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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/11895-0.txt b/11895-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe4c35f --- /dev/null +++ b/11895-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3353 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 11895 *** + +PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR + + +BY + +NORMAN ANGELL + + +Author of "The Great Illusion" + + +1912 + + + + +PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR + +By NORMAN ANGELL, + +Author of "The Great Illusion." + +1912 + + + + +THE TEXT OF THIS BOOK. + + + Whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the powers, or sit in + sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no consequence at the + present moment.... + + We have sometimes been assured by persons who profess to know that + the danger of war has become an illusion.... Well, here is a war + which has broken out in spite of all that rulers and diplomatists + could do to prevent it, a war in which the Press has had no part, a + war which the whole force of the money power has been subtly and + steadfastly directed to prevent, which has come upon us, not through + the ignorance or credulity of the people, but, on the contrary, + through their knowledge of their history and their destiny, and + through their intense realisation of their wrongs and of their + duties, as they conceived them, a war which from all these causes + has burst upon us with all the force of a spontaneous explosion, and + which in strife and destruction has carried all before it. Face to + face with this manifestation, who is the man bold enough to say that + force is never a remedy? Who is the man who is foolish enough to say + that martial virtues do not play a vital part in the health and + honour of every people? (Cheers.) Who is the man who is vain enough + to suppose that the long antagonisms of history and of time can in + all circumstances be adjusted by the smooth and superficial + conventions of politicians and ambassadors?--MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL + at Sheffield. + + Mr. Norman Angell's theory was one to enable the citizens of this + country to sleep quietly, and to lull into false security the + citizens of all great countries. That is undoubtedly the reason why + he met with so much success.... It was a very comfortable theory for + those nations which have grown rich and whose ideals and initiative + have been sapped by over much prosperity. But the great delusion of + Norman Angell, which led to the writing of "The Great Illusion," has + been dispelled for ever by the Balkan League. In this connection it + is of value to quote the words of Mr. Winston Churchill, which give + very adequately the reality as opposed to theory.--_The Review of + Reviews_, from an article on "The Débâcle of Norman Angell." + +And an odd score of like pronouncements from newspapers and public men +since the outbreak of the Balkan War. + +The interrogations they imply have been put definitely in the first +chapter of this book; the replies to those questions summarised in that +chapter and elaborated in the others. + + + + +_The "key" to this book and the summary of its arguments are contained +in Chapter I. (pp. 7-12)_ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +I. The Questions and their Answers + +II. "Peace" and "War" in the Balkans + +III. Economic Causes in the Balkan War + +IV. Turkish Ideals in our Political Thought + +V. Our Responsibility for Balkan Wars + +VI. Pacifism, Defence, and the "Impossibility of War" + +VII. "Theories" False and True; their Role in European Politics + +VIII. What Shall we DO? + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWER. + + +CHAPTER II. + +"PEACE" AND "WAR" IN THE BALKANS. + +"Peace" in the Balkans under the Turkish System--The inadequacy of our +terms--The repulsion of the Turkish invasion--The Christian effort to +bring the reign of force and conquest to an end--The difference between +action designed to settle relationship on force and counter action +designed to prevent such settlement--The force of the policeman and the +force of the brigand--The failure of conquest as exemplified by the +Turk--Will the Balkan peoples prove Pacifist or Bellicist; adopt the +Turkish or the Christian System? + + +CHAPTER III. + +ECONOMICS AND THE BALKAN WAR. + +The "economic system" of the Turk--The Turkish "Trade of Conquest" as a +cause of this war--Racial and Religious hatred of primitive +societies--Industrialism as a solvent--Its operation in Europe--Balkans +geographically remote from main drift of European economic +development--The false economies of the Powers as a cause of their +jealousies and quarrels--- This has prevented settlement--What is the +"economic motive"?--Impossible to separate moral and +material--Nationality and the War System. + + +CHAPTER IV. + +TURKISH IDEALS IN OUR POLITICAL THOUGHT. + +This war and "the Turks of Britain and Prussia"--The Anglo-Saxon and +opposed ideals--Mr. C. Chesterton's case for "killing and being killed" +as the best method of settling differences--Its application to Civil +Conflicts--As in Spanish-America--The difference between Devonshire and +Venezuela--Will the Balkans adopt the Turco-Venezuelan political ideals +or the British? + + +CHAPTER V. + +OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BALKAN WARS. + +Mr. Winston Churchill on the "Responsibility" of Diplomacy--What does he +mean?--An easy (and popular) philosophy--Can we neglect past if we would +avoid future errors?--British temper and policy in the Crimean War--What +are its lessons?--Why we fought a war to sustain the "integrity and +independence of the Turkish dominion in Europe"--Supporting the Turk +against his Christian victims--From fear of Russian growth which we are +now aiding--The commentary of events--Shall we back the wrong horse +again? + + +CHAPTER VI. + +PACIFISM, DEFENCE, AND "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAR." + +Did the Crimean War prove Bright and Cobden wrong?--Our curious +reasoning--Mr. Churchill on "illusions"--The danger of war is not the +illusion but its benefits--We are all Pacifists now since we all desire +Peace--Will more armaments alone secure it?--The experience of +mankind--War "the failure of human wisdom"--Therefore more wisdom is the +remedy--But the Militarists only want more arms--The German Lord +Roberts--The military campaign against political Rationalism--How to +make war certain. + + +CHAPTER VII. + +"THEORIES" FALSE AND TRUE: THEIR ROLE IN EUROPEAN PROGRESS. + +The improvement of ideas the foundation of all improvement--Shooting +straight and thinking straight; the one as important as the +other--Pacifism and the Millennium--How we got rid of wars of +religion--A few ideas have changed the face of the world--The simple +ideas the most important--The "theories" which have led to war--The work +of the reformer to destroy old and false theories--The intellectual +interdependence of nations--Europe at unity in this matter--New ideas +cannot be confined to one people--No fear of ourselves or any nation +being ahead of the rest. + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +WHAT MUST WE _DO_? + +We must have the right political faith--Then we must give effect to +it--Good intention not enough--The organization of the great forces of +modern life--Our indifference as to the foundations of the evil--The +only hope. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWER. + + +What has Pacifism, Old or New, to say now? + +Is War impossible? + +Is it unlikely? + +Is it futile? + +Is not force a remedy, and at times the only remedy? + +Could any remedy have been devised on the whole so conclusive and +complete as that used by the Balkan peoples? + +Have not the Balkan peoples redeemed War from the charges too readily +brought against it as simply an instrument of barbarism? + +Have questions of profit and loss, economic considerations, anything +whatever to do with this war? + +Would the demonstration of its economic futility have kept the peace? + +Are theories and logic of the slightest use, since force alone can +determine the issue? + +Is not war therefore inevitable, and must we not prepare diligently for +it? I will answer all these questions quite simply and directly without +casuistry and logic-chopping, and honestly desiring to avoid paradox and +"cleverness." And these quite simple answers will not be in +contradiction with anything that I have written, nor will they +invalidate any of the principles I have attempted to explain. + +And my answers may be summarised thus:-- + +(1) This war has justified both the Old Pacifism and the New. By +universal admission events have proved that the Pacifists who opposed +the Crimean War were right and their opponents wrong. Had public opinion +given more consideration to those Pacifist principles, this country +would not have "backed the wrong horse," and this war, two wars which +have preceded it, and many of the abominations of which the Balkan +peninsular has been the scene during the last 60 years might have been +avoided, and in any case Great Britain would not now carry upon her +shoulders the responsibility of having during half a century supported +the Turk against the Christian and of having tried uselessly to prevent +what has now taken place--the break-up of the Turk's rule in Europe. + +(2) War is not impossible, and no responsible Pacifist ever said it was; +it is not the likelihood of war which is the illusion, but its benefits. + +(3) It is likely or unlikely according as the parties to a dispute are +guided by wisdom or folly. + +(4) It _is_ futile; and force is no remedy. + +(5) Its futility is proven by the war waged daily by the Turks as +conquerors, during the last 400 years. And because the Balkan peoples +have chosen the less evil of two kinds of war, and will use their +victory to bring a system based on force and conquest to an end, we who +do not believe in force and conquest rejoice in their action, and +believe it will achieve immense benefits. But if instead of using their +victory to eliminate force, they in their turn pin their faith to it, +continue to use it the one against the other, exploiting by its means +the populations they rule, and become not the organisers of social +co-operation among the Balkan populations, but merely, like the Turks, +their conquerors and "owners," then they in their turn will share the +fate of the Turk. + +(6) The fundamental causes of this war are economic in the narrower, as +well as in the larger sense of the term; in the first because conquest +was the Turk's only trade--he desired to live out of taxes wrung from a +conquered people, to exploit them as a means of livelihood, and this +conception was at the bottom of most of Turkish misgovernment. And in +the larger sense its cause is economic because in the Balkans, remote +geographically from the main drift of European economic development, +there has not grown up that interdependent social life, the innumerable +contacts which in the rest of Europe have done so much to attenuate +primitive religious and racial hatreds. + +(7) A better understanding by the Turk of the real nature of civilised +government, of the economic futility of conquest of the fact that a +means of livelihood (an economic system), based upon having more force +than someone else and using it ruthlessly against him, is an impossible +form of human relationship bound to break down, _would_ have kept the +peace. + +(8) If European statecraft had not been animated by false conceptions, +largely economic in origin, based upon a belief in the necessary rivalry +of states, the advantages of preponderant force and conquest, the +Western nations could have composed their quarrels and ended the +abominations of the Balkan peninsula long ago--even in the opinion of +the _Times_. And it is our own false statecraft--that of Great +Britain--which has a large part of the responsibility for this failure +of European civilisation. It has caused us to sustain the Turk in +Europe, to fight a great and popular war with that aim, and led us into +treaties which had they been kept, would have obliged us to fight to-day +on the side of the Turk against the Balkan States. + +(9) If by "theories" and "logic" is meant the discussion of and interest +in principles, the ideas that govern human relationship, they are the +only things that can prevent future wars, just as they were the only +things that brought religious wars to an end--a preponderant power +"imposing" peace playing no role therein. Just as it was false religious +theories which made the religious wars, so it is false political +theories which make the political wars. + +(10) War is only inevitable in the sense that other forms of error and +passion--religious persecution for instance--are inevitable; they cease +with better understanding, as the attempt to impose religious belief by +force has ceased in Europe. + +(11) We should not prepare for war; we should prepare to prevent war; +and though that preparation may include battleships and conscription, +those elements will quite obviously make the tension and danger greater +unless there is also a better European opinion. + +These summarised replies need a little expansion. + + + +CHAPTER II. + +"PEACE" AND "WAR" IN THE BALKANS. + +"Peace" in the Balkans under the Turkish System--The inadequacy of our +terms--The repulsion of the Turkish invasion--The Christian effort to +bring the reign of force and conquest to an end--The difference between +action designed to settle relationship on force and counter action +designed to prevent such settlement--The force of the policeman and the +force of the brigand--The failure of conquest as exemplified by the +Turk--Will the Balkan peoples prove Pacifist or Bellicist; adopt the +Turkish or the Christian System? + + +Had we thrashed out the question of war and peace as we must finally, it +would hardly be necessary to explain that the apparent paradox in Answer +No. 4 (that war is futile, and that this war will have immense benefits) +is due to the inadequacy of our language, which compels us to use the +same word for two opposed purposes, not to any real contradiction of +fact. + +We called the condition of the Balkan peninsula "Peace" until the other +day, merely because the respective Ambassadors still happened to be +resident in the capitals to which they were accredited. + +Let us see what "Peace" under Turkish rule really meant, and who is the +real invader in this war. Here is a very friendly and impartial +witness--Sir Charles Elliot--who paints for us the character of the +Turk as an "administrator":-- + + "The Turk in Europe has an overweening sense of his superiority, + and remains a nation apart, mixing little with the conquered + populations, whose customs and ideas he tolerates, but makes little + effort to understand. The expression indeed, 'Turkey in Europe' + means indeed no more than 'England in Asia,' if used as a + designation for India.... The Turks have done little to assimilate + the people whom they have conquered, and still less, been + assimilated by them. In the larger part of the Turkish dominions, + the Turks themselves are in a minority.... The Turks certainly + resent the dismemberment of their Empire, but not in the sense in + which the French resent the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. + They would never use the word 'Turkey' or even its oriental + equivalent, 'The High Country' in ordinary conversation. They would + never say that Syria and Greece are parts of Turkey which have been + detached, but merely that they are tributaries which have become + independent, provinces once occupied by Turks where there are no + Turks now. As soon as a province passes under another Government, + the Turks find it the most natural thing in the world to leave it + and go somewhere else. In the same spirit the Turk talks quite + pleasantly of leaving Constantinople some day, he will go over to + Asia and found another capital. One can hardly imagine Englishmen + speaking like that of London, but they might conceivably speak so + of Calcutta.... The Turk is a conqueror and nothing else. The + history of the Turk is a catalogue of battles. His contributions to + art, literature, science and religion, are practically nil. Their + desire has not been to instruct, to improve, hardly even to govern, + but simply to conquer.... The Turk makes nothing at all; he takes + whatever he can get, as plunder or pillage. He lives in the houses + which he finds, or which he orders to be built for him. In + unfavourable circumstances he is a marauder. In favourable, a + _Grand Seigneur_ who thinks it his right to enjoy with grace and + dignity all that the world can hold, but who will not lower himself + by engaging in art, literature, trade or manufacture. Why should + he, when there are other people to do these things for him. Indeed, + it may be said that he takes from others even his religion, + clothes, language, customs; there is hardly anything which is + Turkish and not borrowed. The religion is Arabic; the language half + Arabic and Persian; the literature almost entirely imitative; the + art Persian or Byzantine; the costumes, in the Upper Classes and + Army mostly European. There is nothing characteristic in + manufacture or commerce, except an aversion to such pursuits. In + fact, all occupations, except agriculture and military service are + distasteful to the true Osmanli. He is not much of a merchant. He + may keep a stall in a bazaar, but his operations are rarely + undertaken on a scale which merits the name of commerce or finance. + It is strange to observe how, when trade becomes active in any + seaport, or upon the railway lines, the Osmanli retires and + disappears, while Greeks, Armenians and Levantines thrive in his + place. Neither does he much affect law, medicine or the learned + professions. Such callings are followed by Moslims but they are apt + to be of non-Turkish race. But though he does none of these things + ... the Turk is a soldier. The moment a sword or rifle is put into + his hands, he instinctively knows how to use it with effect, and + feels at home in the ranks or on a horse. The Turkish Army is not + so much a profession or an institution necessitated by the fears + and aims of the Government as the quite normal state of the Turkish + nation.... Every Turk is a born soldier, and adopts other pursuits + chiefly because times are bad. When there is a question of + fighting, if only in a riot, the stolid peasant wakes up and shows + surprising power of finding organisation and expedients, and alas! + a surprising ferocity. The ordinary Turk is an honest and + good-humoured soul, kind to children and animals, and very patient; + but when the fighting spirit comes on him, he becomes like the + terrible warriors of the Huns or Henghis Khan, and slays, burns and + ravages without mercy or discrimination."[1] + +Such is the verdict of an instructed, travelled and observant English +author and diplomatist, who lived among these people for many years, and +who learned to like them, who studied them and their history. It does +not differ, of course, appreciably, from what practically every student +of the Turk has discovered: the Turk is the typical conqueror. As a +nation, he has lived by the sword, and he is dying by the sword, because +the sword, the mere exercise of force by one man or group of men upon +another, conquest in other words, is an impossible form of human +relationship. + +And in order to maintain this evil form of relationship--its evil and +futility is the whole basis of the principles I have attempted to +illustrate--he has not even observed the rough chivalry of the brigand. +The brigand, though he might knock men on the head, will refrain from +having his force take the form of butchering women and disembowelling +children. Not so the Turk. His attempt at Government will take the form +of the obscene torture of children, of a bestial ferocity which is not a +matter of dispute or exaggeration, but a thing to which scores, +hundreds, thousands even of credible European, witnesses have testified. +"The finest gentleman, sir, that ever butchered a woman or burned a +village," is the phrase that _Punch_ most justly puts into the mouth of +the defender of our traditional Turcophil policy. + +And this condition is "Peace," and the act which would put a stop to it +is "War." It is the inexactitude and inadequacy of our language which +creates much of the confusion of thought in this matter; we have the +same term for action destined to achieve a given end and for a +counter-action destined to prevent it. + +Yet we manage, in other than the international field, in civil matters, +to make the thing clear enough. + +Once an American town was set light to by incendiaries, and was +threatened with destruction. In order to save at least a part of it, the +authorities deliberately burned down a block of buildings in the pathway +of the fire. Would those incendiaries be entitled to say that the town +authorities were incendiaries also, and "believed in setting light to +towns?" Yet this is precisely the point of view of those who tax +Pacifists with approving war because they approve the measure aimed at +bringing it to an end. + +Put it another way. You do not believe that force should determine the +transfer of property or conformity to a creed, and I say to you: "Hand +me your purse and conform to my creed or I kill you." You say: "Because +I do not believe that force should settle these matters, I shall try and +prevent it settling them, and therefore if you attack I shall resist; if +I did not I should be allowing force to settle them." I attack; you +resist and disarm me and say: "My force having neutralised yours, and +the equilibrium being now established, I will hear any reasons you may +have to urge for my paying you money; or any argument in favour of your +creed. Reason, understanding, adjustment shall settle it." You would be +a Pacifist. Or, if you deem that that word connotes non-resistance, +though to the immense bulk of Pacifists it does not, you would be an +anti-Bellicist to use a dreadful word coined by M. Emile Faguet in the +discussion of this matter. If, however, you said: "Having disarmed you +and established the equilibrium, I shall now upset it in my favour by +taking your weapon and using it against you unless you hand me _your_ +purse and subscribe to _my_ creed. I do this because force alone can +determine issues, and because it is a law of life that the strong should +eat up the weak." You would then be a Bellicist. + +In the same way, when we prevent the brigand from carrying on his +trade--taking wealth by force--it is not because we believe in force as +a means of livelihood, but precisely because we do not. And if, in +preventing the brigand from knocking out brains, we are compelled to +knock out his brains, is it because we believe in knocking out people's +brains? Or would we urge that to do so is the way to carry on a trade, +or a nation, or a government, or make it the basis of human +relationship? + +In every civilised country, the basis of the relationship on which the +community rests is this: no individual is allowed to settle his +differences with another by force. But does this mean that if one +threatens to take my purse, I am not allowed to use force to prevent it? +That if he threatens to kill me, I am not to defend myself, because "the +individual citizens are not allowed to settle their differences by +force?" It is _because_ of that, because the act of self-defence is an +attempt to prevent the settlement of a difference by force, that the law +justifies it.[2] + +But the law would not justify me, if having disarmed my opponent, having +neutralised his force by my own, and re-established the social +equilibrium, I immediately proceeded to upset it, by asking him for his +purse on pain of murder. I should then be settling the matter by +force--I should then have ceased to be a Pacifist, and have become a +Bellicist. + +For that is the difference between the two conceptions: the Bellicist +says: "Force alone can settle these matters; it is the final appeal; +therefore fight it out. Let the best man win. When you have preponderant +strength, impose your view; force the other man to your will; not +because it is right, but because you are able to do so." It is the +"excellent policy" which Lord Roberts attributes to Germany and +approves. + +We anti-Bellicists take an exactly contrary view. We say: "To fight it +out settles nothing, since it is not a question of who is stronger, but +of whose view is best, and as that is not always easy to establish, it +is of the utmost importance in the interest of all parties, in the long +run, to keep force out of it." + +The former is the policy of the Turks. They have been obsessed with the +idea that if only they had enough of physical force, ruthlessly +exercised, they could solve the whole question of government, of +existence for that matter, without troubling about social adjustment, +understanding, equity, law, commerce; "blood and iron" were all that was +needed. The success of that policy can now be judged. + +And whether good or evil comes of the present war will depend upon +whether the Balkan States are on the whole guided by the Bellicist +principle or the opposed one. If having now momentarily eliminated force +as between themselves, they re-introduce it, if the strongest, +presumably Bulgaria, adopts Lord Roberts' "excellent policy" of striking +because she has the preponderant force, enters upon a career of conquest +of other members of the Balkan League, and the populations of the +conquered territories, using them for exploitation by military +force--why then there will be no settlement and this war will have +accomplished nothing save futile waste and slaughter. For they will have +taken under a new flag, the pathway of the Turk to savagery, +degeneration, death. + +But if on the other hand they are guided more by the Pacifist principle, +if they believe that co-operation between States is better than conflict +between them, if they believe that the common interest of all in good +Government is greater than the special interest of any one in conquest, +that the understanding of human relationships, the capacity for the +organisation of society are the means by which men progress, and not the +imposition of force by one man or group upon another, why, they will +have taken the pathway to better civilisation. But then they will have +disregarded Lord Roberts' advice. + +And this distinction between the two systems, far from being a matter of +abstract theory of metaphysics or logic chopping, is just the difference +which distinguishes the Briton from the Turk, which distinguishes +Britain from Turkey. The Turk has just as much physical vigour as the +Briton, is just as virile, manly and military. The Turk has the same raw +materials of Nature, soil and water. There is no difference in the +capacity for the exercise of physical force--or if there is, the +difference is in favour of the Turk. The real difference is a difference +of ideas, of mind and outlook on the part of the individuals composing +the respective societies; the Turk has one general conception of human +society and the code and principles upon which it is founded, mainly a +militarist one; and the Englishman has another, mainly a Pacifist one. +And whether the European society as a whole is to drift towards the +Turkish ideal or towards the English ideal will depend upon whether it +is animated mainly by the Pacifist or mainly by the Bellicist doctrine; +if the former, it will stagger blindly like the Turk along the path to +barbarism; if the latter, it will take a better road. + +[Footnote 1: "Turkey in Europe," pp. 88-9 and 91-2. + +It is significant, by the way, that the "born soldier" has now been +crushed by a non-military race whom he has always despised as having no +military tradition. Capt. F.W. von Herbert ("Bye Paths in the Balkans") +wrote (some years before the present war): "The Bulgars as Christian +subjects of Turkey exempt from military service, have tilled the ground +under stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions, and the profession of +arms is new to them." + +"Stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions" is, in view of subsequent +events distinctly good.] + +[Footnote 2: I dislike to weary the reader with such damnable iteration, +but when a Cabinet Minister is unable in this discussion to distinguish +between the folly of a thing and its possibility, one _must_ make the +fundamental point clear.] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +ECONOMICS AND THE BALKAN WAR. + +The "economic system" of the Turk--The Turkish "Trade of Conquest" as a +cause of this war--Racial and Religious hatred of primitive +societies--Industrialism as a solvent--Its operation in Europe--Balkans +geographically remote from main drift of European economic +development--The false economies of the Powers as a cause of their +jealousies and quarrels--This has prevented settlement--What is the +"economic motive"?--Impossible to separate moral and +material--Nationality and the War System. + + +In dealing with answer No. 4 I have shown how the inadequacy of our +language leads us so much astray in our notions of the real role of +force in human relationships. But there is a curious phenomenon of +thought which explains perhaps still more how misconceptions grow up on +this subject, and that is the habit of thinking of a war which, of +course, must include two parties, in terms, solely of one party at a time. +Thus one critic[3] is quite sure that because the Balkan peoples "recked +nothing of financial disaster," economic considerations have had nothing +to do with their war--a conclusion which seems to be arrived at by the +process of judgment just indicated: to find the cause of condition +produced by two parties you shall rigorously ignore one. For there is a +great deal of internal evidence for believing that the writer of the +article in question would admit very readily that the efforts of the +Turk to wring taxes out of the conquered peoples--not in return for a +civilized administration but simply as the means of livelihood, of +turning conquest into a trade--had a very great deal to do in explaining +the Turk's presence there at all and the Christian's desire to get rid +of him; while the same article specifically states that the mutual +jealousies of the great powers, based on a desire to "grab" (an economic +motive), had a great deal to do with preventing a peaceful settlement of +the difficulties. Yet "economics" have nothing to do with it! + +I have attempted elsewhere to make these two points--that it is on the +one hand the false economics of the Turks, and on the other hand the +false economics of the powers of Europe, colouring the policy and +Statecraft of both, which have played an enormous, in all human +probability, a determining role in the immediate provoking cause of the +war; and, of course, a further and more remote cause of the whole +difficulty is the fact that the Balkan peoples never having been +subjected to the discipline of that complex social life which arises +from trade and commerce have never grown out of (or to a less degree) +those primitive racial and religious hostilities which at one time in +Europe as a whole provoked conflicts like that now raging in the +Balkans. The following article which appeared[4] at the outbreak of the +war may summarise some of the points with which we have been dealing. + +Polite and good-natured people think it rude to say "Balkans" if a +Pacifist be present. Yet I never understood why, and I understand now +less than ever. It carries the implication that because war has broken +out that fact disposes of all objection to it. The armies are at grips, +therefore peace is a mistake. Passion reigns on the Balkans, therefore +passion is preferable to reason. + +I suppose cannibalism and infanticide, polygamy, judicial torture, +religious persecution, witchcraft, during all the years we did these +"inevitable" things, were defended in the same way, and those who +resented all criticism of them pointed in triumph to the cannibal feast, +the dead child, the maimed witness, the slain heretic, or the burned +witch. But the fact did not prove the wisdom of those habits, still less +their inevitability; for we have them no more. + +We are all agreed as to the fundamental cause of the Balkan trouble: the +hate born of religious, racial, national, and language differences; the +attempt of an alien conqueror to live parasitically upon the conquered, +and the desire of conqueror and conquered alike to satisfy in massacre +and bloodshed the rancour of fanaticism and hatred. + +Well, in these islands, not so very long ago, those things were causes +of bloodshed; indeed, they were a common feature of European life. But +if they are inevitable in human relationship, how comes it that Adana is +no longer duplicated by St. Bartholomew; the Bulgarian bands by the +vendetta of the Highlander and the Lowlander; the struggle of the Slav +and Turk, Serb and Bulgar, by that of Scots and English, and English and +Welsh? The fanaticism of the Moslem to-day is no intenser than that of +Catholic and heretic in Rome, Madrid, Paris, and Geneva at a time which +is only separated from us by the lives of three or four elderly men. The +heretic or infidel was then in Europe also a thing unclean and +horrifying, exciting in the mind of the orthodox a sincere and honest +hatred and a (very largely satisfied) desire to kill. The Catholic of +the 16th century was apt to tell you that he could not sit at table with +a heretic because the latter carried with him a distinctive and +overpoweringly repulsive odour. If you would measure the distance Europe +has travelled, think what this means: all the nations of Christendom +united in a war lasting 200 years for the capture of the Holy Sepulchre; +and yet, when in our day the representatives, seated round a table, +could have had it for the asking, they did not deem it worth the asking, +so little of the ancient passion was there left. The very nature of man +seemed to be transformed. For, wonderful though it be that orthodox +should cease killing heretic, infinitely more wonderful still is it that +he should cease wanting to kill him. + +And just as most of us are certain that the underlying causes of this +conflict are "inevitable" and "inherent in unchanging human nature," so +are we certain that so _un_human a thing as economics can have no +bearing on it. + +Well, I will suggest that the transformation of the heretic-hating and +heretic-killing European is due mainly to economic forces; that it is +because the drift of those forces has in such large part left the +Balkans, where until yesterday the people lived the life not much +different from that which they lived in the time of Abraham, to one side +that war is now raging; that economic factors of a more immediate kind +form a large part of the provoking cause of that war; and that a better +understanding mainly of certain economic facts of their international +relationship on the part of the great nations of Europe is essential +before much progress towards solution can be made. + +But then, by "economics," of course, I mean not a merchant's profit or a +moneylender's interest, but the method by which men earn their bread, +which must also mean the kind of life they lead. + +We generally think of the primitive life of man--that of the herdsman or +the tent liver--as something idyllic. The picture is as far as possible +from the truth. Those into whose lives economics do not enter, or enter +very little--that is to say, those who, like the Congo cannibal, or the +Red Indian, or the Bedouin, do not cultivate, or divide their labour, or +trade, or save, or look to the future, have shed little of the primitive +passions of other animals of prey, the tigers and the wolves, who have +no economics at all, and have no need to check an impulse or a hate. +But industry, even of the more primitive kind, means that men must +divide their labour, which means that they must put some sort of +reliance upon one another; the thing of prey becomes a partner, and the +attitude towards it changes. And as this life becomes more complex, as +the daily needs and desires push men to trade and barter, that means +building up a social organisation, rules and codes, and courts to +enforce them; as the interdependence widens and deepens it necessarily +means disregarding certain hostilities. If the neighbouring tribe wants +to trade with you they must not kill you; if you want the services of +the heretic you must not kill him, and you must keep your obligation +towards him, and mutual good faith is death to long-sustained hatreds. + +You cannot separate the moral from the social and economic development +of a people, and the great service of a complex social and industrial +organisation, which is built up by the desire of men for better material +conditions, is not that it "pays" but that it makes a more +interdependent human society, and that it leads men to recognise what is +the best relationship between them. And the fact of recognising that +some act of aggression is causing stocks to fall is not important +because it may save Oppenheim's or Solomon's money but because it is a +demonstration that we are dependent upon some community on the other +side of the world, that their damage is our damage, and that we have an +interest in preventing it. It teaches us, as only some such simple and +mechanical means can teach, the lesson of human fellowship. + +And it is by such means as this that Western Europe has in some measure, +within its respective political frontiers, learnt that lesson. Each has +learnt, within the confines of the nation at least, that wealth is made +by work, not robbery; that, indeed, general robbery is fatal to +prosperity; that government consists not merely in having the power of +the sword but in organising society--in "knowing how"; which means the +development of ideas; in maintaining courts; in making it possible to +run railways, post offices, and all the contrivances of a complex +society. + +Now rulers did not create these things; it was the daily activities of +the people, born of their desires and made possible by the circumstances +in which they lived, by the trading and the mining and the shipping +which they carried on, that made them. But the Balkans have been +geographically outside the influence of European industrial and +commercial life. The Turk has hardly felt it at all. He has learnt none +of the social and moral lessons which interdependence and improved +communications have taught the Western European, and it is because he +has not learnt these lessons, because he is a soldier and a conqueror, +to an extent and completeness that other nations of Europe lost a +generation or two since, that the Balkanese are fighting and that war is +raging. + +But not merely in this larger sense, but in the more immediate, narrower +sense, are the fundamental causes of this war economic. + +This war arises, as the past wars against the Turkish conqueror have +arisen, by the desire of the Christian peoples on whom he lives to shake +off this burden. "To live upon their subjects is the Turks' only means +of livelihood," says one authority. The Turk is an economic parasite, +and the economic organism must end of rejecting him. + +For the management of society, simple and primitive even as that of the +Balkan mountains, needs some effort and work and capacity for +administration, or even rudimentary economic life cannot be carried on. +And the Turkish system, founded on the sword and nothing else ("the +finest soldier in Europe"), cannot give that small modicum, of energy or +administrative capacity. The one thing he knows is brute force; but it +is not by the strength of his muscles that an engineer runs a machine, +but by knowing how. The Turk cannot build a road, or make a bridge, or +administer a post office, or found a court of law. And these things are +necessary. And he will not let them be done by the Christian, who, +because he did not belong to the conquering class, has had to work, and +has consequently become the class which possesses whatever capacity for +work and administration the country can show, because to do so would be +to threaten the Turk's only trade. If the Turk granted the Christians +equal political rights they would inevitably "run the country," And yet +the Turk himself cannot do it; and he will not let others do it, because +to do so would be to threaten his supremacy. + +And the more the use of force fails, the more, of course, does he resort +to it, and that is why many of us who do not believe in force, and +desire to see it disappear in the relationship not merely of religious +but of political groups, might conceivably welcome this war of the +Balkan Christians, in so far as it is an attempt to resist the use of +force in those relationships. Of course, I do not try to estimate the +"balance of criminality." Right is not all on one side--it never is. But +the broad issue is clear and plain. And only those concerned with the +name rather than the thing, with nominal and verbal consistency rather +than realities, will see anything paradoxical or contradictory in +Pacifist approval of Christian resistance to the use of Turkish force. + +It is the one fact which stands out incontrovertibly from the whole +weary muddle. It is quite clear that the inability to act in common +arises from the fact that in the international sphere the European is +still dominated by illusions which he has dropped when he deals with +home politics. The political faith of the Turk, which he would never +think of applying at home as between the individuals of his nation, he +applies pure and unalloyed when he comes to deal with foreigners as +nations. The economic conception--using the term in that wider sense +which I have indicated earlier in this article--which guides his +individual conduct is the antithesis of that which guides his national +conduct. + +While the Christian does not believe in robbery inside the frontier, he +does without; while within the State he realises that greater advantage +lies on the side of each observing the general code, so that civilised +society can exist, instead of on the side of having society go to pieces +by each disregarding it; while within the State he realises that +government is a matter of administration, not the seizure of property; +that one town does not add to its wealth by "capturing" another, that +indeed one community cannot "own" another--while, I say, he believes all +these things in his daily life at home, he disregards them all when he +comes to the field of international relationship, _la haute politique_. +To annex some province by a cynical breach of treaty obligation (Austria +in Bosnia, Italy in Tripoli) is regarded as better politics than to act +loyally with the community of nations to enforce their common interest +in order and good government. In fact, we do not believe that there can +be a community of nations, because, in fact, we do not believe that +their interests are common, but rival; like the Turk, we believe that if +you do not exercise force upon your "rival" he will exercise it upon +you; that nations live upon one another, not by co-operation with one +another--and it is for this reason presumably that you must "own" as +much of your neighbours' as possible. It is the Turkish conception from +beginning to end. + +And it is because these false beliefs prevent the nations of Christendom +acting loyally the one to the other, because each is playing for its own +hand, that the Turk, with hint of some sordid bribe, has been able to +play off each against the other. + +This is the crux of the matter. When Europe can honestly act in common +on behalf of common interests some solution can be found. And the +capacity of Europe to act together will not be found so long as the +accepted doctrines of European statecraft remain unchanged, so long as +they are dominated by existing illusions. + + * * * * * + +In a paper read before the British Association of this year, I attempted +to show in more general terms this relation between economic impulse and +ideal motive. The following are relevant passages:-- + +A nation, a people, we are given to understand, have higher motives than +money, or "self-interest." What do we mean when we speak of the money of +a nation, or the self-interest of a community? We mean--and in such a +discussion as this can mean nothing else--better conditions for the +great mass of the people, the fullest possible lives, the abolition or +attenuation of poverty and of narrow circumstances, that the millions +shall be better housed and clothed and fed, capable of making provision +for sickness and old age, with lives prolonged and cheered--and not +merely this, but also that they shall be better educated, with character +disciplined by steady labour and a better use of leisure, a general +social atmosphere which shall make possible family affection, individual +dignity and courtesy and the graces of life, not alone among the few, +but among the many. + +Now, do these things constitute as a national policy an inspiring +aim or not? Yet they are, speaking in terms of communities, pure +self-interest--all bound up with economic problems, with money. Does +Admiral Mahan mean us to take him at his word when he would attach to +such efforts the same discredit that one implies in talking of a +mercenary individual? Would he have us believe that the typical great +movements of our times--Socialism, Trades Unionism, Syndicalism, +Insurance Bills, Land Laws, Old Age Pensions, Charity Organisation, +Improved Education--bound up as they all are with economic problems--are +not the sort of objects which more and more are absorbing the best +activities of Christendom? + +I have attempted to show that the activities which lie outside the range +of these things--the religious wars, movements like those which promoted +the Crusades, or the sort of tradition which we associate with the duel +(which has, in fact, disappeared from Anglo-Saxon society)--do not and +cannot any longer form part of the impulse creating the long-sustained +conflicts between large groups which a European war implies, partly +because such allied moral differences as now exist do not in any way +coincide with the political divisions, but intersect them, and partly +because in the changing character of men's ideals there is a distinct +narrowing of the gulf which is supposed to separate ideal and material +aims. Early ideals, whether in the field of politics or religion, are +generally dissociated from any aim of general well-being. In early +politics ideals are concerned simply with personal allegiance to some +dynastic chief, a feudal lord or a monarch. The well-being of a +community does not enter into the matter at all: it is the personal +allegiance which matters. Later the chief must embody in his person that +well-being, or he does not achieve the allegiance of a community of any +enlightenment; later, the well-being of the community becomes the end in +itself without being embodied in the person of an hereditary chief, so +that the community realise that their efforts, instead of being directed +to the protection of the personal interests of some chief, are as a +matter of fact directed to the protection of their own interests, and +their altruism has become self-interest, since self-sacrifice of a +community for the sake of the community is a contradiction in terms. In +the religious sphere a like development has been shown. Early religious +ideals have no relation to the material betterment of mankind. The early +Christian thought it meritorious to live a sterile life at the top of a +pillar, eaten by vermin, as the Hindoo saint to-day thinks it +meritorious to live an equally sterile life upon a bed of spikes. But as +the early Christian ideal progressed, sacrifices having no end connected +with the betterment of mankind lost their appeal. The Christian saint +who would allow the nails of his fingers to grow through the palms of +his clasped hands would excite, not our admiration, but our revolt. More +and more is religious effort being subjected to this test: does it make +for the improvement of society? If not, it stands condemned. Political +ideals will inevitably follow a like development, and will be more and +more subjected to a like test. + +I am aware that very often at present they are not so subjected. +Dominated as our political thought is by Roman and feudal +imagery--hypnotised by symbols and analogies which the necessary +development of organised society has rendered obsolete--the ideals even +of democracies are still often pure abstractions, divorced from any aim +calculated to advance the moral or material betterment of mankind. The +craze for sheer size of territory, simple extent of administrative area, +is still deemed a thing deserving immense, incalculable sacrifices. + + * * * * * + +And yet even these ideals, firmly set as they are in our language and +tradition, are rapidly yielding to the necessary force of events. A +generation ago it would have been inconceivable that a people or a +monarch should calmly see part of its country secede and establish +itself as a separate political entity without attempting to prevent it +by force of arms. Yet this is what happened but a year or two since in +the Scandinavian peninsula. For forty years Germany has added to her own +difficulties and those of the European situation for the purpose of +including Alsace and Lorraine in its Federation, but even there, obeying +the tendency which is world-wide, an attempt has been made at the +creation of a constitutional and autonomous government. The history of +the British Empire for fifty years has been a process of undoing the +work of conquest. Colonies are now neither colonies nor possessions. +They are independent States. Great Britain, which for centuries has made +such sacrifices to retain Ireland, is now making great sacrifices in +order to make her secession workable. To all political arrangements, to +all political ideals, the final test will be applied: Does it or does it +not make for the widest interests of the mass of the people involved?... +And I would ask those who think that war must be a permanent element in +the settlement of the moral differences of men to think for one moment +of the factors which stood in the way of the abandonment of the use of +force by governments, and by one religious group against another in the +matter of religious belief. On the one hand you had authority with all +the prestige of historical right and the possession of physical power in +its most imposing form, the means of education still in their hands; +government authority extending to all sorts of details of life to which +it no longer extends; immense vested interests outside government; and +finally the case for the imposition of dogma by authority a strong one, +and still supported by popular passion: and on the other hand, you had +as yet poor and feeble instruments of mere opinion; the printed book +still a rarity; the Press non-existent, communication between men still +rudimentary, worse even than it had been two thousand years previously. +And yet, despite these immense handicaps upon the growth of opinion and +intellectual ferment as against physical force, it was impossible for a +new idea to find life in Geneva or Rome or Edinburgh or London without +quickly crossing and affecting all the other centres, and not merely +making headway against entrenched authority, but so quickly breaking up +the religious homogeneity of states, that not only were governments +obliged to abandon the use of force in religious matters as against +their subjects, but religious wars between nations became impossible for +the double reason that a nation no longer expressed a single religious +belief (you had the anomaly of a Protestant Sweden fighting in alliance +with a Catholic France), and that the power of opinion had become +stronger than the power of physical force--because, in other words, the +limits of military force were more and more receding. + +But if the use of force was so ineffective against the spiritual +possessions of man when the arms to be used in their defence were so +poor and rudimentary, how could a government hope to crush out by force +to-day such things as a nation's language, law, literature, morals, +ideals, when it possesses such means of defence as are provided in +security of tenure of material possessions, a cheap literature, a +popular Press, a cheap and secret postal system, and all the other means +of rapid and perfected inter-communication? + +You will notice that I have spoken throughout not of the _defence_ of a +national ideal by arms, but of its attack; if you have to defend your +ideal it is because someone attacks it, and without attack your defence +would not be called for. + +If you are compelled to prevent someone using force as against your +nationality, it is because he believes that by the use of that force he +can destroy or change it. If he thought that the use of force would be +ineffective to that end he would not employ it. + +I have attempted to show elsewhere that the abandonment of war for +material ends depends upon a general realisation of its futility for +accomplishing those ends. In like manner does the abandonment of war for +moral or ideal ends depend upon the general realisation of the growing +futility of such means for those ends also--and for the growing futility +of those ends if they could be accomplished. + +We are sometimes told that it is the spirit of nationality--the desire +to be of your place and locality--that makes war. That is not so. It is +the desire of other men that you shall not be of your place and +locality, of your habits and traditions, but of theirs. Not the desire +of nationality, but the desire to destroy nationality is what makes the +wars of nationality. If the Germans did not think that the retention of +Polish or Alsatian nationality might hamper them in the art of war, +hamper them in the imposition of force on some other groups, there would +be no attempt to crush out this special possession of the Poles and +Alsatians. It is the belief in force and a preference for settling +things by force instead of by agreement that threatens or destroys +nationality. And I have given an indication of the fact that it is not +merely war, but the preparation for war, implying as it does great +homogeneity in states and centralised bureaucratic control, which is +to-day the great enemy of nationality. Before this tendency to +centralisation which military necessity sets up much that gives colour +and charm to European life is disappearing. And yet we are told that it +is the Pacifists who are the enemy of nationality, and we are led to +believe that in some way the war system in Europe stands for the +preservation of nationality! + +[Footnote 3: Review of Reviews, November, 1912.] + +[Footnote 4: In the "Daily Mail," to whose Editor I am indebted for +permission to reprint it.] + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +TURKISH IDEALS IN OUR POLITICAL THOUGHT. + +This war and "the Turks of Britain and Prussia"--The Anglo-Saxon and +opposed ideals--Mr. C. Chesterton's case for "killing and being killed" +as the best method of settling differences--Its application to Civil +Conflicts--As in Spanish-America--The difference between Devonshire and +Venezuela--Will the Balkans adopt the Turco-Venezuelan political ideals +or the British? + + +An English political writer remarked, on it becoming evident that the +Christian States were driving back the Turks: "This is a staggering blow +to _all_ the Turks--those of England and Prussia as well as those of +Turkey." + +But, of course, the British and Prussian Turks will never see it--like +the Bourbons, they learn not. Here is a typically military system, the +work of "born fighters" which has gone down in welter before the +assaults of much less military States, the chief of which, indeed, has +grown up in what Captain von Herbert has called, with some contempt, +"stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions," formed by the people whom +the Turks regarded as quite unfit to be made into warriors; whom they +regarded much as some Europeans regard the Jews. It is the Christian +populations of the Balkans who were the traders and workers--those +brought most under economic influences; it was the Turks who escaped +those influences. A few years since, I wrote: "If the conqueror profits +much by his conquest, as the Romans in one sense did, it is the +conqueror who is threatened by the enervating effect of the soft and +luxurious life; while it is the conquered who are forced to labour for +the conqueror, and who learn in consequence those qualities of steady +industry which are certainly a better moral training than living upon +the fruits of others, upon labour extorted at the sword's point. It is +the conqueror who becomes effete, and it is the conquered who learn +discipline and the qualities making for a well-ordered State." + +Could we ask a better illustration than the history of the Turk and his +Christian victims? I exemplified the matter thus: "If during long +periods a nation gives itself up to war, trade languishes, the +population loses the habit of steady industry, government and +administration become corrupt, abuses escape punishment, and the real +sources of a people's strength and expansion dwindle. What has caused +the relative failure and decline of Spanish, Portuguese, and French +expansion in Asia and the New World, and the relative success of English +expansion therein? Was it the mere hazards of war which gave to Great +Britain the domination of India and half of the New World? That is +surely a superficial reading of history. It was, rather, that the +methods and processes of Spain, Portugal, and France were military, +while those of the Anglo-Saxon world were commercial and peaceful. Is it +not a commonplace that in India, quite as much as in the New World, the +trader and the settler drove out the soldier and the conqueror? The +difference between the two methods was that one was a process of +conquest, and the other of colonizing, or non-military administration +for commercial purposes. The one embodied the sordid Cobdenite idea, +which so excites the scorn of the militarists, and the other the lofty +military ideal. The one was parasitism; the other co-operation.... + +"How may we sum up the whole case, keeping in mind every empire that +ever existed--the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Mede and Persian, the +Macedonian, the Roman, the Frank, the Saxon, the Spanish, the +Portuguese, the Bourbon, the Napoleonic? In all and every one of them we +may see the same process, which is this: If it remains military it +decays; if it prospers and takes its share of the work of the world it +ceases to be military. There is no other reading of history." + +But despite these very plain lessons, there are many amongst us who +regard physical conflict as the ideal form of human relationship; +"killing and being killed" as the best way to determine the settlement +of differences, and a society which drifts from these ideals as on the +high road to degeneration, and who deem those who set before themselves +the ideal of abolishing or attenuating poverty for the mass of men, "low +and sordid." + +Thus Mr. Cecil Chesterton[5]: + + In essence Mr. Angell's query is: "Should usurers go to war?" + + I may say, in passing, that I am not clear that even on the + question thus raised Mr. Angell makes out his case. His case, + broadly stated, is that the net of "Finance"--or, to put it + plainer, Cosmopolitan Usury--which is at present spread over Europe + would be disastrously torn by any considerable war; and that in + consequence it is to the interest of the usurers to preserve peace. + But here, it seems to me, we must make a clear differentiation. It + may easily be to the interest of a particular usurer, or group of + usurers, to provoke war; that very financial crisis which Mr. + Angell anticipates may quite probably be a source of profit to + them. That it would not be to the interest of a nation of usurers + to fight is very probable. That such a nation would not fight, or, + if it did, would be exceedingly badly beaten, is certain. But that + only serves to raise the further question of whether it is to the + ultimate advantage of a nation to repose upon usury; and whether + the breaking of the net of usury which at present unquestionably + holds Europe in captivity would not be for the advantage, as it + would clearly be for the honour, of our race.... The sword is too + sacred a thing to be prostituted to such dirty purposes. But + whether he succeeds or fails in this attempt, it will make no + difference to the mass of plain men who, when they fight and risk + their lives, do not do so in the expectation of obtaining a certain + interest on their capital, but for quite other reasons. + + Mr. Angell's latest appeal comes, I think, at an unfortunate + moment. It is not merely that the Balkan States have refused to be + convinced by Mr. Angell as to their chances of commercial profit + from the war. It is that if Mr. Angell had succeeded to the fullest + extent in convincing them that there was not a quarter per cent. to + be made out of the war, nay, that--horrible thought!--they would + actually be poorer at the end of the war than at the beginning, + they would have gone to war all the same. + + Since Mr. Angell's argument clearly applies as much or more to + civil as to international conflicts, I may perhaps be allowed to + turn to civil conflicts to make clear my meaning. In this country + during the last three centuries one solid thing has been done. The + power of Parliament was pitted in battle against the power of the + Crown, and won. As a result, for good or evil, Parliament really is + stronger than the Crown to-day. The power of the mass of the + people to control Parliament has been given as far as mere + legislation could give it. We all know that it is a sham. And if + you ask what it is that makes the difference of reality between the + two cases, it is this: that men killed and were killed for the one + thing and not for the other. + + I have no space to develop all that I should like to say about the + indirect effects of war. All I will say is this, that men do judge, + and always will judge, things by the ultimate test of how they + fight. The German victory of forty years ago has produced not only + an astonishing expansion, industrial as well as political of + Germany, but has (most disastrously, as I think) infected Europe + with German ideas, especially with the idea that you make a nation + strong by making its people behave like cattle. God send that I may + live to see the day when victorious armies from Gaul shall shatter + this illusion, burn up Prussianism with all its Police Regulations, + Insurance Acts, Poll Taxes, and insults to the poor, and reassert + the Republic. It will never be done in any other way. + + If arbitration is ever to take the place of war, it must be backed + by a corresponding array of physical force. Now the question + immediately arises: Are we prepared to arm any International + Tribunal with any such powers? Personally, I am not.... Turn back + some fifty years to the great struggle for the emancipation of + Italy. Suppose that a Hague Tribunal had then been in existence, + armed with coercive powers. The dispute between Austria and + Sardinia must have been referred to that tribunal. That tribunal + must have been guided by existing treaties. The Treaty of Vienna + was perhaps the most authoritative ever entered into by European + Powers. By that treaty, Venice and Lombardy were unquestionably + assigned to Austria. A just tribunal administering international + law _must_ have decided in favour of Austria, and have used the + whole armed force of Europe to coerce Italy into submission. Are + those Pacifists, who try at the same time to be Democrats, prepared + to acquiesce in such a conclusion? Personally, I am not. + +I replied as follows: + + Mr. Cecil Chesterton says that the question which I have raised is + this: "Should usurers go to war?" + + That, of course, is not true. I have never, even by implication, + put such a problem, and there is nothing in the article which he + criticises, nor in any other statement of my own, that justifies + it. What I have asked is whether peoples should go to war. + + I should have thought it was pretty obvious that, whatever happens, + usurers do not go to war: the peoples go to war, and the peoples + pay, and the whole question is whether they should go on making war + and paying for it. Mr. Chesterton says that if they are wise they + will; I say that if they are wise they will not. + + I have attempted to show that the prosperity of peoples--by which, + of course, one means the diminution of poverty, better houses, soap + and water, healthy children, lives prolonged, conditions + sufficiently good to ensure leisure and family affection, fuller + and completer lives generally--is not secured by fighting one + another, but by co-operation and labour, by a better organisation + of society, by improved human relationship, which, of course, can + only come of better understanding of the conditions of that + relationship, which better understanding means discussion, + adjustment, a desire and capacity to see the point of view of the + other man--of all of which war and its philosophy is the negation. + + To all of this Mr. Chesterton replies: "That only concerns the Jews + and the moneylenders." Again, this is not true. It concerns all of + us, like all problems of our struggle with Nature. It is in part at + least an economic problem, and that part of it is best stated in + the more exact and precise terms that I have employed to deal with + it--the term's of the market-place. But to imply that the + conditions that there obtain are the affair merely of bankers and + financiers, to imply that these things do not touch the lives of + the mass, is simply to talk a nonsense the meaninglessness of which + only escapes some of us because in these matters we happen to be + very ignorant. It is not mainly usurers who suffer from bad finance + and bad economics (one may suggest that they are not quite so + simple); it is mainly the people as a whole. + + Mr. Chesterton says that we should break this "net of usury" in + which the peoples are enmeshed. I agree heartily; but that net has + been woven mainly by war (and that diversion of energy and + attention from social management which war involves), and is, so + far as the debts of the European States are concerned (so large an + element of usury), almost solely the outcome of war. And if the + peoples go on piling up debt, as they must if they are to go on + piling up armaments (as Mr. Chesterton wants them to), giving the + best of their attention and emotion to sheer physical conflict, + instead of to organisation and understanding, they will merely + weave that web of debt and usury still closer; it will load us more + heavily and strangle us to a still greater extent. If usury is the + enemy, the remedy is to fight usury. Mr. Chesterton says the remedy + is for its victims to fight one another. + + And you will not fight usury by hanging Rothschilds, for usury is + worst where that sort of thing is resorted to. Widespread debt is + the outcome of bad management and incompetence, economic or social, + and only better management will remedy it. Mr. Chesterton is sure + that better management is only arrived at by "killing and being + killed." He really does urge this method even in civil matters. (He + tells us that the power of Parliament over the Crown is real, and + that of the people over Parliament a sham, "because men killed and + were killed for the one, and not for the other.") It is the method + of Spanish America where it is applied more frankly and logically, + and where still, in many places, elections are a military affair, + the questions at issue being settled by killing and being killed, + instead of by the cowardly, pacifist methods current in Europe. The + result gives us the really military civilisations of Venezuela, + Colombia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. And, although the English system + may have many defects--I think it has--those defects exist in a + still greater degree where force "settles" the matters in dispute, + where the bullet replaces the ballot, and where bayonets are + resorted to instead of brains. For Devonshire is better than + Nicaragua. Really it is. And it would get us out of none of our + troubles for one group to impose its views simply by preponderant + physical force, for Mr. Asquith, for instance, in the true Castro + or Zuyala manner, to announce that henceforth all critics of the + Insurance Act are to be shot, and that the present Cabinet will + hold office as long as it can depend upon the support of the Army. + For, even if the country rose in rebellion, and fought it out and + won, the successful party would (if they also believed in force) do + exactly the same thing to _their_ opponents; and so it would go on + never-endingly (as it has gone on during weary centuries throughout + the larger part of South America), until the two parties came once + more to their senses, and agreed not to use force when they + happened to be able to do so; which is our present condition. But + it is the condition of England merely because the English, as a + whole, have ceased to believe in Mr. Chesterton's principles; it is + not yet the condition of Venezuela because the Venezuelans have not + yet ceased to believe those principles, though even they are + beginning to. + + Mr. Chesterton says: "Men do judge, and always will judge, by the + ultimate test of how they fight." The pirate who gives his blood + has a better right, therefore, to the ship than the merchant (who + may be a usurer!) who only gives his money. Well, that is the view + which was all but universal well into the period of what, for want + of a better word, we call civilisation. Not only was it the basis + of all such institutions as the ordeal and duel; not only did it + justify (and in the opinion of some still justifies) the wars of + religion and the use of force in religious matters generally; not + only was it the accepted national polity of such communities as the + Vikings, the Barbary States, and the Red Indians; but it is still, + unfortunately, the polity of certain European states. But the idea + is a survival and--and this is the important point--an admission of + failure to understand where right lies: to "fight it out" is the + remedy of the boy who for the life of him cannot see who is right + and who is wrong. + + At ten years of age we are all quite sure that piracy is a finer + calling than trade, and the pirate a finer fellow than the Shylock + who owns the ship--which, indeed, he may well be. But as we grow up + (which some of the best of us never do) we realise that piracy is + not the best way to establish the ownership of cargoes, any more + than the ordeal is the way to settle cases at law, or the rack of + proving a dogma, or the Spanish American method the way to settle + differences between Liberals and Conservatives. + + And just as civil adjustments are made most efficiently, as they + are in England (say), as distinct from South America, by a general + agreement not to resort to force, so it is the English method in + the international field which gives better results than that based + on force. The relationship of Great Britain to Canada or Australia + is preferable to the relationship of Russia to Finland or Poland, + or Germany to Alsace-Lorraine. The five nations of the British + Empire have, by agreement, abandoned the use of force as between + themselves. Australia may do us an injury--exclude our subjects, + English or Indian, and expose them to insult--but we know very well + that force will not be used against her. To withhold such force is + the basis of the relationship of these five nations; and, given a + corresponding development of ideas, might equally well be the basis + of the relationship of fifteen--about all the nations of the world + who could possibly fight. The difficulties Mr. Chesterton + imagines--an international tribunal deciding in favour of Austria + concerning the recession of Venice and Lombardy, and summoning the + forces of United Europe to coerce Italy into submission--are, of + course, based on the assumption that a United Europe, having + arrived at such understanding as to be able to sink its + differences, would be the same kind of Europe that it is now, or + was a generation ago. If European statecraft advances sufficiently + to surrender the use of force against neighbouring states, it will + have advanced sufficiently to surrender the use of force against + unwilling provinces, as in some measure British statesmanship has + already done. To raise the difficulty that Mr. Chesterton does is + much the same as assuming that a court of law in San Domingo or + Turkey will give the same results as a court of law in Great + Britain, because the form of the mechanism is the same. And does + Mr. Chesterton suggest that the war system settles these matters to + perfection? That it has worked satisfactorily in Ireland and + Finland, or, for the matter of that, in Albania or Macedonia? + + For if Mr. Chesterton urges that killing and being killed is the + way to determine the best means of governing a country, it is his + business to defend the Turk, who has adopted that principle during + four hundred years, not the Christians, who want to bring that + method to an end and adopt another. And I would ask no better + example of the utter failure of the principles that I combat and + Mr. Chesterton defends than their failure in the Balkan Peninsula. + + This war is due to the vile character of Turkish rule, and the + Turk's rule is vile because it is based on the sword. Like Mr. + Chesterton (and our pirate), the Turk believes in the right of + conquest, "the ultimate test of how they fight." "The history of + the Turks," says Sir Charles Elliott, "is almost exclusively a + catalogue of battles." He has lived (for the most gloriously + uneconomic person has to live, to follow a trade of some sort, even + if it be that of theft) on tribute exacted from the Christian + populations, and extorted, not in return for any work of + administration, but simply because he was the stronger. And that + has made his rule intolerable, and is the cause of this war. + + Now, my whole thesis is that understanding, work, co-operation, + adjustment, must be the basis of human society; that conquest as a + means of achieving national advantage must fail; that to base your + prosperity or means of livelihood, your economic system, in short, + upon having more force than someone else, and exercising it against + him, is an impossible form of human relationship that is bound to + break down. And Mr. Chesterton says that the war in the Balkans + demolishes this thesis. I do not agree with him. + + The present war in the Balkans is an attempt--and happily a + successful one--to bring this reign of force and conquest to an + end, and that is why those of us who do not believe in military + force rejoice. + + The debater, more concerned with verbal consistency than realities + and the establishment of sound principles, will say that this means + the approval of war. It does not; it merely means the choice of the + less evil of two forms of war. War has been going on in the + Balkans, not for a month, but has been waged by the Turks daily + against these populations for 400 years. + + The Balkan peoples have now brought to an end a system of rule + based simply upon the accident of force--"killing and being + killed." And whether good or ill comes of this war will depend upon + whether they set up a similar system or one more in consonance with + pacifist principles. I believe they will choose the latter course; + that is to say, they will continue to co-operate between themselves + instead of fighting between themselves; they will settle + differences by discussion, adjustment, not force. But if they are + guided by Mr. Chesterton's principle, if each one of the Balkan + nations is determined to impose its own especial point of view, to + refuse all settlement by co-operation and understanding, where it + can resort to force--why, in that case, the strongest (presumably + Bulgaria) will start conquering the rest, start imposing government + by force, and will listen to no discussion or argument; will + simply, in short, take the place of the Turk in the matter, and the + old weary contest will begin afresh, and we shall have the Turkish + system under a new name, until that in its turn is destroyed, and + the whole process begun again _da capo_. And if Mr. Chesterton says + that this is not his philosophy, and that he would recommend the + Balkan nations to come to an understanding, and co-operate + together, instead of fighting one another, why does he give + different counsels to the nations of Christendom as a whole? If it + is well for the Balkan peoples to abandon conflict as between + themselves in favour of co-operation against the common enemy, why + is it ill for the other Christian peoples to abandon such conflict + in favour of co-operation against their common enemy, which is wild + nature and human error, ignorance and passion. + +[Footnote 5: From "Everyman" to whose Editor I am indebted for +permission to print my reply.] + + + +CHAPTER V. + +OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BALKAN WARS. + +Mr. Winston Churchill on the "Responsibility" of Diplomacy--What does he +mean?