birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are +bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive +through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next.</p> + +<p>Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of +agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. +Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts +to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness +has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of +the problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so +explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, +nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. +The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain +in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. +Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show +that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty; +but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be +said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an +extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy.</p> + +<p>Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that +they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between +rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that +first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the +Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is +<a name="Page_211"></a>involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a +serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese +are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. +Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, +the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous +people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure +torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races +would find insufficient—for example, to conceal the hiding-place of +stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of <i>active</i> courage, +they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their +readiness to commit suicide.</p> + +<p>Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is +hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all +except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. +For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk +of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the +fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I +think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an +honest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as +economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China +than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any +Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more +corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that +changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we +are—which is not saying much.</p> + +<p>I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are <a name="Page_212"></a>in ordinary life, when +they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat +sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are +capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of +this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was +a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But +their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this +element in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it +impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of +them becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or +devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I +suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite +of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And +many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic +love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the +West.</p> + +<p>To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the +foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient +civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, +under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American +financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude +imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who +have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty +in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not +obey the laws of perspective.</p> + +<p>The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved; +it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something <a name="Page_213"></a>may +be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is +supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these +qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle +disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be +seen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will force +it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to +which Japan has been driven.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96">[96]</a><p> This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish +a very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed +Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, <i>Review of the Far East,</i> April 16, +1922.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII"></a><a name="Page_214"></a>CHAPTER XIII</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA<br /></p> + + +<p>China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of +culture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient +beauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is content +to be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tend +to be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European +tourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is +apt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctive +and non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one who +regards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a +country with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do +not view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquire +what is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interesting +survival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the +first step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher +education, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use and +appreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Western +follies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and +one of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_215"></a>There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of +the classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a more +intelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditional +study of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in +the eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have +secured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learning +reading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still form +the majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given. +Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the +classical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at +the same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one of +these schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people who +are taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns +one finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which +is very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probably +those who can both read and write form about five per cent, of the +population.</p> + +<p>The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on +modern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old +examination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, has +done much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementary +education. The following statistics showing the increase in the number +of schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's +<i>China Awakened</i>, p. 4:—</p> +<pre> + 1910 1914 1917 1919<br /> +Number of Schools 42,444 59,796 128,048 134,000 +Number of Teachers 185,566 200,000 326,417 326,000 +Number of Students 1,625,534 3,849,554 4,269,197 4,500,000 +</pre> +<p><a name="Page_216"></a>Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil +war, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is +very remarkable.</p> + +<p>There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing +to the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has +been impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small +scale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable +government.</p> + +<p>The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be +only elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the +older texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, +within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest +renaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China +for many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, +even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the +innocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one +almost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the +Vacation—learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern +world, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some +eleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and +against the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the +same as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one +is driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of +specialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that +the ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more +account of modern needs, and give more <a name="Page_217"></a>instruction in science, modern +languages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, +so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China.</p> + +<p>The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the +missionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As +everyone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired +through the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their +own account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual +loss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded +(and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the +surplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American +universities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, +both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts +in China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have +come to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the +Great Powers.</p> + +<p>One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I +saw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), +the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller +Hospital), and the so-called Peking University.</p> + +<p>Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western +hills, with a number of fine solid buildings,<a name="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97"><sup>[97]</sup></a> in a good American +style, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. <a name="Page_218"></a>It has +an atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a +(Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the +American College President. The teachers are partly American, partly +Chinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the +latter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of +every virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, +exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the +teaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was +thorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American +institutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. +Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the +most skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot +understand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European +language is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful +throughout the Far East.</p> + +<p>The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and +philosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is +commonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards +to America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China +they become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute +greatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty +and technical intelligence.</p> + +<p>The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing +an interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty with +European utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese, +but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy, +though perhaps not <a name="Page_219"></a>wholly successful. The hospital has all the most +modern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the +Standard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use to +anyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical College +teaches many things besides medicine—English literature, for +example—and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order +to produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the European +level, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessary +for medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a sound +knowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to +China, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent.</p> + +<p>The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have +to suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so +at least I was told) had already established a university in Peking, +fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But the +Methodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" to +their schools, so the already existing university had to alter its name +to "Government University." The case is exactly as if a collection of +old-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach the +doctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to +abandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question +of extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can be +abandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it +sometimes gives rise.</p> + +<p>Returned students (<i>i.e.</i> students who have been <a name="Page_220"></a>at foreign +universities) form a definite set in China.<a name="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98"><sup>[98]</sup></a> There is in Peking a +"Returned Students' Club," a charming place. It is customary among +Europeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. +There are occasionally disagreements between different sections; in +particular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite as +equals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression was +that America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other +country; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than +those returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinaman +who wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem +romantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions which +conservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to +those of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it +is useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One is +reminded of the conversation in <i>Eothen</i> between the English country +gentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England <a name="Page_221"></a>to the +refrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels," while +the Englishman keeps saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is +still, thank God, the British yeoman."</p> + +<p>Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole +admirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the +needs of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a national +temperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeans +ultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always +missionaries—not of Christianity, though they often think that is what +they are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Clean +living, clean thinking, and pep," I think an American would reply. This +means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness +for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as +being easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy for +the leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire—that hardened +old cynic—laid it down that the true ends of life are "<i>aimer et +penser</i>." Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with +"pep." The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate +both. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save the +lives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worth +saving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether +satisfactory.</p> + +<p>The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established +schools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. +In these, a certain proportion of the teachers are European <a name="Page_222"></a>or +American, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One +can never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by +white men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously +in the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration +of China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. +Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they +are not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other +country, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, +and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility +to exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really +beautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used +to have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking +Government University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for +keenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the +Science Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came +across them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire +Western knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. +They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not +capitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best +among their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, +but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely +Chinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government +University, leave much to be desired from the point of view of +instruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is +not sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough <a name="Page_223"></a>mental discipline. +But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the +profoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. +Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the +Government—loved by the Powers on account of its weakness—has to part +with all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and +plunder the country, as in Europe—for China must be compared with +Europe, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is +unhappily divided.</p> + +<p>The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a +powerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in +1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. +Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement." And what they did was not +merely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the + Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the + Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to + the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. + For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures + showing them the real situation, internally as well as + externally; but especially by establishing free schools and + maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too + high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also + teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with + the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that + fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. </p></div> + +<p>One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards +modern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality +between men and women. The position of women in Peking <a name="Page_224"></a>Government +University is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to +examinations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the +university. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective +women teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive +institution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would +horrify most British head mistresses.</p> + +<p>There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary +education, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls +tend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as +the boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet +in Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner +speeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt +co-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter +should receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not +ripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the +sphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having +imagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I +realized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried +out in China.</p> + +<p>Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot +give what Young China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions +of centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European +superstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. +It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that +there is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and +for that free spirit of sceptical <a name="Page_225"></a>inquiry by which they are seeking to +build a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its +best days.</p> + +<p>While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher +pay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many +months. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation +to the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who +clubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The +incident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a +revolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the +teachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them +all that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of +bandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and +European intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may +say broadly that the old traditional education, with the military +governors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for +Conservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions +stand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically +though not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone +stands for intellectual freedom.</p> + +<p>The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by +foreigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire +military strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to +advance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who +quite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That +is why the West regards them as uncivilized.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97">[97]</a><p> It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in +purely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and +Nanking Teachers' Training College.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98">[98]</a><p> Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from <i>Who's Who of +American Returned Students</i>, a classification of the occupations of 596 +Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items +are: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in +Government service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three +members of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical +practitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and +religious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese +holding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400 +<i>(ib.).</i> This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America +in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese +university students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a +classification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are: +Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22; +natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified +separately), 19.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV"></a><a name="Page_226"></a>CHAPTER XIV</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA<br /></p> + + +<p>China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial +possibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as +nearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the +next few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this +development as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties +are very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will +therefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the +possibilities of the near future.</p> + +<p>We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's +industrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then +the mines, before going on to other matters.</p> + +<p>When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of +Oxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to +them, and did all it could to keep them at a distance.<a name="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99"><sup>[99]</sup></a> In 1875 a +short line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the +Central Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In +1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was +accomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then +thought <a name="Page_227"></a>that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for +concessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important +line from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a +Hankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far +as Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with +the Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung +Railway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the +south. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the +Yangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and +managed by foreign officials of the respective countries which had +obtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware +that some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated +beyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the +Chinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of +most of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to +realize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem +was how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow +line and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by the +help of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the +hands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow +line was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was +constructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the +big main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the +Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. +The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be +<a name="Page_228"></a>regarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong +enough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more +or less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the +agreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China—five +years hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost +to China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important +railways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of +the situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity.</p> + +<p>Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges—quite rightly, as I +think—the great importance of nationalizing <i>all</i> Chinese railways. At +Washington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and +to concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early +in 1919, he said<a name="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100"><sup>[100]</sup></a>:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p><i>The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of + the new Republican State is the railway key</i>.... The revolution + of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of + popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being + carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left + behind a more subtle weapon. <i>This weapon is the railway</i>. Russia + with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. + Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited + the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put + into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted + economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this + grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all + intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign <i>enclave</i>, + subversive of the Chinese State. <i>The especial evil to-day is + that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new + technique,</i> which ... she will eventually extend into the very + heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and + Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) <a name="Page_229"></a>unless she is summarily + arrested. <i>At all costs this must be stopped.</i> The method of + doing so is easy: <i>It is to have it laid down categorically, and + accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on + Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must + be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; + that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese + citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; + and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered + simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section + by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board</i>. </p></div> + +<p>If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this +reform—as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale—will +have been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect +Japan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her +promises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of +Japanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. +Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the +Shantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it.</p> + +<p>It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan +Railway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by +foreigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably +managed. I quote from Mr. Tyau<a name="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101"><sup>[101]</sup></a> the following statistics, which +refer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027 +kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial +railways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres. +Total, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are +mainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which <a name="Page_230"></a>the first must be +regarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably +recovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer +the importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign +railway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. +Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in +1918:—</p> + +<pre> +Name of Line. Kilometres Year Per cent. earned +Operated. Completed. on Investment.<br /> +Peking-Mukden 987 1897 22.7 +Peking-Hankow 1306 1905 15.8 +Shanghai-Nanking 327 1908 6.2 +Tientsin-Pukow 1107 1912 6.2 +Peking-Suiyuan 490 1915 5.6 +</pre> +<p>Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less +prosperous.</p> + +<p>I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway +administration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the +evils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed +by different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was +no uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to +another. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially +to open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of +which would probably be enormous.</p> + +<p>Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows +foreign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its +industries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent +of foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far +from satisfactory. <a name="Page_231"></a>Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché at +Peking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards +China's mineral resources:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good + supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial + development. To indicate how little China has developed its + marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, + 14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now + 20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer + resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, + produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that + China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an + additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native + methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of + pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel + industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence + it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished + steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony + and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable + progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores + during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its + mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's + welfare.<a name="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102"><sup>[102]</sup></a> </p></div> + +<p>The <i>China Year Book</i> for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of +coal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons.<a name="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103"><sup>[103]</sup></a> +Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000 +tons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident +that great progress was made during those three years, and there is +every reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been +maintained. The main problem <a name="Page_232"></a>for China, however, is not <i>rapid</i> +development, but <i>national</i> development. Japan is poor in minerals, and +has set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of +China. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, +that only industrial development can support the growing population, +which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the +mainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for +imperialism.</p> + +<p>The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at +Shanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for +shipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each +for the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng<a name="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104"><sup>[104]</sup></a> says:—</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly + supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from + America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited + in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by + virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home + consumption). </p></div> + +<p>Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs +explanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to +understand modern politics.</p> + +<p>The <i>China Year Book</i> for 1919<a name="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105"><sup>[105]</sup></a> (a work as little concerned with +politics as <i>Whitaker's Almanack</i>) gives a list of the five principal +iron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and +most important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and +Coal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of +the third <a name="Page_233"></a>group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in +sight is estimated by the <i>China Year Book</i> at 50,000,000 tons, derived +chiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per cent. of +iron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as +603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The <i>Year Book</i> +proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the +agreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which +enforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government +undertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to +compel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources." It should +be added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical +adviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be +sold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, +leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.<a name="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106"><sup>[106]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The second item in the <i>China Year Book's</i> list is the Tungkuan Shan +mines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district on +the Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work +these mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in +1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of £52,000, and the mines were +transferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation." +These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their +capacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were +sold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. is +$20,000,000, which is considerably more than £52,000. This was the only +one of the five iron mines mentioned in the <i>Year Book</i> <a name="Page_234"></a>which was not +in Japanese hands at the time when the <i>Year Book</i> was published.</p> + +<p>Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession which +was granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be +worked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain +60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan +of operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of +170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of +steel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000 +tons a year."</p> + +<p>The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunction +with the Hengshan Colliery by the railway." I presume it is to be sold +back to China along with the railway.</p> + +<p>The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the most +promising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the +Japanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and +Japanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. +The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of +Penhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine." It will be +observed that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result +of the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The <i>Year Book</i> adds: +"The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka +ironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at +Osaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron."</p> + +<p>It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have +allowed the Japanese to acquire <a name="Page_235"></a>a position of vantage from which they +can only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely +imperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of +their own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their +national independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that +make them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that +the chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order +to be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, +says nothing about iron mines;<a name="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107"><sup>[107]</sup></a> therefore the old-fashioned Chinese +did not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are +awake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later +to the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue +our survey of facts.</p> + +<p>It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly +agricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are +crops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the +third country in the world, India being the first and the United States +the second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, +but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, +and it is industry that is our present topic.</p> + +<p>To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was +officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since +<a name="Page_236"></a>then no official returns for the whole country have been published ... +but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for the +present number of factory operatives and mine workers."<a name="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108"><sup>[108]</sup></a> Of course, +the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as +specially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the +wages range from 15 to 45 cents a day.<a name="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109"><sup>[109]</sup></a> (The cent varies in value, +but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as +industry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. +Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, +the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. +Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent +to which he has come under American influence, as well as that of +conservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young +Chinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped +that the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will +make the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of +America and Japan.</p> + +<p>There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. +There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise +is needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire.</p> + +<p>Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably +develop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in +native hands.</p> + +<p>The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200,000,000 +(630,000,000 taels), and the <a name="Page_237"></a>total imports slightly larger. It is +better, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency +fluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The +tael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its +value fluctuates with the value of silver. The <i>China Year Book</i> gives +imports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and +214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as +577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in +pounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124 +millions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the +foreign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is +increasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how +little the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as +revolutions and civil wars.</p> + +<p>Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways +and mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national +independence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is +obviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new +lines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, +in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire +a power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope +that the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act +upon it.</p> + +<p>In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, +since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and +development by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It +should therefore be enacted that, in <a name="Page_238"></a>future, no sale of mines or of any +interest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the +security of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of +extra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to +accept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its +validity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, +such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear +China, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if +not, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, +it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It +would be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely +Chinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological +and mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the +right (<i>a</i>) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (<i>b</i>) to +work minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in +spite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers +should be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point +compatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, +except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is +clear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as +opportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible +to say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established +in China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign +aggression. This is a point to which, along with other general questions +connected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last +chapter.</p> + +<p>It is said by Europeans who have business <a name="Page_239"></a>experience in China that the +Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as +modern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially +honest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But +their successful businesses—so one gathers—do not usually extend +beyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or +later through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from +my own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very +quickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with +Confucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in +business methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung +and other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the +highest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The +Chinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to +commerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly +introducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, +every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, +that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout +the next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development +should be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But +that is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese +independence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99">[99]</a><p> For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit. +pp. 183 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100">[100]</a><p> <i>China in</i> 1918. Published by the <i>Peking Leader</i>, pp. +45-6.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101">[101]</a><p> Op. cit. chap. xi.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102">[102]</a><p> <i>China in</i> 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in +the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated +by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. p. +51.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103">[103]</a><p> Page 63. The 1922 <i>Year Book</i> gives 19,500,000 tons of +coal production.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104">[104]</a><p> <i>Modern China,</i> p, 265.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105">[105]</a><p> Pages 74-5.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106">[106]</a><p> Coleman, op. cit. chap. xiv.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107">[107]</a><p> It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is +nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine +pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure +where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. +Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and +steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton +Sinclair, <i>The Profits of Religion</i>, 1918, p. 175.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108">[108]</a><p> Page 237.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109">[109]</a><p> Page 218.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV"></a><a name="Page_240"></a>CHAPTER XV</h2> + +<p style='text-align: center;'>THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA<br /></p> + + +<p>In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint +of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, +in what order, I should advocate in that case.</p> + +<p>To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, +and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China +has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, +because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist +Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of +Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, +because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own +economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was +fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, +though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the +long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing +to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China +becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned +ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to +China; and one or other of these is very likely <a name="Page_241"></a>to come about. All the +Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, +in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of +Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their +own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power.</p> + +<p>The problem is not merely one of <i>political</i> independence; a certain +cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in +this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it +would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had +to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a +nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they +adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and +they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must +be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with +safety.</p> + +<p>First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary—not, of course, the +bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude +which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow +them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated +Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal +tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has +proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to +foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is +capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United +States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong +enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong +enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. <a name="Page_242"></a>It cannot be too +strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. +But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely +necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, +not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western +skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, +political independence will have little value.</p> + +<p>The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of +an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; +(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued +concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the +above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have +to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the +political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are +also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good +government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and +education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the +priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, +unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have +acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to +oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought +to be taken in the above order.</p> + +<p>1. <i>The establishment of an orderly government</i>.—At the moment of +writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A +battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is +usually considered, though falsely accord<a name="Page_243"></a>ing to some good authorities, +the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though <i>The Times</i> calls +him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than +"Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he +wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all +China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, +to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to +depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive +elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force.</p> + +<p>So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best +thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint +programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of +military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice +of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which +all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in +public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, +sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some +powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere +military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in +favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the +scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such +a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous +propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, +and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded +soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the +financial <a name="Page_244"></a>problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will +not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of +Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not +accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from +them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may +not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it +would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to +raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese +merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich +Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the +Government.</p> + +<p>When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt +that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of +autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few +things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. +Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally +recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more +scope.</p> + +<p>While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed +upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of +Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will +be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country +to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective +decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. +This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very +rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the <a name="Page_245"></a>slightest +failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The +society must make itself obviously the champion of the national +interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to +foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or +condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in +the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and +honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the +respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is +organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political +problems with which China is faced.</p> + +<p>Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign +rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty +Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves +from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was +in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the +Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of +Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in +general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet +Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by +the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's +resources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions +by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable +opportunity.</p> + +<p>2. <i>Industrial development.</i>—On this subject I have already written in +Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to +consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all <a name="Page_246"></a>railways ought +to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to +be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not +State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to +be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not +be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly +government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to +lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. +Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a +monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans.</p> + +<p>Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be +desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State +Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country +which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, +it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the +second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the +foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in +the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital +industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is +perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by +undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent +the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can +acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop +Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening +power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both +oppressed and misled.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_247"></a>But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change +in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family +ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which +already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at +present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these +requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize +that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State +Socialism must fail.</p> + +<p>For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should +learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I +think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards +the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import +skilled workmen—say from Germany—and cause them to give instruction to +Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be +desired to develop.</p> + +<p>3. <i>Education.</i>—If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive +Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the +population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a +good in itself, but is also essential for developing political +consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. +The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state +of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary +education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, +in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses +cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, +it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating <a name="Page_248"></a>such a vast +population could be borne by the nation without a considerable +industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is +mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for +the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American +millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese +education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why +industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of +education.</p> + +<p>For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be +sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There +is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are +being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed +a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese +educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears.</p> + +<p>Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education +as in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to +have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will +soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too +numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and +mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission +schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to +become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western +civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national +life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes +them more conservative in purely Chinese <a name="Page_249"></a>matters than the young men and +women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans +in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese +are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of +course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates +against national self-respect in those whom they teach.</p> + +<p>Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some +time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American +university. But for the great majority of university students it is far +better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned +students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from +which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A +society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all +really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, +as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students +returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this +difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university +education, but at present the difficulty would be serious.</p> + +<p>To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring +leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be +aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As +regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have +enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill +could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the +requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example +personally known to <a name="Page_250"></a>me, Dr. Hu Suh.<a name="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110"><sup>[110]</sup></a> He has great learning, wide +culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his +writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. +He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but +by no means a slavish admirer of our ways.</p> + +<p>The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be +needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an +intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be +combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl +Marx.</p> + +<p>The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the +world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is +possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to +develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. +This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the +preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific +temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a +knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical +problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one +due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its +international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, +the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of +famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong +government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties +and the <a name="Page_251"></a>recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a +model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to +defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand +Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western +philosophy of life.</p> + +<p>If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, +as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, +embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the +campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps +emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their +material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at +home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the +West achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by +the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but +would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great +military nations of the modern world will bring about their own +destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, +with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If +China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if +Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made +China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of +foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn +aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and +devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better +economic system—then China will have played the <a name="Page_252"></a>part in the world for +which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope +in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see +inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is +realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover +of mankind.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><a name="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110">[110]</a><p> An account of a portion of his work will be found in +Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="APPENDIX"></a><a name="Page_253"></a>APPENDIX<br /></h2> + + +<p>While the above pages were going through the Press, some important +developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated +Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated +towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of +Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to +be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not +unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in +Chinese politics.</p> + +<p>For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his +intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, +befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in +our newspapers. According to <i>The Times</i>, he has pronounced in favour of +the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the +restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the +South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it +in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. <i>The Times</i> Peking +correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares +that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national +interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any +obstructionists."</p> + +<p>On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending +his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground +for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and +is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to +<a name="Page_254"></a>conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. +The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in +the same telegram as follows:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall + be elected by the people; District police shall be created under + District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil + governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to + the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and + paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and + <i>gendarmerie</i>, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible + for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall + agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the + Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes + shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a + stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, + the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under + the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries + established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the + people on the land. </p></div> + +<p>This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of +it will ever be carried out.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been +stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and +Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. +Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that +Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation +than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate +Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a +past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the +Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our +newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely +<a name="Page_255"></a>unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in <i>The Times</i> of May +15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"><p>I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, + which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. + Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms + are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and + opium-smoking are rife. </p></div> + +<p>Nevertheless, on May 30, <i>The Times</i> had to confess that this army had +won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in +Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions.</p> + +<p>The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived +by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the +victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will +be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped +also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not +be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of +that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, +there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with +him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more +likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There +is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang +for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But +it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still +problematical.</p> + +<p><i>June</i> 21, 1922.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="INDEX"></a><a name="Page_256"></a>INDEX</h2> + + +<ul><li>Academy, Imperial, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> +<li>Adams, Will, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> +<li>Afghanistan, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> +<li>Ainu, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a></li> +<li><a name="america"></a>America, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a> ff., <a href='#Page_159'>159</a> ff +<ul><li> and naval policy, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>-<a href='#Page_162'>162</a></li> +<li> and trade with Russia, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>-<a href='#Page_163'>163</a></li> +<li> and Chinese finance, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>-<a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> +<li> and Japan, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Americanism, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a></li> +<li>Ancestor-worship, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a></li> +<li>An Fu Party, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a></li> +<li>Anglo-Japanese Alliance, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> +<li>Annam, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> +<li>Arnold, Julean, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a></li> +<li>Art, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a></li> +<li>Australia, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Backhouse, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> +<li>Balfour, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a></li> +<li>Benthamites, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></li> +<li>Birth-rate— +<ul><li> in China, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a></li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Bismarck, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li>Bland, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> n, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> +<li>Bolsheviks, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> ff., <a href='#Page_175'>175</a> ff., <a href='#Page_245'>245</a></li> +<li>Bolshevism, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a> +<ul><li> in China, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Books, burning of, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> ff.</li> +<li>Boxer rising, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a> +<ul><li> indemnity, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Brailsford, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a></li> +<li>Buddhism, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a> +<ul><li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a> ff., <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Burma, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a><a name="Page_257"></a></li> +<li>Bushido, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Canada, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a></li> +<li>Canton, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> +<li>Capitalism, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a></li> +<li>Cassel agreement, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a></li> +<li>Chamberlain, Prof. B.H., <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a></li> +<li>Changchun, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a></li> +<li>Chang-tso-lin, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>,242, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a></li> +<li>Chao Ki, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a></li> +<li>Chen Chiung Ming, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page_255'>255</a></li> +<li>Chen, Eugene, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Cheng, S.G., <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> n., <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n., <a href='#Page_139'>139</a> n., <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> +<li>Chien Lung, Emperor, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> ff.</li> +<li>Chi Li, Mr., <a href='#Page_37'>37</a></li> +<li>China— +<ul><li> early history, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a> ff.</li> +<li> derivation of name, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> +<li> population, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>-<a href='#Page_34'>34</a></li> +<li> Year Book, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></li> +<li> produce, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a></li> +<li> influence on Japan, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a> ff.,104</li> +<li> and the war, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> ff.</li> +<li> Post Offices, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Chinese— +<ul><li> character of, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>-<a href='#Page_213'>213</a></li> +<li> love of laughter, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>-<a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a></li> +<li> dignity, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a></li> +<li> pacifism, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a></li> +<li> callousness, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a></li> +<li> cowardice, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> +<li> avarice, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> +<li> patience, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> +<li> excitability, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Chingkiang, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a></li> +<li>Chinlingchen mine, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> +<li>Chita, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a><a name="Page_258"></a></li> +<li>Choshu, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a></li> +<li>Chou dynasty, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> +<li>Christianity in Japan, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a> ff.</li> +<li>Chuang Tze, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a></li> +<li>Chu Fu Tze, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> +<li>Chu Hsi, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a></li> +<li>Civilization— +<ul><li> alphabetical, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a></li> +<li> Chinese, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a> ff.</li> +<li> European, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Coal in China, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> ff.</li> +<li>Coleman, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> n., <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Colour prejudice, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a> +<ul><li> and labour, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Confucius, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></li> +<li>Confucianism, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a> ff., <a href='#Page_190'>190</a> +<ul><li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Consortium, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> ff., <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> +<li>Cordier, Henri, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> n., <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a> n., <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a> n., <a href='#Page_31'>31</a> n., <a href='#Page_187'>187</a> n.</li> +<li>Cotton, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a> +<ul><li> industry in Osaka, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Customs— +<ul><li> Chinese, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> ff.,</li> +<li> on exports, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a></li> +<li> internal, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>-<a href='#Page_57'>57</a></li></ul></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Dairen, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a> +<ul><li> Conference at, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Denison, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a></li> +<li>Dewey, Professor, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a> +<ul><li> Mrs., <a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Diet, Japanese, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a> ff.</li> +<li>Dutch in Japan, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a> ff., <a href='#Page_100'>100</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Education, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> ff., <a href='#Page_76'>76</a> ff., <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>-<a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a> ff. +<ul><li> statistics of, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a></li> +<li> classical, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>-<a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li> +<li> European and American, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>-<a href='#Page_221'>221</a></li> +<li> modern Chinese, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a> ff.</li> +<li> of women, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>-<a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Efficiency, creed of, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></li> +<li>"Eight Legs," <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a></li> +<li>Emperor of China <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> ff, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a> +<ul><li> "First," <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Empress Dowager, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a> n.</li> +<li>Examination, competitive, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> ff, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a><a name="Page_259"></a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>"Face," <a href='#Page_204'>204</a></li> +<li>Famines in China, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> +<li>Far Eastern Republic, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> +<li>Federalism in China, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> +<li>Feudalism— +<ul><li> in China, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a></li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Filial Piety, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a> ff., <a href='#Page_61'>61</a> +<ul><li> and patriotism, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a></li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Foreign Trade statistics, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>-<a href='#Page_237'>237</a></li> +<li>Forestry, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></li> +<li>Fourteen Points, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a></li> +<li>France, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a> +<ul><li> and Shantung, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>-<a href='#Page_138'>138</a></li> +<li> and Japan, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Fukien, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Galileo, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> +<li>Genoa Conference, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a></li> +<li>Genro, the, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a> ff., <a href='#Page_128'>128</a></li> +<li>George III, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> +<li>Germany, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a> +<ul><li> property in China during war, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Giles, Lionel, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a> n.</li> +<li>Giles, Professor, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a> n., <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> n., <a href='#Page_187'>187</a> n.</li> +<li>Gladstone, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> +<li>Gleason, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n.</li> +<li>Gobi desert, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> +<li>Gompers, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a></li> +<li>Great Britain— +<ul><li> and China, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a> ff.</li> +<li> and Shantung, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Great Wall, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> +<li>Greeks, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> +<li>Guam, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Han dynasty, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></li> +<li>Hanyehping Co., <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> +<li>Hart, Sir Robert, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a></li> +<li>Hayashi, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Hearn, Lafcadio, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a></li> +<li><a name="heaven"></a>Heaven (in Chinese religion), <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a> +<ul><li> Temple of, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Hideyoshi, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> +<li>Hirth, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> n., <a href='#Page_23'>23</a> n., <a href='#Page_27'>27</a> n.</li> +<li>Hong Kong, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a><a name="Page_260"></a></li> +<li>Hsu Shi-chang, President, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> +<li>Hughes, Premier, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a> n.</li> +<li>Hughes, Secretary, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a></li> +<li>Hung Wu, Emperor, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> +<li>Huns, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> +<li>Hu Suh, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Ichimura, Dr., <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> +<li>Ideograms, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a> ff.</li> +<li>Immigration, Asiatic, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a> ff.</li> +<li>Imperialism. <a href='#Page_82'>82</a></li> +<li>India, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></li> +<li>Industrialism, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a> +<ul><li> in China, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>,</li> +<li> <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>-<a href='#Page_239'>239</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a> ff.</li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Inouye, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a></li> +<li>Intelligentsia in China, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a></li> +<li>Iron in China, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> n., <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> ff. +<ul><li> Japanese control of, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Ishii, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>. <i>See</i> also <a href="#lansing">Lansing-Ishii</a> +<ul><li> Agreement.</li></ul></li> +<li>Ito, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a> ff</li> +<li>Iyeyasu, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Japan, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>-<a href='#Page_175'>175</a> +<ul><li> early history, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a> ff.</li> +<li> constitution, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a> ff.</li> +<li> war with China, <a href='#Page_113'>113</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li> war with Russia, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li> clan loyalty, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></li> +<li> loyalty to Allies, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a></li> +<li> hegemony in Asia, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></li> +<li> loans to China in 1918, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a></li> +<li> Socialism in, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Jenghis Khan, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> ff.</li> +<li>Jews, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Kang Hsi, Emperor, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> n.</li> +<li>Kara Korum, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a></li> +<li>Kato, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Kiangnan Dock, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> +<li>Kiaochow, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> +<li>Kieff, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Koo, Mr. Wellington, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> n., <a href='#Page_164'>164</a></li> +<li>Korea, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a></li> +<li>Kublai Khan, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a></li> +<li>Kyoto, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a></li> +<li>Kyushu, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Lama Religion, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a><a name="Page_261"></a></li> +<li>Lamont, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a></li> +<li>Lansing, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a></li> +<li><a name="lansing"></a>Lansing-Ishii Agreement, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> +<li>Lao-Tze, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a></li> +<li>Legge, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> n., <a href='#Page_39'>39</a> n., <a href='#Page_82'>82</a> n.</li> +<li>Lenin, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>,</li> +<li>Lennox, Dr., <a href='#Page_73'>73</a> n.</li> +<li>Literati, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a> ff.</li> +<li>Li Ung Bing, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> +<li>Li Yuan Hung, President, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a> ff.</li> +<li>Li Yuen, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> n.</li> +<li>Lloyd George, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></li> +<li>Louis XIV., <a href='#Page_51'>51</a></li> +<li>Louis, Saint, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Macao, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a></li> +<li>Macartney, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> +<li>Malthus, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a></li> +<li>Manchu dynasty, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a></li> +<li>Manchuria, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> +<li>Manila, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> +<li>Marco Polo, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Marcus Aurelius, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></li> +<li>Marx, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> +<li>Masuda, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> +<li>McLaren, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a> n.</li> +<li>Mechanistic Outlook, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a> ff.</li> +<li>Merv, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Mikado, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a> +<ul><li> worship of, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>-<a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Militarism, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a> n.</li> +<li>Millard, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n., <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> n.</li> +<li>Minamoto Yoritomo, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a></li> +<li>Mines, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a> ff.</li> +<li>Ming dynasty, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a></li> +<li>Missionaries, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a> +<ul><li> Roman Catholic, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> n.</li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Mongol dynasty, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> ff., <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> +<li>Mongolia, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> +<li>Morgan, J.P., <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a></li> +<li>Morphia, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li> +<li>Moscow, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Mukden, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li>Murdoch, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> n., <a href='#Page_86'>86</a> n., <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a> n.</li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Nationalism, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> +<li>Nestorianism, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a></li> +<li>Nicolaievsk, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a><a name="Page_262"></a></li> +<li>Nietzsche, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a></li> +<li>Nishapur, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> +<li>Nobunaga, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> +<li>Northcliffe, Lord, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> n.</li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Observatory, Peking, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> +<li>Okuma, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a></li> +<li>Open Door, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a></li> +<li>Opium, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Panama Tolls, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a></li> +<li>Peking, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a> +<ul><li> Legation Quarter, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a></li> +<li> Union Medical College, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> +<li> Government University, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a> n., <a href='#Page_222'>222</a></li> +<li> Girls' High Normal School, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Penhsihu mine, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> +<li>Perry, Commodore, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a></li> +<li>Persia, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> +<li>Phonetic writing, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a></li> +<li>Plato, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> +<li>Po Chui, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a></li> +<li>Po Lo, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a></li> +<li>Pooley, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a> n., <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a> n.</li> +<li>Pope, The, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> +<li>Port Arthur, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> +<li>Portsmouth, Treaty of, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>-<a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a></li> +<li>Portuguese, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a> ff.</li> +<li>Progress, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a></li> +<li><a name="putnam"></a>Putnam Weale, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a> n., <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Railways, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a> ff. +<ul><li> nationalization of, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a> ff.</li> +<li> statistics of, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> +<li> Chinese Eastern, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> Fa-ku-Men, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a></li> +<li> Hankow-Canton, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> Peking-Kalgan, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a></li> +<li> Peking-Hankow, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> Shantung, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> ff., <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> Siberian, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> +<li> South Manchurian, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a></li> +<li> Tientsin-Pukow, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Reid, Rev. Gilbert, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n., <a href='#Page_139'>139</a> n. <a href='#Page_142'>142</a><a name="Page_263"></a></li> +<li>Reinsch, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> n., <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a></li> +<li>Restoration in Japan, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a> 8.</li> +<li>Revolution of 1911, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a> ff. +<ul><li> and Japan, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Rockefeller Hospital, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a></li> +<li>Rome, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a></li> +<li>Roosevelt, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a></li> +<li>Rousseau, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a></li> +<li>Russia, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> ff., <a href='#Page_175'>175</a> ff. +<ul><li> war with Japan, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>,123, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> +<li> secret treaty with Japan, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a></li> +<li> and Shantung, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>-<a href='#Page_139'>139</a></li></ul></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Salt tax, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a></li> +<li><i>San Felipe</i>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> +<li>Sato, Admiral, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a></li> +<li>Satsuma, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a></li> +<li>Science, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></li> +<li>Shank, Mr., <a href='#Page_69'>69</a></li> +<li>Shantung, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a> ff., <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> +<ul><li> secret treaties concerning, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li> +<li> in Versailles Treaty, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a></li> +<li> and Washington Conference, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> ff.</li></ul></li> +<li>Shaw, Bernard, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> +<li>Sherfesee, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></li> +<li>Shih Huang Ti, <i>See</i> Emperor, "First"</li> +<li>Shi-King, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> +<li>Shinto, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a> ff., <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> +<li>Shogun, The, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a> ff.</li> +<li>Shu-King, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> n., <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> +<li>Simpson, Lennox. <i>See</i> <a href="#putnam">Putnam Weale</a></li> +<li>Socialism, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a> ff. +<ul><li> State, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a></li> +<li> in Japan, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li> +<li> in China, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Soyeda, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a> n.</li> +<li>Spaniards in Japan, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> +<li>Student Movement, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a></li> +<li>Students— +<ul><li> returned, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> +<li> statistics of, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a> n.</li></ul></li> +<li>Summer Palace, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> +<li>Sung dynasty, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> +<li>Sun Yat Sen, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page_256'>256</a></li> +<li>Supreme Ruler. <i>See</i> <a href="#heaven">Heaven</a>.</li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Taiping Rebellion, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a><a name="Page_264"></a></li> +<li>Tai-tsung, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a> n.</li> +<li>Tang dynasty, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> +<li>Taochung iron mine, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> +<li>Taoism, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a> ff.</li> +<li>Tartars, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> +<li>Tayeh mines, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> n., <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> +<li>Teachers' strike, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a></li> +<li>Tenny, Raymond P., <a href='#Page_33'>33</a></li> +<li>Tibet, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> +<li>Ting, Mr. V.K., <a href='#Page_73'>73</a> n.</li> +<li>Tokugawa, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a></li> +<li>Tong, Hollington K., <a href='#Page_143'>143</a> n., <a href='#Page_204'>204</a> n.</li> +<li>Trade Unionism, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>-<a href='#Page_181'>181</a> +<ul><li>in Japan, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>-<a href='#Page_115'>115</a></li></ul></li> +<li>Treaty Ports, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a></li> +<li>Tsing-hua College, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li> +<li>Tsing-tau, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> +<li>Tuan Chih-jui, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a> ff.</li> +<li>Tuangkuan Shan mines, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> +<li>Tuchuns, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> +<li>Twenty-one Demands, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a> ff., <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> +<li>Tyau, M.T.Z., <a href='#Page_144'>144</a> n., <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a> n., <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a> n., <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>United States. <i>See</i> <a href="#america">America</a>.</li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Versailles Treaty, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>,151<a name="Page_265"></a></li> +<li>Vladivostok, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> +<li>Volga, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a></li> +<li>Voltaire, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Waley, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a></li> +<li>War, Great, idealistic aims of, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a> ff.</li> +<li>Washington Conference, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> n., <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a> ff., <a href='#Page_178'>178</a></li> +<li>Wei-hai-wei, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a></li> +<li>White men, virtues of, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> +<li>William II., <a href='#Page_122'>122</a></li> +<li>Wilson, President, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a></li> +<li>Women, position of, in China, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>-<a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li> +<li>Woosung College, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></li> +<li>Wu-Pei-Fu, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page_255'>255</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul><li>Yamagata, Prince, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a> n.</li> +<li>Yangtze, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a></li> +<li>Yao and Shun, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> +<li>Yellow River, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a></li> +<li>Y.M.C.A., <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a></li> +<li>Young China, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> ff., <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> +<li>Yü, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> +<li>Yuan Shi-k'ai, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a> ff., <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a></li> +</ul> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF CHINA ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Problem of China + +Author: Bertrand Russell + +Release Date: November 3, 2004 [EBook #13940] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF CHINA *** + + + + +Produced by Brendan Lane and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + + + + + + +THE PROBLEM OF CHINA + +BY + +BERTRAND RUSSELL + +O.M., F.K.S. + +_London_ +GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD +RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET +FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1922 +SECOND IMPRESSION 1966 + +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN +BY PHOTOLITHOGRAPHY +UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED +WOKING AND LONDON + + + + +CONTENTS + +CHAPTER + + FOREWORD + I. QUESTIONS + II. CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + III. CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS + IV. MODERN CHINA + V. JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION + VI. MODERN JAPAN + VII. JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 +VIII. JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR + IX. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE + X. PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST + XI. CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED + XII. THE CHINESE CHARACTER +XIII. HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA + XIV. INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA + XV. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA + APPENDIX + INDEX + + + The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shû (Heedless), the Ruler of + the Northern Ocean was Hû (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre + was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of + Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how + they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven + orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and + breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try + and make them for him." Accordingly they dug one orifice in him + every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.--[_Chuang + Tze_, Legge's translation.] + + + + +The Problem of China + + + + +CHAPTER I + +QUESTIONS + + +A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and +reflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very +puzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe +will not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important +affinities with those of China, but they have also important +differences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, +even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, +since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the +human race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by +the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive +factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it +important, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there +should be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, +even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give. + +The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally +into three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these +groups, however, can be considered in isolation, because each is +intimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the +cultural questions are the most important, both for China and for +mankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less +equanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that +end. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for +practical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations +as for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed +business community has long been a commonplace of novelists and +moralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up +the pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded +as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the +artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to +oneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to +survive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause +misery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all +foreign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of +us? + +China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid +process of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed +in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits +quite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to +strike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the +whole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the +Celestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would +venture to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in +which we are better than old China, and to other respects in which we +are worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be +fruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a +superior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to +exploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior" +race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior +to ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate +knowledge of China, would take the same view. + +In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask +oneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard +to home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I +ultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more +desirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see +realized in the world? Different people will answer these questions +differently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade +a man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be +content merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that +the reader may feel likewise. + +The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not +merely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive +happiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of +knowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry +lists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no +appreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, +incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a +thing which is good and delightful on its own account. The same may be +said, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on +this topic would, however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak +of art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do +not mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of +course these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the +almost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian +peasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates +folk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the +Puritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy +of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we +have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of +us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of +Chinese civilization. + +In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of +good or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has +in promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good +things which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, +also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we +endeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread +oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not +strong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy +by means of their own merits and exertions alone. + +These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in +considering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and +commercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of +certain more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in +China one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a +society which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, +upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for +example, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come +under Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have +secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we +brought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a +life full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite +achievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and +unless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the +less familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed +always make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to +take as a matter of course. + +The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change +is needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable +ultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our +economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if +the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our +civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able +to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a +very splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, +however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The +first danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining +nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more +to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations +which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that +they may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, +into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except +armaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in +China. