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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/11352-0.txt b/11352-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd07ee7 --- /dev/null +++ b/11352-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10177 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 11352 *** + +GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR + + + +BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI + + + +TRANSLATED BY ALLEN H. POWLES + + +1912 + + + +All the patriotic sections of the German people were greatly excited +during the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on all +hearts that in the settlement of the Morocco dispute no mere commercial +or colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but that +the honour and future of the German nation were at stake. A deep rift +had opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action +of the Government. Public opinion, which was clearly in favour of +asserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our political +position, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would have +demanded. I cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in an +overwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, would +have been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation. +Haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic of +the German Reichstag in modern Berlin as it was in medieval Regensburg. +These conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages, +which were partly written some time ago. + +Nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national and +political development. At such times it is necessary to be absolutely +clear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be +surmounted, and the sacrifices to be made. + +The task I have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of all +diplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. It is +obvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view. + +Our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past, +have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nation +which, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must, +and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulness +of my German heart that I have recorded my convictions. I believe that +thus I shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers' +hearts, and strengthen the national purpose. + +THE AUTHOR. + +_October, 1911_ + + + + +CONTENTS + +PREFACE + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Power of the peace idea--Causes of the love of peace in Germany-- + German consciousness of strength--Lack of definite political aims + --Perilous situation of Germany and the conditions of successful + self-assertion--Need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to + explain the tasks and aims of Germany in the light of history + + +CHAPTER I +THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR + +Pacific ideals and arbitration--The biological necessity of war--The + duty of self-assertion--The right of conquest--The struggle for + employment--War a moral obligation--Beneficent results of war + --War from the Christian and from the materialist standpoints-- + Arbitration and international law--Destructiveness and immorality + of peace aspirations--Real and Utopian humanity--Dangerous + results of peace aspirations in Germany--The duty of + the State + + +CHAPTER II +THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR + +Bismarck and the justification of war--The duty to fight--The teaching + of history--War only justifiable on adequate grounds--The + foundations of political morality--Political and individual morality + --The grounds for making war--The decision to make war--The + responsibility of the statesman + + +CHAPTER III +A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT + +The ways of Providence in history--Christianity and the Germans-- + The Empire and the Papacy--Breach between the German World + Empire and the revived spiritual power--Rise of the great States + of Europe and political downfall of Germany after the Thirty + Years' War--Rise of the Prussian State--The epoch of the Revolution + and the War of Liberation--Intellectual supremacy of + Germany--After the War of Liberation--Germany under William + I. and Bismarck--Change in the conception of the State and + the principle of nationality--New economic developments and + the World Power of England--Rise of other World Powers-- + Socialism, and how to overcome it--German science and art-- + Internal disintegration of Germany and her latent strength + + +CHAPTER IV +GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION + +Grounds of the intellectual supremacy of Germany--Germany's role + as spiritual and intellectual leader--Conquest of religious and + social obstacles--Inadequacy of our present political position-- + To secure what we have won our first duty--Necessity of increasing + our political power--Necessity of colonial expansion-- + Menace to our aspirations from hostile Powers + + +CHAPTER V +WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL + +Points of view for judging of the political situation--The States of the + Triple Alliance--The political interests of France and Russia-- + The Russo-French Alliance--The policy of Great Britain-- + America and the rising World Powers of the Far East--The importance + of Turkey--Spain and the minor States of Europe--Perilous + position of Germany--World power or downfall--Increase + of political power: how to obtain it--German colonial + policy--The principle of the balance of power in Europe--Neutral + States--The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs + of other States--Germany and the rules of international politics + --The foundations of our internal strength + + +CHAPTER VI +THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY FOR WAR + +Its necessity--Its twofold aspect--The educational importance of + military efficiency--Different military systems--Change in the + nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization-- + Variety of methods of preparation for war--The armaments of + minor States--The armaments of the Great Powers--Harmonious + development of all elements of strength--Influence on armaments + of different conceptions of the duties of the State--Permanent + factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness-- + Statecraft in this connection + + +CHAPTER VII +THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR + +Our opponents--The French army--The military power of Russia-- + The land forces of England--The military power of Germany and + Austria; of Italy--The Turkish army--The smaller Balkan States + --The Roumanian army--The armies of the lesser States of Central + Europe--Greece and Spain--The fleets of the principal naval + Powers--The enmity of France--The hostility of England-- + Russia's probable behaviour in a war against Germany--The + military situation of Germany--Her isolation--What will be at + stake in our next war--Preparation for war + + +CHAPTER VIII +THE NEXT NAVAL WAR + +England's preparations for a naval war against Germany--Germany's + first measures against England--England and the neutrality of the + small neighbouring States--The importance of Denmark--Commercial + mobilization--The two kinds of blockade: The close + blockade and the extended blockade--England's attack on our + coasts--Co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--The decisive + battle and its importance--Participation of France and Russia in + a German-English war + + +CHAPTER IX +THE CRUCIAL QUESTION + +Reciprocal relations of land and sea power--The governing points of + view in respect of war preparations--Carrying out of universal + military service--The value of intellectual superiority--Masses, + weapons, and transport in modern war--Tactical efficiency and + the quality of the troops--The advantage of the offensive--Points + to be kept in view in war preparations--Refutation of the prevailing + restricted notions on this head--The _Ersatzreserve_--New + formations--Employment of the troops of the line and the new + formations--Strengthening of the standing army--The importance + of personality + + +CHAPTER X +ARMY ORGANIZATION + +Not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further + development--Fighting power and tactical efficiency--Strength of the + peace establishment--Number of officers and N.C.O.'s, especially in the + infantry--Relations of the different arms to each other--Distribution + of machine guns--Proportion between infantry and artillery--Lessons to + be learned from recent wars with regard to this--Superiority at the + decisive point--The strength of the artillery and tactical + efficiency--Tactical efficiency of modern armies--Tactical efficiency + and the marching depth of an army corps--Importance of the internal + organization of tactical units--Organization and distribution of field + artillery; of heavy field howitzers--Field pioneers and fortress + pioneers--Tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--Increase of the + cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--Tactical organization of the + cavalry--Development of the air-fleet--Summary of the necessary + requirements--Different ways of carrying them out--Importance of + governing points of view for war preparations + + +CHAPTER XI +TRAINING AND EDUCATION + +The spirit of training--Self-dependence and the employment of masses-- + Education in self-dependence--Defects in our training for war on the + grand scale--Need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to + the training of our commanders--Practical training of the artillery-- + Training in tactical efficiency--Practice in marching under war + conditions--Training of the train officers and column leaders-- + Control of the General Staff by the higher commanders--Value of + manoeuvres: how to arrange them--Preliminary theoretical training of + the higher commanders--Training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the + pioneers and commissariat troops--Promotion of intellectual development + in the army--Training in the military academy + + +CHAPTER XII +PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR + +The position of a World Power implies naval strength--Development + of German naval ideals--The task of the German fleet; its strength + --Importance of coast defences--Necessity of accelerating our + naval armaments--The building of the fleet--The institution of + the air-fleet--Preliminary measures for a war on commerce-- + Mobilization--General points of view with regard to preparations + for the naval war--Lost opportunities in the past + + +CHAPTER XIII +THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION + +The universal importance of national education--Its value for the + army--Hurtful influences at work on it--Duties of the State with + regard to national health--Work and sport--The importance of + the school--The inadequacy of our national schools--Military + education and education in the national schools--Methods of + instruction in the latter--Necessity for their reform--Continuation + schools--Influence of national education on the Russo-Japanese + War--Other means of national education--The propaganda of + action + + +CHAPTER XIV +FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR + +Duties of the State in regard to war preparations--The State and + national credit--The financial capacity of Germany--Necessity of + new sources of revenue--The imperial right of inheritance--Policy + of interests and alliances--Moulding and exploitation of the + political situation--The laws of political conduct--Interaction of + military and political war preparations--Political preparations + for our next war--Governing factors in the conduct of German policy + + +EPILOGUE + +The latest political events--Conduct of the German Imperial Government + --The arrangement with France--Anglo-French relations and + the attitude of England--The requirements of the situation + + + + +GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR + + + +INTRODUCTION + +The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has +been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way +which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining +the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in +Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal +enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With the +increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of +sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great +conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our +future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a +solution at the present time. + +We have been capable of soaring upwards. Mighty deeds raised Germany +from political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of European +nations. But we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and to +advance along the path of development in politics and culture. We +tremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands from +us. Yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from our +glorious past. How rightly Fichte once judged his countrymen when he +said the German can never wish for a thing by itself; he must always +wish for its contrary also. + +The Germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlike +nation of Europe. For a long time they have proved themselves to be the +ruling people of the Continent by the power of their arms and the +loftiness of their ideas. Germans have bled and conquered on countless +battlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shown +that the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. In +striking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become a +peace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. A rude shock is +needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their +military strength. + +This strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes. + +It springs first from the good-natured character of the German people, +which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations and +partisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. It is connected +with another characteristic of the German nature. Our aim is to be just, +and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchange +relations share this aim. We are always ready to consider the peaceful +assurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign Press to be no less +genuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resist +the view that the political world is only ruled by interests and never +from ideal aims of philanthropy. "Justice," Goethe says aptly, "is a +quality and a phantom of the Germans." We are always inclined to assume +that disputes between States can find a peaceful solution on the basis +of justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is. + +An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted +in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed +in commercial life. + +The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world. +Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhaps +the greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty years +Germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion +of her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line, +we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the +world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great +industrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are established +all over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of the +globe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands of +Germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Under +these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides. + +Our trade and our industries--owners no less than employés--do not want +this development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is the +essential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition will +be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have +never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained +by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce. + +Universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, for +war in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limited +circles, but the whole nation suffers alike. All families and all +classes have to pay the same toll of human lives. Finally comes the +effect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of the +times--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of an +aspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfold +in peace. + +Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem +entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire +received with "astonishment and indignation" from Frederick the Great, +that "the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power"; +that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans, +cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the +greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. We regard our +warlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is the +special duty of the German Reichstag to lighten so far as possible. We +seem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament is +not an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of our +national health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige. +We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it +as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. + +Besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continued +justification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate and +often unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the German people. +The agelong dream of the German nation was realized in the political +union of the greater part of the German races and in the founding of the +German Empire. Since then there lives in the hearts of all (I would not +exclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proud +consciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increased +political power. This consciousness is supported by the fixed +determination never to abandon these acquisitions. The conviction is +universal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the whole +nation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. We all wish, indeed, to be +able to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict, +and we live in the belief that the power of our State will steadily +increase without our needing to fight for it. We do not at the bottom of +our hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with a +certain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to let +ourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow. +Every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. Not +merely in the North, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race with +glorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner of +Prussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of all +thought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in the +South also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of petty +nationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the German stock live +in the heart of the people. Here and there, maybe, such emotions slumber +in the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer and +more luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animated +by latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousness +await their awakening. + +Thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below the +surface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. It fritters +itself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. We no +longer have a clearly defined political and national aim, which grips +the imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unity +of action. Such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in the +yearnings for German unity, for the fulfilment of the Barbarossa legend. +A great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems to +me to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in the +world is threatened by external complications, the greater is this +danger. + +Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding all +peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that +their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often +pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific +settlement. + +In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful +methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable, +our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result of +our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also +because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual +upstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, and +now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for +centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect. We have thus +injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. It must be +reserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situation +thus affected, but one point can be mentioned without further +consideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties is +adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the +Germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces +brought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of this +struggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation. +We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset by +the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this +struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry +through a Seven Years' War for our position as a World Power, if we gain +a start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which will +fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces +of the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops, +but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for +all their dearest possessions. + +These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the +standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great +tasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before the +German people as the greatest civilized people known to history. + +From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations for +peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of +the German people, according to their true moral significance. I must +try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of +nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true +civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality. +I must endeavour to develop from the history of the German past in its +connection with the conditions of the present those aspects of the +question which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. The +historical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according to +inward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drastic +obligations. No one need passively submit to the pressure of +circumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at the +parting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or to +decadence. "A favoured position in the world will only become effective +in the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it." It +seemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this parting +of the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light I +may on the different paths which are open to our people. A nation must +fully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can it +take deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and, +looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for any +sacrifices which the present or future may demand. + +These sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financial +sphere, depend mainly on the idea of what Germany is called upon to +strive for and attain in the present and the future. Only those who +share my conception of the duties and obligations of the German people, +and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing the +sword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusions +in the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financial +demands which spring out of it. It is only in their logical connection +with the entire development, political and moral, of the State that the +military requirements find their motive and their justification. + + + + +CHAPTER I + + + +THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR + +Since 1795, when Immanuel Kant published in his old age his treatise on +"Perpetual Peace," many have considered it an established fact that war +is the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. In spite of +all that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the struggle +between nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization is +credited with a power to which war must yield. But, undisturbed by such +human theories and the change of times, war has again and again marched +from country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved its +destructive as well as creative and purifying power. It has not +succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. Long periods of +war, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on the +contrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, from +the political intercourse of nations. + +This wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. The +maintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanship +should aim. This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days a +quite peculiar power over men's spirits. This aspiration finds its +public expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the Press of +every country and of every party opens its columns to it. The current in +this direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of Governments +profess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peace +is the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out the +aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all Governments exert +themselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish the +conflagration. + +Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action. +They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote +their own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at the +Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the +United States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried to +conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and +foremost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany. No +practical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved. + +We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts. +This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as the +weaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest +need of international protection, have been completely passed over in +the American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be +assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans, +with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced +"perfidious Albion" to accede to the proposals. We may suppose that +England intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, but +that America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of +sovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out her +plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America. +Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over +the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for +themselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts +of President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace, +and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for Foreign +Affairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of +the United States an era in the history of mankind. + +This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and +marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been +shown by a race of Epigoni. "It has always been," H. von Treitschke +tells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played +with the dream of perpetual peace." + +Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours to +diminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which war +entails are justifiable. It is an incontestable fact that war +temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic +development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the +primitive brutality of man. It is therefore a most desirable +consummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible, +and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily +in the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential nature +of war. All that the Hague Peace Congress has accomplished in this +limited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war, +universal acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the object +is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place in +historical development. + +This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws +which rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the first +importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be +dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, +which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real +civilization. "War is the father of all things." [A] The sages of +antiquity long before Darwin recognized this. + +[Footnote A: (Heraclitus of Ephesus).] + +The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all +healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the +result of contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not +merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "To supplant or +to be supplanted is the essence of life," says Goethe, and the strong +life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good +everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the +most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the +universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. This struggle is +regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and +by the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animal +world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the human +race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances. +The man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means to +assert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the +individual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness of +right. The life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined, +doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent +the less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour, +envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. Still more +often, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures of +a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment. + +There can be no doubt on this point. The nation is made up of +individuals, the State of communities. The motive which influences each +member is prominent in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle for +possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the +relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only +as it is compatible with advantage. So long as there are men who have +human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive +for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests +come into being and occasions for making war arise. + +"The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law +of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and +institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the +intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The +extrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the external +development of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal +development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggle +of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward +development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of +nations--war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist? +In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat +of the other! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates." [B] + +[Footnote B: Clauss Wagner, "Der Krieg als schaffendes Weltprinzip."] + +That social system in which the most efficient personalities possess the +greatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocial +struggle. In the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquer +which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral, +material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend +itself. War will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions, +enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus +promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual +and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which +render possible a general progressive development. They confer victory +because the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war, +inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy +budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "War," says A. +W. von Schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in +Nature." + +Now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may exist +between peoples and States, like that between the fellow-members of a +society, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need not +always degenerate Into war. Struggle and war are not identical. This +rivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as the +intrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results. +Above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the State stands the +law, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that the +right shall prevail. Behind the law stands the State, armed with power, +which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively to +promote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. But there is no +impartial power that stands above the rivalry of States to restrain +injustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote the +highest ends of mankind. Between States the only check on injustice is +force, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own +part and promote its own ends and ideals. If in doing so it comes into +conflict with the ideals and views of other States, it must either +submit and concede the precedence to the rival people or State, or +appeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i.e., of +war--in order to make its own views prevail. No power exists which can +judge between States, and makes its judgments prevail. Nothing, in fact, +is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress the +ascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay. + +It will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form a +superior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is +stronger. This attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the more +intensive vitality will prevail. The allied opponents have the seeds of +corruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporary +reverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory over +numerical superiority. The history of Germany is an eloquent example of +this truth. + +Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct of +self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a +natural condition of existence. "Man is a fighter." Self-sacrifice is a +renunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or in +the life of States, which are agglomerations of individuals. The first +and paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence. +By self-assertion alone can the State maintain the conditions of life +for its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man is +entitled to claim from it. This duty of self-assertion is by no means +satisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes the +obligation to assure the possibility of life and development to the +whole body of the nation embraced by the State. + +Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a +given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they +require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. +Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, +as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say, +by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. + +The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first the +procedure is pacific. Over-populated countries pour a stream of +emigrants into other States and territories. These submit to the +legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditions +of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants, +with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest. + +The right of colonization is also recognized. Vast territories inhabited +by uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized States, and +made subject to their rule. Higher civilization and the correspondingly +greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. This right +is, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determine +what degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. The +impossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these international +relations has been the cause of many wars. The subjugated nation does +not recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilized +nation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence. +This situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions of +civilization have changed in the course of time. The subject nation has, +perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and the +difference in civilization has consequently lessened. Such a state of +things is growing ripe in British India. + +Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. It +may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races, +and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which the +mother-country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to +acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of +self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign +soil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right. +The threatened people will see the point of Goethe's lines: + + "That which them didst inherit from thy sires, + In order to possess it, must be won." + +The procedure of Italy in Tripoli furnishes an example of such +conditions, while Germany in the Morocco question could not rouse +herself to a similar resolution.