--An easy (and popular) philosophy--Can we neglect past if we would +avoid future errors?--British temper and policy in the Crimean War--What +are its lessons?--Why we fought a war to sustain the "integrity and +independence of the Turkish dominion in Europe"--Supporting the Turk +against his Christian victims--From fear of Russian growth which we are +now aiding--The commentary of events--Shall we back the wrong horse +again? + + + Here was a war which had broken out in spite of all that rulers and + diplomatists could do to prevent it, a war in which the Press had + had no part, a war which the whole force of the money power had + been subtly and steadfastly directed to prevent, which had come + upon us not through the ignorance or credulity of the people; but, + on the contrary, through their knowledge of their history and their + destiny.... Who is the man who is vain enough to suppose that the + long antagonisms of history and of time can in all circumstances be + adjusted by the smooth and superficial conventions of politicians + and ambassadors? + +Thus Mr. Churchill. It is a plea for the inevitability, not merely of +war, but of a people's "destiny." + +What precisely does it mean? Does it mean that the European Powers have +in the past been entirely wise and honest, have never intrigued with +the Turk the one against the other, have always kept good faith, have +never been inspired by false political theories and tawdry and shoddy +ideals, have, in short, no responsibility for the abominations that have +gone on in the Balkan peninsula for a century? No one outside a lunatic +asylum would urge it. But, then, that means that diplomacy has _not_ +done all it might to prevent this war. Why does Mr. Churchill say it +has? + +And does the passage I have quoted mean that we--that English +diplomacy--has had no part in European diplomacy in the past? Have we +not, on the contrary, by universal admission played a predominant role +by backing the wrong horse? + +But, then, that is not a popular thing to point out, and Mr. Churchill +is very careful not to point it out in any way that could give +justification to an unpopular view or discredit a popular one. He is, +however, far too able a Cabinet Minister to ignore obvious facts, and it +is interesting to note how he disposes of them. Observe the following +passage: + + For the drama or tragedy which is moving to its climax in the + Balkans we all have our responsibilities, and none of us can escape + our share of them by blaming others or by blaming the Turk. If + there is any man here who, looking back over the last 35 years, + thinks he knows where to fix the sole responsibility for all the + procrastination and provocation, for all the jealousies and + rivalries, for all the religious and racial animosities, which have + worked together for this result, I do not envy him his + complacency.... Whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the + Powers or sit in sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no + consequence at the present moment. + +Now if for this tragedy we "all have our responsibility," then what +becomes of his first statement that the war is raging despite all that +rulers and diplomats could do to prevent it? If the war was +"inevitable," and rulers and diplomats have done all they could to +prevent it, neither they nor we have any responsibility for it. He +knows, of course, that it is impossible to deny that responsibility, +that our errors in the past _have_ been due not to any lack of readiness +to fight or quarrel with foreign nations, but precisely to the tendency +to do those things and our _in_disposition to set aside instinctive and +reasonless jealousies and rivalries in favour of a deeper sense of +responsibility and a somewhat longer vision. + +But, again, this quite obvious moral, that if we have our +responsibility, if, in other words, we have _not_ done all that we might +and _have_ been led away by temper and passion, we should, in order to +avoid a repetition of such errors in the future, try and see where we +have erred in the past, is precisely the moral that Mr. Churchill does +_not_ draw. Again, it is not the popular line to show with any +definiteness that we have been wrong. An abstract proposition that "we +all have our responsibilities," is, while a formal admission of the +obvious fact also at the same time, an excuse, almost a justification. +You realise Mr. Churchill's method: Having made the necessary admission +of fact, you immediately prevent any unpleasant (or unpopular) practical +conclusion concerning our duty in the matter by talking of the +"complacency" of those who would fix any real and definite part of the +responsibility upon you. (Because, of course, no man, knows where lies, +and no one would ever attempt to fix, the "sole" responsibility). +Incidentally, one might point out to Mr. Churchill that the attempt to +see the errors of past conduct and to avoid them in the future is _not_ +complacency, but that airily to dismiss our responsibility by saying +that it is of "no consequence whether we sit in sackcloth and ashes" +_is_ complacency. + +Mr. Churchill's idea seems to be that men should forget their +errors--and commit them again. For that is what it amounts to. We +cannot, indeed, undo the past, that is true; but we can prevent it +being repeated. But we certainly shall not prevent such repetition if we +hug the easy doctrine that we have always been right--that it is not +worth while to see how our principles have worked out in practice, to +take stock of our experience, and to see what results the principles we +propose again to put into operation, have given. + +The practical thing for us if we would avoid like errors in the future +is to see where _our_ responsibility lies--a thing which we shall never +do if we are governed by the net impression which disengages itself from +speeches like those of Mr. Churchill. For the net result of that speech, +the impression, despite a few shrewd qualifications which do not in +reality affect that net result but which may be useful later wherewith +to silence critics, is that war is inevitable, a matter of "destiny," +that diplomacy--the policy pursued by the respective powers--can do +nothing to prevent it; that as brute force is the one and final appeal +the only practical policy is to have plenty of armaments and to show a +great readiness to fight; that it is futile to worry about past errors; +(especially as an examination of them would go a long way to discredit +the policy just indicated); that the troublesome and unpopular people +who in the past happen to have kept their heads during a prevailing +dementia--and whose policy happens to have been as right as that of the +popular side was wrong--can be dismissed with left-handed references to +"complacency," This sort of thing is popular enough, of course, but-- + +Well, I will take the risks of a tactic which is the exact contrary to +that adopted by Mr. Churchill and would urge upon those whose patriotism +is not of the order which is ready to see their country in the wrong and +who do feel some responsibility for its national policy, to ask +themselves these questions: + +Is it true that the Powers could have prevented in large measure the +abominations which Turkey has practised in the Balkans for the last +half-century or so? + +Has our own policy been a large factor in determining that of the +Powers? + +Has our own policy directly prevented in the past the triumph of the +Christian populations which, despite that policy, has finally taken +place? + +Was our own policy at fault when we were led into a war to ensure the +"integrity and independence of the Turkish dominions in Europe"? + +Is the general conception of Statecraft on which that policy has been +based--the "Balance of Power" which presupposes the necessary rivalry of +nations and which in the past has led to oppose Russia as it is now +leading to oppose Germany--sound, and has it been justified in history? + +Did we give due weight to the considerations urged by the public men of +the past who opposed such features of this policy as the Crimean War; +was the immense popularity of that war any test of its wisdom; were the +rancour, hatred and scorn poured upon those men just or deserved? + + * * * * * + +Now the first four of these questions have been answered by history and +are answered by every one to-day in an emphatic affirmative. This is not +the opinion of a Pacifist partisan. Even the _Times_ is constrained to +admit that "these futile conflicts might have ended years ago, if it had +not been for the quarrels of the Western nations."[6] And as to the +Crimean War, has not the greatest Conservative foreign minister of the +nineteenth century admitted that "we backed the wrong horse"--and, what +is far more to the point, have not events unmistakably demonstrated it? + +Do we quite realise that if foreign policy had that continuity which +the political pundits pretend, we should now be fighting on the side of +the Turk against the Balkan States? That we have entered into solemn +treaty obligations, as part of our national policy, to guarantee for +ever the "integrity and independence of the Turkish dominions in +Europe," that we fought a great and popular war to prevent that triumph +of the Christian population which will arise as the result of the +present war? That but for this policy which caused us to maintain the +Turk in Europe the present war would certainly not be raging, and, what +is much more to the point, that but for our policy the abominations +which have provoked it and which it is its object to terminate, would so +far as human reason can judge at all have been brought to an end +generations since? Do we quite realise that _we_ are in large part +responsible, not merely for the war, but for the long agony of horror +which have provoked it and made it necessary; that when we talk of the +jealousies and rivalries of the Powers as playing so large a part in the +responsibility for these things, we represent, perhaps, the chief among +those jealousies and rivalries? That it is not mainly the Turk nor the +Russian nor the Austrian which has determined the course of history in +the Balkan peninsular since the middle of the 19th century, but we +Englishmen--the country gentleman obsessed by vague theories of the +Balance of Power and heaven knows what, reading his _Times_ and barking +out his preposterous politics over the dinner table? That this fatal +policy was dictated simply by fear of the growth of "Russian barbarism +and autocracy" and "the overshadowing of the Western nations by a +country whose institutions are inimical to our own"? That while we were +thus led into war by a phantom danger to our Indian possessions, we were +quite blind to the real danger which threatened them, which a year or +two later, in the Mutiny, nearly lost us them and which were not due to +the machinations of a rival power but to our own misgovernment; that +this very "barbaric growth" and expansion towards India which we fought +a war to check we are now actively promoting in Persia and elsewhere by +our (effective) alliance? That while as recently as fifteen years ago we +would have gone to war to prevent any move of Russia towards the Indian +frontier, we are to-day actually encouraging her to build a railway +there? And that it is now another nation which stands as the natural +barrier to Russian expansion to the West--Germany--whose power we are +challenging, and that all tendencies point to our backing again the +wrong horse, to our fighting _with_ the "semi-Asiatic barbarian" (as our +fathers used to call him) against the nation which has close racial and +cultural affinity to our own, just as half a century since the same +fatal obsession about the "Balance of Power" led us to fight with the +Mohammedan in order to bolster up for half a century his anti-Christian +rule. + +The misreading of history in this matter is, unfortunately, not +possible. The point upon which in the Crimean war the negotiations with +Russia finally broke was the claim, based upon her reading of the Vienna +note, to stand as religious protector of the Greek Christians in the +Balkan peninsular. That was the pivot of the whole negotiations, and the +war was the outcome of our support of the Turkish view--or, rather, our +conduct of Turkish policy, for throughout the whole period England was +conducting the Turkish negotiations; indeed, as Bright said at the time, +she was carrying on the Turkish Government and ruling the Turkish Empire +through her ministers in Constantinople. + +I will quote a speech of the period made in the House of Commons. It was +as follows: + + Our opponents seem actuated by a frantic and bitter hostility to + Russia, and, without considering the calamities in which they might + involve this country, they have sought to urge it into a great war, + as they imagined, on behalf of European freedom, and in order to + cripple the resources of Russia.... + + The question is, whether the advantages both to Turkey and England + of avoiding war altogether, would have been less than those which + are likely to arise from the policy which the Government has + pursued? Now, if the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton is right in + saying that Turkey is a growing power, and that she has elements of + strength which unlearned persons like myself know nothing about; + surely no immediate, or sensible, or permanent mischief could have + arisen to her from the acceptance of the Vienna note, which all the + distinguished persons who agreed to it have declared to be + perfectly consistent with her honour and independence. If she had + been growing stronger and stronger of late years, surely she would + have grown still stronger in the future, and there might have been + a reasonable expectation that, whatever disadvantages she might + have suffered for a time from that note, her growing strength would + have enabled her to overcome them, while the peace of Europe might + have been preserved. But suppose that Turkey is not a growing + power, but that the Ottoman rule in Europe is tottering to its + fall, I come to the conclusion that, whatever advantages were + afforded to the Christian population of Turkey would have enabled + them to grow more rapidly in numbers, in industry, in wealth, in + intelligence, and in political power; and that, as they thus + increased in influence, they would have become more able, in case + any accident, which might not be far distant, occurred, to + supplant the Mahommedan rule, and to establish themselves in + Constantinople as a Christian State, which, I think, every man who + hears me will admit is infinitely more to be desired than that the + Mahommedan power should be permanently sustained by the bayonets of + France and the fleets of England. Europe would thus have been at + peace; for I do not think even the most bitter enemies of Russia + believe that the Emperor of Russia intended last year, if the + Vienna note or Prince Menchikoff's last and most moderate + proposition had been accepted, to have marched on Constantinople. + Indeed, he had pledged himself in the most distinct manner to + withdraw his troops at once from the Principalities, if the Vienna + note were accepted; and therefore in that case Turkey would have + been delivered from the presence of the foe; peace would for a time + have been secured for Europe; and the whole matter would have + drifted on to its natural solution--which is, that the Mahommedan + power in Europe should eventually succumb to the growing power of + the Christian population of the Turkish territories. + +Now, looking back upon what has since happened, which view shows the +greater wisdom and prevision? That of the man who delivered this speech +(and he was John Bright) or those against whom he spoke? To which set of +principles has time given the greater justification? + +Yet upon the men who resisted what we all admit, in this case at least, +to have been the false theories and who supported, what we equally admit +now, to have been the right principles, we poured the same sort of +ferocious contempt that we are apt now spasmodically to pour upon those +who, sixty years later, would prevent our drifting in the same blind +fashion into a war just as futile and bound to be infinitely more +disastrous--a war embodying the same "principles" supported by just the +same theories and just the same arguments which led us into this other +one. + +I know full well the prejudice which the names I am about to cite is apt +to cause. We poured out upon the men who bore them a rancour, contempt +and hatred which few men in English public life have had to face. +Morley, in his life of Cobden, says of these two men--Cobden and Bright: + + They had, as Lord Palmerston said, the whole world against them. It + was not merely the august personages of the Court, nor the + illustrious veterans in Government and diplomacy, nor the most + experienced politicians in Parliament, nor the powerful + journalists, nor the men versed in great affairs of business. It + was no light thing to confront even that solid mass of hostile + judgment. But besides all this, Cobden and Mr. Bright knew that the + country at large, even their trusty middle and industrial classes, + had turned their faces resolutely and angrily away from them. Their + own great instrument, the public meeting, was no longer theirs to + wield. The army of the Nonconformists, which has so seldom been + found fighting on the wrong side, was seriously divided. + + Public opinion was bitterly and impatiently hostile and + intractable. Mr. Bright was burnt in effigy. Cobden, at a meeting + in his own constituency, after an energetic vindication of his + opinions, saw resolutions carried against him. Every morning they + were reviled in half the newspapers in the country as enemies of + the commonwealth. They were openly told that they were traitors, + and that it was a pity they could not be punished as traitors. + + In the House, Lord Palmerston once began his reply by referring to + Mr. Bright as "the Honourable and Reverend gentleman," Cobden rose + to call him to order for this flippant and unbecoming phrase. Lord + Palmerston said he would not quarrel about words. Then went on to + say that he thought it right to tell Mr. Bright that his opinion + was a matter of entire difference, and that he treated his censure + with the most perfect indifference and contempt. On another + occasion he showed the same unmannerliness to Cobden himself. + Cobden had said that under certain circumstances he would fight, or + if he could not fight, he would work for the wounded in the + hospitals. "Well," said Lord Palmerston in reply, with the sarcasm + of a schoolboy's debating society, "there are many people in this + country who think that the party to which he belongs should go + immediately into a hospital of a different kind, and which I shall + not mention." This refined irony was a very gentle specimen of the + insult and contumely which was poured upon Cobden and Mr. Bright at + this time.... + + It is impossible not to regard the attitude of the two objects of + this vast unpopularity as one of the most truly honourable + spectacles in our political history. The moral fortitude, like the + political wisdom of these two strong men, begins to stand out with + a splendour that already recalls the great historic heights of + statesmanship and patriotism. Even now our heart-felt admiration + and gratitude goes out to them as it goes out to Burke for his + lofty and manful protests against the war with America and the + oppression of Ireland, and to Charles Fox for his bold and + strenuous resistance to the war with the French Republic. + +Before indulging in the dementia which those names usually produce, will +the reader please note that it is not my business now to defend either +the general principles of Cobden and Bright or the political spirit +which they are supposed to represent. Let them be as sordid, mean, +unworthy, pusillanimous as you like--and as the best of us then said +they were ("a mean, vain, mischievous clique" even so good a man as Tom +Hughes could call them). We called them cowards--because practically +alone they faced a country which had become a howling mob; we called +their opponents "courageous" because with the whole country behind them +they habitually poured contempt upon the under dog. + +And we thus hated these men because they did their best to dissuade us +from undertaking a certain war. Very good; we have had our war; we +carried our point, we prevented the break-up of the Turkish Empire; +those men were completely beaten. And they are dead. Cannot we afford +to set aside those old passions and see how far in one particular at +least they may have been right? + +We admit, of course, if we are honest--happily everyone admits--that +these despised men were right and those who abused them were wrong. The +verdict of fact is there. Says Lord Morley:-- + + When we look back upon the affairs of that time, we see that there + were two policies open. Lord Palmerston's was one, Cobden and + Bright's the other. If we are to compare Lord Palmerston's + statesmanship and insight in the Eastern Question with that of his + two great adversaries, it is hard, in the light of all that has + happened since, to resist the conclusion that Cobden and Mr. Bright + were right, and Lord Palmerston was disastrously wrong. It is easy + to plead extenuating circumstances for the egregious mistakes in + Lord Palmerston's policy about the Eastern Question, the Suez Canal, + and some other important subjects; but the plea can only be allowed + after it has been frankly recognized that they really were mistakes, + and that these abused men exposed and avoided them. Lord Palmerston, + for instance, asked why the Czar could not be "satisfied, as we all + are, with the progressively liberal system of Turkey." Cobden, in + his pamphlet twenty years before, insisted that this progressively + liberal system of Turkey had no existence. Which of these two + propositions was true may be left to the decision of those who lent + to the Turk many millions of money on the strength of Lord + Palmerston's ignorant and delusive assurances. It was mainly owing + to Lord Palmerston, again, that the efforts of the war were + concentrated at Sebastopol. Sixty thousand English and French + troops, he said, with the co-operation of the fleets, would take + Sebastopol in six weeks. Cobden gave reasons for thinking very + differently, and urged that the destruction of Sebastopol, even when + it was achieved, would neither inflict a crushing blow to Russia, + nor prevent future attacks upon Turkey. Lord Palmerston's error may + have been intelligible and venial; nevertheless, as a fact, he was + in error and Cobden was not, and the error cost the nation one of + the most unfortunate, mortifying, and absolutely useless campaigns + in English history. Cobden held that if we were to defend Turkey + against Russia, the true policy was to use our navy, and not to send + a land force to the Crimea. Would any serious politician now be + found to deny it? We might prolong the list of propositions, general + and particular, which Lord Palmerston maintained and Cobden + traversed, from the beginning to the end of the Russian War. There + is not one of these propositions in which later events have not + shown that Cobden's knowledge was greater, his judgment cooler, his + insight more penetrating and comprehensive. The bankruptcy of the + Turkish Government, the further dismemberment of its Empire by the + Treaty of Berlin, the abrogation of the Black Sea Treaty, have + already done something to convince people that the two leaders saw + much further ahead in 1854 and 1855 than men who had passed all + their lives in foreign chanceries and the purlieus of Downing + Street. + + It is startling to look back upon the bullying contempt which the + man who was blind permitted himself to show to the men who could + see. The truth is, that to Lord Palmerston it was still + incomprehensible and intolerable that a couple of manufacturers from + Lancashire should presume to teach him foreign policy. Still more + offensive to him was their introduction of morality into the + mysteries of the Foreign Office.[7] + +What have peace theories to do with this war? asks the practical man, +who is the greatest mystic of all, contemptuously. Well, they have +everything to do with it. For if we had understood some peace theories a +little better a generation or two ago, if we had not allowed passion and +error and prejudice instead of reason to dominate our policy, the sum of +misery which these Balkan populations have known would have been +immeasurably less. It is quite true that we could not have prevented +this war by sending peace pamphlets to the Turk, or to the Balkanese, +for that matter, but we could have prevented it if we ourselves had read +them a generation or two since, just as our only means of preventing +future wars is by showing a little less prejudice and a little less +blindness. + +And the practical question, despite Mr. Churchill, is whether we shall +allow a like passion and a like prejudice again to blind us; whether we +shall again back the wrong horse in the name of the same hollow theories +drifting to a similar but greater futility and catastrophe, or whether +we shall profit by our past to assure a better future. + +[Footnote 6: 14/11/12] + +[Footnote 7: _The Life of Richard Cobden._--UNWIN.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +PACIFISM, DEFENCE, AND "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAR." + +Did the Crimean War prove Bright and Cobden wrong?--Our curious +reasoning--Mr. Churchill on "illusions"--The danger of war is not the +illusion but its benefits--We are all Pacifists now since we all desire +Peace--Will more armaments alone secure it?--The experience of +mankind--War "the failure of human wisdom"--Therefore more wisdom is the +remedy--But the Militarists only want more arms--The German Lord +Roberts--The military campaign against political Rationalism--How to +make war certain. + + +The question surely, which for practical men stands out from the mighty +historical episode touched on in the last chapter, is this: Was the fact +that these despised men were so entirely right and their triumphant +adversaries so entirely wrong a mere fluke, or was it due to the +soundness of one set of principles and the hollowness of the other; and +were the principles special to that case, or general to international +conflict as a whole? + +To have an opinion of worth on that question we must get away from +certain confusions and misrepresentations. + +It is a very common habit for the Bellicist to quote the list of wars +which have taken place since the Crimean War as proof of the error of +Bright and Cobden. But what are the facts? + +Here were two men who strenuously and ruthlessly opposed a certain +policy; they urged, not only that it would inevitably lead to war, but +that the war would be futile--but not sterile, for they saw that others +would grow from it. Their counsel was disregarded and the war came, and +events have proved that they were right and the war-makers wrong, and +the very fact that the wars took place is cited as disapproving their +"theories."[8] + +It is a like confusion of thought which prompts Mr. Churchill to refer +to Pacifists as people who deem the _danger_ of war an illusion. + +This persistent misconception is worth a little examination. + + * * * * * + +The smoke from the first railway engines in England killed the cattle +and the poultry of the country gentlemen near whose property the +railroad passed--at least, that is what the country gentleman wrote to +the _Times_. + +Now if in the domain of quite simple material things the dislike of +having fixed habits of thought disturbed, leads gentlemen to resent +innovations in that way, it is not astonishing that innovations of a +more intangible and elusive kind should be subject to a like unconscious +misrepresentation, especially by newspapers and public men pushed by +commercial or political necessity to say the popular thing rather than +the true thing: that contained in the speech of Mr. Churchill, which, +together with a newspaper comment thereon, I have made the "text" of +this little book, is a typical case in point. + +It is possible, of course, that Mr. Churchill in talking about "persons +who profess to know that the danger of war has become an illusion," had +not the slightest intention of referring to those who share the views +embodied in "The Great Illusion," which are, _not_ that the danger of +war is an illusion, but that the benefit is. All that happened was that +his hearers and readers interpreted his words as referring thereto; and +that, of course, he could not possibly prevent. + +In any case, to misrepresent an author (and I mean always, of course, +quite sincere and unconscious misrepresentations, like that which led +the country gentlemen to write that railway smoke killed poultry) is a +trifling matter, but to misrepresent an idea, is not, for it makes that +better understanding of facts, the creation of a more informed public +opinion, by which alone we can avoid a possibly colossal folly, an +understanding difficult enough as it is, still more difficult. + +And that is why the current misrepresentation (again unconscious) of +most efforts at the better understanding of the facts of international +relationship needs very badly to be corrected. I will therefore be very +definite. + +The implication that Pacifists of any kind have ever urged that war is +impossible is due either to that confusion of thought just touched upon, +or is merely a silly gibe of those who deride arguments to which they +have not listened, and consequently do not understand, or which they +desire to misrepresent; and such misrepresentation is, when not +unconscious, always stupid and unfair. + +So far as I am concerned, I have never written a line, nor, so far as I +know, has anyone else, to plead that war is impossible. I have, on the +contrary, always urged, with the utmost emphasis that war is not only +possible but extremely likely, so long as we remain as ignorant as we +are concerning what it can accomplish, and unless we use our energies +and efforts to prevent it, instead of directing those efforts to create +it. What anti-Bellicists as a whole urge, is not that war is impossible +or improbable, but that it is impossible to benefit by it; that conquest +must, in the long run, fail to achieve advantage; that the general +recognition of this can only add to our security. And incidentally most +of us have declared our complete readiness to take any demonstrably +necessary measure for the maintenance of armament, but urge that the +effort must not stop there. + +One is justified in wondering whether the public men--statesmen, +soldiers, bishops, preachers, journalists--who indulge in this gibe, are +really unable to distinguish between the plea that a thing is unwise, +foolish, and the plea that it is impossible; whether they really suppose +that anyone in our time could argue that human folly is impossible, or +an "illusion." It is quite evidently a tragic reality. Undoubtedly the +readiness with which these critics thus fall back upon confusion +of thought indicates that they themselves have illimitable confidence in +it. But the confusion of thought does not stop here. + +I have spoken of Pacifists and Bellicists, but, of course, we are all +Pacifists now. Lord Roberts, Lord Charles Beresford, Lord Fisher, Mr. +Winston Churchill, The Navy League, the Navier League, the Universal +Military Service League, the German Emperor, the Editor of _The +Spectator_, all the Chancelleries of Europe, alike declare that their +one object is the maintenance of peace. Never were such Pacifists. The +German Emperor, speaking to his army, invariably points out that they +stand for the peace of Europe. Does a First Lord want new ships? It is +because a strong British Navy is the best guarantee of peace. Lord +Roberts wants conscription because that is the one way to preserve +peace, and the Editor of _The Spectator_ tells us that Turkey's great +crime is that she has not paid enough attention to soldiering and +armament, that if only she had been stronger all would have been well. +All alike are quite persuaded indeed that the one way to peace is to get +more armament. + +Well, that is the method that mankind has pursued during the whole of +its history; it has never shown the least disposition not to take this +advice and not to try this method to the full. And written history, to +say nothing of unwritten history, is there to tell us how well it has +succeeded. + +Unhappily, one has to ask whether some of these military Pacifists +really want it to succeed? Again I do not tax any with conscious +insincerity. But it does result not merely from what some imply, but +from what they say. For certain of these doughty Pacifists having told +you how much their one object is to secure peace, then proceed to tell +you that this thing which they hope to secure is a very evil thing, that +under its blighting influence nations wane in luxury and sloth. And of +course they imply that our own nation, about a third of whom have not +enough to eat and about another third of whom have a heart-breaking +struggle with small means and precariousness of livelihood, is in danger +of this degeneration which comes from too much wealth and luxury and +sloth and ease. I could fill a dozen books the size of this with the +solemn warning of such Pacifists as these against the danger of peace +(which they tell you they are struggling to maintain), and how splendid +and glorious a thing, how fine a discipline is war (which they tell you +they are trying so hard to avoid). Thus the Editor of _The Spectator_ +tells us that mankind cannot yet dispense with the discipline of war; +and Lord Roberts, that to make war when you are really ready for it (or +that in any case for Germany to do it) is "an excellent policy and one +to be pursued by every nation prepared to play a great part in history." + +The truth is, of course, that we are not likely to get peace from those +who believe it to be an evil thing and war and aggression a good thing, +or, at least, are very mixed in their views as to this. Before men can +secure peace they must at least make up their minds whether it is peace +or war they want. If you do not know what you want, you are not likely +to get it--or you are likely to get it, whichever way you prefer to put +it. + +And that is another thing which divides us from the military Pacifists: +we really do want peace. As between war and peace we have made our +choice, and having made it, stick to it. There may be something to be +said for war--for settling a thing by fighting about it instead of by +understanding it,--just as there may be something to be said for the +ordeal, or the duel, as against trial by evidence, for the rack as a +corrective of religious error, for judicial torture as a substitute for +cross-examination, for religious wars, for all these things--but the +balance of advantage is against them and we have discarded them. + +But there is a still further difference which divides us: We have +realised that we discarded those things only when we really understood +their imperfections and that we arrived at that understanding by +studying them, by discussing them,--because one man in London or another +in Paris raised plainly and boldly the whole question of their wisdom +and because the intellectual ferment created by those interrogations, +either in the juridical or religious field, re-acted on the minds of men +in Geneva or Wurtenburg or Rome or Madrid. It was by this means, not by +improving the rapiers or improving the instruments of the inquisition, +that we got rid of the duel and that Catholics ceased to torture +Protestants or _vice versa_. We gave these things up because we realised +the futility of physical force in these conflicts. We shall give up war +for the same reason. + +But the Bellicist says that discussions of this sort, these attempts to +find out the truth, are but the encouragement of pernicious theories: +there is, according to him, but one way--better rapiers, more and better +racks, more and better inquisitions. + +Mr. Bonar Law, in one of the very wisest phrases ever pronounced by a +statesman, has declared that "war is the failure of human wisdom." + +That is the whole case of Pacifism: we shall not improve except at the +price of using our reason in these matters; of understanding them +better. Surely it is a truism that that is the price of all progress; +saner conceptions--man's recognition of his mistakes, whether those +mistakes take the form of cannibalism, slavery, torture, superstition, +tyranny, false laws, or what you will. The veriest savage, or for that +matter the ape, can blindly fight, but whether the animal develops into +a man, or the savage into civilized man, depends upon whether the +element of reason enters in an increasing degree into the solution of +his problems. + +The Militarist argues otherwise. He admits the difficulty comes from +man's small disposition to think; therefore don't think--fight. We +fight, he says, because we have insufficient wisdom in these matters; +therefore do not let us trouble to get more wisdom or understanding; all +we need do is to get better weapons. I am not misrepresenting him; that +is quite fairly the popular line: it is no use talking about these +things or trying to explain them, all that is logic and theories; what +you want to do is to get a bigger army or more battleships. And, of +course, the Bellicist on the other side of the frontier says exactly the +same thing, and I am still waiting to have explained to me how, +therefore, if this matter depends upon understanding, we can ever solve +it by neglecting understanding, which the Militarist urges us to do. Not +only does he admit, but pleads, that these things are complex, and +supposes that that is an argument why they should not be studied. + +And a third distinction will, I think, make the difference between us +still clearer. Like the Bellicist, I am in favour of defence. If in a +duelling society a duellist attacked me, or, as a Huguenot in the Paris +of the sixteenth century a Catholic had attacked me, I should certainly +have defended myself, and if needs be have killed my aggressor. But that +attitude would not have prevented my doing my small part in the creation +of a public opinion which should make duelling or such things as the +massacre of St. Bartholomew impossible by showing how unsatisfactory and +futile they were; and I should know perfectly well that neither would +stop until public opinion had, as the result of education of one kind or +another, realised their futility. But it is as certain as anything can +be that the Churchills of that society or of that day would have been +vociferous in declaring (as in the case of the duel they still to-day +declare in Prussia) that this attempt to prove the futility of duelling +was not only a bad and pernicious campaign, but was in reality a subtle +attempt to get people killed in the street by bullies, and that those +who valued their security would do their best to discredit all +anti-duelling propaganda--by misrepresentation, if needs be. + +Let this matter be quite clear. No one who need be considered in this +discussion would think of criticising Lord Roberts for wanting the army, +and Mr. Churchill for wanting the navy, to be as good and efficient as +possible and as large as necessary. Personally--and I speak, I know, for +many of my colleagues in the anti-war movement--I would be prepared to +support British conscription if it be demonstrably wise or necessary. +But what we criticise is the persistent effort to discredit honest +attempts at a better understanding of the facts of international +relationship, the everlasting gibe which it is thought necessary to +fling at any constructive effort, apart from armament, to make peace +secure. These men profess to be friends of peace, they profess to +regret the growth of armament, to deplore the unwisdom, ignorance, +prejudice and misunderstanding out of which the whole thing grows, but +immediately there is any definite effort to correct this unwisdom, to +examine the grounds of the prejudice and misunderstanding, there is a +volte face and such efforts are sneered at as "sentimental" or "sordid," +according as the plea for peace is put upon moral or material grounds. +It is not that they disagree in detail with any given proposition +looking towards a basis of international co-operation, but that in reality +they deprecate raising the matter at all.[9] It must be armaments and +nothing but armaments with them. If there had been any possibility of +success in that we should not now be entering upon the 8,000th or +9,000th war of written history. Armaments may be necessary, but they are +not enough. Our plan is armaments plus education; theirs is armament +versus education. And by education, of course, we do not mean school +books, or an extension of the School Board curriculum, but a recognition +of the fact that the character of human society is determined by the +extent to which its units attempt to arrive at an _understanding_ of +their relationship, instead of merely subduing one another by force, +which does not lead to understanding at all: in Turkey, or Venezuela, or +San Domingo, there is no particular effort made to adjust differences by +understanding; in societies of that type they only believe in settling +differences by armaments. That is why there are very few books, very +little thought or discussion, very little intellectual ferment but a +great many guns and soldiers and battles. And throughout the world the +conflict is going on between these rival schools. On the whole the +Western world, inside the respective frontiers, almost entirely now +tends to the Pacifist type. But not so in the international field, for +where the Powers are concerned, where it is a question of the attitude +of one nation in relation to another, you get a degree of understanding +rather less than more than that which obtains in the internal politics +of Venezuela, or Turkey, or Morocco, or any other "warlike" state. + +And the difficulty of creating a better European opinion and temper is +due largely to just this idea that obsesses the Militarist, that unless +they misrepresent facts in a sensational direction the nations will be +too apathetic to arm; that education will abolish funk, and that +presumably funk is a necessary element in self-defence. + +For the most creditable explanation that we can give of the Militarist's +objection to having this matter discussed at all, is the evident +impression that such discussion will discourage measures for +self-defence; the Militarist does not believe that a people desiring to +understand these things and interested in the development of a better +European society, can at the same time be determined to resist the use +of force. They believe that unless the people are kept in a blue funk, +they will not arm, and that is why it is that the Militarist of the +respective countries are for ever talking about our degeneration and the +rest. And the German Militarist is just as angry with the unwarlike +qualities of his people as the English Militarist is with ours. + +Just note this parallel: + + BRITISH OPINION ON BRITISH APATHY AND GERMAN VIGOUR. + + "There is a way in which Britain is certain to have war and its + horrors and calamities; it is this--by persisting in her present + course of unpreparedness, her apathy, unintelligence, and blindness, + and in her disregard of the warnings of the most ordinary political + insight, as well as of the example of history. + + "Now in the year 1912, just as in 1866, and just as in 1870, war + will take place the instant the German forces by land and sea are, + by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory as + anything in human calculation can be made certain. 'Germany strikes + when Germany's hour has struck.' That is the time-honoured policy of + her Foreign Office. It is her policy at the present hour, and it is + an excellent policy. It is, or should be, the policy of every nation + prepared to play a great part in history."--LORD ROBERTS, at + Manchester. + + "Britain is disunited; Germany is homogeneous. We are quarrelling + about the Lords' Veto, Home Rule, and a dozen other questions of + domestic politics. We have a Little Navy Party, an Anti-Militarist + Party; Germany is unanimous upon the question of naval + expansion."--MR. BLATCHFORD. + + + GERMAN OPINION ON GERMAN APATHY AND BRITISH VIGOUR. + + "Whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm + which constituted the greatness of its history. With the increase of + wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of sacrificing + the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great conceptions, and + close their eyes complacently to the duties of our future and to the + pressing problems of international life which await a solution at + the present time."--GENERAL VON BERNHARDI in "Germany and the Next + War." + + "There is no one German people, no single Germany.... There are more + abrupt contrasts between Germans and Germans than between Germans + and Indians." + + "One must admire the consistent fidelity and patriotism of the + English race, as compared with the uncertain and erratic methods of + the German people, their mistrust, and suspicion.... In spite of + numerous wars, bloodshed, and disaster, England always emerges + smoothly and easily from her military crises and settles down to new + conditions and surroundings in her usual cool and deliberate manner, + so different from the German."--_Berliner Tageblatt_, March 14, 1911. + +Presumably each doughty warrior knows his own country better than that +of the other, which would carry a conclusion directly contrary to that +which he draws. + +But note also where this idea that it is necessary artificially to +stimulate the defensive zeal of each country by resisting any tendency +to agreement and understanding leads. It leads even so good a man as +Lord Roberts into the trap of dogmatic prophesy concerning the +intentions of a very complex heterogeneous nation of 65 million people. +Lord Roberts could not possibly tell you what his own country will do +five, ten, or fifteen years hence in such matters as Home Rule or the +Suffragists, or even the payment of doctors, but he knows exactly what a +foreign country will do in a much more serious matter. The simple truth +is, of course, that no man knows what "Germany" will do ten years hence, +any more than we can know what "England" will do. We don't even know +what England will _be_, whether Unionist or Liberal or Labour, +Socialist, Free Trade or Protectionist. All these things, like the +question of Peace and War depends upon all sorts of tendencies, drifts +and developments. At bottom, of course, since war, in Mr. Bonar Law's +fine phrase, is "never inevitable--only the failure of human wisdom," it +depends upon whether we become a little less or a little more wise. If +the former, we shall have it; if the latter, we shall not. But this +dogmatism concerning the other man's evil intentions is the very thing that +leads away from wisdom.[10] The sort of temper and ideas which it +provokes on both sides of the frontier may be gathered from just such +average gems as these plucked recently from the English press:-- + + Yes, we may as well face it. _War with Germany is inevitable_, and + the only question is--Shall we consult her convenience as to its + date? Shall we wait till Germany's present naval programme, which + is every year reducing our advantage, is complete? Shall we wait + till the smouldering industrial revolution, of which all these + strikes are warnings, has broken into flame? Shall we wait till + Consols are 65 and our national credit is gone? Shall we wait till + the Income Tax is 1s. 6d. in the pound? OR SHALL WE STRIKE + NOW--_finding every out-of-work a job in connection with the + guardianship of our shores_, and, with our mighty fleet, either + sinking every German ship or towing it in triumph into a British + port? _Why_ should we do it? _Because the command of the seas is + ever ours_; because our island position, our international trade + and our world-wide dominions _demand that no other nation shall + dare to challenge our supremacy_. That is why. Oh, yes, the cost + would be great, but we could raise it to-day all right, _and we + should get it back_. + + If the struggle comes to-day, we shall win--and after it is over, + there will be abounding prosperity in the land, and no more labour + unrest. + + Yes, we have no fear of Germany to-day. The only enemy we fear is + the crack-brained fanatics who prate about peace and goodwill + whilst foreign _Dreadnoughts_ are gradually closing in upon us. As + Mr. Balfour said at the Eugenic Conference the other day, man is a + wild animal; and there is no room, in present circumstances, for + any tame ones.--_John Bull_, Aug. 24, 1912. + +The italics and large type are those of the original, not mine. This +paper explains, by the way, in this connection that "In the +Chancelleries of Europe _John Bull_ is regarded as a negligible +journalistic quantity. But _John Bull_ is read by a million people every +week, and that million not the least thoughtful and intelligent section +of the community, they _think_ about what they read." + +One of the million seems to have thought to some purpose, for the next +week there was the following letter from him. It was given the place of +honour in a series and runs as follows:-- + + I would have extended your "Down with the German Fleet!" to "Down + with Germany and the Germans!" For, unless the whole ---- lot are + swept off the surface of the earth, there will be no peace. If the + people in England could only realise the quarrelsome, deceitful, + underhanded, egotistic any tyrannical character of the Germans, + there would not be so much balderdash about a friendly + understanding, etc., between England and Germany. The German is a + born tyrant. The desire to remain with Britain on good terms will + only last so long until Germany feels herself strong enough to beat + England both on sea and on land: afterwards it'll simply be "_la + bourse ou la vie_," as the French proverb goes. Provided they do not + know that there are any English listeners about, phrases like the + following can be heard every day in German restaurants and other + public places: "I hate England and the English!" "Never mind, they + won't be standing in our way much longer. We shall soon be ready." + +And _John Bull_, with its million readers, is not alone. This is how the +_Daily Express_, in a double-leaded leader, teaches history to its +readers:-- + + When, one day, Englishmen are not allowed to walk the pavements of + their cities, and their women are for the pleasure of the invaders, + and the offices of the Tiny England newspapers are incinerated by a + furious mob; when foreign military officers proclaim martial law + from the Royal Exchange steps, and when some billions of pounds + have to be raised by taxation--by taxation of the "toiling + millions" as well as others--to pay the invaders out, and the + British Empire consists of England--less Dover, required for a + foreign strategic tunnel--and the Channel Islands--then the ghosts + of certain politicians and publicists will probably call a meeting + for the discussion of the Fourth Dimension.--Leading Article, + _Daily Express_, 8/7/12. + +And not merely shall our women fill the harems of the German pashas, +and Englishmen not be allowed to walk upon the pavement (it would be the +German way of solving the traffic problem--near the Bank), but a +"well-known Diplomat" in another paper tells us what else will happen. + + If England be vanquished it means the end of all things as far as + she is concerned, and will ring in a new and somewhat terrible era. + Bankrupt, shorn of all power, deserted, as must clearly follow, as + a commercial state, and groaning under a huge indemnity that she + cannot pay and is not intended to be able to pay, what will be the + melancholy end of this great country and her teeming population of + forty-five millions? + + ... Her shipping trade will be transferred as far as possible from + the English to the German flag. Her banking will be lost, as London + will no longer be the centre of commerce, and efforts will be made + to enable Berlin to take London's place. Her manufactures will + gradually desert her. Failing to obtain payments in due time, + estates will be sequestered and become the property of wealthy + Germans. The indemnity to be demanded is said to be one thousand + millions sterling. + + The immediate result of defeat would mean, of course, that + insolvency would take place in a very large number of commercial + businesses, and others would speedily follow. Those who cannot get + away will starve unless large relief funds are forthcoming from, + say, Canada and the United States, for this country, bereft of its + manufactures, will not be able to sustain a population of more than + a very few millions.--From an Article by "A Well-known + Diplomatist" in _The Throne_, June 12, 1912. + +These are but samples; and this sort of thing is going on in England and +Germany alike. And when one protests that it is wicked rubbish born of +funk and ignorance, that whatever happens in war this does not happen, +and that it is based on false economics and grows into utterly false +conceptions of international relationship, one is shouted down as an +anti-armament man and an enemy of his country. + +Well, if that view is persisted in, if in reality it is necessary for a +people to have lies and nonsense told to them in order to induce them to +defend themselves, some will be apt to decide that they are not worth +defending. Or rather will they decide that this phase of the +pro-armament campaign--which is not so much a campaign in favour of +armament as one against education and understanding--will end in turning +us into a nation either of poltroons or of bullies and aggressors, and +that since life is a matter of the choice of risks it is wiser and more +courageous to choose the less evil. A nation may be defeated and still +live in the esteem of men--and in its own. No civilized man esteems a +nation of Bashi-Bazouks or Prussian Junkers. Of the two risks +involved--the risk of attack arising from a possible superiority of +armament on the part of a rival, and the risk of drifting into conflict +because, concentrating all our energies on the mere instrument of +combat, we have taken no adequate trouble to understand the facts of +this case--it is at least an arguable proposition that the second risk +is the greater. And I am prompted to this expression of opinion without +surrendering one iota of a lifelong and passionate belief that a nation +attacked should defend itself to the last penny and to the last man. + +And you think that this idea that the nations--ours amongst them--may +drift into futile war from sheer panic and funk arising out of the +terror inspired by phantoms born of ignorance, is merely the idea of +Pacifist cranks? + +The following, referring to the "precautionary measures" (_i.e._, +mobilization of armies) taken by the various Powers, is from a leading +article of the _Times_:-- + + "Precautions" are understandable, but the remark of our Berlin + Correspondent that they may produce an untenable position from + which retreat must be humiliating is applicable in more than one + direction. Our Vienna Correspondent truly says that "there is no + valid reason to believe war between Austria-Hungary and Russia to + be inevitable, or even immediately probable." We entirely agree, + but wish we could add that the absence of any valid reason was + placing strict limitations upon the scope of "precautions." The + same correspondent says he is constantly being asked:--"Is there no + means of avoiding war?" The same question is now being asked, with + some bewilderment, by millions of men in this country, who want to + know what difficulties there are in the present situation which + should threaten Europe with a general war, or even a collision + larger than that already witnessed.... There is no great nation in + Europe which to-day has the least desire that millions of men + should be torn from their homes and flung headlong to destruction + at the bidding of vain ambitions. The Balkan peoples fought for a + cause which was peculiarly their own. They were inspired by the + memories of centuries of wrong which they were burning to avenge. + The larger nations have no such quarrel, unless it is wilfully + manufactured for them. The common sense of the peoples of Europe is + well aware that no issue has been presented which could not be + settled by amicable discussion. In England men will learn with + amazement and incredulity that war is possible over the question of + a Servian port, or even over the larger issues which are said to + lie behind it. Yet that is whither the nations are blindly drifting + Who, then, makes war? The answer is to be found in the + Chancelleries of Europe, among the men who have too long played + with human lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so + enmeshed in formulas and the jargon of diplomacy that they have + ceased to be conscious of the poignant realities with which they + trifle. And thus will war continue to be made, until the great + masses who are the sport of professional schemers and dreamers say + the word which, shall bring, not eternal peace, for that is + impossible, but a determination that wars shall be fought only in a + just and righteous and vital cause. If that word is ever to be + spoken, there never was a more appropriate occasion than the + present; and we trust it will be spoken while there is yet time. + +And the very next day there appeared in the _Daily Mail_ an article by +Mr. Lovat Fraser ending thus:-- + + The real answer rests, or ought to rest, with the man in the train. + Does he want to join in Armageddon? It is time that he began to + think about it, for his answer may soon be sought. + +Now we have here, stated in the first case by the most authoritative of +English newspapers, and in the second by an habitual contributor of the +most popular, the whole case of Pacifism as I have attempted to expound +it, namely: (1) That our current statecraft--its fundamental +conceptions, its "axioms," its terminology--has become obsolete by +virtue of the changed conditions of European society; that the causes of +conflict which it creates are half the time based on illusions, upon +meaningless and empty formulas; (2) that its survival is at bottom due +to popular ignorance and indifference--the survival on the part of the +great mass of just those conceptions born of the old and now obsolete +conditions--since diplomacy, like all functions of government, is a +reflection of average opinion; (3) that this public opinion is not +something which descends upon us from the skies but is the sum of the +opinions of each one of us and is the outcome of our daily contacts, our +writing and talking and discussion, and that the road to safety lies in +having that general public opinion better informed not in directly +discouraging such better information; (4) that the mere multiplication +of "precautions" in the shape of increased armaments and a readiness for +war, in the absence of a corresponding and parallel improvement of +opinion, will merely increase and not exorcise the danger, and, +finally, (5) that the problem of war is necessarily a problem of at +least two parties, and that if we are to solve it, to understand it +even, we must consider it in terms of two parties, not one; it is not a +question of what shall be the policy of each without reference to the +other, but what the final upshot of the two policies taken in +conjunction will be. + +Now in all this the _Times_, especially in one outstanding central idea, +is embodying a conception which is the antithesis of that expressed by +Militarists of the type of Mr. Churchill, and, I am sorry to say, of +Lord Roberts. To these latter war is not something that we, the peoples +of Europe, create by our ignorance and temper, by the nursing of old and +vicious theories, by the poorness and defects of the ideas our +intellectual activities have developed during the last generation or +two, but something that "comes upon us" like the rain or the earthquake, +and against which we can only protect ourselves by one thing: more arms, +a greater readiness to fight. + +In effect the anti-Educationalists say this: "What, as practical men, we +have to do, is to be stronger than our enemy; the rest is theory and +does not matter." + +Well the inevitable outcome of such an attitude is catastrophe. + +I have said elsewhere that in this matter it seems fatally easy to +secure either one of two kinds of action: that of the "practical man" +who limits his energies to securing a policy which will perfect the +machinery of war and disregard anything else; or that of the idealist, +who, persuaded of the brutality or immorality of war, is apt to show a +certain indifference concerning self-defence. What is needed is the type +of activity which will include both halves of the problem: provision for +education, for a Political Reformation in this matter, _as well as_ such +means of defence as will meantime counterbalance the existing impulse +to aggression. To concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the +other half is to render the whole problem insoluble. + +What must inevitably happen if the nations take the line of the +"practical man," and limit their energies simply and purely to piling up +armaments? + +A critic once put to me what he evidently deemed a poser: "Do you urge +that we shall be stronger than our enemy, or weaker?" + +To which I replied: "The last time that question was asked me was in +Berlin, by Germans. What would you have had me reply to those +Germans?"--a reply which, of course, meant this: In attempting to find +the solution of this question in terms of one party, you are attempting +the impossible. The outcome will be war, and war would not settle it. It +would all have to be begun over again. + +The Navy League catechism says: "Defence consists in being so strong +that it will be dangerous for your enemy to attack you."