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with +political and economic questions; and it is through their influence that +dangers arise. + +China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on +the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering +the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan +must count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for +Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. +Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has +ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore +distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or +more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China +may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth +possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may +control China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese +will be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I +believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the +Japanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the +nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and unneighbourly. I +shall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the +relations of China and Japan. + +To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of +Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then +something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, +it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic +relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of +1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of +1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is +possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, +and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan +had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant +foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to +understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation +they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence +the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made +people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to +apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done. + +Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain +what is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost +more important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly +the most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the +resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the +white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only +the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power +in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the +chances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced +nations. + +The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the +conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have +guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it +far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far +Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China +preserve any shadow of independence without a great development of +nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate +nationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say to +patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found +only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world; +it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is +essentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized" +nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their +bombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other +within the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism +has kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being +goaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and +leave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and +rapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a +slender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than +despair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some +tolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that +are worse. + +Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a +psychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, +our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our +imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from +a superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its +own sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has +become somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have +never taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more +indolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally +accepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have +been aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like +China, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has +been governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to +introduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might +have had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not +many) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that +Western push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot +now take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me +far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than +those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of +Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with +our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe +that those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The +Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way of +life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the +world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, +exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency +directed to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this +consummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some +of that wisdom for which it despises the East. + +It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how +profound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks +are attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as +Japan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day after +day, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, +gay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of +everything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understand +and no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us lay +at death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the +indifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of +loud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a +great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed +that none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so +insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the +endless information of the well-informed. + +One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there +were no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of +poplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, and +found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads, +wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled +together surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, others +silently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted up +gnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, +and children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human beings they +undoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to grow +intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knew +that they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a +boat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had +heard--falsely perhaps--that the earth was more generous than in the +country they had left. Some would die by the way, all would suffer +hunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferings +would be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, +unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of +Westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia +is so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planet +are lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the +theorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force them +into actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could not +believe that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of +industrialism and forced labour. + +Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions +of the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a truly +popular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen the +sleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seen +them, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that +patient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely and +unspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiar +intellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics are +inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to +torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or +theory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants, +protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what we +had to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I +heard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the +sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a +terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale. + +It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + + +Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early +history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon +the question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not +composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of +princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or +warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, +whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age +of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age" +mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the +Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks +of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a +fairly high level of civilization--much higher than that of any other +part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, +too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon +its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly +alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive +torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have +inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human +sacrifice; in the Shu-King, however, there is little trace of +superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were all +occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of +the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state +of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows +what was expected of an Emperor:-- + + He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and + thoughtful--naturally and without effort. He was sincerely + courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these + qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and + extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and + virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the + nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also + regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became + brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the + myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were + transformed. The result was universal concord.[1] + +The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history +is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.[2] There is no reason to +doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier +times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the +Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in +1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of +nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this +time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of +France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at +its lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, each +strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over +subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting +for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which +temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians +always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of +eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention. + +What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which +fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious +prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven +at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous +with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Giles +maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct +translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word +"Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the +latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means +"Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both +terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the +God of the Old Testament.[4] + +As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven" +remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The +Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites +continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in +1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven in +Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual +sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official +survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be +called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never +had any connection with the State. + +The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C., +because with this year begins Confucius' _Springs and Autumns_, which is +a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official. + +One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the +Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one +comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He +acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221 +B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable +for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, +the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The +destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by +many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up +again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang +Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all +China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his +son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China" +is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chinese +put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with +what is now China proper. + +The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as +appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being +reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore +history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong +force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of +the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a +vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not +of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and +radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that-- + + All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own + family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office + of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit + themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian + classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go + before the local civil and military authorities so that they may + be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the + Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses + exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity + to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their + relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, + those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent + to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are + those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture + and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws + and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, + op. cit. i. p. 203.) + +It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The +Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other +hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of +old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to +destroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6] +says:-- + + No radical change can take place in China without encountering + the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then + than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical + change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the + worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was + good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their + children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to + support their contention and these they freely quoted to show + that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the + government to such an extent that something had to be done to + silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on + the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any + rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as + were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or + Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature + under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not + of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, + this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a + number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was + subsequently buried alive. + +This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is +anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship +of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has +a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have +excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, +which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made +progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with +a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary +pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has come +down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was +somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two +years, in 191. B.C. + +After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit +his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206 +B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism--exactly +coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in +Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact +with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.[7] Their +relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well +as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. +Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, +and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little +importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164 +a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.[8] +Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which +stands for Antoninus. + +It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense +prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European +armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to +think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as +ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military +superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are +tempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a mere +delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of +the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,[9] dealing with +the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han +dynasty, says:-- + + The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the + history of the world when they have grouped around the people of + Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the + expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these + voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of + these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the + Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same + time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that + of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who + wrote the history of their little world while they believed that + they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole. + +In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is +liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the +civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if +we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion. + +After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of +disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this +dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest +extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.[10] The Empire +of Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained a +great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis +and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in +China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis +destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When +Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people +were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the +corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, +shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have +their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one +of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have +escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill +any that might emerge.[11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and +Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these +massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of +Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of +causing death were more merciful than those that have been employed +since the Armistice. + +Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through +Marco Polo and Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the +first Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the +Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat +abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital +from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which +still surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory +which is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical +instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this +observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the +suppression of the Boxers.[12] I understand they have been restored in +accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If +so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty +secured to the world. + +Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in +the history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two +successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by +storms, and partly by Japanese valour. + +After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, +and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, +and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until +the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways, +and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having +contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the +pigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution. + +The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be +attributed to any military skill; on the contrary, considering its +extent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and +incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and +were less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a +barren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a +very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after +centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, +conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose +their ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and +went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived +the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of +barbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved +from this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the +white men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is +lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national +independence. + +In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese +civilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of +Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as +long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the +world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with +an almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the +eighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50 +millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is +said to have sunk to about 17 millions.[13] A census has been taken at +various times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of +individuals. From the number of houses the population is computed by a +more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different +methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons +between different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam +Weale[14] says:-- + + The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the + restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million + persons, which is less than the number given in the first census + of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai + Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably + a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the + amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the + toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was + so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the + population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less + stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now, + however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of + the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population + had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the + no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145 + millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, + and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) + it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) + it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk + to 261 millions. + +I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year +Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):-- + + The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations + has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates + of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. + The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the + census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910, + the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the + Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a + Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is + pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as + approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not + individuals were counted. + +The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is +given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population +of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at +various other dates are given as follows (p. 2): + +A.D. A.D. +1381 59,850,000 / 143,125,225 +1412 66,377,000 1760--203,916,477 +1580 60,692,000 1761 205,293,053 +1662 21,068,000 1762 198,214,553 +1668 25,386,209 1790 155,249,897 + / 23,312,200 / 307,467,200 +1710 --27,241,129 1792- 333,000,000 +1711 28,241,129 / 362,467,183 +1736 125,046,245 1812--360,440,000 + / 157,343,975 1842 413,021,000 +1743 149,332,730 1868 404,946,514 + \ 150,265,475 1881 380,000,000 +1753 103,050,600 1882 381,309,000 + 1885 377,636,000 + +These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population +of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year +(_e.g._ 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. +Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21 +millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But +no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increased +from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and +1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or +diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or +any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. +What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than +guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be +about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As +for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume +that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely +that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed +can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former +times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to +be distrusted. + +There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization +which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select +as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet +in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion +among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by +examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system +distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a +stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which is +therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I +have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other +countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each +of the three. + +1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but +symbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: it +means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of +different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no +such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, +catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible; +that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be +written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be +represented by some elaborate device.[15] For these reasons, there is a +movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers; +and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to +take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that +they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other +argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where +reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to +decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the +movement for phonetic writing deserves support. + +There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, +which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which +something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably +traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a +sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the +Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can +be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different +sounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese +characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of +dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, +without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in +Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an +Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the +spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from +Latin. + +The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which +enables it to be a means of communication between different places and +different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to +place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is +more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing +spoken sounds than by one which does. + +Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method +of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably +passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a +symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian +hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic +writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of +the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced +civilization--a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact +that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of +homonyms. + +As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the +mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in +an article published in the _Chinese Students' Monthly_ (Baltimore), +for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological +Problems of China." He says (p. 327):-- + + Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as + a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something + inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The + accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental + formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world + culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a + fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical + users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own + virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical + civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and + inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized + portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the + most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the + same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; + up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient + Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and + their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks + and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially + explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language + which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any + solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened + to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No + other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would + give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do.... + + The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the + alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in + the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final + truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already + protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries. + It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it + represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this + language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the + spirit remains to be determined. + +Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which +is impregnated with Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that +the Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization" +as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to +judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the +distinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt +that this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind +indicated in the above quotation. + +2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social +influence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions +and on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of +Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature. +Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about +whose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have +been less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes +him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics, +which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little +religious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in +the countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and +administered the Empire. + +Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than +to that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical +statesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues +he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed +to secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a +peaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was +essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former +ages. He accepted the existing religion--a rather unemphatic +monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved +a shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to +render as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress +upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the +following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards +our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining +always a due reserve."[16] But reverence for spiritual beings was not an +_active_ part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship, +which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's +neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when +he was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right--for the Chinese, unlike +the Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was +justified if he governed very badly. The following passage from +Professor Giles[17] illustrates this point:-- + + The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by + adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a + punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in + his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his + divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an + example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under + the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the + feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of + the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps + the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... + If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits + are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and + what can the people do but get rid of him?" + +This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout +Chinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent. + +Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the +weakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the system +departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated +against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the +tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted +with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the +Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and +accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China +praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to +construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which +Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit +is illustrated by the following story:[18] + + One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high + level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us + here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has + stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my + part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different + standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will + shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found." + +It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus +and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up. + +Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary to +filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the +indigence of one's aged parents.[19] This form of sin, however, is rare +in China as in other countries. + +The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without +children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no +descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has +made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great +biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to +China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this +respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the +preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization +had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the +Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family +became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen +until our own day. + +Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is +certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, +of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to +the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's +loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a +very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to +militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the +interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing +the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore +family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out +by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe. + +Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code +of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It +taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral +code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that +only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with +personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It +was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more +imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he +must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control--an extension +of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He +must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must +"save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries; +he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love +or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all +his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, +but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the +guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have +occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them +less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not +immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack +your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and +won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette; +so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and +fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in +China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the +scourge it is with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian +ethics.[20] + +Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century +A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust +aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,[21] whose interpretation of +Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall +of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured +Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were +struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and +appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of +drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists +of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but +the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were +ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many +centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion +but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and +practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the +belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all +others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be +very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic +lingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there was +religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable +that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding +ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe. + +3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive +examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and +unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its +hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the +present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book +on _China after the War_, pp. 59-60.[22] After considering the +educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues: + + In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of + moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during + the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the + Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was + composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was + considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that + in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who + were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total + enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high + as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of + "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended + by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public + offices. College training and local elections supplemented each + other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest + emphasis. + + Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never + been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the + introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system, + must be held responsible. The "election" system furnished no + fixed standard for the recommendation of public service + candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic + class from which alone were to be found eligible men. + Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the + elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the + competitive examination system in their place. The examinations + were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they + were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the + introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and + stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some + useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese + education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite + of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary + attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in + family education and in private schools. + +Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in +examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, +such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the +Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful +through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was +purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. +The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu +(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects +of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23] +says: + + In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit + of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form + of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This + was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of + Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs," + which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature, + was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, + because after the introduction of the theme the writer was + required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two + members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The + theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five + Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or + any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his + school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of + Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity + with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as + passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. + To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a + man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time + qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was + absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to + recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was + not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect + or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary + development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago + reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely + on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this + rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have + been so long venerated. + +These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no +doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things +that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one +considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was +probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, +the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. +Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the +possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of +administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the +preservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest. +But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away +to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to +perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce +and cruel system which they miscall civilization. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: Legge's _Shu-King,_ p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, _Ancient +History of China_, Columbia University Press, 1911--a book which gives +much useful critical information about early China.] + +[Footnote 2: Hirth, op. cit. p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.] + +[Footnote 3: See Hirth, op. cit., p. 100 ff.] + +[Footnote 4: On this subject, see Professor Giles's _Confucianism and +its Rivals,_ Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.] + +[Footnote 5: Cf. Henri Cordier, _Histoire Générale de la Chine_, Paris, +1920, vol. i. p. 213.] + +[Footnote 6: _Outlines of Chinese History_ (Shanghai, Commercial Press, +1914), p. 61.] + +[Footnote 7: See Hirth, _China and the Roman Orient_ (Leipzig and +Shanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are +allusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. cit., i. +p. 271.] + +[Footnote 8: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 281.] + +[Footnote 9: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 237.] + +[Footnote 10: Murdoch, in his _History of Japan_ (vol. i. p. 146), thus +describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire: + +"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the +illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes +of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign +of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung +(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever +seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of +civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the +most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on +the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines +of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along +these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the +inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the +Hindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and +Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the +Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia."] + +[Footnote 11: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.] + +[Footnote 12: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.] + +[Footnote 13: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.] + +[Footnote 14: _The Truth About China and Japan_. George Allen & Unwin, +Ltd., pp. 13, 14.] + +[Footnote 15: For example, the nearest approach that could be made in +Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word +"Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of +characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.] + +[Footnote 16: Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, _à propos_ +of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following +footnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be +equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to +have meant 'no familiarity.'"] + +[Footnote 17: Op. cit., p. 21.] + +[Footnote 18: Giles, op. cit. p. 86.] + +[Footnote 19: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.] + +[Footnote 20: As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even +more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight." +(Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.] + +[Footnote 21: Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, +and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident +occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles +are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above +the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered +father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are +impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and +the son-in-law's faith revived.] + +[Footnote 22: Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking, +1920.] + +[Footnote 23: Op. cit. p. 233.] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS + + +In order to understand the international position of China, some facts +concerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was +for many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and +fertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. +Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the +beginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of +officials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as +in England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly +religious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was +imported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that +country to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, +but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey +practically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the +seventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. +(What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument +discovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth +centuries Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at +Court, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in +rectifying the irregularities and confusions of the Chinese +calendar.[24] Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the +walls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels +between different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both +China and Japan. + +In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in +China, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a +permanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time +was Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a +patron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens +of his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King +George III is given by Backhouse and Bland.[25] I wish I could quote it +all, but some extracts must suffice. It begins: + + You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, + impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our + civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing + your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent + offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: + the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful + humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. + +He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing +with an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be +gratified. An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for: + + If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills + you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and + code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if + your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our + civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and + customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy + might become, nothing would be gained thereby. + + Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to + maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the + State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... have + no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O + King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater + devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission + to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your + country hereafter. + +He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels +that they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange: + +"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and +lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to +import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own +produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire +produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to +yourselves," the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to +continue. + +He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forget +the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by +intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of +the usages of our Celestial Empire." He concludes with the injunction: +"Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!" + +What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this +document has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the +world, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The +Empire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger +population; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had +not fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by +absorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the +Japanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. +The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the +Great, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of +China, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty +years. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything +needed for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade +upon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things +which they would do better without. + +Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, +namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at +least the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would +not have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is +a museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be +seen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to +impress him with the splendour of _Le Roi Soleil_. Compared to the +Chinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact +that Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and +all the other men who have adorned literature and the arts, does not +make us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and +Robert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by +giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an +Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. +Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung +is absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to +demonstrate this proposition. + +Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese +Government endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with +the cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, +as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and +Scandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on +China, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,[26] a building whose +artistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been +about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that +of Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the +superiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the +river Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at +Hong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British +diplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an +indemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the +French took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under +Chinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to +Japan's complete victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions +would have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany +and Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support +of Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between +China and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the +important rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the +Russo-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution. + +The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in +Shantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of +it; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few +converts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in +Christian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval +base there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, +which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with +the Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese +possession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its +restitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did +not, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the +German Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, +since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. +Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and +to hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the +Boxer rising, which is said to have begun as a movement against the +Germans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in +every respect, the Russians by creating a naval base at Port Arthur, +the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the +Yangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the +policy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door. + +The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans +know about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of +Peking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of +Peking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, +filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a +bare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is +administered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no +powers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and +traitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the +Japanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their +crimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the +Americans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of +communicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of +Chien Lung is completed. + +Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The +Americans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they +still had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on +higher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, +partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. +The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the +friendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is +incalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any +signs of following suit. + +To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is +faced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, +China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which +have been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no +experience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in +later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps +of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers--a +prerogative which every single one of them exercises. + +The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.[27] At +the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty +which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports +and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the +whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a +schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be +calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only +been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.[28] Revision of the +schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in +the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is +practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties +involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with +twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the +tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers. + +When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it +must be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese +the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign +States.[29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no +time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other +commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to +find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no +motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised +free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we +forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But +no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have +abandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act. + +The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for +the sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all +exports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, +and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is +desperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should +consider the tax indispensable. + +There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time +of the Taiping rebellion, namely the erection of internal customs +barriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with +the internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending +goods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the +payment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is +generally less than the internal tariff charges, this provision favours +foreign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of +internal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the +ground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal +customs in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export +tariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But +there were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all +could be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not +chiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should +be added that internal customs are collected by the provincial +authorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies +and civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong +enough to stop these abuses. + +The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the +Chinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the +service, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of +any other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials +is in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures) +there were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000 +were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, +by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties +exceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the +present system. The Chinese have the appointment of the +Inspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to +their country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, +so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern +bureaucracy. So long as the foreign officials are responsible to the +Chinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful +educative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an +efficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical +and intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their +slaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs +has much to recommend it during the early stages.[30] + +At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence +in the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact +that the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue +derivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, +so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of +Chinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the +Customs administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese +politics by recognizing or not recognizing a given _de facto_ +Government. (There is no Government _de jure_, at any rate in the +North.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an +artificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary +instincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal +reform. It means that no Government which is in earnest in attempting +to introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, +which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of +reconstruction. + +There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was +accepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the +security acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the +employment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the +Customs, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, +and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards +the Customs. + +The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to +China. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities +of interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. +The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three +telegrams in _The Times_ which appeared during January of this year. + +On January 14, 1922, _The Times_ published the following in a telegram +from its Peking correspondent: + + It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be + rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a + substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, + while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and + simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the + Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all + records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the + Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to + liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very + few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the + Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a + Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible + prospect of the removal of this difficulty. + +I venture to think _The Times_ would regard the difficulty as removed +if the Manchu Empire were restored. + +As to the "splendid salt surplus," there are two telegrams from the +Peking correspondent to _The Times_ (of January 12th and 23rd, +respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government +artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as +follows:-- + + Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is + happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the + Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet + faithful to the Central Government--the better half went over to + the Canton Government long ago--has dispatched a squadron of + gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if + $3,000,000 (about £400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately + forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the + revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has + been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic + Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for + immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the + traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate. + +The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:-- + + The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a + serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in + my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near + Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of + Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in + the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate + the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and + Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the + Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do + not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The + Reorganization Loan of £25,000,000 is secured on the salt + revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the + department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In + various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, + the local _Tuchuns_ (military governors) impound the collections + and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the + foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so + large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have + considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points + on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is + another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the + amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers + would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any + active form of intervention in this country. In view of the + extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present + interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000 + (£11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been + dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on + January 28th remains unsolved. + +It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting +punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the +Washington Conference should attempt to interfere! + +It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon +themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. +This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a +man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is +expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore +can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the +family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China +realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of +honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe--no +very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with +Western nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese +nationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will +begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for +the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, +but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power for +good in China will be at an end. + +I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did +to China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in +modern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. +Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of +modern Japan--a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is +not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But +before passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social +and political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in +China would be unintelligible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 24: In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining +his attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: +"As to the western doctrine which glorifies _Tien Chu_, the Lord of the +Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly +conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them--a point +which you soldiers and people should understand." (Giles, op. cit. p. +252.)] + +[Footnote 25: _Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking_, pp. 322 ff.] + +[Footnote 26: The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly +built by the Empress Dowager.] + +[Footnote 27: There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. +vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's _Modern China_, Clarendon Press, 1919.] + +[Footnote 28: A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington +Conference.] + +[Footnote 29: If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained +possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the +policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly +satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.] + +[Footnote 30: _The Times_ of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on +Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be +allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did +not deal with the Customs _administration_, nevertheless _The Times_ +assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of +the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption +which it would afford. I wrote to _The Times_ pointing out that they had +confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was +dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not +print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to +conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +MODERN CHINA + + +The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, +because in population and potential strength China is the greatest +nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of +the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been +brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington +Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it +is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts +and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try +to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which +it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, +though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic +development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as +our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we +shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon +China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses +have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason +has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the +Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst +is Japan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own larger +interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan +and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America +stands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. +Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination +by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers +become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very +essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, +internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be +a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only +ultimate solution. + +After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, +namely, the present internal condition of China. + +As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, +decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many +causes led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of +Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a +warlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon +the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails +and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike +compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were +rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This +characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in +common. + +The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but +differences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from the +more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained +inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous +foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, +destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful +people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which +lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have +diminished the population by 150 millions,[31] and was almost as +terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful +whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded +(by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China +by Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising +(1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for +a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. +But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after +the Boxer movement that the revolution broke out. + +The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit +to ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the +Canton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected +provisional President. But the Nothern Army remained faithful to the +dynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its +Commander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better scheme. +He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on +condition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. +Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the Legations, being what is +called a "strong man," _i.e._ a believer in blood and iron, not likely +to be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North +has always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan +Shih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in +the way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he +had every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic +corps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must +be admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of +his policy and methods. + +A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave +place to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine +the permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the +Parliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament +wished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but +he had the preponderance in military strength. Under these +circumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon +overthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament +(which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by +unconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to +a revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After +this, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of +China. He appointed his army lieutenants military governors of +provinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His régime might +have lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, +and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916--of a broken heart, +it was said. + +Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military +governors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government +when his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the +populations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been +civil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to +determine which of various rival generals should govern various groups +of provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but +this has lost most of its constitutional significance. + +The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are +called Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit +depredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. +They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and +administered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally +appointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the +soldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, +and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such +portions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to +surrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the +Japanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be +prolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met +there for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely +civil to the President and the Prime Minister, who still officially +represent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal +Government was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt +treasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, +to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to +Chang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool +of Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to +Mongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he +would undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at +Mukden ever since.[32] + +In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government +of a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. +Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, +succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its +Northern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government +under the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two +provinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a +moment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has +been checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the +neighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes +designs of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.[33] +In all ascertainable respects it is a Government which deserves the +support of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the +_New Republic_, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity +which it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This +opposition is partly on general principles, because we dislike radical +reform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement--of a +common type in China--would have given us a virtual monopoly of the +railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded +with the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the +change of Government has made ratification impossible. The new +Government, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of +them, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or +less similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The +American Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the +British Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have +lost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because +we, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is +vigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement +lapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital. + +The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend +of China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a +mistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in +magnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to +a single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In _The Times_ of +November 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article headed: "The Peril of +China. A dozen rival Governments." But in Europe there are much more +than a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those +of China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in +China, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of +destruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has +been incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. +You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that +you will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being +fought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which +they are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the +inhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the +average, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole. + +It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes +possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing +a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into +provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the +revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was +attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful +working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population +without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in +Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now +favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not +much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty +of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The +Central Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find +the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad +enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But +it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan +without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese +independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find +a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign +assistance. + +It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, +and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of +consolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has +great weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite +possibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, +at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the +others. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been +already mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in +Japanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. +Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is +an able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he +established his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a +blow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to +terms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself +with Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his +authority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see +Appendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a +breathing-space is all that is needed. + +The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few +regions where there are mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking +has nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to +the fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built +round a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far +as I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in +the whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government +employment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and +the work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long +and the pay infinitesimal. + +Seventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in +agriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while +wheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.[34] +The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only +just sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived +in China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to +drought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, +as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned, +foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the +Chinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those +who died of it shared this view. + +Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide +their holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely +sufficient to support himself and his family. Consequently, when the +rainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It +would of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more +scientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by +afforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly +improved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. +But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually +supposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their +families continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of +population, according to many writers, finds full scope.[35] If so, the +good done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of +more children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the +end, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher +standard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And +popular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there +is a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these +difficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of +competent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary +education. + +Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional +life of China takes two forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. +Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have +opened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we +had not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our +intercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background; +one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners +as such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that +intercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but +apparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where +unreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. +The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable +intellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum +of common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether +privately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of +enriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets. + +In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, +with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops +full of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese +part of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the +rich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through +a gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered +beauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and +Sunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, +half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, +spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and +disease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always +made me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life +would not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for +the poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life +brings more happiness to the Chinese than English life does to us. At +any rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do +not think it would be true. + +Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of +Shanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there +is so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of +which is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over +China, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, +is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are +divided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route +from Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which +has long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From +Peking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned +by the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern +bank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it +only runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of +the railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the +importance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong. + +In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower +Yangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of +industrialism. China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are +mostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number +of cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the +employer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern +China the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is +an inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long +hours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it +literally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is +not the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China +will not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and +education enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in +China, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid +and cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible +method by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is +in sight. + +The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that +which it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been +practically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many +centuries the country has been governed by the successful candidates in +competitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of +prestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the +old traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now +teaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and +public opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have +intellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including +Chang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,[36] are, of course, mostly +too stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes +their régime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China--_i.e._ of +those who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at +home--is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for +learning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, +because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their +outlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will +probably be strong enough to regenerate China--if only the Powers will +allow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action. + +It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of +Young China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a +modern education, and I should like to give some idea of their +mentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two +generations: the older men, who had fought their way with great +difficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian +prejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and +colleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded +people ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight +against the family. The older men--men varying in age from 30 to +50--have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of +the rationalists of Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, +painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the +beliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science +and a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and +miraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will give you +some idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in +becoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, +their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. +But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they +have achieved in their own minds. + +It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our +culture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate +Chinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen +among the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization +even when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal +candour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the +industrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When +they become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to +spread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire +the front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings +along the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best." In all this they +differ greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from +America; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were +soaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling +activity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the +prejudices in which they were brought up, they have not taken on a new +set, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to +consider any proposition honestly on its merits. + +The younger men, however, have something more than the first generation +of modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have +retained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the +pioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This +may be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more +than that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with +Western ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them +without a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without +being torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn +Western knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made +the process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still +have reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their +predecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing +practically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese +reverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I +see the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them +practical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in +the directions in which it ought to move. + +There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that +is the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important then +detailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the +Confucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial +society. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and +broadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, +have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical +efficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be +taken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of +some new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can +exterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to +be horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our +god; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee." And +so it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the +opposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing +really necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee, +Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the +British Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestry +in China."[37] In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of +forestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are +suitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (_e.g_. for +railway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that +the floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely +prevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were +reafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most +reforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject +for ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because +Confucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will +be cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory +as it is taught in our universities, and despise such humble questions +as the utility of trees. After learning all about (say) the proper +relations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find that +some Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not +considered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in +the West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally true +everywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students are +most eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial +processes might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our +theoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industry +is already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginning +to be a marked improvement. + +It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook +and that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most +modern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maxims +to replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men's +morals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they +dare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference +of morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, because +we are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes _per diem_. +What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about +government, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the +Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring +the mechanistic outlook. + +Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." I mean +something which exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the +Y.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes all these from the Chinese +outlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean is +the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our +scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. +The essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual who +has this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense of +perception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other +people to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual +is not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously +assailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or other of which he is +too apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the +class-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the +mystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in +their Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind except +as potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the +spread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a +life against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, is +as old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulent +forms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to +protest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a +fable[38]:-- + + Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to + protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, + and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the real + nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them. + + One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of + horses." + + So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and + put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them + by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that + two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and + thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and + trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the + fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them + were dead. + + The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it + round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square." + + The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it + curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line." + + But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and + wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and + line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in + managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with + clay and wood. Those who _govern_ the Empire make the same + mistake. + +Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the +chief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this +fable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane and +tolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of the +West. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to +see whether they "drink water and fling up their heels over the +champaign," and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. +Unlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the +foreigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into +trousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as +a rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of +cutting off the Emperor's head, as other nations do, they left him his +title, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about £600,000), and +he remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his +etiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with +a Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter +you or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature +or a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate +perception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of +pictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk +swooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his +claws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All +these pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one +feels also in their dealings with human beings--something which I can +perhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, +unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing +their best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of +which our Western world has far too little. Together with their +exquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite +extraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton +and cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake +of the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems +translated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley[39] is called _Business Men_, +and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects +in which the Chinese are our superiors:-- + + Business men boast of their skill and cunning + But in philosophy they are like little children. + Bragging to each other of successful depredations + They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body. + What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth + Who saw the wide world in a jade cup, + By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth: + On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability? + +I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth" +would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as +that is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of +solving the Far Eastern question. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 31: _The Truth about China and Japan_, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. +14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (_Modern China_, p. 13) says that +it "killed twenty million people," which is the more usual estimate, cf. +_China of the Chinese_ by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the +population was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt +that 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.] + +[Footnote 32: In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more +subservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by +Wu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 33: The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to +have made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton +Government was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng +Chiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (_The Times_, +April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See +Appendix.] + +[Footnote 34: The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, +especially in Manchuria.] + +[Footnote 35: There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the +birth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether +the birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet +by my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union +Medical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the +average number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while +the infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show +that the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of +statistics, generalizations about the population question in China must +be received with extreme caution.] + +[Footnote 36: I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. +Bland, _per contra_, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. +Contrast p. 104 of his _China, Japan and Korea_ with pp. 143, 146 of +Coleman's _The Far East Unveiled_, which gives the view of everybody +except Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin +reported in _The Times_ recently, but he was, of course, unable to +estimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.] + +[Footnote 37: Printed in _China in 1918_, published by the _Peking +Leader_.] + +[Footnote 38: _Musings of a Chinese Mystic_, by Lionel Giles (Murray), +p. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his _Texts of +Taoism_ in _Sacred Books of the East_, Vol. XXXIX.] + +[Footnote 39: Waley, 170 _Chinese Poems_, p. 96.] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION + + +For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order +to understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know +something of that country, to which we must now turn our attention. + +In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the +persistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the +centuries. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" by +no means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from +Korea in 552 A.D.[40] At the same time and from the same source Chinese +civilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through +the occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won +favour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to +China in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The +Japanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism +nationally they ordered one or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, +with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the +adherents of the traditional Shinto religion.[41] After some +vicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign +religion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than +Shinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief +religion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable +to find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of +peasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods" +(which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism.[42] Probably the +revival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing belief +in that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of the +population. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned, +Buddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto. + +The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to +restore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of +645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the +good old days. What the object was of those who established the +government of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that +may be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and +internal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low +ebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great +feudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government +fell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made +intelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved +imitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. The Chinese +Emperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from +the Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a +vigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so. + +The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of +645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is +set forth by Murdoch[43] as follows:-- + + In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled + on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends + who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for + purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some + of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the + British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they + certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the + four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization + with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the + sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye--for they + were two of this venturesome quartette--have often told of their + rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these + despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan + they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their + effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place + Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world. + +The two students who went to China in 608 A.D. "rendered even more +illustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have +done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked +back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, +and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two +National Doctors." + +Politically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately +following was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and +Richelieu--curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the +sovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. +The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably +with about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, +there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, +but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, +in 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, +but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just +the opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious +mixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies. + +Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems +to see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, +namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China +on the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, +and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which +went on in mediæval Europe between the Church, which represented ideas +derived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to +preserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, +Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization +over rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in +Japan. + +After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, +but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So +long as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power) +it continued to represent what was most civilized in Japan: the study +of Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve +respect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who +remained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were +so degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it +would have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them +and the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly +from the mediæval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, +although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even +greater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the +secular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado +and his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of +the Restoration. + +The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the +nominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of +power to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of +their infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some +monastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented +the military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of +the Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title of +the people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun," which means +"Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being the +Ainus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the +form which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto +Yoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But +before long the Shogun became nearly as much of a figure-head as the +Mikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the +actual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This +lasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened +that Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the +Minamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun +himself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished +at the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the +practice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister +and his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, +but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their +successors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter. + +What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the +Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, +originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming +at the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both +ignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted +the future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions +of peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to +undergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of +warlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching +doctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism +became national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became +important feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was +ready to fight on the slightest provocation. Sieges of monasteries and +battles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history. + +The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years' +experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country +completely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and +closely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the +Portuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final +expulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is +instructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought +with them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated +the former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually +no Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were +engaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, +Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed +than were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island +(containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and +were throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing +merchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their +larger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread +of Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and +their guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The +Portuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to +make converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese +began to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the +Portuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping +the Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese had +been able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a +Papal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit +monopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards +from Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican +and Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the +Jesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled +furiously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the +Japanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought +against the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the +extent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their +national independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the _San +Felipe_, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast +of Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his +harbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, +which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000 +crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in +Japan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had +the Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after +trying reason in vain, attempted intimidation. + + He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast + extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him + how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the + sway of a single man.... "Our Kings," said this outspoken seaman, + "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer + _religieux_ who induce the people to embrace our religion, and + when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who + combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not + much trouble in accomplishing the rest."[44] + +As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the +Portuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. +Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with +Japan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, +Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, +Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally +gave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the +Japanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, +they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian +nations. + +Meanwhile, a succession of three great men--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and +Iyeyasu--had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the +quasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of +internal peace which lasted until the Restoration--period of nearly two +and a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central +Government to enforce whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to +the foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between +them had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about +300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to +be subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account +of their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical +position. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began +in 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, has had +great power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during +its rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to +Christianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the +movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may +be, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible +without losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more +anti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in +1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in +the most vigorous terms:-- + + So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold + as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip + himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great + Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with + their heads.[45] + +The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly +cruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political +motives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with +the King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no +foreign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of +Christians against the newly established central power. Economic +exploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart +from political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if +there had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the +power of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese +armies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; the +Japanese had learnt the use of fire-arms; and their knowledge of +strategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest +cities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population +of Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would +therefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any +expedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have +been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. +But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world +showing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. +Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, +where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the +inmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of +European Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their +reports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The +Japanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the +white men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel +convinced that it was unwise. + +For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry's +squadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace +and almost complete stagnation--the only period of either in Japanese +history, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of +fire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy +until they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see +another period of isolation. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 40: The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's +_History of Japan_, The volume dealing with the earlier period is +published by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was +published earlier; its title is: _A History of Japan during the Century +of Early Foreign Intercourse_ (1542--1651), by James Murdoch M.A. in +collaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the _Japan Chronicle_, +1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II +respectively.] + +[Footnote 41: Murdoch I. pp. 113 ff.] + +[Footnote 42: Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.] + +[Footnote 43: Murdoch I. p. 147.] + +[Footnote 44: Murdoch, II, p. 288.] + +[Footnote 45: Murdoch II, p. 667.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +MODERN JAPAN + + +The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the +history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would +have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan +to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is +almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration +in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has +risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great +War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading +statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the +beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with +ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders +and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To +realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining +the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time +of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific +knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in +the Book of Joshua. + +The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have been +duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an +immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so +little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has +brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to +that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to +tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has +synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most +anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for +social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily +interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been +effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than +appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends +to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and +Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people +suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but +this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon. + +Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two +separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially +pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more +analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is +no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to +give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that +country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good +books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative +is McLaren's _Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era_ +1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared +in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course +invaluable; his book _Japan, An Interpretation_ shows his dawning +realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the +cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to +say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan. + +Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the +Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of +his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful +of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at +various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been +in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during +its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, +except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era +was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the +country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the +Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed +Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics +and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces +and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore +first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which +Japan has played in international affairs. + +What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to +power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end +of the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems to +have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy +personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with +contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was +often kept in great poverty. + + Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of + early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the + Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a + Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no + aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were + in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on + their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the + Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to + examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the + Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was + regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the + autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of + the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western + Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing + with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the + throne. + + In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the + relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be + sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by + Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, + throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the + Heavenly Gods.[46] + +What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very +different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado +had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the +ancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogun +for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial +treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never +willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren +once more (p. 33):-- + + The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of + Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the + expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! + Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in + enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific + attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not + be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was + directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, + but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general + unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in + armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years + previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had + been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising + gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the + students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those + men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. + +This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan +down to the present day. + +The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the +West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, +in his authoritative _History of Japan,_[47] says:-- + + + + In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development + most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at + fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the + solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and + facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain + their own unit of social organization, which is not the + individual, as with us, but the _family_. Furthermore, the + resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central + and local, to certain European systems is not the result of + imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is + merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who + overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal + system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new + equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe + for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or + twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the + administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan + by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 + A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding + fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten + Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of + officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from + China and established in the seventh century.... The present + administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was + neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor + adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity + that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies. + +The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of +the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the +foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and +secured the support of the country by being the champions of +nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted +which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan +from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the +greatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the Central +Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, +China and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and a +protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and +commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and +worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and +by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation +of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern +Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of +preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little +pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese +and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few +Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called _The Invention of a New +Religion_, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He +points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, +to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very +ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on +obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto +has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as +to suit modern requirements.[48] It is, of course, preferable to +Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not +one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has +been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado. + +Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the +Mikado until some time after the Restoration:-- + + The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its + sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the + beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of + living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been + assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was + the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have + been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long + centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the + Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, + generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. + At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of + the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the + Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling + their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest + against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign + (that of Meiji)--the most glorious in Japanese history--there + have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was + set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in + another. + +This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely +credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of +superstition has gone _pari passu_ with the spread of education, and a +revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the +midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and +instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there +is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler--as absolute as any sovereign +ever has been. + +The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. +Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied +from Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D., +whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to +somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese +pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that +the Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain +again:-- + + The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the + fifth century _after_ Christ, and even the accounts of what + happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. + Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the + certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy + does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient + circumstance. While granting a dispensation _re_ the national + mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of + the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who + strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in + Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will + starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading _Commentary + on the Japanese Constitution_ down to school compendiums, the + absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon. + +This question of fictitious early history might be considered +unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to +believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of +the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought +and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:-- + + Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, + was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it + is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the + popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where + they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change + all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado + descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, + and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims + the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and + constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense + popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and + low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as + public servants, but rather as executants of supreme--one might + say supernatural--authority. Shinto, because connected with the + Imperial family, is to be alone honoured. + +All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese +politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of +the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, +and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented +politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes +miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no +constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of +the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are +omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them +the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have +invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the +Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves +take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and +Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The +Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so +until the Mikado is captured by some other clique. + +From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom +in the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan were +a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists +of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there +is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to +dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly +there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and +making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the +Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and +the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy +in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. +There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and +anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese +industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as +Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed +there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has +saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed +if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of +these occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after +the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of +Japanese politics.[50] + +In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to +impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, +and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The Russian +Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated +men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the +Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it +had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it +would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a +prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed +secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the +restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations +to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, +faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse +the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of +neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, +led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to +alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the +peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they +would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact +resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was +known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The +Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the +indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese +demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed +up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese +announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted +the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus +the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, +because they had been tricked--the former in the belief that it could +yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter +in the belief that the Government would never give way about the +indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, +furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government--of the +nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the +real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision +of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view; +there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could +not have been made without trickery. + +Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in +which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as +democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that +Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, +took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all +their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great +Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the +Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin +with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japan +there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about +25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter +compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than +that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from +pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the +Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not +collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine +must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, +but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of +course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the +Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet +refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be +applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted +temporarily by Imperial decree--a provision which had no analogue in the +German Constitution. + +The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, +it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, +since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. +To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in +conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was +issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the +Constitution as follows[51]:-- + + Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire + of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors + unbroken for ages eternal." + + "By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his + _Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan_, "it is meant that + the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of + the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects." + + Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred + and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is + peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established + at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The + Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent + above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. + He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no + power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no + irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither + be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion." + + Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises + the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary + power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, + prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not + sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The + Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, + makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and + commutation of punishments. + + As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article + 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their + advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." + + Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in + framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of + his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities + belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a + Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the + Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of + State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included + by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is + only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to + the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But + the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open + answers from them before the public, and it may also present + addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions. + + "The Minister President of State is to make representations to + the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to + His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, + every branch of the administration being under control of the + said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his + responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the + other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for + the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint + responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the + Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike + personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one + of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the + Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of + control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the + latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some + countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate + body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct + of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint + responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the + power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme + power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be + approved of according to our Constitution." + +In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first +four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the +Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by +Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen +of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with +introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished +to preserve Japanese independence _vis-à-vis_ the Western Powers, but +did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own +account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. +Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of +the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. +But when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to an +earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The +Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous +at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by +glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and +France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war +against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the +hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government +has never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as the +Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant +international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. +Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was +afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was +powerless to prevent it.[52] His opposition, however, was tiresome, +until at last he was murdered in Korea. + +Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a +consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The +nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two +chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed +towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant +as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the +present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. +An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing +system, but the whole unity and _morale_ of the nation; I do not believe +that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be. +Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal +regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive +element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan +to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact +everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, +industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot +emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the +mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore +the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into +industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing +food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because +Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot +obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with +America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong +navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very +similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy +requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets +requires--or rather, is thought to require--starvation wages and long +hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, most +of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day +and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.[53] Labour organization +is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain to +spread if the number of industrial workers increases without a very +marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of +the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable +of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are +vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism +and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of +myth upon which the Japanese State depends.[55] There is therefore a +likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence--assuming a peaceful and +prosperous development in the meantime--of a very bitter class conflict +between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and +bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with +agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue. + +The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for +the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop +industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control +Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic +interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a +large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for +wage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners +means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial +piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a +continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which +the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with +the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, +there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution. + +From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a +diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent +to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is +fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which +patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to +emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, +involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but +ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be free +thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. +Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that +remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 46: McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.] + +[Footnote 47: Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.] + +[Footnote 48: "What _popular_ Shinto, as expounded by its village +priests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully +selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true +aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of +Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which +disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight." (Murdoch, I, +p. 173 n.)] + +[Footnote 49: The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. +Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office and +Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. +When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on +tho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to +regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme of +party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of +the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but +are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial +Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are +titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments +showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the +great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military +man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom +policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, +albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."] + +[Footnote 50: The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit. +chaps, xii. and xiii.] + +[Footnote 51: _The Far East Unveiled_, pp. 252-58.] + +[Footnote 52: See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.] + +[Footnote 53: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.] + +[Footnote 54: See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour +Movements in Japan," published by the _Japan Chronicle_, 1921, for an +account of what is happening in this direction.] + +[Footnote 55: _The Times_ of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from +its correspondent in Tokyo, _à propos_ of the funeral of Prince +Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:-- + +"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of +expenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which +was introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as +the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last +year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not +render true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the +highest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic +institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that +the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the +resolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the +incident."] + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 + + +Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is +necessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking +of the "Yellow Races," as though China and Japan formed some kind of +unity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead +one to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in +comparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the +Chinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities; +but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very +small. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in the +scale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a +hairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit +the Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan +descent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest +importance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and +Chinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more +important than a common racial origin. + +It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived +from China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as +Chinese, and Buddhism, which is still the religion of the people, is of +the sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which +are the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported +along with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the +irruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different +histories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar +had developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of +the First Emperor (_c._ 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land +empire, having much contact with foreign nations--Annamese, Burmese, +Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an +island kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea +and occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at +war with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal +chivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative +problems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines +of Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China +was still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in +one of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But +naturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that +which befel them in their own country. + +In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue +one finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, +which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised +where conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were +in feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on +the contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire was so vast and +immemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a +different set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and +compromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves +plunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in +developing the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the +situation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been +schooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal +anarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated +the previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like +our thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our +mechanism but dislike our thought. + +From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a +unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and +India contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are +easily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with +modern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely +than in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and +invulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong +as to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if +Russia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German +organizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of +possibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for +power and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal +mentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon +Asiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it +conflicts with China and Russia, which the present weakness of those +Powers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both +are likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the +essential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent. + +It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two +somewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as +the champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the +other hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, +and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are +inefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to +China and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has +inspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of +Korea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a +member of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of +the Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great +Powers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in +Asia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who +happen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in +the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred million +natives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of Great +Britain."[56] While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable +Englishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived +from the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply +an intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates the +intensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may +be, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before +the Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley[57] +quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the +following list of white men's sins:-- + + (1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that + all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization. + + (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, + but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors. + + (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession + is made to them they demand and take more. + + (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races + in greatness and wickedness. + + (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of + everything, will adopt any measures to gain it. + +This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have +supposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be +unlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They +argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as +possible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed +by Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been +equalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his +wildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he +wants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards +Japan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is +to be above the whites, not merely equal with them. Count Okuma put the +matter very simply in an address given in 1913:-- + + The white races regard the world as their property and all other + races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the + rôle of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they + please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, + and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white + races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, + and woe to them.[58] + +It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that +Japan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the +eminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the +Japanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us. + +The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal +affairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without +first consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had +infringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war +caused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and +decisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to +oppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the +Boxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the +fruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and +France, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for +themselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans +presumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow +Peril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese +war inevitable. It would not have mattered much to Japan if the Chinese +had established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have +constituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for +nothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called +Dairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the +Chinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting +Port Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having +accomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The +Russo-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this +Alliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the +corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, +when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided +that, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, +the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally +inspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the +Russian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from +calling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and +Russia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of +Portsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance +served its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese +war. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to +acquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus +curbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an +Entente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded +with France in 1904 would have been useless, and the alliance which +defeated Germany could not have been created. + +Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia +alone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her +strength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to +greatness was due to our support. + +The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all +interference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called +Dairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. +This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then been +called the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437 +miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen +as the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely +naval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to +Western models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a +treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910 +they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists +with every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be +fully the equals of the white men. + +The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a +monopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was +practically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China +by means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. +Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,[59] which shows how +the South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:-- + +"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed a contract with Messrs +Pauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways +northwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for +the work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan +protested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol +annexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that +'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the +neighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any +branch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that +railway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and +Russia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without +Russian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the +Russian rights, the projected line could not be built without her +consent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in +tone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was +obviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task! + +"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the +clause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to +Hsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to +build the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, +although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were +specificially excluded from participation in railway construction north +of the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British +Note the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and +Chinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the +agreement. + +"Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in +Manchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902 +and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of +the bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from +seeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. +Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but +with no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State +Department at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her +action was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which +assigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway +(South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining +thereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III +and IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is +declared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or +exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty +or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the +second is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct +any general measures common to all countries which China may take for +the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.' + +"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to +build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of +Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not +a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of +Manchuria.' + +"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling +in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such +flagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and +pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since +recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its +subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as +the protest from Tokio.... + +"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men +railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other +projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the +important Antung-Mukden line.[60] The same alleged secret protocol was +used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the +Newchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in +1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with +Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was +construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration +within the railway zone.'" + +Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover +the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung--though the latter has +been nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or +by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired +vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and +have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the +provinces through which they run. + +After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and +agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting +Manchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. +Russia had entered into extensive obligations to support Japan's claims +at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. +Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the +support of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the Far +Eastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international +questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party +aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They +have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, +as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China +politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several +times in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was +obtaining financial support from some Japanese.[61] When the revolution +actually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was +prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems +that the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the +union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. +Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor +of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, +though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of +some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions +of Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation +gives the gist[62]:-- + + It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on + December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, + with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East." + This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese + Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd + categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances + would Japan recognize a republican form of government in + China.... In connection with the peace conference held at + Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a + trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to + Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the + dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the + Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with + the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria + against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by + Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese + protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining + concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. + Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian + Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of + day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied + their authenticity. + +The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the +Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the +day. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was +strongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as +strongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the +influence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to +make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would +doubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war +came, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told +in a separate chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 56: Quoted by A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policy_, Allen & +Unwin, 1920, p. 18.] + +[Footnote 57: Op. cit. p. 16 n.] + +[Footnote 58: Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.] + +[Footnote 59: A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 48-51.] + +[Footnote 60: This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.] + +[Footnote 61: Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.] + +[Footnote 62: Page 66.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR + + +The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is +Japanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but +after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach +in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their +new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The +Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to +have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at +issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time +there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one +side rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely +victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure +possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in +Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending +China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by +the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of +Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse +after the Great War. + +The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have +the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. +But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, +the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military +control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were +displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. +(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung. + +Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China +could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to +turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, +who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese +remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they +presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the +Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented +in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with +Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms +Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese +province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain +specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be +opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted +to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria +and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a +protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for +Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial +enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron +and steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze,[63] where we claim +a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, +that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except +Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that +Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed +by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be +administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely +Japanese in _personnel_; that China should purchase from Japan at least +50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese +arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and +employing Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to +construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan +should have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and +finally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda +in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics. + +These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chinese +independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and +industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British +position in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we +had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands +constituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an +uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action +against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were +explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.[64] He had no +time to find out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret +agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan +wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.[65] By the +terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the +Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan +communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus +definitely breaking the treaty;[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr. +Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles. + +China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured +certain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by an +ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on +the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth +group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.[67] In +this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United +States immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the +agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore +still able to do something to further the objects for which we were +supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In +1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, +it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the +Ishii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the +United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, +particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The +rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.[68] + +I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.[69] +In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing +diplomatic relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the +declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off +diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all +neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in +Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He +induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of +expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, +on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of +declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected +with these events deserve some study. + +In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese +had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, +French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for +reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been +some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should +participate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. +These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of +Japan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear +that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. +When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in +Tokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, +Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as of +paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan +could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient +Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in +the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of +the economic activities of 400,000,000 people."[70] Accordingly the +proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the +Japanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their +sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they +filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing +them of cowardice and military incompetence.[71] + +But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the +situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience +to Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had +always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing +to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic +relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no +_promises_ to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American +Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was +ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were +bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged +China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and +Great Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continued +support of Japan. + +In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was +inviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan +concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. +This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the +assistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital +interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China +from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having +hostile designs against Russia or Japan." The last article provided that +"the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of +the High Contracting Parties."[72] That is to say, the treaty was not +communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of +Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The High +Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting +the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the +prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement," +one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all +Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese +Empire. + +On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to +sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with +Japan containing the following words:-- + + His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the + request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they + will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of + Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north + of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being + understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual + peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims + to the German islands south of the equator. + +The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by +Notes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo.[73] On February +19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian +Ambassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial Japanese +Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace +negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special +interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands +belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." +The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:-- + + The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the + Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the + Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung + and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It + also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese + Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed + before the war in this Chinese province and these islands. + + M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support + to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations + with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. + The consequences in China should be the following: + + First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and + consuls; + + Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave + Chinese territory; + + Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the + ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the + disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and + Portugal; + + Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in + China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she + possesses in certain ports of China. + +The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian +Ambassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:-- + + In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is + charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it + can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of + Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual + surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung + and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in + the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.[74] + +It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no +_quid pro quo_, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the +previous year. + +After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's +participation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the +hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope +being realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest +ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the +Chinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last +days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished +by the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917. + +Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into +the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has +been one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the +revolutionary movement.[75] If the Chinese had not been interfered with +at this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding in +establishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his +successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine +constitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had +dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was +resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, +and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan +Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his +Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese +Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic +relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue. + +On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It +was President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking +off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; +but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented +a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of +national unity was more important than entry into the war, and +suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What +had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never +have become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by +the Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to +instigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat +Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration +of war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd +George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.[76] The Cabinet, on +May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration +of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to +coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved +impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to +compel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the +Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act +as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of +constitutional government. After these various illegalities, the +military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their +number, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu +Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more +agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, +sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient +unconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to +declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and +against militarism. + +Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the +war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of +the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We +wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living +in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German +trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was +duly carried out--not only public property, but private property also, +so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to +the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till +after the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics in +overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of +hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities +insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew +to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the +Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took +upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the merciless +persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have +been much greater. + +The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of +Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the +belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side +two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to +the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our +operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with +proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be +fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, +after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for +ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet +get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law +and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of +German-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that."[77] The +European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to +enter the war for righteousness. + +We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration +of war. What Japan gained was somewhat different. + +The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, +was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist +Japanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the +war, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality--for +Japan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of +Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal +elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the +Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were +concluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially +published, is given by Millard.[78] By these agreements the Japanese +were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and +Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of +the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and +generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the +excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient. + +After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they +placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,[79] _i.e.,_ +about £25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were +as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of +victory. Unfortunately for Japan, the side on which Japan was fighting +in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies +of Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For +various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until +after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace +negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were +compelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed +everything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have +joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on +this subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the +most interesting in his book.[80] By Article 156 of the Treaty of +Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, +title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung.[81] Although +President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, +America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise +the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles +resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, +encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,[82] refused to sign +the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province +as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to +a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we had +annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in +the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext. + +Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public +opinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 +was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly +ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the +Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu +leaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking +Government has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always +for American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her +position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America might +re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference +was announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a +view to having the question settled before the opening of the +Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory +concessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional +evacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of +England and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the +American Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I +understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with +America. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount +to much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. +On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington +Conference. + +There is a question with which the Washington Conference determined not +to concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great +importance in the Far East--I mean the question of Russia. It was +considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, +to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, +with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. +Their existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in a +quarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselves +in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russia +has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the +Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after +a time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake +Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern +Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is +practically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have +launched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks--Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, +etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in military +occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, +though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire. + +In the early days of the Bolshevik régime the Russians lost Northern +Manchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly +of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of +the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects +with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail +between Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme +annoyance to European business men in the Far East, since it means that +letters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead +of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with +the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is +the reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, +various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and +endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which +led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon +all Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a +war with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the +opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former position +in Manchuria. Already, according to _The Times_ correspondent in Peking, +Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany +combined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda. + +The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger +Chinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have +a good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in +Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As +they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the +agreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset +impartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America.[83] For +America, no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are +economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far +East, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political +freedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage +beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may +become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, +however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, +because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is +treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But +what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet +impossible to say. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 63: On this subject George Gleason, _What Shall I Think of +Japan?_ pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel +mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the +Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people. +The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty +miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. +The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 +feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 +years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained +from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand +miners dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is +capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five +centuries.... + +"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart +of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special +trade domain." + +Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this +matter is given by Mr. Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chaps. x.-xiv. +See below, pp. 232-3.] + +[Footnote 64: See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, _Japan Weekly Chronicle_, +October 20, 1921.] + +[Footnote 65: The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, +_Japan's Foreign Policies_, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.] + +[Footnote 66: On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to +the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China +a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what +purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only +contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was +directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. +Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably +foolish" (_The Far East Unveiled_, p. 73).] + +[Footnote 67: The demands in their original and revised forms, with the +negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of _Democracy +and the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.] + +[Footnote 68: The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung +question are printed in S.G. Cheng's _Modern China_, Appendix ii, iii +and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp. +214-6.] + +[Footnote 69: Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and +official history of this matter. They are: _An American Diplomat in +China_, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; _Democracy and +the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and +_China, Captive or Free?_ by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director +of International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.] + +[Footnote 70: Millard, p. 99.] + +[Footnote 71: See Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 23 ff; +Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chap, v., and Millard, chap. iii.] + +[Footnote 72: Millard, pp. 64-66.] + +[Footnote 73: Reid, op. cit. pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. cit., pp. 343-6.] + +[Footnote 74: See Appendix III of Cheng's _Modern China_, which contains +this note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to the +negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal of +the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea +Islands north of the Equator."] + +[Footnote 75: The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration +of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.] + +[Footnote 76: Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.] + +[Footnote 77: Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, +"Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who +still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything +except money-grubbing.] + +[Footnote 78: Appendix C, pp. 421-4.] + +[Footnote 79: A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an +article on "China's Finances in 1918" in _China in_ 1918, published +early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the +comments appear also in Putnam Weale's _The Truth about China and +Japan_.] + +[Footnote 80: Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese +questions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. +Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case," League of +Nations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's +arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.] + +[Footnote 81: See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's +_Modern China_, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.] + +[Footnote 82: This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's +_China Awakened_ (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix., "The Student Movement."] + +[Footnote 83: "Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest +against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China +Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares +that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel +due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make +demands consistent with those rights" (_Daily Herald_, December 22, +1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian +labouring masses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What +Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the +Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs +of the capitalists.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE + + +The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at +Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the +Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be +dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual +decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their +effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia. + +In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been +brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact +between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general +alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of +America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing +for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The +situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as +regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in +the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem +to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. +It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more +liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of +Wei-hai-wei--a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive +but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, +and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the +terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as +Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that +date. + +One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement +not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified +exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between +America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. +Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring +naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of +the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a +first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo +this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve +the peace with Japan. + +Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision +of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The +foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have +insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the +Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they +desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, +though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one +of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put +their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as +they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels +sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese +importation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy +in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature +of their penetration of China.