[C] + +[Footnote C: This does not imply that Germany could and ought to have +occupied part of Morocco. On more than one ground I think that it was +imperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this State on the basis +of the Algeçiras Convention. Among other advantages, which need not be +discussed here, Germany would have had the country secured to her as a +possible sphere of colonization. That would have set up justifiable +claims for the future.] + +In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at +once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided +by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since +its decisions rest on the very nature of things. + +Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a +convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the +same result. + +In America, England, Germany, to mention only the chief commercial +countries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of the +population. The native population cannot consume all the products of +this work. The industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. Work +and employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladly +accept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country. +But this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itself +from such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. We +find, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries into +existence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the other +hand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, to +crush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumer +for itself or win fresh ones. It is an embittered struggle which rages +in the market of the world. It has already often assumed definite +hostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensify +this struggle. Great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shut +their doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on the +down-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourable +conditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goods +cheaper than those imported from the old industrial States. These latter +will see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus it +may well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactory +conditions of life to its workers. Such a State runs the danger not only +of losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of also +gradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and political +world through diminishing production and lessened profits. + +In this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. We +cannot reject the possibility that a State, under the necessity of +providing remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war. +If more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stake +in Morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, Germany +would hardly have conceded to France the most favourable position in the +Morocco market without a struggle. England, doubtless, would not shrink +from a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of the +South African goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened her +Indian market, the control of which is the foundation of her world +sovereignty. The knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biological +laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from +international relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is not +only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an +indispensable factor in civilization. + +The attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connected +with the view of life generally. + +If we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as something +purely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outward +decay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man can +attain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possible +diminution of all bodily suffering. The State will be regarded as a sort +of assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possession +and enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. We must endorse the +view which Wilhelm von Humboldt professed in his treatise on the limits +of the activity of the State.[D] The compulsory functions of the State +must be limited to the assurance of property and life. The State will be +considered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shun +war as the greatest conceivable evil. + +[Footnote D: W. von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der +Wirksamkelt des Staates zu bestimmen."] + +If, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of States as merely +a fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not rest +on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers, +and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of the +chequered conditions of life, the task of the State will appear in a +very different light. The State will not be to us merely a legal and +social insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have the +one object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reach +of the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising the +intellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, and +of securing for them that influence on the world which tends to the +combined progress of humanity. We shall see in the State, as Fichte +taught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is to +put into practice the moral duty on earth. "The State," says Treitschke, +"is a moral community. It is called upon to educate the human race by +positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should +develop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike for +nation and individuals, the highest moral task." + +This highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. Man +can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a +community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He must +be in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individual +out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and +makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The State +alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest +degree of life.[E] + +[Footnote E: To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and +thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to +error, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, by +Implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Any +action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State +and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide +domain of Utopias.] + +War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it +is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation. +As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls +for war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it. + +If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, we +shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its +political power increases. The higher object at which it aims is +closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It is +only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that +creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most +splendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilities +and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which +power creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, and +recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is +content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace on +sluggard's couch it lies," then its citizens become stunted. The efforts +of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost. +This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small +States, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls victim to the +same curse. + +All petty and personal interests force their way to the front during a +long period of peace. Selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxury +obliterates idealism. Money acquires an excessive and unjustifiable +power, and character does not obtain due respect: + + + "Man is stunted by peaceful days, + In idle repose his courage decays. + Law is the weakling's game. + Law makes the world the same. + But in war man's strength is seen, + War ennobles all that is mean; + Even the coward belies his name." + SCHILLER: _Braut v. Messina_. + +"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social +petrifaction and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of the +goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience. +War alone teaches this lesson." [F] + +[Footnote F: Kuno Fischer, "Hegel," i., p. 737.] + +War, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and to +expand national power than any other means known to history. It +certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at +the same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. This +is especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regarded +not merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as the +expression of the united will of a whole nation. + +All petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the grave +decision which a war involves. The common danger unites all in a common +effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedly +spurned. This union contains a liberating power which produces happy and +permanent results in the national life. We need only recall the uniting +power of the War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and their +historical consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every war +vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the sham +reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are +unmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth, +and honour come to the front and are put into play. "A thousand touching +traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous war +awakes in noble nations." [G] + +[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 482.] + +Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "War," he +said, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment +constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it; +every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues." + +"At the moment when the State cries out that its very life is at stake, +social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. The individual +must forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body. +He should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison with +the welfare of the community. War is elevating, because the individual +disappears before the great conception of the State. The devotion of the +members of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidly +conspicuous as in war.... What a perversion of morality to wish to +abolish heroism among men!" [H] + +[Footnote H: Treitschke, "Politik" i., p. 74.] + +Even defeat may bear a rich harvest. It often, indeed, passes an +irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads to +a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous +constitution. "I recognize in the effect of war upon national +character," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "one of the most salutary +elements in the moulding of the human race." + +The individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge his +life on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the cause +which he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals to +personal morality. Similarly, nations and States can achieve no loftier +consummation than to stake their whole power on upholding their +independence, their honour, and their reputation. + +Such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. The +possibility of war is required to give the national character that +stimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nations +enabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by the +fullest development of their moral forces. An intellectual and vigorous +nation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a Phaecian +existence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace. + +From this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily +detrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics. +The States which from various considerations are always active in this +direction are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United States +of America, e.g., in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal +peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to +money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred +million dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incur +a great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with England +or Japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance of +contest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stress +of great political emotions, without which the moral development of the +national character is impossible. If they advance farther on this road, +they will one day pay dearly for such a policy. + +Again, from the Christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion. +Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God above +all things, and thy neighbour as thyself." This law can claim no +significance for the relations of one country to another, since its +application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love +which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love +for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead +men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature +cannot be political. Its object is to promote morality of the +individual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in the +interests of the community. It tells us to love our individual enemies, +but does not remove the conception of enmity. Christ Himself said: "I am +not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." His teaching can never be +adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. There +never was a religion which was more combative than Christianity. Combat, +moral combat, is its very essence. If we transfer the ideas of +Christianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the power +of the State--power in the widest sense, not merely from the material +aspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancement +of humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be made +which a war demands. Thus, according to Christianity, we cannot +disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally +and historically. + +Again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, the +purely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. The +individual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour, +since it may cost him life and prosperity. The State, however, as such +can also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wage +war, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives and +happiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved. + +The loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamental +notion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness, +the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing the +minority in their own interests. Thus, those who from the materialistic +standpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency from +motives of self-interest. + +Reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, but +that it is justifiable from every point of view. The practical methods +which the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the prevention +of war are shown to be absolutely ineffective. + +It is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement of +rights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, but +also the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullest +assertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time on +this basis to settle the disputes which arise between the various +countries by Arbitration Courts, and so to render war impossible. The +politician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestly +believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted. + +Two questions in this connection are at once suggested: On what right is +the finding of this Arbitration Court based? and what sanctions insure +that the parties will accept this finding? + +To the first question the answer is that such a right does not, and +cannot, exist. The conception of right is twofold. It signifies, +firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is right +and good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the State, either +written or sanctioned by tradition. In its first meaning it is an +indefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it is +variable and capable of development. The right determined by law is only +an attempt to secure a right in itself. In this sense right is the +system of social aims secured by compulsion. It is therefore impossible +that a written law should meet all the special points of a particular +case. The application of the legal right must always be qualified in +order to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. A certain +freedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to the +administration of justice. The established law, within a given and +restricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just. + +The conception of this right is still more obscured by the complex +nature of the consciousness of right and wrong. A quite different +consciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whether +persons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in most +varied forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, and +frequently in opposition to, the established law. In Christian countries +murder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is a +sacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as a +crime. It is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions of +right. + +There is yet another cause of uncertainty. The moral consciousness of +the same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs and +schools of philosophy. The established law can seldom keep pace with +this inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lags +behind. A condition of things arises where the living moral +consciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, where +legal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and Mephistopheles' +scoffing words are true: + + "Laws are transmitted, as one sees, + Just like inherited disease. + They're handed down from race to race, + And noiseless glide from place to place. + Reason they turn to nonsense; worse, + They make beneficence a curse! + Ah me! That you're a grandson you + As long as you're alive shall rue." + _Faust_ (translation by Sir T. Martin). + +Thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the +same ideas in their private and social intercourse. The conception of +the constitutional State in the strictest sense is an impossibility, and +would lead to an intolerable state of things. The hard and fast +principle must be modified by the progressive development of the fixed +law, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and of +self-help allowed by the community. If sometimes between individuals the +duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a +universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated +relations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its own +conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which +spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical +life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification, +and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and +none can say that one nation has a better right than the other. There +never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here and +there particular relations can be brought under definite international +laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification. +Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international +code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own +conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest +ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an +injustice, and thus dishonour itself. + +Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring +people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and +is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in +the civilized world. Every Arbitration Court must originate in a certain +political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must +treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the +contracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. In this way every +progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may +easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the +expansion of the young and vigorous State in favour of one which is +sinking in the scale of civilization. + +These considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question: +How can the judgment of the Arbitration Court be enforced if any State +refuses to submit to it? Where does the power reside which insures the +execution of this judgment when pronounced? + +In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908 +that the High Court of International Justice established by the second +Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding +decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. +The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this +idea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that +public opinion must represent the view which the American plutocrats +think most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that the +widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material +prosperity, commerce, and money-making. As a matter of fact, public +opinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only be +employed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided. + +We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the +separate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empire +existed. Such an empire never can or will arise again. Even if it did, +it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all +human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the +unchecked rivalry of different groups. + +So long as we live under such a State system as at present, the German +Imperial Chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared, +in his speech in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that treaties for +arbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainable +legal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between two +countries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. Such a treaty merely +proved that between the two contracting States no serious inducement to +break the peace could be imagined. It therefore only confirmed the +relations already existing. "If these relations change, if differences +develop between the two nations which affect their national existence, +which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then every +arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke." + +It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an Arbitration +Court can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlike +decision, even as regards the State in whose favour it is pronounced. If +we imagine, for example, that Silesia had fallen to Frederick the Great +by the finding of a Court of Arbitration, and not by a war of +unparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have been +equally important for Prussia and for Germany? No one will maintain this. + +The material increase in power which accrued to Frederick's country by +the acquisition of Silesia is not to be underestimated. But far more +important was the circumstance that this country could not be conquered +by the strongest European coalition, and that it vindicated its position +as the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. It was +war which laid the foundations of Prussia's power, which amassed a +heritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. War +forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could grow +up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. Here once +more war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons of +history we shall see the same result again and again. + +If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite +aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only +be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as +unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It +is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice +their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and +thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed to +obviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts of +Arbitration--that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formal +law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The +weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and +vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment +on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most +disastrous consequences for humanity generally. + +With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate +appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral +and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration. +So, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highest +material blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; for +the maintenance of national character and political independence; for +the expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of the +national welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nations +according to the scale of their importance in civilization; for +intellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for the +honour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressive +development is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home and +abroad is only a question of time. History speaks with no uncertain +voice on this subject. It shows that valour is a necessary condition of +progress. Where with growing civilization and increasing material +prosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and the +resolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, there +the nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their own +politically or racially. + +"A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political +world when national character and military tradition act and react upon +each." These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war, +and he is incontestably right. + +These efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merely +lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature where the +struggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damaging +and unnerving effect. The apostles of peace draw large sections of a +nation into the spell of their Utopian efforts, and they thus introduce +an element of weakness into the national life; they cripple the +justifiable national pride in independence, and support a nerveless +opportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higher +humanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its own +weakness. They thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, just +as the Prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in +1805 and 1806, and brought the State to the brink of destruction. + +The functions of true humanity are twofold. On the one hand there is the +promotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well as +of political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform development +of character; on the other hand there is the practical realization of +ideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual and +of the community. + +It seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards the +suppression of war with those of the Social Democratic Labour party, +which goes hand in hand with them. The aims of both parties are Utopian. +The organized Labour party strives after an ideal whose realization is +only conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work are +settled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when the +cost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. Until this is the case +the prices of the international market determine the standard of wages. +The nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settle +independently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing its +position in the international market in competition with nations who +work longer hours and at lower rates. Want of employment and extreme +misery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. On the +other hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, by +excluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration of +products and a profound demoralization of the working population. + +The case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. Its execution, as +we saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is as +impossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. A State +which disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouring +countries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guiding +rule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, and +become the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours. + +We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts after +peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with +arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most +countries. "God will see to it," says Treitschke,[I] "that war always +recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!" + +[Footnote I: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 76.] + +Nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in Germany no inconsiderable +danger. We Germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpractical +dreams. "The accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universal +attribute with us, as in France." [J] We lack the true feeling for +political exigencies. A deep social and religious gulf divides the +German people into different political groups, which are bitterly +antagonistic to each other. The traditional feuds in the political world +still endure. The agitation for peace introduces a new element of +weakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our national +and party life. + +[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 81.] + +It is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believe +in the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that the +general good is being advanced by them. Equally true is it, however, +that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfish +political projects. Its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes its +danger. + +Every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionary +schemes. They must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as an +unhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Our +people must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or may +be the goal of a policy_. The policy of a great State has positive aims. +It will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that is +possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentous +questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation, +the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this +conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the +idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating +law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of the +peace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words: + + "Dreams of a peaceful day? + Let him dream who may! + 'War' is our rallying cry, + Onward to victory!" + + + + +CHAPTER II + + + +THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR + +Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that no +one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of +intentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseen +what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation, +and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. In +his "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect: +"Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a +nation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as to +anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [A] + +[Footnote A: "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93.] + +We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to be +regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it +as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out +for so long. It is difficult to gauge its true import. The notion of +forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must not +think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to +be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the +pressure of the whole political situation. + +Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict +letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the +decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own +initiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterances +cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle +of political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only +run counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we exclude +from politics that independence of action which is the true motive +force. + +The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the +natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the +controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. It +does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are +unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourable +position affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statecraft +becomes a tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its +ends. "Men make history," [B] as Bismarck's actions clearly show. + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 28.] + +No doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit of +a peaceful solution. The death of some one man, the setting of some +great ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to change +it fundamentally. But the great disputes in the life of a nation cannot +be settled so simply. The man who wished to bring the question to a +decisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for the +moment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels, +and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilable +interests. With the death of King Edward VII. of England the policy of +isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against +Germany, has broken down. The antagonism of Germany and England, based +on the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, still +persists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not always +profitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening the +tension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of Germany. + +It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should +depend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would be +thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many +unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less +dependent on chance. + +It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician +Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war +should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been +attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a +weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated +should determine political action. + +For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look +to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the +conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and +sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value +is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct +estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of +the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness +of decision. + +If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged +right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as +necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country +the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister +cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far +more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater +sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and +courage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment. +In the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought never +to be brought about falls to the ground. And yet this theory has in our +day found many supporters, especially in Germany. + +Even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war is +impossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banished +from the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should be +postponed so long as possible.