[11] Mr. +Churchill, however, goes farther than the Navy League, and says: "The +way to make war impossible is to make victory certain." + +The Navy League definition is at least possible of application to +practical politics, because rough equality of the two parties would make +attack by either dangerous. Mr. Churchill's principle is impossible of +application to practical politics, because it could only be applied by +one party, and would, in the terms of the Navy League principle, deprive +the other party of the right of defence. As a matter of simple fact, +both the Navy League, by its demand for two ships to one, and Mr. +Churchill, by his demand for certain victory, deny in this matter +Germany's right to defend herself; and such denial is bound, on the part +of a people animated by like motives to ourselves, to provoke a +challenge. When the Navy League says, as it does, that a self-respecting +nation should not depend upon the goodwill of foreigners for its safety, +but upon its own strength, it recommends Germany to maintain her efforts +to arrive at some sort of equality with ourselves. When Mr. Churchill +goes further and says that a nation should be so strong as to make +victory over its rivals certain, he knows that if Germany were to adopt +his own doctrine its inevitable outcome would be war. + +The issue is plain: We get a better understanding of certain political +facts in Europe, or we have war. And the Bellicist at present is +resolutely opposed to such political education. And it is for that +reason, not because he is asking for adequate armament, that some of the +best of this country look with the deepest misgiving upon his work, and +will continue to do so in increasing degree unless his policy be +changed. + +Now a word as to the peace Pacifist--the Pacifist sans phrases--as +distinct from the military Pacifist. It is not because I am in favour of +defence that I have at times with some emphasis disassociated myself +from certain features and methods of the peace movement, for +non-resistance is no necessary part of that movement, and, indeed, so +far as I know, it is no appreciable part. It is the methods not the +object or the ideals of the peace movement which I have ventured to +criticize, without, I hope, offence to men whom I respect in the very +highest and sincerest degree. The methods of Pacifism have in the past, +to some extent at least, implied a disposition to allow easy emotion to +take the place of hard thinking, good intention to stand for +intellectual justification; and it is as plain as anything well can be +that some of the best emotion of the world has been expended upon some +of the very worst objects, and that in no field of human +effort--medicine, commerce, engineering, legislation--has good intention +ever been able to dispense with the necessity of knowing the how and the +why. + +It is not that the somewhat question-begging and emotional terminology +of some Pacifists--the appeal to brotherly love and humanity--connotes +things which are in themselves poor or mean (as the average Militarist +would imply), but because so much of Pacifism in the past has failed to +reconcile intellectually the claims of these things with what are the +fundamental needs of men and to show their relation and practical +application to actual problems and conditions. + +[Footnote 8: As a matter of fact, of course, the work of these two men +has not been fruitless. As Lord Morley truly says: "They were routed on +the question of the Crimean War, but it was the rapid spread of their +principles which within the next twenty years made intervention +impossible in the Franco-Austrian War, in the American War, in the +Danish War, in the Franco-German War, and above all, in the war between +Russia and Turkey, which broke out only the other day."] + +[Footnote 9: Thus the Editor of the _Spectator_:-- + +"For ourselves, as far as the main economic proposition goes, he +preaches to the converted.... If nations were perfectly wise and held +perfectly sound economic theories, they would recognize that exchange is +the union of forces, and that it is very foolish to hate or be jealous +of your co-operators.... Men are savage, bloodthirsty creatures ... and +when their blood is up will fight for a word or a sign, or, as Mr. +Angell would put it, for an illusion." + +Therefore, argues the _Spectator_, let the illusion continue--for there +is no other conclusion to be drawn from the argument.] + +[Footnote 10: Need it be said that this criticism does not imply the +faintest want of respect for Lord Roberts, his qualities and his +services. He has ventured into the field of foreign politics and +prophecy. A public man of great eminence, he has expressed an English +view of German "intentions." For the man in the street (I write in that +capacity) to receive that expression in silence is to endorse it, to +make it national. And I have stated here the reasons which make such an +attitude disastrous. We all greatly respect Lord Roberts, but, even +before that, must come respect for our country, the determination that +it shall be in the right and not in the wrong, which it certainly will +be if this easy dogmatism concerning the evil intentions of other +nations becomes national.] + +[Footnote 11: The German Navy Law in its preamble might have filched +this from the British Navy League catechism.] + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +"THEORIES" FALSE AND TRUE: THEIR ROLE IN EUROPEAN PROGRESS. + +The improvement of ideas the foundation of all improvement--Shooting +straight and thinking straight; the one as important as the +other--Pacifism and the Millennium--How we got rid of wars of +religion--A few ideas have changed the face of the world--The simple +ideas the most important--The "theories" which have led to war--The work +of the reformer to destroy old and false theories--The intellectual +interdependence of nations--Europe at unity in this matter--New ideas +cannot be confined to one people--No fear of ourselves or any nation +being ahead of the rest. + + +But what, it will be said, is the practical outcome? Admitting that we +are, or that our fathers were, in part responsible for this war, that it +is their false theories which have made it necessary, that like false +theories on our part may make future wars inevitable--what shall we do +to prevent that catastrophe? + +Now while as an "abstract proposition" everyone will admit that the one +thing which distinguishes the civilized man from the savage is a +difference of ideas, no one apparently believes that it is a dangerous +and evil thing for the political ideas of savages to dominate most of +our countrymen or that so intangible a thing as "ideas" have any +practical importance at all. While we believe this, of course--to the +extent to which we believe it--improvement is out of the question. We +have to realize that civic faith, like religious faith, is of +importance; that if English influence is to stand for the right and not +the wrong in human affairs, it is impossible for each one of us +individuals to be wrong; that if the great mass is animated by temper, +blindness, ignorance, passion, small and mean prejudices, it is not +possible for "England" to stand for something quite different and for +its influence to be ought but evil. To say that we are "for our country +right or wrong" does not get over the matter at all; rather is it +equivalent to saying that we would as readily have it stand for evil as +for good. And we do not in the least seem to realize that for an +Englishman to go on talking wicked nonsense across the dinner table and +making one of the little rivulets of bad temper and prejudice which +forms the mighty river drowning sane judgment is to do the England of +our dreams a service as ill (in reality far more mischievous) as though +the plans of fortresses were sold to Germany. We must all learn to shoot +straight; apparently we need not learn to think straight. And yet if +Europe could do the second it could dispense with the first. "Good +faith" has a score of connotations, and we believe apparently that good +politics can dispense with all of them and that "Patriotism" has naught +to do with any. + +Of course, to shoot straight is so much easier than to think straight, +and I suppose at bottom the bellicist believes that the latter is a +hopeless object since "man is not a thinking animal." He deems, +apparently, we must just leave it at that. Of course, if he does leave +it at that--if we persist in believing that it is no good discussing +these matters, trying to find out the truth about them, writing books +and building churches--our civilization is going to drift just precisely +as those other civilizations which have been guided by the same dreadful +fatalism have drifted--towards the Turkish goal. "Kismet. Man is a fool +to babble of these things; what he may do is of no avail; all things +will happen as they were pre-ordained." And the English Turk--the man +who prefers to fight things out instead of thinking things out--takes +the same line. + +If he adopts the Turkish philosophy he must be content with the Turkish +result. But the Western world as a whole has refused to be content with +the Turkish result, and however tiresome it may be to know about +things, to bother with "theories" and principles, we have come to +realise that we have to choose between one of two courses: either to +accept things as they are, not to worry about improvement or betterment +at all, fatalistically to let things slide or--to find out bit by bit +where our errors have been and to correct those errors. This is a hard +road, but it is the road the Western world has chosen; and it is better +than the other. + +And it has not accepted this road because it expects the millenium +to-morrow week. There is no millenium, and Pacifists do not expect it or +talk about it; the word is just one of those three-shies-a-penny +brickbats thrown at them by ignorance. You do not dismiss attempts to +correct errors in medicine or surgery, or education, or tramcars, or +cookery, by talking about the millenium; why should you throw that word +at attempts to correct the errors of international relationship? + +Nothing has astonished me more than the fact that the "practical" man +who despises "theories" nearly always criticises Pacifism because it is +not an absolute dogma with all its thirty-nine articles water-tight. +"You are a Pacifist, then suppose...," and then follows generally some +very remote hypothesis of what would happen if all the Orient composed +its differences and were to descend suddenly upon the Western world; or +some dogmatic (and very theoretical) proposition about the +unchangeability of human nature, and the foolishness of expecting the +millenium--an argument which would equally well have told against the +union of Scotland and England or would equally justify the political +parties in a South American republic in continuing to settle their +differences by militarist methods instead of the Pacifist methods of +England. + +Human nature may be unchanging: it is no reason why we should fight a +futile war with Germany over nothing at all; the yellow peril may +threaten; that is a very good reason why we should compose our +differences in Europe. Men always will quarrel, perhaps, over religious +questions, bigotry and fanaticism always will exist--it did not prevent +our getting rid of the wars of religion, still less is it a reason for +re-starting them. + +The men who made that immense advance--the achievement of religious +toleration--possible, were not completely right and had not a +water-tight theory amongst them; they did not bring the millenium, but +they achieved an immense step. They _were_ pioneers of religious +freedom, yet were themselves tyrants and oppressors; those who abolished +slavery _did_ a good work, though much of the world _was_ left in +industrial servitude; it _was_ a good thing to abolish judicial torture, +though much of our penal system did yet remain barbaric; it _was_ a real +advance to recognise the errors upon which these things rested, although +that recognition did not immediately achieve a complete, logical, +symmetrical and perfect change, because mankind does not advance that +way. And so with war. Pacifism does not even pretend to be a dogma: it +is an attempt to correct in men's minds some of the errors and false +theories out of which war grows. + +The reply to this is generally that the inaptitude of men for clear +thinking and the difficulties of the issues involved will render any +decision save the sheer clash of physical force impossible; that the +field of foreign politics is such a tangle that the popular mind will +always fall back upon decision by force. + +As a matter of fact the outstanding principles which serve to improve +human conduct, are quite simple and understandable, as soon as they have +been shorn of the sophistries and illusions with which the pundits +clothe them. The real work of the reformers is to hack away these +encumbering theories. The average European has not followed, and could +not follow, the amazing and never-ending disputation on obscure +theological points round which raged the Reformation; but the one solid +fact which did emerge from the whole was the general realization that +whatever the truth might be in all this confusion, it was quite +evidently wicked and futile to attempt to compel conformity to any one +section of it by force; that in the interests of all force should be +withheld; because if such queries were settled by the accident of +predominant force, it would prove, not which was right, but which was +stronger. So in such things as witchcraft. The learned and astute judges +of the 18th century, who sent so many thousands to their death for +impossible crimes, knew far more of the details of witchcraft than do +we, and would beat us hopelessly in an argument on the subject; but all +their learning was of no avail, because they had a few simple facts, the +premises, crooked, and we have them straight; and all that we need to +know in this amazing tangle of learned nonsense, is that the +probabilities are against an old woman having caused a storm at sea and +drowned a Scottish King. And so with the French Revolution. What the +Encyclopaedists and other pioneers of that movement really did for the +European peoples in that matter, was not to elaborate fantastic schemes +of constitution making, but by their argumentation to achieve the +destruction of old political sophistries--Divine Rights of Kings and +what not--and to enable one or two simple facts to emerge clearly and +unmistakeably, as that the object of government is the good of the +governed, and can find its justification in nothing else whatsoever. It +was these simple truths which, spreading over the world--with many +checks and set-backs--have so profoundly modified the structure of +Christendom. + +Somewhere it is related of Montaigne that talking with academic +colleagues, he expressed a contemptuous disbelief in the whole elaborate +theory of witchcraft as it existed at that time. Scandalised, his +colleagues took him into the University library, and showed him +hundreds, thousands, of parchment volumes written in Latin by the +learned men of the subject. Had he read these volumes, that he talked so +disrespectfully of their contents? No, replied Montaigne, he had not +read them, and he was not going to, because they were all wrong, and he +was right. And Montaigne spoke with this dogmatism because he realised +that he saw clearly that which they did not--the crookedness and +unsoundness of just those simple fundamental assumptions on which the +whole fantastic structure was based. + +And so with all the sophistries and illusions by which the war system is +still defended. If the public as a whole had to follow all the +intricacies of those marvellous diplomatic combinations, the maze of our +foreign politics, to understand abstruse points of finance and +economics, in order to have just and sound ideas as to the real +character of international relationship, why then public opinion would +go on being as ignorant and mistaken as it had been hitherto. But sound +opinion and instincts in that field depend upon nothing of the sort, but +upon the emergence of a few quite simple facts, which are indisputable +and self-evident, which stare us in the face, and which absolutely +disprove all the elaborate theories of the Bellicist statesmen. + +For instance, if conquest and extension of territory is the main road of +moral and material progress, the fundamental need which sets up all +these rivalries and collisions, then it is the populations of the Great +States which should be the most enviable; the position of the Russian +should be more desirable than that of the Hollander; it is not. The +Austrian should be better off than the Switzer; he is not. If a nation's +wealth is really subject to military confiscation, and needs the defence +of military power, then the wealth of those small states should be +insecure indeed--and Belgian national stocks stand 20 points higher than +the German. If nations are rival units, then we should benefit by the +disappearance of our rivals--and if they disappeared, something like a +third of our population would starve to death. If the growth and +prosperity of rival nations threatens us, then we should be in far +greater danger of America to-day than we were some 50 years ago, when +the growth of that power disturbed the sleep of our statesmen (and when, +incidentally, we were just as much afraid of the growth of that power as +we are now afraid of the growth of Germany). If the growing power of +Russia compelled us to fight a great war in alliance with the Turk to +check her "advance on India," why are we now co-operating with Russia to +build railroads to India? + +It is such quite simple questions as these, and the quite plain facts +which underlie them which will lead to sounder conceptions in this +matter on the part of the peoples. + +It is not we who are the "theorists," if by "theorists" is meant the +constructors of elaborate and deceptive theorems in this matter. It is +our opponents, the military mystics, who persistently shut their eyes to +the great outstanding facts of history and of our time. And these +fantastic theories are generally justified by most esoteric doctrine, +not by the appeal to the facts which stare you in the face. I once +replied to a critic thus:-- + + In examining my critic's balance sheet I remarked that were his + figures as complete as they were absurdly incomplete and + misleading, I should still have been unimpressed. We all know that + very marvellous results are possible with figures; but one can + generally find some simple fact which puts them to the supreme test + without undue mathematics. I do not know whether it has ever + happened to my critic, as it has happened to me, while watching the + gambling in the casino of a Continental watering resort, to have a + financial genius present weird columns of figures, which + demonstrate conclusively, irrefragably, that by this system which + they embody one can break the bank and win a million. I have never + examined these figures, and never shall, for this reason: the + genius in question is prepared to sell his wonderful secret for + twenty francs. Now, in the face of that fact I am not interested + in his figures. If they were worth examination they would not be + for sale. + + And so in this matter there are certain test facts which upset the + adroitest statistical legerdemain. Though, really, the fallacy + which regards an addition of territory as an addition of wealth to + the "owning" nation is a very much simpler matter than the + fallacies lying behind gambling systems, which are bound up with + the laws of chance and the law of averages and much else that + philosophers will quarrel about till the end of time. It requires + an exceptional mathematical brain really to refute those fallacies, + whereas the one we are dealing with is due simply to the difficulty + experienced by most of us in carrying in our heads two facts at the + same time. It is so much easier to seize on one fact and forget the + other. Thus we realize that when Germany has conquered + Alsace-Lorraine she has "captured" a province worth, "cash value," + in my critic's phrase, sixty-six millions sterling. What we + overlook is that Germany has also captured the people who own the + property and who continue to own it. We have multiplied by _x_, it + is true, but we have overlooked the fact that we have had to divide + by _x_, and that the resultant is consequently, so far as the + individual is concerned, exactly what it was before. My critic + remembered the multiplication all right, but he forgot the + division. + +Just think of all the theories, the impossible theories for which the +"practical" man has dragged the nations into war: the Balance of Power, +for instance. Fifteen or twenty years ago it was the ineradicable belief +of fifty or sixty million Americans, good, honest, sincere, and astute +folk, that it was their bounden duty, their manifest interest, to +fight--and in the words of one of their Senators, annihilate--Great +Britain, in the interests of the Monroe Doctrine (which is a form of the +"Balance of Power"). I do not think any one knew what the Monroe +Doctrine meant, or could coherently defend it. An American Ambassador +had an after-dinner story at the time. + +"What is this I hear, Jones, that you do not believe in the Monroe +Doctrine?" + +"It is a wicked lie. I have said no such thing. I do believe in the +Monroe Doctrine. I would lay down my life for it; I would die for it. +What I did say was that I didn't know what it meant." + +And it was this vague theory which very nearly drove America into a war +that would have been disastrous to the progress of Anglo-Saxon +civilization. + +This was at the time of the Venezuelan crisis: the United States, which +for nearly one hundred years had lived in perfect peace with a British +power touching her frontier along three thousand miles, laid it down as +a doctrine that her existence was imperilled if Great Britain should +extend by so much as a mile a vague frontier running through a South +American swamp thousands of miles away. And for that cause these decent +and honourable people were prepared to take all the risks that would be +involved to Anglo-Saxon civilisation by a war between England and +America. The present writer happened at that time to be living in +America, and concerned with certain political work. Night after night he +heard these fulminations against Great Britain; politicians, +Congressmen, Senators, Governors, Ministers, Preachers, clamouring for +war, for a theory as vague and as little practical as one could wish. + +And we, of course, have had our like obsessions without number: "the +independence integrity of the Turkish dominion in Europe" is one. Just +think of it! Take in the full sound of the phrase: "the independence +integrity of the Turkish dominion in Europe!" + +What, of course, makes these fantastic political doctrines possible, +what leads men to subscribe to them, are a few false general conceptions +to which they hold tenaciously--as all fundamental conceptions are held, +and ought to be. The general conceptions in question are precisely the +ones I have indicated: that nations are rival and struggling units, that +military force is consequently the determining factor of their relative +advantage; that enlargement of political frontiers is the supreme need, +and so on. + +And the revision of these fundamental conceptions will, of course, be +the general work of Christendom, and given the conditions which now +obtain, the development will go on _pari passu_ in all nations or not +all. It will not be the work of "nations" at all; it will be the work of +individual men. + +States do not think. It is the men who form the states who think, and +the number of those men who will act as pioneers in a better policy +must, of course, at first be small: a group here and a group there, the +best men of all countries--England, France, Germany, +America--influencing by their ideas finally the great mass. To say, as +so many do in this matter: "Let other nations do it first" is, of +course, to condemn us all to impotence--for the other nations use the +same language. To ask that one group of forty or seventy or ninety +million people shall by some sort of magic all find their way to a saner +doctrine before such doctrine has affected other groups is to talk the +language of childishness. Things do not happen in that in human affairs. +It is not in that way that opinion grows. It did not grow in that way +in any one of the steps that I have mentioned--in the abolition of +religious persecution, or slavery, or judicial torture. Unless the +individual man sees his responsibility for determining what is right and +knowing how and why it is right, there will be no progress; there cannot +even be a beginning. + +We are to an even greater degree an integral part of European Society, +and a factor of European Policy, than we were at the time of the Crimean +War, when we mainly determined it; and our theories and discussions will +act and re-act upon that policy just as did any considerable body of +thought, whether French political thought of the eighteenth century, or +German religious thought of the sixteenth century, even at a time when +the means of producing that reaction, the book, literature, the +newspaper, rapid communication, were so immeasurably more primitive and +rudimentary than ours. What we think and say and do affects not merely +ourselves, but that whole body politic of Christendom of which we are an +integral part. + +It is a curious fact that the moral and intellectual interdependence of +States preceded by a long period, that material and economic +independence which I have tried recently to make clear. Nothing is more +contrary to fact than to suppose that any considerable movement of +opinion in Europe can be limited to the frontiers of one nation. Even at +a time when it took half a generation for a thought to travel from one +capital to another, a student or thinker in some obscure Italian, Swiss +or German village was able to modify policy, to change the face of +Europe and of mankind. Coming nearer to our time, it was the work of the +encyclopaedists and earlier political questioners which made the French +Revolution; and the effect of that Revolution was not confined to +France. The ideas which animated it re-acted directly upon our Empire, +upon the American Colonies, upon the Spanish Colonies, upon Italy, and +the formation of United Italy, upon Germany--the world over. These +miracles, almost too vast and great to conceive, were the outcome of +that intangible thing, an idea, an aspiration, an ideal. And if they +could accomplish so much in that day when the popular press and cheap +literature and improved communication did not exist, how is it possible +to suppose that any great ferment of opinion can be limited to one group +in our day, when we have a condition of things in which the declaration +of an English Cabinet Minister to-night is read to-morrow morning by +every reading German? + +It should be to our everlasting glory that our political thought in the +past, some of our political institutions, parliamentary government, and +what not, have had an enormous influence in the world. We have some +ground for hoping that another form of political institution which we +have initiated, a relationship of distinct political groups into which +force does not enter, will lead the way to a better condition of things +in Christendom. We have demonstrated that five independent nations, the +nations of the British Empire, can settle their differences as between +one another without the use of force. We have definitely decided that +whatever the attitude Australia, Canada, and South Africa may adopt to +us we shall not use force to change it. What is possible with five is +possible with fifteen nations. Just as we have given to the world +roughly our conception of Parliamentary Government, so it is to be hoped +may we give to the world our conception of the true relationship of +nations. + +The great steps of the past--religious freedom, the abolition of torture +and of slavery, the rights of the mass, self-government--every real step +which man has made has been made because men "theorised," because a +Galileo, or a Luther, or a Calvin, or a Voltaire, Rousseau, Bentham, +Spencer, Darwin, wrote and put notes of interrogation. Had they not done +so none of those things could have been accomplished. The greatest work +of the renaissance was the elimination of physical force in the struggle +of religious groups, in religious struggles generally; the greatest work +of our generation will be elimination of physical force from the +struggle of the political groups and from political struggles generally. +But it will be done in exactly the same way: by a common improvement of +opinion. And because we possess immeasurably better instruments for the +dissemination of ideas, we should be able to achieve the Political +Reformation of Europe much more rapidly and effectively than our +predecessors achieved the great intellectual Reformation of their time. + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +WHAT MUST WE _DO_? + +We must have the right political faith--Then we must give effect to +it--Good intention not enough--The organization of the great forces of +modern life--Our indifference as to the foundations of the evil--The +only hope. + + +What then must we _do_? Well the first and obvious thing is for each to +do his civic duty, for each to determine that he at least shall not +reject, with that silly temper which nearly always meets most new points +of view, principles which do at least seek to explain things, and do +point to the possibility of a better way. + +The first thing is to make our own policy right--and that is the work of +each one of us; to correct the temper which made us, for instance, to +our shame, the partners of the Turk in his work of oppression. + +And we must realise that mere good intent does not suffice; that +understanding, by which alone we can make headway, is not arrived at by +a pleasant emotion like that produced by a Beethoven Sonata; that we pay +for our progress in a little harder money than that, the money of hard +work, in which must be included hard thinking. And having got that far, +we must realise that sound ideas do not spread themselves. They are +spread by men. It is one of the astonishing things in the whole problem +of the breaking of war, that while men realise that if women are to have +votes, or men to be made temperate, or the White Slave Traffic to be +stopped, or for that matter, if battleships are to be built, or +conscription to be introduced, or soap or pills to be sold, effort, +organisation, time, money, must be put into these things. But the +greatest revolution that the world has known since mankind acquired the +right to freedom of opinion, will apparently get itself accomplished +without any of these things; or that at least the Government can quite +easily attend to it by asking other Governments to attend a Conference. +We must realise that a change of opinion, the recognition of a new fact, +or of facts heretofore not realised, is a slow and laborious work, even +in the relatively simple things which I have mentioned, and that you +cannot make savages into civilised men by collecting them round a table. +For the Powers of Europe, so far as their national policies are +concerned, are still uncivilised individuals. And their Conferences are +bound to fail, when each unit has the falsest conception concerning the +matters under discussion. Governments are the embodied expression of +general public opinion--and not the best public opinion at that; and +until opinion is modified, the embodiment of it will no more be capable +of the necessary common action, than would Red Indians be capable of +forming an efficient Court of Law, while knowing nothing of law or +jurisprudence, or worse still, having utterly false notions of the +principles upon which human society is based. + +And the occasional conferences of private men still hazy as to these +principles are bound to be as ineffective. If the mere meeting and +contact of people cleared up misunderstandings, we should not have +Suffragettes and Anti-Suffragettes, or Mr. Lloyd George at grips with +the doctors. + +These occasional conferences, whether official, like those of the Hague, +or non-official like those which occasionally meet in London or in +Berlin, will not be of great avail in this matter unless a better public +opinion renders them effective. They are of some use and no one would +desire to see them dropped, but they will not of themselves stem or turn +the drift of opinion. What is needed is a permanent organisation of +propaganda, framed, not for the purpose of putting some cut and dried +scheme into immediate operation, but with the purpose of clarifying +European public opinion, making the great mass see a few simple facts +straight, instead of crooked, and founded in the hope that ten or +fifteen years of hard, steady, persistent work, will create in that time +(by virtue of the superiority of the instruments, the Press and the rest +of it which we possess) a revolution of opinion as great as that +produced at the time of the Reformation, in a period which probably was +not more than the lifetime of an ordinary man. + +The organization for such permanent work has hardly begun. The Peace +Societies have done, and are doing, a real service, but it is evident, +for the reasons already indicated, that if the great mass are to be +affected, instruments of far wider sweep must be used. Our great +commercial and financial interests, our educational and academic +institutions, our industrial organizations, the political bodies, must +all be reached. An effort along the right lines has been made thanks to +the generosity of a more than ordinarily enlightened Conservative +capitalist. But the work should be taken up at a hundred points. Some +able financier should do for the organization of Banking--which has +really become the Industry of Finance and Credit--the same sort of +service that Sir Charles Macara has done for the cotton industry of the +world. The international action and co-ordination of Trades Unions the +world over should be made practical and not, in this matter, be allowed +to remain a merely platonic aspiration. + +The greater European Universities should possess endowed Chairs of the +Science of International Statecraft. While we have Chairs to investigate +the nature of the relationship of insects, we have none to investigate +the nature of the relationship of man in his political grouping. And the +occupants of these Chairs might change places--that of Berlin coming to +London or Oxford, and that of Oxford going to Berlin. + +The English Navy League and the German Navy League alike tell us that +the object of their endeavours is to create an instrument of peace. In +that case their efforts should not be confined to increasing the size of +the respective arms, but should also be directed to determining how and +why and when, and under what conditions, and for what purpose that arm +should be used. And that can only be done effectually if the two bodies +learn something of the aims and objects of the other. The need for a +Navy, and the size of the Navy, depends upon policy, either our own +policy, or the policy of the prospective aggressor; and to know +something of that, and its adjustment, is surely an integral part of +national defence. If both these Navy Leagues, in the fifteen or sixteen +years during which they have been in existence, had possessed an +intelligence committee, each conferring with the other, and spending +even a fraction of the money and energy upon disentangling policy that +has been spent upon the sheer bull-dog piling up of armaments, in all +human possibility, the situation which now confronts us would not exist. + +Then each political party of the respective Parliaments might have its +accredited delegates in the Lobbies of the other: the Social Democrats +might have their permanent delegates in London, in the Lobbies of the +House of Commons; the Labour Party might have their Permanent Delegates +in the Lobbies of the Reichstag; and when any Anglo-German question +arose, those delegates could speak through the mouth of the Members of +the Party to which they were accredited, to the Parliament of the other +nation. The Capitalistic parties could have a like bi-national +organisation. + +"These are wild and foolish suggestions"--that is possible. They have +never, however, been discussed with a view to the objects in question. +All efforts in this direction have been concentrated upon an attempt to +realize mechanically, by some short and royal road, a result far too +great and beneficent to be achieved so cheaply. + +Before our Conferences, official or unofficial, can have much success, +the parties to them must divest their minds of certain illusions which +at present dominate them. Until that is done, you might as reasonably +expect two cannibals to arrive at a workable scheme for consuming one +another. The elementary conceptions, the foundations of the thing are +unworkable. Our statecraft is still founded on a sort of political +cannibalism, upon the idea that nations progress by conquering, or +dominating one another. So long as that is our conception of the +relationship of human groups we shall always stand in danger of +collision, and our schemes of association and co-operation will always +break down. + + + + +APPENDIX. + + +Many of the points touched upon in the last two chapters are brought out +clearly in a recent letter addressed to the Press by my friend and +colleague Mr. A.W. Haycock. In this letter to the Press he says:-- + + If you will examine systematically, as I have done, the comments + which have appeared in the Liberal Press, either in the form of + leading articles, or in letters from readers, concerning Lord + Roberts' speech, you will find that though it is variously + described as "diabolical," "pernicious," "wicked," "inflammatory" + and "criminal," the real fundamental assumptions on which the whole + speech is based, and which, if correct, justify it, are by + implication admitted; at any rate, in not one single case that I + can discover are they seriously challenged. + + Now, when you consider this, it is the most serious fact of the + whole incident--far more disquieting in reality than the fact of + the speech itself, especially when we remember that Lord Roberts + did but adopt and adapt the arguments already used with more + sensationalism and less courtesy by Mr. Winston Churchill himself. + + The protests against Lord Roberts' speech take the form of denying + the intention of Germany to attach this country. But how can his + critics be any more aware of the intentions of Germany--65 millions + of people acted upon by all sorts of complex political and social + forces--than is Lord Roberts? Do we know the intention of England + with reference to Woman's Suffrage or Home Rule or Tariff Reform? + How, therefore, can we know the intentions of "Germany"? + + Lord Roberts, with courtesy, in form at least and with the warmest + tribute to the "noble and imaginative patriotism" of German policy, + assumed that that policy would follow the same general impulse that + our own has done in the past, and would necessarily follow it since + the relation between military power and national greatness and + prosperity was to-day what it always has been. In effect, Lord + Roberts' case amounts to this:-- + + "We have built up our Empire and our trade by virtue of the + military power of our state; we exist as a nation, sail the seas, + and carry on our trade, by virtue of our predominant strength; as + that strength fails we shall do all these things merely on the + sufferance of stronger nations, who, when pushed by the needs of an + expanding population to do so, will deprive us of the capacity for + carrying on those vital functions of life, and transfer the means + of so doing to themselves to their very great advantage; we have + achieved such transfer to ourselves in the past by force and must + expect other nations to try and do the same thing unless we are + able to prevent them. It is the inevitable struggles of life to be + fought out either by war or armaments." + + These are not Lord Roberts' words, but the proposition is the clear + underlying assumption of his speech. And his critics do not + seriously challenge it. Mr. Churchill by implication warmly + supports it. At Glasgow he said: "The whole fortune of our race and + Empire, the whole treasure accumulated during so many centuries of + sacrifice and achievement would perish and be swept utterly away, + if our naval supremacy were to be impaired." + + Now why should there be any danger of Germany bringing about this + catastrophe unless she could profit enormously by so doing? But + that implies that a nation does expand by military force, does + achieve the best for its people by that means; it does mean that if + you are not stronger than your rival, you carry on your trade "on + sufferance" and at the appointed hour will have it taken from you + by him. And if that assumption--plainly indicated as it is by a + Liberal Minister--is right, who can say that Lord Roberts' + conclusion is not justified? + + Now as to the means of preventing the war. Lord Roberts' formula + is:-- + + "Such a battle front by sea and land that no power or probable + combination of powers shall dare to attack us without the certainty + of disaster." + + This, of course, is taken straight from Mr. Churchill, who, at + Dundee, told us that "the way to make war impossible is to be so + strong as to make victory certain." + + We have all apparently, Liberals and Conservatives alike, accepted + this "axiom" as self-evident. + + Well, since it is so obvious as all that we may expect the Germans + to adopt it. At present they are guided by a much more modest + principle (enunciated in the preamble of the German Navy Law); + namely, to be sufficiently strong to make it _dangerous_ for your + enemy to attack. They must now, according to our "axiom," be so + strong as to make our defeat certain. + + I am quite sure that the big armament people in Germany are very + grateful for the advice which Mr. Churchill and Lord Roberts thus + give to the nations of the world, and we may expect to see German + armaments so increased as to accord with the new principle. + + And Lord Roberts is courageous enough to abide by the conclusion + which flows from the fundamental assumption of Liberals and + Conservatives alike, _i.e._, that trade and the means of livelihood + can be transferred by force. We have transferred it in the past. + "It is excellent policy; it is, or should be, the policy of every + nation prepared to play a great part in history." Such are Lord + Roberts' actual words. At least, they don't burke the issue. + + The Germans will doubtless note the combination: be so strong as to + make victory certain, and strike when you have made it certain, and + they will then, in the light of this advice, be able to put the + right interpretation upon our endeavours to create a great + conscript force and our arrangements, which have been going on for + some years, to throw an expeditionary force on to the continent. + + The outlook is not very pleasant, is it? And yet if you accept the + "axiom" that our Empire and our trade is dependent upon force and + can be advantageously attacked by a stronger power there is no + escape from the inevitable struggle--for the other "axiom" that + safety can be secured merely by being enormously stronger than your + rival is, as soon as it is tested by applying it to the two parties + to the conflict--and, of course, one has as much right to apply it + as the other--seen to be simply dangerous and muddle-headed + rubbish. Include the two parties in your "axiom" (as you must) and + it becomes impossible of application. + + Now the whole problem sifts finally down to this one question: Is + the assumption made by Lord Roberts and implied by Mr. Churchill + concerning the relation of military force to trade and national + life well founded? If it is, conflict is inevitable. It is no good + crying "panic." If there is this enormous temptation pushing to our + national ruin, we ought to be in a panic. And if it is not true? + Even in that case conflict will equally be inevitable unless we + realise its falseness, for a universal false opinion concerning a + fact will have the same result in conduct as though the false + belief were true. + + And my point is that those concerned to prevent this conflict seem + but mildly interested in examining the foundations of the false + beliefs that make conflict inevitable. Part of the reluctance to + study the subject seems to arise from the fear that if we deny the + nonsensical idea that the British Empire would instantaneously fall + to pieces were the Germans to dominate the North Sea for 24 hours + we should weaken the impulse to defence. That is probably an + utterly false idea, but suppose it is true, is the risk of less + ardour in defence as great as the risk which comes of having a + nation of Roberts and Churchills on both sides of the frontier? + + If that happens war becomes not a risk but a certainty. + + And it is danger of happening. I speak from the standpoint of a + somewhat special experience. During the last 18 months I have + addressed not scores but many hundreds of meetings on the subject + of the very proposition on which Lord Roberts' speech is based and + which I have indicated at the beginning of this letter; I have + answered not hundreds but thousands of questions arising out of it. + And I think that gives me a somewhat special understanding of the + mind of the man in the street. The reason he is subject to panic, + and "sees red" and will often accept blindly counsels like those of + Lord Roberts, is that he holds as axioms these primary assumptions + to which I have referred, namely, that he carries on his daily life + by virtue of military force, and that the means of carrying it on + will be taken from him by the first stronger power that rises in + the world, and that that power will be pushed to do it by the + advantage of such seizure. And these axioms he never finds + challenged even by his Liberal guides. + + The issue for those who really desire a better condition is clear. + So long as by their silence, or by their indifference to the + discussion of the fundamental facts of this problem they create the + impression that Mr. Churchill's axioms are unchallengeable, the + panic-mongers will have it all their own way, and our action will + be a stimulus to similar action in Germany, and that action will + again re-act on ours, and so on _ad infinitum._ + + Why is not some concerted effort made to create in both countries + the necessary public opinion, by encouraging the study and + discussion of the elements of the case, in some such way, for + instance, as that adopted by Mr. Norman Angell in his book? + + One organization due to private munificence has been formed and is + doing, within limits, an extraordinarily useful work, but we can + only hope to affect policy by a much more general interest--the + interest of those of leisure and influence. And that does not seem + to be forthcoming. + + My own work, which has been based quite frankly on Mr. Angell's + book, has convinced me that it embodies just the formula most + readily understanded of the people. It constitutes a constructive + doctrine of International Policy--the only statement I know so + definitely applicable to modern conditions. + + But the old illusions are so entrenched that if any impression is + to be made on public opinion generally, effort must be persistent, + permanent, and widespread. Mere isolated conferences, disconnected + from work of a permanent character, are altogether inadequate for + the forces that have to be met. + + What is needed is a permanent and widespread organization embracing + Trades Unions, Churches and affiliated bodies, Schools and + Universities, basing its work on some definite doctrine of + International Policy which can supplant the present conceptions of + struggle and chaos. + + I speak, at least, from the standpoint of experience; in the last + resort the hostility, fear and suspicion which from time to time + gains currency among the great mass of the people, is due to those + elementary misconceptions as to the relation of prosperity, the + opportunities of life, to military power. So long as these + misconceptions are dominant, nothing is easier than to precipitate + panic and bad feeling, and unless we can modify them, we shall in + all human probability drift into conflict; and this incident of + Lord Roberts' speech and the comment which it has provoked, show + that for some not very well defined reason, Liberals, quite as much + as Conservatives, by implication, accept the axioms upon which it + is based, and give but little evidence that they are seriously + bestirring themselves to improve that political education upon + which according to their creed, progress can alone be made. + + Yours very faithfully, + + A.W. HAYCOCK. + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Peace Theories and the Balkan War, by Norman Angell + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 11895 *** diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45a5c41 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #11895 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/11895) diff --git a/old/11895-8.txt b/old/11895-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4ccecd --- /dev/null +++ b/old/11895-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3776 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Peace Theories and the Balkan War, by Norman Angell + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Peace Theories and the Balkan War + +Author: Norman Angell + +Release Date: April 3, 2004 [EBook #11895] +[Date last updated: Jan 29, 2006] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR *** + + + + +Produced by MBP and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + + + + + + + + +PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR + + +BY + +NORMAN ANGELL + + +Author of "The Great Illusion" + + +1912 + + + + +PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR + +By NORMAN ANGELL, + +Author of "The Great Illusion." + +1912 + + + + +THE TEXT OF THIS BOOK. + + + Whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the powers, or sit in + sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no consequence at the + present moment.... + + We have sometimes been assured by persons who profess to know that + the danger of war has become an illusion.... Well, here is a war + which has broken out in spite of all that rulers and diplomatists + could do to prevent it, a war in which the Press has had no part, a + war which the whole force of the money power has been subtly and + steadfastly directed to prevent, which has come upon us, not through + the ignorance or credulity of the people, but, on the contrary, + through their knowledge of their history and their destiny, and + through their intense realisation of their wrongs and of their + duties, as they conceived them, a war which from all these causes + has burst upon us with all the force of a spontaneous explosion, and + which in strife and destruction has carried all before it. Face to + face with this manifestation, who is the man bold enough to say that + force is never a remedy? Who is the man who is foolish enough to say + that martial virtues do not play a vital part in the health and + honour of every people? (Cheers.) Who is the man who is vain enough + to suppose that the long antagonisms of history and of time can in + all circumstances be adjusted by the smooth and superficial + conventions of politicians and ambassadors?--MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL + at Sheffield. + + Mr. Norman Angell's theory was one to enable the citizens of this + country to sleep quietly, and to lull into false security the + citizens of all great countries. That is undoubtedly the reason why + he met with so much success.... It was a very comfortable theory for + those nations which have grown rich and whose ideals and initiative + have been sapped by over much prosperity. But the great delusion of + Norman Angell, which led to the writing of "The Great Illusion," has + been dispelled for ever by the Balkan League. In this connection it + is of value to quote the words of Mr. Winston Churchill, which give + very adequately the reality as opposed to theory.--_The Review of + Reviews_, from an article on "The Débâcle of Norman Angell." + +And an odd score of like pronouncements from newspapers and public men +since the outbreak of the Balkan War. + +The interrogations they imply have been put definitely in the first +chapter of this book; the replies to those questions summarised in that +chapter and elaborated in the others. + + + + +_The "key" to this book and the summary of its arguments are contained +in Chapter I. (pp. 7-12)_ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +I. The Questions and their Answers + +II. "Peace" and "War" in the Balkans + +III. Economic Causes in the Balkan War + +IV. Turkish Ideals in our Political Thought + +V. Our Responsibility for Balkan Wars + +VI. Pacifism, Defence, and the "Impossibility of War" + +VII. "Theories" False and True; their Role in European Politics + +VIII. What Shall we DO? + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWER. + + +CHAPTER II. + +"PEACE" AND "WAR" IN THE BALKANS. + +"Peace" in the Balkans under the Turkish System--The inadequacy of our +terms--The repulsion of the Turkish invasion--The Christian effort to +bring the reign of force and conquest to an end--The difference between +action designed to settle relationship on force and counter action +designed to prevent such settlement--The force of the policeman and the +force of the brigand--The failure of conquest as exemplified by the +Turk--Will the Balkan peoples prove Pacifist or Bellicist; adopt the +Turkish or the Christian System? + + +CHAPTER III. + +ECONOMICS AND THE BALKAN WAR. + +The "economic system" of the Turk--The Turkish "Trade of Conquest" as a +cause of this war--Racial and Religious hatred of primitive +societies--Industrialism as a solvent--Its operation in Europe--Balkans +geographically remote from main drift of European economic +development--The false economies of the Powers as a cause of their +jealousies and quarrels--- This has prevented settlement--What is the +"economic motive"?--Impossible to separate moral and +material--Nationality and the War System. + + +CHAPTER IV. + +TURKISH IDEALS IN OUR POLITICAL THOUGHT. + +This war and "the Turks of Britain and Prussia"--The Anglo-Saxon and +opposed ideals--Mr. C. Chesterton's case for "killing and being killed" +as the best method of settling differences--Its application to Civil +Conflicts--As in Spanish-America--The difference between Devonshire and +Venezuela--Will the Balkans adopt the Turco-Venezuelan political ideals +or the British? + + +CHAPTER V. + +OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BALKAN WARS. + +Mr. Winston Churchill on the "Responsibility" of Diplomacy--What does he +mean?--An easy (and popular) philosophy--Can we neglect past if we would +avoid future errors?--British temper and policy in the Crimean War--What +are its lessons?--Why we fought a war to sustain the "integrity and +independence of the Turkish dominion in Europe"--Supporting the Turk +against his Christian victims--From fear of Russian growth which we are +now aiding--The commentary of events--Shall we back the wrong horse +again? + + +CHAPTER VI. + +PACIFISM, DEFENCE, AND "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAR." + +Did the Crimean War prove Bright and Cobden wrong?--Our curious +reasoning--Mr. Churchill on "illusions"--The danger of war is not the +illusion but its benefits--We are all Pacifists now since we all desire +Peace--Will more armaments alone secure it?--The experience of +mankind--War "the failure of human wisdom"--Therefore more wisdom is the +remedy--But the Militarists only want more arms--The German Lord +Roberts--The military campaign against political Rationalism--How to +make war certain. + + +CHAPTER VII. + +"THEORIES" FALSE AND TRUE: THEIR ROLE IN EUROPEAN PROGRESS. + +The improvement of ideas the foundation of all improvement--Shooting +straight and thinking straight; the one as important as the +other--Pacifism and the Millennium--How we got rid of wars of +religion--A few ideas have changed the face of the world--The simple +ideas the most important--The "theories" which have led to war--The work +of the reformer to destroy old and false theories--The intellectual +interdependence of nations--Europe at unity in this matter--New ideas +cannot be confined to one people--No fear of ourselves or any nation +being ahead of the rest. + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +WHAT MUST WE _DO_? + +We must have the right political faith--Then we must give effect to +it--Good intention not enough--The organization of the great forces of +modern life--Our indifference as to the foundations of the evil--The +only hope. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWER. + + +What has Pacifism, Old or New, to say now? + +Is War impossible? + +Is it unlikely? + +Is it futile? + +Is not force a remedy, and at times the only remedy? + +Could any remedy have been devised on the whole so conclusive and +complete as that used by the Balkan peoples? + +Have not the Balkan peoples redeemed War from the charges too readily +brought against it as simply an instrument of barbarism? + +Have questions of profit and loss, economic considerations, anything +whatever to do with this war? + +Would the demonstration of its economic futility have kept the peace? + +Are theories and logic of the slightest use, since force alone can +determine the issue? + +Is not war therefore inevitable, and must we not prepare diligently for +it? I will answer all these questions quite simply and directly without +casuistry and logic-chopping, and honestly desiring to avoid paradox and +"cleverness." And these quite simple answers will not be in +contradiction with anything that I have written, nor will they +invalidate any of the principles I have attempted to explain. + +And my answers may be summarised thus:-- + +(1) This war has justified both the Old Pacifism and the New. By +universal admission events have proved that the Pacifists who opposed +the Crimean War were right and their opponents wrong. Had public opinion +given more consideration to those Pacifist principles, this country +would not have "backed the wrong horse," and this war, two wars which +have preceded it, and many of the abominations of which the Balkan +peninsular has been the scene during the last 60 years might have been +avoided, and in any case Great Britain would not now carry upon her +shoulders the responsibility of having during half a century supported +the Turk against the Christian and of having tried uselessly to prevent +what has now taken place--the break-up of the Turk's rule in Europe. + +(2) War is not impossible, and no responsible Pacifist ever said it was; +it is not the likelihood of war which is the illusion, but its benefits. + +(3) It is likely or unlikely according as the parties to a dispute are +guided by wisdom or folly. + +(4) It _is_ futile; and force is no remedy. + +(5) Its futility is proven by the war waged daily by the Turks as +conquerors, during the last 400 years. And because the Balkan peoples +have chosen the less evil of two kinds of war, and will use their +victory to bring a system based on force and conquest to an end, we who +do not believe in force and conquest rejoice in their action, and +believe it will achieve immense benefits. But if instead of using their +victory to eliminate force, they in their turn pin their faith to it, +continue to use it the one against the other, exploiting by its means +the populations they rule, and become not the organisers of social +co-operation among the Balkan populations, but merely, like the Turks, +their conquerors and "owners," then they in their turn will share the +fate of the Turk. + +(6) The fundamental causes of this war are economic in the narrower, as +well as in the larger sense of the term; in the first because conquest +was the Turk's only trade--he desired to live out of taxes wrung from a +conquered people, to exploit them as a means of livelihood, and this +conception was at the bottom of most of Turkish misgovernment. And in +the larger sense its cause is economic because in the Balkans, remote +geographically from the main drift of European economic development, +there has not grown up that interdependent social life, the innumerable +contacts which in the rest of Europe have done so much to attenuate +primitive religious and racial hatreds. + +(7) A better understanding by the Turk of the real nature of civilised +government, of the economic futility of conquest of the fact that a +means of livelihood (an economic system), based upon having more force +than someone else and using it ruthlessly against him, is an impossible +form of human relationship bound to break down, _would_ have kept the +peace. + +(8) If European statecraft had not been animated by false conceptions, +largely economic in origin, based upon a belief in the necessary rivalry +of states, the advantages of preponderant force and conquest, the +Western nations could have composed their quarrels and ended the +abominations of the Balkan peninsula long ago--even in the opinion of +the _Times_. And it is our own false statecraft--that of Great +Britain--which has a large part of the responsibility for this failure +of European civilisation. It has caused us to sustain the Turk in +Europe, to fight a great and popular war with that aim, and led us into +treaties which had they been kept, would have obliged us to fight to-day +on the side of the Turk against the Balkan States. + +(9) If by "theories" and "logic" is meant the discussion of and interest +in principles, the ideas that govern human relationship, they are the +only things that can prevent future wars, just as they were the only +things that brought religious wars to an end--a preponderant power +"imposing" peace playing no role therein. Just as it was false religious +theories which made the religious wars, so it is false political +theories which make the political wars. + +(10) War is only inevitable in the sense that other forms of error and +passion--religious persecution for instance--are inevitable; they cease +with better understanding, as the attempt to impose religious belief by +force has ceased in Europe. + +(11) We should not prepare for war; we should prepare to prevent war; +and though that preparation may include battleships and conscription, +those elements will quite obviously make the tension and danger greater +unless there is also a better European opinion. + +These summarised replies need a little expansion. + + + +CHAPTER II. + +"PEACE" AND "WAR" IN THE BALKANS. + +"Peace" in the Balkans under the Turkish System--The inadequacy of our +terms--The repulsion of the Turkish invasion--The Christian effort to +bring the reign of force and conquest to an end--The difference between +action designed to settle relationship on force and counter action +designed to prevent such settlement--The force of the policeman and the +force of the brigand--The failure of conquest as exemplified by the +Turk--Will the Balkan peoples prove Pacifist or Bellicist; adopt the +Turkish or the Christian System? + + +Had we thrashed out the question of war and peace as we must finally, it +would hardly be necessary to explain that the apparent paradox in Answer +No. 4 (that war is futile, and that this war will have immense benefits) +is due to the inadequacy of our language, which compels us to use the +same word for two opposed purposes, not to any real contradiction of +fact. + +We called the condition of the Balkan peninsula "Peace" until the other +day, merely because the respective Ambassadors still happened to be +resident in the capitals to which they were accredited. + +Let us see what "Peace" under Turkish rule really meant, and who is the +real invader in this war. Here is a very friendly and impartial +witness--Sir Charles Elliot--who paints for us the character of the +Turk as an "administrator":-- + + "The Turk in Europe has an overweening sense of his superiority, + and remains a nation apart, mixing little with the conquered + populations, whose customs and ideas he tolerates, but makes little + effort to understand. The expression indeed, 'Turkey in Europe' + means indeed no more than 'England in Asia,' if used as a + designation for India.... The Turks have done little to assimilate + the people whom they have conquered, and still less, been + assimilated by them. In the larger part of the Turkish dominions, + the Turks themselves are in a minority.... The Turks certainly + resent the dismemberment of their Empire, but not in the sense in + which the French resent the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. + They would never use the word 'Turkey' or even its oriental + equivalent, 'The High Country' in ordinary conversation. They would + never say that Syria and Greece are parts of Turkey which have been + detached, but merely that they are tributaries which have become + independent, provinces once occupied by Turks where there are no + Turks now. As soon as a province passes under another Government, + the Turks find it the most natural thing in the world to leave it + and go somewhere else. In the same spirit the Turk talks quite + pleasantly of leaving Constantinople some day, he will go over to + Asia and found another capital. One can hardly imagine Englishmen + speaking like that of London, but they might conceivably speak so + of Calcutta.... The Turk is a conqueror and nothing else. The + history of the Turk is a catalogue of battles. His contributions to + art, literature, science and religion, are practically nil. Their + desire has not been to instruct, to improve, hardly even to govern, + but simply to conquer.... The Turk makes nothing at all; he takes + whatever he can get, as plunder or pillage. He lives in the houses + which he finds, or which he orders to be built for him. In + unfavourable circumstances he is a marauder. In favourable, a + _Grand Seigneur_ who thinks it his right to enjoy with grace and + dignity all that the world can hold, but who will not lower himself + by engaging in art, literature, trade or manufacture. Why should + he, when there are other people to do these things for him. Indeed, + it may be said that he takes from others even his religion, + clothes, language, customs; there is hardly anything which is + Turkish and not borrowed. The religion is Arabic; the language half + Arabic and Persian; the literature almost entirely imitative; the + art Persian or Byzantine; the costumes, in the Upper Classes and + Army mostly European. There is nothing characteristic in + manufacture or commerce, except an aversion to such pursuits. In + fact, all occupations, except agriculture and military service are + distasteful to the true Osmanli. He is not much of a merchant. He + may keep a stall in a bazaar, but his operations are rarely + undertaken on a scale which merits the name of commerce or finance. + It is strange to observe how, when trade becomes active in any + seaport, or upon the railway lines, the Osmanli retires and + disappears, while Greeks, Armenians and Levantines thrive in his + place. Neither does he much affect law, medicine or the learned + professions. Such callings are followed by Moslims but they are apt + to be of non-Turkish race. But though he does none of these things + ... the Turk is a soldier. The moment a sword or rifle is put into + his hands, he instinctively knows how to use it with effect, and + feels at home in the ranks or on a horse. The Turkish Army is not + so much a profession or an institution necessitated by the fears + and aims of the Government as the quite normal state of the Turkish + nation.... Every Turk is a born soldier, and adopts other pursuits + chiefly because times are bad. When there is a question of + fighting, if only in a riot, the stolid peasant wakes up and shows + surprising power of finding organisation and expedients, and alas! + a surprising ferocity. The ordinary Turk is an honest and + good-humoured soul, kind to children and animals, and very patient; + but when the fighting spirit comes on him, he becomes like the + terrible warriors of the Huns or Henghis Khan, and slays, burns and + ravages without mercy or discrimination."[1] + +Such is the verdict of an instructed, travelled and observant English +author and diplomatist, who lived among these people for many years, and +who learned to like them, who studied them and their history. It does +not differ, of course, appreciably, from what practically every student +of the Turk has discovered: the Turk is the typical conqueror. As a +nation, he has lived by the sword, and he is dying by the sword, because +the sword, the mere exercise of force by one man or group of men upon +another, conquest in other words, is an impossible form of human +relationship. + +And in order to maintain this evil form of relationship--its evil and +futility is the whole basis of the principles I have attempted to +illustrate--he has not even observed the rough chivalry of the brigand. +The brigand, though he might knock men on the head, will refrain from +having his force take the form of butchering women and disembowelling +children. Not so the Turk. His attempt at Government will take the form +of the obscene torture of children, of a bestial ferocity which is not a +matter of dispute or exaggeration, but a thing to which scores, +hundreds, thousands even of credible European, witnesses have testified. +"The finest gentleman, sir, that ever butchered a woman or burned a +village," is the phrase that _Punch_ most justly puts into the mouth of +the defender of our traditional Turcophil policy. + +And this condition is "Peace," and the act which would put a stop to it +is "War." It is the inexactitude and inadequacy of our language which +creates much of the confusion of thought in this matter; we have the +same term for action destined to achieve a given end and for a +counter-action destined to prevent it. + +Yet we manage, in other than the international field, in civil matters, +to make the thing clear enough. + +Once an American town was set light to by incendiaries, and was +threatened with destruction. In order to save at least a part of it, the +authorities deliberately burned down a block of buildings in the pathway +of the fire. Would those incendiaries be entitled to say that the town +authorities were incendiaries also, and "believed in setting light to +towns?" Yet this is precisely the point of view of those who tax +Pacifists with approving war because they approve the measure aimed at +bringing it to an end. + +Put it another way. You do not believe that force should determine the +transfer of property or conformity to a creed, and I say to you: "Hand +me your purse and conform to my creed or I kill you." You say: "Because +I do not believe that force should settle these matters, I shall try and +prevent it settling them, and therefore if you attack I shall resist; if +I did not I should be allowing force to settle them." I attack; you +resist and disarm me and say: "My force having neutralised yours, and +the equilibrium being now established, I will hear any reasons you may +have to urge for my paying you money; or any argument in favour of your +creed. Reason, understanding, adjustment shall settle it." You would be +a Pacifist. Or, if you deem that that word connotes non-resistance, +though to the immense bulk of Pacifists it does not, you would be an +anti-Bellicist to use a dreadful word coined by M. Emile Faguet in the +discussion of this matter. If, however, you said: "Having disarmed you +and established the equilibrium, I shall now upset it in my favour by +taking your weapon and using it against you unless you hand me _your_ +purse and subscribe to _my_ creed. I do this because force alone can +determine issues, and because it is a law of life that the strong should +eat up the weak." You would then be a Bellicist. + +In the same way, when we prevent the brigand from carrying on his +trade--taking wealth by force--it is not because we believe in force as +a means of livelihood, but precisely because we do not. And if, in +preventing the brigand from knocking out brains, we are compelled to +knock out his brains, is it because we believe in knocking out people's +brains? Or would we urge that to do so is the way to carry on a trade, +or a nation, or a government, or make it the basis of human +relationship? + +In every civilised country, the basis of the relationship on which the +community rests is this: no individual is allowed to settle his +differences with another by force. But does this mean that if one +threatens to take my purse, I am not allowed to use force to prevent it? +That if he threatens to kill me, I am not to defend myself, because "the +individual citizens are not allowed to settle their differences by +force?" It is _because_ of that, because the act of self-defence is an +attempt to prevent the settlement of a difference by force, that the law +justifies it.