[84] + +Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and +integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these +are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning. + +From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was +the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end +of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of +Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the +Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, +they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings +in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and +through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse +was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, +and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the +resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of +Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The +Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the +question afresh. + +At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all +their own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the +Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation +with China. This point was important, because, ever since the +Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to +recognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese +Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary +to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered +with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to +the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before +the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between +the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, +was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a +deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, +of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no +longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old +days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some +disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was +roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution +more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would +probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work +of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly +urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less +strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between +China and Japan. + +By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the +private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as +regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the +negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they +would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back +the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of +a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese +refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were +compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid +in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway +was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs +or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be +handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. +Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese +retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic +manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the +other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President. + +It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years +hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years +hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both +Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to +this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have +some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that +case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete +control of the Shantung railway. + +On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than +might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new +international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with +them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary +to consider certain Far Eastern questions _not_ discussed at Washington, +since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form. + +The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at +Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is +secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both +together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will +not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See +Appendix.) + +The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions +in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain +unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check +them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the +Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any +near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have +decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A +conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place +at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the +effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. +But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. _The +Times_ of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian official +accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in _The +Times_ as follows:-- + + The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given + out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen + Conference. + + It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly + expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government + decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place + on August 26th last year. + + The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic + principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of + Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military + establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in + Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on + foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that + the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as + possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. + Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of + the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the + Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis + agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair + Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and + territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be + speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the + affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of + property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be + met. + + The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be + relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had + progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, + would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita + that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable + period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed + the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that + the preparations for the relief of the said division might be + dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate + despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the + withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should + fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops. + + Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out + within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed + arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the + same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by + Japan. + + Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a + sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely + ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought + up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not + only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but + declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to + Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the + Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring + the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government + instructed its delegates to quit Dairen. + +The Russian official account is given by _The Times_ immediately below +the above. It is as follows:-- + + On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with + the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. + Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian + Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, + but when the question of military evacuation was reached the + Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued + Japanese intervention. + + Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the + negotiations _re_ military convention, reproaching the Far + Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The + Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be + signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese + military evacuation. + + On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum + demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an + hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement + with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far + Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far + Eastern territory. _Re_ evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note + promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen + circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. + On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken + up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops + remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th. + +Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according +to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial +will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, +I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqué +it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese +unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all +that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, +which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to +evacuate Egypt. + +It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the +Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese +felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with +at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will +naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of +the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. +This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the +assembled peacemakers.[85] + +It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. +This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. +Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic +capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. +Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their +armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America +look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to +compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent +years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed +coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation +from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending +to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the +authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, +believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that +France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become +anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa +have sown the seeds of future wars--unless, by some miracle, the +"civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 84: See _e.g._ chap. viii. of Millard's _Democracy and the +Eastern Question._] + +[Footnote 85: I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of +the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic +mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more +high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were +communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they +showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies +have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.] + + + + +CHAPTER X + +PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST + + +The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to +guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, +and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will +endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying +the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I +regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively +the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an +attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests +and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86] + +I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the +dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of +peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise +and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The +pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the +optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American +public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, +athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main +ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the +Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, +whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to +explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious +hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western +Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength +of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. +Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his +sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. +This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been +somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard +Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as +it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an +attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England +of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment +than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from +Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors +is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development +is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to +estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United +States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of +idealism. + +Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It +is apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of +live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less +pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the +contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical +philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle +of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are +useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by +any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort +of world. + +All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington +Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the +friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, +hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst +enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power +to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if +there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to +see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the +militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done +in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the +future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state +Japan's case, although, _for the present_, I think it weaker than +America's. + +It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American +policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while +clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American +interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal +to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand +that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that +America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in +having.[87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very +pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the +seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the +cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of +American interests. To take next the question of China: American +ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country +should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The +policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so +rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of +the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal +policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting +a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest. + +In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices +are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight +whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In +the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to +discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed +by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a +discrimination in favour of American shipping. Even if the President +ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least +two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view +of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the +way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and +to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against +"shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is +_always_ honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that +America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial +interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases. + +I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself +with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American +weekly, The _Freeman_ (November 23, 1921, p. 244):-- + + On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an + obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large + banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated + the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in + fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an + emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with + intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious + effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese + Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new + international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese + Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, + together with other obligations already in arrears, and still + others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had + also received the full and energetic support of the Department of + State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were + at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; + having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they + came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to + save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government + would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus + prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American + financial protectorate. + +It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated +negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the +terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very +adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the _Freeman_ +concludes:-- + + If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the + consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, + those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to + take full advantage of the situation. + +There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington +Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the +connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to +establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international +control over China. In the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_ for November 17, +1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I +find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish +international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the +_Philadelphia Public Ledger_: "We suspect the motives which led to the +suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly +oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: +"International control will not do. China must be given time and +opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or +exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing +through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China +must agree. In the same issue of the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_--which, by +the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world--I find the +following (p. 728):-- + + Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The + international bankers have a scheme for the international control + of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a + sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese + Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the + Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the + Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing + this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's + statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks + about resisting the control of the international banks he is + fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the + Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full + opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny." + +Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be +due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had +nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and +one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson." + +I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, +and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European +radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control +reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a +Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, +for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would +be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic +as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, +although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though +this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the +Chinese. + +In the _New Republic_ for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. +Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is +prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was +written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far +East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign +commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good +substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually +increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the +chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the +spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization +for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such +_objets d'art_ as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the +gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one +day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man +throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret +society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. +It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be +told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The +definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good +government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat +dividends to capitalists. + +The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They +have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human +happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if +they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce +something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that +we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will +be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul +of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her +salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When +America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of +intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained. +Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans +recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with +blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is +that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank +God that they are not as this publican. + +So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of +Japan. + +Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that +Japan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not +suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United +States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of +Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only +two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to +fight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and +developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled +on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern +morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was +horrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began +to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured +Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with +the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by +the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good +qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers." + +People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the +intensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought +into contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the +highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy +white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke +would venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated +in this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that +white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese, +is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured +races in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from +retaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general +will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be +re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the +survival of civilizations of a different type from that of the +industrial West. + +The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of +the West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in +its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the +Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine being, +is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular +support for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely +economic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediæval way. The +morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic. +Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado +is the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of +superstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century +theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe +the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels +promoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in +one sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt. + +Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a +proposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until +it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view +that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially +nationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the +State religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,[88] and +propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto +religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is +not a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism, +Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to +appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is +believed by the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites for +marriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is +considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a +universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,[89] like +the Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples +the priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of +English Archdeacons. + +The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their +sense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but +they have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to +industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful +as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has +hitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any +nation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves our +gratitude. + +The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard +working, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them +have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and +incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means +universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of +quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a +whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest +respect. + +The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of +Socialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are +often theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour +organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In +Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety +of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, +if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a +political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists +resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the +national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but +not so much as Socialists in America--so at least I am informed by an +American who is in a position to judge. + +The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. +By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly +responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They +therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the +Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the +evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to +keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. +Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable +in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real +Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless +the existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the +Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung +but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal +government of Japan would probably have been excellent. + +The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that +the Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that the +Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The +argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States +will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in +the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented +with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then +Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield +in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi, +as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will +lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be +incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, +of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and +the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A +war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of +Japan. + +One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany +in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial +empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the +Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners; +so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused +our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with +America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by +our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, +similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French +sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has +brought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors +largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it +is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons +are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them +further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case +of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed +at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in +Eastern Asia. + +The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, +as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper +passions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; America +believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to +persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an +extension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt +futile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and +culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a +delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, +profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve +their own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and +in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice +is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese +are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the +white man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. +Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic +conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the +Americans. + +Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong +through impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China +the same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then +they could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the +champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, +and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to +them. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do; +they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only +to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore +behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this +same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the +worst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, +they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, +they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible +for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best +Americans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese +policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not +achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a +great misfortune for mankind. + +A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in +itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would +destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to +Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide +militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. +If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will +only become more liberal if the present régime is discredited by +failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the +interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint +diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only +Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate +neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of +actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance +with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an +encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan +has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only +permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese +at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our +Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the +ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform. + +We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency +in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, +millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not +mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still +able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the +Japanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik +propaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the +effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from +Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except +the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of +developing industry without passing through the stage of private +capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are +more and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as +it has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, +for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State, +whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to +federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very +great deal of government, and more control of individual lives by the +authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed +personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all +others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful +practical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is +the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these +reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much +progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the +same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved +successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were +probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. +The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively +Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, +carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less +corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, like +the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of +mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, +adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and +gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon +spent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régime +under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his +life. + +It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation +develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain +Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control +of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be +useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, +but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America +or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the +supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, +recover the position which she held in relation to China before the +Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an +instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for +centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the +last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long. + +The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way +regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as +much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, +the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be +able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with +Asiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking +nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong +for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, +on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be +desirable In the interests of mankind as a whole. + +What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for +China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. +The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end +some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending +of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of +some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably +quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in +the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in +the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through +years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their +development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference +without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. +Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but +have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. +The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult +one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the +Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we +do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution +suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution +slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely +imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable. + +There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the +Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable +chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the _status quo_ +is to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have made +concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four +Powers--America, Great Britain, France, and Japan--have agreed to +exploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortium +as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will +therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only +people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As +they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set +to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers +are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must +be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish +colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth +of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China +for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of +America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust +magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of +radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by +some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom. + +But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace +and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, +France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so +far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the +peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no +means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous +competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing +the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the +domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the +strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's +interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese +interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for +the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable +government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, +and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will +not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own +railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic +independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the +form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will +keep a _dossier_ of every student educated in colleges under American +control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or +Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard +of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the +United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In +short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to +"God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the +wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give +to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that +which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination +of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be +perfect. + +The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy +competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive +competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeeded +in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced +industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between +workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow +races.[92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap +Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to +white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of +industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an +obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any +person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every +other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per +head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who +either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the +others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an +opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of +the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British +Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial +conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole +question of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble for +centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since +Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this +matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world. + +The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by +means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is +obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except +through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, +China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands +of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into +submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, +attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot +see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result +of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect +that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the +Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and +the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as +the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be +fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive +civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, +the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any +sort would survive it. + +To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big +financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. +No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due +to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But +not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a +few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the +interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic +immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social +interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system +makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to +the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also +to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is +seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by +accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the +present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the +weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of +Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little +freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the +present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is +production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation +produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. +Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in +internal labour problems and in international relations. The development +of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the +Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the +things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs +for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply +these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish +pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will +be regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of the +consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will +cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to +exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not +possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present +American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not +secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only +international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of +revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure +until international Socialism is established throughout the world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 86: The interests of England, apart from the question of +India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, +British interests are allied with American finance, as against the +pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.] + +[Footnote 87: It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington +Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there +agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the +navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy +is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government +has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of +reluctant taxpayers. See _The Times'_ New York Correspondent's telegram +in _The Times_ of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22.] + +[Footnote 88: See Chamberlain, _The Invention of a New Religion_, +published by the Rationalist Press Association.] + +[Footnote 89: See Murdoch, _History of Japan_, I. pp. 500 ff.] + +[Footnote 90: An excellent account of these is given in _The Socialist +and Labour Movement in Japan_, by an American Sociologist, published by +the _Japan Chronicle_.] + +[Footnote 91: Author of a book called _If Japan and America Fight_.] + +[Footnote 92: The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is +illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in _The Times_ for +April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of +shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime +Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp +instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by +black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation +reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and +turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to +blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from +the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not +generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I +deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, +assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a +blessing.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED + + +There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a +close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the +Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact +will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or +whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that +of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the +past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, +Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediæval Europe from +the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these +cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of +China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case +again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from +us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the +Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear +we are unteachable. + +I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of +the questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three +following chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning the internal +condition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the +hopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult +situation. + +With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I +cannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact +after such a long period of separate development as has marked those of +China and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is +surprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is +not more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth +while to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two +civilizations. + +Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, +which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish +religion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an +outcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and +Galileo as representing these three elements, which have remained +singularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive +literature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more +urbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical +belief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with the +conception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our +nationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power +and the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly +be, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive +also the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been +acquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our +mentality. + +No one of these three elements has had any appreciable part in the +development of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese +painting, sculpture, and music.[93] China belongs, in the dawn of its +history, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia +contributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the +Greeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by +the rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so +the original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow +River. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch +far either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this +similarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little +in common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the +Egyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze[94] and Confucius, who both belong to +the sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should +regard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute +everything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the +differences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and +Babylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do +not think science can, at present, account wholly for national +character. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not +the whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant +individuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, +Mahomet, and Confucius. + +The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the founder of Taoism. "Lao +Tze" is not really a proper name, but means merely "the old +philosopher." He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of +Confucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He +held that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way +or manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that +we ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to +conform to it. "Tao" means "way," but used in a more or less mystical +sense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life." I +think he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way," and +that if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, +like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere +magic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. +But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist +philosophy from the first. + +Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but +his ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more +interesting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one +of freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences +with Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they +contrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the pure +men of old." There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, +because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some +sense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife +in the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of +humour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by +Chuang-Tze's account of Po-Lo who "understood the management of +horses," and trained them till five out of every ten died.[95] Their +restraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with +Western mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature +and art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present +day. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance +of a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so +that Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the +Chinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in +Peking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in +the theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement +at its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor +of a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. +In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due +to the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man +should always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments +(being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate +them in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, +which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue +in their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, +makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at +being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration +for the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of +passion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first +all the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually the beauty and +dignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who +have lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best. + +The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from +the favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that +I am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are +largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern +is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When +one compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of +some other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even +if they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, +is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to +a powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly +has succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners +and perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is +quite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been +provided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the +humblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of +white men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot +demean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard +this as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the +Chinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors. + +There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional +civilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from +India in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a +definite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant +outlook which we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man +adopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity +and Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man +can accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man +may be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is +incompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both +Buddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental +difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any +individual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. +Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It +has mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a +message to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as +natural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive +pessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of +all this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, +wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at +all. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or +religious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of +these two religions in China has been that the more religious and +contemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active +administrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the +official teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were +examined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has +been in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been +lacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western +nations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have conformed very +closely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the +population has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that +subject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations +have had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and +resources. + +Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in +China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other +two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is +practically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but +throughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it +is not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin." +Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been no +science and no industrialism. + +What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization +with the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, +but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to +dissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural +contact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political +and economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural +question as far as I can in isolation. + +There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not +simply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist +Western aggression, but because a very large number of people consider +learning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a +high value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only +of the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that +Western knowledge is more useful. Many students go every year to +universities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or +economics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to +China, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or +politicians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, +especially in the educated classes. + +The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had +ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This +was not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack +of new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the +stimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily +keen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of +libraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human +material. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in +science, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore +the spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the +Church put in its way in Europe. I have no doubt that if the Chinese +could get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within +the next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It +is quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with +fresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the +enthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the +renaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy. + +It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, +that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring +wealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an +ethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. They are +not by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me +that they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them +think there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The +habit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and +some of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they +were looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and +before long they will realize that they must work out their own +salvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults +and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will +make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours. + +The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the +scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just +conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to +see gradually uniting. + +Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production without +possession, action without self-assertion, development without +domination." I think one could derive from these words a conception of +the ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted +that they are very different from the ends which most white men set +before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly +sought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a +philosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to +Germany. + +But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with +Chinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese +practice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, +of course, a great deal of truth in this. Possession, which is one of +the three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to +the heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of +money--not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the +English or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful +men make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny. + +Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and +domination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese +practice. There is much less desire than among the white races to +tyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is +quite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on +which are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the +world could ever be "too proud to fight," that nation would be China. +The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, +showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they +could be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire +freedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may +compel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their +virtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have +been an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is +extraordinarily slight. + +Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the +Chinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a +poet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by +Mr. Waley, called by him _The Old Man with the Broken Arm_, to make a +hero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. Their +pacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that +they do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure--as +their pictures show--in observing characteristic manifestations of +different kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a +preconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which +dominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our +active impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with +us; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The +cultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their +earliest sages write. If one points out to them that this shows how +little progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress when +you already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seems +to a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own +wisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call +progress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable +goal. + +It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West +with what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek +knowledge, in the hope--which I fear is usually vain--that knowledge may +prove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three +motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our +religion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, +and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and +the missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the +world; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese +have no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions are +many, but reason is one," and with that they are content to let us go +our way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different +from those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking +concessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get +their claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good +soldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not +worth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their +reasonableness. + +I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that +Europeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine +ourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we +still practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we +are firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are +immeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation +like the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to +them is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound +mistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is +miserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier +because the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook +than our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, +but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of +beauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In +this respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. +I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but +for that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to +be fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us the indispensable +minimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of +that contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all +the other nations of antiquity have perished. + +When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I +thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn +from them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found +this attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who +go only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese +do not excel in the things we really value--military prowess and +industrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the +simple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than +in the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where +such things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for +our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance +and contemplative peace of mind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 93: See Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 368, and Giles, op. cit. p. +187.] + +[Footnote 94: With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is +of doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three +centuries after his death. Cf. Giles, op. cit., Lecture V.] + +[Footnote 95: Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.] + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE CHINESE CHARACTER + + +There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, +full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be +that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this +opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I +was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have +talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people +would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not +wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle +Oriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an +Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as +many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the +game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is +deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in +London. + +One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of +securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, +both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many +years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a +single Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the +Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their +outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils: +the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the +anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at +first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to +be reformed. + +But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable +misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the +foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of +soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the +bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt +all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really +wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to +lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that +may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a +mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit? + +The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have +to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for +these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the +capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure +in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, +are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted; +they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened +by a joke. + +I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in +chairs--the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies very +severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes +to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their +pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in +the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, +they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order +to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying +whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. +Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the +universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they +might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows +_complete_ self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own +interest. + +One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion +that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten +what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in +Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are +places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging +up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing +poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in +_Whitaker's Almanac_. A European, in recommending a place of residence, +will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can +conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a +Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will +tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an +ancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of the +world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook +that strikes the Westerner as barbaric. + +The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet +dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. +They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their +pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military +weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider +efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. +I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the +greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A +Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on +traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to +feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, +the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical +Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his +environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as +delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the +contrast between China and the English-speaking world. + +We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical +camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, +for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the +question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and +therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is +really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the +feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of +this pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time he +has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, +compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the +feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the +thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may +suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations +"progressive." + +There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common +than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form--not a +better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. +It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread +failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore +money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a +means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, +are often content to remain poor. In China, the _tuchuns_ (military +governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole +purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a +suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life +quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose +power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that +such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed +to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin +whole continents in order to win an election campaign. + +The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than +one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the +Great Powers--especially Japan--the harm would be much less than is +done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities +of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are +performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, +and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been +wholly lost in the rest of the world. + +The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign +pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he +might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a +rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech +and a free Press.[96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow the +herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men +still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the +conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the +West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. +Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in +China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few +leading financiers. + +The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China +as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity +in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest +beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if +you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a +Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because +your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute +an offence. + +Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as +industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words +that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. +But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, +which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the +most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are +accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what +is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I +were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer +from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful. +Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall +not venture to decide. + +The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in +their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to +its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be +taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it +is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to +cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his +title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of +several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably +in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was +nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, +without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put. + +Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It +was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu +party in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was +accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most +widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the +students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great +preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when +they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. +In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking +and change the Government almost without firing a shot. + +The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers' +strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The +Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left +its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce +payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, +accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and +police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely +wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in +China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for +revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in +corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to +extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing +the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated +in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the +interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public +feeling. + +Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. +The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize +acutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are +aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to +naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. +They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy +eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its +coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by +developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new +reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts +of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit +tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in +centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and +then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. +Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations +the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects. + +Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for +colonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for their +surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the +Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status +of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be +recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese +derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of +their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their +unrivalled national cohesiveness--in spite of the civil wars, which +merely ruffle the surface--that they can afford to despise military +methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall +have exhausted itself in internecine combats. + +China is much less a political entity than a civilization--the only one +that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the +Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have +perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There +have been foreign influences--first Buddhism, and now Western science. +But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science +will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as +much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had +not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. +What is bad in the West--its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness +to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims--they +see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its +science, they do wish to adopt. + +The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and +literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the +spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who +have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is +needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization +to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like +ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are +not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new +civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to +create. + +So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese +character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad +sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced +so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should +prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as +well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is +less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the +balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, +and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the +Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer +pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. +With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and +callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, +admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible +remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of +China's greatest virtues. + +The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. +They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one +per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other +ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the +Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw +materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those +whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese +would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the +philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions +were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few +dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by +white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and +that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the +efforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their own +consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present +birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are +bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive +through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next. + +Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of +agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. +Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts +to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness +has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of +the problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so +explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, +nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. +The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain +in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. +Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show +that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty; +but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be +said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an +extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy. + +Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that +they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between +rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that +first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the +Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is +involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a +serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese +are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. +Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, +the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous +people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure +torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races +would find insufficient--for example, to conceal the hiding-place of +stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of _active_ courage, +they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their +readiness to commit suicide. + +Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is +hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all +except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. +For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk +of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the +fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I +think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an +honest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as +economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China +than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any +Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more +corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that +changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we +are--which is not saying much. + +I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, when +they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat +sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are +capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of +this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was +a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But +their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this +element in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it +impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of +them becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or +devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I +suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite +of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And +many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic +love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the +West. + +To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the +foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient +civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, +under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American +financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude +imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who +have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty +in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not +obey the laws of perspective. + +The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved; +it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something may +be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is +supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these +qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle +disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be +seen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will force +it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to +which Japan has been driven. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 96: This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish +a very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed +Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, _Review of the Far East,_ April 16, +1922.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA + + +China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of +culture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient +beauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is content +to be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tend +to be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European +tourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is +apt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctive +and non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one who +regards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a +country with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do +not view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquire +what is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interesting +survival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the +first step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher +education, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use and +appreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Western +follies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and +one of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch. + +There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of +the classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a more +intelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditional +study of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in +the eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have +secured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learning +reading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still form +the majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given. +Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the +classical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at +the same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one of +these schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people who +are taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns +one finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which +is very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probably +those who can both read and write form about five per cent, of the +population. + +The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on +modern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old +examination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, has +done much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementary +education. The following statistics showing the increase in the number +of schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's +_China Awakened_, p. 4:-- + + 1910 1914 1917 1919 + +Number of Schools 42,444 59,796 128,048 134,000 +Number of Teachers 185,566 200,000 326,417 326,000 +Number of Students 1,625,534 3,849,554 4,269,197 4,500,000 + +Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil +war, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is +very remarkable. + +There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing +to the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has +been impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small +scale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable +government. + +The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be +only elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the +older texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, +within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest +renaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China +for many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, +even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the +innocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one +almost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the +Vacation--learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern +world, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some +eleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and +against the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the +same as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one +is driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of +specialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that +the ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more +account of modern needs, and give more instruction in science, modern +languages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, +so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China. + +The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the +missionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As +everyone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired +through the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their +own account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual +loss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded +(and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the +surplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American +universities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, +both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts +in China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have +come to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the +Great Powers. + +One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I +saw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), +the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller +Hospital), and the so-called Peking University. + +Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western +hills, with a number of fine solid buildings,[97] in a good American +style, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. It has +an atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a +(Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the +American College President. The teachers are partly American, partly +Chinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the +latter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of +every virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, +exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the +teaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was +thorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American +institutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. +Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the +most skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot +understand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European +language is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful +throughout the Far East. + +The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and +philosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is +commonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards +to America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China +they become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute +greatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty +and technical intelligence. + +The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing +an interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty with +European utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese, +but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy, +though perhaps not wholly successful. The hospital has all the most +modern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the +Standard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use to +anyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical College +teaches many things besides medicine--English literature, for +example--and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order +to produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the European +level, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessary +for medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a sound +knowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to +China, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent. + +The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have +to suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so +at least I was told) had already established a university in Peking, +fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But the +Methodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" to +their schools, so the already existing university had to alter its name +to "Government University." The case is exactly as if a collection of +old-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach the +doctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to +abandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question +of extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can be +abandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it +sometimes gives rise. + +Returned students (_i.e._ students who have been at foreign +universities) form a definite set in China.[98] There is in Peking a +"Returned Students' Club," a charming place. It is customary among +Europeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. +There are occasionally disagreements between different sections; in +particular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite as +equals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression was +that America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other +country; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than +those returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinaman +who wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem +romantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions which +conservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to +those of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it +is useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One is +reminded of the conversation in _Eothen_ between the English country +gentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England to the +refrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels," while +the Englishman keeps saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is +still, thank God, the British yeoman." + +Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole +admirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the +needs of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a national +temperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeans +ultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always +missionaries--not of Christianity, though they often think that is what +they are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Clean +living, clean thinking, and pep," I think an American would reply. This +means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness +for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as +being easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy for +the leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire--that hardened +old cynic--laid it down that the true ends of life are "_aimer et +penser_." Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with +"pep." The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate +both. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save the +lives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worth +saving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether +satisfactory. + +The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established +schools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. +In these, a certain proportion of the teachers are European or +American, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One +can never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by +white men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously +in the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration +of China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. +Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they +are not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other +country, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, +and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility +to exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really +beautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used +to have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking +Government University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for +keenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the +Science Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came +across them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire +Western knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. +They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not +capitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best +among their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, +but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely +Chinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government +University, leave much to be desired from the point of view of +instruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is +not sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough mental discipline. +But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the +profoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. +Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the +Government--loved by the Powers on account of its weakness--has to part +with all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and +plunder the country, as in Europe--for China must be compared with +Europe, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is +unhappily divided. + +The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a +powerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in +1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. +Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement." And what they did was not +merely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):-- + + Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the + Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the + Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to + the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. + For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures + showing them the real situation, internally as well as + externally; but especially by establishing free schools and + maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too + high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also + teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with + the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that + fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. + +One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards +modern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality +between men and women. The position of women in Peking Government +University is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to +examinations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the +university. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective +women teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive +institution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would +horrify most British head mistresses. + +There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary +education, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls +tend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as +the boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet +in Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner +speeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt +co-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter +should receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not +ripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the +sphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having +imagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I +realized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried +out in China. + +Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot +give what Young China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions +of centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European +superstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. +It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that +there is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and +for that free spirit of sceptical inquiry by which they are seeking to +build a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its +best days. + +While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher +pay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many +months. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation +to the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who +clubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The +incident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a +revolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the +teachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them +all that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of +bandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and +European intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may +say broadly that the old traditional education, with the military +governors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for +Conservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions +stand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically +though not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone +stands for intellectual freedom. + +The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by +foreigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire +military strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to +advance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who +quite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That +is why the West regards them as uncivilized. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 97: It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in +purely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and +Nanking Teachers' Training College.] + +[Footnote 98: Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from _Who's Who of +American Returned Students_, a classification of the occupations of 596 +Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items +are: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in +Government service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three +members of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical +practitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and +religious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese +holding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400 +_(ib.)._ This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America +in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese +university students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a +classification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are: +Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22; +natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified +separately), 19.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA + + +China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial +possibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as +nearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the +next few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this +development as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties +are very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will +therefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the +possibilities of the near future. + +We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's +industrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then +the mines, before going on to other matters. + +When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of +Oxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to +them, and did all it could to keep them at a distance.[99] In 1875 a +short line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the +Central Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In +1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was +accomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then +thought that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for +concessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important +line from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a +Hankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far +as Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with +the Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung +Railway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the +south. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the +Yangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and +managed by foreign officials of the respective countries which had +obtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware +that some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated +beyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the +Chinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of +most of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to +realize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem +was how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow +line and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by the +help of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the +hands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow +line was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was +constructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the +big main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the +Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. +The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be +regarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong +enough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more +or less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the +agreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China--five +years hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost +to China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important +railways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of +the situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity. + +Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges--quite rightly, as I +think--the great importance of nationalizing _all_ Chinese railways. At +Washington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and +to concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early +in 1919, he said[100]:-- + + _The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of + the new Republican State is the railway key_.... The revolution + of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of + popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being + carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left + behind a more subtle weapon. _This weapon is the railway_. Russia + with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. + Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited + the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put + into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted + economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this + grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all + intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign _enclave_, + subversive of the Chinese State. _The especial evil to-day is + that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new + technique,_ which ... she will eventually extend into the very + heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and + Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) unless she is summarily + arrested. _At all costs this must be stopped._ The method of + doing so is easy: _It is to have it laid down categorically, and + accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on + Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must + be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; + that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese + citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; + and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered + simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section + by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board_. + +If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this +reform--as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale--will +have been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect +Japan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her +promises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of +Japanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. +Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the +Shantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it. + +It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan +Railway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by +foreigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably +managed. I quote from Mr. Tyau[101] the following statistics, which +refer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027 +kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial +railways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres. +Total, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are +mainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which the first must be +regarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably +recovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer +the importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign +railway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. +Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in +1918:-- + +Name of Line. Kilometres Year Per cent, earned + Operated. Completed. on Investment. + +Peking-Mukden 987 1897 22.7 +Peking-Hankow 1306 1905 15.8 +Shanghai-Nanking 327 1908 6.2 +Tientsin-Pukow 1107 1912 6.2 +Peking-Suiyuan 490 1915 5.6 + +Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less +prosperous. + +I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway +administration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the +evils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed +by different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was +no uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to +another. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially +to open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of +which would probably be enormous. + +Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows +foreign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its +industries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent +of foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far +from satisfactory. Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché at +Peking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards +China's mineral resources:-- + + China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good + supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial + development. To indicate how little China has developed its + marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, + 14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now + 20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer + resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, + produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that + China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an + additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native + methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of + pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel + industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence + it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished + steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony + and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable + progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores + during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its + mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's + welfare.[102] + +The _China Year Book_ for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of +coal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons.[103] +Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000 +tons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident +that great progress was made during those three years, and there is +every reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been +maintained. The main problem for China, however, is not _rapid_ +development, but _national_ development. Japan is poor in minerals, and +has set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of +China. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, +that only industrial development can support the growing population, +which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the +mainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for +imperialism. + +The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at +Shanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for +shipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each +for the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng[104] says:-- + + For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly + supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from + America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited + in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by + virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home + consumption). + +Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs +explanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to +understand modern politics. + +The _China Year Book_ for 1919[105] (a work as little concerned with +politics as _Whitaker's Almanack_) gives a list of the five principal +iron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and +most important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and +Coal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of +the third group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in +sight is estimated by the _China Year Book_ at 50,000,000 tons, derived +chiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per cent. of +iron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as +603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The _Year Book_ +proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the +agreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which +enforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government +undertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to +compel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources." It should +be added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical +adviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be +sold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, +leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.[106] + +The second item in the _China Year Book's_ list is the Tungkuan Shan +mines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district on +the Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work +these mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in +1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of £52,000, and the mines were +transferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation." +These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their +capacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were +sold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. is +$20,000,000, which is considerably more than £52,000. This was the only +one of the five iron mines mentioned in the _Year Book_ which was not +in Japanese hands at the time when the _Year Book_ was published. + +Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession which +was granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be +worked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain +60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan +of operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of +170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of +steel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000 +tons a year." + +The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunction +with the Hengshan Colliery by the railway." I presume it is to be sold +back to China along with the railway. + +The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the most +promising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the +Japanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and +Japanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. +The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of +Penhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine." It will be +observed that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result +of the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The _Year Book_ adds: +"The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka +ironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at +Osaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron." + +It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have +allowed the Japanese to acquire a position of vantage from which they +can only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely +imperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of +their own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their +national independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that +make them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that +the chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order +to be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, +says nothing about iron mines;[107] therefore the old-fashioned Chinese +did not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are +awake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later +to the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue +our survey of facts. + +It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly +agricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are +crops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the +third country in the world, India being the first and the United States +the second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, +but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, +and it is industry that is our present topic. + +To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was +officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since +then no official returns for the whole country have been published ... +but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for the +present number of factory operatives and mine workers."[108] Of course, +the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as +specially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the +wages range from 15 to 45 cents a day.[109] (The cent varies in value, +but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as +industry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. +Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, +the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. +Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent +to which he has come under American influence, as well as that of +conservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young +Chinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped +that the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will +make the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of +America and Japan. + +There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. +There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise +is needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire. + +Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably +develop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in +native hands. + +The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200,000,000 +(630,000,000 taels), and the total imports slightly larger. It is +better, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency +fluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The +tael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its +value fluctuates with the value of silver. The _China Year Book_ gives +imports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and +214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as +577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in +pounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124 +millions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the +foreign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is +increasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how +little the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as +revolutions and civil wars. + +Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways +and mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national +independence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is +obviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new +lines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, +in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire +a power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope +that the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act +upon it. + +In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, +since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and +development by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It +should therefore be enacted that, in future, no sale of mines or of any +interest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the +security of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of +extra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to +accept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its +validity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, +such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear +China, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if +not, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, +it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It +would be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely +Chinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological +and mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the +right (_a_) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (_b_) to +work minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in +spite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers +should be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point +compatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, +except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is +clear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as +opportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible +to say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established +in China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign +aggression. This is a point to which, along with other general questions +connected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last +chapter. + +It is said by Europeans who have business experience in China that the +Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as +modern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially +honest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But +their successful businesses--so one gathers--do not usually extend +beyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or +later through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from +my own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very +quickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with +Confucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in +business methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung +and other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the +highest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The +Chinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to +commerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly +introducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, +every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, +that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout +the next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development +should be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But +that is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese +independence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 99: For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit. +pp. 183 ff.] + +[Footnote 100: _China in_ 1918. Published by the _Peking Leader_, pp. +45-6.] + +[Footnote 101: Op. cit. chap. xi.] + +[Footnote 102: _China in_ 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in +the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated +by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. p. +51.] + +[Footnote 103: Page 63. The 1922 _Year Book_ gives 19,500,000 tons of +coal production.] + +[Footnote 104: _Modern China,_ p, 265.] + +[Footnote 105: Pages 74-5.] + +[Footnote 106: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xiv.] + +[Footnote 107: It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is +nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine +pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure +where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. +Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and +steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton +Sinclair, _The Profits of Religion_, 1918, p. 175.] + +[Footnote 108: Page 237.] + +[Footnote 109: Page 218.] + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA + + +In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint +of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, +in what order, I should advocate in that case. + +To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, +and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China +has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, +because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist +Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of +Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, +because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own +economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was +fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, +though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the +long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing +to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China +becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned +ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to +China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the +Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, +in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of +Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their +own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power. + +The problem is not merely one of _political_ independence; a certain +cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in +this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it +would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had +to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a +nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they +adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and +they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must +be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with +safety. + +First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary--not, of course, the +bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude +which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow +them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated +Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal +tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has +proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to +foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is +capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United +States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong +enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong +enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too +strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. +But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely +necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, +not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western +skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, +political independence will have little value. + +The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of +an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; +(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued +concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the +above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have +to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the +political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are +also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good +government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and +education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the +priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, +unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have +acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to +oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought +to be taken in the above order. + +1. _The establishment of an orderly government_.--At the moment of +writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A +battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is +usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, +the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though _The Times_ calls +him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than +"Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he +wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all +China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, +to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to +depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive +elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force. + +So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best +thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint +programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of +military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice +of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which +all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in +public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, +sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some +powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere +military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in +favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the +scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such +a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous +propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, +and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded +soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the +financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will +not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of +Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not +accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from +them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may +not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it +would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to +raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese +merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich +Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the +Government. + +When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt +that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of +autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few +things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. +Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally +recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more +scope. + +While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed +upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of +Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will +be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country +to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective +decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. +This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very +rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest +failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The +society must make itself obviously the champion of the national +interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to +foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or +condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in +the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and +honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the +respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is +organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political +problems with which China is faced. + +Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign +rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty +Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves +from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was +in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the +Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of +Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in +general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet +Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by +the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's +resources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions +by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable +opportunity. + +2. _Industrial development._--On this subject I have already written in +Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to +consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought +to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to +be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not +State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to +be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not +be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly +government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to +lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. +Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a +monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans. + +Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be +desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State +Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country +which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, +it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the +second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the +foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in +the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital +industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is +perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by +undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent +the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can +acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop +Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening +power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both +oppressed and misled. + +But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change +in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family +ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which +already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at +present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these +requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize +that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State +Socialism must fail. + +For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should +learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I +think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards +the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import +skilled workmen--say from Germany--and cause them to give instruction to +Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be +desired to develop. + +3. _Education._--If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive +Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the +population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a +good in itself, but is also essential for developing political +consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. +The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state +of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary +education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, +in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses +cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, +it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast +population could be borne by the nation without a considerable +industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is +mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for +the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American +millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese +education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why +industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of +education. + +For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be +sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There +is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are +being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed +a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese +educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears. + +Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education +as in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to +have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will +soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too +numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and +mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission +schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to +become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western +civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national +life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes +them more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and +women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans +in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese +are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of +course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates +against national self-respect in those whom they teach. + +Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some +time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American +university. But for the great majority of university students it is far +better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned +students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from +which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A +society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all +really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, +as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students +returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this +difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university +education, but at present the difficulty would be serious. + +To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring +leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be +aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As +regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have +enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill +could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the +requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example +personally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide +culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his +writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. +He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but +by no means a slavish admirer of our ways. + +The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be +needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an +intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be +combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl +Marx. + +The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the +world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is +possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to +develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. +This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the +preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific +temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a +knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical +problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one +due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its +international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, +the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of +famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong +government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties +and the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a +model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to +defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand +Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western +philosophy of life. + +If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, +as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, +embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the +campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps +emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their +material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at +home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the +West achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by +the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but +would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great +military nations of the modern world will bring about their own +destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, +with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If +China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if +Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made +China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of +foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn +aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and +devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better +economic system--then China will have played the part in the world for +which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope +in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see +inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is +realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover +of mankind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 110: An account of a portion of his work will be found in +Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.] + + + + +APPENDIX + + +While the above pages were going through the Press, some important +developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated +Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated +towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of +Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to +be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not +unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in +Chinese politics. + +For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his +intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, +befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in +our newspapers. According to _The Times_, he has pronounced in favour of +the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the +restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the +South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it +in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. _The Times_ Peking +correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares +that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national +interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any +obstructionists." + +On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending +his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground +for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and +is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to +conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. +The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in +the same telegram as follows: + + Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall + be elected by the people; District police shall be created under + District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil + governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to + the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and + paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and + _gendarmerie_, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible + for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall + agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the + Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes + shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a + stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, + the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under + the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries + established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the + people on the land. + +This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of +it will ever be carried out. + +Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been +stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and +Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. +Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that +Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation +than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate +Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a +past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the +Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our +newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely +unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in _The Times_ of May +15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect: + + I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, + which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. + Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms + are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and + opium-smoking are rife. + +Nevertheless, on May 30, _The Times_ had to confess that this army had +won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in +Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions. + +The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived +by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the +victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will +be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped +also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not +be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of +that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, +there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with +him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more +likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There +is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang +for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But +it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still +problematical. + +_June_ 21, 1922. + + + + +INDEX + +Academy, Imperial, 44 +Adams, Will, 94 +Afghanistan, 175 +Ainu, 117 +America, 17, 54, 63, 69, 134, 136, 145 ff., 159 ff + and naval policy, 161-2 + and trade with Russia, 162-3 + and Chinese finance, 163-5, 244 + and Japan, 167 ff. +Americanism, 221 +Ancestor-worship, 39 +An Fu Party, 145, 205, 243 +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 120, 123, 133, 137, 149, 175 +Annam, 52 +Arnold, Julean, 231 +Art, 11, 12, 28, 189 +Australia, 181 + +Backhouse, 49 +Balfour, 152, 153 +Benthamites, 80 +Birth-rate-- + in China, 73 + in Japan, 116 +Bismarck, 112, 130 +Bland, 49, 77 n, 107 +Bolsheviks, 17, 18, 128, 136, 143, 146 ff., 175 ff., 245 +Bolshevism, 82 + in China, 175, 194, 204 +Books, burning of, 24 ff. +Boxer rising, 53, 54, 227 + indemnity, 54, 217 +Brailsford, 166 +Buddhism, 27, 31, 48, 190 + in Japan, 86 ff., 91, 105, 169 +Burma, 52 +Bushido, 172 + +Canada, 181 +Canton, 50, 68, 71, 75, 207 +Capitalism, 179 +Cassel agreement, 69 +Chamberlain, Prof. B.H., 103, 105 +Changchun, 124 +Chang-tso-lin, 68, 71, 77,242, 253 +Chao Ki, 40 +Chen Chiung Ming, 68, 253-5 +Chen, Eugene, 133 n. +Cheng, S.G., 55 n., 65, 134 n., 139 n., 232 +Chien Lung, Emperor, 49 ff. +Chi Li, Mr., 37 +China-- + early history, 21 S ff. + derivation of name, 24 + population, 31-4 + Year Book, 32 + produce, 72 + influence on Japan, 86 ff.,104 + and the war, 134 ff. + Post Offices, 150 +Chinese-- + character of, 199-213 + love of laughter, 188-9, 200 + dignity, 202 + pacifism, 195, 213 + callousness, 209 + cowardice, 210 + avarice, 211 + patience, 206 + excitability, 212 +Chingkiang, 60 +Chinlingchen mine, 234 +Chita, 146, 154 +Choshu, 99, 101, 102, 106 +Chou dynasty, 22 +Christianity in Japan, 92 ff. +Chuang Tze, 8, 82, 188, 192 +Chu Fu Tze, 43 +Chu Hsi, 46 +Civilization-- + alphabetical, 37 + Chinese, 187 ff. + European, 186 +Coal in China, 132 n., 231 ff. +Coleman, 77 n., 110, 132 n., 133 n. +Colour prejudice, 168, 173 + and labour, 181 ff. +Confucius, 21, 22, 24, 38, 187, 208 +Confucianism, 34, 38 ff., 190 + in Japan, 118 +Consortium, 14, 163 ff., 179, 244 +Cordier, Henri, 24 n., 25, 27 n., 28, 30 n., 31 n., 187 n. +Cotton, 76, 235 + industry in Osaka, 114 +Customs-- + Chinese, 55 ff., + on exports, 56 + internal, 56-7 + +Dairen, 123 + Conference at, 154 ff. +Denison, 129 +Dewey, Professor, 69, 224 + Mrs., 224 +Diet, Japanese, 109 ff. +Dutch in Japan, 94 ff., 100 + +Education, 44 ff., 76 ff., 193, 214-225, 247 ff. + statistics of, 215 + classical, 215-7 + European and American, 217-21 + modern Chinese, 221 ff. + of women, 223-4 +Efficiency, creed of, 17 +"Eight Legs," 45, 46 +Emperor of China 22 ff, 39, 83, 88, 205 + "First," 24 ff. +Empress Dowager, 52 n. +Examination, competitive, 34, 44 ff, 76 + +"Face," 204 +Famines in China, 72, 210 +Far Eastern Republic, 140, 154 +Federalism in China, 70, 244 +Feudalism-- + in China, 24, 26 + in Japan, 89 ff. +Filial Piety, 39 ff., 61 + and patriotism, 41 + in Japan, 118, 169 +Foreign Trade statistics, 236-7 +Forestry, 80 +Fourteen Points, 53 +France, 52, 53, 123 + and Shantung, 137-8 + and Japan, 157 +Fukien, 132 + +Galileo, 186 +Genoa Conference, 146 +Genro, the, 91, 106 ff., 128 +George III, 49 +Germany, 30, 53, 109, 138, 172 + property in China during war, 141 ff. +Giles, Lionel, 82 n. +Giles, Professor, 23, 39, 43 n., 49 n., 187 n. +Gladstone, 157, 160 +Gleason, 132 n., 134 n. +Gobi desert, 31 +Gompers, 163 +Great Britain-- + and China, 52 ff. + and Shantung, 137 +Great Wall, 24 +Greeks, 186 +Guam, 150 + +Han dynasty, 27 +Hanyehping Co., 132 n., 232-3 +Hart, Sir Robert, 57 +Hayashi, 133 n. +Hearn, Lafcadio, 99 +Heaven (in Chinese religion), 23, 43 + Temple of, 23, 24 +Hideyoshi, 87, 93, 94 +Hirth, 22 n., 23 n., 27 n. +Hong Kong, 52, 69, 75, 207 +Hsu Shi-chang, President, 44 +Hughes, Premier, 181 n. +Hughes, Secretary, 152, 153 +Hung Wu, Emperor, 45 +Huns, 24, 27, 31 +Hu Suh, 250 + +Ichimura, Dr., 121 +Ideograms, 34 ff. +Immigration, Asiatic, 181 ff. +Imperialism. 82 +India, 27, 29, 48, 119, 120 +Industrialism, 186 + in China, 75, 76, 212, + 226-39, 245 ff. + in Japan, 114 +Inouye, 88 +Intelligentsia in China, 76 +Iron in China, 131, 132 n., 231 ff. + Japanese control of, 232 ff. +Ishii, 135. _See_ also Lansing-Ishii + Agreement. +Ito, 88. 109 ff +lyeyasu, 91, 94, 95 + +Japan, 14, 15, 27, 30, 52, 53, 62, 63, 86-175 + early history, 86 ff. + constitution, 109 ff. + war with China, 113, 122, 130 + war with Russia, 108, 123, 130 + clan loyalty, 118 + loyalty to Allies, 136 + hegemony in Asia, 120 + loans to China in 1918, 143 + Socialism in, 114, 170 +Jenghis Khan, 28 ff. +Jews, 186 + +Kang Hsi, Emperor, 49 n. +Kara Korum, 30 +Kato, 133 n. +Kiangnan Dock, 232 +Kiaochow, 53, 131, 151 +Kieff, 29 +Koo, Mr. Wellington, 58 n., 164 +Korea, 53, 86, 120, 122, 124 +Kublai Khan, 29, 30 +Kyoto, 96 +Kyushu, 92, 94 + +Lama Religion, 43 +Lamont, 165 +Lansing, 144 +Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 134, 139, 151 +Lao-Tze, 43, 82, 187, 194 +Legge, 22 n., 39 n., 82 n. +Lenin, 180, 250, +Lennox, Dr., 73 n. +Literati, 25, 26, 38 ff. +Li Ung Bing, 26, 45 +Li Yuan Hung, President, 140 ff. +Li Yuen, 28 n. +Lloyd George, 133, 140, 157 +Louis XIV., 51 +Louis, Saint, 29 + +Macao, 62 +Macartney, 49 +Malthus, 73 +Manchu dynasty, 30, 31, 43, 64 +Manchuria, 53, 68, 120, 123, 127, 130, 146, 154, 177, 178, 207 +Manila, 93 +Marco Polo, 29 +Marcus Aurelius, 27 +Marx, 250 +Masuda, 93 +McLaren, 98, 103 n. +Mechanistic Outlook, 81 ff. +Merv, 29 +Mikado, 87, 99, 106 + worship of, 98, 103, 168-9 +Militarism, 16, 42, 43 n. +Millard, 134 n., 143, 151 n. +Minamoto Yoritomo, 90 +Mines, 230 ff. +Ming dynasty, 30 +Missionaries, 196 + Roman Catholic, 48, 49 n. + in Japan, 92 ff. +Mongol dynasty, 28 ff., 43 +Mongolia, 29, 43, 120, 147, 154 +Morgan, J.P., 157, 165 +Morphia, 150 +Moscow, 29 +Mukden, 130 +Murdoch, 28 n., 86 n., 101, 107 n. + +Nationalism, 16 +Nestorianism, 48 +Nicolaievsk, 155 +Nietzsche, 84, 194 +Nishapur, 29 +Nobunaga, 94 +Northcliffe, Lord, 77 n. + +Observatory, Peking, 30, 49 +Okuma, 120, 122 +Open Door, 55, 162, 179 +Opium, 52 + +Panama Tolls, 162 +Peking, 30, 34, 52, 72 + Legation Quarter, 54 + Union Medical College, 73, 219 + Government University, 217 n., 222 + Girls' High Normal School, 224 +Penhsihu mine, 234 +Perry, Commodore, 96, 100, 167 +Persia, 27, 29, 175 +Phonetic writing, 35 +Plato, 186 +Po Chui, 195 +Po Lo, 83 +Pooley, 120 n., 121, 124, 128, 133 n. +Pope, The, 29, 169 +Port Arthur, 54, 123, 130, 150, 175 +Portsmouth, Treaty of, 108-9, 125 +Portuguese, 92 ff. +Progress, 13, 196, 202 +Putnam Weale, 32, 33, 65, 143 n., 165, 228 + +Railways, 226 ff. + nationalization of, 228 ff. + statistics of, 230 + Chinese Eastern, 123, 126, 143, 146, 227 + Fa-ku-Men, 124 + Hankow-Canton, 227 + Peking-Kalgan, 227, 229 + Peking-Hankow, 227 + Shantung, 151 ff., 227 + Siberian, 146, 227 + South Manchurian, 124, 125, 126 + Tientsin-Pukow, 227 +Reid, Rev. Gilbert, 134 n., 139 n. 142 +Reinsch, 134 n., 135, 136 +Restoration in Japan, 87, 97 8. +Revolution of 1911, 30, 65 ff. + and Japan, 128 ff. +Rockefeller Hospital, 218 +Rome, 27, 51 +Roosevelt, 108 +Rousseau, 42 +Russia, 15, 18-20, 29, 53, 108, 119, 127, 146 ff., 175 ff. + war with Japan, 108,123, 130 + secret treaty with Japan, 136 + and Shantung, 138-9 + +Salt tax, 59, 60 +_San Felipe_, 93 +Sato, Admiral, 172 +Satsuma, 94, 99, 101, 102, 106 +Science, 51, 80, 81, 186, 193 +Shank, Mr., 69 +Shantung, 53, 127, 131 ff., 178 + secret treaties concerning, 137 + in Versailles Treaty, 144 + and Washington Conference, 145, 151 ff. +Shaw, Bernard, 160 +Sherfesee, 80 +Shih Huang Ti, _See_ Emperor, "First" +Shi-King, 25 +Shinto, 87 ff., 103, 105, 169 +Shogun, The, 90, 99 ff. +Shu-King, 21, 22 n., 25 +Simpson, Lennox. _See_ Putnam Weale +Socialism, 64, 181 ff. + State, 180, 246 + in Japan, 114, 170 + in China, 222, 236 +Soyeda, 144 n. +Spaniards in Japan, 93 +Student Movement, 223, 243 +Students-- + returned, 17, 193, 219 + statistics of, 220 n. +Summer Palace, 52 +Sung dynasty, 30, 45 +Sun Yat Sen, 65, 68, 128, 140, 253-6 +Supreme Ruler. _See_ Heaven + +Taiping Rebellion, 32, 56, 65 +Tai-tsung, 28 n. +Tang dynasty, 28, 44 +Taochung iron mine, 234 +Taoism, 43, 187 ff. +Tartars, 27, 31 +Tayeh mines, 231 n., 232-3 +Teachers' strike, 206, 225 +Tenny, Raymond P., 33 +Tibet, 31, 43 +Ting, Mr. V.K., 73 n. +Tokugawa, 99 +Tong, Hollington K., 143 n., 204 n. +Trade Unionism, 180-1 + in Japan, 114-5 +Treaty Ports, 74 +Tsing-hua College, 217 +Tsing-tau, 131, 151 +Tuan Chih-jui, 140 ff. +Tuangkuan Shan mines, 233 +Tuchuns, 61, 67, 71, 76, 203, 206 +Twenty-one Demands, 131 ff., 233, 234 +Tyau, M.T.Z., 144 n., 215, 220 n., 223, 226 n., 230, 235 + +United States. _See_ America. + +Versailles Treaty, 53, 142, 144,151 +Vladivostok, 146, 154 +Volga, 18 +Voltaire, 221 + +Waley, 84, 195 +War, Great, idealistic aims of, 141 ff. +Washington Conference, 16, 55 n., 61, 63, 127, 145, 149 ff., 178 +Wei-hai-wei, 54, 149 +White men, virtues of, 121 +William II., 122 +Wilson, President, 140, 142 +Women, position of, in China, 223-4 +Woosung College, 239 +Wu-Pei-Fu, 42, 60, 68, 71, 242, 253-3 + +Yamagata, Prince, 115 n. +Yangtze, 52, 132 +Yao and Shun, 21, 22 +Yellow River, 21, 187 +Y.M.C.A., 82, 83, 222 +Young China, 26, 61, 77 ff., 144, 145, 167, 193, 247, 250 +Yü, 22 +Yuan Shi-k'ai, 65 ff., 129, 135 + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Problem of China, by Bertrand Russell + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF CHINA *** + +***** This file should be named 13940-8.txt or 13940-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/9/4/13940/ + +Produced by Brendan Lane and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Problem of China + +Author: Bertrand Russell + +Release Date: November 3, 2004 [EBook #13940] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF CHINA *** + + + + +Produced by Brendan Lane and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + + + + + + +THE PROBLEM OF CHINA + +BY + +BERTRAND RUSSELL + +O.M., F.K.S. + +_London_ +GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD +RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET +FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1922 +SECOND IMPRESSION 1966 + +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN +BY PHOTOLITHOGRAPHY +UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED +WOKING AND LONDON + + + + +CONTENTS + +CHAPTER + + FOREWORD + I. QUESTIONS + II. CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + III. CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS + IV. MODERN CHINA + V. JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION + VI. MODERN JAPAN + VII. JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 +VIII. JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR + IX. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE + X. PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST + XI. CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED + XII. THE CHINESE CHARACTER +XIII. HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA + XIV. INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA + XV. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA + APPENDIX + INDEX + + + The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shu (Heedless), the Ruler of + the Northern Ocean was Hu (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre + was Chaos. Shu and Hu were continually meeting in the land of + Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how + they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven + orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and + breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try + and make them for him." Accordingly they dug one orifice in him + every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.--[_Chuang + Tze_, Legge's translation.] + + + + +The Problem of China + + + + +CHAPTER I + +QUESTIONS + + +A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and +reflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very +puzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe +will not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important +affinities with those of China, but they have also important +differences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, +even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, +since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the +human race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by +the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive +factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it +important, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there +should be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, +even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give. + +The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally +into three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these +groups, however, can be considered in isolation, because each is +intimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the +cultural questions are the most important, both for China and for +mankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less +equanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that +end. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for +practical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations +as for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed +business community has long been a commonplace of novelists and +moralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up +the pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded +as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the +artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to +oneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to +survive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause +misery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all +foreign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of +us? + +China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid +process of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed +in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits +quite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to +strike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the +whole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the +Celestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would +venture to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in +which we are better than old China, and to other respects in which we +are worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be +fruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a +superior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to +exploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior" +race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior +to ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate +knowledge of China, would take the same view. + +In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask +oneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard +to home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I +ultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more +desirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see +realized in the world? Different people will answer these questions +differently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade +a man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be +content merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that +the reader may feel likewise. + +The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not +merely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive +happiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of +knowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry +lists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no +appreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, +incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a +thing which is good and delightful on its own account. The same may be +said, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on +this topic would, however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak +of art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do +not mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of +course these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the +almost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian +peasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates +folk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the +Puritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy +of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we +have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of +us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of +Chinese civilization. + +In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of +good or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has +in promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good +things which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, +also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we +endeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread +oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not +strong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy +by means of their own merits and exertions alone. + +These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in +considering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and +commercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of +certain more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in +China one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a +society which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, +upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for +example, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come +under Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have +secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we +brought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a +life full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite +achievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and +unless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the +less familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed +always make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to +take as a matter of course. + +The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change +is needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable +ultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our +economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if +the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our +civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able +to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a +very splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, +however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The +first danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining +nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more +to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations +which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that +they may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, +into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except +armaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in +China. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with +political and economic questions; and it is through their influence that +dangers arise. + +China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on +the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering +the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan +must count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for +Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. +Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has +ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore +distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or +more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China +may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth +possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may +control China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese +will be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I +believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the +Japanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the +nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and unneighbourly. I +shall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the +relations of China and Japan. + +To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of +Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then +something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, +it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic +relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of +1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of +1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is +possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, +and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan +had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant +foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to +understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation +they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence +the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made +people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to +apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done. + +Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain +what is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost +more important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly +the most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the +resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the +white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only +the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power +in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the +chances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced +nations. + +The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the +conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have +guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it +far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far +Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China +preserve any shadow of independence without a great development of +nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate +nationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say to +patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found +only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world; +it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is +essentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized" +nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their +bombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other +within the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism +has kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being +goaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and +leave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and +rapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a +slender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than +despair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some +tolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that +are worse. + +Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a +psychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, +our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our +imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from +a superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its +own sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has +become somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have +never taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more +indolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally +accepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have +been aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like +China, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has +been governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to +introduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might +have had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not +many) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that +Western push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot +now take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me +far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than +those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of +Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with +our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe +that those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The +Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way of +life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the +world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, +exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency +directed to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this +consummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some +of that wisdom for which it despises the East. + +It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how +profound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks +are attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as +Japan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day after +day, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, +gay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of +everything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understand +and no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us lay +at death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the +indifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of +loud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a +great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed +that none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so +insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the +endless information of the well-informed. + +One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there +were no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of +poplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, and +found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads, +wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled +together surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, others +silently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted up +gnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, +and children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human beings they +undoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to grow +intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knew +that they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a +boat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had +heard--falsely perhaps--that the earth was more generous than in the +country they had left. Some would die by the way, all would suffer +hunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferings +would be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, +unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of +Westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia +is so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planet +are lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the +theorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force them +into actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could not +believe that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of +industrialism and forced labour. + +Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions +of the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a truly +popular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen the +sleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seen +them, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that +patient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely and +unspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiar +intellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics are +inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to +torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or +theory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants, +protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what we +had to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I +heard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the +sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a +terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale. + +It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + + +Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early +history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon +the question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not +composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of +princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or +warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, +whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age +of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age" +mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the +Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks +of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a +fairly high level of civilization--much higher than that of any other +part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, +too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon +its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly +alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive +torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have +inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human +sacrifice; in the Shu-King, however, there is little trace of +superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yue (the latter's successor), were all +occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of +the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state +of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows +what was expected of an Emperor:-- + + He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and + thoughtful--naturally and without effort. He was sincerely + courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these + qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and + extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and + virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the + nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also + regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became + brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the + myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were + transformed. The result was universal concord.[1] + +The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history +is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.[2] There is no reason to +doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier +times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the +Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in +1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of +nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this +time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of +France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at +its lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, each +strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over +subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting +for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which +temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians +always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of +eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention. + +What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which +fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious +prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven +at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous +with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Giles +maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct +translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word +"Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the +latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means +"Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both +terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the +God of the Old Testament.[4] + +As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven" +remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The +Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites +continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in +1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven in +Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual +sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official +survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be +called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never +had any connection with the State. + +The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C., +because with this year begins Confucius' _Springs and Autumns_, which is +a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official. + +One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the +Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one +comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He +acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221 +B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable +for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, +the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The +destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by +many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up +again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang +Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all +China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his +son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China" +is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chinese +put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with +what is now China proper. + +The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as +appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being +reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore +history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong +force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of +the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a +vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not +of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and +radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that-- + + All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own + family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office + of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit + themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian + classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go + before the local civil and military authorities so that they may + be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the + Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses + exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity + to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their + relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, + those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent + to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are + those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture + and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws + and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, + op. cit. i. p. 203.) + +It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The +Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other +hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of +old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to +destroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6] +says:-- + + No radical change can take place in China without encountering + the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then + than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical + change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the + worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was + good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their + children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to + support their contention and these they freely quoted to show + that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the + government to such an extent that something had to be done to + silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on + the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any + rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as + were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or + Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature + under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not + of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, + this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a + number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was + subsequently buried alive. + +This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is +anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship +of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has +a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have +excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, +which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made +progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with +a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary +pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has come +down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was +somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two +years, in 191. B.C. + +After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit +his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206 +B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism--exactly +coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in +Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact +with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.[7] Their +relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well +as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. +Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, +and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little +importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164 +a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.[8] +Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which +stands for Antoninus. + +It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense +prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European +armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to +think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as +ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military +superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are +tempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a mere +delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of +the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,[9] dealing with +the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han +dynasty, says:-- + + The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the + history of the world when they have grouped around the people of + Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the + expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these + voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of + these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the + Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same + time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that + of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who + wrote the history of their little world while they believed that + they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole. + +In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is +liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the +civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if +we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion. + +After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of +disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this +dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest +extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.[10] The Empire +of Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained a +great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis +and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in +China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis +destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When +Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people +were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the +corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, +shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have +their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one +of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have +escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill +any that might emerge.[11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and +Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these +massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of +Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of +causing death were more merciful than those that have been employed +since the Armistice. + +Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through +Marco Polo and Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the +first Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the +Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat +abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital +from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which +still surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory +which is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical +instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this +observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the +suppression of the Boxers.[12] I understand they have been restored in +accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If +so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty +secured to the world. + +Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in +the history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two +successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by +storms, and partly by Japanese valour. + +After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, +and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, +and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until +the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways, +and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having +contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the +pigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution. + +The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be +attributed to any military skill; on the contrary, considering its +extent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and +incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and +were less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a +barren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a +very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after +centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, +conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose +their ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and +went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived +the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of +barbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved +from this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the +white men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is +lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national +independence. + +In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese +civilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of +Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as +long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the +world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with +an almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the +eighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50 +millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is +said to have sunk to about 17 millions.[13] A census has been taken at +various times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of +individuals. From the number of houses the population is computed by a +more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different +methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons +between different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam +Weale[14] says:-- + + The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the + restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million + persons, which is less than the number given in the first census + of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai + Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably + a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the + amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the + toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was + so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the + population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less + stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now, + however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of + the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population + had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the + no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145 + millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, + and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) + it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) + it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk + to 261 millions. + +I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year +Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):-- + + The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations + has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates + of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. + The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the + census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910, + the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the + Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a + Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is + pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as + approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not + individuals were counted. + +The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is +given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population +of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at +various other dates are given as follows (p. 2): + +A.D. A.D. +1381 59,850,000 / 143,125,225 +1412 66,377,000 1760--203,916,477 +1580 60,692,000 1761 205,293,053 +1662 21,068,000 1762 198,214,553 +1668 25,386,209 1790 155,249,897 + / 23,312,200 / 307,467,200 +1710 --27,241,129 1792- 333,000,000 +1711 28,241,129 / 362,467,183 +1736 125,046,245 1812--360,440,000 + / 157,343,975 1842 413,021,000 +1743 149,332,730 1868 404,946,514 + \ 150,265,475 1881 380,000,000 +1753 103,050,600 1882 381,309,000 + 1885 377,636,000 + +These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population +of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year +(_e.g._ 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. +Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21 +millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But +no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increased +from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and +1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or +diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or +any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. +What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than +guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be +about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As +for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume +that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely +that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed +can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former +times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to +be distrusted. + +There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization +which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select +as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet +in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion +among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by +examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system +distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a +stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which is +therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I +have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other +countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each +of the three. + +1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but +symbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: it +means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of +different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no +such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, +catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible; +that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be +written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be +represented by some elaborate device.[15] For these reasons, there is a +movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers; +and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to +take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that +they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other +argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where +reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to +decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the +movement for phonetic writing deserves support. + +There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, +which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which +something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably +traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a +sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the +Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can +be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different +sounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese +characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of +dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, +without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in +Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an +Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the +spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from +Latin. + +The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which +enables it to be a means of communication between different places and +different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to +place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is +more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing +spoken sounds than by one which does. + +Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method +of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably +passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a +symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian +hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic +writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of +the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced +civilization--a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact +that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of +homonyms. + +As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the +mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in +an article published in the _Chinese Students' Monthly_ (Baltimore), +for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological +Problems of China." He says (p. 327):-- + + Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as + a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something + inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The + accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental + formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world + culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a + fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical + users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own + virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical + civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and + inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized + portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the + most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the + same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; + up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient + Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and + their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks + and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially + explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language + which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any + solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened + to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No + other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would + give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do.... + + The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the + alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in + the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final + truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already + protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries. + It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it + represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this + language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the + spirit remains to be determined. + +Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which +is impregnated with Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that +the Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization" +as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to +judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the +distinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt +that this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind +indicated in the above quotation. + +2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social +influence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions +and on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of +Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature. +Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about +whose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have +been less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes +him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics, +which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little +religious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in +the countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and +administered the Empire. + +Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than +to that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical +statesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues +he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed +to secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a +peaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was +essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former +ages. He accepted the existing religion--a rather unemphatic +monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved +a shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to +render as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress +upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the +following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards +our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining +always a due reserve."[16] But reverence for spiritual beings was not an +_active_ part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship, +which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's +neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when +he was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right--for the Chinese, unlike +the Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was +justified if he governed very badly. The following passage from +Professor Giles[17] illustrates this point:-- + + The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by + adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a + punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in + his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his + divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an + example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under + the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the + feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of + the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps + the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... + If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits + are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and + what can the people do but get rid of him?" + +This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout +Chinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent. + +Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the +weakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the system +departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated +against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the +tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted +with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the +Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and +accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China +praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to +construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which +Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit +is illustrated by the following story:[18] + + One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high + level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us + here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has + stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my + part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different + standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will + shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found." + +It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus +and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up. + +Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary to +filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the +indigence of one's aged parents.[19] This form of sin, however, is rare +in China as in other countries. + +The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without +children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no +descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has +made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great +biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to +China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this +respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the +preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization +had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the +Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family +became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen +until our own day. + +Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is +certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, +of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to +the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's +loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a +very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to +militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the +interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing +the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore +family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out +by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe. + +Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code +of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It +taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral +code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that +only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with +personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It +was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more +imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he +must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control--an extension +of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He +must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must +"save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries; +he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love +or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all +his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, +but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the +guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have +occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them +less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not +immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack +your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and +won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette; +so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and +fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in +China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the +scourge it is with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian +ethics.[20] + +Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century +A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust +aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,[21] whose interpretation of +Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall +of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured +Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were +struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and +appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of +drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists +of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but +the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were +ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many +centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion +but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and +practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the +belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all +others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be +very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic +lingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there was +religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable +that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding +ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe. + +3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive +examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and +unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its +hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the +present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book +on _China after the War_, pp. 59-60.[22] After considering the +educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues: + + In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of + moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during + the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the + Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was + composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was + considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that + in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who + were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total + enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high + as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of + "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended + by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public + offices. College training and local elections supplemented each + other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest + emphasis. + + Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never + been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the + introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chue system, + must be held responsible. The "election" system furnished no + fixed standard for the recommendation of public service + candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic + class from which alone were to be found eligible men. + Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the + elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the + competitive examination system in their place. The examinations + were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they + were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the + introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and + stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some + useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese + education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite + of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary + attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in + family education and in private schools. + +Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in +examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, +such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the +Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful +through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was +purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. +The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu +(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects +of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23] +says: + + In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit + of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form + of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This + was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of + Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs," + which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature, + was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, + because after the introduction of the theme the writer was + required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two + members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The + theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five + Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or + any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his + school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of + Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity + with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as + passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. + To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a + man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time + qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was + absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to + recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was + not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect + or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary + development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago + reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely + on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this + rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have + been so long venerated. + +These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no +doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things +that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one +considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was +probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, +the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. +Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the +possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of +administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the +preservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest. +But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away +to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to +perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce +and cruel system which they miscall civilization. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: Legge's _Shu-King,_ p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, _Ancient +History of China_, Columbia University Press, 1911--a book which gives +much useful critical information about early China.] + +[Footnote 2: Hirth, op. cit. p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.] + +[Footnote 3: See Hirth, op. cit., p. 100 ff.] + +[Footnote 4: On this subject, see Professor Giles's _Confucianism and +its Rivals,_ Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.] + +[Footnote 5: Cf. Henri Cordier, _Histoire Generale de la Chine_, Paris, +1920, vol. i. p. 213.] + +[Footnote 6: _Outlines of Chinese History_ (Shanghai, Commercial Press, +1914), p. 61.] + +[Footnote 7: See Hirth, _China and the Roman Orient_ (Leipzig and +Shanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are +allusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. cit., i. +p. 271.] + +[Footnote 8: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 281.] + +[Footnote 9: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 237.] + +[Footnote 10: Murdoch, in his _History of Japan_ (vol. i. p. 146), thus +describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire: + +"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the +illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes +of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign +of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung +(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever +seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of +civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the +most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on +the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines +of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along +these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the +inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the +Hindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and +Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the +Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia."] + +[Footnote 11: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.] + +[Footnote 12: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.] + +[Footnote 13: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.] + +[Footnote 14: _The Truth About China and Japan_. George Allen & Unwin, +Ltd., pp. 13, 14.] + +[Footnote 15: For example, the nearest approach that could be made in +Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word +"Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of +characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.] + +[Footnote 16: Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, _a propos_ +of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following +footnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be +equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to +have meant 'no familiarity.'"] + +[Footnote 17: Op. cit., p. 21.] + +[Footnote 18: Giles, op. cit. p. 86.] + +[Footnote 19: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.] + +[Footnote 20: As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even +more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight." +(Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.] + +[Footnote 21: Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, +and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident +occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles +are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above +the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered +father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are +impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and +the son-in-law's faith revived.] + +[Footnote 22: Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking, +1920.] + +[Footnote 23: Op. cit. p. 233.] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS + + +In order to understand the international position of China, some facts +concerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was +for many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and +fertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. +Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the +beginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of +officials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as +in England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly +religious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was +imported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that +country to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, +but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey +practically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the +seventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. +(What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument +discovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth +centuries Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at +Court, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in +rectifying the irregularities and confusions of the Chinese +calendar.[24] Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the +walls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels +between different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both +China and Japan. + +In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in +China, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a +permanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time +was Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a +patron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens +of his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King +George III is given by Backhouse and Bland.[25] I wish I could quote it +all, but some extracts must suffice. It begins: + + You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, + impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our + civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing + your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent + offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: + the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful + humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. + +He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing +with an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be +gratified. An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for: + + If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills + you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and + code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if + your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our + civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and + customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy + might become, nothing would be gained thereby. + + Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to + maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the + State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... have + no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O + King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater + devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission + to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your + country hereafter. + +He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels +that they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange: + +"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and +lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to +import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own +produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire +produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to +yourselves," the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to +continue. + +He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forget +the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by +intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of +the usages of our Celestial Empire." He concludes with the injunction: +"Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!" + +What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this +document has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the +world, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The +Empire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger +population; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had +not fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by +absorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the +Japanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. +The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the +Great, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of +China, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty +years. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything +needed for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade +upon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things +which they would do better without. + +Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, +namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at +least the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would +not have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is +a museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be +seen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to +impress him with the splendour of _Le Roi Soleil_. Compared to the +Chinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact +that Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and +all the other men who have adorned literature and the arts, does not +make us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and +Robert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by +giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an +Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. +Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung +is absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to +demonstrate this proposition. + +Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese +Government endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with +the cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, +as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and +Scandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on +China, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,[26] a building whose +artistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been +about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that +of Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the +superiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the +river Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at +Hong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British +diplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an +indemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the +French took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under +Chinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to +Japan's complete victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions +would have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany +and Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support +of Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between +China and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the +important rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the +Russo-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution. + +The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in +Shantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of +it; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few +converts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in +Christian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval +base there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, +which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with +the Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese +possession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its +restitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did +not, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the +German Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, +since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. +Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and +to hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the +Boxer rising, which is said to have begun as a movement against the +Germans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in +every respect, the Russians by creating a naval base at Port Arthur, +the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the +Yangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the +policy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door. + +The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans +know about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of +Peking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of +Peking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, +filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a +bare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is +administered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no +powers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and +traitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the +Japanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their +crimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the +Americans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of +communicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of +Chien Lung is completed. + +Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The +Americans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they +still had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on +higher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, +partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. +The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the +friendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is +incalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any +signs of following suit. + +To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is +faced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, +China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which +have been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no +experience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in +later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps +of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers--a +prerogative which every single one of them exercises. + +The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.[27] At +the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty +which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports +and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the +whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a +schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be +calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only +been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.[28] Revision of the +schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in +the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is +practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties +involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with +twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the +tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers. + +When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it +must be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese +the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign +States.[29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no +time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other +commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to +find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no +motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised +free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we +forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But +no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have +abandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act. + +The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for +the sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all +exports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, +and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is +desperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should +consider the tax indispensable. + +There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time +of the Taiping rebellion, namely the erection of internal customs +barriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with +the internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending +goods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the +payment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is +generally less than the internal tariff charges, this provision favours +foreign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of +internal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the +ground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal +customs in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export +tariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But +there were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all +could be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not +chiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should +be added that internal customs are collected by the provincial +authorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies +and civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong +enough to stop these abuses. + +The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the +Chinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the +service, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of +any other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials +is in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures) +there were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000 +were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, +by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties +exceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the +present system. The Chinese have the appointment of the +Inspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to +their country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, +so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern +bureaucracy. So long as the foreign officials are responsible to the +Chinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful +educative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an +efficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical +and intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their +slaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs +has much to recommend it during the early stages.[30] + +At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence +in the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact +that the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue +derivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, +so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of +Chinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the +Customs administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese +politics by recognizing or not recognizing a given _de facto_ +Government. (There is no Government _de jure_, at any rate in the +North.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an +artificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary +instincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal +reform. It means that no Government which is in earnest in attempting +to introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, +which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of +reconstruction. + +There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was +accepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the +security acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the +employment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the +Customs, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, +and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards +the Customs. + +The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to +China. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities +of interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. +The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three +telegrams in _The Times_ which appeared during January of this year. + +On January 14, 1922, _The Times_ published the following in a telegram +from its Peking correspondent: + + It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be + rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a + substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, + while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and + simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the + Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all + records by L1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the + Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to + liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very + few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the + Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a + Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible + prospect of the removal of this difficulty. + +I venture to think _The Times_ would regard the difficulty as removed +if the Manchu Empire were restored. + +As to the "splendid salt surplus," there are two telegrams from the +Peking correspondent to _The Times_ (of January 12th and 23rd, +respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government +artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as +follows:-- + + Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is + happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the + Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet + faithful to the Central Government--the better half went over to + the Canton Government long ago--has dispatched a squadron of + gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if + $3,000,000 (about L400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately + forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the + revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has + been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic + Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for + immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the + traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate. + +The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:-- + + The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a + serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in + my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near + Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of + Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in + the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate + the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and + Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the + Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do + not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The + Reorganization Loan of L25,000,000 is secured on the salt + revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the + department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In + various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, + the local _Tuchuns_ (military governors) impound the collections + and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the + foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so + large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have + considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points + on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is + another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the + amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers + would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any + active form of intervention in this country. In view of the + extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present + interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000 + (L11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been + dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on + January 28th remains unsolved. + +It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting +punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the +Washington Conference should attempt to interfere! + +It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon +themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. +This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a +man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is +expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore +can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the +family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China +realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of +honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe--no +very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with +Western nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese +nationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will +begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for +the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, +but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power for +good in China will be at an end. + +I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did +to China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in +modern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. +Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of +modern Japan--a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is +not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But +before passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social +and political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in +China would be unintelligible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 24: In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining +his attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: +"As to the western doctrine which glorifies _Tien Chu_, the Lord of the +Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly +conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them--a point +which you soldiers and people should understand." (Giles, op. cit. p. +252.)] + +[Footnote 25: _Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking_, pp. 322 ff.] + +[Footnote 26: The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly +built by the Empress Dowager.] + +[Footnote 27: There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. +vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's _Modern China_, Clarendon Press, 1919.] + +[Footnote 28: A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington +Conference.] + +[Footnote 29: If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained +possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the +policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly +satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.] + +[Footnote 30: _The Times_ of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on +Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be +allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did +not deal with the Customs _administration_, nevertheless _The Times_ +assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of +the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption +which it would afford. I wrote to _The Times_ pointing out that they had +confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was +dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not +print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to +conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +MODERN CHINA + + +The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, +because in population and potential strength China is the greatest +nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of +the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been +brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington +Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it +is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts +and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try +to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which +it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, +though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic +development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as +our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we +shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon +China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses +have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason +has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the +Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst +is Japan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own larger +interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan +and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America +stands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. +Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination +by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers +become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very +essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, +internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be +a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only +ultimate solution. + +After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, +namely, the present internal condition of China. + +As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, +decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many +causes led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of +Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a +warlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon +the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails +and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike +compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were +rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This +characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in +common. + +The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but +differences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from the +more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained +inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous +foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, +destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful +people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which +lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have +diminished the population by 150 millions,[31] and was almost as +terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful +whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded +(by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China +by Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising +(1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for +a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. +But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after +the Boxer movement that the revolution broke out. + +The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit +to ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the +Canton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected +provisional President. But the Nothern Army remained faithful to the +dynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its +Commander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better scheme. +He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on +condition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. +Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the Legations, being what is +called a "strong man," _i.e._ a believer in blood and iron, not likely +to be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North +has always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan +Shih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in +the way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he +had every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic +corps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must +be admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of +his policy and methods. + +A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave +place to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine +the permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the +Parliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament +wished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but +he had the preponderance in military strength. Under these +circumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon +overthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament +(which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by +unconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to +a revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After +this, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of +China. He appointed his army lieutenants military governors of +provinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His regime might +have lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, +and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916--of a broken heart, +it was said. + +Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military +governors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government +when his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the +populations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been +civil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to +determine which of various rival generals should govern various groups +of provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but +this has lost most of its constitutional significance. + +The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are +called Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit +depredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. +They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and +administered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally +appointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the +soldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, +and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such +portions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to +surrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the +Japanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be +prolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met +there for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely +civil to the President and the Prime Minister, who still officially +represent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal +Government was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt +treasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, +to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to +Chang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool +of Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to +Mongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he +would undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at +Mukden ever since.[32] + +In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government +of a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. +Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, +succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its +Northern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government +under the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two +provinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a +moment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has +been checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the +neighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes +designs of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.[33] +In all ascertainable respects it is a Government which deserves the +support of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the +_New Republic_, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity +which it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This +opposition is partly on general principles, because we dislike radical +reform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement--of a +common type in China--would have given us a virtual monopoly of the +railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded +with the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the +change of Government has made ratification impossible. The new +Government, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of +them, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or +less similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The +American Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the +British Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have +lost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because +we, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is +vigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement +lapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital. + +The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend +of China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a +mistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in +magnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to +a single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In _The Times_ of +November 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article headed: "The Peril of +China. A dozen rival Governments." But in Europe there are much more +than a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those +of China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in +China, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of +destruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has +been incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. +You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that +you will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being +fought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which +they are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the +inhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the +average, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole. + +It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes +possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing +a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into +provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the +revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was +attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful +working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population +without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in +Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now +favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not +much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty +of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The +Central Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find +the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad +enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But +it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan +without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese +independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find +a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign +assistance. + +It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, +and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of +consolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has +great weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite +possibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, +at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the +others. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been +already mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in +Japanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. +Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is +an able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he +established his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a +blow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to +terms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself +with Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his +authority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see +Appendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a +breathing-space is all that is needed. + +The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few +regions where there are mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking +has nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to +the fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built +round a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far +as I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in +the whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government +employment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and +the work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long +and the pay infinitesimal. + +Seventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in +agriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while +wheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.[34] +The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only +just sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived +in China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to +drought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, +as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned, +foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the +Chinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those +who died of it shared this view. + +Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide +their holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely +sufficient to support himself and his family. Consequently, when the +rainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It +would of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more +scientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by +afforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly +improved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. +But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually +supposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their +families continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of +population, according to many writers, finds full scope.[35] If so, the +good done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of +more children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the +end, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher +standard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And +popular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there +is a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these +difficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of +competent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary +education. + +Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional +life of China takes two forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. +Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have +opened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we +had not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our +intercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background; +one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners +as such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that +intercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but +apparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where +unreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. +The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable +intellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum +of common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether +privately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of +enriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets. + +In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, +with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops +full of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese +part of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the +rich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through +a gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered +beauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and +Sunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, +half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, +spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and +disease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always +made me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life +would not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for +the poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life +brings more happiness to the Chinese than English life does to us. At +any rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do +not think it would be true. + +Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of +Shanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there +is so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of +which is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over +China, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, +is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are +divided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route +from Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which +has long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From +Peking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned +by the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern +bank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it +only runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of +the railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the +importance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong. + +In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower +Yangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of +industrialism. China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are +mostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number +of cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the +employer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern +China the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is +an inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long +hours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it +literally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is +not the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China +will not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and +education enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in +China, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid +and cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible +method by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is +in sight. + +The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that +which it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been +practically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many +centuries the country has been governed by the successful candidates in +competitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of +prestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the +old traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now +teaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and +public opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have +intellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including +Chang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,[36] are, of course, mostly +too stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes +their regime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China--_i.e._ of +those who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at +home--is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for +learning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, +because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their +outlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will +probably be strong enough to regenerate China--if only the Powers will +allow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action. + +It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of +Young China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a +modern education, and I should like to give some idea of their +mentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two +generations: the older men, who had fought their way with great +difficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian +prejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and +colleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded +people ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight +against the family. The older men--men varying in age from 30 to +50--have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of +the rationalists of Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, +painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the +beliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science +and a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and +miraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will give you +some idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in +becoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, +their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. +But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they +have achieved in their own minds. + +It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our +culture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate +Chinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen +among the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization +even when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal +candour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the +industrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When +they become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to +spread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire +the front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings +along the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best." In all this they +differ greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from +America; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were +soaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling +activity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the +prejudices in which they were brought up, they have not taken on a new +set, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to +consider any proposition honestly on its merits. + +The younger men, however, have something more than the first generation +of modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have +retained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the +pioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This +may be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more +than that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with +Western ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them +without a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without +being torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn +Western knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made +the process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still +have reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their +predecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing +practically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese +reverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I +see the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them +practical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in +the directions in which it ought to move. + +There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that +is the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important then +detailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the +Confucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial +society. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and +broadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, +have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical +efficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be +taken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of +some new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can +exterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to +be horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our +god; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee." And +so it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the +opposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing +really necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee, +Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the +British Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestry +in China."[37] In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of +forestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are +suitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (_e.g_. for +railway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that +the floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely +prevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were +reafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most +reforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject +for ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because +Confucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will +be cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory +as it is taught in our universities, and despise such humble questions +as the utility of trees. After learning all about (say) the proper +relations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find that +some Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not +considered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in +the West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally true +everywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students are +most eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial +processes might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our +theoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industry +is already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginning +to be a marked improvement. + +It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook +and that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most +modern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maxims +to replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men's +morals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they +dare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference +of morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, because +we are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes _per diem_. +What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about +government, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the +Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring +the mechanistic outlook. + +Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." I mean +something which exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the +Y.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes all these from the Chinese +outlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean is +the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our +scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. +The essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual who +has this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense of +perception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other +people to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual +is not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously +assailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or other of which he is +too apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the +class-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the +mystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in +their Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind except +as potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the +spread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a +life against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, is +as old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulent +forms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to +protest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a +fable[38]:-- + + Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to + protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, + and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the real + nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them. + + One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of + horses." + + So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and + put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them + by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that + two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and + thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and + trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the + fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them + were dead. + + The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it + round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square." + + The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it + curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line." + + But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and + wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and + line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in + managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with + clay and wood. Those who _govern_ the Empire make the same + mistake. + +Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the +chief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this +fable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane and +tolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of the +West. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to +see whether they "drink water and fling up their heels over the +champaign," and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. +Unlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the +foreigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into +trousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as +a rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of +cutting off the Emperor's head, as other nations do, they left him his +title, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about L600,000), and +he remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his +etiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with +a Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter +you or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature +or a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate +perception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of +pictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk +swooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his +claws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All +these pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one +feels also in their dealings with human beings--something which I can +perhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, +unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing +their best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of +which our Western world has far too little. Together with their +exquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite +extraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton +and cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake +of the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems +translated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley[39] is called _Business Men_, +and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects +in which the Chinese are our superiors:-- + + Business men boast of their skill and cunning + But in philosophy they are like little children. + Bragging to each other of successful depredations + They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body. + What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth + Who saw the wide world in a jade cup, + By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth: + On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability? + +I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth" +would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as +that is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of +solving the Far Eastern question. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 31: _The Truth about China and Japan_, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. +14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (_Modern China_, p. 13) says that +it "killed twenty million people," which is the more usual estimate, cf. +_China of the Chinese_ by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the +population was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt +that 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.] + +[Footnote 32: In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more +subservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by +Wu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 33: The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to +have made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton +Government was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng +Chiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (_The Times_, +April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See +Appendix.] + +[Footnote 34: The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, +especially in Manchuria.] + +[Footnote 35: There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the +birth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether +the birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet +by my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union +Medical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the +average number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while +the infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show +that the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of +statistics, generalizations about the population question in China must +be received with extreme caution.] + +[Footnote 36: I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. +Bland, _per contra_, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. +Contrast p. 104 of his _China, Japan and Korea_ with pp. 143, 146 of +Coleman's _The Far East Unveiled_, which gives the view of everybody +except Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin +reported in _The Times_ recently, but he was, of course, unable to +estimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.] + +[Footnote 37: Printed in _China in 1918_, published by the _Peking +Leader_.] + +[Footnote 38: _Musings of a Chinese Mystic_, by Lionel Giles (Murray), +p. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his _Texts of +Taoism_ in _Sacred Books of the East_, Vol. XXXIX.] + +[Footnote 39: Waley, 170 _Chinese Poems_, p. 96.] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION + + +For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order +to understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know +something of that country, to which we must now turn our attention. + +In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the +persistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the +centuries. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" by +no means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from +Korea in 552 A.D.[40] At the same time and from the same source Chinese +civilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through +the occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won +favour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to +China in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The +Japanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism +nationally they ordered one or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, +with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the +adherents of the traditional Shinto religion.[41] After some +vicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign +religion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than +Shinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief +religion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable +to find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of +peasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods" +(which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism.[42] Probably the +revival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing belief +in that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of the +population. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned, +Buddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto. + +The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to +restore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of +645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the +good old days. What the object was of those who established the +government of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that +may be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and +internal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low +ebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great +feudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government +fell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made +intelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved +imitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. The Chinese +Emperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from +the Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a +vigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so. + +The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of +645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is +set forth by Murdoch[43] as follows:-- + + In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled + on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends + who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for + purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some + of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the + British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they + certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the + four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization + with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the + sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye--for they + were two of this venturesome quartette--have often told of their + rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these + despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan + they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their + effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place + Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world. + +The two students who went to China in 608 A.D. "rendered even more +illustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have +done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked +back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, +and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two +National Doctors." + +Politically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately +following was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and +Richelieu--curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the +sovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. +The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably +with about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, +there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, +but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, +in 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, +but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just +the opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious +mixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies. + +Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems +to see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, +namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China +on the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, +and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which +went on in mediaeval Europe between the Church, which represented ideas +derived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to +preserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, +Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization +over rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in +Japan. + +After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, +but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So +long as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power) +it continued to represent what was most civilized in Japan: the study +of Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve +respect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who +remained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were +so degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it +would have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them +and the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly +from the mediaeval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, +although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even +greater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the +secular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado +and his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of +the Restoration. + +The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the +nominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of +power to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of +their infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some +monastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented +the military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of +the Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title of +the people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun," which means +"Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being the +Ainus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the +form which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto +Yoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But +before long the Shogun became nearly as much of a figure-head as the +Mikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the +actual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This +lasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened +that Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the +Minamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun +himself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished +at the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the +practice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister +and his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, +but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their +successors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter. + +What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the +Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, +originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming +at the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both +ignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted +the future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions +of peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to +undergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of +warlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching +doctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism +became national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became +important feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was +ready to fight on the slightest provocation. Sieges of monasteries and +battles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history. + +The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years' +experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country +completely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and +closely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the +Portuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final +expulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is +instructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought +with them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated +the former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually +no Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were +engaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, +Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed +than were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island +(containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and +were throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing +merchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their +larger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread +of Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and +their guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The +Portuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to +make converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese +began to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the +Portuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping +the Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese had +been able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a +Papal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit +monopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards +from Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican +and Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the +Jesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled +furiously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the +Japanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought +against the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the +extent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their +national independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the _San +Felipe_, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast +of Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his +harbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, +which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000 +crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in +Japan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had +the Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after +trying reason in vain, attempted intimidation. + + He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast + extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him + how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the + sway of a single man.... "Our Kings," said this outspoken seaman, + "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer + _religieux_ who induce the people to embrace our religion, and + when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who + combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not + much trouble in accomplishing the rest."[44] + +As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the +Portuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. +Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with +Japan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, +Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, +Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally +gave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the +Japanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, +they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian +nations. + +Meanwhile, a succession of three great men--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and +Iyeyasu--had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the +quasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of +internal peace which lasted until the Restoration--period of nearly two +and a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central +Government to enforce whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to +the foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between +them had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about +300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to +be subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account +of their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical +position. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began +in 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, has had +great power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during +its rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to +Christianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the +movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may +be, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible +without losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more +anti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in +1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in +the most vigorous terms:-- + + So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold + as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip + himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great + Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with + their heads.[45] + +The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly +cruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political +motives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with +the King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no +foreign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of +Christians against the newly established central power. Economic +exploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart +from political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if +there had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the +power of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese +armies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; the +Japanese had learnt the use of fire-arms; and their knowledge of +strategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest +cities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population +of Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would +therefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any +expedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have +been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. +But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world +showing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. +Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, +where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the +inmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of +European Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their +reports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The +Japanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the +white men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel +convinced that it was unwise. + +For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry's +squadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace +and almost complete stagnation--the only period of either in Japanese +history, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of +fire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy +until they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see +another period of isolation. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 40: The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's +_History of Japan_, The volume dealing with the earlier period is +published by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was +published earlier; its title is: _A History of Japan during the Century +of Early Foreign Intercourse_ (1542--1651), by James Murdoch M.A. in +collaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the _Japan Chronicle_, +1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II +respectively.] + +[Footnote 41: Murdoch I. pp. 113 ff.] + +[Footnote 42: Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.] + +[Footnote 43: Murdoch I. p. 147.] + +[Footnote 44: Murdoch, II, p. 288.] + +[Footnote 45: Murdoch II, p. 667.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +MODERN JAPAN + + +The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the +history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would +have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan +to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is +almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration +in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has +risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great +War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading +statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the +beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with +ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders +and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To +realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining +the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time +of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific +knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in +the Book of Joshua. + +The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have been +duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an +immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so +little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has +brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to +that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to +tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has +synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most +anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for +social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily +interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been +effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than +appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends +to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and +Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people +suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but +this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon. + +Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two +separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially +pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more +analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is +no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to +give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that +country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good +books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative +is McLaren's _Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era_ +1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared +in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course +invaluable; his book _Japan, An Interpretation_ shows his dawning +realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the +cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to +say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan. + +Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the +Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of +his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful +of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at +various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been +in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during +its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, +except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era +was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the +country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the +Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed +Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics +and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces +and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore +first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which +Japan has played in international affairs. + +What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to +power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end +of the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems to +have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy +personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with +contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was +often kept in great poverty. + + Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of + early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the + Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a + Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no + aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were + in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on + their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the + Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to + examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the + Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was + regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the + autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of + the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western + Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing + with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the + throne. + + In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the + relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be + sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by + Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, + throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the + Heavenly Gods.[46] + +What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very +different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado +had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the +ancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogun +for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial +treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never +willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren +once more (p. 33):-- + + The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of + Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the + expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! + Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in + enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific + attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not + be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was + directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, + but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general + unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in + armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years + previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had + been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising + gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the + students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those + men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. + +This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan +down to the present day. + +The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the +West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, +in his authoritative _History of Japan,_[47] says:-- + + + + In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development + most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at + fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the + solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and + facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain + their own unit of social organization, which is not the + individual, as with us, but the _family_. Furthermore, the + resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central + and local, to certain European systems is not the result of + imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is + merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who + overthrew the Tokugawa regime in 1868, and abolished the feudal + system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new + equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe + for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or + twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the + administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan + by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 + A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding + fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten + Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of + officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from + China and established in the seventh century.... The present + administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was + neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor + adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity + that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies. + +The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of +the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the +foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and +secured the support of the country by being the champions of +nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted +which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan +from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the +greatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the Central +Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, +China and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and a +protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and +commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and +worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and +by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation +of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern +Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of +preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little +pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese +and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few +Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called _The Invention of a New +Religion_, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He +points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, +to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very +ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on +obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto +has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as +to suit modern requirements.[48] It is, of course, preferable to +Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not +one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has +been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado. + +Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the +Mikado until some time after the Restoration:-- + + The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its + sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the + beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of + living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been + assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was + the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have + been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long + centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the + Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, + generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. + At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of + the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the + Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling + their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest + against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign + (that of Meiji)--the most glorious in Japanese history--there + have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was + set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in + another. + +This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely +credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of +superstition has gone _pari passu_ with the spread of education, and a +revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the +midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and +instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there +is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler--as absolute as any sovereign +ever has been. + +The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. +Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied +from Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D., +whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to +somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese +pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that +the Romans were descended from AEneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain +again:-- + + The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the + fifth century _after_ Christ, and even the accounts of what + happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. + Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the + certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy + does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient + circumstance. While granting a dispensation _re_ the national + mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of + the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who + strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in + Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will + starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading _Commentary + on the Japanese Constitution_ down to school compendiums, the + absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon. + +This question of fictitious early history might be considered +unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to +believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of +the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought +and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:-- + + Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, + was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it + is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the + popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where + they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change + all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado + descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, + and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims + the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and + constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense + popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and + low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as + public servants, but rather as executants of supreme--one might + say supernatural--authority. Shinto, because connected with the + Imperial family, is to be alone honoured. + +All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese +politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of +the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, +and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented +politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes +miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no +constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of +the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are +omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them +the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have +invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the +Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves +take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and +Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The +Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so +until the Mikado is captured by some other clique. + +From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom +in the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan were +a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists +of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there +is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to +dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly +there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and +making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the +Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and +the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy +in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. +There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and +anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese +industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as +Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed +there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has +saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed +if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of +these occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after +the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of +Japanese politics.[50] + +In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to +impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, +and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The Russian +Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated +men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the +Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it +had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it +would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a +prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed +secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the +restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations +to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, +faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse +the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of +neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, +led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to +alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the +peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they +would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact +resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was +known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The +Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the +indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese +demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed +up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese +announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted +the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus +the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, +because they had been tricked--the former in the belief that it could +yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter +in the belief that the Government would never give way about the +indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, +furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government--of the +nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the +real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision +of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view; +there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could +not have been made without trickery. + +Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in +which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as +democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that +Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, +took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all +their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great +Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the +Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin +with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japan +there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about +25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter +compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than +that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from +pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the +Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not +collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine +must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, +but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of +course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the +Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet +refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be +applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted +temporarily by Imperial decree--a provision which had no analogue in the +German Constitution. + +The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, +it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, +since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. +To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in +conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was +issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the +Constitution as follows[51]:-- + + Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire + of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors + unbroken for ages eternal." + + "By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his + _Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan_, "it is meant that + the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of + the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects." + + Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred + and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is + peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established + at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The + Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent + above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. + He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no + power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no + irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither + be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion." + + Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises + the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary + power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, + prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not + sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The + Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, + makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and + commutation of punishments. + + As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article + 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their + advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." + + Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in + framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of + his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities + belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a + Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the + Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of + State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included + by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is + only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to + the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But + the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open + answers from them before the public, and it may also present + addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions. + + "The Minister President of State is to make representations to + the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to + His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, + every branch of the administration being under control of the + said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his + responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the + other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for + the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint + responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the + Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike + personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one + of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the + Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of + control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the + latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some + countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate + body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct + of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint + responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the + power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme + power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be + approved of according to our Constitution." + +In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first +four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the +Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by +Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen +of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with +introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished +to preserve Japanese independence _vis-a-vis_ the Western Powers, but +did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own +account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. +Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of +the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. +But when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to an +earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The +Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous +at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by +glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and +France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war +against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the +hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government +has never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as the +Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant +international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. +Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was +afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was +powerless to prevent it.[52] His opposition, however, was tiresome, +until at last he was murdered in Korea. + +Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a +consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The +nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two +chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed +towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant +as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the +present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. +An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing +system, but the whole unity and _morale_ of the nation; I do not believe +that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be. +Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal +regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive +element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan +to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact +everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, +industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot +emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the +mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore +the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into +industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing +food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because +Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot +obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with +America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong +navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very +similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy +requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets +requires--or rather, is thought to require--starvation wages and long +hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, most +of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day +and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.[53] Labour organization +is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain to +spread if the number of industrial workers increases without a very +marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of +the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable +of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are +vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism +and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of +myth upon which the Japanese State depends.