[C] + +[Footnote C: Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on +March 30, 1911. In his speech of November 9, 1911, the Imperial +Chancellor referred to the above-quoted words of Prince Bismarck +in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the Morocco question.] + +Those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude as +the supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as +a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing +importance. According to this view, a war recognized as inevitable must +be postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to use +exceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary and +justifiable aspirations by force of arms. + +Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion +that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the +chief duty, of any policy. + +To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite +answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only +the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring +about a war. + +Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that +wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the +happiest results, both politically and socially. A feeble policy has +always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to +take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to +adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as +to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter. +Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most +striking examples of this. + +The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful +and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the +steps of his glorious ancestor. "He noticed how his state occupied an +untenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers, +and showed his determination to give a definite character (_décider cet +être_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge +the territory of the State and _corriger la figure de la Prusse_, if +Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name +of 'Kingdom.'" [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity, +and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. None of +the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he +postpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be the +aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself +favourable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The whole +history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally +would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of +decision which he showed. + +[Footnote D Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 51.] + +We see a quite different development under the reign of Frederick +William III., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our +nation cannot be too often reminded. + +It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided. +Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the Prussian +Government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied +Russians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great +moral cost. According to all human calculation, the participation of +Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive +superiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and +would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the +moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had +ingrained on her by his wars. At the darkest moment of defeat they shone +most brightly. In spite of the political downfall, the effects of +Frederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired +his State and his people. This is clearly seen in the quite different +attitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under the +degrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny. The power which had been +acquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself +more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it +was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible +the heroic revival of 1813. + +The German wars of Unification also belong to the category of wars +which, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest. +The instability and political weakness which the Prussian Government +showed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of Olmütz in 1850, had +deeply shaken the political and national importance of Prussia. On the +other hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once more +her duties as a nation, when King William I. and Bismarck were at the +helm, was soon abundantly manifest. Bismarck, by bringing about our +wars of Unification in order to improve radically an untenable position +and secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled the +long-felt wish of the German people, and raised Germany to the +undisputed rank of a first-class European Power. The military successes +and the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for an +unparalleled material prosperity. It is difficult to imagine how +pitiable the progress of the German people would have been had not these +wars been brought about by a deliberate policy. + +The most recent history tells the same story. If we judge the Japanese +standpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fight +Russia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morally +justifiable. It was immensely daring to challenge the Russian giant, but +the purely military conditions were favourable, and the Japanese nation, +which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed an +extended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to open +new channels for her superabundant activities. Japan, from her own point +of view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power in +Eastern Asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of Russia. The Japanese +statesmen were justified by the result. The victorious campaign created +wider conditions of life for the Japanese people and State, and at one +blow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics, +and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to great +material advancement. If this war had been avoided from weakness or +philanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters would +have taken a very different turn. The growing power of Russia in the +Amur district and in Korea would have repelled or at least hindered the +Japanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attained +through this war, glorious alike for military prowess and political +foresight. + +The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has +always led to happy results. Even an unsuccessfully waged war may +sometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vital +interests without a blow. We find an example of this in the recent +heroic struggle of the small Boer States against the British Empire. In +this struggle they were inevitably defeated. It was easy to foresee that +an armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces of +England and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally could +not bear heavy losses. But yet--if all indications are not +misleading--the blood shed by the Boer people will yield a free and +prosperous future. In spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic; +men like President Stein, Botha, and De Wett, with their gallant +followers, performed many great military feats. The whole nation +combined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which Byron +sings: + + "For freedom's battle once begun, + Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, + Though baffled oft, is ever won." + +Inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any later +developments, have been won by this struggle. The Boers have maintained +their place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselves +superior to the English. It was only after many glorious victories that +they yielded to a crushingly superior force. They accumulated a store of +fame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, a +power to be reckoned with. The result of this development is that the +Boers are now the foremost people in South Africa, and that England +preferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by their +continual hostility. This laid the foundation for the United Free States +of South Africa.[E] + +[Footnote E: "War and the Arme Blanche," by Erskine Childers: "The truth +came like a flash ... that all along we had been conquering the +country, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215). + +"To ... aim at so cowing the Boer national spirit, as to gain a +permanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyond +our power to achieve. Peaceable political fusion under our own flag +was the utmost we could secure. That means a conditional surrender, +or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). Lord Roberts wrote +a very appreciative introduction to this book without any protest +against the opinions expressed in it.] + +President Kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and not +Cecil Rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, be +known in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of South Africa, +who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value the +inestimable moral qualities according to their real importance. + +The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been +deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest +results. War, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of political +agent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but in +every case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery. +He who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility. + +It is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision except +from the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existing +conditions which have created national armies. Absolute clearness of +vision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken, +and what political aims justify the use of armed force. + +This question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactory +answer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty of +the State. + +If this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual and +moral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moral +education of the human race, then the State's own acts must necessarily +conform to the moral laws. But the acts of the State cannot be judged by +the standard of individual morality. If the State wished to conform to +this standard it would often find itself at variance with its own +particular duties. The morality of the State must be developed out of +its own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in the +personality of the man and his duties towards society. The morality of +the State must be judged by the nature and _raison d'être_ of the State, +and not of the individual citizen. But the end-all and be-all of a State +is power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face +should not meddle in politics." [F] + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] + +Machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policy +was the advancement of power. This term, however, has acquired, since +the German Reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewd +Florentine. To him power was desirable in itself; for us "the State is +not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and +promote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by being +applied for the greatest good of mankind." [G] + +[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] + +The criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in the +last resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed his +own nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection." [H] If the +same standard is applied to the State, then "its highest moral duty is +to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the +higher community of which he is a member; but the State is itself the +highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty +of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of +sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for there +is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot +sacrifice itself to something higher. When a State sees its downfall +staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A +sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts +the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a +State." [I] + +[Footnote H: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote I: _Ibid_., i., p 3.] + +I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political +morality better than in the words of our great national historian. But +we can reach the same conclusions by another road. The individual is +responsible only for himself. If, either from weakness or from moral +reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the +consequences of his actions recoil only on him. The situation is quite +different in the case of a State. It represents the ramifying and often +conflicting interests of a community. Should it from any reason neglect +the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal +personality, but it injures also the body of private interests +which it represents. This incalculably far-reaching detriment affects +not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of +individuals and the community. Accordingly it is a moral duty of the +State to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and +promoter of all higher interests. This duty it cannot fulfil unless it +possesses the needful power. + +The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first +and foremost duty of the State. This aspect of the question supplies a +fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can be +estimated. The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this +duty, and thus served the interests of the community? And this not +merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material +interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the +State, and thus indirectly its higher aims. + +It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that +numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the +community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only +natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be +erroneous. Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must +be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy. +"Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most +contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." [J] This +argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads +logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means; +that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures +are permissible. + +[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] + +A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for +political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must +be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. So far as I +know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel +bound to attempt one at this point. War, with which I am dealing at +present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it +pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the +seriousness of warlike measures. I must deviate here a little from my +main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of +political morality. + +The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is +generally assumed. The power of the State does not rest exclusively on +the factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth, +and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements, +which are reciprocally related to the material. The energy with which a +State promotes its own interests and represents the rights of its +citizens in foreign States, the determination which it displays to +support them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor of +strength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselves +to let things come to a crisis in a like case. Similarly a reliable and +honourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with allies +as well as with foes. A statesman is thus under no obligation to deceive +deliberately. He can from the political standpoint avoid all +negotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he will +thereby serve the reputation and power of his State no less than when he +holds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, and +renounces all political formulas and phrases. + +In antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and the +Jesuits have tried to justify regicide.[K] At the present day political +murder is universally condemned from the standpoint of political +morality. The same holds good of preconcerted political deception. A +State which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute. +The man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in a +contradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims, +since he denies it by his actions. It is not, of course, necessary that +a man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to an +opponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point. +But it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise crafty +deceptions. A fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic of +great statesmen. Subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit of +diplomacy. + +[Footnote K: Mariana, "De rege et regis institutione." Toledo, 1598.] + +Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latent +war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a +position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and +deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties +are determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflict +between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and +prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it +is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately +moral nature of that end. + +Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action. +But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are +of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are +conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of +things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the +infringement of the right appears morally justified. York's decision to +conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of +right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made +under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the +Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral. Now it is always +justifiable to terminate an immoral situation. + +As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument +shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultima +ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other +States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful +methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw, +rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. War +therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is +not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the +ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparently +trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully +justifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the State, and consequently +its moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential part +of its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there +is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword +must be drawn to do so. + +In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is +whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the +power of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether the +inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict +greater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantages +which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not +declared. A further point to be considered is whether the general +position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military +success. With these considerations of expediency certain other weighty +aspects of the question must also be faced. + +It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in looking +only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of +the existing generation. Such policy would be opposed to all that +constitutes the essential nature of the State. Its conduct must be +guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is +gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the +future. "The true greatness of the State is that it links the past with +the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to +regard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life." [L] + +[Footnote L: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] + +The law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and in +the decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than the +sacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "I cannot conceive," +Zelter once wrote to Goethe, "how any right deed can be performed +without sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very opposite +of what is desirable." + +A second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely that +which Zelter rightly emphasizes. A great end cannot be attained except +by staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certainty +of success can ever be anticipated. Every undertaking implies a greater +or less venture. The daily intercourse of civic life teaches us this +lesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must be +taken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguely +estimated. In questions of comparatively trifling importance much may be +done by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce a +satisfactory status. The solution of such problems is the sphere of +diplomatic activity. The state of things is quite different when vital +questions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, but +will guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party. +Then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmen +to act. Men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun the +solemn decision of war. In such questions any reluctance to face the +opponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt at +a temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of political +prestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made good +in another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the State, +the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations. + +Not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such a +case. The mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention to +wage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. This +intention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiations +without arms are like music-books without instruments," as Frederick the +Great said. It is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to which +the opponent's purpose yields. When, therefore, the threat of war is +insufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin; +the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the +_duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike. + +Finally, there is a third point to be considered. Cases may occur where +war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no +prospect of success. The responsibility of this has also to be borne. So +at least Frederick the Great thought. His brother Henry, after the +battle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the +Marquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France. Again, +after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but +the King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. He knew better what +suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to +die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. President +Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States of +America on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "It +must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran, +"that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men +and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the +sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war +is in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the most +prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice.... +It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than +not to have fought at all." + +To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher +sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in +itself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by the +consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when +the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and +military situation. + +It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy, +especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only +heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the +reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to +fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties. + +No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain +circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ +war as a political means. So long as all human progress and all natural +development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage +in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible. + +When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting +any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has +forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually +acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there +are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only +await the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the State +towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of +success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable. +When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by +affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements +of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to +promote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced the +more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be +obtained with comparatively small sacrifices. + +These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active +policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and +concentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truth +of Schiller's lines: + + "The chance that once thou hast refused + Will never through the centuries recur." + +The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take +the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the +future to the present need of peace. + +It is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficult +to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist +which justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all the +greater because the historical significance of the act must be +considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its +justification. + +War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successes +which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries. +The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long +epochs.[M] + +[Footnote M: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 2.] +54 +The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a +great State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries; +but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and +keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical +imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can +at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [N] + +[Footnote N: Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft," p. 30.] + +He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State, +and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way +settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of +political morality. + +He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be +fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his +hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the +fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point +he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true +interests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the +definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing +favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the +hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise +with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther +once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write +and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much +greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business +of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and +the marches, etc.--that is what the petty and simple do who only look +with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or +saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to +save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the +sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It +will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful +and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."[O] + +[Footnote O: Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation."] + +Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to +further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of +war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State +and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political +purposes correspond to these problems. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + + +A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL +DEVELOPMENT + +The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is +consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. The +same holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were, +personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely +various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable +of the most different achievements, and serving the most multifarious +purposes in the great evolution of human existence. + +Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the +materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation +to-day. + +According to it, all that happens in the world is a necessary +consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become +conscious. It denies the difference between the empiric and the +intelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom. + +This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seems +everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the +insufficient human intelligence. The existence of the universe is +opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are +incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and +time. + +The essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. We +recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; the +impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our +understanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quite +impossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear--although no +demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual laws +beyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to a +conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual +change. Even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden +moral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread of +civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and +higher forms of life. + +It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in every +individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too +limited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge of +things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to +understand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may also +term the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidance +for our further investigation and procedure. + +The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the history +of the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What is +true," Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised and +supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by +its history." + +The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, the +laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces +have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work +towards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We are +here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget +that States are personalities endowed with very different human +attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that +these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of +States as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very different +effect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour to +grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the +naturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we +wish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study the +history of the German people in its connection with that of the other +European States, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto +followed, and what guidance the past gives for Our future policy. From +the time of their first appearance in history the Germans showed +themselves a first-class civilized people. + +When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians +there were two main elements which shaped the future of the West, +Christianity and the Germans. The Christian teaching preached equal +rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and +slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the +attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the +grave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man, +and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the +individual conscience, the starting-point of all development. It thus +gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose +morality rested solely on the relations with the state. Simultaneously +with this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North poured +victoriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decaying +nations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep their +nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. The +States which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized how +difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a +higher. The Germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. The +German element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and +offered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture of +German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did +the growing nations appear. + +In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world. +The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germans +with the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated +itself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the +Alps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea of +the Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued to +flourish. + +In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until A.D. 1453. In the West, +however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476. +Italy had fallen into the hands of the East Goths and Lombards +successively. The Visigoths had established their dominion in Spain, and +the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul. + +A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with his +powerful hand, extended the Frankish Empire far beyond the boundaries of +Gaul. By the subjugation of the Saxons he became lord of the country +between the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy by +the conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the Western +Roman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. His +successors clung to this claim; but the Frankish Empire soon fell to +pieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards became +France, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the later +Germany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy and +Spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually +amalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East Frankish +Empire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained +their Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerful +German [A] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of Charles the Great to +the Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first _German_ King who +took this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in a +quarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of the +Church, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in +order to prove their pretended title to that country. + +[Footnote A: German (Deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular," +opposed to "foreign"--_e.g._, the Latin Church dialect. It was first +used as the name of a people, in the tenth century A.D.] + +The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living in +Rome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of a +Church which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way +of the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldest +creations of the human intellect--to found and maintain a +world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers. + +Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. The +freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual +dominion. In the portentous struggle of the two Powers for the +supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire, +the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widely +different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a +homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of the +estates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axe +of Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church. + +The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German power +lay on the ground in fragments. A period of almost complete anarchy +followed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad +characteristics of the German people, contributed to extend this +destruction to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the German +people deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power was +budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetry +was passing through a first classical period. Every German country was +ringing with song; the depth of German sentiment found universal +expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealism +inspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empire +every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above +the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The material +prosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better +regulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the Hanseatic League bore +its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great +trade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice and +Genoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never again +attained. + +Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in the +breasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, and +was destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in +the spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church had +lost much of her influence on men's minds. On the other hand, a refining +movement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit of +antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to +the Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined by +everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich von +Hutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed," rang loud through the +districts of Germany. + +Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, which +conceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe to +her foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerly +in the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shed +it's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for +national independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequences +for the development of humanity had been fought out since the Persian +wars. In this cause the German people nearly disappeared, and lost all +political importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned to +foreign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church did +not remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and the +Staufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a +mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself. +Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won an +undisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritual +freedom was established. This most important element of civilization was +retained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become ever +since the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace of +Westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious +freedom. + +The States of the Latin race on their side now put forward strong claims +to the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas of +freedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled among +themselves about the predominance. At the same time, in Germanized +England a firs-class Protestant power was being developed, and the age +of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the Reformation +and the Thirty Years' War, opened new and unsuspected paths to human +intellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a fresh +stimulus. Gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the +newly-discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fell +to the lot of the Germanic and the southern part to that of the Latin +race. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, and +consequently, of world politics. Germany remained excluded from this +great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes +and religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, the +Low Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repel +the inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the French +ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by these +wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world. +Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in +political power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States, +which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the German cause. +But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre of +Protestant power was established in the North--i.e., Prussia. + +After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back the +Slavs, who poured in from the East, in wrestling large tracts from them, +and in completely Germanizing them. This struggle, like that with the +niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which +extended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and successfully planted +Germanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finally +victorious also against Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic. +In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strong +political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an +influential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germany +devolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to Catholic +Austria grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into an +independent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a German +population, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' War +Prussia broke away from Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confronted +France and Russia as an independent Protestant State. + +But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once more +slowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy has exhausted the +resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of the +monarchy, _L'état c'est moi,_ carried to an extreme, provoked a +tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous +revolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more specially in +Germany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism. +The German Empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary States survived, +among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again under +Napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and +bore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain, +and even to the inhospitable plains of Russia, which by a gradual +political absorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of power +in wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to an +important place among the European nations. Austria, which had become +more and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before the +mighty Corsican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her +dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught. + +But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest +humiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of +the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the +Protestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm, +won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and for +Germany, and paved the way for further world-wide historical +developments. + +While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular +despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights,_ another +quite different revolution was working in Prussia--the revolution of +_duty_. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately +to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State. +Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposition +to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the idea +of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to +sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the +clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis +on which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same time +Stein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in Prussia. + +While measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thus +being adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was to +depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a +German Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in the +domain of art and science, where German character and endeavour found +the deepest and fullest expression. A great change had been effected in +this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year +1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and +deeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised their +minds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlit +heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and +superiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and science +became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this +dismembered people, and decided the victory of Protestantism in German +life." [B] + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte", i., p. 88.] + +Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she +developed the root-idea of the Reformation into the right of +unrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [C] Moral obligations, such as no +nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the +philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs +of her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies was +realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classical +literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as +the political work of the Prussian monarchy", [D] and of those men of +action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin. + +[Footnote C: _Ibid.,_ i., p. 90.] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid._] + +The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an event +in the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the great +annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last +abortion of the revolution--a + + "Part of the power that still + Produces Good, while still devising Ill"; + +on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Let +man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the +religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual +change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; who +gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect, +and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people to +consciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed that +the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain; +a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify +to the divinity in man. + +The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to +whom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate of +the Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront of +humanity. + +Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation +could give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, and +Goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of +Liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny. + +We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great +struggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, and +weakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed +the German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure +enthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expression +in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of +thousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took a +prominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost to +their mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria and +Russia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties. + +Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing up +from the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that no +longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came to +the front, King William I. and the hero of the Saxon forest. Resolutely +they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from +ignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of the +popular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters with +Austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and left +the German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a +Great Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the +vast majority of the German peoples united under the Imperial crown +which the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire was +revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, +and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the North +Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from the +ashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old German +Confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs. + +It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of Germany +vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the +economic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on all +sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed in +between France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed +to gather the full fruits of our victories. The short-sightedness and +party feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag--the old hereditary failings +of our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intense +love of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behind +in the race with other countries. + +In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious +Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found +the second largest colonial Empire in the world; England appropriated +the most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a +comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content +with some modest strips of territory. In addition to, and in connection +with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward. + +Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Frederick the Great, +and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conception +of the State has completely changed since the turn of the century. The +patrimonial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary possession of +the Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents the +reverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant of +the State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is the +key to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of the +State the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the +tendency is as follows: Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and +the nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquire +a uniform national character and common national interests. + +This new order of things entirely altered the basis of international +relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerce +and trade also developed on wholly new lines. + +After 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and trade +restrictions--were gradually removed. Landed property ceased to be a +monopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "England +introduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machinery +into industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by +steamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the same +time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and +chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton. +There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in +the widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension of +colonization over Polynesia, etc." England at the same time girdled the +earth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort of +world-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not, +indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone +days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests +dependent on herself. + +Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, linking the West +and the East, the United States of North America have risen to be an +industrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported by +exceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing +character of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitable +recognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on the +point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy. + + +Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but has +extended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressing +farther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossed +swords with the States of the Mongolian race. This vast population, +which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands of +years of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, and +categorically claims its share in international life. The entrance of +Japan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms. +"Asia for the Asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her +breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power has +emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a European foe. +China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mighty +movement is thrilling Asia--the awakening of a new epoch. + +Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the +civilized countries of Europe, are threatening from Asia, the old cradle +of the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forces +which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of the +French Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized +the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a +consciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers, +originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material +position, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, and +seek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. They do not +wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically +recognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, in +which they themselves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not only +perpetually menace State and society, but endanger in the separate +countries the industries from which they live, since they threaten to +destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by +continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany this +movement has affected large sections of the population. + +Until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture and +cattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of German +industries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in +connection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade has +marvellously increased. Germany has become an industrial and trading +nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds +work and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost its +leading position in the economic life of the people. The artisan +class has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in trade +unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the +international social democracy. It is hostile to the national class +distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of +the State. + +It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous +agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the +anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law of +self-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certain +point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizen +may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an +opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly +devotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grant +this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of +capital. + +Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, it +may create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employment +to all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislation +against every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age, +or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of +work, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him from +working. + +The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of three +victorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large for +present purposes, although without the conscious intention of the State. +German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a +market for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervened +with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. As +Scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of +man, so the Emperor William I. recognized the duty of the State towards +those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The position +of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social +legislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now +existed. + +A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats +indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the +working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing +State and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and +progress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, How +to win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willing +workers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny. + +Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of +all progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world. +Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last +century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a +prominent position through the universality of her philosophy and her +thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things. + +The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature are +attested by the fact that the annual export of German books to foreign +countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that +of France, England, and America combined. It is only in the domain of +the exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to give +precedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win a +leading position. It shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions, +and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our +political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The German +Empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only are +the social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, are +divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter +enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish +denominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between North +and South has prevented the population from growing into a completely +united body. + +So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of +sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into +narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in +her nationality, her intellectual development, in her science, +industries, and trade. + +And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future? +What duties are enforced on us by the past? + +It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the +German State answers this question, depend not only our own further +development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of +the world. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + + +GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION + +Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical +development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of +human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire of +Central Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seeds +of intellectual and moral development were sown by the German +intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with +irresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for the +entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German +people. + +This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on +the freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have ever +and again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nation +whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as +the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the +intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free +and natural development. The Germans have thus always been the +standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark +against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worsted +in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best +heart's blood in the cause. Intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruled +the Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this +people--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the +political attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth +century. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed +into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need of +a free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengaged +itself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened into +world-historical importance. + +Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, on +which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must +rest: the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation, +which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked +all free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop to +the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mind +the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time +pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On this +substructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose +deepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result of +free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a +foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way and +that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and +knowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress. +Reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religious +reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion, +and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not +attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results +of natural philosophy. + +The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle +for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. We +are thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannot +shrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is +being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human +efforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part +in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special +qualities. + +No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate +all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own +spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it +received. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culture +with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the great +community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "Depth of +conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the +limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to +traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all +nations and ages--this has at all times been the German characteristic; +this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture." [A] To no +nation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self +"that which is given to mankind as a whole." We often see in other +nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same +capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which +specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and +imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position. + +[Footnote A: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 95.] + +There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge +our highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we can +mount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of science +and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics +touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results +of scientific inquiry. + +First and foremost it is German science which must regain its +superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate +our birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of the +perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over +Nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more +useful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutions +of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrict +ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit +civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create +conditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can +find its expression. + +It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which +exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition +not only our future development, but the higher life generally. These +problems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply and +permanently than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the +empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany. +The German nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, which +works slowly in opposition to the different movements. The Germans thus +seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great +controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into +the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of +evolution. + +We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no +doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the +community and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts to +find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class +with healthy and patriotic ambitions. + +It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty, +requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed +upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation, +and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity +which is lamentably deficient to-day. + +No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The old +antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in +Germany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and +political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute +liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the +conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present there +appears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism of +Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of +the Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movement +can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect +of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is +rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially all +denominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must never +renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To +do so would mean loss of prestige. + +Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of human +civilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir of +a great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no less +significance in the sphere of its international relations. These +problems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply the +intellectual development, and on their solution depends the position of +Germany in the world. + +The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms +and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered +geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the +Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large +number of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other +States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have +developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national +customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of +her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most +characteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie +outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the +strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against +the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves +are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism, +which seems to have lost its old victorious strength. + +Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the +overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign +countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is +absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even +to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its +increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of +living. + +This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, +or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its +intellectual importance. + +At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course of +centuries grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of all +political significance, a large section of our people did not feel this +insufficiency. Even during the age of our classical literature the +patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the +thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of German +genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship." [B] + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 195.] + +Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines: + + "German majesty and honour + Fall not with the princes' crown; + When amid the flames of war + German Empire crashes down, + German greatness stands unscathed." [C] + +[Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905 +by Bernhard Suphan.] + +The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds +different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence +of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since +we must now take into consideration the immense development of Germany +in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old +importance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from the +vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due +measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political +federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can +only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act +in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties +towards the human race. + +Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding +the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a +foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the +ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to +imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched +again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly +threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely +repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics +from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance +westwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. On +the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions +which were once under German influence are now once more subject to +Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Russian +Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The +German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs; +Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic +workmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia. +Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic +flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an +obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of +self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined +whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is +not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will +be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict +grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and +show less determination to protect the German soil at all costs. + +The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their +struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their +nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot +withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our +trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but +they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. +The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, +and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the +Government must reckon. + +Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to +preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of +universal culture. + +Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and +in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the +world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful +as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are +contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while +the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we +wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our +civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back +in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world. + +Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1, +1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is +already large enough and does not need expansion.... We shall have to +consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... We +have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to +take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should +receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [D] + +[Footnote D: This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister +Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."] + +That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed. + +If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we +survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must +admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not +here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of +the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language. + +England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from +the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies which +are directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in the +interest of English industries and English capital. The work of +civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has +always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her +sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by +transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent +culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy +self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as +Canada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they +will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not +only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the +present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in +the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to +secure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is a +great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and +it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence. + +The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by +them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister, +Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Ten +years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France +has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in +every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be +spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown +in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of +Heaven." [E] + +[Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."] + +The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German +policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading +thought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputes +under which the partition of Africa and the last phase of French +colonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents to +Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distant +and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of +the country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, it +is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run, +since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed, +tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned +colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have +obtained the best shares." + +This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with +mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital +powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for +colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria, +has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and +prides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte +and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the +Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France +in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy +alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany. + +The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of +attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In the +face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its +importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place +in the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspire +to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the +limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach this +goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never +again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be +opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international +politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair +rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality +and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to +them. + +Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a +fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity. + +The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and +improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of +great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely +extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary +capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more +brilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have +returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The +increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to +a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative +industrial occupation. + +There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid +development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the +import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale +of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of +life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which +England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take +much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to +close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order to +encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of +other countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends +on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question +of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall +very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population +means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the +question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of +population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and +home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation +will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for +the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We +shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to +surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in +the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a +home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland. +There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the +unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from +building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and +at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers, +may keep our sea communications open. + +We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial +possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are +only used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think of +colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal +population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and +immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which +retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance +for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each +nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is +quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count +among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be." +[F] + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 8.] + +We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our +requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our +growing working population, but would supply raw