[2] + +But the law would not justify me, if having disarmed my opponent, having +neutralised his force by my own, and re-established the social +equilibrium, I immediately proceeded to upset it, by asking him for his +purse on pain of murder. I should then be settling the matter by +force--I should then have ceased to be a Pacifist, and have become a +Bellicist. + +For that is the difference between the two conceptions: the Bellicist +says: "Force alone can settle these matters; it is the final appeal; +therefore fight it out. Let the best man win. When you have preponderant +strength, impose your view; force the other man to your will; not +because it is right, but because you are able to do so." It is the +"excellent policy" which Lord Roberts attributes to Germany and +approves. + +We anti-Bellicists take an exactly contrary view. We say: "To fight it +out settles nothing, since it is not a question of who is stronger, but +of whose view is best, and as that is not always easy to establish, it +is of the utmost importance in the interest of all parties, in the long +run, to keep force out of it." + +The former is the policy of the Turks. They have been obsessed with the +idea that if only they had enough of physical force, ruthlessly +exercised, they could solve the whole question of government, of +existence for that matter, without troubling about social adjustment, +understanding, equity, law, commerce; "blood and iron" were all that was +needed. The success of that policy can now be judged. + +And whether good or evil comes of the present war will depend upon +whether the Balkan States are on the whole guided by the Bellicist +principle or the opposed one. If having now momentarily eliminated force +as between themselves, they re-introduce it, if the strongest, +presumably Bulgaria, adopts Lord Roberts' "excellent policy" of striking +because she has the preponderant force, enters upon a career of conquest +of other members of the Balkan League, and the populations of the +conquered territories, using them for exploitation by military +force--why then there will be no settlement and this war will have +accomplished nothing save futile waste and slaughter. For they will have +taken under a new flag, the pathway of the Turk to savagery, +degeneration, death. + +But if on the other hand they are guided more by the Pacifist principle, +if they believe that co-operation between States is better than conflict +between them, if they believe that the common interest of all in good +Government is greater than the special interest of any one in conquest, +that the understanding of human relationships, the capacity for the +organisation of society are the means by which men progress, and not the +imposition of force by one man or group upon another, why, they will +have taken the pathway to better civilisation. But then they will have +disregarded Lord Roberts' advice. + +And this distinction between the two systems, far from being a matter of +abstract theory of metaphysics or logic chopping, is just the difference +which distinguishes the Briton from the Turk, which distinguishes +Britain from Turkey. The Turk has just as much physical vigour as the +Briton, is just as virile, manly and military. The Turk has the same raw +materials of Nature, soil and water. There is no difference in the +capacity for the exercise of physical force--or if there is, the +difference is in favour of the Turk. The real difference is a difference +of ideas, of mind and outlook on the part of the individuals composing +the respective societies; the Turk has one general conception of human +society and the code and principles upon which it is founded, mainly a +militarist one; and the Englishman has another, mainly a Pacifist one. +And whether the European society as a whole is to drift towards the +Turkish ideal or towards the English ideal will depend upon whether it +is animated mainly by the Pacifist or mainly by the Bellicist doctrine; +if the former, it will stagger blindly like the Turk along the path to +barbarism; if the latter, it will take a better road. + +[Footnote 1: "Turkey in Europe," pp. 88-9 and 91-2. + +It is significant, by the way, that the "born soldier" has now been +crushed by a non-military race whom he has always despised as having no +military tradition. Capt. F.W. von Herbert ("Bye Paths in the Balkans") +wrote (some years before the present war): "The Bulgars as Christian +subjects of Turkey exempt from military service, have tilled the ground +under stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions, and the profession of +arms is new to them." + +"Stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions" is, in view of subsequent +events distinctly good.] + +[Footnote 2: I dislike to weary the reader with such damnable iteration, +but when a Cabinet Minister is unable in this discussion to distinguish +between the folly of a thing and its possibility, one _must_ make the +fundamental point clear.] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +ECONOMICS AND THE BALKAN WAR. + +The "economic system" of the Turk--The Turkish "Trade of Conquest" as a +cause of this war--Racial and Religious hatred of primitive +societies--Industrialism as a solvent--Its operation in Europe--Balkans +geographically remote from main drift of European economic +development--The false economies of the Powers as a cause of their +jealousies and quarrels--This has prevented settlement--What is the +"economic motive"?--Impossible to separate moral and +material--Nationality and the War System. + + +In dealing with answer No. 4 I have shown how the inadequacy of our +language leads us so much astray in our notions of the real role of +force in human relationships. But there is a curious phenomenon of +thought which explains perhaps still more how misconceptions grow up on +this subject, and that is the habit of thinking of a war which, of +course, must include two parties, in terms, solely of one party at a time. +Thus one critic[3] is quite sure that because the Balkan peoples "recked +nothing of financial disaster," economic considerations have had nothing +to do with their war--a conclusion which seems to be arrived at by the +process of judgment just indicated: to find the cause of condition +produced by two parties you shall rigorously ignore one. For there is a +great deal of internal evidence for believing that the writer of the +article in question would admit very readily that the efforts of the +Turk to wring taxes out of the conquered peoples--not in return for a +civilized administration but simply as the means of livelihood, of +turning conquest into a trade--had a very great deal to do in explaining +the Turk's presence there at all and the Christian's desire to get rid +of him; while the same article specifically states that the mutual +jealousies of the great powers, based on a desire to "grab" (an economic +motive), had a great deal to do with preventing a peaceful settlement of +the difficulties. Yet "economics" have nothing to do with it! + +I have attempted elsewhere to make these two points--that it is on the +one hand the false economics of the Turks, and on the other hand the +false economics of the powers of Europe, colouring the policy and +Statecraft of both, which have played an enormous, in all human +probability, a determining role in the immediate provoking cause of the +war; and, of course, a further and more remote cause of the whole +difficulty is the fact that the Balkan peoples never having been +subjected to the discipline of that complex social life which arises +from trade and commerce have never grown out of (or to a less degree) +those primitive racial and religious hostilities which at one time in +Europe as a whole provoked conflicts like that now raging in the +Balkans. The following article which appeared[4] at the outbreak of the +war may summarise some of the points with which we have been dealing. + +Polite and good-natured people think it rude to say "Balkans" if a +Pacifist be present. Yet I never understood why, and I understand now +less than ever. It carries the implication that because war has broken +out that fact disposes of all objection to it. The armies are at grips, +therefore peace is a mistake. Passion reigns on the Balkans, therefore +passion is preferable to reason. + +I suppose cannibalism and infanticide, polygamy, judicial torture, +religious persecution, witchcraft, during all the years we did these +"inevitable" things, were defended in the same way, and those who +resented all criticism of them pointed in triumph to the cannibal feast, +the dead child, the maimed witness, the slain heretic, or the burned +witch. But the fact did not prove the wisdom of those habits, still less +their inevitability; for we have them no more. + +We are all agreed as to the fundamental cause of the Balkan trouble: the +hate born of religious, racial, national, and language differences; the +attempt of an alien conqueror to live parasitically upon the conquered, +and the desire of conqueror and conquered alike to satisfy in massacre +and bloodshed the rancour of fanaticism and hatred. + +Well, in these islands, not so very long ago, those things were causes +of bloodshed; indeed, they were a common feature of European life. But +if they are inevitable in human relationship, how comes it that Adana is +no longer duplicated by St. Bartholomew; the Bulgarian bands by the +vendetta of the Highlander and the Lowlander; the struggle of the Slav +and Turk, Serb and Bulgar, by that of Scots and English, and English and +Welsh? The fanaticism of the Moslem to-day is no intenser than that of +Catholic and heretic in Rome, Madrid, Paris, and Geneva at a time which +is only separated from us by the lives of three or four elderly men. The +heretic or infidel was then in Europe also a thing unclean and +horrifying, exciting in the mind of the orthodox a sincere and honest +hatred and a (very largely satisfied) desire to kill. The Catholic of +the 16th century was apt to tell you that he could not sit at table with +a heretic because the latter carried with him a distinctive and +overpoweringly repulsive odour. If you would measure the distance Europe +has travelled, think what this means: all the nations of Christendom +united in a war lasting 200 years for the capture of the Holy Sepulchre; +and yet, when in our day the representatives, seated round a table, +could have had it for the asking, they did not deem it worth the asking, +so little of the ancient passion was there left. The very nature of man +seemed to be transformed. For, wonderful though it be that orthodox +should cease killing heretic, infinitely more wonderful still is it that +he should cease wanting to kill him. + +And just as most of us are certain that the underlying causes of this +conflict are "inevitable" and "inherent in unchanging human nature," so +are we certain that so _un_human a thing as economics can have no +bearing on it. + +Well, I will suggest that the transformation of the heretic-hating and +heretic-killing European is due mainly to economic forces; that it is +because the drift of those forces has in such large part left the +Balkans, where until yesterday the people lived the life not much +different from that which they lived in the time of Abraham, to one side +that war is now raging; that economic factors of a more immediate kind +form a large part of the provoking cause of that war; and that a better +understanding mainly of certain economic facts of their international +relationship on the part of the great nations of Europe is essential +before much progress towards solution can be made. + +But then, by "economics," of course, I mean not a merchant's profit or a +moneylender's interest, but the method by which men earn their bread, +which must also mean the kind of life they lead. + +We generally think of the primitive life of man--that of the herdsman or +the tent liver--as something idyllic. The picture is as far as possible +from the truth. Those into whose lives economics do not enter, or enter +very little--that is to say, those who, like the Congo cannibal, or the +Red Indian, or the Bedouin, do not cultivate, or divide their labour, or +trade, or save, or look to the future, have shed little of the primitive +passions of other animals of prey, the tigers and the wolves, who have +no economics at all, and have no need to check an impulse or a hate. +But industry, even of the more primitive kind, means that men must +divide their labour, which means that they must put some sort of +reliance upon one another; the thing of prey becomes a partner, and the +attitude towards it changes. And as this life becomes more complex, as +the daily needs and desires push men to trade and barter, that means +building up a social organisation, rules and codes, and courts to +enforce them; as the interdependence widens and deepens it necessarily +means disregarding certain hostilities. If the neighbouring tribe wants +to trade with you they must not kill you; if you want the services of +the heretic you must not kill him, and you must keep your obligation +towards him, and mutual good faith is death to long-sustained hatreds. + +You cannot separate the moral from the social and economic development +of a people, and the great service of a complex social and industrial +organisation, which is built up by the desire of men for better material +conditions, is not that it "pays" but that it makes a more +interdependent human society, and that it leads men to recognise what is +the best relationship between them. And the fact of recognising that +some act of aggression is causing stocks to fall is not important +because it may save Oppenheim's or Solomon's money but because it is a +demonstration that we are dependent upon some community on the other +side of the world, that their damage is our damage, and that we have an +interest in preventing it. It teaches us, as only some such simple and +mechanical means can teach, the lesson of human fellowship. + +And it is by such means as this that Western Europe has in some measure, +within its respective political frontiers, learnt that lesson. Each has +learnt, within the confines of the nation at least, that wealth is made +by work, not robbery; that, indeed, general robbery is fatal to +prosperity; that government consists not merely in having the power of +the sword but in organising society--in "knowing how"; which means the +development of ideas; in maintaining courts; in making it possible to +run railways, post offices, and all the contrivances of a complex +society. + +Now rulers did not create these things; it was the daily activities of +the people, born of their desires and made possible by the circumstances +in which they lived, by the trading and the mining and the shipping +which they carried on, that made them. But the Balkans have been +geographically outside the influence of European industrial and +commercial life. The Turk has hardly felt it at all. He has learnt none +of the social and moral lessons which interdependence and improved +communications have taught the Western European, and it is because he +has not learnt these lessons, because he is a soldier and a conqueror, +to an extent and completeness that other nations of Europe lost a +generation or two since, that the Balkanese are fighting and that war is +raging. + +But not merely in this larger sense, but in the more immediate, narrower +sense, are the fundamental causes of this war economic. + +This war arises, as the past wars against the Turkish conqueror have +arisen, by the desire of the Christian peoples on whom he lives to shake +off this burden. "To live upon their subjects is the Turks' only means +of livelihood," says one authority. The Turk is an economic parasite, +and the economic organism must end of rejecting him. + +For the management of society, simple and primitive even as that of the +Balkan mountains, needs some effort and work and capacity for +administration, or even rudimentary economic life cannot be carried on. +And the Turkish system, founded on the sword and nothing else ("the +finest soldier in Europe"), cannot give that small modicum, of energy or +administrative capacity. The one thing he knows is brute force; but it +is not by the strength of his muscles that an engineer runs a machine, +but by knowing how. The Turk cannot build a road, or make a bridge, or +administer a post office, or found a court of law. And these things are +necessary. And he will not let them be done by the Christian, who, +because he did not belong to the conquering class, has had to work, and +has consequently become the class which possesses whatever capacity for +work and administration the country can show, because to do so would be +to threaten the Turk's only trade. If the Turk granted the Christians +equal political rights they would inevitably "run the country," And yet +the Turk himself cannot do it; and he will not let others do it, because +to do so would be to threaten his supremacy. + +And the more the use of force fails, the more, of course, does he resort +to it, and that is why many of us who do not believe in force, and +desire to see it disappear in the relationship not merely of religious +but of political groups, might conceivably welcome this war of the +Balkan Christians, in so far as it is an attempt to resist the use of +force in those relationships. Of course, I do not try to estimate the +"balance of criminality." Right is not all on one side--it never is. But +the broad issue is clear and plain. And only those concerned with the +name rather than the thing, with nominal and verbal consistency rather +than realities, will see anything paradoxical or contradictory in +Pacifist approval of Christian resistance to the use of Turkish force. + +It is the one fact which stands out incontrovertibly from the whole +weary muddle. It is quite clear that the inability to act in common +arises from the fact that in the international sphere the European is +still dominated by illusions which he has dropped when he deals with +home politics. The political faith of the Turk, which he would never +think of applying at home as between the individuals of his nation, he +applies pure and unalloyed when he comes to deal with foreigners as +nations. The economic conception--using the term in that wider sense +which I have indicated earlier in this article--which guides his +individual conduct is the antithesis of that which guides his national +conduct. + +While the Christian does not believe in robbery inside the frontier, he +does without; while within the State he realises that greater advantage +lies on the side of each observing the general code, so that civilised +society can exist, instead of on the side of having society go to pieces +by each disregarding it; while within the State he realises that +government is a matter of administration, not the seizure of property; +that one town does not add to its wealth by "capturing" another, that +indeed one community cannot "own" another--while, I say, he believes all +these things in his daily life at home, he disregards them all when he +comes to the field of international relationship, _la haute politique_. +To annex some province by a cynical breach of treaty obligation (Austria +in Bosnia, Italy in Tripoli) is regarded as better politics than to act +loyally with the community of nations to enforce their common interest +in order and good government. In fact, we do not believe that there can +be a community of nations, because, in fact, we do not believe that +their interests are common, but rival; like the Turk, we believe that if +you do not exercise force upon your "rival" he will exercise it upon +you; that nations live upon one another, not by co-operation with one +another--and it is for this reason presumably that you must "own" as +much of your neighbours' as possible. It is the Turkish conception from +beginning to end. + +And it is because these false beliefs prevent the nations of Christendom +acting loyally the one to the other, because each is playing for its own +hand, that the Turk, with hint of some sordid bribe, has been able to +play off each against the other. + +This is the crux of the matter. When Europe can honestly act in common +on behalf of common interests some solution can be found. And the +capacity of Europe to act together will not be found so long as the +accepted doctrines of European statecraft remain unchanged, so long as +they are dominated by existing illusions. + + * * * * * + +In a paper read before the British Association of this year, I attempted +to show in more general terms this relation between economic impulse and +ideal motive. The following are relevant passages:-- + +A nation, a people, we are given to understand, have higher motives than +money, or "self-interest." What do we mean when we speak of the money of +a nation, or the self-interest of a community? We mean--and in such a +discussion as this can mean nothing else--better conditions for the +great mass of the people, the fullest possible lives, the abolition or +attenuation of poverty and of narrow circumstances, that the millions +shall be better housed and clothed and fed, capable of making provision +for sickness and old age, with lives prolonged and cheered--and not +merely this, but also that they shall be better educated, with character +disciplined by steady labour and a better use of leisure, a general +social atmosphere which shall make possible family affection, individual +dignity and courtesy and the graces of life, not alone among the few, +but among the many. + +Now, do these things constitute as a national policy an inspiring +aim or not? Yet they are, speaking in terms of communities, pure +self-interest--all bound up with economic problems, with money. Does +Admiral Mahan mean us to take him at his word when he would attach to +such efforts the same discredit that one implies in talking of a +mercenary individual? Would he have us believe that the typical great +movements of our times--Socialism, Trades Unionism, Syndicalism, +Insurance Bills, Land Laws, Old Age Pensions, Charity Organisation, +Improved Education--bound up as they all are with economic problems--are +not the sort of objects which more and more are absorbing the best +activities of Christendom? + +I have attempted to show that the activities which lie outside the range +of these things--the religious wars, movements like those which promoted +the Crusades, or the sort of tradition which we associate with the duel +(which has, in fact, disappeared from Anglo-Saxon society)--do not and +cannot any longer form part of the impulse creating the long-sustained +conflicts between large groups which a European war implies, partly +because such allied moral differences as now exist do not in any way +coincide with the political divisions, but intersect them, and partly +because in the changing character of men's ideals there is a distinct +narrowing of the gulf which is supposed to separate ideal and material +aims. Early ideals, whether in the field of politics or religion, are +generally dissociated from any aim of general well-being. In early +politics ideals are concerned simply with personal allegiance to some +dynastic chief, a feudal lord or a monarch. The well-being of a +community does not enter into the matter at all: it is the personal +allegiance which matters. Later the chief must embody in his person that +well-being, or he does not achieve the allegiance of a community of any +enlightenment; later, the well-being of the community becomes the end in +itself without being embodied in the person of an hereditary chief, so +that the community realise that their efforts, instead of being directed +to the protection of the personal interests of some chief, are as a +matter of fact directed to the protection of their own interests, and +their altruism has become self-interest, since self-sacrifice of a +community for the sake of the community is a contradiction in terms. In +the religious sphere a like development has been shown. Early religious +ideals have no relation to the material betterment of mankind. The early +Christian thought it meritorious to live a sterile life at the top of a +pillar, eaten by vermin, as the Hindoo saint to-day thinks it +meritorious to live an equally sterile life upon a bed of spikes. But as +the early Christian ideal progressed, sacrifices having no end connected +with the betterment of mankind lost their appeal. The Christian saint +who would allow the nails of his fingers to grow through the palms of +his clasped hands would excite, not our admiration, but our revolt. More +and more is religious effort being subjected to this test: does it make +for the improvement of society? If not, it stands condemned. Political +ideals will inevitably follow a like development, and will be more and +more subjected to a like test. + +I am aware that very often at present they are not so subjected. +Dominated as our political thought is by Roman and feudal +imagery--hypnotised by symbols and analogies which the necessary +development of organised society has rendered obsolete--the ideals even +of democracies are still often pure abstractions, divorced from any aim +calculated to advance the moral or material betterment of mankind. The +craze for sheer size of territory, simple extent of administrative area, +is still deemed a thing deserving immense, incalculable sacrifices. + + * * * * * + +And yet even these ideals, firmly set as they are in our language and +tradition, are rapidly yielding to the necessary force of events. A +generation ago it would have been inconceivable that a people or a +monarch should calmly see part of its country secede and establish +itself as a separate political entity without attempting to prevent it +by force of arms. Yet this is what happened but a year or two since in +the Scandinavian peninsula. For forty years Germany has added to her own +difficulties and those of the European situation for the purpose of +including Alsace and Lorraine in its Federation, but even there, obeying +the tendency which is world-wide, an attempt has been made at the +creation of a constitutional and autonomous government. The history of +the British Empire for fifty years has been a process of undoing the +work of conquest. Colonies are now neither colonies nor possessions. +They are independent States. Great Britain, which for centuries has made +such sacrifices to retain Ireland, is now making great sacrifices in +order to make her secession workable. To all political arrangements, to +all political ideals, the final test will be applied: Does it or does it +not make for the widest interests of the mass of the people involved?... +And I would ask those who think that war must be a permanent element in +the settlement of the moral differences of men to think for one moment +of the factors which stood in the way of the abandonment of the use of +force by governments, and by one religious group against another in the +matter of religious belief. On the one hand you had authority with all +the prestige of historical right and the possession of physical power in +its most imposing form, the means of education still in their hands; +government authority extending to all sorts of details of life to which +it no longer extends; immense vested interests outside government; and +finally the case for the imposition of dogma by authority a strong one, +and still supported by popular passion: and on the other hand, you had +as yet poor and feeble instruments of mere opinion; the printed book +still a rarity; the Press non-existent, communication between men still +rudimentary, worse even than it had been two thousand years previously. +And yet, despite these immense handicaps upon the growth of opinion and +intellectual ferment as against physical force, it was impossible for a +new idea to find life in Geneva or Rome or Edinburgh or London without +quickly crossing and affecting all the other centres, and not merely +making headway against entrenched authority, but so quickly breaking up +the religious homogeneity of states, that not only were governments +obliged to abandon the use of force in religious matters as against +their subjects, but religious wars between nations became impossible for +the double reason that a nation no longer expressed a single religious +belief (you had the anomaly of a Protestant Sweden fighting in alliance +with a Catholic France), and that the power of opinion had become +stronger than the power of physical force--because, in other words, the +limits of military force were more and more receding. + +But if the use of force was so ineffective against the spiritual +possessions of man when the arms to be used in their defence were so +poor and rudimentary, how could a government hope to crush out by force +to-day such things as a nation's language, law, literature, morals, +ideals, when it possesses such means of defence as are provided in +security of tenure of material possessions, a cheap literature, a +popular Press, a cheap and secret postal system, and all the other means +of rapid and perfected inter-communication? + +You will notice that I have spoken throughout not of the _defence_ of a +national ideal by arms, but of its attack; if you have to defend your +ideal it is because someone attacks it, and without attack your defence +would not be called for. + +If you are compelled to prevent someone using force as against your +nationality, it is because he believes that by the use of that force he +can destroy or change it. If he thought that the use of force would be +ineffective to that end he would not employ it. + +I have attempted to show elsewhere that the abandonment of war for +material ends depends upon a general realisation of its futility for +accomplishing those ends. In like manner does the abandonment of war for +moral or ideal ends depend upon the general realisation of the growing +futility of such means for those ends also--and for the growing futility +of those ends if they could be accomplished. + +We are sometimes told that it is the spirit of nationality--the desire +to be of your place and locality--that makes war. That is not so. It is +the desire of other men that you shall not be of your place and +locality, of your habits and traditions, but of theirs. Not the desire +of nationality, but the desire to destroy nationality is what makes the +wars of nationality. If the Germans did not think that the retention of +Polish or Alsatian nationality might hamper them in the art of war, +hamper them in the imposition of force on some other groups, there would +be no attempt to crush out this special possession of the Poles and +Alsatians. It is the belief in force and a preference for settling +things by force instead of by agreement that threatens or destroys +nationality. And I have given an indication of the fact that it is not +merely war, but the preparation for war, implying as it does great +homogeneity in states and centralised bureaucratic control, which is +to-day the great enemy of nationality. Before this tendency to +centralisation which military necessity sets up much that gives colour +and charm to European life is disappearing. And yet we are told that it +is the Pacifists who are the enemy of nationality, and we are led to +believe that in some way the war system in Europe stands for the +preservation of nationality! + +[Footnote 3: Review of Reviews, November, 1912.] + +[Footnote 4: In the "Daily Mail," to whose Editor I am indebted for +permission to reprint it.] + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +TURKISH IDEALS IN OUR POLITICAL THOUGHT. + +This war and "the Turks of Britain and Prussia"--The Anglo-Saxon and +opposed ideals--Mr. C. Chesterton's case for "killing and being killed" +as the best method of settling differences--Its application to Civil +Conflicts--As in Spanish-America--The difference between Devonshire and +Venezuela--Will the Balkans adopt the Turco-Venezuelan political ideals +or the British? + + +An English political writer remarked, on it becoming evident that the +Christian States were driving back the Turks: "This is a staggering blow +to _all_ the Turks--those of England and Prussia as well as those of +Turkey." + +But, of course, the British and Prussian Turks will never see it--like +the Bourbons, they learn not. Here is a typically military system, the +work of "born fighters" which has gone down in welter before the +assaults of much less military States, the chief of which, indeed, has +grown up in what Captain von Herbert has called, with some contempt, +"stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions," formed by the people whom +the Turks regarded as quite unfit to be made into warriors; whom they +regarded much as some Europeans regard the Jews. It is the Christian +populations of the Balkans who were the traders and workers--those +brought most under economic influences; it was the Turks who escaped +those influences. A few years since, I wrote: "If the conqueror profits +much by his conquest, as the Romans in one sense did, it is the +conqueror who is threatened by the enervating effect of the soft and +luxurious life; while it is the conquered who are forced to labour for +the conqueror, and who learn in consequence those qualities of steady +industry which are certainly a better moral training than living upon +the fruits of others, upon labour extorted at the sword's point. It is +the conqueror who becomes effete, and it is the conquered who learn +discipline and the qualities making for a well-ordered State." + +Could we ask a better illustration than the history of the Turk and his +Christian victims? I exemplified the matter thus: "If during long +periods a nation gives itself up to war, trade languishes, the +population loses the habit of steady industry, government and +administration become corrupt, abuses escape punishment, and the real +sources of a people's strength and expansion dwindle. What has caused +the relative failure and decline of Spanish, Portuguese, and French +expansion in Asia and the New World, and the relative success of English +expansion therein? Was it the mere hazards of war which gave to Great +Britain the domination of India and half of the New World? That is +surely a superficial reading of history. It was, rather, that the +methods and processes of Spain, Portugal, and France were military, +while those of the Anglo-Saxon world were commercial and peaceful. Is it +not a commonplace that in India, quite as much as in the New World, the +trader and the settler drove out the soldier and the conqueror? The +difference between the two methods was that one was a process of +conquest, and the other of colonizing, or non-military administration +for commercial purposes. The one embodied the sordid Cobdenite idea, +which so excites the scorn of the militarists, and the other the lofty +military ideal. The one was parasitism; the other co-operation.... + +"How may we sum up the whole case, keeping in mind every empire that +ever existed--the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Mede and Persian, the +Macedonian, the Roman, the Frank, the Saxon, the Spanish, the +Portuguese, the Bourbon, the Napoleonic? In all and every one of them we +may see the same process, which is this: If it remains military it +decays; if it prospers and takes its share of the work of the world it +ceases to be military. There is no other reading of history." + +But despite these very plain lessons, there are many amongst us who +regard physical conflict as the ideal form of human relationship; +"killing and being killed" as the best way to determine the settlement +of differences, and a society which drifts from these ideals as on the +high road to degeneration, and who deem those who set before themselves +the ideal of abolishing or attenuating poverty for the mass of men, "low +and sordid." + +Thus Mr. Cecil Chesterton[5]: + + In essence Mr. Angell's query is: "Should usurers go to war?" + + I may say, in passing, that I am not clear that even on the + question thus raised Mr. Angell makes out his case. His case, + broadly stated, is that the net of "Finance"--or, to put it + plainer, Cosmopolitan Usury--which is at present spread over Europe + would be disastrously torn by any considerable war; and that in + consequence it is to the interest of the usurers to preserve peace. + But here, it seems to me, we must make a clear differentiation. It + may easily be to the interest of a particular usurer, or group of + usurers, to provoke war; that very financial crisis which Mr. + Angell anticipates may quite probably be a source of profit to + them. That it would not be to the interest of a nation of usurers + to fight is very probable. That such a nation would not fight, or, + if it did, would be exceedingly badly beaten, is certain. But that + only serves to raise the further question of whether it is to the + ultimate advantage of a nation to repose upon usury; and whether + the breaking of the net of usury which at present unquestionably + holds Europe in captivity would not be for the advantage, as it + would clearly be for the honour, of our race.... The sword is too + sacred a thing to be prostituted to such dirty purposes. But + whether he succeeds or fails in this attempt, it will make no + difference to the mass of plain men who, when they fight and risk + their lives, do not do so in the expectation of obtaining a certain + interest on their capital, but for quite other reasons. + + Mr. Angell's latest appeal comes, I think, at an unfortunate + moment. It is not merely that the Balkan States have refused to be + convinced by Mr. Angell as to their chances of commercial profit + from the war. It is that if Mr. Angell had succeeded to the fullest + extent in convincing them that there was not a quarter per cent. to + be made out of the war, nay, that--horrible thought!--they would + actually be poorer at the end of the war than at the beginning, + they would have gone to war all the same. + + Since Mr. Angell's argument clearly applies as much or more to + civil as to international conflicts, I may perhaps be allowed to + turn to civil conflicts to make clear my meaning. In this country + during the last three centuries one solid thing has been done. The + power of Parliament was pitted in battle against the power of the + Crown, and won. As a result, for good or evil, Parliament really is + stronger than the Crown to-day. The power of the mass of the + people to control Parliament has been given as far as mere + legislation could give it. We all know that it is a sham. And if + you ask what it is that makes the difference of reality between the + two cases, it is this: that men killed and were killed for the one + thing and not for the other. + + I have no space to develop all that I should like to say about the + indirect effects of war. All I will say is this, that men do judge, + and always will judge, things by the ultimate test of how they + fight. The German victory of forty years ago has produced not only + an astonishing expansion, industrial as well as political of + Germany, but has (most disastrously, as I think) infected Europe + with German ideas, especially with the idea that you make a nation + strong by making its people behave like cattle. God send that I may + live to see the day when victorious armies from Gaul shall shatter + this illusion, burn up Prussianism with all its Police Regulations, + Insurance Acts, Poll Taxes, and insults to the poor, and reassert + the Republic. It will never be done in any other way. + + If arbitration is ever to take the place of war, it must be backed + by a corresponding array of physical force. Now the question + immediately arises: Are we prepared to arm any International + Tribunal with any such powers? Personally, I am not.... Turn back + some fifty years to the great struggle for the emancipation of + Italy. Suppose that a Hague Tribunal had then been in existence, + armed with coercive powers. The dispute between Austria and + Sardinia must have been referred to that tribunal. That tribunal + must have been guided by existing treaties. The Treaty of Vienna + was perhaps the most authoritative ever entered into by European + Powers. By that treaty, Venice and Lombardy were unquestionably + assigned to Austria. A just tribunal administering international + law _must_ have decided in favour of Austria, and have used the + whole armed force of Europe to coerce Italy into submission. Are + those Pacifists, who try at the same time to be Democrats, prepared + to acquiesce in such a conclusion? Personally, I am not. + +I replied as follows: + + Mr. Cecil Chesterton says that the question which I have raised is + this: "Should usurers go to war?" + + That, of course, is not true. I have never, even by implication, + put such a problem, and there is nothing in the article which he + criticises, nor in any other statement of my own, that justifies + it. What I have asked is whether peoples should go to war. + + I should have thought it was pretty obvious that, whatever happens, + usurers do not go to war: the peoples go to war, and the peoples + pay, and the whole question is whether they should go on making war + and paying for it. Mr. Chesterton says that if they are wise they + will; I say that if they are wise they will not. + + I have attempted to show that the prosperity of peoples--by which, + of course, one means the diminution of poverty, better houses, soap + and water, healthy children, lives prolonged, conditions + sufficiently good to ensure leisure and family affection, fuller + and completer lives generally--is not secured by fighting one + another, but by co-operation and labour, by a better organisation + of society, by improved human relationship, which, of course, can + only come of better understanding of the conditions of that + relationship, which better understanding means discussion, + adjustment, a desire and capacity to see the point of view of the + other man--of all of which war and its philosophy is the negation. + + To all of this Mr. Chesterton replies: "That only concerns the Jews + and the moneylenders." Again, this is not true. It concerns all of + us, like all problems of our struggle with Nature. It is in part at + least an economic problem, and that part of it is best stated in + the more exact and precise terms that I have employed to deal with + it--the term's of the market-place. But to imply that the + conditions that there obtain are the affair merely of bankers and + financiers, to imply that these things do not touch the lives of + the mass, is simply to talk a nonsense the meaninglessness of which + only escapes some of us because in these matters we happen to be + very ignorant. It is not mainly usurers who suffer from bad finance + and bad economics (one may suggest that they are not quite so + simple); it is mainly the people as a whole. + + Mr. Chesterton says that we should break this "net of usury" in + which the peoples are enmeshed. I agree heartily; but that net has + been woven mainly by war (and that diversion of energy and + attention from social management which war involves), and is, so + far as the debts of the European States are concerned (so large an + element of usury), almost solely the outcome of war. And if the + peoples go on piling up debt, as they must if they are to go on + piling up armaments (as Mr. Chesterton wants them to), giving the + best of their attention and emotion to sheer physical conflict, + instead of to organisation and understanding, they will merely + weave that web of debt and usury still closer; it will load us more + heavily and strangle us to a still greater extent. If usury is the + enemy, the remedy is to fight usury. Mr. Chesterton says the remedy + is for its victims to fight one another. + + And you will not fight usury by hanging Rothschilds, for usury is + worst where that sort of thing is resorted to. Widespread debt is + the outcome of bad management and incompetence, economic or social, + and only better management will remedy it. Mr. Chesterton is sure + that better management is only arrived at by "killing and being + killed." He really does urge this method even in civil matters. (He + tells us that the power of Parliament over the Crown is real, and + that of the people over Parliament a sham, "because men killed and + were killed for the one, and not for the other.") It is the method + of Spanish America where it is applied more frankly and logically, + and where still, in many places, elections are a military affair, + the questions at issue being settled by killing and being killed, + instead of by the cowardly, pacifist methods current in Europe. The + result gives us the really military civilisations of Venezuela, + Colombia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. And, although the English system + may have many defects--I think it has--those defects exist in a + still greater degree where force "settles" the matters in dispute, + where the bullet replaces the ballot, and where bayonets are + resorted to instead of brains. For Devonshire is better than + Nicaragua. Really it is. And it would get us out of none of our + troubles for one group to impose its views simply by preponderant + physical force, for Mr. Asquith, for instance, in the true Castro + or Zuyala manner, to announce that henceforth all critics of the + Insurance Act are to be shot, and that the present Cabinet will + hold office as long as it can depend upon the support of the Army. + For, even if the country rose in rebellion, and fought it out and + won, the successful party would (if they also believed in force) do + exactly the same thing to _their_ opponents; and so it would go on + never-endingly (as it has gone on during weary centuries throughout + the larger part of South America), until the two parties came once + more to their senses, and agreed not to use force when they + happened to be able to do so; which is our present condition. But + it is the condition of England merely because the English, as a + whole, have ceased to believe in Mr. Chesterton's principles; it is + not yet the condition of Venezuela because the Venezuelans have not + yet ceased to believe those principles, though even they are + beginning to. + + Mr. Chesterton says: "Men do judge, and always will judge, by the + ultimate test of how they fight." The pirate who gives his blood + has a better right, therefore, to the ship than the merchant (who + may be a usurer!) who only gives his money. Well, that is the view + which was all but universal well into the period of what, for want + of a better word, we call civilisation. Not only was it the basis + of all such institutions as the ordeal and duel; not only did it + justify (and in the opinion of some still justifies) the wars of + religion and the use of force in religious matters generally; not + only was it the accepted national polity of such communities as the + Vikings, the Barbary States, and the Red Indians; but it is still, + unfortunately, the polity of certain European states. But the idea + is a survival and--and this is the important point--an admission of + failure to understand where right lies: to "fight it out" is the + remedy of the boy who for the life of him cannot see who is right + and who is wrong. + + At ten years of age we are all quite sure that piracy is a finer + calling than trade, and the pirate a finer fellow than the Shylock + who owns the ship--which, indeed, he may well be. But as we grow up + (which some of the best of us never do) we realise that piracy is + not the best way to establish the ownership of cargoes, any more + than the ordeal is the way to settle cases at law, or the rack of + proving a dogma, or the Spanish American method the way to settle + differences between Liberals and Conservatives. + + And just as civil adjustments are made most efficiently, as they + are in England (say), as distinct from South America, by a general + agreement not to resort to force, so it is the English method in + the international field which gives better results than that based + on force. The relationship of Great Britain to Canada or Australia + is preferable to the relationship of Russia to Finland or Poland, + or Germany to Alsace-Lorraine. The five nations of the British + Empire have, by agreement, abandoned the use of force as between + themselves. Australia may do us an injury--exclude our subjects, + English or Indian, and expose them to insult--but we know very well + that force will not be used against her. To withhold such force is + the basis of the relationship of these five nations; and, given a + corresponding development of ideas, might equally well be the basis + of the relationship of fifteen--about all the nations of the world + who could possibly fight. The difficulties Mr. Chesterton + imagines--an international tribunal deciding in favour of Austria + concerning the recession of Venice and Lombardy, and summoning the + forces of United Europe to coerce Italy into submission--are, of + course, based on the assumption that a United Europe, having + arrived at such understanding as to be able to sink its + differences, would be the same kind of Europe that it is now, or + was a generation ago. If European statecraft advances sufficiently + to surrender the use of force against neighbouring states, it will + have advanced sufficiently to surrender the use of force against + unwilling provinces, as in some measure British statesmanship has + already done. To raise the difficulty that Mr. Chesterton does is + much the same as assuming that a court of law in San Domingo or + Turkey will give the same results as a court of law in Great + Britain, because the form of the mechanism is the same. And does + Mr. Chesterton suggest that the war system settles these matters to + perfection? That it has worked satisfactorily in Ireland and + Finland, or, for the matter of that, in Albania or Macedonia? + + For if Mr. Chesterton urges that killing and being killed is the + way to determine the best means of governing a country, it is his + business to defend the Turk, who has adopted that principle during + four hundred years, not the Christians, who want to bring that + method to an end and adopt another. And I would ask no better + example of the utter failure of the principles that I combat and + Mr. Chesterton defends than their failure in the Balkan Peninsula. + + This war is due to the vile character of Turkish rule, and the + Turk's rule is vile because it is based on the sword. Like Mr. + Chesterton (and our pirate), the Turk believes in the right of + conquest, "the ultimate test of how they fight." "The history of + the Turks," says Sir Charles Elliott, "is almost exclusively a + catalogue of battles." He has lived (for the most gloriously + uneconomic person has to live, to follow a trade of some sort, even + if it be that of theft) on tribute exacted from the Christian + populations, and extorted, not in return for any work of + administration, but simply because he was the stronger. And that + has made his rule intolerable, and is the cause of this war. + + Now, my whole thesis is that understanding, work, co-operation, + adjustment, must be the basis of human society; that conquest as a + means of achieving national advantage must fail; that to base your + prosperity or means of livelihood, your economic system, in short, + upon having more force than someone else, and exercising it against + him, is an impossible form of human relationship that is bound to + break down. And Mr. Chesterton says that the war in the Balkans + demolishes this thesis. I do not agree with him. + + The present war in the Balkans is an attempt--and happily a + successful one--to bring this reign of force and conquest to an + end, and that is why those of us who do not believe in military + force rejoice. + + The debater, more concerned with verbal consistency than realities + and the establishment of sound principles, will say that this means + the approval of war. It does not; it merely means the choice of the + less evil of two forms of war. War has been going on in the + Balkans, not for a month, but has been waged by the Turks daily + against these populations for 400 years. + + The Balkan peoples have now brought to an end a system of rule + based simply upon the accident of force--"killing and being + killed." And whether good or ill comes of this war will depend upon + whether they set up a similar system or one more in consonance with + pacifist principles. I believe they will choose the latter course; + that is to say, they will continue to co-operate between themselves + instead of fighting between themselves; they will settle + differences by discussion, adjustment, not force. But if they are + guided by Mr. Chesterton's principle, if each one of the Balkan + nations is determined to impose its own especial point of view, to + refuse all settlement by co-operation and understanding, where it + can resort to force--why, in that case, the strongest (presumably + Bulgaria) will start conquering the rest, start imposing government + by force, and will listen to no discussion or argument; will + simply, in short, take the place of the Turk in the matter, and the + old weary contest will begin afresh, and we shall have the Turkish + system under a new name, until that in its turn is destroyed, and + the whole process begun again _da capo_. And if Mr. Chesterton says + that this is not his philosophy, and that he would recommend the + Balkan nations to come to an understanding, and co-operate + together, instead of fighting one another, why does he give + different counsels to the nations of Christendom as a whole? If it + is well for the Balkan peoples to abandon conflict as between + themselves in favour of co-operation against the common enemy, why + is it ill for the other Christian peoples to abandon such conflict + in favour of co-operation against their common enemy, which is wild + nature and human error, ignorance and passion. + +[Footnote 5: From "Everyman" to whose Editor I am indebted for +permission to print my reply.] + + + +CHAPTER V. + +OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BALKAN WARS. + +Mr. Winston Churchill on the "Responsibility" of Diplomacy--What does he +mean?--An easy (and popular) philosophy--Can we neglect past if we would +avoid future errors?--British temper and policy in the Crimean War--What +are its lessons?--Why we fought a war to sustain the "integrity and +independence of the Turkish dominion in Europe"--Supporting the Turk +against his Christian victims--From fear of Russian growth which we are +now aiding--The commentary of events--Shall we back the wrong horse +again? + + + Here was a war which had broken out in spite of all that rulers and + diplomatists could do to prevent it, a war in which the Press had + had no part, a war which the whole force of the money power had + been subtly and steadfastly directed to prevent, which had come + upon us not through the ignorance or credulity of the people; but, + on the contrary, through their knowledge of their history and their + destiny.... Who is the man who is vain enough to suppose that the + long antagonisms of history and of time can in all circumstances be + adjusted by the smooth and superficial conventions of politicians + and ambassadors? + +Thus Mr. Churchill. It is a plea for the inevitability, not merely of +war, but of a people's "destiny." + +What precisely does it mean? Does it mean that the European Powers have +in the past been entirely wise and honest, have never intrigued with +the Turk the one against the other, have always kept good faith, have +never been inspired by false political theories and tawdry and shoddy +ideals, have, in short, no responsibility for the abominations that have +gone on in the Balkan peninsula for a century? No one outside a lunatic +asylum would urge it. But, then, that means that diplomacy has _not_ +done all it might to prevent this war. Why does Mr. Churchill say it +has? + +And does the passage I have quoted mean that we--that English +diplomacy--has had no part in European diplomacy in the past? Have we +not, on the contrary, by universal admission played a predominant role +by backing the wrong horse? + +But, then, that is not a popular thing to point out, and Mr. Churchill +is very careful not to point it out in any way that could give +justification to an unpopular view or discredit a popular one. He is, +however, far too able a Cabinet Minister to ignore obvious facts, and it +is interesting to note how he disposes of them. Observe the following +passage: + + For the drama or tragedy which is moving to its climax in the + Balkans we all have our responsibilities, and none of us can escape + our share of them by blaming others or by blaming the Turk. If + there is any man here who, looking back over the last 35 years, + thinks he knows where to fix the sole responsibility for all the + procrastination and provocation, for all the jealousies and + rivalries, for all the religious and racial animosities, which have + worked together for this result, I do not envy him his + complacency.... Whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the + Powers or sit in sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no + consequence at the present moment. + +Now if for this tragedy we "all have our responsibility," then what +becomes of his first statement that the war is raging despite all that +rulers and diplomats could do to prevent it? If the war was +"inevitable," and rulers and diplomats have done all they could to +prevent it, neither they nor we have any responsibility for it. He +knows, of course, that it is impossible to deny that responsibility, +that our errors in the past _have_ been due not to any lack of readiness +to fight or quarrel with foreign nations, but precisely to the tendency +to do those things and our _in_disposition to set aside instinctive and +reasonless jealousies and rivalries in favour of a deeper sense of +responsibility and a somewhat longer vision. + +But, again, this quite obvious moral, that if we have our +responsibility, if, in other words, we have _not_ done all that we might +and _have_ been led away by temper and passion, we should, in order to +avoid a repetition of such errors in the future, try and see where we +have erred in the past, is precisely the moral that Mr. Churchill does +_not_ draw. Again, it is not the popular line to show with any +definiteness that we have been wrong. An abstract proposition that "we +all have our responsibilities," is, while a formal admission of the +obvious fact also at the same time, an excuse, almost a justification. +You realise Mr. Churchill's method: Having made the necessary admission +of fact, you immediately prevent any unpleasant (or unpopular) practical +conclusion concerning our duty in the matter by talking of the +"complacency" of those who would fix any real and definite part of the +responsibility upon you. (Because, of course, no man, knows where lies, +and no one would ever attempt to fix, the "sole" responsibility). +Incidentally, one might point out to Mr. Churchill that the attempt to +see the errors of past conduct and to avoid them in the future is _not_ +complacency, but that airily to dismiss our responsibility by saying +that it is of "no consequence whether we sit in sackcloth and ashes" +_is_ complacency. + +Mr. Churchill's idea seems to be that men should forget their +errors--and commit them again. For that is what it amounts to. We +cannot, indeed, undo the past, that is true; but we can prevent it +being repeated. But we certainly shall not prevent such repetition if we +hug the easy doctrine that we have always been right--that it is not +worth while to see how our principles have worked out in practice, to +take stock of our experience, and to see what results the principles we +propose again to put into operation, have given. + +The practical thing for us if we would avoid like errors in the future +is to see where _our_ responsibility lies--a thing which we shall never +do if we are governed by the net impression which disengages itself from +speeches like those of Mr. Churchill. For the net result of that speech, +the impression, despite a few shrewd qualifications which do not in +reality affect that net result but which may be useful later wherewith +to silence critics, is that war is inevitable, a matter of "destiny," +that diplomacy--the policy pursued by the respective powers--can do +nothing to prevent it; that as brute force is the one and final appeal +the only practical policy is to have plenty of armaments and to show a +great readiness to fight; that it is futile to worry about past errors; +(especially as an examination of them would go a long way to discredit +the policy just indicated); that the troublesome and unpopular people +who in the past happen to have kept their heads during a prevailing +dementia--and whose policy happens to have been as right as that of the +popular side was wrong--can be dismissed with left-handed references to +"complacency," This sort of thing is popular enough, of course, but-- + +Well, I will take the risks of a tactic which is the exact contrary to +that adopted by Mr. Churchill and would urge upon those whose patriotism +is not of the order which is ready to see their country in the wrong and +who do feel some responsibility for its national policy, to ask +themselves these questions: + +Is it true that the Powers could have prevented in large measure the +abominations which Turkey has practised in the Balkans for the last +half-century or so? + +Has our own policy been a large factor in determining that of the +Powers? + +Has our own policy directly prevented in the past the triumph of the +Christian populations which, despite that policy, has finally taken +place? + +Was our own policy at fault when we were led into a war to ensure the +"integrity and independence of the Turkish dominions in Europe"? + +Is the general conception of Statecraft on which that policy has been +based--the "Balance of Power" which presupposes the necessary rivalry of +nations and which in the past has led to oppose Russia as it is now +leading to oppose Germany--sound, and has it been justified in history? + +Did we give due weight to the considerations urged by the public men of +the past who opposed such features of this policy as the Crimean War; +was the immense popularity of that war any test of its wisdom; were the +rancour, hatred and scorn poured upon those men just or deserved? + + * * * * * + +Now the first four of these questions have been answered by history and +are answered by every one to-day in an emphatic affirmative. This is not +the opinion of a Pacifist partisan. Even the _Times_ is constrained to +admit that "these futile conflicts might have ended years ago, if it had +not been for the quarrels of the Western nations."[6] And as to the +Crimean War, has not the greatest Conservative foreign minister of the +nineteenth century admitted that "we backed the wrong horse"--and, what +is far more to the point, have not events unmistakably demonstrated it? + +Do we quite realise that if foreign policy had that continuity which +the political pundits pretend, we should now be fighting on the side of +the Turk against the Balkan States? That we have entered into solemn +treaty obligations, as part of our national policy, to guarantee for +ever the "integrity and independence of the Turkish dominions in +Europe," that we fought a great and popular war to prevent that triumph +of the Christian population which will arise as the result of the +present war? That but for this policy which caused us to maintain the +Turk in Europe the present war would certainly not be raging, and, what +is much more to the point, that but for our policy the abominations +which have provoked it and which it is its object to terminate, would so +far as human reason can judge at all have been brought to an end +generations since? Do we quite realise that _we_ are in large part +responsible, not merely for the war, but for the long agony of horror +which have provoked it and made it necessary; that when we talk of the +jealousies and rivalries of the Powers as playing so large a part in the +responsibility for these things, we represent, perhaps, the chief among +those jealousies and rivalries? That it is not mainly the Turk nor the +Russian nor the Austrian which has determined the course of history in +the Balkan peninsular since the middle of the 19th century, but we +Englishmen--the country gentleman obsessed by vague theories of the +Balance of Power and heaven knows what, reading his _Times_ and barking +out his preposterous politics over the dinner table? That this fatal +policy was dictated simply by fear of the growth of "Russian barbarism +and autocracy" and "the overshadowing of the Western nations by a +country whose institutions are inimical to our own"? That while we were +thus led into war by a phantom danger to our Indian possessions, we were +quite blind to the real danger which threatened them, which a year or +two later, in the Mutiny, nearly lost us them and which were not due to +the machinations of a rival power but to our own misgovernment; that +this very "barbaric growth" and expansion towards India which we fought +a war to check we are now actively promoting in Persia and elsewhere by +our (effective) alliance? That while as recently as fifteen years ago we +would have gone to war to prevent any move of Russia towards the Indian +frontier, we are to-day actually encouraging her to build a railway +there? And that it is now another nation which stands as the natural +barrier to Russian expansion to the West--Germany--whose power we are +challenging, and that all tendencies point to our backing again the +wrong horse, to our fighting _with_ the "semi-Asiatic barbarian" (as our +fathers used to call him) against the nation which has close racial and +cultural affinity to our own, just as half a century since the same +fatal obsession about the "Balance of Power" led us to fight with the +Mohammedan in order to bolster up for half a century his anti-Christian +rule. + +The misreading of history in this matter is, unfortunately, not +possible. The point upon which in the Crimean war the negotiations with +Russia finally broke was the claim, based upon her reading of the Vienna +note, to stand as religious protector of the Greek Christians in the +Balkan peninsular. That was the pivot of the whole negotiations, and the +war was the outcome of our support of the Turkish view--or, rather, our +conduct of Turkish policy, for throughout the whole period England was +conducting the Turkish negotiations; indeed, as Bright said at the time, +she was carrying on the Turkish Government and ruling the Turkish Empire +through her ministers in Constantinople. + +I will quote a speech of the period made in the House of Commons. It was +as follows: + + Our opponents seem actuated by a frantic and bitter hostility to + Russia, and, without considering the calamities in which they might + involve this country, they have sought to urge it into a great war, + as they imagined, on behalf of European freedom, and in order to + cripple the resources of Russia.... + + The question is, whether the advantages both to Turkey and England + of avoiding war altogether, would have been less than those which + are likely to arise from the policy which the Government has + pursued? Now, if the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton is right in + saying that Turkey is a growing power, and that she has elements of + strength which unlearned persons like myself know nothing about; + surely no immediate, or sensible, or permanent mischief could have + arisen to her from the acceptance of the Vienna note, which all the + distinguished persons who agreed to it have declared to be + perfectly consistent with her honour and independence. If she had + been growing stronger and stronger of late years, surely she would + have grown still stronger in the future, and there might have been + a reasonable expectation that, whatever disadvantages she might + have suffered for a time from that note, her growing strength would + have enabled her to overcome them, while the peace of Europe might + have been preserved. But suppose that Turkey is not a growing + power, but that the Ottoman rule in Europe is tottering to its + fall, I come to the conclusion that, whatever advantages were + afforded to the Christian population of Turkey would have enabled + them to grow more rapidly in numbers, in industry, in wealth, in + intelligence, and in political power; and that, as they thus + increased in influence, they would have become more able, in case + any accident, which might not be far distant, occurred, to + supplant the Mahommedan rule, and to establish themselves in + Constantinople as a Christian State, which, I think, every man who + hears me will admit is infinitely more to be desired than that the + Mahommedan power should be permanently sustained by the bayonets of + France and the fleets of England. Europe would thus have been at + peace; for I do not think even the most bitter enemies of Russia + believe that the Emperor of Russia intended last year, if the + Vienna note or Prince Menchikoff's last and most moderate + proposition had been accepted, to have marched on Constantinople. + Indeed, he had pledged himself in the most distinct manner to + withdraw his troops at once from the Principalities, if the Vienna + note were accepted; and therefore in that case Turkey would have + been delivered from the presence of the foe; peace would for a time + have been secured for Europe; and the whole matter would have + drifted on to its natural solution--which is, that the Mahommedan + power in Europe should eventually succumb to the growing power of + the Christian population of the Turkish territories. + +Now, looking back upon what has since happened, which view shows the +greater wisdom and prevision? That of the man who delivered this speech +(and he was John Bright) or those against whom he spoke? To which set of +principles has time given the greater justification? + +Yet upon the men who resisted what we all admit, in this case at least, +to have been the false theories and who supported, what we equally admit +now, to have been the right principles, we poured the same sort of +ferocious contempt that we are apt now spasmodically to pour upon those +who, sixty years later, would prevent our drifting in the same blind +fashion into a war just as futile and bound to be infinitely more +disastrous--a war embodying the same "principles" supported by just the +same theories and just the same arguments which led us into this other +one. + +I know full well the prejudice which the names I am about to cite is apt +to cause. We poured out upon the men who bore them a rancour, contempt +and hatred which few men in English public life have had to face. +Morley, in his life of Cobden, says of these two men--Cobden and Bright: + + They had, as Lord Palmerston said, the whole world against them. It + was not merely the august personages of the Court, nor the + illustrious veterans in Government and diplomacy, nor the most + experienced politicians in Parliament, nor the powerful + journalists, nor the men versed in great affairs of business. It + was no light thing to confront even that solid mass of hostile + judgment. But besides all this, Cobden and Mr. Bright knew that the + country at large, even their trusty middle and industrial classes, + had turned their faces resolutely and angrily away from them. Their + own great instrument, the public meeting, was no longer theirs to + wield. The army of the Nonconformists, which has so seldom been + found fighting on the wrong side, was seriously divided. + + Public opinion was bitterly and impatiently hostile and + intractable. Mr. Bright was burnt in effigy. Cobden, at a meeting + in his own constituency, after an energetic vindication of his + opinions, saw resolutions carried against him. Every morning they + were reviled in half the newspapers in the country as enemies of + the commonwealth. They were openly told that they were traitors, + and that it was a pity they could not be punished as traitors. + + In the House, Lord Palmerston once began his reply by referring to + Mr. Bright as "the Honourable and Reverend gentleman," Cobden rose + to call him to order for this flippant and unbecoming phrase. Lord + Palmerston said he would not quarrel about words. Then went on to + say that he thought it right to tell Mr. Bright that his opinion + was a matter of entire difference, and that he treated his censure + with the most perfect indifference and contempt. On another + occasion he showed the same unmannerliness to Cobden himself. + Cobden had said that under certain circumstances he would fight, or + if he could not fight, he would work for the wounded in the + hospitals. "Well," said Lord Palmerston in reply, with the sarcasm + of a schoolboy's debating society, "there are many people in this + country who think that the party to which he belongs should go + immediately into a hospital of a different kind, and which I shall + not mention." This refined irony was a very gentle specimen of the + insult and contumely which was poured upon Cobden and Mr. Bright at + this time.... + + It is impossible not to regard the attitude of the two objects of + this vast unpopularity as one of the most truly honourable + spectacles in our political history. The moral fortitude, like the + political wisdom of these two strong men, begins to stand out with + a splendour that already recalls the great historic heights of + statesmanship and patriotism. Even now our heart-felt admiration + and gratitude goes out to them as it goes out to Burke for his + lofty and manful protests against the war with America and the + oppression of Ireland, and to Charles Fox for his bold and + strenuous resistance to the war with the French Republic. + +Before indulging in the dementia which those names usually produce, will +the reader please note that it is not my business now to defend either +the general principles of Cobden and Bright or the political spirit +which they are supposed to represent. Let them be as sordid, mean, +unworthy, pusillanimous as you like--and as the best of us then said +they were ("a mean, vain, mischievous clique" even so good a man as Tom +Hughes could call them). We called them cowards--because practically +alone they faced a country which had become a howling mob; we called +their opponents "courageous" because with the whole country behind them +they habitually poured contempt upon the under dog. + +And we thus hated these men because they did their best to dissuade us +from undertaking a certain war. Very good; we have had our war; we +carried our point, we prevented the break-up of the Turkish Empire; +those men were completely beaten. And they are dead. Cannot we afford +to set aside those old passions and see how far in one particular at +least they may have been right? + +We admit, of course, if we are honest--happily everyone admits--that +these despised men were right and those who abused them were wrong. The +verdict of fact is there. Says Lord Morley:-- + + When we look back upon the affairs of that time, we see that there + were two policies open. Lord Palmerston's was one, Cobden and + Bright's the other. If we are to compare Lord Palmerston's + statesmanship and insight in the Eastern Question with that of his + two great adversaries, it is hard, in the light of all that has + happened since, to resist the conclusion that Cobden and Mr. Bright + were right, and Lord Palmerston was disastrously wrong. It is easy + to plead extenuating circumstances for the egregious mistakes in + Lord Palmerston's policy about the Eastern Question, the Suez Canal, + and some other important subjects; but the plea can only be allowed + after it has been frankly recognized that they really were mistakes, + and that these abused men exposed and avoided them. Lord Palmerston, + for instance, asked why the Czar could not be "satisfied, as we all + are, with the progressively liberal system of Turkey." Cobden, in + his pamphlet twenty years before, insisted that this progressively + liberal system of Turkey had no existence. Which of these two + propositions was true may be left to the decision of those who lent + to the Turk many millions of money on the strength of Lord + Palmerston's ignorant and delusive assurances. It was mainly owing + to Lord Palmerston, again, that the efforts of the war were + concentrated at Sebastopol. Sixty thousand English and French + troops, he said, with the co-operation of the fleets, would take + Sebastopol in six weeks. Cobden gave reasons for thinking very + differently, and urged that the destruction of Sebastopol, even when + it was achieved, would neither inflict a crushing blow to Russia, + nor prevent future attacks upon Turkey. Lord Palmerston's error may + have been intelligible and venial; nevertheless, as a fact, he was + in error and Cobden was not, and the error cost the nation one of + the most unfortunate, mortifying, and absolutely useless campaigns + in English history. Cobden held that if we were to defend Turkey + against Russia, the true policy was to use our navy, and not to send + a land force to the Crimea. Would any serious politician now be + found to deny it? We might prolong the list of propositions, general + and particular, which Lord Palmerston maintained and Cobden + traversed, from the beginning to the end of the Russian War. There + is not one of these propositions in which later events have not + shown that Cobden's knowledge was greater, his judgment cooler, his + insight more penetrating and comprehensive. The bankruptcy of the + Turkish Government, the further dismemberment of its Empire by the + Treaty of Berlin, the abrogation of the Black Sea Treaty, have + already done something to convince people that the two leaders saw + much further ahead in 1854 and 1855 than men who had passed all + their lives in foreign chanceries and the purlieus of Downing + Street. + + It is startling to look back upon the bullying contempt which the + man who was blind permitted himself to show to the men who could + see. The truth is, that to Lord Palmerston it was still + incomprehensible and intolerable that a couple of manufacturers from + Lancashire should presume to teach him foreign policy. Still more + offensive to him was their introduction of morality into the + mysteries of the Foreign Office.