[55] There is therefore a +likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence--assuming a peaceful and +prosperous development in the meantime--of a very bitter class conflict +between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and +bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with +agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue. + +The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for +the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop +industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control +Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic +interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a +large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for +wage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners +means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial +piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a +continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which +the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with +the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, +there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution. + +From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a +diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent +to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is +fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which +patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to +emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, +involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but +ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be free +thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. +Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that +remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 46: McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.] + +[Footnote 47: Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.] + +[Footnote 48: "What _popular_ Shinto, as expounded by its village +priests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully +selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true +aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of +Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which +disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight." (Murdoch, I, +p. 173 n.)] + +[Footnote 49: The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. +Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office and +Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. +When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on +tho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to +regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme of +party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of +the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but +are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial +Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are +titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments +showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the +great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military +man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom +policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, +albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."] + +[Footnote 50: The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit. +chaps, xii. and xiii.] + +[Footnote 51: _The Far East Unveiled_, pp. 252-58.] + +[Footnote 52: See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.] + +[Footnote 53: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.] + +[Footnote 54: See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour +Movements in Japan," published by the _Japan Chronicle_, 1921, for an +account of what is happening in this direction.] + +[Footnote 55: _The Times_ of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from +its correspondent in Tokyo, _a propos_ of the funeral of Prince +Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:-- + +"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of +expenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which +was introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as +the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last +year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not +render true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the +highest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic +institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that +the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the +resolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the +incident."] + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 + + +Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is +necessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking +of the "Yellow Races," as though China and Japan formed some kind of +unity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead +one to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in +comparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the +Chinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities; +but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very +small. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in the +scale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a +hairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit +the Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan +descent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest +importance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and +Chinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more +important than a common racial origin. + +It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived +from China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as +Chinese, and Buddhism, which is still the religion of the people, is of +the sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which +are the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported +along with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the +irruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different +histories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar +had developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of +the First Emperor (_c._ 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land +empire, having much contact with foreign nations--Annamese, Burmese, +Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an +island kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea +and occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at +war with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal +chivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative +problems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines +of Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China +was still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in +one of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But +naturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that +which befel them in their own country. + +In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue +one finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, +which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised +where conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were +in feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on +the contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire was so vast and +immemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a +different set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and +compromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves +plunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in +developing the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the +situation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been +schooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal +anarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated +the previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like +our thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our +mechanism but dislike our thought. + +From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a +unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and +India contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are +easily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with +modern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely +than in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and +invulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong +as to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if +Russia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German +organizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of +possibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for +power and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal +mentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon +Asiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it +conflicts with China and Russia, which the present weakness of those +Powers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both +are likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the +essential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent. + +It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two +somewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as +the champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the +other hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, +and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are +inefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to +China and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has +inspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of +Korea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a +member of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of +the Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great +Powers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in +Asia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who +happen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in +the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred million +natives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of Great +Britain."[56] While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable +Englishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived +from the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply +an intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates the +intensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may +be, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before +the Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley[57] +quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the +following list of white men's sins:-- + + (1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that + all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization. + + (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, + but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors. + + (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession + is made to them they demand and take more. + + (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races + in greatness and wickedness. + + (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of + everything, will adopt any measures to gain it. + +This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have +supposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be +unlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They +argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as +possible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed +by Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been +equalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his +wildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he +wants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards +Japan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is +to be above the whites, not merely equal with them. Count Okuma put the +matter very simply in an address given in 1913:-- + + The white races regard the world as their property and all other + races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the + role of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they + please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, + and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white + races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, + and woe to them.[58] + +It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that +Japan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the +eminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the +Japanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us. + +The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal +affairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without +first consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had +infringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war +caused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and +decisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to +oppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the +Boxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the +fruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and +France, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for +themselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans +presumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow +Peril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese +war inevitable. It would not have mattered much to Japan if the Chinese +had established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have +constituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for +nothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called +Dairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the +Chinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting +Port Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having +accomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The +Russo-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this +Alliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the +corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, +when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided +that, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, +the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally +inspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the +Russian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from +calling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and +Russia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of +Portsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance +served its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese +war. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to +acquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus +curbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an +Entente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded +with France in 1904 would have been useless, and the alliance which +defeated Germany could not have been created. + +Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia +alone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her +strength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to +greatness was due to our support. + +The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all +interference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called +Dairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. +This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then been +called the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437 +miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen +as the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely +naval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to +Western models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a +treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910 +they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists +with every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be +fully the equals of the white men. + +The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a +monopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was +practically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China +by means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. +Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,[59] which shows how +the South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:-- + +"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed a contract with Messrs +Pauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways +northwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for +the work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan +protested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol +annexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that +'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the +neighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any +branch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that +railway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and +Russia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without +Russian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the +Russian rights, the projected line could not be built without her +consent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in +tone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was +obviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task! + +"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the +clause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to +Hsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to +build the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, +although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were +specificially excluded from participation in railway construction north +of the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British +Note the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and +Chinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the +agreement. + +"Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in +Manchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902 +and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of +the bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from +seeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. +Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but +with no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State +Department at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her +action was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which +assigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway +(South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining +thereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III +and IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is +declared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or +exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty +or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the +second is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct +any general measures common to all countries which China may take for +the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.' + +"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to +build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of +Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not +a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of +Manchuria.' + +"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling +in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such +flagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and +pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since +recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its +subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as +the protest from Tokio.... + +"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men +railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other +projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the +important Antung-Mukden line.[60] The same alleged secret protocol was +used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the +Newchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in +1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with +Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was +construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration +within the railway zone.'" + +Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover +the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung--though the latter has +been nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or +by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired +vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and +have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the +provinces through which they run. + +After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and +agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting +Manchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. +Russia had entered into extensive obligations to support Japan's claims +at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. +Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the +support of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the Far +Eastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international +questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party +aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They +have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, +as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China +politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several +times in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was +obtaining financial support from some Japanese.[61] When the revolution +actually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was +prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems +that the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the +union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. +Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor +of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, +though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of +some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions +of Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation +gives the gist[62]:-- + + It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on + December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, + with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East." + This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese + Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd + categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances + would Japan recognize a republican form of government in + China.... In connection with the peace conference held at + Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a + trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to + Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the + dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the + Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with + the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria + against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for + Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by + Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese + protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining + concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. + Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian + Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of + day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied + their authenticity. + +The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the +Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the +day. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was +strongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as +strongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the +influence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to +make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would +doubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war +came, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told +in a separate chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 56: Quoted by A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policy_, Allen & +Unwin, 1920, p. 18.] + +[Footnote 57: Op. cit. p. 16 n.] + +[Footnote 58: Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.] + +[Footnote 59: A.M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 48-51.] + +[Footnote 60: This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.] + +[Footnote 61: Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.] + +[Footnote 62: Page 66.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR + + +The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is +Japanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but +after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach +in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their +new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The +Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to +have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at +issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time +there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one +side rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely +victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure +possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in +Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending +China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by +the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of +Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse +after the Great War. + +The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have +the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. +But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, +the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military +control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were +displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. +(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung. + +Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China +could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to +turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, +who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese +remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they +presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the +Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented +in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with +Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms +Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese +province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain +specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be +opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted +to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria +and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a +protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for +Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial +enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron +and steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze,[63] where we claim +a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, +that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except +Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that +Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed +by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be +administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely +Japanese in _personnel_; that China should purchase from Japan at least +50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese +arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and +employing Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to +construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan +should have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and +finally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda +in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics. + +These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chinese +independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and +industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British +position in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we +had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands +constituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an +uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action +against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were +explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.[64] He had no +time to find out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret +agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan +wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.[65] By the +terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the +Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan +communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus +definitely breaking the treaty;[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr. +Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles. + +China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured +certain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by an +ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on +the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth +group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.[67] In +this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United +States immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the +agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore +still able to do something to further the objects for which we were +supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In +1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, +it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the +Ishii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the +United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, +particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The +rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.[68] + +I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.[69] +In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing +diplomatic relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the +declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off +diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all +neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in +Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He +induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of +expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, +on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of +declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected +with these events deserve some study. + +In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese +had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, +French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for +reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been +some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should +participate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. +These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of +Japan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear +that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. +When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in +Tokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, +Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as of +paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan +could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient +Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in +the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of +the economic activities of 400,000,000 people."[70] Accordingly the +proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the +Japanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their +sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they +filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing +them of cowardice and military incompetence.[71] + +But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the +situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience +to Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had +always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing +to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic +relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no +_promises_ to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American +Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was +ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were +bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged +China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and +Great Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continued +support of Japan. + +In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was +inviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan +concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. +This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the +assistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital +interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China +from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having +hostile designs against Russia or Japan." The last article provided that +"the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of +the High Contracting Parties."[72] That is to say, the treaty was not +communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of +Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The High +Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting +the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the +prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement," +one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all +Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese +Empire. + +On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to +sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with +Japan containing the following words:-- + + His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the + request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they + will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of + Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north + of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being + understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual + peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims + to the German islands south of the equator. + +The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by +Notes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo.[73] On February +19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian +Ambassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial Japanese +Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace +negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special +interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands +belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." +The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:-- + + The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the + Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the + Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung + and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It + also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese + Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed + before the war in this Chinese province and these islands. + + M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support + to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations + with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. + The consequences in China should be the following: + + First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and + consuls; + + Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave + Chinese territory; + + Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the + ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the + disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and + Portugal; + + Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in + China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she + possesses in certain ports of China. + +The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian +Ambassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:-- + + In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, + under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is + charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it + can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of + Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual + surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung + and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in + the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.[74] + +It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no +_quid pro quo_, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the +previous year. + +After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's +participation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the +hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope +being realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest +ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the +Chinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last +days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished +by the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917. + +Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into +the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has +been one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the +revolutionary movement.[75] If the Chinese had not been interfered with +at this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding in +establishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his +successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine +constitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had +dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was +resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, +and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan +Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his +Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese +Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic +relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue. + +On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It +was President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking +off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; +but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented +a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of +national unity was more important than entry into the war, and +suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What +had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never +have become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by +the Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to +instigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat +Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration +of war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd +George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.[76] The Cabinet, on +May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration +of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to +coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved +impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to +compel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the +Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act +as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of +constitutional government. After these various illegalities, the +military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their +number, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu +Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more +agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, +sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient +unconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to +declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and +against militarism. + +Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the +war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of +the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We +wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living +in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German +trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was +duly carried out--not only public property, but private property also, +so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to +the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till +after the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics in +overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of +hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities +insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew +to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the +Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took +upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the merciless +persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have +been much greater. + +The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of +Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the +belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side +two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to +the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our +operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with +proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be +fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, +after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for +ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet +get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law +and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of +German-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that."[77] The +European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to +enter the war for righteousness. + +We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration +of war. What Japan gained was somewhat different. + +The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, +was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist +Japanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the +war, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality--for +Japan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of +Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal +elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the +Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were +concluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially +published, is given by Millard.[78] By these agreements the Japanese +were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and +Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of +the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and +generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the +excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient. + +After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they +placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,[79] _i.e.,_ +about L25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were +as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of +victory. Unfortunately for Japan, the side on which Japan was fighting +in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies +of Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For +various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until +after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace +negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were +compelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed +everything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have +joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on +this subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the +most interesting in his book.[80] By Article 156 of the Treaty of +Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, +title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung.[81] Although +President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, +America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise +the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles +resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, +encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,[82] refused to sign +the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province +as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to +a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we had +annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in +the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext. + +Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public +opinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 +was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly +ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the +Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu +leaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking +Government has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always +for American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her +position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America might +re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference +was announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a +view to having the question settled before the opening of the +Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory +concessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional +evacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of +England and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the +American Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I +understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with +America. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount +to much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. +On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington +Conference. + +There is a question with which the Washington Conference determined not +to concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great +importance in the Far East--I mean the question of Russia. It was +considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, +to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, +with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. +Their existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in a +quarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselves +in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russia +has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the +Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after +a time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake +Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern +Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is +practically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have +launched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks--Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, +etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in military +occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, +though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire. + +In the early days of the Bolshevik regime the Russians lost Northern +Manchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly +of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of +the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects +with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail +between Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme +annoyance to European business men in the Far East, since it means that +letters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead +of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with +the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is +the reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, +various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and +endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which +led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon +all Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a +war with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the +opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former position +in Manchuria. Already, according to _The Times_ correspondent in Peking, +Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany +combined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda. + +The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger +Chinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have +a good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in +Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As +they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the +agreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset +impartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America.[83] For +America, no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are +economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far +East, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political +freedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage +beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may +become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, +however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, +because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is +treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But +what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet +impossible to say. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 63: On this subject George Gleason, _What Shall I Think of +Japan?_ pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel +mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the +Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people. +The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty +miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. +The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 +feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 +years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained +from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand +miners dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is +capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five +centuries.... + +"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart +of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special +trade domain." + +Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this +matter is given by Mr. Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chaps. x.-xiv. +See below, pp. 232-3.] + +[Footnote 64: See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, _Japan Weekly Chronicle_, +October 20, 1921.] + +[Footnote 65: The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, +_Japan's Foreign Policies_, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.] + +[Footnote 66: On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to +the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China +a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what +purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only +contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was +directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. +Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably +foolish" (_The Far East Unveiled_, p. 73).] + +[Footnote 67: The demands in their original and revised forms, with the +negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of _Democracy +and the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.] + +[Footnote 68: The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung +question are printed in S.G. Cheng's _Modern China_, Appendix ii, iii +and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp. +214-6.] + +[Footnote 69: Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and +official history of this matter. They are: _An American Diplomat in +China_, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; _Democracy and +the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and +_China, Captive or Free?_ by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director +of International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.] + +[Footnote 70: Millard, p. 99.] + +[Footnote 71: See Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 23 ff; +Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chap, v., and Millard, chap. iii.] + +[Footnote 72: Millard, pp. 64-66.] + +[Footnote 73: Reid, op. cit. pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. cit., pp. 343-6.] + +[Footnote 74: See Appendix III of Cheng's _Modern China_, which contains +this note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to the +negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal of +the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea +Islands north of the Equator."] + +[Footnote 75: The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration +of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.] + +[Footnote 76: Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.] + +[Footnote 77: Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, +"Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who +still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything +except money-grubbing.] + +[Footnote 78: Appendix C, pp. 421-4.] + +[Footnote 79: A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an +article on "China's Finances in 1918" in _China in_ 1918, published +early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the +comments appear also in Putnam Weale's _The Truth about China and +Japan_.] + +[Footnote 80: Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese +questions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. +Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case," League of +Nations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's +arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.] + +[Footnote 81: See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's +_Modern China_, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.] + +[Footnote 82: This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's +_China Awakened_ (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix., "The Student Movement."] + +[Footnote 83: "Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest +against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China +Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares +that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel +due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make +demands consistent with those rights" (_Daily Herald_, December 22, +1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian +labouring masses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What +Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the +Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs +of the capitalists.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE + + +The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at +Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the +Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be +dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual +decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their +effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia. + +In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been +brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact +between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general +alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of +America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing +for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The +situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as +regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in +the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem +to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. +It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more +liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of +Wei-hai-wei--a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive +but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, +and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the +terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as +Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that +date. + +One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement +not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified +exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between +America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. +Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring +naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of +the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a +first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo +this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve +the peace with Japan. + +Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision +of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The +foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have +insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the +Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they +desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, +though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one +of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put +their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as +they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels +sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese +importation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy +in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature +of their penetration of China.[84] + +Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and +integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these +are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning. + +From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was +the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end +of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of +Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the +Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, +they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings +in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and +through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse +was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, +and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the +resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of +Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The +Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the +question afresh. + +At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all +their own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the +Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation +with China. This point was important, because, ever since the +Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to +recognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese +Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary +to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered +with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to +the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before +the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between +the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, +was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a +deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, +of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no +longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old +days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some +disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was +roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution +more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would +probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work +of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly +urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less +strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between +China and Japan. + +By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the +private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as +regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the +negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they +would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back +the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of +a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese +refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were +compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid +in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway +was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs +or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be +handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. +Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese +retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic +manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the +other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President. + +It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years +hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years +hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both +Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to +this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have +some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that +case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete +control of the Shantung railway. + +On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than +might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new +international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with +them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary +to consider certain Far Eastern questions _not_ discussed at Washington, +since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form. + +The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at +Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is +secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both +together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will +not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See +Appendix.) + +The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions +in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain +unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check +them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the +Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any +near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have +decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A +conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place +at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the +effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. +But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. _The +Times_ of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian official +accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in _The +Times_ as follows:-- + + The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given + out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen + Conference. + + It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly + expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government + decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place + on August 26th last year. + + The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic + principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of + Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military + establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in + Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on + foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that + the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as + possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. + Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of + the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the + Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis + agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair + Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and + territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be + speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the + affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of + property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be + met. + + The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be + relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had + progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, + would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita + that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable + period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed + the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that + the preparations for the relief of the said division might be + dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate + despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the + withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should + fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops. + + Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out + within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed + arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the + same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by + Japan. + + Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a + sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely + ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought + up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not + only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but + declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to + Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the + Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring + the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government + instructed its delegates to quit Dairen. + +The Russian official account is given by _The Times_ immediately below +the above. It is as follows:-- + + On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with + the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. + Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian + Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, + but when the question of military evacuation was reached the + Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued + Japanese intervention. + + Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the + negotiations _re_ military convention, reproaching the Far + Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The + Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be + signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese + military evacuation. + + On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum + demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an + hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement + with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far + Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far + Eastern territory. _Re_ evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note + promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen + circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. + On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken + up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops + remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th. + +Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according +to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial +will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, +I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communique +it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese +unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all +that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, +which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to +evacuate Egypt. + +It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the +Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese +felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with +at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will +naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of +the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. +This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the +assembled peacemakers.[85] + +It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. +This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. +Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic +capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. +Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their +armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America +look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to +compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent +years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed +coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation +from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending +to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the +authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, +believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that +France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become +anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa +have sown the seeds of future wars--unless, by some miracle, the +"civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 84: See _e.g._ chap. viii. of Millard's _Democracy and the +Eastern Question._] + +[Footnote 85: I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of +the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic +mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more +high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were +communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they +showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies +have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.] + + + + +CHAPTER X + +PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST + + +The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to +guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, +and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will +endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying +the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I +regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively +the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an +attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests +and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86] + +I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the +dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of +peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise +and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The +pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the +optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American +public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, +athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main +ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the +Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, +whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to +explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious +hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western +Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength +of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. +Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his +sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. +This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been +somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard +Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as +it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an +attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England +of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment +than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from +Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors +is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development +is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to +estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United +States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of +idealism. + +Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It +is apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of +live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less +pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the +contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical +philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle +of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are +useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by +any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort +of world. + +All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington +Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the +friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, +hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst +enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power +to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if +there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to +see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the +militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done +in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the +future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state +Japan's case, although, _for the present_, I think it weaker than +America's. + +It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American +policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while +clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American +interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal +to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand +that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that +America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in +having.[87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very +pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the +seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the +cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of +American interests. To take next the question of China: American +ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country +should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The +policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so +rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of +the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal +policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting +a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest. + +In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices +are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight +whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In +the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to +discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed +by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a +discrimination in favour of American shipping. Even if the President +ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least +two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view +of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the +way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and +to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against +"shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is +_always_ honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that +America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial +interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases. + +I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself +with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American +weekly, The _Freeman_ (November 23, 1921, p. 244):-- + + On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an + obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large + banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated + the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in + fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an + emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with + intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious + effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese + Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new + international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese + Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, + together with other obligations already in arrears, and still + others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had + also received the full and energetic support of the Department of + State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were + at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; + having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they + came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to + save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government + would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus + prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American + financial protectorate. + +It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated +negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the +terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very +adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the _Freeman_ +concludes:-- + + If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the + consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, + those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to + take full advantage of the situation. + +There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington +Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the +connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to +establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international +control over China. In the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_ for November 17, +1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I +find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish +international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the +_Philadelphia Public Ledger_: "We suspect the motives which led to the +suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly +oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: +"International control will not do. China must be given time and +opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or +exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing +through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China +must agree. In the same issue of the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_--which, by +the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world--I find the +following (p. 728):-- + + Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The + international bankers have a scheme for the international control + of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a + sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese + Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the + Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the + Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing + this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's + statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks + about resisting the control of the international banks he is + fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the + Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full + opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny." + +Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be +due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had +nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and +one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson." + +I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, +and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European +radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control +reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a +Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, +for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would +be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic +as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, +although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though +this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the +Chinese. + +In the _New Republic_ for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. +Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is +prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was +written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far +East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign +commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good +substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually +increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the +chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the +spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization +for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such +_objets d'art_ as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the +gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one +day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man +throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret +society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. +It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be +told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The +definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good +government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat +dividends to capitalists. + +The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They +have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human +happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if +they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce +something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that +we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will +be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul +of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her +salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When +America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of +intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained. +Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans +recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with +blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is +that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank +God that they are not as this publican. + +So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of +Japan. + +Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that +Japan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not +suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United +States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of +Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only +two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to +fight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and +developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled +on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern +morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was +horrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began +to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured +Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with +the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by +the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good +qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers." + +People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the +intensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought +into contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the +highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy +white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke +would venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated +in this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that +white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese, +is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured +races in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from +retaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general +will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be +re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the +survival of civilizations of a different type from that of the +industrial West. + +The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of +the West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in +its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the +Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine being, +is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular +support for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely +economic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediaeval way. The +morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic. +Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado +is the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of +superstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century +theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe +the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels +promoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in +one sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt. + +Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a +proposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until +it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view +that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially +nationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the +State religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,[88] and +propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto +religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is +not a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism, +Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to +appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is +believed by the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites for +marriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is +considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a +universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,[89] like +the Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples +the priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of +English Archdeacons. + +The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their +sense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but +they have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to +industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful +as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has +hitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any +nation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves our +gratitude. + +The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard +working, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them +have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and +incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means +universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of +quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a +whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest +respect. + +The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of +Socialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are +often theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour +organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In +Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety +of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, +if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a +political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists +resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the +national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but +not so much as Socialists in America--so at least I am informed by an +American who is in a position to judge. + +The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. +By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly +responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They +therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the +Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the +evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to +keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. +Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable +in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real +Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless +the existing regime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the +Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung +but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal +government of Japan would probably have been excellent. + +The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that +the Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that the +Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The +argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States +will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in +the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented +with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then +Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield +in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi, +as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will +lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be +incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, +of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and +the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A +war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of +Japan. + +One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany +in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial +empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the +Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners; +so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused +our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with +America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by +our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, +similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French +sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has +brought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors +largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it +is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons +are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them +further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case +of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed +at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in +Eastern Asia. + +The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, +as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper +passions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; America +believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to +persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an +extension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt +futile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and +culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a +delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, +profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve +their own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and +in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice +is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese +are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the +white man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. +Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic +conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the +Americans. + +Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong +through impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China +the same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then +they could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the +champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, +and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to +them. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do; +they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only +to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore +behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this +same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the +worst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, +they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, +they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible +for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best +Americans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese +policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not +achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a +great misfortune for mankind. + +A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in +itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would +destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to +Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide +militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. +If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will +only become more liberal if the present regime is discredited by +failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the +interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint +diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only +Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate +neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of +actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance +with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an +encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan +has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only +permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese +at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our +Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the +ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform. + +We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency +in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, +millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not +mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still +able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the +Japanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik +propaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the +effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from +Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except +the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of +developing industry without passing through the stage of private +capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are +more and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as +it has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, +for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State, +whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to +federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very +great deal of government, and more control of individual lives by the +authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed +personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all +others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful +practical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is +the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these +reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much +progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the +same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved +successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were +probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. +The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively +Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, +carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less +corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's regime, and who moreover, like +the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of +mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, +adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and +gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon +spent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist regime +under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his +life. + +It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation +develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain +Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control +of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be +useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, +but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America +or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the +supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, +recover the position which she held in relation to China before the +Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an +instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for +centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the +last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long. + +The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way +regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as +much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, +the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be +able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with +Asiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking +nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong +for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, +on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be +desirable In the interests of mankind as a whole. + +What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for +China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. +The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end +some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending +of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of +some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably +quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in +the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in +the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through +years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their +development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference +without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. +Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but +have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. +The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult +one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the +Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we +do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution +suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution +slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely +imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable. + +There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the +Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable +chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the _status quo_ +is to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have made +concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four +Powers--America, Great Britain, France, and Japan--have agreed to +exploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortium +as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will +therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only +people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As +they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set +to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers +are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must +be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish +colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth +of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China +for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of +America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust +magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of +radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by +some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom. + +But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace +and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, +France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so +far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the +peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no +means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous +competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing +the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the +domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the +strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's +interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese +interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for +the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable +government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, +and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will +not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own +railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic +independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the +form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will +keep a _dossier_ of every student educated in colleges under American +control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or +Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard +of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the +United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In +short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to +"God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the +wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give +to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that +which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination +of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be +perfect. + +The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy +competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive +competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeeded +in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced +industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between +workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow +races.[92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap +Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to +white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of +industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an +obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any +person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every +other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per +head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who +either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the +others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an +opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of +the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British +Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial +conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole +question of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble for +centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since +Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this +matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world. + +The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by +means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is +obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except +through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, +China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands +of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into +submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, +attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot +see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result +of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect +that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the +Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and +the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as +the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be +fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive +civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, +the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any +sort would survive it. + +To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big +financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. +No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due +to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But +not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a +few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the +interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic +immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social +interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system +makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to +the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also +to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is +seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by +accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the +present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the +weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of +Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little +freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the +present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is +production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation +produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. +Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in +internal labour problems and in international relations. The development +of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the +Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the +things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs +for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply +these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish +pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will +be regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of the +consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will +cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to +exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not +possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present +American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not +secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only +international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of +revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure +until international Socialism is established throughout the world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 86: The interests of England, apart from the question of +India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, +British interests are allied with American finance, as against the +pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.] + +[Footnote 87: It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington +Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there +agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the +navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy +is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government +has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of +reluctant taxpayers. See _The Times'_ New York Correspondent's telegram +in _The Times_ of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22.] + +[Footnote 88: See Chamberlain, _The Invention of a New Religion_, +published by the Rationalist Press Association.] + +[Footnote 89: See Murdoch, _History of Japan_, I. pp. 500 ff.] + +[Footnote 90: An excellent account of these is given in _The Socialist +and Labour Movement in Japan_, by an American Sociologist, published by +the _Japan Chronicle_.] + +[Footnote 91: Author of a book called _If Japan and America Fight_.] + +[Footnote 92: The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is +illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in _The Times_ for +April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of +shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime +Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp +instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by +black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation +reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and +turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to +blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from +the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not +generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I +deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, +assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a +blessing.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED + + +There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a +close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the +Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact +will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or +whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that +of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the +past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, +Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediaeval Europe from +the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these +cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of +China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case +again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from +us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the +Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear +we are unteachable. + +I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of +the questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three +following chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning the internal +condition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the +hopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult +situation. + +With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I +cannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact +after such a long period of separate development as has marked those of +China and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is +surprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is +not more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth +while to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two +civilizations. + +Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, +which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish +religion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an +outcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and +Galileo as representing these three elements, which have remained +singularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive +literature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more +urbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical +belief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with the +conception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our +nationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power +and the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly +be, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive +also the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been +acquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our +mentality. + +No one of these three elements has had any appreciable part in the +development of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese +painting, sculpture, and music.[93] China belongs, in the dawn of its +history, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia +contributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the +Greeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by +the rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so +the original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow +River. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch +far either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this +similarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little +in common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the +Egyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze[94] and Confucius, who both belong to +the sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should +regard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute +everything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the +differences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and +Babylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do +not think science can, at present, account wholly for national +character. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not +the whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant +individuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, +Mahomet, and Confucius. + +The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the founder of Taoism. "Lao +Tze" is not really a proper name, but means merely "the old +philosopher." He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of +Confucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He +held that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way +or manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that +we ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to +conform to it. "Tao" means "way," but used in a more or less mystical +sense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life." I +think he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way," and +that if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, +like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere +magic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. +But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist +philosophy from the first. + +Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but +his ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more +interesting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one +of freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences +with Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they +contrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the pure +men of old." There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, +because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some +sense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife +in the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of +humour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by +Chuang-Tze's account of Po-Lo who "understood the management of +horses," and trained them till five out of every ten died.[95] Their +restraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with +Western mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature +and art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present +day. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance +of a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so +that Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the +Chinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in +Peking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in +the theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement +at its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor +of a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. +In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due +to the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man +should always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments +(being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate +them in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, +which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue +in their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, +makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at +being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration +for the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of +passion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first +all the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually the beauty and +dignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who +have lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best. + +The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from +the favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that +I am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are +largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern +is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When +one compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of +some other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even +if they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, +is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to +a powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly +has succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners +and perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is +quite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been +provided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the +humblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of +white men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot +demean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard +this as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the +Chinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors. + +There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional +civilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from +India in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a +definite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant +outlook which we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man +adopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity +and Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man +can accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man +may be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is +incompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both +Buddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental +difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any +individual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. +Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It +has mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a +message to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as +natural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive +pessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of +all this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, +wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at +all. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or +religious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of +these two religions in China has been that the more religious and +contemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active +administrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the +official teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were +examined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has +been in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been +lacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western +nations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have conformed very +closely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the +population has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that +subject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations +have had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and +resources. + +Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in +China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other +two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is +practically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but +throughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it +is not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin." +Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been no +science and no industrialism. + +What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization +with the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, +but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to +dissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural +contact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political +and economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural +question as far as I can in isolation. + +There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not +simply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist +Western aggression, but because a very large number of people consider +learning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a +high value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only +of the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that +Western knowledge is more useful. Many students go every year to +universities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or +economics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to +China, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or +politicians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, +especially in the educated classes. + +The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had +ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This +was not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack +of new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the +stimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily +keen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of +libraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human +material. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in +science, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore +the spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the +Church put in its way in Europe. I have no doubt that if the Chinese +could get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within +the next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It +is quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with +fresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the +enthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the +renaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy. + +It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, +that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring +wealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an +ethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. They are +not by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me +that they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them +think there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The +habit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and +some of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they +were looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and +before long they will realize that they must work out their own +salvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults +and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will +make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours. + +The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the +scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just +conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to +see gradually uniting. + +Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production without +possession, action without self-assertion, development without +domination." I think one could derive from these words a conception of +the ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted +that they are very different from the ends which most white men set +before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly +sought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a +philosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to +Germany. + +But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with +Chinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese +practice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, +of course, a great deal of truth in this. Possession, which is one of +the three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to +the heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of +money--not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the +English or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful +men make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny. + +Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and +domination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese +practice. There is much less desire than among the white races to +tyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is +quite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on +which are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the +world could ever be "too proud to fight," that nation would be China. +The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, +showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they +could be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire +freedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may +compel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their +virtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have +been an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is +extraordinarily slight. + +Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the +Chinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a +poet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by +Mr. Waley, called by him _The Old Man with the Broken Arm_, to make a +hero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. Their +pacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that +they do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure--as +their pictures show--in observing characteristic manifestations of +different kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a +preconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which +dominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our +active impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with +us; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The +cultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their +earliest sages write. If one points out to them that this shows how +little progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress when +you already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seems +to a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own +wisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call +progress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable +goal. + +It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West +with what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek +knowledge, in the hope--which I fear is usually vain--that knowledge may +prove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three +motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our +religion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, +and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and +the missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the +world; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese +have no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions are +many, but reason is one," and with that they are content to let us go +our way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different +from those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking +concessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get +their claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good +soldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not +worth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their +reasonableness. + +I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that +Europeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine +ourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we +still practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we +are firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are +immeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation +like the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to +them is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound +mistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is +miserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier +because the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook +than our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, +but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of +beauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In +this respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. +I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but +for that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to +be fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us the indispensable +minimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of +that contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all +the other nations of antiquity have perished. + +When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I +thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn +from them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found +this attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who +go only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese +do not excel in the things we really value--military prowess and +industrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the +simple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than +in the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where +such things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for +our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance +and contemplative peace of mind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 93: See Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 368, and Giles, op. cit. p. +187.] + +[Footnote 94: With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is +of doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three +centuries after his death. Cf. Giles, op. cit., Lecture V.] + +[Footnote 95: Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.] + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE CHINESE CHARACTER + + +There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, +full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be +that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this +opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I +was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have +talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people +would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not +wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle +Oriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an +Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as +many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the +game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is +deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in +London. + +One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of +securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, +both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many +years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a +single Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the +Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their +outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils: +the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the +anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at +first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to +be reformed. + +But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable +misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the +foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of +soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the +bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt +all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really +wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to +lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that +may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a +mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit? + +The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have +to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for +these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the +capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure +in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, +are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted; +they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened +by a joke. + +I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in +chairs--the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies very +severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes +to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their +pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in +the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, +they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order +to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying +whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. +Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the +universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they +might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows +_complete_ self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own +interest. + +One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion +that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten +what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in +Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are +places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging +up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing +poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in +_Whitaker's Almanac_. A European, in recommending a place of residence, +will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can +conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a +Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will +tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an +ancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of the +world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook +that strikes the Westerner as barbaric. + +The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet +dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. +They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their +pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military +weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider +efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. +I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the +greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A +Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on +traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to +feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, +the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical +Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his +environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as +delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the +contrast between China and the English-speaking world. + +We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical +camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, +for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the +question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and +therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is +really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the +feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of +this pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time he +has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, +compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the +feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the +thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may +suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations +"progressive." + +There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common +than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form--not a +better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. +It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread +failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore +money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a +means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, +are often content to remain poor. In China, the _tuchuns_ (military +governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole +purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a +suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life +quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose +power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that +such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed +to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin +whole continents in order to win an election campaign. + +The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than +one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the +Great Powers--especially Japan--the harm would be much less than is +done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities +of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are +performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, +and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been +wholly lost in the rest of the world. + +The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign +pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he +might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a +rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech +and a free Press.[96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow the +herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men +still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the +conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the +West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. +Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in +China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few +leading financiers. + +The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China +as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity +in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest +beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if +you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a +Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because +your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute +an offence. + +Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as +industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words +that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. +But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, +which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the +most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are +accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what +is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I +were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer +from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful. +Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall +not venture to decide. + +The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in +their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to +its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be +taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it +is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to +cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his +title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of +several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably +in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was +nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, +without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put. + +Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It +was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu +party in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was +accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most +widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the +students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great +preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when +they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. +In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking +and change the Government almost without firing a shot. + +The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers' +strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The +Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left +its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce +payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, +accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and +police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely +wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in +China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for +revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in +corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to +extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing +the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated +in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the +interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public +feeling. + +Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. +The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize +acutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are +aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to +naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. +They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy +eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its +coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by +developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new +reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts +of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit +tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in +centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and +then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. +Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations +the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects. + +Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for +colonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for their +surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the +Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status +of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be +recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese +derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of +their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their +unrivalled national cohesiveness--in spite of the civil wars, which +merely ruffle the surface--that they can afford to despise military +methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall +have exhausted itself in internecine combats. + +China is much less a political entity than a civilization--the only one +that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the +Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have +perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There +have been foreign influences--first Buddhism, and now Western science. +But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science +will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as +much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had +not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. +What is bad in the West--its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness +to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims--they +see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its +science, they do wish to adopt. + +The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and +literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the +spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who +have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is +needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization +to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like +ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are +not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new +civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to +create. + +So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese +character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad +sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced +so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should +prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as +well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is +less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the +balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, +and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the +Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer +pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. +With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and +callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, +admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible +remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of +China's greatest virtues. + +The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. +They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one +per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other +ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the +Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw +materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those +whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese +would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the +philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions +were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few +dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by +white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and +that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the +efforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their own +consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present +birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are +bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive +through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next. + +Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of +agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. +Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts +to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness +has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of +the problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so +explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, +nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. +The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain +in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. +Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show +that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty; +but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be +said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an +extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy. + +Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that +they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between +rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that +first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the +Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is +involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a +serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese +are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. +Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, +the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous +people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure +torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races +would find insufficient--for example, to conceal the hiding-place of +stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of _active_ courage, +they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their +readiness to commit suicide. + +Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is +hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all +except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. +For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk +of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the +fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I +think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an +honest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as +economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China +than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any +Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more +corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that +changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we +are--which is not saying much. + +I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, when +they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat +sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are +capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of +this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was +a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But +their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this +element in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it +impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of +them becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or +devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I +suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite +of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And +many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic +love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the +West. + +To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the +foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient +civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, +under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American +financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude +imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who +have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty +in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not +obey the laws of perspective. + +The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved; +it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something may +be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is +supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these +qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle +disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be +seen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will force +it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to +which Japan has been driven. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 96: This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish +a very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed +Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, _Review of the Far East,_ April 16, +1922.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA + + +China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of +culture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient +beauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is content +to be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tend +to be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European +tourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is +apt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctive +and non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one who +regards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a +country with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do +not view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquire +what is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interesting +survival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the +first step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher +education, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use and +appreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Western +follies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and +one of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch. + +There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of +the classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a more +intelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditional +study of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in +the eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have +secured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learning +reading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still form +the majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given. +Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the +classical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at +the same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one of +these schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people who +are taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns +one finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which +is very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probably +those who can both read and write form about five per cent, of the +population. + +The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on +modern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old +examination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, has +done much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementary +education. The following statistics showing the increase in the number +of schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's +_China Awakened_, p. 4:-- + + 1910 1914 1917 1919 + +Number of Schools 42,444 59,796 128,048 134,000 +Number of Teachers 185,566 200,000 326,417 326,000 +Number of Students 1,625,534 3,849,554 4,269,197 4,500,000 + +Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil +war, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is +very remarkable. + +There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing +to the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has +been impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small +scale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable +government. + +The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be +only elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the +older texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, +within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest +renaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China +for many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, +even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the +innocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one +almost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the +Vacation--learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern +world, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some +eleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and +against the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the +same as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one +is driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of +specialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that +the ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more +account of modern needs, and give more instruction in science, modern +languages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, +so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China. + +The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the +missionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As +everyone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired +through the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their +own account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual +loss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded +(and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the +surplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American +universities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, +both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts +in China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have +come to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the +Great Powers. + +One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I +saw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), +the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller +Hospital), and the so-called Peking University. + +Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western +hills, with a number of fine solid buildings,[97] in a good American +style, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. It has +an atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a +(Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the +American College President. The teachers are partly American, partly +Chinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the +latter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of +every virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, +exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the +teaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was +thorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American +institutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. +Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the +most skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot +understand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European +language is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful +throughout the Far East. + +The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and +philosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is +commonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards +to America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China +they become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute +greatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty +and technical intelligence. + +The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing +an interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty with +European utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese, +but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy, +though perhaps not wholly successful. The hospital has all the most +modern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the +Standard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use to +anyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical College +teaches many things besides medicine--English literature, for +example--and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order +to produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the European +level, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessary +for medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a sound +knowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to +China, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent. + +The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have +to suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so +at least I was told) had already established a university in Peking, +fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But the +Methodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" to +their schools, so the already existing university had to alter its name +to "Government University." The case is exactly as if a collection of +old-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach the +doctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to +abandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question +of extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can be +abandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it +sometimes gives rise. + +Returned students (_i.e._ students who have been at foreign +universities) form a definite set in China.[98] There is in Peking a +"Returned Students' Club," a charming place. It is customary among +Europeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. +There are occasionally disagreements between different sections; in +particular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite as +equals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression was +that America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other +country; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than +those returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinaman +who wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem +romantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions which +conservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to +those of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it +is useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One is +reminded of the conversation in _Eothen_ between the English country +gentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England to the +refrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels," while +the Englishman keeps saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is +still, thank God, the British yeoman." + +Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole +admirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the +needs of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a national +temperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeans +ultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always +missionaries--not of Christianity, though they often think that is what +they are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Clean +living, clean thinking, and pep," I think an American would reply. This +means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness +for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as +being easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy for +the leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire--that hardened +old cynic--laid it down that the true ends of life are "_aimer et +penser_." Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with +"pep." The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate +both. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save the +lives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worth +saving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether +satisfactory. + +The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established +schools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. +In these, a certain proportion of the teachers are European or +American, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One +can never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by +white men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously +in the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration +of China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. +Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they +are not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other +country, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, +and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility +to exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really +beautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used +to have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking +Government University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for +keenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the +Science Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came +across them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire +Western knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. +They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not +capitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best +among their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, +but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely +Chinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government +University, leave much to be desired from the point of view of +instruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is +not sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough mental discipline. +But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the +profoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. +Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the +Government--loved by the Powers on account of its weakness--has to part +with all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and +plunder the country, as in Europe--for China must be compared with +Europe, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is +unhappily divided. + +The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a +powerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in +1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. +Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement." And what they did was not +merely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):-- + + Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the + Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the + Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to + the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. + For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures + showing them the real situation, internally as well as + externally; but especially by establishing free schools and + maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too + high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also + teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with + the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that + fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. + +One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards +modern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality +between men and women. The position of women in Peking Government +University is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to +examinations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the +university. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective +women teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive +institution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would +horrify most British head mistresses. + +There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary +education, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls +tend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as +the boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet +in Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner +speeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt +co-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter +should receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not +ripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the +sphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having +imagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I +realized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried +out in China. + +Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot +give what Young China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions +of centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European +superstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. +It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that +there is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and +for that free spirit of sceptical inquiry by which they are seeking to +build a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its +best days. + +While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher +pay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many +months. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation +to the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who +clubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The +incident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a +revolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the +teachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them +all that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of +bandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and +European intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may +say broadly that the old traditional education, with the military +governors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for +Conservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions +stand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically +though not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone +stands for intellectual freedom. + +The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by +foreigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire +military strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to +advance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who +quite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That +is why the West regards them as uncivilized. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 97: It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in +purely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and +Nanking Teachers' Training College.] + +[Footnote 98: Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from _Who's Who of +American Returned Students_, a classification of the occupations of 596 +Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items +are: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in +Government service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three +members of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical +practitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and +religious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese +holding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400 +_(ib.)._ This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America +in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese +university students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a +classification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are: +Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22; +natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified +separately), 19.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA + + +China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial +possibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as +nearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the +next few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this +development as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties +are very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will +therefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the +possibilities of the near future. + +We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's +industrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then +the mines, before going on to other matters. + +When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of +Oxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to +them, and did all it could to keep them at a distance.[99] In 1875 a +short line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the +Central Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In +1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was +accomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then +thought that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for +concessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important +line from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a +Hankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far +as Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with +the Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung +Railway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the +south. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the +Yangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and +managed by foreign officials of the respective countries which had +obtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware +that some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated +beyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the +Chinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of +most of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to +realize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem +was how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow +line and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by the +help of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the +hands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow +line was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was +constructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the +big main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the +Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. +The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be +regarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong +enough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more +or less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the +agreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China--five +years hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost +to China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important +railways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of +the situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity. + +Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges--quite rightly, as I +think--the great importance of nationalizing _all_ Chinese railways. At +Washington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and +to concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early +in 1919, he said[100]:-- + + _The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of + the new Republican State is the railway key_.... The revolution + of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of + popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being + carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left + behind a more subtle weapon. _This weapon is the railway_. Russia + with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. + Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited + the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put + into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted + economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this + grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all + intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign _enclave_, + subversive of the Chinese State. _The especial evil to-day is + that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new + technique,_ which ... she will eventually extend into the very + heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and + Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) unless she is summarily + arrested. _At all costs this must be stopped._ The method of + doing so is easy: _It is to have it laid down categorically, and + accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on + Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must + be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; + that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese + citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; + and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered + simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section + by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board_. + +If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this +reform--as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale--will +have been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect +Japan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her +promises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of +Japanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. +Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the +Shantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it. + +It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan +Railway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by +foreigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably +managed. I quote from Mr. Tyau[101] the following statistics, which +refer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027 +kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial +railways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres. +Total, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are +mainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which the first must be +regarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably +recovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer +the importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign +railway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. +Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in +1918:-- + +Name of Line. Kilometres Year Per cent, earned + Operated. Completed. on Investment. + +Peking-Mukden 987 1897 22.7 +Peking-Hankow 1306 1905 15.8 +Shanghai-Nanking 327 1908 6.2 +Tientsin-Pukow 1107 1912 6.2 +Peking-Suiyuan 490 1915 5.6 + +Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less +prosperous. + +I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway +administration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the +evils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed +by different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was +no uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to +another. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially +to open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of +which would probably be enormous. + +Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows +foreign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its +industries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent +of foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far +from satisfactory. Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attache at +Peking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards +China's mineral resources:-- + + China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good + supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial + development. To indicate how little China has developed its + marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, + 14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now + 20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer + resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, + produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that + China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an + additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native + methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of + pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel + industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence + it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished + steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony + and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable + progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores + during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its + mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's + welfare.[102] + +The _China Year Book_ for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of +coal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons.[103] +Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000 +tons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident +that great progress was made during those three years, and there is +every reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been +maintained. The main problem for China, however, is not _rapid_ +development, but _national_ development. Japan is poor in minerals, and +has set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of +China. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, +that only industrial development can support the growing population, +which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the +mainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for +imperialism. + +The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at +Shanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for +shipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each +for the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng[104] says:-- + + For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly + supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from + America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited + in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by + virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home + consumption). + +Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs +explanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to +understand modern politics. + +The _China Year Book_ for 1919[105] (a work as little concerned with +politics as _Whitaker's Almanack_) gives a list of the five principal +iron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and +most important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and +Coal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of +the third group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in +sight is estimated by the _China Year Book_ at 50,000,000 tons, derived +chiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per cent. of +iron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as +603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The _Year Book_ +proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the +agreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which +enforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government +undertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to +compel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources." It should +be added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical +adviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be +sold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, +leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.[106] + +The second item in the _China Year Book's_ list is the Tungkuan Shan +mines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district on +the Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work +these mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in +1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of L52,000, and the mines were +transferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation." +These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their +capacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were +sold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. is +$20,000,000, which is considerably more than L52,000. This was the only +one of the five iron mines mentioned in the _Year Book_ which was not +in Japanese hands at the time when the _Year Book_ was published. + +Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession which +was granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be +worked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain +60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan +of operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of +170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of +steel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000 +tons a year." + +The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunction +with the Hengshan Colliery by the railway." I presume it is to be sold +back to China along with the railway. + +The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the most +promising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the +Japanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and +Japanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. +The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of +Penhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine." It will be +observed that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result +of the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The _Year Book_ adds: +"The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka +ironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at +Osaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron." + +It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have +allowed the Japanese to acquire a position of vantage from which they +can only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely +imperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of +their own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their +national independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that +make them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that +the chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order +to be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, +says nothing about iron mines;[107] therefore the old-fashioned Chinese +did not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are +awake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later +to the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue +our survey of facts. + +It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly +agricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are +crops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the +third country in the world, India being the first and the United States +the second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, +but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, +and it is industry that is our present topic. + +To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was +officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since +then no official returns for the whole country have been published ... +but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for the +present number of factory operatives and mine workers."[108] Of course, +the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as +specially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the +wages range from 15 to 45 cents a day.[109] (The cent varies in value, +but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as +industry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. +Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, +the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. +Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent +to which he has come under American influence, as well as that of +conservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young +Chinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped +that the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will +make the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of +America and Japan. + +There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. +There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise +is needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire. + +Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably +develop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in +native hands. + +The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under L200,000,000 +(630,000,000 taels), and the total imports slightly larger. It is +better, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency +fluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The +tael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its +value fluctuates with the value of silver. The _China Year Book_ gives +imports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and +214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as +577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in +pounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124 +millions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the +foreign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is +increasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how +little the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as +revolutions and civil wars. + +Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways +and mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national +independence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is +obviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new +lines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, +in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire +a power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope +that the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act +upon it. + +In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, +since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and +development by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It +should therefore be enacted that, in future, no sale of mines or of any +interest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the +security of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of +extra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to +accept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its +validity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, +such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear +China, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if +not, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, +it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It +would be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely +Chinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological +and mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the +right (_a_) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (_b_) to +work minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in +spite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers +should be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point +compatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, +except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is +clear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as +opportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible +to say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established +in China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign +aggression. This is a point to which, along with other general questions +connected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last +chapter. + +It is said by Europeans who have business experience in China that the +Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as +modern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially +honest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But +their successful businesses--so one gathers--do not usually extend +beyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or +later through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from +my own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very +quickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with +Confucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in +business methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung +and other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the +highest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The +Chinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to +commerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly +introducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, +every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, +that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout +the next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development +should be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But +that is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese +independence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 99: For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit. +pp. 183 ff.] + +[Footnote 100: _China in_ 1918. Published by the _Peking Leader_, pp. +45-6.] + +[Footnote 101: Op. cit. chap. xi.] + +[Footnote 102: _China in_ 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in +the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated +by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. p. +51.] + +[Footnote 103: Page 63. The 1922 _Year Book_ gives 19,500,000 tons of +coal production.] + +[Footnote 104: _Modern China,_ p, 265.] + +[Footnote 105: Pages 74-5.] + +[Footnote 106: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xiv.] + +[Footnote 107: It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is +nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine +pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure +where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. +Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and +steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton +Sinclair, _The Profits of Religion_, 1918, p. 175.] + +[Footnote 108: Page 237.] + +[Footnote 109: Page 218.] + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA + + +In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint +of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, +in what order, I should advocate in that case. + +To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, +and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China +has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, +because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist +Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of +Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, +because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own +economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was +fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, +though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the +long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing +to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China +becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned +ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to +China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the +Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, +in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of +Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their +own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power. + +The problem is not merely one of _political_ independence; a certain +cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in +this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it +would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had +to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a +nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they +adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and +they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must +be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with +safety. + +First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary--not, of course, the +bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude +which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow +them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated +Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal +tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has +proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to +foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is +capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United +States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong +enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong +enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too +strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. +But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely +necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, +not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western +skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, +political independence will have little value. + +The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of +an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; +(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued +concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the +above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have +to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the +political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are +also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good +government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and +education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the +priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, +unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have +acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to +oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought +to be taken in the above order. + +1. _The establishment of an orderly government_.--At the moment of +writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A +battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is +usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, +the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though _The Times_ calls +him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than +"Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he +wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all +China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, +to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to +depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive +elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force. + +So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best +thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint +programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of +military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice +of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which +all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in +public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, +sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some +powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere +military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in +favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the +scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such +a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous +propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, +and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded +soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the +financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will +not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of +Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not +accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from +them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may +not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it +would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to +raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese +merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich +Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the +Government. + +When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt +that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of +autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few +things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. +Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally +recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more +scope. + +While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed +upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of +Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will +be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country +to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective +decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. +This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very +rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest +failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The +society must make itself obviously the champion of the national +interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to +foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or +condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in +the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and +honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the +respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is +organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political +problems with which China is faced. + +Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign +rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty +Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves +from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was +in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the +Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of +Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in +general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet +Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by +the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's +resources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions +by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable +opportunity. + +2. _Industrial development._--On this subject I have already written in +Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to +consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought +to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to +be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not +State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to +be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not +be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly +government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to +lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. +Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a +monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans. + +Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be +desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State +Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country +which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, +it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the +second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the +foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in +the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital +industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is +perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by +undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent +the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can +acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop +Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening +power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both +oppressed and misled. + +But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change +in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family +ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which +already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at +present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these +requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize +that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State +Socialism must fail. + +For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should +learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I +think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards +the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import +skilled workmen--say from Germany--and cause them to give instruction to +Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be +desired to develop. + +3. _Education._--If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive +Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the +population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a +good in itself, but is also essential for developing political +consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. +The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state +of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary +education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, +in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses +cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, +it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast +population could be borne by the nation without a considerable +industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is +mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for +the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American +millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese +education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why +industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of +education. + +For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be +sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There +is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are +being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed +a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese +educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears. + +Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education +as in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to +have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will +soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too +numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and +mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission +schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to +become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western +civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national +life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes +them more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and +women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans +in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese +are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of +course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates +against national self-respect in those whom they teach. + +Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some +time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American +university. But for the great majority of university students it is far +better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned +students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from +which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A +society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all +really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, +as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students +returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this +difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university +education, but at present the difficulty would be serious. + +To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring +leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be +aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As +regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have +enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill +could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the +requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example +personally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide +culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his +writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. +He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but +by no means a slavish admirer of our ways. + +The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be +needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an +intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be +combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl +Marx. + +The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the +world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is +possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to +develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. +This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the +preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific +temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a +knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical +problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one +due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its +international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, +the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of +famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong +government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties +and the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a +model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to +defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand +Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western +philosophy of life. + +If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, +as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, +embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the +campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps +emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their +material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at +home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the +West achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by +the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but +would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great +military nations of the modern world will bring about their own +destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, +with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If +China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if +Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made +China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of +foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn +aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and +devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better +economic system--then China will have played the part in the world for +which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope +in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see +inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is +realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover +of mankind. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 110: An account of a portion of his work will be found in +Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.] + + + + +APPENDIX + + +While the above pages were going through the Press, some important +developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated +Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated +towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of +Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to +be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not +unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in +Chinese politics. + +For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his +intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, +befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in +our newspapers. According to _The Times_, he has pronounced in favour of +the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the +restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the +South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it +in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. _The Times_ Peking +correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares +that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national +interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any +obstructionists." + +On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending +his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground +for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and +is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to +conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. +The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in +the same telegram as follows: + + Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall + be elected by the people; District police shall be created under + District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil + governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to + the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and + paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and + _gendarmerie_, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible + for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall + agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the + Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes + shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a + stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, + the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under + the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries + established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the + people on the land. + +This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of +it will ever be carried out. + +Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been +stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and +Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. +Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that +Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation +than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate +Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a +past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the +Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our +newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely +unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in _The Times_ of May +15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect: + + I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, + which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. + Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms + are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and + opium-smoking are rife. + +Nevertheless, on May 30, _The Times_ had to confess that this army had +won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in +Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions. + +The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived +by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the +victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will +be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped +also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not +be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of +that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, +there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with +him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more +likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There +is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang +for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But +it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still +problematical. + +_June_ 21, 1922. + + + + +INDEX + +Academy, Imperial, 44 +Adams, Will, 94 +Afghanistan, 175 +Ainu, 117 +America, 17, 54, 63, 69, 134, 136, 145 ff., 159 ff + and naval policy, 161-2 + and trade with Russia, 162-3 + and Chinese finance, 163-5, 244 + and Japan, 167 ff. +Americanism, 221 +Ancestor-worship, 39 +An Fu Party, 145, 205, 243 +Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 120, 123, 133, 137, 149, 175 +Annam, 52 +Arnold, Julean, 231 +Art, 11, 12, 28, 189 +Australia, 181 + +Backhouse, 49 +Balfour, 152, 153 +Benthamites, 80 +Birth-rate-- + in China, 73 + in Japan, 116 +Bismarck, 112, 130 +Bland, 49, 77 n, 107 +Bolsheviks, 17, 18, 128, 136, 143, 146 ff., 175 ff., 245 +Bolshevism, 82 + in China, 175, 194, 204 +Books, burning of, 24 ff. +Boxer rising, 53, 54, 227 + indemnity, 54, 217 +Brailsford, 166 +Buddhism, 27, 31, 48, 190 + in Japan, 86 ff., 91, 105, 169 +Burma, 52 +Bushido, 172 + +Canada, 181 +Canton, 50, 68, 71, 75, 207 +Capitalism, 179 +Cassel agreement, 69 +Chamberlain, Prof. B.H., 103, 105 +Changchun, 124 +Chang-tso-lin, 68, 71, 77,242, 253 +Chao Ki, 40 +Chen Chiung Ming, 68, 253-5 +Chen, Eugene, 133 n. +Cheng, S.G., 55 n., 65, 134 n., 139 n., 232 +Chien Lung, Emperor, 49 ff. +Chi Li, Mr., 37 +China-- + early history, 21 S ff. + derivation of name, 24 + population, 31-4 + Year Book, 32 + produce, 72 + influence on Japan, 86 ff.,104 + and the war, 134 ff. + Post Offices, 150 +Chinese-- + character of, 199-213 + love of laughter, 188-9, 200 + dignity, 202 + pacifism, 195, 213 + callousness, 209 + cowardice, 210 + avarice, 211 + patience, 206 + excitability, 212 +Chingkiang, 60 +Chinlingchen mine, 234 +Chita, 146, 154 +Choshu, 99, 101, 102, 106 +Chou dynasty, 22 +Christianity in Japan, 92 ff. +Chuang Tze, 8, 82, 188, 192 +Chu Fu Tze, 43 +Chu Hsi, 46 +Civilization-- + alphabetical, 37 + Chinese, 187 ff. + European, 186 +Coal in China, 132 n., 231 ff. +Coleman, 77 n., 110, 132 n., 133 n. +Colour prejudice, 168, 173 + and labour, 181 ff. +Confucius, 21, 22, 24, 38, 187, 208 +Confucianism, 34, 38 ff., 190 + in Japan, 118 +Consortium, 14, 163 ff., 179, 244 +Cordier, Henri, 24 n., 25, 27 n., 28, 30 n., 31 n., 187 n. +Cotton, 76, 235 + industry in Osaka, 114 +Customs-- + Chinese, 55 ff., + on exports, 56 + internal, 56-7 + +Dairen, 123 + Conference at, 154 ff. +Denison, 129 +Dewey, Professor, 69, 224 + Mrs., 224 +Diet, Japanese, 109 ff. +Dutch in Japan, 94 ff., 100 + +Education, 44 ff., 76 ff., 193, 214-225, 247 ff. + statistics of, 215 + classical, 215-7 + European and American, 217-21 + modern Chinese, 221 ff. + of women, 223-4 +Efficiency, creed of, 17 +"Eight Legs," 45, 46 +Emperor of China 22 ff, 39, 83, 88, 205 + "First," 24 ff. +Empress Dowager, 52 n. +Examination, competitive, 34, 44 ff, 76 + +"Face," 204 +Famines in China, 72, 210 +Far Eastern Republic, 140, 154 +Federalism in China, 70, 244 +Feudalism-- + in China, 24, 26 + in Japan, 89 ff. +Filial Piety, 39 ff., 61 + and patriotism, 41 + in Japan, 118, 169 +Foreign Trade statistics, 236-7 +Forestry, 80 +Fourteen Points, 53 +France, 52, 53, 123 + and Shantung, 137-8 + and Japan, 157 +Fukien, 132 + +Galileo, 186 +Genoa Conference, 146 +Genro, the, 91, 106 ff., 128 +George III, 49 +Germany, 30, 53, 109, 138, 172 + property in China during war, 141 ff. +Giles, Lionel, 82 n. +Giles, Professor, 23, 39, 43 n., 49 n., 187 n. +Gladstone, 157, 160 +Gleason, 132 n., 134 n. +Gobi desert, 31 +Gompers, 163 +Great Britain-- + and China, 52 ff. + and Shantung, 137 +Great Wall, 24 +Greeks, 186 +Guam, 150 + +Han dynasty, 27 +Hanyehping Co., 132 n., 232-3 +Hart, Sir Robert, 57 +Hayashi, 133 n. +Hearn, Lafcadio, 99 +Heaven (in Chinese religion), 23, 43 + Temple of, 23, 24 +Hideyoshi, 87, 93, 94 +Hirth, 22 n., 23 n., 27 n. +Hong Kong, 52, 69, 75, 207 +Hsu Shi-chang, President, 44 +Hughes, Premier, 181 n. +Hughes, Secretary, 152, 153 +Hung Wu, Emperor, 45 +Huns, 24, 27, 31 +Hu Suh, 250 + +Ichimura, Dr., 121 +Ideograms, 34 ff. +Immigration, Asiatic, 181 ff. +Imperialism. 82 +India, 27, 29, 48, 119, 120 +Industrialism, 186 + in China, 75, 76, 212, + 226-39, 245 ff. + in Japan, 114 +Inouye, 88 +Intelligentsia in China, 76 +Iron in China, 131, 132 n., 231 ff. + Japanese control of, 232 ff. +Ishii, 135. _See_ also Lansing-Ishii + Agreement. +Ito, 88. 109 ff +lyeyasu, 91, 94, 95 + +Japan, 14, 15, 27, 30, 52, 53, 62, 63, 86-175 + early history, 86 ff. + constitution, 109 ff. + war with China, 113, 122, 130 + war with Russia, 108, 123, 130 + clan loyalty, 118 + loyalty to Allies, 136 + hegemony in Asia, 120 + loans to China in 1918, 143 + Socialism in, 114, 170 +Jenghis Khan, 28 ff. +Jews, 186 + +Kang Hsi, Emperor, 49 n. +Kara Korum, 30 +Kato, 133 n. +Kiangnan Dock, 232 +Kiaochow, 53, 131, 151 +Kieff, 29 +Koo, Mr. Wellington, 58 n., 164 +Korea, 53, 86, 120, 122, 124 +Kublai Khan, 29, 30 +Kyoto, 96 +Kyushu, 92, 94 + +Lama Religion, 43 +Lamont, 165 +Lansing, 144 +Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 134, 139, 151 +Lao-Tze, 43, 82, 187, 194 +Legge, 22 n., 39 n., 82 n. +Lenin, 180, 250, +Lennox, Dr., 73 n. +Literati, 25, 26, 38 ff. +Li Ung Bing, 26, 45 +Li Yuan Hung, President, 140 ff. +Li Yuen, 28 n. +Lloyd George, 133, 140, 157 +Louis XIV., 51 +Louis, Saint, 29 + +Macao, 62 +Macartney, 49 +Malthus, 73 +Manchu dynasty, 30, 31, 43, 64 +Manchuria, 53, 68, 120, 123, 127, 130, 146, 154, 177, 178, 207 +Manila, 93 +Marco Polo, 29 +Marcus Aurelius, 27 +Marx, 250 +Masuda, 93 +McLaren, 98, 103 n. +Mechanistic Outlook, 81 ff. +Merv, 29 +Mikado, 87, 99, 106 + worship of, 98, 103, 168-9 +Militarism, 16, 42, 43 n. +Millard, 134 n., 143, 151 n. +Minamoto Yoritomo, 90 +Mines, 230 ff. +Ming dynasty, 30 +Missionaries, 196 + Roman Catholic, 48, 49 n. + in Japan, 92 ff. +Mongol dynasty, 28 ff., 43 +Mongolia, 29, 43, 120, 147, 154 +Morgan, J.P., 157, 165 +Morphia, 150 +Moscow, 29 +Mukden, 130 +Murdoch, 28 n., 86 n., 101, 107 n. + +Nationalism, 16 +Nestorianism, 48 +Nicolaievsk, 155 +Nietzsche, 84, 194 +Nishapur, 29 +Nobunaga, 94 +Northcliffe, Lord, 77 n. + +Observatory, Peking, 30, 49 +Okuma, 120, 122 +Open Door, 55, 162, 179 +Opium, 52 + +Panama Tolls, 162 +Peking, 30, 34, 52, 72 + Legation Quarter, 54 + Union Medical College, 73, 219 + Government University, 217 n., 222 + Girls' High Normal School, 224 +Penhsihu mine, 234 +Perry, Commodore, 96, 100, 167 +Persia, 27, 29, 175 +Phonetic writing, 35 +Plato, 186 +Po Chui, 195 +Po Lo, 83 +Pooley, 120 n., 121, 124, 128, 133 n. +Pope, The, 29, 169 +Port Arthur, 54, 123, 130, 150, 175 +Portsmouth, Treaty of, 108-9, 125 +Portuguese, 92 ff. +Progress, 13, 196, 202 +Putnam Weale, 32, 33, 65, 143 n., 165, 228 + +Railways, 226 ff. + nationalization of, 228 ff. + statistics of, 230 + Chinese Eastern, 123, 126, 143, 146, 227 + Fa-ku-Men, 124 + Hankow-Canton, 227 + Peking-Kalgan, 227, 229 + Peking-Hankow, 227 + Shantung, 151 ff., 227 + Siberian, 146, 227 + South Manchurian, 124, 125, 126 + Tientsin-Pukow, 227 +Reid, Rev. Gilbert, 134 n., 139 n. 142 +Reinsch, 134 n., 135, 136 +Restoration in Japan, 87, 97 8. +Revolution of 1911, 30, 65 ff. + and Japan, 128 ff. +Rockefeller Hospital, 218 +Rome, 27, 51 +Roosevelt, 108 +Rousseau, 42 +Russia, 15, 18-20, 29, 53, 108, 119, 127, 146 ff., 175 ff. + war with Japan, 108,123, 130 + secret treaty with Japan, 136 + and Shantung, 138-9 + +Salt tax, 59, 60 +_San Felipe_, 93 +Sato, Admiral, 172 +Satsuma, 94, 99, 101, 102, 106 +Science, 51, 80, 81, 186, 193 +Shank, Mr., 69 +Shantung, 53, 127, 131 ff., 178 + secret treaties concerning, 137 + in Versailles Treaty, 144 + and Washington Conference, 145, 151 ff. +Shaw, Bernard, 160 +Sherfesee, 80 +Shih Huang Ti, _See_ Emperor, "First" +Shi-King, 25 +Shinto, 87 ff., 103, 105, 169 +Shogun, The, 90, 99 ff. +Shu-King, 21, 22 n., 25 +Simpson, Lennox. _See_ Putnam Weale +Socialism, 64, 181 ff. + State, 180, 246 + in Japan, 114, 170 + in China, 222, 236 +Soyeda, 144 n. +Spaniards in Japan, 93 +Student Movement, 223, 243 +Students-- + returned, 17, 193, 219 + statistics of, 220 n. +Summer Palace, 52 +Sung dynasty, 30, 45 +Sun Yat Sen, 65, 68, 128, 140, 253-6 +Supreme Ruler. _See_ Heaven + +Taiping Rebellion, 32, 56, 65 +Tai-tsung, 28 n. +Tang dynasty, 28, 44 +Taochung iron mine, 234 +Taoism, 43, 187 ff. +Tartars, 27, 31 +Tayeh mines, 231 n., 232-3 +Teachers' strike, 206, 225 +Tenny, Raymond P., 33 +Tibet, 31, 43 +Ting, Mr. V.K., 73 n. +Tokugawa, 99 +Tong, Hollington K., 143 n., 204 n. +Trade Unionism, 180-1 + in Japan, 114-5 +Treaty Ports, 74 +Tsing-hua College, 217 +Tsing-tau, 131, 151 +Tuan Chih-jui, 140 ff. +Tuangkuan Shan mines, 233 +Tuchuns, 61, 67, 71, 76, 203, 206 +Twenty-one Demands, 131 ff., 233, 234 +Tyau, M.T.Z., 144 n., 215, 220 n., 223, 226 n., 230, 235 + +United States. _See_ America. + +Versailles Treaty, 53, 142, 144,151 +Vladivostok, 146, 154 +Volga, 18 +Voltaire, 221 + +Waley, 84, 195 +War, Great, idealistic aims of, 141 ff. +Washington Conference, 16, 55 n., 61, 63, 127, 145, 149 ff., 178 +Wei-hai-wei, 54, 149 +White men, virtues of, 121 +William II., 122 +Wilson, President, 140, 142 +Women, position of, in China, 223-4 +Woosung College, 239 +Wu-Pei-Fu, 42, 60, 68, 71, 242, 253-3 + +Yamagata, Prince, 115 n. +Yangtze, 52, 132 +Yao and Shun, 21, 22 +Yellow River, 21, 187 +Y.M.C.A., 82, 83, 222 +Young China, 26, 61, 77 ff., 144, 145, 167, 193, 247, 250 +Yue, 22 +Yuan Shi-k'ai, 65 ff., 129, 135 + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Problem of China, by Bertrand Russell + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF CHINA *** + +***** This file should be named 13940.txt or 13940.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/9/4/13940/ + +Produced by Brendan Lane and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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