materials and +foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that +immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying +unproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We +find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers, +and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign +masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged, +do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will +depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world +speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the +German Empire? + +These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from +the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its +present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this +point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and +hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political +relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course +of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to +political paralysis at the time when the great European States built +themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not +enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in +politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long +concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural +development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power, +international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What +we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior +force of hostile interests and Powers. + +It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths +we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our +forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the +straight road of our intended development. + +The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an +advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension, +it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often +follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to +stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every +occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will +be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + + +WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL + +In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its +history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted +to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the +Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, +must be the basis of our future development. + +The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international +relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the +impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character +and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even +at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and +our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it +will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us. + + "The man of sense will by the forelock clutch + Whatever lies within his power, + Stick fast to it, and neither shirk, + Nor from his enterprise be thrust, + But, having once begun to work, + Go working on because he must." + _Faust_ + (translated by Sir Theodore Martin). + +The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the +hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing +territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of +both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of +these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity, +examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which +concern us are weighed one against the other. + +These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly +to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the +States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must +try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the +day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations +of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion. +We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions +of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and +therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines +of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a +country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or +timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not +seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy +is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men +who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and +often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such +digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his +opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the +student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep +his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must +therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense +clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions. + +We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps. + +On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive +alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In +this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably +unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately +connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States +combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the +North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical +national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to +shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred +battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the +bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the +Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of +Slavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories. +There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the +struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and +commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those +of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react +detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between +Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of +overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its +political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be +assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so +long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the +Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy +to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during +the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered +such an alliance possible. + +The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of +Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show +many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough +to influence the political position of the Empire. + +Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The +antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will +diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a +natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by +Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its +political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from +her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her +true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is +the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power. +That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor +Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a +permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in +Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural +colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by +Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, +even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this +annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We +should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the +Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and +France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance. + + +The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive +character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but +does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not +guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential +interests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in +its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events. +Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences," pointed out that +this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the +future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her +Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with +England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance. +The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an +undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct +opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in +order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This +undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as +the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the +encroachment of Italy into those regions. + +The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has +suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in +the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy +look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to +the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not +regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied +armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We +must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the +Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we +calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own +political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to +strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an +essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of +the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then +will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real +meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative +results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital +interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with +sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not +concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the +consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, +indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would +probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria. +Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of +Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and +incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a +contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we +must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France. + +England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts +to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in +Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which +secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in +commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's +Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in +combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the +coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against +England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding +such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She +is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of +the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make +overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies +can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It is +our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can. + +France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European +Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of +_revanche_. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she +has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the +humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the +defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she +wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and, +if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe +which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune +smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too +weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all +protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for +this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, are +inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this +latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, +and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to +Germany than from Russia. + +The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring +a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The +establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of +a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political +annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, +so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible +illusion as to its extent and meaning. + +Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to +approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her +North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that +strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of +colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French +sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France +will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her +best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in +every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the +Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed +them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance +which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable +that she will maintain honourably and with no _arrière-pensée_ the +obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco. +The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the +French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The French +policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on +the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite +unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can +be negotiated before the question between them has been once more +decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France +sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but +strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the +East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others. + +The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and +of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is +following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to +an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central +Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _status +quo_. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with +Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be +overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any +aggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seems +likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more +reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanying +events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of +internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable, +therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention +in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept +away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose, +meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and +an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although +this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions +of Germany in North Persia. + +It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is +adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the +mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether +in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the +direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the +dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate +to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has +long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the +Baltic. + +Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, +and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European +policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself, +also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years +been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into +Central Europe. + +Pan-Slavism is still hard at work. + +It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement +and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Her +present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the +present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong +monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the +internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation +is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry +is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from +what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a +healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Government +has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed +expectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under the +stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an +attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad. +Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in +the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China, +must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly, +Turkey. + +Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the +Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not +identical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive +war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She +wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of +Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and +East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on +advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed. +Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with +Germany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of the +German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore +always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths. + +England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian +Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the +spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France +she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany +under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms. + +The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the +heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So, +also, no natural community of interests exists between England and +France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to +any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an +Anglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostility +to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two +States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might +mask the real objects. + +This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very +comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made +astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which +commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which +England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may +well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political +and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition +in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The +American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and +will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the +point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far +as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite +of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily +directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in +order to understand the line of thought which guides the English +politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found +in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the +world. + +Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of +view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of +Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the +other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North +America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenest +competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The +annexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty with +Japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two +nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked, +and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union +are so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vast +distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very +bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly has +always diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as quite recently +in the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the object +clearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearing +the consequences of such collision. The American competition in trade +and industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated as +inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense, +according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty by +which a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established. + +England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America. +The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in the +further development of things, be so accentuated that England will be +forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an +undisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action. +The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strained +to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the Arbitration +Treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does not +consider that the present political relations of the two nations are +permanent. + +There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly +threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India +and Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation for +independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the +Low-German element in South Africa. + +Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English +position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national +movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it +clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement. +She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine +the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support, +and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in +opposition to the Caliphate. + +The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where +some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England, +so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, has +attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But +now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows +itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism, +thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of +Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave +danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in +the world. + +While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and +abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together, +either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto. +Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union has +definitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the Imperial +Conference in 1911 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated. +.... When the question of imperial defence came up, the policy was +rejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the oversea +dominions in every imaginable eventuality." The great self-ruled +colonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour of +need, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employed +wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not +approve." [A] There are clear indications that the policy of the +dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is +contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and +Australia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV., into independent +nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal +independence. + +[Footnote A: Th. Schiemann in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of July 5, 1911.] + +All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of +England's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitude +towards Germany. + +England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her +imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must +be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must +not be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be +destroyed. + +A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great +English colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distant +parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of +expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet +might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory +which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of +England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability of +expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can +no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall +victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered. + +The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the +German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer +a prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without any +excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet, +contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a +correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French +fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely +getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other +contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable +means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years +to come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importance +of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia. + +The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters. +It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance of +power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one +of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled +and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's +stage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes +undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This +policy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each +other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directly +from this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen +France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State +which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born +rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the +East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus +the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England's +most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and +self-evident. + +The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would +chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is +the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of +the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English +point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war. +England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a +large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before +the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and +to some extent a great benefit, to English industries. + +After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite +comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check +the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in +large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is +building, and attack the objectionable neighbour. + +English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt +to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the +most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance--Germany, England, and +America--has been suggested.[B] But for such a union with Germany to be +possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German +development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our +colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial +and industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her +traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the +Great Powers in the world. + +[Footnote B: "The United States and the War Cloud in Europe," by Th. +Schiemann, _McClure's Magazine_, June, 1910.] + +It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent +to that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacit +approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of +the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements +of English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and +the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable +indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy. +The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every +expansion of Germany's power were openly shown in the very recent +Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on +the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without +a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp. + +A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which +no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep +the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our +political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves +with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and +Utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter +the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixity +of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a +vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire. + +On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part in +English policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the one +side, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out +her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her +fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the +political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy +in the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political, +notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically +with those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this. + +No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has at +present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in +the sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding with +Germany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely that +the Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of +England. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded in +inflicting a political and military defeat on Germany. + +For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations about +Arbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany. +There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us +in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutely +opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement +in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the +nature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen +competition between the two countries, especially in South America; +there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political +complications. + +Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only +in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China. +In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and +seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to +count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitude +to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions +in East Asia. If the two nations joined hands--a hardly probable +eventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain an +independent position between them. The political rivalry between +the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they are +antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other +in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to +retain their possessions in Asia. + +While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present +directly influence our policy, Turkey--the predominant Power of the Near +East--is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is +emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest +course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple +Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which +threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. +Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against +Russia and against England--the two States, that is, with whose +hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can +threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short +sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no +sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a +war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to +the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding +position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important +key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong +to Russia or England. + +If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so +long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern +basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters. +Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a +development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be +strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite +impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position, +while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her. +From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the +Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of +Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be. + +Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent +importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her +Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German +policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres +of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means +negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey; +Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for +Germany. + +Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared +neutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20, 1815, under the +collective guarantee [C] of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in the +Treaties of London of November 15,1831, and of April 19,1839, on the +part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself. + +[Footnote C: By a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of the +contracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all +agree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the _right_ to +interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced.] + +If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the +continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance +and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement +balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we +take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be +guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple +Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In +consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France, +and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to +Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not +inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all +considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political +superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in +strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English +landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy +really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior +forces will be united against Germany and Austria. + +Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily +difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our +nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an +extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we +are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets +for our growing industries. But at every step which we take in this +direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet +have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, +by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further +expansion of German international influence and of German maritime +power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the +English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved +in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not +neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her +extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, +will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off +the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be +only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be +paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces +in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against +France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps +with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on +the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position +lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion +barred. + +Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the +international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, +cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, +though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the +one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and +warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with +which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where +their interests clash. + +With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but +not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently +peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, +but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisis +in the history of the German nation. + +We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our +position among the Powers of _Europe_; we now must decide whether we +wish to develop into and maintain a _World Empire_, and procure for +German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been +hitherto withheld from them. + +Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make +the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we +willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower +in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is +involved in our decision. + +"To be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day, +disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests +and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official +peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history +inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the +narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region +of realities. + +There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and +development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the _status +quo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever +seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and +temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to +gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the +trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior +tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the +powers of a continuous development. + +We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing +still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, +and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with +our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are +straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to +extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and +advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with +peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to +continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon +us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our +arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and +we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be +sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and +the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritual +and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German +thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind. + +If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a +catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to +attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at +the risk of a war with numerically superior foes. + +Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by +acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German +colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from +Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual +incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former +South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of +Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish +population. + +Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our +political power in other ways. + +In the first place, our political position would be considerably +consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that +France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find +ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another _we +must square our account with France_ if we wish for a free hand in our +international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a +sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all +cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by +force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never +again come across our path. + +Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political +power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case +of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with +armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by +our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same +lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be +presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good +policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and +the Triple Alliance has already been discussed. + +Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the +Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as +mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan +Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further +intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in +Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence, +in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the +integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their +independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best +secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might +eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central +European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by +this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily +unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be +essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the +expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the +geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of +the political community based on it. + +We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial +territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our +population. Very recent events have shown that, under certain +circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa +by pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugal +might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the +Portuguese colonies. We may assume that some understanding exists +between England and Germany which contemplates a division of the +Portuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_. +It cannot, indeed, be certain that England, if the contingency arrives, +would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually +exists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even been +often said, although disputed in other quarters, that Great Britain, +after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of the +Portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugal +the possession of _all_ her colonies. + +Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our +African territory would be possible. These need not be discussed here +more particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of +a successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of +territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require +countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there +are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the +settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our +overflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generally +speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our +industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the +growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This +represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us +from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization. + +A part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditions +point--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of +the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of +providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but +remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign +countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our +exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture. + +An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity. +It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace +the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for +the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. This +notion is only justified in a certain sense. In the first place, such a +policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow +population in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee the +certainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. It secures to +all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means +competition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political power +which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the +economic relations. The principle of the open door prevails +everywhere--in Egypt, Manchuria, in the Congo State, in Morocco--and +everywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: in +Manchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and in +Morocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fall +naturally to that State which is practically dominant; its products are +bought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power of +the State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar +advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be +evaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best be +regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonial +policy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies or its own +and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets +lie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations. + +The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many +old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European +policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in +Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost +sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely +disregarded. + +The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling +that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for +the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the +limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays +the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence +in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory +of balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power, +and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain +guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The +conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a close +community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into +political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort +of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a +State-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five +Great Powers--England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which +latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866 +Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power. + +"Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among +the nations." "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a +real equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated,"[D] This +condition does not exist between the European nations. England by +herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow +themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of +French. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by +special alliances. One result only has been obtained--the hindrance of +the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in +particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power +can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing +state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of +rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually +ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers +which stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England's +policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and +to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order +herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and +the sovereignty of the world. + +[Footnote D: Treitschke.] + +We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present +distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a +State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of +course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just +basis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of one +embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is +established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in +this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central +European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in +one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase +our own power. + +A further question, suggested by the present political position, is +whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning +of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a +different conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be, +permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one +contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of +Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory +is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State from +which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has +no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This +argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, +in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last +mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the +neutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic, +since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral +country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to +the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest +moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development +presupposes such competition. + +[Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without +guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.] + +Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal +affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the +State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and +powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference +in the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances of +such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in the +private affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but +none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval +preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international +intercourse that between the States of one and the same political system +a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The +unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to +political intercourse under all conditions involves serious +difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first +preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord +Palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false is +the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States +of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for +international politics can be laid down. + +After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals; +and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his +affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the +individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates +the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the +State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But +no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide +whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its +own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State +renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should +circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party +disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat +to the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every State +acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of +another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an +interference may become." On the other hand, it must be remembered that +the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still +graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international +right, but simply and solely on power and expediency. + +I have gone closely into these questions of international policy +because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly +influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and +may give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential that +we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by +considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only +depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must +remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any +circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that +the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as +possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions +possible. "No man," so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3, +1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to +make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take +advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position." + +If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which +guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our +forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts. + +The political and national development of the German people has always, +so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the +hereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism of +the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, +the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national +objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, +also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is +painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so +restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in +fruitless quarrels among themselves. + +Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome +these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy, +consistent development of our power. + +It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual and +social life arising from the like variety of the German nationality and +political system offers valuable advantages. It presents countless +centres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a high +spiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development. +But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference of +this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics. + +Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions +which are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugal +forces of the German nature--the common system of defence of our country +by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong +national empire. + +No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its own +destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to +no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. A +glance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which +is forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day. + +The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the common +interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions, +as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful +personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to +stir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality, +and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union. + +We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of +acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends +through and for our people. + +Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German character +to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development +of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific, +and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State is +beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the +independence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills and +stunts the independence of free men." [F] This independence of the +individual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the State, +forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central +power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our +social conditions. + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 2.] + +We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, +together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, +not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in +the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our +great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great +part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the +contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our +political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the +nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably +beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once +again, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament will +be heard: + + "O Germany, thy oaks still stand, + But thou art fallen, glorious land!" + KÖRNER. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + + +THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR + +Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture +to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by +formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will be +impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future +without an appeal to arms. + +Knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the political +situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible +for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an +army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to +battle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time +down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of +need. + +Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for +warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of +the situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested in +the Reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to +understand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic +misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these +for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country) +cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand, +brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great +wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is +often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national +duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our +people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be +ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to +discharge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of +preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are +passing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable to +consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so +much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect; +we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true +interests of the country better than by improving its military +capabilities. + +Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it must +maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national +asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the +war and supply the requisite means. + +This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in +national development. + +As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold +the field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, do +not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of +victory--so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with the +people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is +capable of wielding the sword with success. + +Military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but it +develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the +occupations of peace. It educates a man to the full mastery of his body, +to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental +powers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him to +order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respect +and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work. + +It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service +deprives economic life of forces which could have been more +appropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. These forces are +not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life. +Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly +repay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. It +is therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of its +countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of +war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and +improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which +the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly +an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and +educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus +promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than +achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which +certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the +national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them +a number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency to +luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations. +Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level +as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must +complete and assist the other. But a people which does not willingly +bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service +renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and +assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are +one-sided and evanescent. + +It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligations +towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all +tendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. The +method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power +can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depends +largely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical and +political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently +ranges between very wide extremes. + +In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military +training was almost exclusively left to the individual. That was +sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made +them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to +hard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination, +subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military +system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the +conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made +to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account +of political possibilities. The great European States maintain standing +armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or +shorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenary +army, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filled +by volunteers. + +In these various ways different degrees of military efficiency are +obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and +intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the +requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities +become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency. + +When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that +with growing civilization the requisite military capacities are always +changing. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldiers +who fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different from +those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have the +physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities +expected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to the +individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of +warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in +the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it +is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. The +preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military +sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized +State from those in countries, standing on a lower level of +civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war +is fought under relatively simple conditions. + +The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less +developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form +of military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising +herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps +in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and +proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and +educational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, by +employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it +never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development. + +When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find +ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical +and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact +with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself. + +A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard +to the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed in +the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other +ways. We see the individual States--according to their geographical +position, their relations to other States and the military strength of +their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater +or less importance in the political system of the world--making their +military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and +expenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life of +civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its +emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is +everywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a _means_ of +attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength. + +Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position +and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify +her policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only +with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling +a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a +continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. As +a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental +European war against her will. + +So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties, +and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays +most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to +develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the +security afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America, +again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest +limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval +power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the +continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any +considerable forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea +conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has +acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly +with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made +concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her +position in the world. + +While in some States a restriction of armaments is natural and +justifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerve +to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of +Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political +pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they +are no longer justified by the size of her population and her +international importance. France affords a conspicuous example of +self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral +duties. + +In the other European States, as in France, external political +conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate +the method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, which +necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own +justification. + +A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of +nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in +the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength +to safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, under +certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and +political schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be +deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements +of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and +maintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of all +opposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases. + +A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on the +friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as +fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international +conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support +from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and under +what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the +consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own +sphere of power. + +This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State +is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace +the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary +expenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it is +itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the +largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another +aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power of +such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison +with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable +military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a +view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military +preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a +defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent +interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision +will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a +real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective +addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist. +The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary +State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain +influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local +conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of +the country. + +It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the +utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such +is, in fact, the case. + +In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with the +political and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy, +preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland, +situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political +independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Germany and the +navy of England. + +The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on +its own power. + +The power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies will +have a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans and +military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes; +but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations +alone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent and +unqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless, +and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and +shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed. + +The military power of an independent State in the true sense must +guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests +of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of +development. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be +considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military +efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions +must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object +thereby to be gained. This object--of which each individual must be +conscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises +the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of +the State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen. + +A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital +factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the +healthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope in +international competition. This is also an essential condition for the +unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where the +natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by external +circumstances, nation and State are stunted and individual growth is set +back. + +Increasing political power and the consequent multiplication of +possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the +intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by +every phase of history. + +The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself +first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of +statesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by force +of arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty of +every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale +commensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemy +cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On the +contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most +strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for +the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than +ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very +important factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits, +which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of +superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be +spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a +small, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War has +proved this once more. + +Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of +every State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert +_power_, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of its +personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the +narrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible nor +profitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined +by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious +development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military +elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system +cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. It +needs a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. In +the Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attacking +strength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, because +its foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political and +moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas. + +The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the +political necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree of +warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may +be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State's +duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst out +whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is +brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of +the State and of the army. + +It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties +of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. The +social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the +duty of the State in a quite different light from the political +_dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing +of things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to the +welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons +on the horizon of the future. + +Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the +nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these +momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and +experienced thinkers. + +First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in +the present political world, even though all the elements for it are +present. + +Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to +40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so +much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are +annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is +set up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would be +available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would not +mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say +a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on +active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from +such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the +continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike +weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the +individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the +highest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the +beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre +cannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been +ordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of the +strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the +rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins his +service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier. +With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we +merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. We +must not regard the present only, but provide for the future. + +The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makes +the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes +of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of +arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity +of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is +sinning against his country. + +The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations, +oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of +things--these turn the scale. + +When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last century +undertook the reorganization of the Prussian army, no political tension +existed. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King had +perceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet the +requirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his +people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations +without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun. +In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has +powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being +under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful +co-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed was +universally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, and +accorded with traditional German sentiment. + +While the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of the +political influences of the day, the military power of the probable +opponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink without +jeopardizing the national safety. + +Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries +of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all +these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the +hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an +obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as +up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by +every means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the army +must be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, in +which a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may be +attained. + +Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree +regulated by the political position of the State. If the State has +satisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping +its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive +character. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous of +expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must +adopt a predominantly offensive military system. + +Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are +dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide +scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where +the discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may lead +to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war, +and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In +this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so +clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that +the majority of the nation accept his view. There are always and +everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own, +and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses. + +Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command +of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful +position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the +population in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is +too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets +public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles, +feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, which +was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in the +military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary +unanimity. + +Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political independence +rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of +self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly +supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it +should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great +duties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic +evasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at +home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects +of our policy. + +To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion, +as King William I. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the +control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray +too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly +great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany. +He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of +inflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people. + +One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that +permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake +of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the +taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious +benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct +disadvantages. + +The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by +the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the +sacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefully +in view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the +conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But +where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual +enforcement of universal service or of the requirements on which +readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in +order to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in order +to maintain its vitality. + +One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction +preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing +conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military +authorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy, +since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon. +Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty to +perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit. + +It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to +disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of +the preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarily +available. "No expenditure without security," runs the formula in which +this policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security is +fixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the duties +which must be fulfilled--as Treitschke, our great historian and national +politician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the great +Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by +sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically +indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the +nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that +the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He +can only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the Ministers +for Commerce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to break +down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the +individual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to create +favourable conditions for profitable business. A great impulse must +thrill the whole productive and financial circles of the State, if the +duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled. + +Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls for +very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the +entire social and political life of the people and on the financial +policy of the State. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + + +THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR + +The social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defend +itself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strength +of the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors which +determine the conditions of preparation for war. + +I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres +of policy and progress which our history and our national character +impose on us. My next task is to observe the possible military +combinations which we must be prepared to face. + +In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can +judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political +intentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movements +will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and +this war will decide our future. + +It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our +probable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessary +basis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves the +intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable +efficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is +determined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions +clash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as to +the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data +available. + +If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups +of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results: +According to the recent communications of the French Finance Minister +Klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan), +the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910 +amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial +Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to +the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service +auxiliaire "--that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in +for service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to the +information of the same Minister, including field army and reserves, +consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. A reduction from +this number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sources +put down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army and +reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000. + +To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1,700,000 +Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per +cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made. + +If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will +correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength +of separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the +2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to the +infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a +considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the +transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers, +70,000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical +service, etc.), 90,000. + +No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per +cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the +birth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly, +it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. Recourse already has been had to the +expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of +filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less +efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves. + +Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the +plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians +and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with +them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and +trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited +conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria. +The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and +conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops are +in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops +stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers +against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are +heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the +Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the +climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops. +The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the +march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value. +There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with +every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative +proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native +Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before +Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the +native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War, +Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians. +An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age +available for military service. The Commission appointed for the purpose +reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in +the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined +some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. They +could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen +the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in +the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the +formation of reserves. + +As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in her +West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops +available. As the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000, +these figures may be considerably raised. + +Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalese +sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912 +a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to +Algeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black +troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. There +is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being +transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient +number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3, +stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the +Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France. +Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a +strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be +available for a European war is still remote. But it cannot be +questioned that they will be so some day. + +Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops in +Europe contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but +the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the +territory termed "Morocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to +come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale. +The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in +organizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the +command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco. + +The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great addition +to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the +country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and France will +certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in +military matters. + +For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the +reinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained from +Algeria and Tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription is +universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000 +men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have +witnessed their exploits on the battlefields of Weissenburg and Wörth. +At least one strong division of Turcos is already available. + +Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the military +power of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are not +published, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information is +forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service, +but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According to +the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the +Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of +Cossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formed +into 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe; +3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry is +divided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independent +regiments. + +In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures +42,000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strength +of 20,000. Each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry +divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive +at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions, +sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be added +unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the +war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000. + +This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. The +Siberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would +certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For the +maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to +leave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least one +division at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. This +would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men; so that +we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army, +1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of +Cossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men, +and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case +of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men +available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank +for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed +to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a +certain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not known +which of these formations would be really raised in event of +mobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be +put into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces which +must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could +easily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whether +arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in +sufficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empire +like Russia in this respect. + +Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to +England, the third member of the Triple Entente. + +The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into two +divisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed by +the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have +at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of +formation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns any +European theatre of war. + +The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinet +divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the +native troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army, +a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total +of 300,000. It is now 270,000 strong, and is destined exclusively for +home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very +highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We +have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army. +This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which seven +are with the colours and five in the reserve. The annual supply of +recruits is 35,000. The regular reserve is now 136,000 strong. There is +also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted +for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the +figure of 200,000. + +Of the regular English army, 134,000 men are stationed in England, +74,500 in India (where, in combination with 159,000 native troops, they +form the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39,000 in different +stations--Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the other +Colonies and Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt +are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in +the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong) +one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in +view of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of the +English is precarious. The 11,000 troops now stationed in South Africa +are to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. In +event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there. + +For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account the +regular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regular +field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted +brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and +trains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form part +of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. They consist of a +very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for +coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with +some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home +Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing +its organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of this +army can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150,000 men may +be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troops +compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the +Colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutes +the weak point in the British armament. England can employ her regular +army in a Continental war so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies. +This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war +break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and +especially in Egypt. + +Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente can +put into the field, Germany can command an active army of 589,705 men +(on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about +25,500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a peace footing is +361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. The combined war strength +of the two States may be estimated as follows: + +In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and +non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an +average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of +3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we +have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment to +it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French +can match with about the same figures. + +The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,000. Liability to +serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the +Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a +total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent., +911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained +Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to +911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a +grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as +Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe. + +In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available +for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would +be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available, +partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion. +However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never +reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia +present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the +enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent +generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the +addition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would +not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field. + +In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must +be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are already +reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple +Alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the +field against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France are +available against Germany. + +[Footnote A: Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne."] + +The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000 +men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry, +in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of +Bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regiments +in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are +united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field +artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193 +field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountain +batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies. +Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regiment +and an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28,000 men. + +On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. Some 70,000 +men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. The +militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might +be mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9 +army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the +Territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions. + +As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48 +officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500 +native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned +officers and privates of Italian birth, and 3,800 natives. + +Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it is +questionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value. +It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence, +while the protection of Tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim a +powerful army if it is to be held against France. + +The Turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joined +the coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents. + +The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275,000 +men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it: + +I. The Active Army (Nizam): + + Infantry 133,000 + Cavalry 26,000 + Artillery 43,000 + Pioneers 4,500 + Special troops 7,500 + Train formations 3,000 + Mechanics 3,000 + +A total, that is, of 220,000 men. + +2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. Within +this limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns for +short trainings. + +3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military employés, officials, +and others, more than 30,000. + +The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. We +need only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia, +Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in a +European theatre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be +regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for +local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior. +To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplest +process. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the +Turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. Turkey thus is +a very valuable ally to whichever party she joins. + +The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies into +the field. + +Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons +and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and +home duties. + +Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing; +this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The +war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000 +rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4 +guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and +228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (third +line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the +militia, an uncertain quantity. + +The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not +known how they are distributed among the various branches of the +service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including +infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine +guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and +national militia, which latter is only available for home service and +comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be +400,000 strong. + +Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power +in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to +their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia +cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of +their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods. + +In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the +permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. The +infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent +cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery +14,000 men with 700 officers. + +For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000 +men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry, +7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is +therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part +of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves +and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000 +trained men available for service. + +Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chiefly +concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into +relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European +States may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if +they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a +European war. + +Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under +consideration, and then Belgium. + +Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men. +The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive +war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns +and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a +total of 141,000 men. + +The Landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36 +12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total +strength of 69,000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000 +men. + +The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which +varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally +available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400 +garrison artillery, and I,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport +troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000 +infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400 +artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of +15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There +is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active +and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot +artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers, +including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder, +Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Völkerack and Haringvliet there are various +outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present +unimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications +in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland). + +Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English +landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. It +would easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us. + + +Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows: +26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison +artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service. + +On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising +74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers +and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry +divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each +of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1 +squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a +garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde +civique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as +a very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are +the fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast +fortifications. + +Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great +military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong +fortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of +strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This +State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, +2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the +strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. In war-time an army of 62,000 +men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically +of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special +arms. + +Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises units +from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as +well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which +is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There +are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students +from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age. + +The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can, +accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case +of war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head. + +In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might in +combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to +Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men +can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the +Landwehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm. + +Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently +stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active +army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is +so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could +at most be put into the field. + +As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the +accompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affords +a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that, +numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours. +This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of +really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four +battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have +ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned +battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The +comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, +that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be +noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really +have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be +counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the +number of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto known +about the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respect +of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important +factor if allied with the English. + + |Battle- |Armoured |Armoured| Armoured |Protected |Number |N S +Nation. |ships |Coast |Gunboats| Cruisers |Cruisers |of |u u + |above |Defence |and | | |Torpedo |m b + |5,000 |Vessels |Armoured| | |Vessels |b m + |Tons. |from |Ships | | | |e a + | |3000 Tons|under | | | |r r + | |to 5,000 |3,000 | | | | i + | |Tons |Tons | | | | i + +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n + |No|Displ. |No|Displ.