[7] + +What have peace theories to do with this war? asks the practical man, +who is the greatest mystic of all, contemptuously. Well, they have +everything to do with it. For if we had understood some peace theories a +little better a generation or two ago, if we had not allowed passion and +error and prejudice instead of reason to dominate our policy, the sum of +misery which these Balkan populations have known would have been +immeasurably less. It is quite true that we could not have prevented +this war by sending peace pamphlets to the Turk, or to the Balkanese, +for that matter, but we could have prevented it if we ourselves had read +them a generation or two since, just as our only means of preventing +future wars is by showing a little less prejudice and a little less +blindness. + +And the practical question, despite Mr. Churchill, is whether we shall +allow a like passion and a like prejudice again to blind us; whether we +shall again back the wrong horse in the name of the same hollow theories +drifting to a similar but greater futility and catastrophe, or whether +we shall profit by our past to assure a better future. + +[Footnote 6: 14/11/12] + +[Footnote 7: _The Life of Richard Cobden._--UNWIN.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +PACIFISM, DEFENCE, AND "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAR." + +Did the Crimean War prove Bright and Cobden wrong?--Our curious +reasoning--Mr. Churchill on "illusions"--The danger of war is not the +illusion but its benefits--We are all Pacifists now since we all desire +Peace--Will more armaments alone secure it?--The experience of +mankind--War "the failure of human wisdom"--Therefore more wisdom is the +remedy--But the Militarists only want more arms--The German Lord +Roberts--The military campaign against political Rationalism--How to +make war certain. + + +The question surely, which for practical men stands out from the mighty +historical episode touched on in the last chapter, is this: Was the fact +that these despised men were so entirely right and their triumphant +adversaries so entirely wrong a mere fluke, or was it due to the +soundness of one set of principles and the hollowness of the other; and +were the principles special to that case, or general to international +conflict as a whole? + +To have an opinion of worth on that question we must get away from +certain confusions and misrepresentations. + +It is a very common habit for the Bellicist to quote the list of wars +which have taken place since the Crimean War as proof of the error of +Bright and Cobden. But what are the facts? + +Here were two men who strenuously and ruthlessly opposed a certain +policy; they urged, not only that it would inevitably lead to war, but +that the war would be futile--but not sterile, for they saw that others +would grow from it. Their counsel was disregarded and the war came, and +events have proved that they were right and the war-makers wrong, and +the very fact that the wars took place is cited as disapproving their +"theories."[8] + +It is a like confusion of thought which prompts Mr. Churchill to refer +to Pacifists as people who deem the _danger_ of war an illusion. + +This persistent misconception is worth a little examination. + + * * * * * + +The smoke from the first railway engines in England killed the cattle +and the poultry of the country gentlemen near whose property the +railroad passed--at least, that is what the country gentleman wrote to +the _Times_. + +Now if in the domain of quite simple material things the dislike of +having fixed habits of thought disturbed, leads gentlemen to resent +innovations in that way, it is not astonishing that innovations of a +more intangible and elusive kind should be subject to a like unconscious +misrepresentation, especially by newspapers and public men pushed by +commercial or political necessity to say the popular thing rather than +the true thing: that contained in the speech of Mr. Churchill, which, +together with a newspaper comment thereon, I have made the "text" of +this little book, is a typical case in point. + +It is possible, of course, that Mr. Churchill in talking about "persons +who profess to know that the danger of war has become an illusion," had +not the slightest intention of referring to those who share the views +embodied in "The Great Illusion," which are, _not_ that the danger of +war is an illusion, but that the benefit is. All that happened was that +his hearers and readers interpreted his words as referring thereto; and +that, of course, he could not possibly prevent. + +In any case, to misrepresent an author (and I mean always, of course, +quite sincere and unconscious misrepresentations, like that which led +the country gentlemen to write that railway smoke killed poultry) is a +trifling matter, but to misrepresent an idea, is not, for it makes that +better understanding of facts, the creation of a more informed public +opinion, by which alone we can avoid a possibly colossal folly, an +understanding difficult enough as it is, still more difficult. + +And that is why the current misrepresentation (again unconscious) of +most efforts at the better understanding of the facts of international +relationship needs very badly to be corrected. I will therefore be very +definite. + +The implication that Pacifists of any kind have ever urged that war is +impossible is due either to that confusion of thought just touched upon, +or is merely a silly gibe of those who deride arguments to which they +have not listened, and consequently do not understand, or which they +desire to misrepresent; and such misrepresentation is, when not +unconscious, always stupid and unfair. + +So far as I am concerned, I have never written a line, nor, so far as I +know, has anyone else, to plead that war is impossible. I have, on the +contrary, always urged, with the utmost emphasis that war is not only +possible but extremely likely, so long as we remain as ignorant as we +are concerning what it can accomplish, and unless we use our energies +and efforts to prevent it, instead of directing those efforts to create +it. What anti-Bellicists as a whole urge, is not that war is impossible +or improbable, but that it is impossible to benefit by it; that conquest +must, in the long run, fail to achieve advantage; that the general +recognition of this can only add to our security. And incidentally most +of us have declared our complete readiness to take any demonstrably +necessary measure for the maintenance of armament, but urge that the +effort must not stop there. + +One is justified in wondering whether the public men--statesmen, +soldiers, bishops, preachers, journalists--who indulge in this gibe, are +really unable to distinguish between the plea that a thing is unwise, +foolish, and the plea that it is impossible; whether they really suppose +that anyone in our time could argue that human folly is impossible, or +an "illusion." It is quite evidently a tragic reality. Undoubtedly the +readiness with which these critics thus fall back upon confusion +of thought indicates that they themselves have illimitable confidence in +it. But the confusion of thought does not stop here. + +I have spoken of Pacifists and Bellicists, but, of course, we are all +Pacifists now. Lord Roberts, Lord Charles Beresford, Lord Fisher, Mr. +Winston Churchill, The Navy League, the Navier League, the Universal +Military Service League, the German Emperor, the Editor of _The +Spectator_, all the Chancelleries of Europe, alike declare that their +one object is the maintenance of peace. Never were such Pacifists. The +German Emperor, speaking to his army, invariably points out that they +stand for the peace of Europe. Does a First Lord want new ships? It is +because a strong British Navy is the best guarantee of peace. Lord +Roberts wants conscription because that is the one way to preserve +peace, and the Editor of _The Spectator_ tells us that Turkey's great +crime is that she has not paid enough attention to soldiering and +armament, that if only she had been stronger all would have been well. +All alike are quite persuaded indeed that the one way to peace is to get +more armament. + +Well, that is the method that mankind has pursued during the whole of +its history; it has never shown the least disposition not to take this +advice and not to try this method to the full. And written history, to +say nothing of unwritten history, is there to tell us how well it has +succeeded. + +Unhappily, one has to ask whether some of these military Pacifists +really want it to succeed? Again I do not tax any with conscious +insincerity. But it does result not merely from what some imply, but +from what they say. For certain of these doughty Pacifists having told +you how much their one object is to secure peace, then proceed to tell +you that this thing which they hope to secure is a very evil thing, that +under its blighting influence nations wane in luxury and sloth. And of +course they imply that our own nation, about a third of whom have not +enough to eat and about another third of whom have a heart-breaking +struggle with small means and precariousness of livelihood, is in danger +of this degeneration which comes from too much wealth and luxury and +sloth and ease. I could fill a dozen books the size of this with the +solemn warning of such Pacifists as these against the danger of peace +(which they tell you they are struggling to maintain), and how splendid +and glorious a thing, how fine a discipline is war (which they tell you +they are trying so hard to avoid). Thus the Editor of _The Spectator_ +tells us that mankind cannot yet dispense with the discipline of war; +and Lord Roberts, that to make war when you are really ready for it (or +that in any case for Germany to do it) is "an excellent policy and one +to be pursued by every nation prepared to play a great part in history." + +The truth is, of course, that we are not likely to get peace from those +who believe it to be an evil thing and war and aggression a good thing, +or, at least, are very mixed in their views as to this. Before men can +secure peace they must at least make up their minds whether it is peace +or war they want. If you do not know what you want, you are not likely +to get it--or you are likely to get it, whichever way you prefer to put +it. + +And that is another thing which divides us from the military Pacifists: +we really do want peace. As between war and peace we have made our +choice, and having made it, stick to it. There may be something to be +said for war--for settling a thing by fighting about it instead of by +understanding it,--just as there may be something to be said for the +ordeal, or the duel, as against trial by evidence, for the rack as a +corrective of religious error, for judicial torture as a substitute for +cross-examination, for religious wars, for all these things--but the +balance of advantage is against them and we have discarded them. + +But there is a still further difference which divides us: We have +realised that we discarded those things only when we really understood +their imperfections and that we arrived at that understanding by +studying them, by discussing them,--because one man in London or another +in Paris raised plainly and boldly the whole question of their wisdom +and because the intellectual ferment created by those interrogations, +either in the juridical or religious field, re-acted on the minds of men +in Geneva or Wurtenburg or Rome or Madrid. It was by this means, not by +improving the rapiers or improving the instruments of the inquisition, +that we got rid of the duel and that Catholics ceased to torture +Protestants or _vice versa_. We gave these things up because we realised +the futility of physical force in these conflicts. We shall give up war +for the same reason. + +But the Bellicist says that discussions of this sort, these attempts to +find out the truth, are but the encouragement of pernicious theories: +there is, according to him, but one way--better rapiers, more and better +racks, more and better inquisitions. + +Mr. Bonar Law, in one of the very wisest phrases ever pronounced by a +statesman, has declared that "war is the failure of human wisdom." + +That is the whole case of Pacifism: we shall not improve except at the +price of using our reason in these matters; of understanding them +better. Surely it is a truism that that is the price of all progress; +saner conceptions--man's recognition of his mistakes, whether those +mistakes take the form of cannibalism, slavery, torture, superstition, +tyranny, false laws, or what you will. The veriest savage, or for that +matter the ape, can blindly fight, but whether the animal develops into +a man, or the savage into civilized man, depends upon whether the +element of reason enters in an increasing degree into the solution of +his problems. + +The Militarist argues otherwise. He admits the difficulty comes from +man's small disposition to think; therefore don't think--fight. We +fight, he says, because we have insufficient wisdom in these matters; +therefore do not let us trouble to get more wisdom or understanding; all +we need do is to get better weapons. I am not misrepresenting him; that +is quite fairly the popular line: it is no use talking about these +things or trying to explain them, all that is logic and theories; what +you want to do is to get a bigger army or more battleships. And, of +course, the Bellicist on the other side of the frontier says exactly the +same thing, and I am still waiting to have explained to me how, +therefore, if this matter depends upon understanding, we can ever solve +it by neglecting understanding, which the Militarist urges us to do. Not +only does he admit, but pleads, that these things are complex, and +supposes that that is an argument why they should not be studied. + +And a third distinction will, I think, make the difference between us +still clearer. Like the Bellicist, I am in favour of defence. If in a +duelling society a duellist attacked me, or, as a Huguenot in the Paris +of the sixteenth century a Catholic had attacked me, I should certainly +have defended myself, and if needs be have killed my aggressor. But that +attitude would not have prevented my doing my small part in the creation +of a public opinion which should make duelling or such things as the +massacre of St. Bartholomew impossible by showing how unsatisfactory and +futile they were; and I should know perfectly well that neither would +stop until public opinion had, as the result of education of one kind or +another, realised their futility. But it is as certain as anything can +be that the Churchills of that society or of that day would have been +vociferous in declaring (as in the case of the duel they still to-day +declare in Prussia) that this attempt to prove the futility of duelling +was not only a bad and pernicious campaign, but was in reality a subtle +attempt to get people killed in the street by bullies, and that those +who valued their security would do their best to discredit all +anti-duelling propaganda--by misrepresentation, if needs be. + +Let this matter be quite clear. No one who need be considered in this +discussion would think of criticising Lord Roberts for wanting the army, +and Mr. Churchill for wanting the navy, to be as good and efficient as +possible and as large as necessary. Personally--and I speak, I know, for +many of my colleagues in the anti-war movement--I would be prepared to +support British conscription if it be demonstrably wise or necessary. +But what we criticise is the persistent effort to discredit honest +attempts at a better understanding of the facts of international +relationship, the everlasting gibe which it is thought necessary to +fling at any constructive effort, apart from armament, to make peace +secure. These men profess to be friends of peace, they profess to +regret the growth of armament, to deplore the unwisdom, ignorance, +prejudice and misunderstanding out of which the whole thing grows, but +immediately there is any definite effort to correct this unwisdom, to +examine the grounds of the prejudice and misunderstanding, there is a +volte face and such efforts are sneered at as "sentimental" or "sordid," +according as the plea for peace is put upon moral or material grounds. +It is not that they disagree in detail with any given proposition +looking towards a basis of international co-operation, but that in reality +they deprecate raising the matter at all.[9] It must be armaments and +nothing but armaments with them. If there had been any possibility of +success in that we should not now be entering upon the 8,000th or +9,000th war of written history. Armaments may be necessary, but they are +not enough. Our plan is armaments plus education; theirs is armament +versus education. And by education, of course, we do not mean school +books, or an extension of the School Board curriculum, but a recognition +of the fact that the character of human society is determined by the +extent to which its units attempt to arrive at an _understanding_ of +their relationship, instead of merely subduing one another by force, +which does not lead to understanding at all: in Turkey, or Venezuela, or +San Domingo, there is no particular effort made to adjust differences by +understanding; in societies of that type they only believe in settling +differences by armaments. That is why there are very few books, very +little thought or discussion, very little intellectual ferment but a +great many guns and soldiers and battles. And throughout the world the +conflict is going on between these rival schools. On the whole the +Western world, inside the respective frontiers, almost entirely now +tends to the Pacifist type. But not so in the international field, for +where the Powers are concerned, where it is a question of the attitude +of one nation in relation to another, you get a degree of understanding +rather less than more than that which obtains in the internal politics +of Venezuela, or Turkey, or Morocco, or any other "warlike" state. + +And the difficulty of creating a better European opinion and temper is +due largely to just this idea that obsesses the Militarist, that unless +they misrepresent facts in a sensational direction the nations will be +too apathetic to arm; that education will abolish funk, and that +presumably funk is a necessary element in self-defence. + +For the most creditable explanation that we can give of the Militarist's +objection to having this matter discussed at all, is the evident +impression that such discussion will discourage measures for +self-defence; the Militarist does not believe that a people desiring to +understand these things and interested in the development of a better +European society, can at the same time be determined to resist the use +of force. They believe that unless the people are kept in a blue funk, +they will not arm, and that is why it is that the Militarist of the +respective countries are for ever talking about our degeneration and the +rest. And the German Militarist is just as angry with the unwarlike +qualities of his people as the English Militarist is with ours. + +Just note this parallel: + + BRITISH OPINION ON BRITISH APATHY AND GERMAN VIGOUR. + + "There is a way in which Britain is certain to have war and its + horrors and calamities; it is this--by persisting in her present + course of unpreparedness, her apathy, unintelligence, and blindness, + and in her disregard of the warnings of the most ordinary political + insight, as well as of the example of history. + + "Now in the year 1912, just as in 1866, and just as in 1870, war + will take place the instant the German forces by land and sea are, + by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory as + anything in human calculation can be made certain. 'Germany strikes + when Germany's hour has struck.' That is the time-honoured policy of + her Foreign Office. It is her policy at the present hour, and it is + an excellent policy. It is, or should be, the policy of every nation + prepared to play a great part in history."--LORD ROBERTS, at + Manchester. + + "Britain is disunited; Germany is homogeneous. We are quarrelling + about the Lords' Veto, Home Rule, and a dozen other questions of + domestic politics. We have a Little Navy Party, an Anti-Militarist + Party; Germany is unanimous upon the question of naval + expansion."--MR. BLATCHFORD. + + + GERMAN OPINION ON GERMAN APATHY AND BRITISH VIGOUR. + + "Whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm + which constituted the greatness of its history. With the increase of + wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of sacrificing + the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great conceptions, and + close their eyes complacently to the duties of our future and to the + pressing problems of international life which await a solution at + the present time."--GENERAL VON BERNHARDI in "Germany and the Next + War." + + "There is no one German people, no single Germany.... There are more + abrupt contrasts between Germans and Germans than between Germans + and Indians." + + "One must admire the consistent fidelity and patriotism of the + English race, as compared with the uncertain and erratic methods of + the German people, their mistrust, and suspicion.... In spite of + numerous wars, bloodshed, and disaster, England always emerges + smoothly and easily from her military crises and settles down to new + conditions and surroundings in her usual cool and deliberate manner, + so different from the German."--_Berliner Tageblatt_, March 14, 1911. + +Presumably each doughty warrior knows his own country better than that +of the other, which would carry a conclusion directly contrary to that +which he draws. + +But note also where this idea that it is necessary artificially to +stimulate the defensive zeal of each country by resisting any tendency +to agreement and understanding leads. It leads even so good a man as +Lord Roberts into the trap of dogmatic prophesy concerning the +intentions of a very complex heterogeneous nation of 65 million people. +Lord Roberts could not possibly tell you what his own country will do +five, ten, or fifteen years hence in such matters as Home Rule or the +Suffragists, or even the payment of doctors, but he knows exactly what a +foreign country will do in a much more serious matter. The simple truth +is, of course, that no man knows what "Germany" will do ten years hence, +any more than we can know what "England" will do. We don't even know +what England will _be_, whether Unionist or Liberal or Labour, +Socialist, Free Trade or Protectionist. All these things, like the +question of Peace and War depends upon all sorts of tendencies, drifts +and developments. At bottom, of course, since war, in Mr. Bonar Law's +fine phrase, is "never inevitable--only the failure of human wisdom," it +depends upon whether we become a little less or a little more wise. If +the former, we shall have it; if the latter, we shall not. But this +dogmatism concerning the other man's evil intentions is the very thing that +leads away from wisdom.[10] The sort of temper and ideas which it +provokes on both sides of the frontier may be gathered from just such +average gems as these plucked recently from the English press:-- + + Yes, we may as well face it. _War with Germany is inevitable_, and + the only question is--Shall we consult her convenience as to its + date? Shall we wait till Germany's present naval programme, which + is every year reducing our advantage, is complete? Shall we wait + till the smouldering industrial revolution, of which all these + strikes are warnings, has broken into flame? Shall we wait till + Consols are 65 and our national credit is gone? Shall we wait till + the Income Tax is 1s. 6d. in the pound? OR SHALL WE STRIKE + NOW--_finding every out-of-work a job in connection with the + guardianship of our shores_, and, with our mighty fleet, either + sinking every German ship or towing it in triumph into a British + port? _Why_ should we do it? _Because the command of the seas is + ever ours_; because our island position, our international trade + and our world-wide dominions _demand that no other nation shall + dare to challenge our supremacy_. That is why. Oh, yes, the cost + would be great, but we could raise it to-day all right, _and we + should get it back_. + + If the struggle comes to-day, we shall win--and after it is over, + there will be abounding prosperity in the land, and no more labour + unrest. + + Yes, we have no fear of Germany to-day. The only enemy we fear is + the crack-brained fanatics who prate about peace and goodwill + whilst foreign _Dreadnoughts_ are gradually closing in upon us. As + Mr. Balfour said at the Eugenic Conference the other day, man is a + wild animal; and there is no room, in present circumstances, for + any tame ones.--_John Bull_, Aug. 24, 1912. + +The italics and large type are those of the original, not mine. This +paper explains, by the way, in this connection that "In the +Chancelleries of Europe _John Bull_ is regarded as a negligible +journalistic quantity. But _John Bull_ is read by a million people every +week, and that million not the least thoughtful and intelligent section +of the community, they _think_ about what they read." + +One of the million seems to have thought to some purpose, for the next +week there was the following letter from him. It was given the place of +honour in a series and runs as follows:-- + + I would have extended your "Down with the German Fleet!" to "Down + with Germany and the Germans!" For, unless the whole ---- lot are + swept off the surface of the earth, there will be no peace. If the + people in England could only realise the quarrelsome, deceitful, + underhanded, egotistic any tyrannical character of the Germans, + there would not be so much balderdash about a friendly + understanding, etc., between England and Germany. The German is a + born tyrant. The desire to remain with Britain on good terms will + only last so long until Germany feels herself strong enough to beat + England both on sea and on land: afterwards it'll simply be "_la + bourse ou la vie_," as the French proverb goes. Provided they do not + know that there are any English listeners about, phrases like the + following can be heard every day in German restaurants and other + public places: "I hate England and the English!" "Never mind, they + won't be standing in our way much longer. We shall soon be ready." + +And _John Bull_, with its million readers, is not alone. This is how the +_Daily Express_, in a double-leaded leader, teaches history to its +readers:-- + + When, one day, Englishmen are not allowed to walk the pavements of + their cities, and their women are for the pleasure of the invaders, + and the offices of the Tiny England newspapers are incinerated by a + furious mob; when foreign military officers proclaim martial law + from the Royal Exchange steps, and when some billions of pounds + have to be raised by taxation--by taxation of the "toiling + millions" as well as others--to pay the invaders out, and the + British Empire consists of England--less Dover, required for a + foreign strategic tunnel--and the Channel Islands--then the ghosts + of certain politicians and publicists will probably call a meeting + for the discussion of the Fourth Dimension.--Leading Article, + _Daily Express_, 8/7/12. + +And not merely shall our women fill the harems of the German pashas, +and Englishmen not be allowed to walk upon the pavement (it would be the +German way of solving the traffic problem--near the Bank), but a +"well-known Diplomat" in another paper tells us what else will happen. + + If England be vanquished it means the end of all things as far as + she is concerned, and will ring in a new and somewhat terrible era. + Bankrupt, shorn of all power, deserted, as must clearly follow, as + a commercial state, and groaning under a huge indemnity that she + cannot pay and is not intended to be able to pay, what will be the + melancholy end of this great country and her teeming population of + forty-five millions? + + ... Her shipping trade will be transferred as far as possible from + the English to the German flag. Her banking will be lost, as London + will no longer be the centre of commerce, and efforts will be made + to enable Berlin to take London's place. Her manufactures will + gradually desert her. Failing to obtain payments in due time, + estates will be sequestered and become the property of wealthy + Germans. The indemnity to be demanded is said to be one thousand + millions sterling. + + The immediate result of defeat would mean, of course, that + insolvency would take place in a very large number of commercial + businesses, and others would speedily follow. Those who cannot get + away will starve unless large relief funds are forthcoming from, + say, Canada and the United States, for this country, bereft of its + manufactures, will not be able to sustain a population of more than + a very few millions.--From an Article by "A Well-known + Diplomatist" in _The Throne_, June 12, 1912. + +These are but samples; and this sort of thing is going on in England and +Germany alike. And when one protests that it is wicked rubbish born of +funk and ignorance, that whatever happens in war this does not happen, +and that it is based on false economics and grows into utterly false +conceptions of international relationship, one is shouted down as an +anti-armament man and an enemy of his country. + +Well, if that view is persisted in, if in reality it is necessary for a +people to have lies and nonsense told to them in order to induce them to +defend themselves, some will be apt to decide that they are not worth +defending. Or rather will they decide that this phase of the +pro-armament campaign--which is not so much a campaign in favour of +armament as one against education and understanding--will end in turning +us into a nation either of poltroons or of bullies and aggressors, and +that since life is a matter of the choice of risks it is wiser and more +courageous to choose the less evil. A nation may be defeated and still +live in the esteem of men--and in its own. No civilized man esteems a +nation of Bashi-Bazouks or Prussian Junkers. Of the two risks +involved--the risk of attack arising from a possible superiority of +armament on the part of a rival, and the risk of drifting into conflict +because, concentrating all our energies on the mere instrument of +combat, we have taken no adequate trouble to understand the facts of +this case--it is at least an arguable proposition that the second risk +is the greater. And I am prompted to this expression of opinion without +surrendering one iota of a lifelong and passionate belief that a nation +attacked should defend itself to the last penny and to the last man. + +And you think that this idea that the nations--ours amongst them--may +drift into futile war from sheer panic and funk arising out of the +terror inspired by phantoms born of ignorance, is merely the idea of +Pacifist cranks? + +The following, referring to the "precautionary measures" (_i.e._, +mobilization of armies) taken by the various Powers, is from a leading +article of the _Times_:-- + + "Precautions" are understandable, but the remark of our Berlin + Correspondent that they may produce an untenable position from + which retreat must be humiliating is applicable in more than one + direction. Our Vienna Correspondent truly says that "there is no + valid reason to believe war between Austria-Hungary and Russia to + be inevitable, or even immediately probable." We entirely agree, + but wish we could add that the absence of any valid reason was + placing strict limitations upon the scope of "precautions." The + same correspondent says he is constantly being asked:--"Is there no + means of avoiding war?" The same question is now being asked, with + some bewilderment, by millions of men in this country, who want to + know what difficulties there are in the present situation which + should threaten Europe with a general war, or even a collision + larger than that already witnessed.... There is no great nation in + Europe which to-day has the least desire that millions of men + should be torn from their homes and flung headlong to destruction + at the bidding of vain ambitions. The Balkan peoples fought for a + cause which was peculiarly their own. They were inspired by the + memories of centuries of wrong which they were burning to avenge. + The larger nations have no such quarrel, unless it is wilfully + manufactured for them. The common sense of the peoples of Europe is + well aware that no issue has been presented which could not be + settled by amicable discussion. In England men will learn with + amazement and incredulity that war is possible over the question of + a Servian port, or even over the larger issues which are said to + lie behind it. Yet that is whither the nations are blindly drifting + Who, then, makes war? The answer is to be found in the + Chancelleries of Europe, among the men who have too long played + with human lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so + enmeshed in formulas and the jargon of diplomacy that they have + ceased to be conscious of the poignant realities with which they + trifle. And thus will war continue to be made, until the great + masses who are the sport of professional schemers and dreamers say + the word which, shall bring, not eternal peace, for that is + impossible, but a determination that wars shall be fought only in a + just and righteous and vital cause. If that word is ever to be + spoken, there never was a more appropriate occasion than the + present; and we trust it will be spoken while there is yet time. + +And the very next day there appeared in the _Daily Mail_ an article by +Mr. Lovat Fraser ending thus:-- + + The real answer rests, or ought to rest, with the man in the train. + Does he want to join in Armageddon? It is time that he began to + think about it, for his answer may soon be sought. + +Now we have here, stated in the first case by the most authoritative of +English newspapers, and in the second by an habitual contributor of the +most popular, the whole case of Pacifism as I have attempted to expound +it, namely: (1) That our current statecraft--its fundamental +conceptions, its "axioms," its terminology--has become obsolete by +virtue of the changed conditions of European society; that the causes of +conflict which it creates are half the time based on illusions, upon +meaningless and empty formulas; (2) that its survival is at bottom due +to popular ignorance and indifference--the survival on the part of the +great mass of just those conceptions born of the old and now obsolete +conditions--since diplomacy, like all functions of government, is a +reflection of average opinion; (3) that this public opinion is not +something which descends upon us from the skies but is the sum of the +opinions of each one of us and is the outcome of our daily contacts, our +writing and talking and discussion, and that the road to safety lies in +having that general public opinion better informed not in directly +discouraging such better information; (4) that the mere multiplication +of "precautions" in the shape of increased armaments and a readiness for +war, in the absence of a corresponding and parallel improvement of +opinion, will merely increase and not exorcise the danger, and, +finally, (5) that the problem of war is necessarily a problem of at +least two parties, and that if we are to solve it, to understand it +even, we must consider it in terms of two parties, not one; it is not a +question of what shall be the policy of each without reference to the +other, but what the final upshot of the two policies taken in +conjunction will be. + +Now in all this the _Times_, especially in one outstanding central idea, +is embodying a conception which is the antithesis of that expressed by +Militarists of the type of Mr. Churchill, and, I am sorry to say, of +Lord Roberts. To these latter war is not something that we, the peoples +of Europe, create by our ignorance and temper, by the nursing of old and +vicious theories, by the poorness and defects of the ideas our +intellectual activities have developed during the last generation or +two, but something that "comes upon us" like the rain or the earthquake, +and against which we can only protect ourselves by one thing: more arms, +a greater readiness to fight. + +In effect the anti-Educationalists say this: "What, as practical men, we +have to do, is to be stronger than our enemy; the rest is theory and +does not matter." + +Well the inevitable outcome of such an attitude is catastrophe. + +I have said elsewhere that in this matter it seems fatally easy to +secure either one of two kinds of action: that of the "practical man" +who limits his energies to securing a policy which will perfect the +machinery of war and disregard anything else; or that of the idealist, +who, persuaded of the brutality or immorality of war, is apt to show a +certain indifference concerning self-defence. What is needed is the type +of activity which will include both halves of the problem: provision for +education, for a Political Reformation in this matter, _as well as_ such +means of defence as will meantime counterbalance the existing impulse +to aggression. To concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the +other half is to render the whole problem insoluble. + +What must inevitably happen if the nations take the line of the +"practical man," and limit their energies simply and purely to piling up +armaments? + +A critic once put to me what he evidently deemed a poser: "Do you urge +that we shall be stronger than our enemy, or weaker?" + +To which I replied: "The last time that question was asked me was in +Berlin, by Germans. What would you have had me reply to those +Germans?"--a reply which, of course, meant this: In attempting to find +the solution of this question in terms of one party, you are attempting +the impossible. The outcome will be war, and war would not settle it. It +would all have to be begun over again. + +The Navy League catechism says: "Defence consists in being so strong +that it will be dangerous for your enemy to attack you."[11] Mr. +Churchill, however, goes farther than the Navy League, and says: "The +way to make war impossible is to make victory certain." + +The Navy League definition is at least possible of application to +practical politics, because rough equality of the two parties would make +attack by either dangerous. Mr. Churchill's principle is impossible of +application to practical politics, because it could only be applied by +one party, and would, in the terms of the Navy League principle, deprive +the other party of the right of defence. As a matter of simple fact, +both the Navy League, by its demand for two ships to one, and Mr. +Churchill, by his demand for certain victory, deny in this matter +Germany's right to defend herself; and such denial is bound, on the part +of a people animated by like motives to ourselves, to provoke a +challenge. When the Navy League says, as it does, that a self-respecting +nation should not depend upon the goodwill of foreigners for its safety, +but upon its own strength, it recommends Germany to maintain her efforts +to arrive at some sort of equality with ourselves. When Mr. Churchill +goes further and says that a nation should be so strong as to make +victory over its rivals certain, he knows that if Germany were to adopt +his own doctrine its inevitable outcome would be war. + +The issue is plain: We get a better understanding of certain political +facts in Europe, or we have war. And the Bellicist at present is +resolutely opposed to such political education. And it is for that +reason, not because he is asking for adequate armament, that some of the +best of this country look with the deepest misgiving upon his work, and +will continue to do so in increasing degree unless his policy be +changed. + +Now a word as to the peace Pacifist--the Pacifist sans phrases--as +distinct from the military Pacifist. It is not because I am in favour of +defence that I have at times with some emphasis disassociated myself +from certain features and methods of the peace movement, for +non-resistance is no necessary part of that movement, and, indeed, so +far as I know, it is no appreciable part. It is the methods not the +object or the ideals of the peace movement which I have ventured to +criticize, without, I hope, offence to men whom I respect in the very +highest and sincerest degree. The methods of Pacifism have in the past, +to some extent at least, implied a disposition to allow easy emotion to +take the place of hard thinking, good intention to stand for +intellectual justification; and it is as plain as anything well can be +that some of the best emotion of the world has been expended upon some +of the very worst objects, and that in no field of human +effort--medicine, commerce, engineering, legislation--has good intention +ever been able to dispense with the necessity of knowing the how and the +why. + +It is not that the somewhat question-begging and emotional terminology +of some Pacifists--the appeal to brotherly love and humanity--connotes +things which are in themselves poor or mean (as the average Militarist +would imply), but because so much of Pacifism in the past has failed to +reconcile intellectually the claims of these things with what are the +fundamental needs of men and to show their relation and practical +application to actual problems and conditions. + +[Footnote 8: As a matter of fact, of course, the work of these two men +has not been fruitless. As Lord Morley truly says: "They were routed on +the question of the Crimean War, but it was the rapid spread of their +principles which within the next twenty years made intervention +impossible in the Franco-Austrian War, in the American War, in the +Danish War, in the Franco-German War, and above all, in the war between +Russia and Turkey, which broke out only the other day."] + +[Footnote 9: Thus the Editor of the _Spectator_:-- + +"For ourselves, as far as the main economic proposition goes, he +preaches to the converted.... If nations were perfectly wise and held +perfectly sound economic theories, they would recognize that exchange is +the union of forces, and that it is very foolish to hate or be jealous +of your co-operators.... Men are savage, bloodthirsty creatures ... and +when their blood is up will fight for a word or a sign, or, as Mr. +Angell would put it, for an illusion." + +Therefore, argues the _Spectator_, let the illusion continue--for there +is no other conclusion to be drawn from the argument.] + +[Footnote 10: Need it be said that this criticism does not imply the +faintest want of respect for Lord Roberts, his qualities and his +services. He has ventured into the field of foreign politics and +prophecy. A public man of great eminence, he has expressed an English +view of German "intentions." For the man in the street (I write in that +capacity) to receive that expression in silence is to endorse it, to +make it national. And I have stated here the reasons which make such an +attitude disastrous. We all greatly respect Lord Roberts, but, even +before that, must come respect for our country, the determination that +it shall be in the right and not in the wrong, which it certainly will +be if this easy dogmatism concerning the evil intentions of other +nations becomes national.] + +[Footnote 11: The German Navy Law in its preamble might have filched +this from the British Navy League catechism.] + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +"THEORIES" FALSE AND TRUE: THEIR ROLE IN EUROPEAN PROGRESS. + +The improvement of ideas the foundation of all improvement--Shooting +straight and thinking straight; the one as important as the +other--Pacifism and the Millennium--How we got rid of wars of +religion--A few ideas have changed the face of the world--The simple +ideas the most important--The "theories" which have led to war--The work +of the reformer to destroy old and false theories--The intellectual +interdependence of nations--Europe at unity in this matter--New ideas +cannot be confined to one people--No fear of ourselves or any nation +being ahead of the rest. + + +But what, it will be said, is the practical outcome? Admitting that we +are, or that our fathers were, in part responsible for this war, that it +is their false theories which have made it necessary, that like false +theories on our part may make future wars inevitable--what shall we do +to prevent that catastrophe? + +Now while as an "abstract proposition" everyone will admit that the one +thing which distinguishes the civilized man from the savage is a +difference of ideas, no one apparently believes that it is a dangerous +and evil thing for the political ideas of savages to dominate most of +our countrymen or that so intangible a thing as "ideas" have any +practical importance at all. While we believe this, of course--to the +extent to which we believe it--improvement is out of the question. We +have to realize that civic faith, like religious faith, is of +importance; that if English influence is to stand for the right and not +the wrong in human affairs, it is impossible for each one of us +individuals to be wrong; that if the great mass is animated by temper, +blindness, ignorance, passion, small and mean prejudices, it is not +possible for "England" to stand for something quite different and for +its influence to be ought but evil. To say that we are "for our country +right or wrong" does not get over the matter at all; rather is it +equivalent to saying that we would as readily have it stand for evil as +for good. And we do not in the least seem to realize that for an +Englishman to go on talking wicked nonsense across the dinner table and +making one of the little rivulets of bad temper and prejudice which +forms the mighty river drowning sane judgment is to do the England of +our dreams a service as ill (in reality far more mischievous) as though +the plans of fortresses were sold to Germany. We must all learn to shoot +straight; apparently we need not learn to think straight. And yet if +Europe could do the second it could dispense with the first. "Good +faith" has a score of connotations, and we believe apparently that good +politics can dispense with all of them and that "Patriotism" has naught +to do with any. + +Of course, to shoot straight is so much easier than to think straight, +and I suppose at bottom the bellicist believes that the latter is a +hopeless object since "man is not a thinking animal." He deems, +apparently, we must just leave it at that. Of course, if he does leave +it at that--if we persist in believing that it is no good discussing +these matters, trying to find out the truth about them, writing books +and building churches--our civilization is going to drift just precisely +as those other civilizations which have been guided by the same dreadful +fatalism have drifted--towards the Turkish goal. "Kismet. Man is a fool +to babble of these things; what he may do is of no avail; all things +will happen as they were pre-ordained." And the English Turk--the man +who prefers to fight things out instead of thinking things out--takes +the same line. + +If he adopts the Turkish philosophy he must be content with the Turkish +result. But the Western world as a whole has refused to be content with +the Turkish result, and however tiresome it may be to know about +things, to bother with "theories" and principles, we have come to +realise that we have to choose between one of two courses: either to +accept things as they are, not to worry about improvement or betterment +at all, fatalistically to let things slide or--to find out bit by bit +where our errors have been and to correct those errors. This is a hard +road, but it is the road the Western world has chosen; and it is better +than the other. + +And it has not accepted this road because it expects the millenium +to-morrow week. There is no millenium, and Pacifists do not expect it or +talk about it; the word is just one of those three-shies-a-penny +brickbats thrown at them by ignorance. You do not dismiss attempts to +correct errors in medicine or surgery, or education, or tramcars, or +cookery, by talking about the millenium; why should you throw that word +at attempts to correct the errors of international relationship? + +Nothing has astonished me more than the fact that the "practical" man +who despises "theories" nearly always criticises Pacifism because it is +not an absolute dogma with all its thirty-nine articles water-tight. +"You are a Pacifist, then suppose...," and then follows generally some +very remote hypothesis of what would happen if all the Orient composed +its differences and were to descend suddenly upon the Western world; or +some dogmatic (and very theoretical) proposition about the +unchangeability of human nature, and the foolishness of expecting the +millenium--an argument which would equally well have told against the +union of Scotland and England or would equally justify the political +parties in a South American republic in continuing to settle their +differences by militarist methods instead of the Pacifist methods of +England. + +Human nature may be unchanging: it is no reason why we should fight a +futile war with Germany over nothing at all; the yellow peril may +threaten; that is a very good reason why we should compose our +differences in Europe. Men always will quarrel, perhaps, over religious +questions, bigotry and fanaticism always will exist--it did not prevent +our getting rid of the wars of religion, still less is it a reason for +re-starting them. + +The men who made that immense advance--the achievement of religious +toleration--possible, were not completely right and had not a +water-tight theory amongst them; they did not bring the millenium, but +they achieved an immense step. They _were_ pioneers of religious +freedom, yet were themselves tyrants and oppressors; those who abolished +slavery _did_ a good work, though much of the world _was_ left in +industrial servitude; it _was_ a good thing to abolish judicial torture, +though much of our penal system did yet remain barbaric; it _was_ a real +advance to recognise the errors upon which these things rested, although +that recognition did not immediately achieve a complete, logical, +symmetrical and perfect change, because mankind does not advance that +way. And so with war. Pacifism does not even pretend to be a dogma: it +is an attempt to correct in men's minds some of the errors and false +theories out of which war grows. + +The reply to this is generally that the inaptitude of men for clear +thinking and the difficulties of the issues involved will render any +decision save the sheer clash of physical force impossible; that the +field of foreign politics is such a tangle that the popular mind will +always fall back upon decision by force. + +As a matter of fact the outstanding principles which serve to improve +human conduct, are quite simple and understandable, as soon as they have +been shorn of the sophistries and illusions with which the pundits +clothe them. The real work of the reformers is to hack away these +encumbering theories. The average European has not followed, and could +not follow, the amazing and never-ending disputation on obscure +theological points round which raged the Reformation; but the one solid +fact which did emerge from the whole was the general realization that +whatever the truth might be in all this confusion, it was quite +evidently wicked and futile to attempt to compel conformity to any one +section of it by force; that in the interests of all force should be +withheld; because if such queries were settled by the accident of +predominant force, it would prove, not which was right, but which was +stronger. So in such things as witchcraft. The learned and astute judges +of the 18th century, who sent so many thousands to their death for +impossible crimes, knew far more of the details of witchcraft than do +we, and would beat us hopelessly in an argument on the subject; but all +their learning was of no avail, because they had a few simple facts, the +premises, crooked, and we have them straight; and all that we need to +know in this amazing tangle of learned nonsense, is that the +probabilities are against an old woman having caused a storm at sea and +drowned a Scottish King. And so with the French Revolution. What the +Encyclopaedists and other pioneers of that movement really did for the +European peoples in that matter, was not to elaborate fantastic schemes +of constitution making, but by their argumentation to achieve the +destruction of old political sophistries--Divine Rights of Kings and +what not--and to enable one or two simple facts to emerge clearly and +unmistakeably, as that the object of government is the good of the +governed, and can find its justification in nothing else whatsoever. It +was these simple truths which, spreading over the world--with many +checks and set-backs--have so profoundly modified the structure of +Christendom. + +Somewhere it is related of Montaigne that talking with academic +colleagues, he expressed a contemptuous disbelief in the whole elaborate +theory of witchcraft as it existed at that time. Scandalised, his +colleagues took him into the University library, and showed him +hundreds, thousands, of parchment volumes written in Latin by the +learned men of the subject. Had he read these volumes, that he talked so +disrespectfully of their contents? No, replied Montaigne, he had not +read them, and he was not going to, because they were all wrong, and he +was right. And Montaigne spoke with this dogmatism because he realised +that he saw clearly that which they did not--the crookedness and +unsoundness of just those simple fundamental assumptions on which the +whole fantastic structure was based. + +And so with all the sophistries and illusions by which the war system is +still defended. If the public as a whole had to follow all the +intricacies of those marvellous diplomatic combinations, the maze of our +foreign politics, to understand abstruse points of finance and +economics, in order to have just and sound ideas as to the real +character of international relationship, why then public opinion would +go on being as ignorant and mistaken as it had been hitherto. But sound +opinion and instincts in that field depend upon nothing of the sort, but +upon the emergence of a few quite simple facts, which are indisputable +and self-evident, which stare us in the face, and which absolutely +disprove all the elaborate theories of the Bellicist statesmen. + +For instance, if conquest and extension of territory is the main road of +moral and material progress, the fundamental need which sets up all +these rivalries and collisions, then it is the populations of the Great +States which should be the most enviable; the position of the Russian +should be more desirable than that of the Hollander; it is not. The +Austrian should be better off than the Switzer; he is not. If a nation's +wealth is really subject to military confiscation, and needs the defence +of military power, then the wealth of those small states should be +insecure indeed--and Belgian national stocks stand 20 points higher than +the German. If nations are rival units, then we should benefit by the +disappearance of our rivals--and if they disappeared, something like a +third of our population would starve to death. If the growth and +prosperity of rival nations threatens us, then we should be in far +greater danger of America to-day than we were some 50 years ago, when +the growth of that power disturbed the sleep of our statesmen (and when, +incidentally, we were just as much afraid of the growth of that power as +we are now afraid of the growth of Germany). If the growing power of +Russia compelled us to fight a great war in alliance with the Turk to +check her "advance on India," why are we now co-operating with Russia to +build railroads to India? + +It is such quite simple questions as these, and the quite plain facts +which underlie them which will lead to sounder conceptions in this +matter on the part of the peoples. + +It is not we who are the "theorists," if by "theorists" is meant the +constructors of elaborate and deceptive theorems in this matter. It is +our opponents, the military mystics, who persistently shut their eyes to +the great outstanding facts of history and of our time. And these +fantastic theories are generally justified by most esoteric doctrine, +not by the appeal to the facts which stare you in the face. I once +replied to a critic thus:-- + + In examining my critic's balance sheet I remarked that were his + figures as complete as they were absurdly incomplete and + misleading, I should still have been unimpressed. We all know that + very marvellous results are possible with figures; but one can + generally find some simple fact which puts them to the supreme test + without undue mathematics. I do not know whether it has ever + happened to my critic, as it has happened to me, while watching the + gambling in the casino of a Continental watering resort, to have a + financial genius present weird columns of figures, which + demonstrate conclusively, irrefragably, that by this system which + they embody one can break the bank and win a million. I have never + examined these figures, and never shall, for this reason: the + genius in question is prepared to sell his wonderful secret for + twenty francs. Now, in the face of that fact I am not interested + in his figures. If they were worth examination they would not be + for sale. + + And so in this matter there are certain test facts which upset the + adroitest statistical legerdemain. Though, really, the fallacy + which regards an addition of territory as an addition of wealth to + the "owning" nation is a very much simpler matter than the + fallacies lying behind gambling systems, which are bound up with + the laws of chance and the law of averages and much else that + philosophers will quarrel about till the end of time. It requires + an exceptional mathematical brain really to refute those fallacies, + whereas the one we are dealing with is due simply to the difficulty + experienced by most of us in carrying in our heads two facts at the + same time. It is so much easier to seize on one fact and forget the + other. Thus we realize that when Germany has conquered + Alsace-Lorraine she has "captured" a province worth, "cash value," + in my critic's phrase, sixty-six millions sterling. What we + overlook is that Germany has also captured the people who own the + property and who continue to own it. We have multiplied by _x_, it + is true, but we have overlooked the fact that we have had to divide + by _x_, and that the resultant is consequently, so far as the + individual is concerned, exactly what it was before. My critic + remembered the multiplication all right, but he forgot the + division. + +Just think of all the theories, the impossible theories for which the +"practical" man has dragged the nations into war: the Balance of Power, +for instance. Fifteen or twenty years ago it was the ineradicable belief +of fifty or sixty million Americans, good, honest, sincere, and astute +folk, that it was their bounden duty, their manifest interest, to +fight--and in the words of one of their Senators, annihilate--Great +Britain, in the interests of the Monroe Doctrine (which is a form of the +"Balance of Power"). I do not think any one knew what the Monroe +Doctrine meant, or could coherently defend it. An American Ambassador +had an after-dinner story at the time. + +"What is this I hear, Jones, that you do not believe in the Monroe +Doctrine?" + +"It is a wicked lie. I have said no such thing. I do believe in the +Monroe Doctrine. I would lay down my life for it; I would die for it. +What I did say was that I didn't know what it meant." + +And it was this vague theory which very nearly drove America into a war +that would have been disastrous to the progress of Anglo-Saxon +civilization. + +This was at the time of the Venezuelan crisis: the United States, which +for nearly one hundred years had lived in perfect peace with a British +power touching her frontier along three thousand miles, laid it down as +a doctrine that her existence was imperilled if Great Britain should +extend by so much as a mile a vague frontier running through a South +American swamp thousands of miles away. And for that cause these decent +and honourable people were prepared to take all the risks that would be +involved to Anglo-Saxon civilisation by a war between England and +America. The present writer happened at that time to be living in +America, and concerned with certain political work. Night after night he +heard these fulminations against Great Britain; politicians, +Congressmen, Senators, Governors, Ministers, Preachers, clamouring for +war, for a theory as vague and as little practical as one could wish. + +And we, of course, have had our like obsessions without number: "the +independence integrity of the Turkish dominion in Europe" is one. Just +think of it! Take in the full sound of the phrase: "the independence +integrity of the Turkish dominion in Europe!" + +What, of course, makes these fantastic political doctrines possible, +what leads men to subscribe to them, are a few false general conceptions +to which they hold tenaciously--as all fundamental conceptions are held, +and ought to be. The general conceptions in question are precisely the +ones I have indicated: that nations are rival and struggling units, that +military force is consequently the determining factor of their relative +advantage; that enlargement of political frontiers is the supreme need, +and so on. + +And the revision of these fundamental conceptions will, of course, be +the general work of Christendom, and given the conditions which now +obtain, the development will go on _pari passu_ in all nations or not +all. It will not be the work of "nations" at all; it will be the work of +individual men. + +States do not think. It is the men who form the states who think, and +the number of those men who will act as pioneers in a better policy +must, of course, at first be small: a group here and a group there, the +best men of all countries--England, France, Germany, +America--influencing by their ideas finally the great mass. To say, as +so many do in this matter: "Let other nations do it first" is, of +course, to condemn us all to impotence--for the other nations use the +same language. To ask that one group of forty or seventy or ninety +million people shall by some sort of magic all find their way to a saner +doctrine before such doctrine has affected other groups is to talk the +language of childishness. Things do not happen in that in human affairs. +It is not in that way that opinion grows. It did not grow in that way +in any one of the steps that I have mentioned--in the abolition of +religious persecution, or slavery, or judicial torture. Unless the +individual man sees his responsibility for determining what is right and +knowing how and why it is right, there will be no progress; there cannot +even be a beginning. + +We are to an even greater degree an integral part of European Society, +and a factor of European Policy, than we were at the time of the Crimean +War, when we mainly determined it; and our theories and discussions will +act and re-act upon that policy just as did any considerable body of +thought, whether French political thought of the eighteenth century, or +German religious thought of the sixteenth century, even at a time when +the means of producing that reaction, the book, literature, the +newspaper, rapid communication, were so immeasurably more primitive and +rudimentary than ours. What we think and say and do affects not merely +ourselves, but that whole body politic of Christendom of which we are an +integral part. + +It is a curious fact that the moral and intellectual interdependence of +States preceded by a long period, that material and economic +independence which I have tried recently to make clear. Nothing is more +contrary to fact than to suppose that any considerable movement of +opinion in Europe can be limited to the frontiers of one nation. Even at +a time when it took half a generation for a thought to travel from one +capital to another, a student or thinker in some obscure Italian, Swiss +or German village was able to modify policy, to change the face of +Europe and of mankind. Coming nearer to our time, it was the work of the +encyclopaedists and earlier political questioners which made the French +Revolution; and the effect of that Revolution was not confined to +France. The ideas which animated it re-acted directly upon our Empire, +upon the American Colonies, upon the Spanish Colonies, upon Italy, and +the formation of United Italy, upon Germany--the world over. These +miracles, almost too vast and great to conceive, were the outcome of +that intangible thing, an idea, an aspiration, an ideal. And if they +could accomplish so much in that day when the popular press and cheap +literature and improved communication did not exist, how is it possible +to suppose that any great ferment of opinion can be limited to one group +in our day, when we have a condition of things in which the declaration +of an English Cabinet Minister to-night is read to-morrow morning by +every reading German? + +It should be to our everlasting glory that our political thought in the +past, some of our political institutions, parliamentary government, and +what not, have had an enormous influence in the world. We have some +ground for hoping that another form of political institution which we +have initiated, a relationship of distinct political groups into which +force does not enter, will lead the way to a better condition of things +in Christendom. We have demonstrated that five independent nations, the +nations of the British Empire, can settle their differences as between +one another without the use of force. We have definitely decided that +whatever the attitude Australia, Canada, and South Africa may adopt to +us we shall not use force to change it. What is possible with five is +possible with fifteen nations. Just as we have given to the world +roughly our conception of Parliamentary Government, so it is to be hoped +may we give to the world our conception of the true relationship of +nations. + +The great steps of the past--religious freedom, the abolition of torture +and of slavery, the rights of the mass, self-government--every real step +which man has made has been made because men "theorised," because a +Galileo, or a Luther, or a Calvin, or a Voltaire, Rousseau, Bentham, +Spencer, Darwin, wrote and put notes of interrogation. Had they not done +so none of those things could have been accomplished. The greatest work +of the renaissance was the elimination of physical force in the struggle +of religious groups, in religious struggles generally; the greatest work +of our generation will be elimination of physical force from the +struggle of the political groups and from political struggles generally. +But it will be done in exactly the same way: by a common improvement of +opinion. And because we possess immeasurably better instruments for the +dissemination of ideas, we should be able to achieve the Political +Reformation of Europe much more rapidly and effectively than our +predecessors achieved the great intellectual Reformation of their time. + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +WHAT MUST WE _DO_? + +We must have the right political faith--Then we must give effect to +it--Good intention not enough--The organization of the great forces of +modern life--Our indifference as to the foundations of the evil--The +only hope. + + +What then must we _do_? Well the first and obvious thing is for each to +do his civic duty, for each to determine that he at least shall not +reject, with that silly temper which nearly always meets most new points +of view, principles which do at least seek to explain things, and do +point to the possibility of a better way. + +The first thing is to make our own policy right--and that is the work of +each one of us; to correct the temper which made us, for instance, to +our shame, the partners of the Turk in his work of oppression. + +And we must realise that mere good intent does not suffice; that +understanding, by which alone we can make headway, is not arrived at by +a pleasant emotion like that produced by a Beethoven Sonata; that we pay +for our progress in a little harder money than that, the money of hard +work, in which must be included hard thinking. And having got that far, +we must realise that sound ideas do not spread themselves. They are +spread by men. It is one of the astonishing things in the whole problem +of the breaking of war, that while men realise that if women are to have +votes, or men to be made temperate, or the White Slave Traffic to be +stopped, or for that matter, if battleships are to be built, or +conscription to be introduced, or soap or pills to be sold, effort, +organisation, time, money, must be put into these things. But the +greatest revolution that the world has known since mankind acquired the +right to freedom of opinion, will apparently get itself accomplished +without any of these things; or that at least the Government can quite +easily attend to it by asking other Governments to attend a Conference. +We must realise that a change of opinion, the recognition of a new fact, +or of facts heretofore not realised, is a slow and laborious work, even +in the relatively simple things which I have mentioned, and that you +cannot make savages into civilised men by collecting them round a table. +For the Powers of Europe, so far as their national policies are +concerned, are still uncivilised individuals. And their Conferences are +bound to fail, when each unit has the falsest conception concerning the +matters under discussion. Governments are the embodied expression of +general public opinion--and not the best public opinion at that; and +until opinion is modified, the embodiment of it will no more be capable +of the necessary common action, than would Red Indians be capable of +forming an efficient Court of Law, while knowing nothing of law or +jurisprudence, or worse still, having utterly false notions of the +principles upon which human society is based. + +And the occasional conferences of private men still hazy as to these +principles are bound to be as ineffective. If the mere meeting and +contact of people cleared up misunderstandings, we should not have +Suffragettes and Anti-Suffragettes, or Mr. Lloyd George at grips with +the doctors. + +These occasional conferences, whether official, like those of the Hague, +or non-official like those which occasionally meet in London or in +Berlin, will not be of great avail in this matter unless a better public +opinion renders them effective. They are of some use and no one would +desire to see them dropped, but they will not of themselves stem or turn +the drift of opinion. What is needed is a permanent organisation of +propaganda, framed, not for the purpose of putting some cut and dried +scheme into immediate operation, but with the purpose of clarifying +European public opinion, making the great mass see a few simple facts +straight, instead of crooked, and founded in the hope that ten or +fifteen years of hard, steady, persistent work, will create in that time +(by virtue of the superiority of the instruments, the Press and the rest +of it which we possess) a revolution of opinion as great as that +produced at the time of the Reformation, in a period which probably was +not more than the lifetime of an ordinary man. + +The organization for such permanent work has hardly begun. The Peace +Societies have done, and are doing, a real service, but it is evident, +for the reasons already indicated, that if the great mass are to be +affected, instruments of far wider sweep must be used. Our great +commercial and financial interests, our educational and academic +institutions, our industrial organizations, the political bodies, must +all be reached. An effort along the right lines has been made thanks to +the generosity of a more than ordinarily enlightened Conservative +capitalist. But the work should be taken up at a hundred points. Some +able financier should do for the organization of Banking--which has +really become the Industry of Finance and Credit--the same sort of +service that Sir Charles Macara has done for the cotton industry of the +world. The international action and co-ordination of Trades Unions the +world over should be made practical and not, in this matter, be allowed +to remain a merely platonic aspiration. + +The greater European Universities should possess endowed Chairs of the +Science of International Statecraft. While we have Chairs to investigate +the nature of the relationship of insects, we have none to investigate +the nature of the relationship of man in his political grouping. And the +occupants of these Chairs might change places--that of Berlin coming to +London or Oxford, and that of Oxford going to Berlin. + +The English Navy League and the German Navy League alike tell us that +the object of their endeavours is to create an instrument of peace. In +that case their efforts should not be confined to increasing the size of +the respective arms, but should also be directed to determining how and +why and when, and under what conditions, and for what purpose that arm +should be used. And that can only be done effectually if the two bodies +learn something of the aims and objects of the other. The need for a +Navy, and the size of the Navy, depends upon policy, either our own +policy, or the policy of the prospective aggressor; and to know +something of that, and its adjustment, is surely an integral part of +national defence. If both these Navy Leagues, in the fifteen or sixteen +years during which they have been in existence, had possessed an +intelligence committee, each conferring with the other, and spending +even a fraction of the money and energy upon disentangling policy that +has been spent upon the sheer bull-dog piling up of armaments, in all +human possibility, the situation which now confronts us would not exist. + +Then each political party of the respective Parliaments might have its +accredited delegates in the Lobbies of the other: the Social Democrats +might have their permanent delegates in London, in the Lobbies of the +House of Commons; the Labour Party might have their Permanent Delegates +in the Lobbies of the Reichstag; and when any Anglo-German question +arose, those delegates could speak through the mouth of the Members of +the Party to which they were accredited, to the Parliament of the other +nation. The Capitalistic parties could have a like bi-national +organisation. + +"These are wild and foolish suggestions"--that is possible. They have +never, however, been discussed with a view to the objects in question. +All efforts in this direction have been concentrated upon an attempt to +realize mechanically, by some short and royal road, a result far too +great and beneficent to be achieved so cheaply. + +Before our Conferences, official or unofficial, can have much success, +the parties to them must divest their minds of certain illusions which +at present dominate them. Until that is done, you might as reasonably +expect two cannibals to arrive at a workable scheme for consuming one +another. The elementary conceptions, the foundations of the thing are +unworkable. Our statecraft is still founded on a sort of political +cannibalism, upon the idea that nations progress by conquering, or +dominating one another. So long as that is our conception of the +relationship of human groups we shall always stand in danger of +collision, and our schemes of association and co-operation will always +break down. + + + + +APPENDIX. + + +Many of the points touched upon in the last two chapters are brought out +clearly in a recent letter addressed to the Press by my friend and +colleague Mr. A.W. Haycock. In this letter to the Press he says:-- + + If you will examine systematically, as I have done, the comments + which have appeared in the Liberal Press, either in the form of + leading articles, or in letters from readers, concerning Lord + Roberts' speech, you will find that though it is variously + described as "diabolical," "pernicious," "wicked," "inflammatory" + and "criminal," the real fundamental assumptions on which the whole + speech is based, and which, if correct, justify it, are by + implication admitted; at any rate, in not one single case that I + can discover are they seriously challenged. + + Now, when you consider this, it is the most serious fact of the + whole incident--far more disquieting in reality than the fact of + the speech itself, especially when we remember that Lord Roberts + did but adopt and adapt the arguments already used with more + sensationalism and less courtesy by Mr. Winston Churchill himself. + + The protests against Lord Roberts' speech take the form of denying + the intention of Germany to attach this country. But how can his + critics be any more aware of the intentions of Germany--65 millions + of people acted upon by all sorts of complex political and social + forces--than is Lord Roberts? Do we know the intention of England + with reference to Woman's Suffrage or Home Rule or Tariff Reform? + How, therefore, can we know the intentions of "Germany"? + + Lord Roberts, with courtesy, in form at least and with the warmest + tribute to the "noble and imaginative patriotism" of German policy, + assumed that that policy would follow the same general impulse that + our own has done in the past, and would necessarily follow it since + the relation between military power and national greatness and + prosperity was to-day what it always has been. In effect, Lord + Roberts' case amounts to this:-- + + "We have built up our Empire and our trade by virtue of the + military power of our state; we exist as a nation, sail the seas, + and carry on our trade, by virtue of our predominant strength; as + that strength fails we shall do all these things merely on the + sufferance of stronger nations, who, when pushed by the needs of an + expanding population to do so, will deprive us of the capacity for + carrying on those vital functions of life, and transfer the means + of so doing to themselves to their very great advantage; we have + achieved such transfer to ourselves in the past by force and must + expect other nations to try and do the same thing unless we are + able to prevent them. It is the inevitable struggles of life to be + fought out either by war or armaments." + + These are not Lord Roberts' words, but the proposition is the clear + underlying assumption of his speech. And his critics do not + seriously challenge it. Mr. Churchill by implication warmly + supports it. At Glasgow he said: "The whole fortune of our race and + Empire, the whole treasure accumulated during so many centuries of + sacrifice and achievement would perish and be swept utterly away, + if our naval supremacy were to be impaired." + + Now why should there be any danger of Germany bringing about this + catastrophe unless she could profit enormously by so doing? But + that implies that a nation does expand by military force, does + achieve the best for its people by that means; it does mean that if + you are not stronger than your rival, you carry on your trade "on + sufferance" and at the appointed hour will have it taken from you + by him. And if that assumption--plainly indicated as it is by a + Liberal Minister--is right, who can say that Lord Roberts' + conclusion is not justified? + + Now as to the means of preventing the war. Lord Roberts' formula + is:-- + + "Such a battle front by sea and land that no power or probable + combination of powers shall dare to attack us without the certainty + of disaster." + + This, of course, is taken straight from Mr. Churchill, who, at + Dundee, told us that "the way to make war impossible is to be so + strong as to make victory certain." + + We have all apparently, Liberals and Conservatives alike, accepted + this "axiom" as self-evident. + + Well, since it is so obvious as all that we may expect the Germans + to adopt it. At present they are guided by a much more modest + principle (enunciated in the preamble of the German Navy Law); + namely, to be sufficiently strong to make it _dangerous_ for your + enemy to attack. They must now, according to our "axiom," be so + strong as to make our defeat certain. + + I am quite sure that the big armament people in Germany are very + grateful for the advice which Mr. Churchill and Lord Roberts thus + give to the nations of the world, and we may expect to see German + armaments so increased as to accord with the new principle. + + And Lord Roberts is courageous enough to abide by the conclusion + which flows from the fundamental assumption of Liberals and + Conservatives alike, _i.e._, that trade and the means of livelihood + can be transferred by force. We have transferred it in the past. + "It is excellent policy; it is, or should be, the policy of every + nation prepared to play a great part in history." Such are Lord + Roberts' actual words. At least, they don't burke the issue. + + The Germans will doubtless note the combination: be so strong as to + make victory certain, and strike when you have made it certain, and + they will then, in the light of this advice, be able to put the + right interpretation upon our endeavours to create a great + conscript force and our arrangements, which have been going on for + some years, to throw an expeditionary force on to the continent. + + The outlook is not very pleasant, is it? And yet if you accept the + "axiom" that our Empire and our trade is dependent upon force and + can be advantageously attacked by a stronger power there is no + escape from the inevitable struggle--for the other "axiom" that + safety can be secured merely by being enormously stronger than your + rival is, as soon as it is tested by applying it to the two parties + to the conflict--and, of course, one has as much right to apply it + as the other--seen to be simply dangerous and muddle-headed + rubbish. Include the two parties in your "axiom" (as you must) and + it becomes impossible of application. + + Now the whole problem sifts finally down to this one question: Is + the assumption made by Lord Roberts and implied by Mr. Churchill + concerning the relation of military force to trade and national + life well founded? If it is, conflict is inevitable. It is no good + crying "panic." If there is this enormous temptation pushing to our + national ruin, we ought to be in a panic. And if it is not true? + Even in that case conflict will equally be inevitable unless we + realise its falseness, for a universal false opinion concerning a + fact will have the same result in conduct as though the false + belief were true. + + And my point is that those concerned to prevent this conflict seem + but mildly interested in examining the foundations of the false + beliefs that make conflict inevitable. Part of the reluctance to + study the subject seems to arise from the fear that if we deny the + nonsensical idea that the British Empire would instantaneously fall + to pieces were the Germans to dominate the North Sea for 24 hours + we should weaken the impulse to defence. That is probably an + utterly false idea, but suppose it is true, is the risk of less + ardour in defence as great as the risk which comes of having a + nation of Roberts and Churchills on both sides of the frontier? + + If that happens war becomes not a risk but a certainty. + + And it is danger of happening. I speak from the standpoint of a + somewhat special experience. During the last 18 months I have + addressed not scores but many hundreds of meetings on the subject + of the very proposition on which Lord Roberts' speech is based and + which I have indicated at the beginning of this letter; I have + answered not hundreds but thousands of questions arising out of it. + And I think that gives me a somewhat special understanding of the + mind of the man in the street. The reason he is subject to panic, + and "sees red" and will often accept blindly counsels like those of + Lord Roberts, is that he holds as axioms these primary assumptions + to which I have referred, namely, that he carries on his daily life + by virtue of military force, and that the means of carrying it on + will be taken from him by the first stronger power that rises in + the world, and that that power will be pushed to do it by the + advantage of such seizure. And these axioms he never finds + challenged even by his Liberal guides. + + The issue for those who really desire a better condition is clear. + So long as by their silence, or by their indifference to the + discussion of the fundamental facts of this problem they create the + impression that Mr. Churchill's axioms are unchallengeable, the + panic-mongers will have it all their own way, and our action will + be a stimulus to similar action in Germany, and that action will + again re-act on ours, and so on _ad infinitum._ + + Why is not some concerted effort made to create in both countries + the necessary public opinion, by encouraging the study and + discussion of the elements of the case, in some such way, for + instance, as that adopted by Mr. Norman Angell in his book? + + One organization due to private munificence has been formed and is + doing, within limits, an extraordinarily useful work, but we can + only hope to affect policy by a much more general interest--the + interest of those of leisure and influence. And that does not seem + to be forthcoming. + + My own work, which has been based quite frankly on Mr. Angell's + book, has convinced me that it embodies just the formula most + readily understanded of the people. It constitutes a constructive + doctrine of International Policy--the only statement I know so + definitely applicable to modern conditions. + + But the old illusions are so entrenched that if any impression is + to be made on public opinion generally, effort must be persistent, + permanent, and widespread. Mere isolated conferences, disconnected + from work of a permanent character, are altogether inadequate for + the forces that have to be met. + + What is needed is a permanent and widespread organization embracing + Trades Unions, Churches and affiliated bodies, Schools and + Universities, basing its work on some definite doctrine of + International Policy which can supplant the present conceptions of + struggle and chaos. + + I speak, at least, from the standpoint of experience; in the last + resort the hostility, fear and suspicion which from time to time + gains currency among the great mass of the people, is due to those + elementary misconceptions as to the relation of prosperity, the + opportunities of life, to military power. So long as these + misconceptions are dominant, nothing is easier than to precipitate + panic and bad feeling, and unless we can modify them, we shall in + all human probability drift into conflict; and this incident of + Lord Roberts' speech and the comment which it has provoked, show + that for some not very well defined reason, Liberals, quite as much + as Conservatives, by implication, accept the axioms upon which it + is based, and give but little evidence that they are seriously + bestirring themselves to improve that political education upon + which according to their creed, progress can alone be made. + + Yours very faithfully, + + A.W. HAYCOCK. + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Peace Theories and the Balkan War, by Norman Angell + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 11895-8.txt or 11895-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/1/8/9/11895/ + +Produced by MBP and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Peace Theories and the Balkan War + +Author: Norman Angell + +Release Date: April 3, 2004 [EBook #11895] +[Date last updated: Jan 29, 2006] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR *** + + + + +Produced by MBP and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + + + + + + + + +PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR + + +BY + +NORMAN ANGELL + + +Author of "The Great Illusion" + + +1912 + + + + +PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR + +By NORMAN ANGELL, + +Author of "The Great Illusion." + +1912 + + + + +THE TEXT OF THIS BOOK. + + + Whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the powers, or sit in + sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no consequence at the + present moment.... + + We have sometimes been assured by persons who profess to know that + the danger of war has become an illusion.... Well, here is a war + which has broken out in spite of all that rulers and diplomatists + could do to prevent it, a war in which the Press has had no part, a + war which the whole force of the money power has been subtly and + steadfastly directed to prevent, which has come upon us, not through + the ignorance or credulity of the people, but, on the contrary, + through their knowledge of their history and their destiny, and + through their intense realisation of their wrongs and of their + duties, as they conceived them, a war which from all these causes + has burst upon us with all the force of a spontaneous explosion, and + which in strife and destruction has carried all before it. Face to + face with this manifestation, who is the man bold enough to say that + force is never a remedy? Who is the man who is foolish enough to say + that martial virtues do not play a vital part in the health and + honour of every people? (Cheers.) Who is the man who is vain enough + to suppose that the long antagonisms of history and of time can in + all circumstances be adjusted by the smooth and superficial + conventions of politicians and ambassadors?--MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL + at Sheffield. + + Mr. Norman Angell's theory was one to enable the citizens of this + country to sleep quietly, and to lull into false security the + citizens of all great countries. That is undoubtedly the reason why + he met with so much success.... It was a very comfortable theory for + those nations which have grown rich and whose ideals and initiative + have been sapped by over much prosperity. But the great delusion of + Norman Angell, which led to the writing of "The Great Illusion," has + been dispelled for ever by the Balkan League. In this connection it + is of value to quote the words of Mr. Winston Churchill, which give + very adequately the reality as opposed to theory.--_The Review of + Reviews_, from an article on "The Debacle of Norman Angell." + +And an odd score of like pronouncements from newspapers and public men +since the outbreak of the Balkan War. + +The interrogations they imply have been put definitely in the first +chapter of this book; the replies to those questions summarised in that +chapter and elaborated in the others. + + + + +_The "key" to this book and the summary of its arguments are contained +in Chapter I. (pp. 7-12)_ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +I. The Questions and their Answers + +II. "Peace" and "War" in the Balkans + +III. Economic Causes in the Balkan War + +IV. Turkish Ideals in our Political Thought + +V. Our Responsibility for Balkan Wars + +VI. Pacifism, Defence, and the "Impossibility of War" + +VII. "Theories" False and True; their Role in European Politics + +VIII. What Shall we DO? + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWER. + + +CHAPTER II. + +"PEACE" AND "WAR" IN THE BALKANS. + +"Peace" in the Balkans under the Turkish System--The inadequacy of our +terms--The repulsion of the Turkish invasion--The Christian effort to +bring the reign of force and conquest to an end--The difference between +action designed to settle relationship on force and counter action +designed to prevent such settlement--The force of the policeman and the +force of the brigand--The failure of conquest as exemplified by the +Turk--Will the Balkan peoples prove Pacifist or Bellicist; adopt the +Turkish or the Christian System? + + +CHAPTER III. + +ECONOMICS AND THE BALKAN WAR. + +The "economic system" of the Turk--The Turkish "Trade of Conquest" as a +cause of this war--Racial and Religious hatred of primitive +societies--Industrialism as a solvent--Its operation in Europe--Balkans +geographically remote from main drift of European economic +development--The false economies of the Powers as a cause of their +jealousies and quarrels--- This has prevented settlement--What is the +"economic motive"?--Impossible to separate moral and +material--Nationality and the War System. + + +CHAPTER IV. + +TURKISH IDEALS IN OUR POLITICAL THOUGHT. + +This war and "the Turks of Britain and Prussia"--The Anglo-Saxon and +opposed ideals--Mr. C. Chesterton's case for "killing and being killed" +as the best method of settling differences--Its application to Civil +Conflicts--As in Spanish-America--The difference between Devonshire and +Venezuela--Will the Balkans adopt the Turco-Venezuelan political ideals +or the British? + + +CHAPTER V. + +OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BALKAN WARS. + +Mr. Winston Churchill on the "Responsibility" of Diplomacy--What does he +mean?--An easy (and popular) philosophy--Can we neglect past if we would +avoid future errors?--British temper and policy in the Crimean War--What +are its lessons?--Why we fought a war to sustain the "integrity and +independence of the Turkish dominion in Europe"--Supporting the Turk +against his Christian victims--From fear of Russian growth which we are +now aiding--The commentary of events--Shall we back the wrong horse +again? + + +CHAPTER VI. + +PACIFISM, DEFENCE, AND "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAR." + +Did the Crimean War prove Bright and Cobden wrong?--Our curious +reasoning--Mr. Churchill on "illusions"--The danger of war is not the +illusion but its benefits--We are all Pacifists now since we all desire +Peace--Will more armaments alone secure it?--The experience of +mankind--War "the failure of human wisdom"--Therefore more wisdom is the +remedy--But the Militarists only want more arms--The German Lord +Roberts--The military campaign against political Rationalism--How to +make war certain. + + +CHAPTER VII. + +"THEORIES" FALSE AND TRUE: THEIR ROLE IN EUROPEAN PROGRESS. + +The improvement of ideas the foundation of all improvement--Shooting +straight and thinking straight; the one as important as the +other--Pacifism and the Millennium--How we got rid of wars of +religion--A few ideas have changed the face of the world--The simple +ideas the most important--The "theories" which have led to war--The work +of the reformer to destroy old and false theories--The intellectual +interdependence of nations--Europe at unity in this matter--New ideas +cannot be confined to one people--No fear of ourselves or any nation +being ahead of the rest. + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +WHAT MUST WE _DO_? + +We must have the right political faith--Then we must give effect to +it--Good intention not enough--The organization of the great forces of +modern life--Our indifference as to the foundations of the evil--The +only hope. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWER. + + +What has Pacifism, Old or New, to say now? + +Is War impossible? + +Is it unlikely? + +Is it futile? + +Is not force a remedy, and at times the only remedy? + +Could any remedy have been devised on the whole so conclusive and +complete as that used by the Balkan peoples? + +Have not the Balkan peoples redeemed War from the charges too readily +brought against it as simply an instrument of barbarism? + +Have questions of profit and loss, economic considerations, anything +whatever to do with this war? + +Would the demonstration of its economic futility have kept the peace? + +Are theories and logic of the slightest use, since force alone can +determine the issue? + +Is not war therefore inevitable, and must we not prepare diligently for +it? I will answer all these questions quite simply and directly without +casuistry and logic-chopping, and honestly desiring to avoid paradox and +"cleverness." And these quite simple answers will not be in +contradiction with anything that I have written, nor will they +invalidate any of the principles I have attempted to explain. + +And my answers may be summarised thus:-- + +(1) This war has justified both the Old Pacifism and the New. By +universal admission events have proved that the Pacifists who opposed +the Crimean War were right and their opponents wrong. Had public opinion +given more consideration to those Pacifist principles, this country +would not have "backed the wrong horse," and this war, two wars which +have preceded it, and many of the abominations of which the Balkan +peninsular has been the scene during the last 60 years might have been +avoided, and in any case Great Britain would not now carry upon her +shoulders the responsibility of having during half a century supported +the Turk against the Christian and of having tried uselessly to prevent +what has now taken place--the break-up of the Turk's rule in Europe. + +(2) War is not impossible, and no responsible Pacifist ever said it was; +it is not the likelihood of war which is the illusion, but its benefits. + +(3) It is likely or unlikely according as the parties to a dispute are +guided by wisdom or folly. + +(4) It _is_ futile; and force is no remedy. + +(5) Its futility is proven by the war waged daily by the Turks as +conquerors, during the last 400 years. And because the Balkan peoples +have chosen the less evil of two kinds of war, and will use their +victory to bring a system based on force and conquest to an end, we who +do not believe in force and conquest rejoice in their action, and +believe it will achieve immense benefits. But if instead of using their +victory to eliminate force, they in their turn pin their faith to it, +continue to use it the one against the other, exploiting by its means +the populations they rule, and become not the organisers of social +co-operation among the Balkan populations, but merely, like the Turks, +their conquerors and "owners," then they in their turn will share the +fate of the Turk. + +(6) The fundamental causes of this war are economic in the narrower, as +well as in the larger sense of the term; in the first because conquest +was the Turk's only trade--he desired to live out of taxes wrung from a +conquered people, to exploit them as a means of livelihood, and this +conception was at the bottom of most of Turkish misgovernment. And in +the larger sense its cause is economic because in the Balkans, remote +geographically from the main drift of European economic development, +there has not grown up that interdependent social life, the innumerable +contacts which in the rest of Europe have done so much to attenuate +primitive religious and racial hatreds. + +(7) A better understanding by the Turk of the real nature of civilised +government, of the economic futility of conquest of the fact that a +means of livelihood (an economic system), based upon having more force +than someone else and using it ruthlessly against him, is an impossible +form of human relationship bound to break down, _would_ have kept the +peace. + +(8) If European statecraft had not been animated by false conceptions, +largely economic in origin, based upon a belief in the necessary rivalry +of states, the advantages of preponderant force and conquest, the +Western nations could have composed their quarrels and ended the +abominations of the Balkan peninsula long ago--even in the opinion of +the _Times_. And it is our own false statecraft--that of Great +Britain--which has a large part of the responsibility for this failure +of European civilisation. It has caused us to sustain the Turk in +Europe, to fight a great and popular war with that aim, and led us into +treaties which had they been kept, would have obliged us to fight to-day +on the side of the Turk against the Balkan States. + +(9) If by "theories" and "logic" is meant the discussion of and interest +in principles, the ideas that govern human relationship, they are the +only things that can prevent future wars, just as they were the only +things that brought religious wars to an end--a preponderant power +"imposing" peace playing no role therein. Just as it was false religious +theories which made the religious wars, so it is false political +theories which make the political wars. + +(10) War is only inevitable in the sense that other forms of error and +passion--religious persecution for instance--are inevitable; they cease +with better understanding, as the attempt to impose religious belief by +force has ceased in Europe. + +(11) We should not prepare for war; we should prepare to prevent war; +and though that preparation may include battleships and conscription, +those elements will quite obviously make the tension and danger greater +unless there is also a better European opinion. + +These summarised replies need a little expansion. + + + +CHAPTER II. + +"PEACE" AND "WAR" IN THE BALKANS. + +"Peace" in the Balkans under the Turkish System--The inadequacy of our +terms--The repulsion of the Turkish invasion--The Christian effort to +bring the reign of force and conquest to an end--The difference between +action designed to settle relationship on force and counter action +designed to prevent such settlement--The force of the policeman and the +force of the brigand--The failure of conquest as exemplified by the +Turk--Will the Balkan peoples prove Pacifist or Bellicist; adopt the +Turkish or the Christian System? + + +Had we thrashed out the question of war and peace as we must finally, it +would hardly be necessary to explain that the apparent paradox in Answer +No. 4 (that war is futile, and that this war will have immense benefits) +is due to the inadequacy of our language, which compels us to use the +same word for two opposed purposes, not to any real contradiction of +fact. + +We called the condition of the Balkan peninsula "Peace" until the other +day, merely because the respective Ambassadors still happened to be +resident in the capitals to which they were accredited. + +Let us see what "Peace" under Turkish rule really meant, and who is the +real invader in this war. Here is a very friendly and impartial +witness--Sir Charles Elliot--who paints for us the character of the +Turk as an "administrator":-- + + "The Turk in Europe has an overweening sense of his superiority, + and remains a nation apart, mixing little with the conquered + populations, whose customs and ideas he tolerates, but makes little + effort to understand. The expression indeed, 'Turkey in Europe' + means indeed no more than 'England in Asia,' if used as a + designation for India.... The Turks have done little to assimilate + the people whom they have conquered, and still less, been + assimilated by them. In the larger part of the Turkish dominions, + the Turks themselves are in a minority.... The Turks certainly + resent the dismemberment of their Empire, but not in the sense in + which the French resent the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. + They would never use the word 'Turkey' or even its oriental + equivalent, 'The High Country' in ordinary conversation. They would + never say that Syria and Greece are parts of Turkey which have been + detached, but merely that they are tributaries which have become + independent, provinces once occupied by Turks where there are no + Turks now. As soon as a province passes under another Government, + the Turks find it the most natural thing in the world to leave it + and go somewhere else. In the same spirit the Turk talks quite + pleasantly of leaving Constantinople some day, he will go over to + Asia and found another capital. One can hardly imagine Englishmen + speaking like that of London, but they might conceivably speak so + of Calcutta.... The Turk is a conqueror and nothing else. The + history of the Turk is a catalogue of battles. His contributions to + art, literature, science and religion, are practically nil. Their + desire has not been to instruct, to improve, hardly even to govern, + but simply to conquer.... The Turk makes nothing at all; he takes + whatever he can get, as plunder or pillage. He lives in the houses + which he finds, or which he orders to be built for him. In + unfavourable circumstances he is a marauder. In favourable, a + _Grand Seigneur_ who thinks it his right to enjoy with grace and + dignity all that the world can hold, but who will not lower himself + by engaging in art, literature, trade or manufacture. Why should + he, when there are other people to do these things for him. Indeed, + it may be said that he takes from others even his religion, + clothes, language, customs; there is hardly anything which is + Turkish and not borrowed. The religion is Arabic; the language half + Arabic and Persian; the literature almost entirely imitative; the + art Persian or Byzantine; the costumes, in the Upper Classes and + Army mostly European. There is nothing characteristic in + manufacture or commerce, except an aversion to such pursuits. In + fact, all occupations, except agriculture and military service are + distasteful to the true Osmanli. He is not much of a merchant. He + may keep a stall in a bazaar, but his operations are rarely + undertaken on a scale which merits the name of commerce or finance. + It is strange to observe how, when trade becomes active in any + seaport, or upon the railway lines, the Osmanli retires and + disappears, while Greeks, Armenians and Levantines thrive in his + place. Neither does he much affect law, medicine or the learned + professions. Such callings are followed by Moslims but they are apt + to be of non-Turkish race. But though he does none of these things + ... the Turk is a soldier. The moment a sword or rifle is put into + his hands, he instinctively knows how to use it with effect, and + feels at home in the ranks or on a horse. The Turkish Army is not + so much a profession or an institution necessitated by the fears + and aims of the Government as the quite normal state of the Turkish + nation.... Every Turk is a born soldier, and adopts other pursuits + chiefly because times are bad. When there is a question of + fighting, if only in a riot, the stolid peasant wakes up and shows + surprising power of finding organisation and expedients, and alas! + a surprising ferocity. The ordinary Turk is an honest and + good-humoured soul, kind to children and animals, and very patient; + but when the fighting spirit comes on him, he becomes like the + terrible warriors of the Huns or Henghis Khan, and slays, burns and + ravages without mercy or discrimination."[1] + +Such is the verdict of an instructed, travelled and observant English +author and diplomatist, who lived among these people for many years, and +who learned to like them, who studied them and their history. It does +not differ, of course, appreciably, from what practically every student +of the Turk has discovered: the Turk is the typical conqueror. As a +nation, he has lived by the sword, and he is dying by the sword, because +the sword, the mere exercise of force by one man or group of men upon +another, conquest in other words, is an impossible form of human +relationship. + +And in order to maintain this evil form of relationship--its evil and +futility is the whole basis of the principles I have attempted to +illustrate--he has not even observed the rough chivalry of the brigand. +The brigand, though he might knock men on the head, will refrain from +having his force take the form of butchering women and disembowelling +children. Not so the Turk. His attempt at Government will take the form +of the obscene torture of children, of a bestial ferocity which is not a +matter of dispute or exaggeration, but a thing to which scores, +hundreds, thousands even of credible European, witnesses have testified. +"The finest gentleman, sir, that ever butchered a woman or burned a +village," is the phrase that _Punch_ most justly puts into the mouth of +the defender of our traditional Turcophil policy. + +And this condition is "Peace," and the act which would put a stop to it +is "War." It is the inexactitude and inadequacy of our language which +creates much of the confusion of thought in this matter; we have the +same term for action destined to achieve a given end and for a +counter-action destined to prevent it. + +Yet we manage, in other than the international field, in civil matters, +to make the thing clear enough. + +Once an American town was set light to by incendiaries, and was +threatened with destruction. In order to save at least a part of it, the +authorities deliberately burned down a block of buildings in the pathway +of the fire. Would those incendiaries be entitled to say that the town +authorities were incendiaries also, and "believed in setting light to +towns?" Yet this is precisely the point of view of those who tax +Pacifists with approving war because they approve the measure aimed at +bringing it to an end. + +Put it another way. You do not believe that force should determine the +transfer of property or conformity to a creed, and I say to you: "Hand +me your purse and conform to my creed or I kill you." You say: "Because +I do not believe that force should settle these matters, I shall try and +prevent it settling them, and therefore if you attack I shall resist; if +I did not I should be allowing force to settle them." I attack; you +resist and disarm me and say: "My force having neutralised yours, and +the equilibrium being now established, I will hear any reasons you may +have to urge for my paying you money; or any argument in favour of your +creed. Reason, understanding, adjustment shall settle it." You would be +a Pacifist. Or, if you deem that that word connotes non-resistance, +though to the immense bulk of Pacifists it does not, you would be an +anti-Bellicist to use a dreadful word coined by M. Emile Faguet in the +discussion of this matter. If, however, you said: "Having disarmed you +and established the equilibrium, I shall now upset it in my favour by +taking your weapon and using it against you unless you hand me _your_ +purse and subscribe to _my_ creed. I do this because force alone can +determine issues, and because it is a law of life that the strong should +eat up the weak." You would then be a Bellicist. + +In the same way, when we prevent the brigand from carrying on his +trade--taking wealth by force--it is not because we believe in force as +a means of livelihood, but precisely because we do not. And if, in +preventing the brigand from knocking out brains, we are compelled to +knock out his brains, is it because we believe in knocking out people's +brains? Or would we urge that to do so is the way to carry on a trade, +or a nation, or a government, or make it the basis of human +relationship? + +In every civilised country, the basis of the relationship on which the +community rests is this: no individual is allowed to settle his +differences with another by force. But does this mean that if one +threatens to take my purse, I am not allowed to use force to prevent it? +That if he threatens to kill me, I am not to defend myself, because "the +individual citizens are not allowed to settle their differences by +force?" It is _because_ of that, because the act of self-defence is an +attempt to prevent the settlement of a difference by force, that the law +justifies it.[2] + +But the law would not justify me, if having disarmed my opponent, having +neutralised his force by my own, and re-established the social +equilibrium, I immediately proceeded to upset it, by asking him for his +purse on pain of murder. I should then be settling the matter by +force--I should then have ceased to be a Pacifist, and have become a +Bellicist. + +For that is the difference between the two conceptions: the Bellicist +says: "Force alone can settle these matters; it is the final appeal; +therefore fight it out. Let the best man win. When you have preponderant +strength, impose your view; force the other man to your will; not +because it is right, but because you are able to do so." It is the +"excellent policy" which Lord Roberts attributes to Germany and +approves. + +We anti-Bellicists take an exactly contrary view. We say: "To fight it +out settles nothing, since it is not a question of who is stronger, but +of whose view is best, and as that is not always easy to establish, it +is of the utmost importance in the interest of all parties, in the long +run, to keep force out of it." + +The former is the policy of the Turks. They have been obsessed with the +idea that if only they had enough of physical force, ruthlessly +exercised, they could solve the whole question of government, of +existence for that matter, without troubling about social adjustment, +understanding, equity, law, commerce; "blood and iron" were all that was +needed. The success of that policy can now be judged. + +And whether good or evil comes of the present war will depend upon +whether the Balkan States are on the whole guided by the Bellicist +principle or the opposed one. If having now momentarily eliminated force +as between themselves, they re-introduce it, if the strongest, +presumably Bulgaria, adopts Lord Roberts' "excellent policy" of striking +because she has the preponderant force, enters upon a career of conquest +of other members of the Balkan League, and the populations of the +conquered territories, using them for exploitation by military +force--why then there will be no settlement and this war will have +accomplished nothing save futile waste and slaughter. For they will have +taken under a new flag, the pathway of the Turk to savagery, +degeneration, death. + +But if on the other hand they are guided more by the Pacifist principle, +if they believe that co-operation between States is better than conflict +between them, if they believe that the common interest of all in good +Government is greater than the special interest of any one in conquest, +that the understanding of human relationships, the capacity for the +organisation of society are the means by which men progress, and not the +imposition of force by one man or group upon another, why, they will +have taken the pathway to better civilisation. But then they will have +disregarded Lord Roberts' advice. + +And this distinction between the two systems, far from being a matter of +abstract theory of metaphysics or logic chopping, is just the difference +which distinguishes the Briton from the Turk, which distinguishes +Britain from Turkey. The Turk has just as much physical vigour as the +Briton, is just as virile, manly and military. The Turk has the same raw +materials of Nature, soil and water. There is no difference in the +capacity for the exercise of physical force--or if there is, the +difference is in favour of the Turk. The real difference is a difference +of ideas, of mind and outlook on the part of the individuals composing +the respective societies; the Turk has one general conception of human +society and the code and principles upon which it is founded, mainly a +militarist one; and the Englishman has another, mainly a Pacifist one. +And whether the European society as a whole is to drift towards the +Turkish ideal or towards the English ideal will depend upon whether it +is animated mainly by the Pacifist or mainly by the Bellicist doctrine; +if the former, it will stagger blindly like the Turk along the path to +barbarism; if the latter, it will take a better road. + +[Footnote 1: "Turkey in Europe," pp. 88-9 and 91-2. + +It is significant, by the way, that the "born soldier" has now been +crushed by a non-military race whom he has always despised as having no +military tradition. Capt. F.W. von Herbert ("Bye Paths in the Balkans") +wrote (some years before the present war): "The Bulgars as Christian +subjects of Turkey exempt from military service, have tilled the ground +under stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions, and the profession of +arms is new to them." + +"Stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions" is, in view of subsequent +events distinctly good.] + +[Footnote 2: I dislike to weary the reader with such damnable iteration, +but when a Cabinet Minister is unable in this discussion to distinguish +between the folly of a thing and its possibility, one _must_ make the +fundamental point clear.] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +ECONOMICS AND THE BALKAN WAR. + +The "economic system" of the Turk--The Turkish "Trade of Conquest" as a +cause of this war--Racial and Religious hatred of primitive +societies--Industrialism as a solvent--Its operation in Europe--Balkans +geographically remote from main drift of European economic +development--The false economies of the Powers as a cause of their +jealousies and quarrels--This has prevented settlement--What is the +"economic motive"?--Impossible to separate moral and +material--Nationality and the War System. + + +In dealing with answer No. 4 I have shown how the inadequacy of our +language leads us so much astray in our notions of the real role of +force in human relationships. But there is a curious phenomenon of +thought which explains perhaps still more how misconceptions grow up on +this subject, and that is the habit of thinking of a war which, of +course, must include two parties, in terms, solely of one party at a time. +Thus one critic[3] is quite sure that because the Balkan peoples "recked +nothing of financial disaster," economic considerations have had nothing +to do with their war--a conclusion which seems to be arrived at by the +process of judgment just indicated: to find the cause of condition +produced by two parties you shall rigorously ignore one. For there is a +great deal of internal evidence for believing that the writer of the +article in question would admit very readily that the efforts of the +Turk to wring taxes out of the conquered peoples--not in return for a +civilized administration but simply as the means of livelihood, of +turning conquest into a trade--had a very great deal to do in explaining +the Turk's presence there at all and the Christian's desire to get rid +of him; while the same article specifically states that the mutual +jealousies of the great powers, based on a desire to "grab" (an economic +motive), had a great deal to do with preventing a peaceful settlement of +the difficulties. Yet "economics" have nothing to do with it! + +I have attempted elsewhere to make these two points--that it is on the +one hand the false economics of the Turks, and on the other hand the +false economics of the powers of Europe, colouring the policy and +Statecraft of both, which have played an enormous, in all human +probability, a determining role in the immediate provoking cause of the +war; and, of course, a further and more remote cause of the whole +difficulty is the fact that the Balkan peoples never having been +subjected to the discipline of that complex social life which arises +from trade and commerce have never grown out of (or to a less degree) +those primitive racial and religious hostilities which at one time in +Europe as a whole provoked conflicts like that now raging in the +Balkans. The following article which appeared[4] at the outbreak of the +war may summarise some of the points with which we have been dealing. + +Polite and good-natured people think it rude to say "Balkans" if a +Pacifist be present. Yet I never understood why, and I understand now +less than ever. It carries the implication that because war has broken +out that fact disposes of all objection to it. The armies are at grips, +therefore peace is a mistake. Passion reigns on the Balkans, therefore +passion is preferable to reason. + +I suppose cannibalism and infanticide, polygamy, judicial torture, +religious persecution, witchcraft, during all the years we did these +"inevitable" things, were defended in the same way, and those who +resented all criticism of them pointed in triumph to the cannibal feast, +the dead child, the maimed witness, the slain heretic, or the burned +witch. But the fact did not prove the wisdom of those habits, still less +their inevitability; for we have them no more. + +We are all agreed as to the fundamental cause of the Balkan trouble: the +hate born of religious, racial, national, and language differences; the +attempt of an alien conqueror to live parasitically upon the conquered, +and the desire of conqueror and conquered alike to satisfy in massacre +and bloodshed the rancour of fanaticism and hatred. + +Well, in these islands, not so very long ago, those things were causes +of bloodshed; indeed, they were a common feature of European life. But +if they are inevitable in human relationship, how comes it that Adana is +no longer duplicated by St. Bartholomew; the Bulgarian bands by the +vendetta of the Highlander and the Lowlander; the struggle of the Slav +and Turk, Serb and Bulgar, by that of Scots and English, and English and +Welsh? The fanaticism of the Moslem to-day is no intenser than that of +Catholic and heretic in Rome, Madrid, Paris, and Geneva at a time which +is only separated from us by the lives of three or four elderly men. The +heretic or infidel was then in Europe also a thing unclean and +horrifying, exciting in the mind of the orthodox a sincere and honest +hatred and a (very largely satisfied) desire to kill. The Catholic of +the 16th century was apt to tell you that he could not sit at table with +a heretic because the latter carried with him a distinctive and +overpoweringly repulsive odour. If you would measure the distance Europe +has travelled, think what this means: all the nations of Christendom +united in a war lasting 200 years for the capture of the Holy Sepulchre; +and yet, when in our day the representatives, seated round a table, +could have had it for the asking, they did not deem it worth the asking, +so little of the ancient passion was there left. The very nature of man +seemed to be transformed. For, wonderful though it be that orthodox +should cease killing heretic, infinitely more wonderful still is it that +he should cease wanting to kill him. + +And just as most of us are certain that the underlying causes of this +conflict are "inevitable" and "inherent in unchanging human nature," so +are we certain that so _un_human a thing as economics can have no +bearing on it. + +Well, I will suggest that the transformation of the heretic-hating and +heretic-killing European is due mainly to economic forces; that it is +because the drift of those forces has in such large part left the +Balkans, where until yesterday the people lived the life not much +different from that which they lived in the time of Abraham, to one side +that war is now raging; that economic factors of a more immediate kind +form a large part of the provoking cause of that war; and that a better +understanding mainly of certain economic facts of their international +relationship on the part of the great nations of Europe is essential +before much progress towards solution can be made. + +But then, by "economics," of course, I mean not a merchant's profit or a +moneylender's interest, but the method by which men earn their bread, +which must also mean the kind of life they lead. + +We generally think of the primitive life of man--that of the herdsman or +the tent liver--as something idyllic. The picture is as far as possible +from the truth. Those into whose lives economics do not enter, or enter +very little--that is to say, those who, like the Congo cannibal, or the +Red Indian, or the Bedouin, do not cultivate, or divide their labour, or +trade, or save, or look to the future, have shed little of the primitive +passions of other animals of prey, the tigers and the wolves, who have +no economics at all, and have no need to check an impulse or a hate. +But industry, even of the more primitive kind, means that men must +divide their labour, which means that they must put some sort of +reliance upon one another; the thing of prey becomes a partner, and the +attitude towards it changes. And as this life becomes more complex, as +the daily needs and desires push men to trade and barter, that means +building up a social organisation, rules and codes, and courts to +enforce them; as the interdependence widens and deepens it necessarily +means disregarding certain hostilities. If the neighbouring tribe wants +to trade with you they must not kill you; if you want the services of +the heretic you must not kill him, and you must keep your obligation +towards him, and mutual good faith is death to long-sustained hatreds. + +You cannot separate the moral from the social and economic development +of a people, and the great service of a complex social and industrial +organisation, which is built up by the desire of men for better material +conditions, is not that it "pays" but that it makes a more +interdependent human society, and that it leads men to recognise what is +the best relationship between them. And the fact of recognising that +some act of aggression is causing stocks to fall is not important +because it may save Oppenheim's or Solomon's money but because it is a +demonstration that we are dependent upon some community on the other +side of the world, that their damage is our damage, and that we have an +interest in preventing it. It teaches us, as only some such simple and +mechanical means can teach, the lesson of human fellowship. + +And it is by such means as this that Western Europe has in some measure, +within its respective political frontiers, learnt that lesson. Each has +learnt, within the confines of the nation at least, that wealth is made +by work, not robbery; that, indeed, general robbery is fatal to +prosperity; that government consists not merely in having the power of +the sword but in organising society--in "knowing how"; which means the +development of ideas; in maintaining courts; in making it possible to +run railways, post offices, and all the contrivances of a complex +society. + +Now rulers did not create these things; it was the daily activities of +the people, born of their desires and made possible by the circumstances +in which they lived, by the trading and the mining and the shipping +which they carried on, that made them. But the Balkans have been +geographically outside the influence of European industrial and +commercial life. The Turk has hardly felt it at all. He has learnt none +of the social and moral lessons which interdependence and improved +communications have taught the Western European, and it is because he +has not learnt these lessons, because he is a soldier and a conqueror, +to an extent and completeness that other nations of Europe lost a +generation or two since, that the Balkanese are fighting and that war is +raging. + +But not merely in this larger sense, but in the more immediate, narrower +sense, are the fundamental causes of this war economic. + +This war arises, as the past wars against the Turkish conqueror have +arisen, by the desire of the Christian peoples on whom he lives to shake +off this burden. "To live upon their subjects is the Turks' only means +of livelihood," says one authority. The Turk is an economic parasite, +and the economic organism must end of rejecting him. + +For the management of society, simple and primitive even as that of the +Balkan mountains, needs some effort and work and capacity for +administration, or even rudimentary economic life cannot be carried on. +And the Turkish system, founded on the sword and nothing else ("the +finest soldier in Europe"), cannot give that small modicum, of energy or +administrative capacity. The one thing he knows is brute force; but it +is not by the strength of his muscles that an engineer runs a machine, +but by knowing how. The Turk cannot build a road, or make a bridge, or +administer a post office, or found a court of law. And these things are +necessary. And he will not let them be done by the Christian, who, +because he did not belong to the conquering class, has had to work, and +has consequently become the class which possesses whatever capacity for +work and administration the country can show, because to do so would be +to threaten the Turk's only trade. If the Turk granted the Christians +equal political rights they would inevitably "run the country," And yet +the Turk himself cannot do it; and he will not let others do it, because +to do so would be to threaten his supremacy. + +And the more the use of force fails, the more, of course, does he resort +to it, and that is why many of us who do not believe in force, and +desire to see it disappear in the relationship not merely of religious +but of political groups, might conceivably welcome this war of the +Balkan Christians, in so far as it is an attempt to resist the use of +force in those relationships. Of course, I do not try to estimate the +"balance of criminality." Right is not all on one side--it never is. But +the broad issue is clear and plain. And only those concerned with the +name rather than the thing, with nominal and verbal consistency rather +than realities, will see anything paradoxical or contradictory in +Pacifist approval of Christian resistance to the use of Turkish force. + +It is the one fact which stands out incontrovertibly from the whole +weary muddle. It is quite clear that the inability to act in common +arises from the fact that in the international sphere the European is +still dominated by illusions which he has dropped when he deals with +home politics. The political faith of the Turk, which he would never +think of applying at home as between the individuals of his nation, he +applies pure and unalloyed when he comes to deal with foreigners as +nations. The economic conception--using the term in that wider sense +which I have indicated earlier in this article--which guides his +individual conduct is the antithesis of that which guides his national +conduct. + +While the Christian does not believe in robbery inside the frontier, he +does without; while within the State he realises that greater advantage +lies on the side of each observing the general code, so that civilised +society can exist, instead of on the side of having society go to pieces +by each disregarding it; while within the State he realises that +government is a matter of administration, not the seizure of property; +that one town does not add to its wealth by "capturing" another, that +indeed one community cannot "own" another--while, I say, he believes all +these things in his daily life at home, he disregards them all when he +comes to the field of international relationship, _la haute politique_. +To annex some province by a cynical breach of treaty obligation (Austria +in Bosnia, Italy in Tripoli) is regarded as better politics than to act +loyally with the community of nations to enforce their common interest +in order and good government. In fact, we do not believe that there can +be a community of nations, because, in fact, we do not believe that +their interests are common, but rival; like the Turk, we believe that if +you do not exercise force upon your "rival" he will exercise it upon +you; that nations live upon one another, not by co-operation with one +another--and it is for this reason presumably that you must "own" as +much of your neighbours' as possible. It is the Turkish conception from +beginning to end. + +And it is because these false beliefs prevent the nations of Christendom +acting loyally the one to the other, because each is playing for its own +hand, that the Turk, with hint of some sordid bribe, has been able to +play off each against the other. + +This is the crux of the matter. When Europe can honestly act in common +on behalf of common interests some solution can be found. And the +capacity of Europe to act together will not be found so long as the +accepted doctrines of European statecraft remain unchanged, so long as +they are dominated by existing illusions. + + * * * * * + +In a paper read before the British Association of this year, I attempted +to show in more general terms this relation between economic impulse and +ideal motive. The following are relevant passages:-- + +A nation, a people, we are given to understand, have higher motives than +money, or "self-interest." What do we mean when we speak of the money of +a nation, or the self-interest of a community? We mean--and in such a +discussion as this can mean nothing else--better conditions for the +great mass of the people, the fullest possible lives, the abolition or +attenuation of poverty and of narrow circumstances, that the millions +shall be better housed and clothed and fed, capable of making provision +for sickness and old age, with lives prolonged and cheered--and not +merely this, but also that they shall be better educated, with character +disciplined by steady labour and a better use of leisure, a general +social atmosphere which shall make possible family affection, individual +dignity and courtesy and the graces of life, not alone among the few, +but among the many. + +Now, do these things constitute as a national policy an inspiring +aim or not? Yet they are, speaking in terms of communities, pure +self-interest--all bound up with economic problems, with money. Does +Admiral Mahan mean us to take him at his word when he would attach to +such efforts the same discredit that one implies in talking of a +mercenary individual? Would he have us believe that the typical great +movements of our times--Socialism, Trades Unionism, Syndicalism, +Insurance Bills, Land Laws, Old Age Pensions, Charity Organisation, +Improved Education--bound up as they all are with economic problems--are +not the sort of objects which more and more are absorbing the best +activities of Christendom? + +I have attempted to show that the activities which lie outside the range +of these things--the religious wars, movements like those which promoted +the Crusades, or the sort of tradition which we associate with the duel +(which has, in fact, disappeared from Anglo-Saxon society)--do not and +cannot any longer form part of the impulse creating the long-sustained +conflicts between large groups which a European war implies, partly +because such allied moral differences as now exist do not in any way +coincide with the political divisions, but intersect them, and partly +because in the changing character of men's ideals there is a distinct +narrowing of the gulf which is supposed to separate ideal and material +aims. Early ideals, whether in the field of politics or religion, are +generally dissociated from any aim of general well-being. In early +politics ideals are concerned simply with personal allegiance to some +dynastic chief, a feudal lord or a monarch. The well-being of a +community does not enter into the matter at all: it is the personal +allegiance which matters. Later the chief must embody in his person that +well-being, or he does not achieve the allegiance of a community of any +enlightenment; later, the well-being of the community becomes the end in +itself without being embodied in the person of an hereditary chief, so +that the community realise that their efforts, instead of being directed +to the protection of the personal interests of some chief, are as a +matter of fact directed to the protection of their own interests, and +their altruism has become self-interest, since self-sacrifice of a +community for the sake of the community is a contradiction in terms. In +the religious sphere a like development has been shown. Early religious +ideals have no relation to the material betterment of mankind. The early +Christian thought it meritorious to live a sterile life at the top of a +pillar, eaten by vermin, as the Hindoo saint to-day thinks it +meritorious to live an equally sterile life upon a bed of spikes. But as +the early Christian ideal progressed, sacrifices having no end connected +with the betterment of mankind lost their appeal. The Christian saint +who would allow the nails of his fingers to grow through the palms of +his clasped hands would excite, not our admiration, but our revolt. More +and more is religious effort being subjected to this test: does it make +for the improvement of society? If not, it stands condemned. Political +ideals will inevitably follow a like development, and will be more and +more subjected to a like test. + +I am aware that very often at present they are not so subjected. +Dominated as our political thought is by Roman and feudal +imagery--hypnotised by symbols and analogies which the necessary +development of organised society has rendered obsolete--the ideals even +of democracies are still often pure abstractions, divorced from any aim +calculated to advance the moral or material betterment of mankind. The +craze for sheer size of territory, simple extent of administrative area, +is still deemed a thing deserving immense, incalculable sacrifices. + + * * * * * + +And yet even these ideals, firmly set as they are in our language and +tradition, are rapidly yielding to the necessary force of events. A +generation ago it would have been inconceivable that a people or a +monarch should calmly see part of its country secede and establish +itself as a separate political entity without attempting to prevent it +by force of arms. Yet this is what happened but a year or two since in +the Scandinavian peninsula. For forty years Germany has added to her own +difficulties and those of the European situation for the purpose of +including Alsace and Lorraine in its Federation, but even there, obeying +the tendency which is world-wide, an attempt has been made at the +creation of a constitutional and autonomous government. The history of +the British Empire for fifty years has been a process of undoing the +work of conquest. Colonies are now neither colonies nor possessions. +They are independent States. Great Britain, which for centuries has made +such sacrifices to retain Ireland, is now making great sacrifices in +order to make her secession workable. To all political arrangements, to +all political ideals, the final test will be applied: Does it or does it +not make for the widest interests of the mass of the people involved?... +And I would ask those who think that war must be a permanent element in +the settlement of the moral differences of men to think for one moment +of the factors which stood in the way of the abandonment of the use of +force by governments, and by one religious group against another in the +matter of religious belief. On the one hand you had authority with all +the prestige of historical right and the possession of physical power in +its most imposing form, the means of education still in their hands; +government authority extending to all sorts of details of life to which +it no longer extends; immense vested interests outside government; and +finally the case for the imposition of dogma by authority a strong one, +and still supported by popular passion: and on the other hand, you had +as yet poor and feeble instruments of mere opinion; the printed book +still a rarity; the Press non-existent, communication between men still +rudimentary, worse even than it had been two thousand years previously. +And yet, despite these immense handicaps upon the growth of opinion and +intellectual ferment as against physical force, it was impossible for a +new idea to find life in Geneva or Rome or Edinburgh or London without +quickly crossing and affecting all the other centres, and not merely +making headway against entrenched authority, but so quickly breaking up +the religious homogeneity of states, that not only were governments +obliged to abandon the use of force in religious matters as against +their subjects, but religious wars between nations became impossible for +the double reason that a nation no longer expressed a single religious +belief (you had the anomaly of a Protestant Sweden fighting in alliance +with a Catholic France), and that the power of opinion had become +stronger than the power of physical force--because, in other words, the +limits of military force were more and more receding. + +But if the use of force was so ineffective against the spiritual +possessions of man when the arms to be used in their defence were so +poor and rudimentary, how could a government hope to crush out by force +to-day such things as a nation's language, law, literature, morals, +ideals, when it possesses such means of defence as are provided in +security of tenure of material possessions, a cheap literature, a +popular Press, a cheap and secret postal system, and all the other means +of rapid and perfected inter-communication? + +You will notice that I have spoken throughout not of the _defence_ of a +national ideal by arms, but of its attack; if you have to defend your +ideal it is because someone attacks it, and without attack your defence +would not be called for. + +If you are compelled to prevent someone using force as against your +nationality, it is because he believes that by the use of that force he +can destroy or change it. If he thought that the use of force would be +ineffective to that end he would not employ it. + +I have attempted to show elsewhere that the abandonment of war for +material ends depends upon a general realisation of its futility for +accomplishing those ends. In like manner does the abandonment of war for +moral or ideal ends depend upon the general realisation of the growing +futility of such means for those ends also--and for the growing futility +of those ends if they could be accomplished. + +We are sometimes told that it is the spirit of nationality--the desire +to be of your place and locality--that makes war. That is not so. It is +the desire of other men that you shall not be of your place and +locality, of your habits and traditions, but of theirs. Not the desire +of nationality, but the desire to destroy nationality is what makes the +wars of nationality. If the Germans did not think that the retention of +Polish or Alsatian nationality might hamper them in the art of war, +hamper them in the imposition of force on some other groups, there would +be no attempt to crush out this special possession of the Poles and +Alsatians. It is the belief in force and a preference for settling +things by force instead of by agreement that threatens or destroys +nationality. And I have given an indication of the fact that it is not +merely war, but the preparation for war, implying as it does great +homogeneity in states and centralised bureaucratic control, which is +to-day the great enemy of nationality. Before this tendency to +centralisation which military necessity sets up much that gives colour +and charm to European life is disappearing. And yet we are told that it +is the Pacifists who are the enemy of nationality, and we are led to +believe that in some way the war system in Europe stands for the +preservation of nationality! + +[Footnote 3: Review of Reviews, November, 1912.] + +[Footnote 4: In the "Daily Mail," to whose Editor I am indebted for +permission to reprint it.] + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +TURKISH IDEALS IN OUR POLITICAL THOUGHT. + +This war and "the Turks of Britain and Prussia"--The Anglo-Saxon and +opposed ideals--Mr. C. Chesterton's case for "killing and being killed" +as the best method of settling differences--Its application to Civil +Conflicts--As in Spanish-America--The difference between Devonshire and +Venezuela--Will the Balkans adopt the Turco-Venezuelan political ideals +or the British? + + +An English political writer remarked, on it becoming evident that the +Christian States were driving back the Turks: "This is a staggering blow +to _all_ the Turks--those of England and Prussia as well as those of +Turkey." + +But, of course, the British and Prussian Turks will never see it--like +the Bourbons, they learn not. Here is a typically military system, the +work of "born fighters" which has gone down in welter before the +assaults of much less military States, the chief of which, indeed, has +grown up in what Captain von Herbert has called, with some contempt, +"stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions," formed by the people whom +the Turks regarded as quite unfit to be made into warriors; whom they +regarded much as some Europeans regard the Jews. It is the Christian +populations of the Balkans who were the traders and workers--those +brought most under economic influences; it was the Turks who escaped +those influences. A few years since, I wrote: "If the conqueror profits +much by his conquest, as the Romans in one sense did, it is the +conqueror who is threatened by the enervating effect of the soft and +luxurious life; while it is the conquered who are forced to labour for +the conqueror, and who learn in consequence those qualities of steady +industry which are certainly a better moral training than living upon +the fruits of others, upon labour extorted at the sword's point. It is +the conqueror who becomes effete, and it is the conquered who learn +discipline and the qualities making for a well-ordered State." + +Could we ask a better illustration than the history of the Turk and his +Christian victims? I exemplified the matter thus: "If during long +periods a nation gives itself up to war, trade languishes, the +population loses the habit of steady industry, government and +administration become corrupt, abuses escape punishment, and the real +sources of a people's strength and expansion dwindle. What has caused +the relative failure and decline of Spanish, Portuguese, and French +expansion in Asia and the New World, and the relative success of English +expansion therein? Was it the mere hazards of war which gave to Great +Britain the domination of India and half of the New World? That is +surely a superficial reading of history. It was, rather, that the +methods and processes of Spain, Portugal, and France were military, +while those of the Anglo-Saxon world were commercial and peaceful. Is it +not a commonplace that in India, quite as much as in the New World, the +trader and the settler drove out the soldier and the conqueror? The +difference between the two methods was that one was a process of +conquest, and the other of colonizing, or non-military administration +for commercial purposes. The one embodied the sordid Cobdenite idea, +which so excites the scorn of the militarists, and the other the lofty +military ideal. The one was parasitism; the other co-operation.... + +"How may we sum up the whole case, keeping in mind every empire that +ever existed--the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Mede and Persian, the +Macedonian, the Roman, the Frank, the Saxon, the Spanish, the +Portuguese, the Bourbon, the Napoleonic? In all and every one of them we +may see the same process, which is this: If it remains military it +decays; if it prospers and takes its share of the work of the world it +ceases to be military. There is no other reading of history." + +But despite these very plain lessons, there are many amongst us who +regard physical conflict as the ideal form of human relationship; +"killing and being killed" as the best way to determine the settlement +of differences, and a society which drifts from these ideals as on the +high road to degeneration, and who deem those who set before themselves +the ideal of abolishing or attenuating poverty for the mass of men, "low +and sordid." + +Thus Mr. Cecil Chesterton[5]: + + In essence Mr. Angell's query is: "Should usurers go to war?" + + I may say, in passing, that I am not clear that even on the + question thus raised Mr. Angell makes out his case. His case, + broadly stated, is that the net of "Finance"--or, to put it + plainer, Cosmopolitan Usury--which is at present spread over Europe + would be disastrously torn by any considerable war; and that in + consequence it is to the interest of the usurers to preserve peace. + But here, it seems to me, we must make a clear differentiation. It + may easily be to the interest of a particular usurer, or group of + usurers, to provoke war; that very financial crisis which Mr. + Angell anticipates may quite probably be a source of profit to + them. That it would not be to the interest of a nation of usurers + to fight is very probable. That such a nation would not fight, or, + if it did, would be exceedingly badly beaten, is certain. But that + only serves to raise the further question of whether it is to the + ultimate advantage of a nation to repose upon usury; and whether + the breaking of the net of usury which at present unquestionably + holds Europe in captivity would not be for the advantage, as it + would clearly be for the honour, of our race.... The sword is too + sacred a thing to be prostituted to such dirty purposes. But + whether he succeeds or fails in this attempt, it will make no + difference to the mass of plain men who, when they fight and risk + their lives, do not do so in the expectation of obtaining a certain + interest on their capital, but for quite other reasons. + + Mr. Angell's latest appeal comes, I think, at an unfortunate + moment. It is not merely that the Balkan States have refused to be + convinced by Mr. Angell as to their chances of commercial profit + from the war. It is that if Mr. Angell had succeeded to the fullest + extent in convincing them that there was not a quarter per cent. to + be made out of the war, nay, that--horrible thought!--they would + actually be poorer at the end of the war than at the beginning, + they would have gone to war all the same. + + Since Mr. Angell's argument clearly applies as much or more to + civil as to international conflicts, I may perhaps be allowed to + turn to civil conflicts to make clear my meaning. In this country + during the last three centuries one solid thing has been done. The + power of Parliament was pitted in battle against the power of the + Crown, and won. As a result, for good or evil, Parliament really is + stronger than the Crown to-day. The power of the mass of the + people to control Parliament has been given as far as mere + legislation could give it. We all know that it is a sham. And if + you ask what it is that makes the difference of reality between the + two cases, it is this: that men killed and were killed for the one + thing and not for the other. + + I have no space to develop all that I should like to say about the + indirect effects of war. All I will say is this, that men do judge, + and always will judge, things by the ultimate test of how they + fight. The German victory of forty years ago has produced not only + an astonishing expansion, industrial as well as political of + Germany, but has (most disastrously, as I think) infected Europe + with German ideas, especially with the idea that you make a nation + strong by making its people behave like cattle. God send that I may + live to see the day when victorious armies from Gaul shall shatter + this illusion, burn up Prussianism with all its Police Regulations, + Insurance Acts, Poll Taxes, and insults to the poor, and reassert + the Republic. It will never be done in any other way. + + If arbitration is ever to take the place of war, it must be backed + by a corresponding array of physical force. Now the question + immediately arises: Are we prepared to arm any International + Tribunal with any such powers? Personally, I am not.... Turn back + some fifty years to the great struggle for the emancipation of + Italy. Suppose that a Hague Tribunal had then been in existence, + armed with coercive powers. The dispute between Austria and + Sardinia must have been referred to that tribunal. That tribunal + must have been guided by existing treaties. The Treaty of Vienna + was perhaps the most authoritative ever entered into by European + Powers. By that treaty, Venice and Lombardy were unquestionably + assigned to Austria. A just tribunal administering international + law _must_ have decided in favour of Austria, and have used the + whole armed force of Europe to coerce Italy into submission. Are + those Pacifists, who try at the same time to be Democrats, prepared + to acquiesce in such a conclusion? Personally, I am not. + +I replied as follows: + + Mr. Cecil Chesterton says that the question which I have raised is + this: "Should usurers go to war?" + + That, of course, is not true. I have never, even by implication, + put such a problem, and there is nothing in the article which he + criticises, nor in any other statement of my own, that justifies + it. What I have asked is whether peoples should go to war. + + I should have thought it was pretty obvious that, whatever happens, + usurers do not go to war: the peoples go to war, and the peoples + pay, and the whole question is whether they should go on making war + and paying for it. Mr. Chesterton says that if they are wise they + will; I say that if they are wise they will not. + + I have attempted to show that the prosperity of peoples--by which, + of course, one means the diminution of poverty, better houses, soap + and water, healthy children, lives prolonged, conditions + sufficiently good to ensure leisure and family affection, fuller + and completer lives generally--is not secured by fighting one + another, but by co-operation and labour, by a better organisation + of society, by improved human relationship, which, of course, can + only come of better understanding of the conditions of that + relationship, which better understanding means discussion, + adjustment, a desire and capacity to see the point of view of the + other man--of all of which war and its philosophy is the negation. + + To all of this Mr. Chesterton replies: "That only concerns the Jews + and the moneylenders." Again, this is not true. It concerns all of + us, like all problems of our struggle with Nature. It is in part at + least an economic problem, and that part of it is best stated in + the more exact and precise terms that I have employed to deal with + it--the term's of the market-place. But to imply that the + conditions that there obtain are the affair merely of bankers and + financiers, to imply that these things do not touch the lives of + the mass, is simply to talk a nonsense the meaninglessness of which + only escapes some of us because in these matters we happen to be + very ignorant. It is not mainly usurers who suffer from bad finance + and bad economics (one may suggest that they are not quite so + simple); it is mainly the people as a whole. + + Mr. Chesterton says that we should break this "net of usury" in + which the peoples are enmeshed. I agree heartily; but that net has + been woven mainly by war (and that diversion of energy and + attention from social management which war involves), and is, so + far as the debts of the European States are concerned (so large an + element of usury), almost solely the outcome of war. And if the + peoples go on piling up debt, as they must if they are to go on + piling up armaments (as Mr. Chesterton wants them to), giving the + best of their attention and emotion to sheer physical conflict, + instead of to organisation and understanding, they will merely + weave that web of debt and usury still closer; it will load us more + heavily and strangle us to a still greater extent. If usury is the + enemy, the remedy is to fight usury. Mr. Chesterton says the remedy + is for its victims to fight one another. + + And you will not fight usury by hanging Rothschilds, for usury is + worst where that sort of thing is resorted to. Widespread debt is + the outcome of bad management and incompetence, economic or social, + and only better management will remedy it. Mr. Chesterton is sure + that better management is only arrived at by "killing and being + killed." He really does urge this method even in civil matters. (He + tells us that the power of Parliament over the Crown is real, and + that of the people over Parliament a sham, "because men killed and + were killed for the one, and not for the other.") It is the method + of Spanish America where it is applied more frankly and logically, + and where still, in many places, elections are a military affair, + the questions at issue being settled by killing and being killed, + instead of by the cowardly, pacifist methods current in Europe. The + result gives us the really military civilisations of Venezuela, + Colombia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. And, although the English system + may have many defects--I think it has--those defects exist in a + still greater degree where force "settles" the matters in dispute, + where the bullet replaces the ballot, and where bayonets are + resorted to instead of brains. For Devonshire is better than + Nicaragua. Really it is. And it would get us out of none of our + troubles for one group to impose its views simply by preponderant + physical force, for Mr. Asquith, for instance, in the true Castro + or Zuyala manner, to announce that henceforth all critics of the + Insurance Act are to be shot, and that the present Cabinet will + hold office as long as it can depend upon the support of the Army. + For, even if the country rose in rebellion, and fought it out and + won, the successful party would (if they also believed in force) do + exactly the same thing to _their_ opponents; and so it would go on + never-endingly (as it has gone on during weary centuries throughout + the larger part of South America), until the two parties came once + more to their senses, and agreed not to use force when they + happened to be able to do so; which is our present condition. But + it is the condition of England merely because the English, as a + whole, have ceased to believe in Mr. Chesterton's principles; it is + not yet the condition of Venezuela because the Venezuelans have not + yet ceased to believe those principles, though even they are + beginning to. + + Mr. Chesterton says: "Men do judge, and always will judge, by the + ultimate test of how they fight." The pirate who gives his blood + has a better right, therefore, to the ship than the merchant (who + may be a usurer!) who only gives his money. Well, that is the view + which was all but universal well into the period of what, for want + of a better word, we call civilisation. Not only was it the basis + of all such institutions as the ordeal and duel; not only did it + justify (and in the opinion of some still justifies) the wars of + religion and the use of force in religious matters generally; not + only was it the accepted national polity of such communities as the + Vikings, the Barbary States, and the Red Indians; but it is still, + unfortunately, the polity of certain European states. But the idea + is a survival and--and this is the important point--an admission of + failure to understand where right lies: to "fight it out" is the + remedy of the boy who for the life of him cannot see who is right + and who is wrong. + + At ten years of age we are all quite sure that piracy is a finer + calling than trade, and the pirate a finer fellow than the Shylock + who owns the ship--which, indeed, he may well be. But as we grow up + (which some of the best of us never do) we realise that piracy is + not the best way to establish the ownership of cargoes, any more + than the ordeal is the way to settle cases at law, or the rack of + proving a dogma, or the Spanish American method the way to settle + differences between Liberals and Conservatives. + + And just as civil adjustments are made most efficiently, as they + are in England (say), as distinct from South America, by a general + agreement not to resort to force, so it is the English method in + the international field which gives better results than that based + on force. The relationship of Great Britain to Canada or Australia + is preferable to the relationship of Russia to Finland or Poland, + or Germany to Alsace-Lorraine. The five nations of the British + Empire have, by agreement, abandoned the use of force as between + themselves. Australia may do us an injury--exclude our subjects, + English or Indian, and expose them to insult--but we know very well + that force will not be used against her. To withhold such force is + the basis of the relationship of these five nations; and, given a + corresponding development of ideas, might equally well be the basis + of the relationship of fifteen--about all the nations of the world + who could possibly fight. The difficulties Mr. Chesterton + imagines--an international tribunal deciding in favour of Austria + concerning the recession of Venice and Lombardy, and summoning the + forces of United Europe to coerce Italy into submission--are, of + course, based on the assumption that a United Europe, having + arrived at such understanding as to be able to sink its + differences, would be the same kind of Europe that it is now, or + was a generation ago. If European statecraft advances sufficiently + to surrender the use of force against neighbouring states, it will + have advanced sufficiently to surrender the use of force against + unwilling provinces, as in some measure British statesmanship has + already done. To raise the difficulty that Mr. Chesterton does is + much the same as assuming that a court of law in San Domingo or + Turkey will give the same results as a court of law in Great + Britain, because the form of the mechanism is the same. And does + Mr. Chesterton suggest that the war system settles these matters to + perfection? That it has worked satisfactorily in Ireland and + Finland, or, for the matter of that, in Albania or Macedonia? + + For if Mr. Chesterton urges that killing and being killed is the + way to determine the best means of governing a country, it is his + business to defend the Turk, who has adopted that principle during + four hundred years, not the Christians, who want to bring that + method to an end and adopt another. And I would ask no better + example of the utter failure of the principles that I combat and + Mr. Chesterton defends than their failure in the Balkan Peninsula. + + This war is due to the vile character of Turkish rule, and the + Turk's rule is vile because it is based on the sword. Like Mr. + Chesterton (and our pirate), the Turk believes in the right of + conquest, "the ultimate test of how they fight." "The history of + the Turks," says Sir Charles Elliott, "is almost exclusively a + catalogue of battles." He has lived (for the most gloriously + uneconomic person has to live, to follow a trade of some sort, even + if it be that of theft) on tribute exacted from the Christian + populations, and extorted, not in return for any work of + administration, but simply because he was the stronger. And that + has made his rule intolerable, and is the cause of this war. + + Now, my whole thesis is that understanding, work, co-operation, + adjustment, must be the basis of human society; that conquest as a + means of achieving national advantage must fail; that to base your + prosperity or means of livelihood, your economic system, in short, + upon having more force than someone else, and exercising it against + him, is an impossible form of human relationship that is bound to + break down. And Mr. Chesterton says that the war in the Balkans + demolishes this thesis. I do not agree with him. + + The present war in the Balkans is an attempt--and happily a + successful one--to bring this reign of force and conquest to an + end, and that is why those of us who do not believe in military + force rejoice. + + The debater, more concerned with verbal consistency than realities + and the establishment of sound principles, will say that this means + the approval of war. It does not; it merely means the choice of the + less evil of two forms of war. War has been going on in the + Balkans, not for a month, but has been waged by the Turks daily + against these populations for 400 years. + + The Balkan peoples have now brought to an end a system of rule + based simply upon the accident of force--"killing and being + killed." And whether good or ill comes of this war will depend upon + whether they set up a similar system or one more in consonance with + pacifist principles. I believe they will choose the latter course; + that is to say, they will continue to co-operate between themselves + instead of fighting between themselves; they will settle + differences by discussion, adjustment, not force. But if they are + guided by Mr. Chesterton's principle, if each one of the Balkan + nations is determined to impose its own especial point of view, to + refuse all settlement by co-operation and understanding, where it + can resort to force--why, in that case, the strongest (presumably + Bulgaria) will start conquering the rest, start imposing government + by force, and will listen to no discussion or argument; will + simply, in short, take the place of the Turk in the matter, and the + old weary contest will begin afresh, and we shall have the Turkish + system under a new name, until that in its turn is destroyed, and + the whole process begun again _da capo_. And if Mr. Chesterton says + that this is not his philosophy, and that he would recommend the + Balkan nations to come to an understanding, and co-operate + together, instead of fighting one another, why does he give + different counsels to the nations of Christendom as a whole? If it + is well for the Balkan peoples to abandon conflict as between + themselves in favour of co-operation against the common enemy, why + is it ill for the other Christian peoples to abandon such conflict + in favour of co-operation against their common enemy, which is wild + nature and human error, ignorance and passion. + +[Footnote 5: From "Everyman" to whose Editor I am indebted for +permission to print my reply.] + + + +CHAPTER V. + +OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BALKAN WARS. + +Mr. Winston Churchill on the "Responsibility" of Diplomacy--What does he +mean?--An easy (and popular) philosophy--Can we neglect past if we would +avoid future errors?--British temper and policy in the Crimean War--What +are its lessons?--Why we fought a war to sustain the "integrity and +independence of the Turkish dominion in Europe"--Supporting the Turk +against his Christian victims--From fear of Russian growth which we are +now aiding--The commentary of events--Shall we back the wrong horse +again? + + + Here was a war which had broken out in spite of all that rulers and + diplomatists could do to prevent it, a war in which the Press had + had no part, a war which the whole force of the money power had + been subtly and steadfastly directed to prevent, which had come + upon us not through the ignorance or credulity of the people; but, + on the contrary, through their knowledge of their history and their + destiny.... Who is the man who is vain enough to suppose that the + long antagonisms of history and of time can in all circumstances be + adjusted by the smooth and superficial conventions of politicians + and ambassadors? + +Thus Mr. Churchill. It is a plea for the inevitability, not merely of +war, but of a people's "destiny." + +What precisely does it mean? Does it mean that the European Powers have +in the past been entirely wise and honest, have never intrigued with +the Turk the one against the other, have always kept good faith, have +never been inspired by false political theories and tawdry and shoddy +ideals, have, in short, no responsibility for the abominations that have +gone on in the Balkan peninsula for a century? No one outside a lunatic +asylum would urge it. But, then, that means that diplomacy has _not_ +done all it might to prevent this war. Why does Mr. Churchill say it +has? + +And does the passage I have quoted mean that we--that English +diplomacy--has had no part in European diplomacy in the past? Have we +not, on the contrary, by universal admission played a predominant role +by backing the wrong horse? + +But, then, that is not a popular thing to point out, and Mr. Churchill +is very careful not to point it out in any way that could give +justification to an unpopular view or discredit a popular one. He is, +however, far too able a Cabinet Minister to ignore obvious facts, and it +is interesting to note how he disposes of them. Observe the following +passage: + + For the drama or tragedy which is moving to its climax in the + Balkans we all have our responsibilities, and none of us can escape + our share of them by blaming others or by blaming the Turk. If + there is any man here who, looking back over the last 35 years, + thinks he knows where to fix the sole responsibility for all the + procrastination and provocation, for all the jealousies and + rivalries, for all the religious and racial animosities, which have + worked together for this result, I do not envy him his + complacency.... Whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the + Powers or sit in sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no + consequence at the present moment. + +Now if for this tragedy we "all have our responsibility," then what +becomes of his first statement that the war is raging despite all that +rulers and diplomats could do to prevent it? If the war was +"inevitable," and rulers and diplomats have done all they could to +prevent it, neither they nor we have any responsibility for it. He +knows, of course, that it is impossible to deny that responsibility, +that our errors in the past _have_ been due not to any lack of readiness +to fight or quarrel with foreign nations, but precisely to the tendency +to do those things and our _in_disposition to set aside instinctive and +reasonless jealousies and rivalries in favour of a deeper sense of +responsibility and a somewhat longer vision. + +But, again, this quite obvious moral, that if we have our +responsibility, if, in other words, we have _not_ done all that we might +and _have_ been led away by temper and passion, we should, in order to +avoid a repetition of such errors in the future, try and see where we +have erred in the past, is precisely the moral that Mr. Churchill does +_not_ draw. Again, it is not the popular line to show with any +definiteness that we have been wrong. An abstract proposition that "we +all have our responsibilities," is, while a formal admission of the +obvious fact also at the same time, an excuse, almost a justification. +You realise Mr. Churchill's method: Having made the necessary admission +of fact, you immediately prevent any unpleasant (or unpopular) practical +conclusion concerning our duty in the matter by talking of the +"complacency" of those who would fix any real and definite part of the +responsibility upon you. (Because, of course, no man, knows where lies, +and no one would ever attempt to fix, the "sole" responsibility). +Incidentally, one might point out to Mr. Churchill that the attempt to +see the errors of past conduct and to avoid them in the future is _not_ +complacency, but that airily to dismiss our responsibility by saying +that it is of "no consequence whether we sit in sackcloth and ashes" +_is_ complacency. + +Mr. Churchill's idea seems to be that men should forget their +errors--and commit them again. For that is what it amounts to. We +cannot, indeed, undo the past, that is true; but we can prevent it +being repeated. But we certainly shall not prevent such repetition if we +hug the easy doctrine that we have always been right--that it is not +worth while to see how our principles have worked out in practice, to +take stock of our experience, and to see what results the principles we +propose again to put into operation, have given. + +The practical thing for us if we would avoid like errors in the future +is to see where _our_ responsibility lies--a thing which we shall never +do if we are governed by the net impression which disengages itself from +speeches like those of Mr. Churchill. For the net result of that speech, +the impression, despite a few shrewd qualifications which do not in +reality affect that net result but which may be useful later wherewith +to silence critics, is that war is inevitable, a matter of "destiny," +that diplomacy--the policy pursued by the respective powers--can do +nothing to prevent it; that as brute force is the one and final appeal +the only practical policy is to have plenty of armaments and to show a +great readiness to fight; that it is futile to worry about past errors; +(especially as an examination of them would go a long way to discredit +the policy just indicated); that the troublesome and unpopular people +who in the past happen to have kept their heads during a prevailing +dementia--and whose policy happens to have been as right as that of the +popular side was wrong--can be dismissed with left-handed references to +"complacency," This sort of thing is popular enough, of course, but-- + +Well, I will take the risks of a tactic which is the exact contrary to +that adopted by Mr. Churchill and would urge upon those whose patriotism +is not of the order which is ready to see their country in the wrong and +who do feel some responsibility for its national policy, to ask +themselves these questions: + +Is it true that the Powers could have prevented in large measure the +abominations which Turkey has practised in the Balkans for the last +half-century or so? + +Has our own policy been a large factor in determining that of the +Powers? + +Has our own policy directly prevented in the past the triumph of the +Christian populations which, despite that policy, has finally taken +place? + +Was our own policy at fault when we were led into a war to ensure the +"integrity and independence of the Turkish dominions in Europe"? + +Is the general conception of Statecraft on which that policy has been +based--the "Balance of Power" which presupposes the necessary rivalry of +nations and which in the past has led to oppose Russia as it is now +leading to oppose Germany--sound, and has it been justified in history? + +Did we give due weight to the considerations urged by the public men of +the past who opposed such features of this policy as the Crimean War; +was the immense popularity of that war any test of its wisdom; were the +rancour, hatred and scorn poured upon those men just or deserved? + + * * * * * + +Now the first four of these questions have been answered by history and +are answered by every one to-day in an emphatic affirmative. This is not +the opinion of a Pacifist partisan. Even the _Times_ is constrained to +admit that "these futile conflicts might have ended years ago, if it had +not been for the quarrels of the Western nations."[6] And as to the +Crimean War, has not the greatest Conservative foreign minister of the +nineteenth century admitted that "we backed the wrong horse"--and, what +is far more to the point, have not events unmistakably demonstrated it? + +Do we quite realise that if foreign policy had that continuity which +the political pundits pretend, we should now be fighting on the side of +the Turk against the Balkan States? That we have entered into solemn +treaty obligations, as part of our national policy, to guarantee for +ever the "integrity and independence of the Turkish dominions in +Europe," that we fought a great and popular war to prevent that triumph +of the Christian population which will arise as the result of the +present war? That but for this policy which caused us to maintain the +Turk in Europe the present war would certainly not be raging, and, what +is much more to the point, that but for our policy the abominations +which have provoked it and which it is its object to terminate, would so +far as human reason can judge at all have been brought to an end +generations since? Do we quite realise that _we_ are in large part +responsible, not merely for the war, but for the long agony of horror +which have provoked it and made it necessary; that when we talk of the +jealousies and rivalries of the Powers as playing so large a part in the +responsibility for these things, we represent, perhaps, the chief among +those jealousies and rivalries? That it is not mainly the Turk nor the +Russian nor the Austrian which has determined the course of history in +the Balkan peninsular since the middle of the 19th century, but we +Englishmen--the country gentleman obsessed by vague theories of the +Balance of Power and heaven knows what, reading his _Times_ and barking +out his preposterous politics over the dinner table? That this fatal +policy was dictated simply by fear of the growth of "Russian barbarism +and autocracy" and "the overshadowing of the Western nations by a +country whose institutions are inimical to our own"? That while we were +thus led into war by a phantom danger to our Indian possessions, we were +quite blind to the real danger which threatened them, which a year or +two later, in the Mutiny, nearly lost us them and which were not due to +the machinations of a rival power but to our own misgovernment; that +this very "barbaric growth" and expansion towards India which we fought +a war to check we are now actively promoting in Persia and elsewhere by +our (effective) alliance? That while as recently as fifteen years ago we +would have gone to war to prevent any move of Russia towards the Indian +frontier, we are to-day actually encouraging her to build a railway +there? And that it is now another nation which stands as the natural +barrier to Russian expansion to the West--Germany--whose power we are +challenging, and that all tendencies point to our backing again the +wrong horse, to our fighting _with_ the "semi-Asiatic barbarian" (as our +fathers used to call him) against the nation which has close racial and +cultural affinity to our own, just as half a century since the same +fatal obsession about the "Balance of Power" led us to fight with the +Mohammedan in order to bolster up for half a century his anti-Christian +rule. + +The misreading of history in this matter is, unfortunately, not +possible. The point upon which in the Crimean war the negotiations with +Russia finally broke was the claim, based upon her reading of the Vienna +note, to stand as religious protector of the Greek Christians in the +Balkan peninsular. That was the pivot of the whole negotiations, and the +war was the outcome of our support of the Turkish view--or, rather, our +conduct of Turkish policy, for throughout the whole period England was +conducting the Turkish negotiations; indeed, as Bright said at the time, +she was carrying on the Turkish Government and ruling the Turkish Empire +through her ministers in Constantinople. + +I will quote a speech of the period made in the House of Commons. It was +as follows: + + Our opponents seem actuated by a frantic and bitter hostility to + Russia, and, without considering the calamities in which they might + involve this country, they have sought to urge it into a great war, + as they imagined, on behalf of European freedom, and in order to + cripple the resources of Russia.... + + The question is, whether the advantages both to Turkey and England + of avoiding war altogether, would have been less than those which + are likely to arise from the policy which the Government has + pursued? Now, if the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton is right in + saying that Turkey is a growing power, and that she has elements of + strength which unlearned persons like myself know nothing about; + surely no immediate, or sensible, or permanent mischief could have + arisen to her from the acceptance of the Vienna note, which all the + distinguished persons who agreed to it have declared to be + perfectly consistent with her honour and independence. If she had + been growing stronger and stronger of late years, surely she would + have grown still stronger in the future, and there might have been + a reasonable expectation that, whatever disadvantages she might + have suffered for a time from that note, her growing strength would + have enabled her to overcome them, while the peace of Europe might + have been preserved. But suppose that Turkey is not a growing + power, but that the Ottoman rule in Europe is tottering to its + fall, I come to the conclusion that, whatever advantages were + afforded to the Christian population of Turkey would have enabled + them to grow more rapidly in numbers, in industry, in wealth, in + intelligence, and in political power; and that, as they thus + increased in influence, they would have become more able, in case + any accident, which might not be far distant, occurred, to + supplant the Mahommedan rule, and to establish themselves in + Constantinople as a Christian State, which, I think, every man who + hears me will admit is infinitely more to be desired than that the + Mahommedan power should be permanently sustained by the bayonets of + France and the fleets of England. Europe would thus have been at + peace; for I do not think even the most bitter enemies of Russia + believe that the Emperor of Russia intended last year, if the + Vienna note or Prince Menchikoff's last and most moderate + proposition had been accepted, to have marched on Constantinople. + Indeed, he had pledged himself in the most distinct manner to + withdraw his troops at once from the Principalities, if the Vienna + note were accepted; and therefore in that case Turkey would have + been delivered from the presence of the foe; peace would for a time + have been secured for Europe; and the whole matter would have + drifted on to its natural solution--which is, that the Mahommedan + power in Europe should eventually succumb to the growing power of + the Christian population of the Turkish territories. + +Now, looking back upon what has since happened, which view shows the +greater wisdom and prevision? That of the man who delivered this speech +(and he was John Bright) or those against whom he spoke? To which set of +principles has time given the greater justification? + +Yet upon the men who resisted what we all admit, in this case at least, +to have been the false theories and who supported, what we equally admit +now, to have been the right principles, we poured the same sort of +ferocious contempt that we are apt now spasmodically to pour upon those +who, sixty years later, would prevent our drifting in the same blind +fashion into a war just as futile and bound to be infinitely more +disastrous--a war embodying the same "principles" supported by just the +same theories and just the same arguments which led us into this other +one. + +I know full well the prejudice which the names I am about to cite is apt +to cause. We poured out upon the men who bore them a rancour, contempt +and hatred which few men in English public life have had to face. +Morley, in his life of Cobden, says of these two men--Cobden and Bright: + + They had, as Lord Palmerston said, the whole world against them. It + was not merely the august personages of the Court, nor the + illustrious veterans in Government and diplomacy, nor the most + experienced politicians in Parliament, nor the powerful + journalists, nor the men versed in great affairs of business. It + was no light thing to confront even that solid mass of hostile + judgment. But besides all this, Cobden and Mr. Bright knew that the + country at large, even their trusty middle and industrial classes, + had turned their faces resolutely and angrily away from them. Their + own great instrument, the public meeting, was no longer theirs to + wield. The army of the Nonconformists, which has so seldom been + found fighting on the wrong side, was seriously divided. + + Public opinion was bitterly and impatiently hostile and + intractable. Mr. Bright was burnt in effigy. Cobden, at a meeting + in his own constituency, after an energetic vindication of his + opinions, saw resolutions carried against him. Every morning they + were reviled in half the newspapers in the country as enemies of + the commonwealth. They were openly told that they were traitors, + and that it was a pity they could not be punished as traitors. + + In the House, Lord Palmerston once began his reply by referring to + Mr. Bright as "the Honourable and Reverend gentleman," Cobden rose + to call him to order for this flippant and unbecoming phrase. Lord + Palmerston said he would not quarrel about words. Then went on to + say that he thought it right to tell Mr. Bright that his opinion + was a matter of entire difference, and that he treated his censure + with the most perfect indifference and contempt. On another + occasion he showed the same unmannerliness to Cobden himself. + Cobden had said that under certain circumstances he would fight, or + if he could not fight, he would work for the wounded in the + hospitals. "Well," said Lord Palmerston in reply, with the sarcasm + of a schoolboy's debating society, "there are many people in this + country who think that the party to which he belongs should go + immediately into a hospital of a different kind, and which I shall + not mention." This refined irony was a very gentle specimen of the + insult and contumely which was poured upon Cobden and Mr. Bright at + this time.... + + It is impossible not to regard the attitude of the two objects of + this vast unpopularity as one of the most truly honourable + spectacles in our political history. The moral fortitude, like the + political wisdom of these two strong men, begins to stand out with + a splendour that already recalls the great historic heights of + statesmanship and patriotism. Even now our heart-felt admiration + and gratitude goes out to them as it goes out to Burke for his + lofty and manful protests against the war with America and the + oppression of Ireland, and to Charles Fox for his bold and + strenuous resistance to the war with the French Republic. + +Before indulging in the dementia which those names usually produce, will +the reader please note that it is not my business now to defend either +the general principles of Cobden and Bright or the political spirit +which they are supposed to represent. Let them be as sordid, mean, +unworthy, pusillanimous as you like--and as the best of us then said +they were ("a mean, vain, mischievous clique" even so good a man as Tom +Hughes could call them). We called them cowards--because practically +alone they faced a country which had become a howling mob; we called +their opponents "courageous" because with the whole country behind them +they habitually poured contempt upon the under dog. + +And we thus hated these men because they did their best to dissuade us +from undertaking a certain war. Very good; we have had our war; we +carried our point, we prevented the break-up of the Turkish Empire; +those men were completely beaten. And they are dead. Cannot we afford +to set aside those old passions and see how far in one particular at +least they may have been right? + +We admit, of course, if we are honest--happily everyone admits--that +these despised men were right and those who abused them were wrong. The +verdict of fact is there. Says Lord Morley:-- + + When we look back upon the affairs of that time, we see that there + were two policies open. Lord Palmerston's was one, Cobden and + Bright's the other. If we are to compare Lord Palmerston's + statesmanship and insight in the Eastern Question with that of his + two great adversaries, it is hard, in the light of all that has + happened since, to resist the conclusion that Cobden and Mr. Bright + were right, and Lord Palmerston was disastrously wrong. It is easy + to plead extenuating circumstances for the egregious mistakes in + Lord Palmerston's policy about the Eastern Question, the Suez Canal, + and some other important subjects; but the plea can only be allowed + after it has been frankly recognized that they really were mistakes, + and that these abused men exposed and avoided them. Lord Palmerston, + for instance, asked why the Czar could not be "satisfied, as we all + are, with the progressively liberal system of Turkey." Cobden, in + his pamphlet twenty years before, insisted that this progressively + liberal system of Turkey had no existence. Which of these two + propositions was true may be left to the decision of those who lent + to the Turk many millions of money on the strength of Lord + Palmerston's ignorant and delusive assurances. It was mainly owing + to Lord Palmerston, again, that the efforts of the war were + concentrated at Sebastopol. Sixty thousand English and French + troops, he said, with the co-operation of the fleets, would take + Sebastopol in six weeks. Cobden gave reasons for thinking very + differently, and urged that the destruction of Sebastopol, even when + it was achieved, would neither inflict a crushing blow to Russia, + nor prevent future attacks upon Turkey. Lord Palmerston's error may + have been intelligible and venial; nevertheless, as a fact, he was + in error and Cobden was not, and the error cost the nation one of + the most unfortunate, mortifying, and absolutely useless campaigns + in English history. Cobden held that if we were to defend Turkey + against Russia, the true policy was to use our navy, and not to send + a land force to the Crimea. Would any serious politician now be + found to deny it? We might prolong the list of propositions, general + and particular, which Lord Palmerston maintained and Cobden + traversed, from the beginning to the end of the Russian War. There + is not one of these propositions in which later events have not + shown that Cobden's knowledge was greater, his judgment cooler, his + insight more penetrating and comprehensive. The bankruptcy of the + Turkish Government, the further dismemberment of its Empire by the + Treaty of Berlin, the abrogation of the Black Sea Treaty, have + already done something to convince people that the two leaders saw + much further ahead in 1854 and 1855 than men who had passed all + their lives in foreign chanceries and the purlieus of Downing + Street. + + It is startling to look back upon the bullying contempt which the + man who was blind permitted himself to show to the men who could + see. The truth is, that to Lord Palmerston it was still + incomprehensible and intolerable that a couple of manufacturers from + Lancashire should presume to teach him foreign policy. Still more + offensive to him was their introduction of morality into the + mysteries of the Foreign Office.[7] + +What have peace theories to do with this war? asks the practical man, +who is the greatest mystic of all, contemptuously. Well, they have +everything to do with it. For if we had understood some peace theories a +little better a generation or two ago, if we had not allowed passion and +error and prejudice instead of reason to dominate our policy, the sum of +misery which these Balkan populations have known would have been +immeasurably less. It is quite true that we could not have prevented +this war by sending peace pamphlets to the Turk, or to the Balkanese, +for that matter, but we could have prevented it if we ourselves had read +them a generation or two since, just as our only means of preventing +future wars is by showing a little less prejudice and a little less +blindness. + +And the practical question, despite Mr. Churchill, is whether we shall +allow a like passion and a like prejudice again to blind us; whether we +shall again back the wrong horse in the name of the same hollow theories +drifting to a similar but greater futility and catastrophe, or whether +we shall profit by our past to assure a better future. + +[Footnote 6: 14/11/12] + +[Footnote 7: _The Life of Richard Cobden._--UNWIN.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +PACIFISM, DEFENCE, AND "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAR." + +Did the Crimean War prove Bright and Cobden wrong?--Our curious +reasoning--Mr. Churchill on "illusions"--The danger of war is not the +illusion but its benefits--We are all Pacifists now since we all desire +Peace--Will more armaments alone secure it?--The experience of +mankind--War "the failure of human wisdom"--Therefore more wisdom is the +remedy--But the Militarists only want more arms--The German Lord +Roberts--The military campaign against political Rationalism--How to +make war certain. + + +The question surely, which for practical men stands out from the mighty +historical episode touched on in the last chapter, is this: Was the fact +that these despised men were so entirely right and their triumphant +adversaries so entirely wrong a mere fluke, or was it due to the +soundness of one set of principles and the hollowness of the other; and +were the principles special to that case, or general to international +conflict as a whole? + +To have an opinion of worth on that question we must get away from +certain confusions and misrepresentations. + +It is a very common habit for the Bellicist to quote the list of wars +which have taken place since the Crimean War as proof of the error of +Bright and Cobden. But what are the facts? + +Here were two men who strenuously and ruthlessly opposed a certain +policy; they urged, not only that it would inevitably lead to war, but +that the war would be futile--but not sterile, for they saw that others +would grow from it. Their counsel was disregarded and the war came, and +events have proved that they were right and the war-makers wrong, and +the very fact that the wars took place is cited as disapproving their +"theories."[8] + +It is a like confusion of thought which prompts Mr. Churchill to refer +to Pacifists as people who deem the _danger_ of war an illusion. + +This persistent misconception is worth a little examination. + + * * * * * + +The smoke from the first railway engines in England killed the cattle +and the poultry of the country gentlemen near whose property the +railroad passed--at least, that is what the country gentleman wrote to +the _Times_. + +Now if in the domain of quite simple material things the dislike of +having fixed habits of thought disturbed, leads gentlemen to resent +innovations in that way, it is not astonishing that innovations of a +more intangible and elusive kind should be subject to a like unconscious +misrepresentation, especially by newspapers and public men pushed by +commercial or political necessity to say the popular thing rather than +the true thing: that contained in the speech of Mr. Churchill, which, +together with a newspaper comment thereon, I have made the "text" of +this little book, is a typical case in point. + +It is possible, of course, that Mr. Churchill in talking about "persons +who profess to know that the danger of war has become an illusion," had +not the slightest intention of referring to those who share the views +embodied in "The Great Illusion," which are, _not_ that the danger of +war is an illusion, but that the benefit is. All that happened was that +his hearers and readers interpreted his words as referring thereto; and +that, of course, he could not possibly prevent. + +In any case, to misrepresent an author (and I mean always, of course, +quite sincere and unconscious misrepresentations, like that which led +the country gentlemen to write that railway smoke killed poultry) is a +trifling matter, but to misrepresent an idea, is not, for it makes that +better understanding of facts, the creation of a more informed public +opinion, by which alone we can avoid a possibly colossal folly, an +understanding difficult enough as it is, still more difficult. + +And that is why the current misrepresentation (again unconscious) of +most efforts at the better understanding of the facts of international +relationship needs very badly to be corrected. I will therefore be very +definite. + +The implication that Pacifists of any kind have ever urged that war is +impossible is due either to that confusion of thought just touched upon, +or is merely a silly gibe of those who deride arguments to which they +have not listened, and consequently do not understand, or which they +desire to misrepresent; and such misrepresentation is, when not +unconscious, always stupid and unfair. + +So far as I am concerned, I have never written a line, nor, so far as I +know, has anyone else, to plead that war is impossible. I have, on the +contrary, always urged, with the utmost emphasis that war is not only +possible but extremely likely, so long as we remain as ignorant as we +are concerning what it can accomplish, and unless we use our energies +and efforts to prevent it, instead of directing those efforts to create +it. What anti-Bellicists as a whole urge, is not that war is impossible +or improbable, but that it is impossible to benefit by it; that conquest +must, in the long run, fail to achieve advantage; that the general +recognition of this can only add to our security. And incidentally most +of us have declared our complete readiness to take any demonstrably +necessary measure for the maintenance of armament, but urge that the +effort must not stop there. + +One is justified in wondering whether the public men--statesmen, +soldiers, bishops, preachers, journalists--who indulge in this gibe, are +really unable to distinguish between the plea that a thing is unwise, +foolish, and the plea that it is impossible; whether they really suppose +that anyone in our time could argue that human folly is impossible, or +an "illusion." It is quite evidently a tragic reality. Undoubtedly the +readiness with which these critics thus fall back upon confusion +of thought indicates that they themselves have illimitable confidence in +it. But the confusion of thought does not stop here. + +I have spoken of Pacifists and Bellicists, but, of course, we are all +Pacifists now. Lord Roberts, Lord Charles Beresford, Lord Fisher, Mr. +Winston Churchill, The Navy League, the Navier League, the Universal +Military Service League, the German Emperor, the Editor of _The +Spectator_, all the Chancelleries of Europe, alike declare that their +one object is the maintenance of peace. Never were such Pacifists. The +German Emperor, speaking to his army, invariably points out that they +stand for the peace of Europe. Does a First Lord want new ships? It is +because a strong British Navy is the best guarantee of peace. Lord +Roberts wants conscription because that is the one way to preserve +peace, and the Editor of _The Spectator_ tells us that Turkey's great +crime is that she has not paid enough attention to soldiering and +armament, that if only she had been stronger all would have been well. +All alike are quite persuaded indeed that the one way to peace is to get +more armament. + +Well, that is the method that mankind has pursued during the whole of +its history; it has never shown the least disposition not to take this +advice and not to try this method to the full. And written history, to +say nothing of unwritten history, is there to tell us how well it has +succeeded. + +Unhappily, one has to ask whether some of these military Pacifists +really want it to succeed? Again I do not tax any with conscious +insincerity. But it does result not merely from what some imply, but +from what they say. For certain of these doughty Pacifists having told +you how much their one object is to secure peace, then proceed to tell +you that this thing which they hope to secure is a very evil thing, that +under its blighting influence nations wane in luxury and sloth. And of +course they imply that our own nation, about a third of whom have not +enough to eat and about another third of whom have a heart-breaking +struggle with small means and precariousness of livelihood, is in danger +of this degeneration which comes from too much wealth and luxury and +sloth and ease. I could fill a dozen books the size of this with the +solemn warning of such Pacifists as these against the danger of peace +(which they tell you they are struggling to maintain), and how splendid +and glorious a thing, how fine a discipline is war (which they tell you +they are trying so hard to avoid). Thus the Editor of _The Spectator_ +tells us that mankind cannot yet dispense with the discipline of war; +and Lord Roberts, that to make war when you are really ready for it (or +that in any case for Germany to do it) is "an excellent policy and one +to be pursued by every nation prepared to play a great part in history." + +The truth is, of course, that we are not likely to get peace from those +who believe it to be an evil thing and war and aggression a good thing, +or, at least, are very mixed in their views as to this. Before men can +secure peace they must at least make up their minds whether it is peace +or war they want. If you do not know what you want, you are not likely +to get it--or you are likely to get it, whichever way you prefer to put +it. + +And that is another thing which divides us from the military Pacifists: +we really do want peace. As between war and peace we have made our +choice, and having made it, stick to it. There may be something to be +said for war--for settling a thing by fighting about it instead of by +understanding it,--just as there may be something to be said for the +ordeal, or the duel, as against trial by evidence, for the rack as a +corrective of religious error, for judicial torture as a substitute for +cross-examination, for religious wars, for all these things--but the +balance of advantage is against them and we have discarded them. + +But there is a still further difference which divides us: We have +realised that we discarded those things only when we really understood +their imperfections and that we arrived at that understanding by +studying them, by discussing them,--because one man in London or another +in Paris raised plainly and boldly the whole question of their wisdom +and because the intellectual ferment created by those interrogations, +either in the juridical or religious field, re-acted on the minds of men +in Geneva or Wurtenburg or Rome or Madrid. It was by this means, not by +improving the rapiers or improving the instruments of the inquisition, +that we got rid of the duel and that Catholics ceased to torture +Protestants or _vice versa_. We gave these things up because we realised +the futility of physical force in these conflicts. We shall give up war +for the same reason. + +But the Bellicist says that discussions of this sort, these attempts to +find out the truth, are but the encouragement of pernicious theories: +there is, according to him, but one way--better rapiers, more and better +racks, more and better inquisitions. + +Mr. Bonar Law, in one of the very wisest phrases ever pronounced by a +statesman, has declared that "war is the failure of human wisdom." + +That is the whole case of Pacifism: we shall not improve except at the +price of using our reason in these matters; of understanding them +better. Surely it is a truism that that is the price of all progress; +saner conceptions--man's recognition of his mistakes, whether those +mistakes take the form of cannibalism, slavery, torture, superstition, +tyranny, false laws, or what you will. The veriest savage, or for that +matter the ape, can blindly fight, but whether the animal develops into +a man, or the savage into civilized man, depends upon whether the +element of reason enters in an increasing degree into the solution of +his problems. + +The Militarist argues otherwise. He admits the difficulty comes from +man's small disposition to think; therefore don't think--fight. We +fight, he says, because we have insufficient wisdom in these matters; +therefore do not let us trouble to get more wisdom or understanding; all +we need do is to get better weapons. I am not misrepresenting him; that +is quite fairly the popular line: it is no use talking about these +things or trying to explain them, all that is logic and theories; what +you want to do is to get a bigger army or more battleships. And, of +course, the Bellicist on the other side of the frontier says exactly the +same thing, and I am still waiting to have explained to me how, +therefore, if this matter depends upon understanding, we can ever solve +it by neglecting understanding, which the Militarist urges us to do. Not +only does he admit, but pleads, that these things are complex, and +supposes that that is an argument why they should not be studied. + +And a third distinction will, I think, make the difference between us +still clearer. Like the Bellicist, I am in favour of defence. If in a +duelling society a duellist attacked me, or, as a Huguenot in the Paris +of the sixteenth century a Catholic had attacked me, I should certainly +have defended myself, and if needs be have killed my aggressor. But that +attitude would not have prevented my doing my small part in the creation +of a public opinion which should make duelling or such things as the +massacre of St. Bartholomew impossible by showing how unsatisfactory and +futile they were; and I should know perfectly well that neither would +stop until public opinion had, as the result of education of one kind or +another, realised their futility. But it is as certain as anything can +be that the Churchills of that society or of that day would have been +vociferous in declaring (as in the case of the duel they still to-day +declare in Prussia) that this attempt to prove the futility of duelling +was not only a bad and pernicious campaign, but was in reality a subtle +attempt to get people killed in the street by bullies, and that those +who valued their security would do their best to discredit all +anti-duelling propaganda--by misrepresentation, if needs be. + +Let this matter be quite clear. No one who need be considered in this +discussion would think of criticising Lord Roberts for wanting the army, +and Mr. Churchill for wanting the navy, to be as good and efficient as +possible and as large as necessary. Personally--and I speak, I know, for +many of my colleagues in the anti-war movement--I would be prepared to +support British conscription if it be demonstrably wise or necessary. +But what we criticise is the persistent effort to discredit honest +attempts at a better understanding of the facts of international +relationship, the everlasting gibe which it is thought necessary to +fling at any constructive effort, apart from armament, to make peace +secure. These men profess to be friends of peace, they profess to +regret the growth of armament, to deplore the unwisdom, ignorance, +prejudice and misunderstanding out of which the whole thing grows, but +immediately there is any definite effort to correct this unwisdom, to +examine the grounds of the prejudice and misunderstanding, there is a +volte face and such efforts are sneered at as "sentimental" or "sordid," +according as the plea for peace is put upon moral or material grounds. +It is not that they disagree in detail with any given proposition +looking towards a basis of international co-operation, but that in reality +they deprecate raising the matter at all.[9] It must be armaments and +nothing but armaments with them. If there had been any possibility of +success in that we should not now be entering upon the 8,000th or +9,000th war of written history. Armaments may be necessary, but they are +not enough. Our plan is armaments plus education; theirs is armament +versus education. And by education, of course, we do not mean school +books, or an extension of the School Board curriculum, but a recognition +of the fact that the character of human society is determined by the +extent to which its units attempt to arrive at an _understanding_ of +their relationship, instead of merely subduing one another by force, +which does not lead to understanding at all: in Turkey, or Venezuela, or +San Domingo, there is no particular effort made to adjust differences by +understanding; in societies of that type they only believe in settling +differences by armaments. That is why there are very few books, very +little thought or discussion, very little intellectual ferment but a +great many guns and soldiers and battles. And throughout the world the +conflict is going on between these rival schools. On the whole the +Western world, inside the respective frontiers, almost entirely now +tends to the Pacifist type. But not so in the international field, for +where the Powers are concerned, where it is a question of the attitude +of one nation in relation to another, you get a degree of understanding +rather less than more than that which obtains in the internal politics +of Venezuela, or Turkey, or Morocco, or any other "warlike" state. + +And the difficulty of creating a better European opinion and temper is +due largely to just this idea that obsesses the Militarist, that unless +they misrepresent facts in a sensational direction the nations will be +too apathetic to arm; that education will abolish funk, and that +presumably funk is a necessary element in self-defence. + +For the most creditable explanation that we can give of the Militarist's +objection to having this matter discussed at all, is the evident +impression that such discussion will discourage measures for +self-defence; the Militarist does not believe that a people desiring to +understand these things and interested in the development of a better +European society, can at the same time be determined to resist the use +of force. They believe that unless the people are kept in a blue funk, +they will not arm, and that is why it is that the Militarist of the +respective countries are for ever talking about our degeneration and the +rest. And the German Militarist is just as angry with the unwarlike +qualities of his people as the English Militarist is with ours. + +Just note this parallel: + + BRITISH OPINION ON BRITISH APATHY AND GERMAN VIGOUR. + + "There is a way in which Britain is certain to have war and its + horrors and calamities; it is this--by persisting in her present + course of unpreparedness, her apathy, unintelligence, and blindness, + and in her disregard of the warnings of the most ordinary political + insight, as well as of the example of history. + + "Now in the year 1912, just as in 1866, and just as in 1870, war + will take place the instant the German forces by land and sea are, + by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory as + anything in human calculation can be made certain. 'Germany strikes + when Germany's hour has struck.' That is the time-honoured policy of + her Foreign Office. It is her policy at the present hour, and it is + an excellent policy. It is, or should be, the policy of every nation + prepared to play a great part in history."--LORD ROBERTS, at + Manchester. + + "Britain is disunited; Germany is homogeneous. We are quarrelling + about the Lords' Veto, Home Rule, and a dozen other questions of + domestic politics. We have a Little Navy Party, an Anti-Militarist + Party; Germany is unanimous upon the question of naval + expansion."--MR. BLATCHFORD. + + + GERMAN OPINION ON GERMAN APATHY AND BRITISH VIGOUR. + + "Whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm + which constituted the greatness of its history. With the increase of + wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of sacrificing + the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great conceptions, and + close their eyes complacently to the duties of our future and to the + pressing problems of international life which await a solution at + the present time."--GENERAL VON BERNHARDI in "Germany and the Next + War." + + "There is no one German people, no single Germany.... There are more + abrupt contrasts between Germans and Germans than between Germans + and Indians." + + "One must admire the consistent fidelity and patriotism of the + English race, as compared with the uncertain and erratic methods of + the German people, their mistrust, and suspicion.... In spite of + numerous wars, bloodshed, and disaster, England always emerges + smoothly and easily from her military crises and settles down to new + conditions and surroundings in her usual cool and deliberate manner, + so different from the German."--_Berliner Tageblatt_, March 14, 1911. + +Presumably each doughty warrior knows his own country better than that +of the other, which would carry a conclusion directly contrary to that +which he draws. + +But note also where this idea that it is necessary artificially to +stimulate the defensive zeal of each country by resisting any tendency +to agreement and understanding leads. It leads even so good a man as +Lord Roberts into the trap of dogmatic prophesy concerning the +intentions of a very complex heterogeneous nation of 65 million people. +Lord Roberts could not possibly tell you what his own country will do +five, ten, or fifteen years hence in such matters as Home Rule or the +Suffragists, or even the payment of doctors, but he knows exactly what a +foreign country will do in a much more serious matter. The simple truth +is, of course, that no man knows what "Germany" will do ten years hence, +any more than we can know what "England" will do. We don't even know +what England will _be_, whether Unionist or Liberal or Labour, +Socialist, Free Trade or Protectionist. All these things, like the +question of Peace and War depends upon all sorts of tendencies, drifts +and developments. At bottom, of course, since war, in Mr. Bonar Law's +fine phrase, is "never inevitable--only the failure of human wisdom," it +depends upon whether we become a little less or a little more wise. If +the former, we shall have it; if the latter, we shall not. But this +dogmatism concerning the other man's evil intentions is the very thing that +leads away from wisdom.[10] The sort of temper and ideas which it +provokes on both sides of the frontier may be gathered from just such +average gems as these plucked recently from the English press:-- + + Yes, we may as well face it. _War with Germany is inevitable_, and + the only question is--Shall we consult her convenience as to its + date? Shall we wait till Germany's present naval programme, which + is every year reducing our advantage, is complete? Shall we wait + till the smouldering industrial revolution, of which all these + strikes are warnings, has broken into flame? Shall we wait till + Consols are 65 and our national credit is gone? Shall we wait till + the Income Tax is 1s. 6d. in the pound? OR SHALL WE STRIKE + NOW--_finding every out-of-work a job in connection with the + guardianship of our shores_, and, with our mighty fleet, either + sinking every German ship or towing it in triumph into a British + port? _Why_ should we do it? _Because the command of the seas is + ever ours_; because our island position, our international trade + and our world-wide dominions _demand that no other nation shall + dare to challenge our supremacy_. That is why. Oh, yes, the cost + would be great, but we could raise it to-day all right, _and we + should get it back_. + + If the struggle comes to-day, we shall win--and after it is over, + there will be abounding prosperity in the land, and no more labour + unrest. + + Yes, we have no fear of Germany to-day. The only enemy we fear is + the crack-brained fanatics who prate about peace and goodwill + whilst foreign _Dreadnoughts_ are gradually closing in upon us. As + Mr. Balfour said at the Eugenic Conference the other day, man is a + wild animal; and there is no room, in present circumstances, for + any tame ones.--_John Bull_, Aug. 24, 1912. + +The italics and large type are those of the original, not mine. This +paper explains, by the way, in this connection that "In the +Chancelleries of Europe _John Bull_ is regarded as a negligible +journalistic quantity. But _John Bull_ is read by a million people every +week, and that million not the least thoughtful and intelligent section +of the community, they _think_ about what they read." + +One of the million seems to have thought to some purpose, for the next +week there was the following letter from him. It was given the place of +honour in a series and runs as follows:-- + + I would have extended your "Down with the German Fleet!" to "Down + with Germany and the Germans!" For, unless the whole ---- lot are + swept off the surface of the earth, there will be no peace. If the + people in England could only realise the quarrelsome, deceitful, + underhanded, egotistic any tyrannical character of the Germans, + there would not be so much balderdash about a friendly + understanding, etc., between England and Germany. The German is a + born tyrant. The desire to remain with Britain on good terms will + only last so long until Germany feels herself strong enough to beat + England both on sea and on land: afterwards it'll simply be "_la + bourse ou la vie_," as the French proverb goes. Provided they do not + know that there are any English listeners about, phrases like the + following can be heard every day in German restaurants and other + public places: "I hate England and the English!" "Never mind, they + won't be standing in our way much longer. We shall soon be ready." + +And _John Bull_, with its million readers, is not alone. This is how the +_Daily Express_, in a double-leaded leader, teaches history to its +readers:-- + + When, one day, Englishmen are not allowed to walk the pavements of + their cities, and their women are for the pleasure of the invaders, + and the offices of the Tiny England newspapers are incinerated by a + furious mob; when foreign military officers proclaim martial law + from the Royal Exchange steps, and when some billions of pounds + have to be raised by taxation--by taxation of the "toiling + millions" as well as others--to pay the invaders out, and the + British Empire consists of England--less Dover, required for a + foreign strategic tunnel--and the Channel Islands--then the ghosts + of certain politicians and publicists will probably call a meeting + for the discussion of the Fourth Dimension.--Leading Article, + _Daily Express_, 8/7/12. + +And not merely shall our women fill the harems of the German pashas, +and Englishmen not be allowed to walk upon the pavement (it would be the +German way of solving the traffic problem--near the Bank), but a +"well-known Diplomat" in another paper tells us what else will happen. + + If England be vanquished it means the end of all things as far as + she is concerned, and will ring in a new and somewhat terrible era. + Bankrupt, shorn of all power, deserted, as must clearly follow, as + a commercial state, and groaning under a huge indemnity that she + cannot pay and is not intended to be able to pay, what will be the + melancholy end of this great country and her teeming population of + forty-five millions? + + ... Her shipping trade will be transferred as far as possible from + the English to the German flag. Her banking will be lost, as London + will no longer be the centre of commerce, and efforts will be made + to enable Berlin to take London's place. Her manufactures will + gradually desert her. Failing to obtain payments in due time, + estates will be sequestered and become the property of wealthy + Germans. The indemnity to be demanded is said to be one thousand + millions sterling. + + The immediate result of defeat would mean, of course, that + insolvency would take place in a very large number of commercial + businesses, and others would speedily follow. Those who cannot get + away will starve unless large relief funds are forthcoming from, + say, Canada and the United States, for this country, bereft of its + manufactures, will not be able to sustain a population of more than + a very few millions.--From an Article by "A Well-known + Diplomatist" in _The Throne_, June 12, 1912. + +These are but samples; and this sort of thing is going on in England and +Germany alike. And when one protests that it is wicked rubbish born of +funk and ignorance, that whatever happens in war this does not happen, +and that it is based on false economics and grows into utterly false +conceptions of international relationship, one is shouted down as an +anti-armament man and an enemy of his country. + +Well, if that view is persisted in, if in reality it is necessary for a +people to have lies and nonsense told to them in order to induce them to +defend themselves, some will be apt to decide that they are not worth +defending. Or rather will they decide that this phase of the +pro-armament campaign--which is not so much a campaign in favour of +armament as one against education and understanding--will end in turning +us into a nation either of poltroons or of bullies and aggressors, and +that since life is a matter of the choice of risks it is wiser and more +courageous to choose the less evil. A nation may be defeated and still +live in the esteem of men--and in its own. No civilized man esteems a +nation of Bashi-Bazouks or Prussian Junkers. Of the two risks +involved--the risk of attack arising from a possible superiority of +armament on the part of a rival, and the risk of drifting into conflict +because, concentrating all our energies on the mere instrument of +combat, we have taken no adequate trouble to understand the facts of +this case--it is at least an arguable proposition that the second risk +is the greater. And I am prompted to this expression of opinion without +surrendering one iota of a lifelong and passionate belief that a nation +attacked should defend itself to the last penny and to the last man. + +And you think that this idea that the nations--ours amongst them--may +drift into futile war from sheer panic and funk arising out of the +terror inspired by phantoms born of ignorance, is merely the idea of +Pacifist cranks? + +The following, referring to the "precautionary measures" (_i.e._, +mobilization of armies) taken by the various Powers, is from a leading +article of the _Times_:-- + + "Precautions" are understandable, but the remark of our Berlin + Correspondent that they may produce an untenable position from + which retreat must be humiliating is applicable in more than one + direction. Our Vienna Correspondent truly says that "there is no + valid reason to believe war between Austria-Hungary and Russia to + be inevitable, or even immediately probable." We entirely agree, + but wish we could add that the absence of any valid reason was + placing strict limitations upon the scope of "precautions." The + same correspondent says he is constantly being asked:--"Is there no + means of avoiding war?" The same question is now being asked, with + some bewilderment, by millions of men in this country, who want to + know what difficulties there are in the present situation which + should threaten Europe with a general war, or even a collision + larger than that already witnessed.... There is no great nation in + Europe which to-day has the least desire that millions of men + should be torn from their homes and flung headlong to destruction + at the bidding of vain ambitions. The Balkan peoples fought for a + cause which was peculiarly their own. They were inspired by the + memories of centuries of wrong which they were burning to avenge. + The larger nations have no such quarrel, unless it is wilfully + manufactured for them. The common sense of the peoples of Europe is + well aware that no issue has been presented which could not be + settled by amicable discussion. In England men will learn with + amazement and incredulity that war is possible over the question of + a Servian port, or even over the larger issues which are said to + lie behind it. Yet that is whither the nations are blindly drifting + Who, then, makes war? The answer is to be found in the + Chancelleries of Europe, among the men who have too long played + with human lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so + enmeshed in formulas and the jargon of diplomacy that they have + ceased to be conscious of the poignant realities with which they + trifle. And thus will war continue to be made, until the great + masses who are the sport of professional schemers and dreamers say + the word which, shall bring, not eternal peace, for that is + impossible, but a determination that wars shall be fought only in a + just and righteous and vital cause. If that word is ever to be + spoken, there never was a more appropriate occasion than the + present; and we trust it will be spoken while there is yet time. + +And the very next day there appeared in the _Daily Mail_ an article by +Mr. Lovat Fraser ending thus:-- + + The real answer rests, or ought to rest, with the man in the train. + Does he want to join in Armageddon? It is time that he began to + think about it, for his answer may soon be sought. + +Now we have here, stated in the first case by the most authoritative of +English newspapers, and in the second by an habitual contributor of the +most popular, the whole case of Pacifism as I have attempted to expound +it, namely: (1) That our current statecraft--its fundamental +conceptions, its "axioms," its terminology--has become obsolete by +virtue of the changed conditions of European society; that the causes of +conflict which it creates are half the time based on illusions, upon +meaningless and empty formulas; (2) that its survival is at bottom due +to popular ignorance and indifference--the survival on the part of the +great mass of just those conceptions born of the old and now obsolete +conditions--since diplomacy, like all functions of government, is a +reflection of average opinion; (3) that this public opinion is not +something which descends upon us from the skies but is the sum of the +opinions of each one of us and is the outcome of our daily contacts, our +writing and talking and discussion, and that the road to safety lies in +having that general public opinion better informed not in directly +discouraging such better information; (4) that the mere multiplication +of "precautions" in the shape of increased armaments and a readiness for +war, in the absence of a corresponding and parallel improvement of +opinion, will merely increase and not exorcise the danger, and, +finally, (5) that the problem of war is necessarily a problem of at +least two parties, and that if we are to solve it, to understand it +even, we must consider it in terms of two parties, not one; it is not a +question of what shall be the policy of each without reference to the +other, but what the final upshot of the two policies taken in +conjunction will be. + +Now in all this the _Times_, especially in one outstanding central idea, +is embodying a conception which is the antithesis of that expressed by +Militarists of the type of Mr. Churchill, and, I am sorry to say, of +Lord Roberts. To these latter war is not something that we, the peoples +of Europe, create by our ignorance and temper, by the nursing of old and +vicious theories, by the poorness and defects of the ideas our +intellectual activities have developed during the last generation or +two, but something that "comes upon us" like the rain or the earthquake, +and against which we can only protect ourselves by one thing: more arms, +a greater readiness to fight. + +In effect the anti-Educationalists say this: "What, as practical men, we +have to do, is to be stronger than our enemy; the rest is theory and +does not matter." + +Well the inevitable outcome of such an attitude is catastrophe. + +I have said elsewhere that in this matter it seems fatally easy to +secure either one of two kinds of action: that of the "practical man" +who limits his energies to securing a policy which will perfect the +machinery of war and disregard anything else; or that of the idealist, +who, persuaded of the brutality or immorality of war, is apt to show a +certain indifference concerning self-defence. What is needed is the type +of activity which will include both halves of the problem: provision for +education, for a Political Reformation in this matter, _as well as_ such +means of defence as will meantime counterbalance the existing impulse +to aggression. To concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the +other half is to render the whole problem insoluble. + +What must inevitably happen if the nations take the line of the +"practical man," and limit their energies simply and purely to piling up +armaments? + +A critic once put to me what he evidently deemed a poser: "Do you urge +that we shall be stronger than our enemy, or weaker?" + +To which I replied: "The last time that question was asked me was in +Berlin, by Germans. What would you have had me reply to those +Germans?"--a reply which, of course, meant this: In attempting to find +the solution of this question in terms of one party, you are attempting +the impossible. The outcome will be war, and war would not settle it. It +would all have to be begun over again. + +The Navy League catechism says: "Defence consists in being so strong +that it will be dangerous for your enemy to attack you."[11] Mr. +Churchill, however, goes farther than the Navy League, and says: "The +way to make war impossible is to make victory certain." + +The Navy League definition is at least possible of application to +practical politics, because rough equality of the two parties would make +attack by either dangerous. Mr. Churchill's principle is impossible of +application to practical politics, because it could only be applied by +one party, and would, in the terms of the Navy League principle, deprive +the other party of the right of defence. As a matter of simple fact, +both the Navy League, by its demand for two ships to one, and Mr. +Churchill, by his demand for certain victory, deny in this matter +Germany's right to defend herself; and such denial is bound, on the part +of a people animated by like motives to ourselves, to provoke a +challenge. When the Navy League says, as it does, that a self-respecting +nation should not depend upon the goodwill of foreigners for its safety, +but upon its own strength, it recommends Germany to maintain her efforts +to arrive at some sort of equality with ourselves. When Mr. Churchill +goes further and says that a nation should be so strong as to make +victory over its rivals certain, he knows that if Germany were to adopt +his own doctrine its inevitable outcome would be war. + +The issue is plain: We get a better understanding of certain political +facts in Europe, or we have war. And the Bellicist at present is +resolutely opposed to such political education. And it is for that +reason, not because he is asking for adequate armament, that some of the +best of this country look with the deepest misgiving upon his work, and +will continue to do so in increasing degree unless his policy be +changed. + +Now a word as to the peace Pacifist--the Pacifist sans phrases--as +distinct from the military Pacifist. It is not because I am in favour of +defence that I have at times with some emphasis disassociated myself +from certain features and methods of the peace movement, for +non-resistance is no necessary part of that movement, and, indeed, so +far as I know, it is no appreciable part. It is the methods not the +object or the ideals of the peace movement which I have ventured to +criticize, without, I hope, offence to men whom I respect in the very +highest and sincerest degree. The methods of Pacifism have in the past, +to some extent at least, implied a disposition to allow easy emotion to +take the place of hard thinking, good intention to stand for +intellectual justification; and it is as plain as anything well can be +that some of the best emotion of the world has been expended upon some +of the very worst objects, and that in no field of human +effort--medicine, commerce, engineering, legislation--has good intention +ever been able to dispense with the necessity of knowing the how and the +why. + +It is not that the somewhat question-begging and emotional terminology +of some Pacifists--the appeal to brotherly love and humanity--connotes +things which are in themselves poor or mean (as the average Militarist +would imply), but because so much of Pacifism in the past has failed to +reconcile intellectually the claims of these things with what are the +fundamental needs of men and to show their relation and practical +application to actual problems and conditions. + +[Footnote 8: As a matter of fact, of course, the work of these two men +has not been fruitless. As Lord Morley truly says: "They were routed on +the question of the Crimean War, but it was the rapid spread of their +principles which within the next twenty years made intervention +impossible in the Franco-Austrian War, in the American War, in the +Danish War, in the Franco-German War, and above all, in the war between +Russia and Turkey, which broke out only the other day."] + +[Footnote 9: Thus the Editor of the _Spectator_:-- + +"For ourselves, as far as the main economic proposition goes, he +preaches to the converted.... If nations were perfectly wise and held +perfectly sound economic theories, they would recognize that exchange is +the union of forces, and that it is very foolish to hate or be jealous +of your co-operators.... Men are savage, bloodthirsty creatures ... and +when their blood is up will fight for a word or a sign, or, as Mr. +Angell would put it, for an illusion." + +Therefore, argues the _Spectator_, let the illusion continue--for there +is no other conclusion to be drawn from the argument.] + +[Footnote 10: Need it be said that this criticism does not imply the +faintest want of respect for Lord Roberts, his qualities and his +services. He has ventured into the field of foreign politics and +prophecy. A public man of great eminence, he has expressed an English +view of German "intentions." For the man in the street (I write in that +capacity) to receive that expression in silence is to endorse it, to +make it national. And I have stated here the reasons which make such an +attitude disastrous. We all greatly respect Lord Roberts, but, even +before that, must come respect for our country, the determination that +it shall be in the right and not in the wrong, which it certainly will +be if this easy dogmatism concerning the evil intentions of other +nations becomes national.] + +[Footnote 11: The German Navy Law in its preamble might have filched +this from the British Navy League catechism.] + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +"THEORIES" FALSE AND TRUE: THEIR ROLE IN EUROPEAN PROGRESS. + +The improvement of ideas the foundation of all improvement--Shooting +straight and thinking straight; the one as important as the +other--Pacifism and the Millennium--How we got rid of wars of +religion--A few ideas have changed the face of the world--The simple +ideas the most important--The "theories" which have led to war--The work +of the reformer to destroy old and false theories--The intellectual +interdependence of nations--Europe at unity in this matter--New ideas +cannot be confined to one people--No fear of ourselves or any nation +being ahead of the rest. + + +But what, it will be said, is the practical outcome? Admitting that we +are, or that our fathers were, in part responsible for this war, that it +is their false theories which have made it necessary, that like false +theories on our part may make future wars inevitable--what shall we do +to prevent that catastrophe? + +Now while as an "abstract proposition" everyone will admit that the one +thing which distinguishes the civilized man from the savage is a +difference of ideas, no one apparently believes that it is a dangerous +and evil thing for the political ideas of savages to dominate most of +our countrymen or that so intangible a thing as "ideas" have any +practical importance at all. While we believe this, of course--to the +extent to which we believe it--improvement is out of the question. We +have to realize that civic faith, like religious faith, is of +importance; that if English influence is to stand for the right and not +the wrong in human affairs, it is impossible for each one of us +individuals to be wrong; that if the great mass is animated by temper, +blindness, ignorance, passion, small and mean prejudices, it is not +possible for "England" to stand for something quite different and for +its influence to be ought but evil. To say that we are "for our country +right or wrong" does not get over the matter at all; rather is it +equivalent to saying that we would as readily have it stand for evil as +for good. And we do not in the least seem to realize that for an +Englishman to go on talking wicked nonsense across the dinner table and +making one of the little rivulets of bad temper and prejudice which +forms the mighty river drowning sane judgment is to do the England of +our dreams a service as ill (in reality far more mischievous) as though +the plans of fortresses were sold to Germany. We must all learn to shoot +straight; apparently we need not learn to think straight. And yet if +Europe could do the second it could dispense with the first. "Good +faith" has a score of connotations, and we believe apparently that good +politics can dispense with all of them and that "Patriotism" has naught +to do with any. + +Of course, to shoot straight is so much easier than to think straight, +and I suppose at bottom the bellicist believes that the latter is a +hopeless object since "man is not a thinking animal." He deems, +apparently, we must just leave it at that. Of course, if he does leave +it at that--if we persist in believing that it is no good discussing +these matters, trying to find out the truth about them, writing books +and building churches--our civilization is going to drift just precisely +as those other civilizations which have been guided by the same dreadful +fatalism have drifted--towards the Turkish goal. "Kismet. Man is a fool +to babble of these things; what he may do is of no avail; all things +will happen as they were pre-ordained." And the English Turk--the man +who prefers to fight things out instead of thinking things out--takes +the same line. + +If he adopts the Turkish philosophy he must be content with the Turkish +result. But the Western world as a whole has refused to be content with +the Turkish result, and however tiresome it may be to know about +things, to bother with "theories" and principles, we have come to +realise that we have to choose between one of two courses: either to +accept things as they are, not to worry about improvement or betterment +at all, fatalistically to let things slide or--to find out bit by bit +where our errors have been and to correct those errors. This is a hard +road, but it is the road the Western world has chosen; and it is better +than the other. + +And it has not accepted this road because it expects the millenium +to-morrow week. There is no millenium, and Pacifists do not expect it or +talk about it; the word is just one of those three-shies-a-penny +brickbats thrown at them by ignorance. You do not dismiss attempts to +correct errors in medicine or surgery, or education, or tramcars, or +cookery, by talking about the millenium; why should you throw that word +at attempts to correct the errors of international relationship? + +Nothing has astonished me more than the fact that the "practical" man +who despises "theories" nearly always criticises Pacifism because it is +not an absolute dogma with all its thirty-nine articles water-tight. +"You are a Pacifist, then suppose...," and then follows generally some +very remote hypothesis of what would happen if all the Orient composed +its differences and were to descend suddenly upon the Western world; or +some dogmatic (and very theoretical) proposition about the +unchangeability of human nature, and the foolishness of expecting the +millenium--an argument which would equally well have told against the +union of Scotland and England or would equally justify the political +parties in a South American republic in continuing to settle their +differences by militarist methods instead of the Pacifist methods of +England. + +Human nature may be unchanging: it is no reason why we should fight a +futile war with Germany over nothing at all; the yellow peril may +threaten; that is a very good reason why we should compose our +differences in Europe. Men always will quarrel, perhaps, over religious +questions, bigotry and fanaticism always will exist--it did not prevent +our getting rid of the wars of religion, still less is it a reason for +re-starting them. + +The men who made that immense advance--the achievement of religious +toleration--possible, were not completely right and had not a +water-tight theory amongst them; they did not bring the millenium, but +they achieved an immense step. They _were_ pioneers of religious +freedom, yet were themselves tyrants and oppressors; those who abolished +slavery _did_ a good work, though much of the world _was_ left in +industrial servitude; it _was_ a good thing to abolish judicial torture, +though much of our penal system did yet remain barbaric; it _was_ a real +advance to recognise the errors upon which these things rested, although +that recognition did not immediately achieve a complete, logical, +symmetrical and perfect change, because mankind does not advance that +way. And so with war. Pacifism does not even pretend to be a dogma: it +is an attempt to correct in men's minds some of the errors and false +theories out of which war grows. + +The reply to this is generally that the inaptitude of men for clear +thinking and the difficulties of the issues involved will render any +decision save the sheer clash of physical force impossible; that the +field of foreign politics is such a tangle that the popular mind will +always fall back upon decision by force. + +As a matter of fact the outstanding principles which serve to improve +human conduct, are quite simple and understandable, as soon as they have +been shorn of the sophistries and illusions with which the pundits +clothe them. The real work of the reformers is to hack away these +encumbering theories. The average European has not followed, and could +not follow, the amazing and never-ending disputation on obscure +theological points round which raged the Reformation; but the one solid +fact which did emerge from the whole was the general realization that +whatever the truth might be in all this confusion, it was quite +evidently wicked and futile to attempt to compel conformity to any one +section of it by force; that in the interests of all force should be +withheld; because if such queries were settled by the accident of +predominant force, it would prove, not which was right, but which was +stronger. So in such things as witchcraft. The learned and astute judges +of the 18th century, who sent so many thousands to their death for +impossible crimes, knew far more of the details of witchcraft than do +we, and would beat us hopelessly in an argument on the subject; but all +their learning was of no avail, because they had a few simple facts, the +premises, crooked, and we have them straight; and all that we need to +know in this amazing tangle of learned nonsense, is that the +probabilities are against an old woman having caused a storm at sea and +drowned a Scottish King. And so with the French Revolution. What the +Encyclopaedists and other pioneers of that movement really did for the +European peoples in that matter, was not to elaborate fantastic schemes +of constitution making, but by their argumentation to achieve the +destruction of old political sophistries--Divine Rights of Kings and +what not--and to enable one or two simple facts to emerge clearly and +unmistakeably, as that the object of government is the good of the +governed, and can find its justification in nothing else whatsoever. It +was these simple truths which, spreading over the world--with many +checks and set-backs--have so profoundly modified the structure of +Christendom. + +Somewhere it is related of Montaigne that talking with academic +colleagues, he expressed a contemptuous disbelief in the whole elaborate +theory of witchcraft as it existed at that time. Scandalised, his +colleagues took him into the University library, and showed him +hundreds, thousands, of parchment volumes written in Latin by the +learned men of the subject. Had he read these volumes, that he talked so +disrespectfully of their contents? No, replied Montaigne, he had not +read them, and he was not going to, because they were all wrong, and he +was right. And Montaigne spoke with this dogmatism because he realised +that he saw clearly that which they did not--the crookedness and +unsoundness of just those simple fundamental assumptions on which the +whole fantastic structure was based. + +And so with all the sophistries and illusions by which the war system is +still defended. If the public as a whole had to follow all the +intricacies of those marvellous diplomatic combinations, the maze of our +foreign politics, to understand abstruse points of finance and +economics, in order to have just and sound ideas as to the real +character of international relationship, why then public opinion would +go on being as ignorant and mistaken as it had been hitherto. But sound +opinion and instincts in that field depend upon nothing of the sort, but +upon the emergence of a few quite simple facts, which are indisputable +and self-evident, which stare us in the face, and which absolutely +disprove all the elaborate theories of the Bellicist statesmen. + +For instance, if conquest and extension of territory is the main road of +moral and material progress, the fundamental need which sets up all +these rivalries and collisions, then it is the populations of the Great +States which should be the most enviable; the position of the Russian +should be more desirable than that of the Hollander; it is not. The +Austrian should be better off than the Switzer; he is not. If a nation's +wealth is really subject to military confiscation, and needs the defence +of military power, then the wealth of those small states should be +insecure indeed--and Belgian national stocks stand 20 points higher than +the German. If nations are rival units, then we should benefit by the +disappearance of our rivals--and if they disappeared, something like a +third of our population would starve to death. If the growth and +prosperity of rival nations threatens us, then we should be in far +greater danger of America to-day than we were some 50 years ago, when +the growth of that power disturbed the sleep of our statesmen (and when, +incidentally, we were just as much afraid of the growth of that power as +we are now afraid of the growth of Germany). If the growing power of +Russia compelled us to fight a great war in alliance with the Turk to +check her "advance on India," why are we now co-operating with Russia to +build railroads to India? + +It is such quite simple questions as these, and the quite plain facts +which underlie them which will lead to sounder conceptions in this +matter on the part of the peoples. + +It is not we who are the "theorists," if by "theorists" is meant the +constructors of elaborate and deceptive theorems in this matter. It is +our opponents, the military mystics, who persistently shut their eyes to +the great outstanding facts of history and of our time. And these +fantastic theories are generally justified by most esoteric doctrine, +not by the appeal to the facts which stare you in the face. I once +replied to a critic thus:-- + + In examining my critic's balance sheet I remarked that were his + figures as complete as they were absurdly incomplete and + misleading, I should still have been unimpressed. We all know that + very marvellous results are possible with figures; but one can + generally find some simple fact which puts them to the supreme test + without undue mathematics. I do not know whether it has ever + happened to my critic, as it has happened to me, while watching the + gambling in the casino of a Continental watering resort, to have a + financial genius present weird columns of figures, which + demonstrate conclusively, irrefragably, that by this system which + they embody one can break the bank and win a million. I have never + examined these figures, and never shall, for this reason: the + genius in question is prepared to sell his wonderful secret for + twenty francs. Now, in the face of that fact I am not interested + in his figures. If they were worth examination they would not be + for sale. + + And so in this matter there are certain test facts which upset the + adroitest statistical legerdemain. Though, really, the fallacy + which regards an addition of territory as an addition of wealth to + the "owning" nation is a very much simpler matter than the + fallacies lying behind gambling systems, which are bound up with + the laws of chance and the law of averages and much else that + philosophers will quarrel about till the end of time. It requires + an exceptional mathematical brain really to refute those fallacies, + whereas the one we are dealing with is due simply to the difficulty + experienced by most of us in carrying in our heads two facts at the + same time. It is so much easier to seize on one fact and forget the + other. Thus we realize that when Germany has conquered + Alsace-Lorraine she has "captured" a province worth, "cash value," + in my critic's phrase, sixty-six millions sterling. What we + overlook is that Germany has also captured the people who own the + property and who continue to own it. We have multiplied by _x_, it + is true, but we have overlooked the fact that we have had to divide + by _x_, and that the resultant is consequently, so far as the + individual is concerned, exactly what it was before. My critic + remembered the multiplication all right, but he forgot the + division. + +Just think of all the theories, the impossible theories for which the +"practical" man has dragged the nations into war: the Balance of Power, +for instance. Fifteen or twenty years ago it was the ineradicable belief +of fifty or sixty million Americans, good, honest, sincere, and astute +folk, that it was their bounden duty, their manifest interest, to +fight--and in the words of one of their Senators, annihilate--Great +Britain, in the interests of the Monroe Doctrine (which is a form of the +"Balance of Power"). I do not think any one knew what the Monroe +Doctrine meant, or could coherently defend it. An American Ambassador +had an after-dinner story at the time. + +"What is this I hear, Jones, that you do not believe in the Monroe +Doctrine?" + +"It is a wicked lie. I have said no such thing. I do believe in the +Monroe Doctrine. I would lay down my life for it; I would die for it. +What I did say was that I didn't know what it meant." + +And it was this vague theory which very nearly drove America into a war +that would have been disastrous to the progress of Anglo-Saxon +civilization. + +This was at the time of the Venezuelan crisis: the United States, which +for nearly one hundred years had lived in perfect peace with a British +power touching her frontier along three thousand miles, laid it down as +a doctrine that her existence was imperilled if Great Britain should +extend by so much as a mile a vague frontier running through a South +American swamp thousands of miles away. And for that cause these decent +and honourable people were prepared to take all the risks that would be +involved to Anglo-Saxon civilisation by a war between England and +America. The present writer happened at that time to be living in +America, and concerned with certain political work. Night after night he +heard these fulminations against Great Britain; politicians, +Congressmen, Senators, Governors, Ministers, Preachers, clamouring for +war, for a theory as vague and as little practical as one could wish. + +And we, of course, have had our like obsessions without number: "the +independence integrity of the Turkish dominion in Europe" is one. Just +think of it! Take in the full sound of the phrase: "the independence +integrity of the Turkish dominion in Europe!" + +What, of course, makes these fantastic political doctrines possible, +what leads men to subscribe to them, are a few false general conceptions +to which they hold tenaciously--as all fundamental conceptions are held, +and ought to be. The general conceptions in question are precisely the +ones I have indicated: that nations are rival and struggling units, that +military force is consequently the determining factor of their relative +advantage; that enlargement of political frontiers is the supreme need, +and so on. + +And the revision of these fundamental conceptions will, of course, be +the general work of Christendom, and given the conditions which now +obtain, the development will go on _pari passu_ in all nations or not +all. It will not be the work of "nations" at all; it will be the work of +individual men. + +States do not think. It is the men who form the states who think, and +the number of those men who will act as pioneers in a better policy +must, of course, at first be small: a group here and a group there, the +best men of all countries--England, France, Germany, +America--influencing by their ideas finally the great mass. To say, as +so many do in this matter: "Let other nations do it first" is, of +course, to condemn us all to impotence--for the other nations use the +same language. To ask that one group of forty or seventy or ninety +million people shall by some sort of magic all find their way to a saner +doctrine before such doctrine has affected other groups is to talk the +language of childishness. Things do not happen in that in human affairs. +It is not in that way that opinion grows. It did not grow in that way +in any one of the steps that I have mentioned--in the abolition of +religious persecution, or slavery, or judicial torture. Unless the +individual man sees his responsibility for determining what is right and +knowing how and why it is right, there will be no progress; there cannot +even be a beginning. + +We are to an even greater degree an integral part of European Society, +and a factor of European Policy, than we were at the time of the Crimean +War, when we mainly determined it; and our theories and discussions will +act and re-act upon that policy just as did any considerable body of +thought, whether French political thought of the eighteenth century, or +German religious thought of the sixteenth century, even at a time when +the means of producing that reaction, the book, literature, the +newspaper, rapid communication, were so immeasurably more primitive and +rudimentary than ours. What we think and say and do affects not merely +ourselves, but that whole body politic of Christendom of which we are an +integral part. + +It is a curious fact that the moral and intellectual interdependence of +States preceded by a long period, that material and economic +independence which I have tried recently to make clear. Nothing is more +contrary to fact than to suppose that any considerable movement of +opinion in Europe can be limited to the frontiers of one nation. Even at +a time when it took half a generation for a thought to travel from one +capital to another, a student or thinker in some obscure Italian, Swiss +or German village was able to modify policy, to change the face of +Europe and of mankind. Coming nearer to our time, it was the work of the +encyclopaedists and earlier political questioners which made the French +Revolution; and the effect of that Revolution was not confined to +France. The ideas which animated it re-acted directly upon our Empire, +upon the American Colonies, upon the Spanish Colonies, upon Italy, and +the formation of United Italy, upon Germany--the world over. These +miracles, almost too vast and great to conceive, were the outcome of +that intangible thing, an idea, an aspiration, an ideal. And if they +could accomplish so much in that day when the popular press and cheap +literature and improved communication did not exist, how is it possible +to suppose that any great ferment of opinion can be limited to one group +in our day, when we have a condition of things in which the declaration +of an English Cabinet Minister to-night is read to-morrow morning by +every reading German? + +It should be to our everlasting glory that our political thought in the +past, some of our political institutions, parliamentary government, and +what not, have had an enormous influence in the world. We have some +ground for hoping that another form of political institution which we +have initiated, a relationship of distinct political groups into which +force does not enter, will lead the way to a better condition of things +in Christendom. We have demonstrated that five independent nations, the +nations of the British Empire, can settle their differences as between +one another without the use of force. We have definitely decided that +whatever the attitude Australia, Canada, and South Africa may adopt to +us we shall not use force to change it. What is possible with five is +possible with fifteen nations. Just as we have given to the world +roughly our conception of Parliamentary Government, so it is to be hoped +may we give to the world our conception of the true relationship of +nations. + +The great steps of the past--religious freedom, the abolition of torture +and of slavery, the rights of the mass, self-government--every real step +which man has made has been made because men "theorised," because a +Galileo, or a Luther, or a Calvin, or a Voltaire, Rousseau, Bentham, +Spencer, Darwin, wrote and put notes of interrogation. Had they not done +so none of those things could have been accomplished. The greatest work +of the renaissance was the elimination of physical force in the struggle +of religious groups, in religious struggles generally; the greatest work +of our generation will be elimination of physical force from the +struggle of the political groups and from political struggles generally. +But it will be done in exactly the same way: by a common improvement of +opinion. And because we possess immeasurably better instruments for the +dissemination of ideas, we should be able to achieve the Political +Reformation of Europe much more rapidly and effectively than our +predecessors achieved the great intellectual Reformation of their time. + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +WHAT MUST WE _DO_? + +We must have the right political faith--Then we must give effect to +it--Good intention not enough--The organization of the great forces of +modern life--Our indifference as to the foundations of the evil--The +only hope. + + +What then must we _do_? Well the first and obvious thing is for each to +do his civic duty, for each to determine that he at least shall not +reject, with that silly temper which nearly always meets most new points +of view, principles which do at least seek to explain things, and do +point to the possibility of a better way. + +The first thing is to make our own policy right--and that is the work of +each one of us; to correct the temper which made us, for instance, to +our shame, the partners of the Turk in his work of oppression. + +And we must realise that mere good intent does not suffice; that +understanding, by which alone we can make headway, is not arrived at by +a pleasant emotion like that produced by a Beethoven Sonata; that we pay +for our progress in a little harder money than that, the money of hard +work, in which must be included hard thinking. And having got that far, +we must realise that sound ideas do not spread themselves. They are +spread by men. It is one of the astonishing things in the whole problem +of the breaking of war, that while men realise that if women are to have +votes, or men to be made temperate, or the White Slave Traffic to be +stopped, or for that matter, if battleships are to be built, or +conscription to be introduced, or soap or pills to be sold, effort, +organisation, time, money, must be put into these things. But the +greatest revolution that the world has known since mankind acquired the +right to freedom of opinion, will apparently get itself accomplished +without any of these things; or that at least the Government can quite +easily attend to it by asking other Governments to attend a Conference. +We must realise that a change of opinion, the recognition of a new fact, +or of facts heretofore not realised, is a slow and laborious work, even +in the relatively simple things which I have mentioned, and that you +cannot make savages into civilised men by collecting them round a table. +For the Powers of Europe, so far as their national policies are +concerned, are still uncivilised individuals. And their Conferences are +bound to fail, when each unit has the falsest conception concerning the +matters under discussion. Governments are the embodied expression of +general public opinion--and not the best public opinion at that; and +until opinion is modified, the embodiment of it will no more be capable +of the necessary common action, than would Red Indians be capable of +forming an efficient Court of Law, while knowing nothing of law or +jurisprudence, or worse still, having utterly false notions of the +principles upon which human society is based. + +And the occasional conferences of private men still hazy as to these +principles are bound to be as ineffective. If the mere meeting and +contact of people cleared up misunderstandings, we should not have +Suffragettes and Anti-Suffragettes, or Mr. Lloyd George at grips with +the doctors. + +These occasional conferences, whether official, like those of the Hague, +or non-official like those which occasionally meet in London or in +Berlin, will not be of great avail in this matter unless a better public +opinion renders them effective. They are of some use and no one would +desire to see them dropped, but they will not of themselves stem or turn +the drift of opinion. What is needed is a permanent organisation of +propaganda, framed, not for the purpose of putting some cut and dried +scheme into immediate operation, but with the purpose of clarifying +European public opinion, making the great mass see a few simple facts +straight, instead of crooked, and founded in the hope that ten or +fifteen years of hard, steady, persistent work, will create in that time +(by virtue of the superiority of the instruments, the Press and the rest +of it which we possess) a revolution of opinion as great as that +produced at the time of the Reformation, in a period which probably was +not more than the lifetime of an ordinary man. + +The organization for such permanent work has hardly begun. The Peace +Societies have done, and are doing, a real service, but it is evident, +for the reasons already indicated, that if the great mass are to be +affected, instruments of far wider sweep must be used. Our great +commercial and financial interests, our educational and academic +institutions, our industrial organizations, the political bodies, must +all be reached. An effort along the right lines has been made thanks to +the generosity of a more than ordinarily enlightened Conservative +capitalist. But the work should be taken up at a hundred points. Some +able financier should do for the organization of Banking--which has +really become the Industry of Finance and Credit--the same sort of +service that Sir Charles Macara has done for the cotton industry of the +world. The international action and co-ordination of Trades Unions the +world over should be made practical and not, in this matter, be allowed +to remain a merely platonic aspiration. + +The greater European Universities should possess endowed Chairs of the +Science of International Statecraft. While we have Chairs to investigate +the nature of the relationship of insects, we have none to investigate +the nature of the relationship of man in his political grouping. And the +occupants of these Chairs might change places--that of Berlin coming to +London or Oxford, and that of Oxford going to Berlin. + +The English Navy League and the German Navy League alike tell us that +the object of their endeavours is to create an instrument of peace. In +that case their efforts should not be confined to increasing the size of +the respective arms, but should also be directed to determining how and +why and when, and under what conditions, and for what purpose that arm +should be used. And that can only be done effectually if the two bodies +learn something of the aims and objects of the other. The need for a +Navy, and the size of the Navy, depends upon policy, either our own +policy, or the policy of the prospective aggressor; and to know +something of that, and its adjustment, is surely an integral part of +national defence. If both these Navy Leagues, in the fifteen or sixteen +years during which they have been in existence, had possessed an +intelligence committee, each conferring with the other, and spending +even a fraction of the money and energy upon disentangling policy that +has been spent upon the sheer bull-dog piling up of armaments, in all +human possibility, the situation which now confronts us would not exist. + +Then each political party of the respective Parliaments might have its +accredited delegates in the Lobbies of the other: the Social Democrats +might have their permanent delegates in London, in the Lobbies of the +House of Commons; the Labour Party might have their Permanent Delegates +in the Lobbies of the Reichstag; and when any Anglo-German question +arose, those delegates could speak through the mouth of the Members of +the Party to which they were accredited, to the Parliament of the other +nation. The Capitalistic parties could have a like bi-national +organisation. + +"These are wild and foolish suggestions"--that is possible. They have +never, however, been discussed with a view to the objects in question. +All efforts in this direction have been concentrated upon an attempt to +realize mechanically, by some short and royal road, a result far too +great and beneficent to be achieved so cheaply. + +Before our Conferences, official or unofficial, can have much success, +the parties to them must divest their minds of certain illusions which +at present dominate them. Until that is done, you might as reasonably +expect two cannibals to arrive at a workable scheme for consuming one +another. The elementary conceptions, the foundations of the thing are +unworkable. Our statecraft is still founded on a sort of political +cannibalism, upon the idea that nations progress by conquering, or +dominating one another. So long as that is our conception of the +relationship of human groups we shall always stand in danger of +collision, and our schemes of association and co-operation will always +break down. + + + + +APPENDIX. + + +Many of the points touched upon in the last two chapters are brought out +clearly in a recent letter addressed to the Press by my friend and +colleague Mr. A.W. Haycock. In this letter to the Press he says:-- + + If you will examine systematically, as I have done, the comments + which have appeared in the Liberal Press, either in the form of + leading articles, or in letters from readers, concerning Lord + Roberts' speech, you will find that though it is variously + described as "diabolical," "pernicious," "wicked," "inflammatory" + and "criminal," the real fundamental assumptions on which the whole + speech is based, and which, if correct, justify it, are by + implication admitted; at any rate, in not one single case that I + can discover are they seriously challenged. + + Now, when you consider this, it is the most serious fact of the + whole incident--far more disquieting in reality than the fact of + the speech itself, especially when we remember that Lord Roberts + did but adopt and adapt the arguments already used with more + sensationalism and less courtesy by Mr. Winston Churchill himself. + + The protests against Lord Roberts' speech take the form of denying + the intention of Germany to attach this country. But how can his + critics be any more aware of the intentions of Germany--65 millions + of people acted upon by all sorts of complex political and social + forces--than is Lord Roberts? Do we know the intention of England + with reference to Woman's Suffrage or Home Rule or Tariff Reform? + How, therefore, can we know the intentions of "Germany"? + + Lord Roberts, with courtesy, in form at least and with the warmest + tribute to the "noble and imaginative patriotism" of German policy, + assumed that that policy would follow the same general impulse that + our own has done in the past, and would necessarily follow it since + the relation between military power and national greatness and + prosperity was to-day what it always has been. In effect, Lord + Roberts' case amounts to this:-- + + "We have built up our Empire and our trade by virtue of the + military power of our state; we exist as a nation, sail the seas, + and carry on our trade, by virtue of our predominant strength; as + that strength fails we shall do all these things merely on the + sufferance of stronger nations, who, when pushed by the needs of an + expanding population to do so, will deprive us of the capacity for + carrying on those vital functions of life, and transfer the means + of so doing to themselves to their very great advantage; we have + achieved such transfer to ourselves in the past by force and must + expect other nations to try and do the same thing unless we are + able to prevent them. It is the inevitable struggles of life to be + fought out either by war or armaments." + + These are not Lord Roberts' words, but the proposition is the clear + underlying assumption of his speech. And his critics do not + seriously challenge it. Mr. Churchill by implication warmly + supports it. At Glasgow he said: "The whole fortune of our race and + Empire, the whole treasure accumulated during so many centuries of + sacrifice and achievement would perish and be swept utterly away, + if our naval supremacy were to be impaired." + + Now why should there be any danger of Germany bringing about this + catastrophe unless she could profit enormously by so doing? But + that implies that a nation does expand by military force, does + achieve the best for its people by that means; it does mean that if + you are not stronger than your rival, you carry on your trade "on + sufferance" and at the appointed hour will have it taken from you + by him. And if that assumption--plainly indicated as it is by a + Liberal Minister--is right, who can say that Lord Roberts' + conclusion is not justified? + + Now as to the means of preventing the war. Lord Roberts' formula + is:-- + + "Such a battle front by sea and land that no power or probable + combination of powers shall dare to attack us without the certainty + of disaster." + + This, of course, is taken straight from Mr. Churchill, who, at + Dundee, told us that "the way to make war impossible is to be so + strong as to make victory certain." + + We have all apparently, Liberals and Conservatives alike, accepted + this "axiom" as self-evident. + + Well, since it is so obvious as all that we may expect the Germans + to adopt it. At present they are guided by a much more modest + principle (enunciated in the preamble of the German Navy Law); + namely, to be sufficiently strong to make it _dangerous_ for your + enemy to attack. They must now, according to our "axiom," be so + strong as to make our defeat certain. + + I am quite sure that the big armament people in Germany are very + grateful for the advice which Mr. Churchill and Lord Roberts thus + give to the nations of the world, and we may expect to see German + armaments so increased as to accord with the new principle. + + And Lord Roberts is courageous enough to abide by the conclusion + which flows from the fundamental assumption of Liberals and + Conservatives alike, _i.e._, that trade and the means of livelihood + can be transferred by force. We have transferred it in the past. + "It is excellent policy; it is, or should be, the policy of every + nation prepared to play a great part in history." Such are Lord + Roberts' actual words. At least, they don't burke the issue. + + The Germans will doubtless note the combination: be so strong as to + make victory certain, and strike when you have made it certain, and + they will then, in the light of this advice, be able to put the + right interpretation upon our endeavours to create a great + conscript force and our arrangements, which have been going on for + some years, to throw an expeditionary force on to the continent. + + The outlook is not very pleasant, is it? And yet if you accept the + "axiom" that our Empire and our trade is dependent upon force and + can be advantageously attacked by a stronger power there is no + escape from the inevitable struggle--for the other "axiom" that + safety can be secured merely by being enormously stronger than your + rival is, as soon as it is tested by applying it to the two parties + to the conflict--and, of course, one has as much right to apply it + as the other--seen to be simply dangerous and muddle-headed + rubbish. Include the two parties in your "axiom" (as you must) and + it becomes impossible of application. + + Now the whole problem sifts finally down to this one question: Is + the assumption made by Lord Roberts and implied by Mr. Churchill + concerning the relation of military force to trade and national + life well founded? If it is, conflict is inevitable. It is no good + crying "panic." If there is this enormous temptation pushing to our + national ruin, we ought to be in a panic. And if it is not true? + Even in that case conflict will equally be inevitable unless we + realise its falseness, for a universal false opinion concerning a + fact will have the same result in conduct as though the false + belief were true. + + And my point is that those concerned to prevent this conflict seem + but mildly interested in examining the foundations of the false + beliefs that make conflict inevitable. Part of the reluctance to + study the subject seems to arise from the fear that if we deny the + nonsensical idea that the British Empire would instantaneously fall + to pieces were the Germans to dominate the North Sea for 24 hours + we should weaken the impulse to defence. That is probably an + utterly false idea, but suppose it is true, is the risk of less + ardour in defence as great as the risk which comes of having a + nation of Roberts and Churchills on both sides of the frontier? + + If that happens war becomes not a risk but a certainty. + + And it is danger of happening. I speak from the standpoint of a + somewhat special experience. During the last 18 months I have + addressed not scores but many hundreds of meetings on the subject + of the very proposition on which Lord Roberts' speech is based and + which I have indicated at the beginning of this letter; I have + answered not hundreds but thousands of questions arising out of it. + And I think that gives me a somewhat special understanding of the + mind of the man in the street. The reason he is subject to panic, + and "sees red" and will often accept blindly counsels like those of + Lord Roberts, is that he holds as axioms these primary assumptions + to which I have referred, namely, that he carries on his daily life + by virtue of military force, and that the means of carrying it on + will be taken from him by the first stronger power that rises in + the world, and that that power will be pushed to do it by the + advantage of such seizure. And these axioms he never finds + challenged even by his Liberal guides. + + The issue for those who really desire a better condition is clear. + So long as by their silence, or by their indifference to the + discussion of the fundamental facts of this problem they create the + impression that Mr. Churchill's axioms are unchallengeable, the + panic-mongers will have it all their own way, and our action will + be a stimulus to similar action in Germany, and that action will + again re-act on ours, and so on _ad infinitum._ + + Why is not some concerted effort made to create in both countries + the necessary public opinion, by encouraging the study and + discussion of the elements of the case, in some such way, for + instance, as that adopted by Mr. Norman Angell in his book? + + One organization due to private munificence has been formed and is + doing, within limits, an extraordinarily useful work, but we can + only hope to affect policy by a much more general interest--the + interest of those of leisure and influence. And that does not seem + to be forthcoming. + + My own work, which has been based quite frankly on Mr. Angell's + book, has convinced me that it embodies just the formula most + readily understanded of the people. It constitutes a constructive + doctrine of International Policy--the only statement I know so + definitely applicable to modern conditions. + + But the old illusions are so entrenched that if any impression is + to be made on public opinion generally, effort must be persistent, + permanent, and widespread. Mere isolated conferences, disconnected + from work of a permanent character, are altogether inadequate for + the forces that have to be met. + + What is needed is a permanent and widespread organization embracing + Trades Unions, Churches and affiliated bodies, Schools and + Universities, basing its work on some definite doctrine of + International Policy which can supplant the present conceptions of + struggle and chaos. + + I speak, at least, from the standpoint of experience; in the last + resort the hostility, fear and suspicion which from time to time + gains currency among the great mass of the people, is due to those + elementary misconceptions as to the relation of prosperity, the + opportunities of life, to military power. So long as these + misconceptions are dominant, nothing is easier than to precipitate + panic and bad feeling, and unless we can modify them, we shall in + all human probability drift into conflict; and this incident of + Lord Roberts' speech and the comment which it has provoked, show + that for some not very well defined reason, Liberals, quite as much + as Conservatives, by implication, accept the axioms upon which it + is based, and give but little evidence that they are seriously + bestirring themselves to improve that political education upon + which according to their creed, progress can alone be made. + + Yours very faithfully, + + A.W. HAYCOCK. + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Peace Theories and the Balkan War, by Norman Angell + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PEACE THEORIES AND THE BALKAN WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 11895.txt or 11895.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/1/8/9/11895/ + +Produced by MBP and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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