|No|Displ|No|Displ. |No|Displ. | |From|f e + | | | | | | | | | | |200+|80- | s + | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| 200| + | | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| +---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- +GERMANY: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |25|332,410| 5|20,600| -| --- |10|114,590|33|122,130| 117| 70| 12 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building|12| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4| --- | 7| --- | 14| -- | -- + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +ENGLAND: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |50|793,260| -| --- | -| --- |38|484,970|66|333,540| 223| 36| 53 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building|12|286,640| -| --- | -| --- | 6|145,320|20|101,320| 51| -- | 19 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +FRANCE: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |22|314,930| -| --- | -| --- |22|214,670|10| 50,780| 71| 191| 52 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| 93,880| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 13| -- | 19 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +ITALY: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready | 8| 96,980| -| --- | -| --- |10| 79,530| 4| 10,040| 53| 39| 7 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| 84,000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 10,200| 14| 28| 13 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +AUSTRIA- | | | | | | | | | | | | | + HUNGARY | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |11|102,620| -| --- | -| --- | 3| 18,870| 4| 10,590| 18| 66| 7 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 5| 94,500| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| --- | 6| -- | -- + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +RUSSIA: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Baltic | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Ready | 4| 62,300| -| --- | 1|1,760| 6| 64,950| 4| 27,270| 60| 19| 13 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 8| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 1| -- | 1 +Black Sea| | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Ready | 6| 72,640| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 13,620| 17| 10| 4 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 7 +Siberian | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet |--| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 2| 9,180| 20| 7| 13 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +UNITED | | | | | | | | | | | | | + STATES: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |30|434,890| 4|13,120| -| --- |14|181,260|16| 65,270| 40| 28| 19 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 7|190,000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 20 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +JAPAN: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |13|194,690| 2| 8,540| -| --- |13|139,830|12| 49,170| 59| 49| 12 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 3| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4|107,120| 3| 15,000| 2| -- | 1 +---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- + +Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leave +a certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be stronger +than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in +event of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further assume +that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-European +stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together +can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships +alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by +a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia +joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition +to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since +the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships, +and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our +coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the +other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of +the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be +superior to us. + +As regards _matériel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is +distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our +equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a +superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless +energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up +some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these +advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of +an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English. + +Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under +certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in +this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente +can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time. + +If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of +the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany, +we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in +every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are +very different. + +If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed +she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member +of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course, +very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost +equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization +and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The +French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united +spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of +the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too, +has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to +double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the +French succeed in making a large African army available for a European +theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with +ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind, +for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may +safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if +only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well +that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of +her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by +the exercise of extraordinary efforts. + +It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military +power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself +desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably +not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her +own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured +the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too +high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has +all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, +and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must +expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple +Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have +struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination +with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would +attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, +and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the +fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the +considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and +threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of +the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without +difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would +enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would +enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, +after investing Metz and Diedenhofen. + +[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.] + +England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must +reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of +an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only +serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign. +English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not +coincident with those of France. + +The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea +commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any +further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy +our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the +supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium +between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in +order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never +impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the +private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her +plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political +position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war +against us. + +If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on +this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the +first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by +the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely +compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might +consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied +by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in +India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European +war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might +interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was +important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall +any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case +of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea +will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm +resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial +centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will +throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of +her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English +policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other +hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only +so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval +bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this +because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's +battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation +will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a +definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It is +very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively +acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South +Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and +stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the +offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the +generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale, +held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, +according to available information, show the English army in a +favourable light so far as strategical ability went. + +If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's +probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian +standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than +a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the +Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to +join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of +communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of +power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is +as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory +over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, +but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia +in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation +for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could +be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire. + +Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an +offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite +different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war. +Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against +complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not +shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for +political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such +a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion +in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast +Empire the social and also political education, especially among the +peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy +seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have +acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools +have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind +anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their +interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote +their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the +Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of +a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive +war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an +extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people +showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be +involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never +bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary +elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every +weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in +internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the +community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the +moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out +their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of +arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we +have already mentioned. + +Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole +power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a +certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by +defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater +exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks, +nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's +political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another +sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her +losses on another frontier. + +Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia +will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars +against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented +the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign +revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and +battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all +probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats +favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against +Russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coûte_. + +If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole +position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in +the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile +forces which would cripple the conduct of the war. + +So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese +War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle +showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest +losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian +army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but +essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of +the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; +indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every +grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above +mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian +generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and +that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must +therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack. + +When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we +cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military +difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel +successfully the attack of our opponents. + +In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our +country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no +opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the +government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our +western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north +through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is +there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper +bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned +through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country +offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves +resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their +army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in +their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten. + +The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and +the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a +prey to our enemies. + +The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a +strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland. +England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire +oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east +alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are +encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides. +This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so +presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our +opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan. + +If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact +that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in +carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia +have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will +sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of +any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an +extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by +the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not +merely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is a +cause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound +to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase +of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct +of Italy at the conference of Algeçiras sufficiently demonstrated. It +even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always +reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a +defensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France and +England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how +difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with +France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we +think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which +is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt +whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were +allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests +are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the +same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria. +Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate +State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements, +patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to +the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of +such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that +might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration. + +We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of +standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the +Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the +struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own +resolution for victory. + +Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our +political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can +only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and +by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect +continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their +interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, +since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and +obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, +then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own +resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of +desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would +destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize +the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would +shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus +check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for +which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war +will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. +This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power +or downfall!" will be our rallying cry. + +Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident +intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the +end, come what may. + +We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted +campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our +enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to +defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last +is won. + +It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numerical +equality with our opponents. On the contrary, we must strive to call up +the entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the great +decision which impends. We must try also to gain a certain superiority +over our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold some +winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. We +must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only by +continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our +preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future +makes on us. A nation of 65,000,000 which stakes _all_ her forces on +winning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot be +conquered. But it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblance +of power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content with +half-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only be +attained by the exertion and development of all her powers. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + + +THE NEXT NAVAL WAR + +In the next European land war we shall probably face our foes with +Austria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the day +against any opposing forces. In a naval war we shall be thrown on our +own resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against the +superior forces which will certainly press us hard. + +There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for, +although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack +would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking +our political power. It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack +_us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France. The English have, +besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should +always be held before our eyes. They talk so much of a possible German +attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question +is from the opposite point of view. Again, the preparations which they +are making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly have +contemplated an attack on Germany. These preparations are like a +strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves +no doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbour of Rosyth is +admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can mean +nothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especially +strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the +Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These are +measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand +an inquiry into the military position thus created. + +The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since +1902. Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it +is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time. +This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the +circumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusively +directed against Germany. + +We must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us to +believe--reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, and +shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. It will be +so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the +offensive against the English fleet. But we must contemplate the +possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning +the freedom of the seas, if England attacks us. We shall now discuss +this possibility. On this matter I am expressing my personal views only, +which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest +exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed +antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. I shall not +betray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any. But I +consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand +what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met. + +In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong +enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question +remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure +protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to +become its master? + +The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, +instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the +war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English +fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its +superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective +blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that +such an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does not +seem to me to promise any great success. + +The English have secured themselves against such attacks by +comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seems +dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall +urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings. +Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than +formerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English +merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under such +circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign +service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's +warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of +these ships will certainly be a difficult task. + +The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and +energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes +which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will +usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the +few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing +our vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken against +neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable +results can be expected from a war against England's trade. On the +contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at +her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must be +ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England's +custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests +are at stake. + +Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire +with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by +the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to +English vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they +can be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has +no knowledge of their existence. + +It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation +from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications +will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way +would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral +Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the +great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be +discovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remain +suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of +trade. + +It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such +communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect +of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to block +these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the +States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether +they would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity, +or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography +dictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with England +and a Continental war with their German neighbours--two possibilities, +each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay much +attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was +at issue is hardly credible. + +The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot be +foreseen. It would probably depend on the general political position and +the attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest. The +policy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor. One +can easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch are +seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on +their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea +side. They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which +obviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sided +with our enemies. + +I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities +which might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to a +sympathetic understanding by the war. I will only point out how +widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the +Continental war and on the political relations generally. The attitude +of Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the +Baltic must mainly depend on her. It is vital to us that these +communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this. +The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly important +for the conduct of the war. Free commerce with Sweden is essential for +us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish +iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted. + +It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the +interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by +diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. We +cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands. + +Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus +raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer +greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us +assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only +trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--a +condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and +should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any +case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on +which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and +also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial +products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They +must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the +Government must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry of +Commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in +collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which +our commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort of +commercial mobilization. + +These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us +in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a +defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our +coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack. + +Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade +closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish +straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she +can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the +Continent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotland +and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea +commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping. + +A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of +the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a +blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base +and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since all +the English naval ports are considerably farther than this from our +coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously +increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich has +recently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. It is considered +the best harbourage on the English coast, and is hardly 300 nautical +miles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities of +fortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distance +from the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes of +blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless +count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutch +coast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means. +Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as +Heligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all +attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. This +task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by +night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on +board. + +Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy, +if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the +offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain +an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive +operations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts +must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We must +endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly +with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the +blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as +possible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces, +for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there +is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the +enemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end. +And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold +attack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionally +favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the +fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy +losses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring, +to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place +or another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and +the battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behind +the farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold the +high seas in full strength. The forces of the defending party, however, +lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight. + +Such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party. +We may therefore fairly assume that the English would decide in favour +of the second kind. At all events, the harbour constructions, partly +building, partly projected, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were chosen with +an eye to this line of blockade. It would entail in the north the +barring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasible +from the military aspect. Only a small force is required to seal up the +Channel, as the navigation route is very narrow. In addition to all +this, the great English naval depots--Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, and +Plymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediately +behind it. Besides, every advance against this line from the north is +flanked by Sheerness and Harwich, so that a retreat to the German coast +might be barred. The conditions for the northern line of blockade will +be no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. The +blockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour of +Rosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the Orkney +Isles. Every attacking fleet from the German north coast will be +unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cut +off from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to the +English superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading +fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the +Baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here we +should have a tolerably secure retreat. This accentuates once more the +supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage +through the Sound and the Great Belt. The command of these straits will +not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the +sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading +fleet. + +In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade +offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are +well worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, it +prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed +by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the +blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or +three divisions. + +As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let +herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests +of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory +arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As +regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous +conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily +divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the +superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea. +Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending +party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction +with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be +deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are +the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be +employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled. + +This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But +it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the +close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet +more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in +far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the +threatened flank of our attacking fleet. + +After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a +mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision +of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event +of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt +to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They +could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our +naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and +Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these +places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea. + +It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate +against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford +extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by +protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the +communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack +will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast +fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely +defensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon +the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the +fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should +inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength +between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must +be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast +fortifications hold out. + +No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a +defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows. +Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments +for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative +movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures +for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers. +The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we +shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy +"scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleet +must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the +enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by +attacking them directly. + +If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they +would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English +force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus +contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing +forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected +to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be +dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a +balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in +mind. + +So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for, +starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines would +be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully +than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they +would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant English +coast. + +Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and +nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the +boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in +hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the +science of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is the +only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we +may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea. + +In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to +be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a +World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England. + +This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of +Germany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the +common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win +recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This was +the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under +Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her +history; and the great Republic of the United States of North America +strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right +of nations for which every people craves." [A] + +[Footnote A: Schiemann.] + +In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this +vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us +in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which, +in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy, +has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the +unscrupulous suppression of her rivals. + +If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English and +takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage +than a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold our +allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her +forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the +two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea, +since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean +interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful +issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then +despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak, +on land--i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be +compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet +to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to +the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an +absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports and +destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife with +France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the +French position as a Great Power. If France, with her falling +birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her +place in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanent +political subservience. Those are the stakes. + +The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated. +That is the less dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present +still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French. +We could operate against it on the inner line--i.e., we could use the +opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the +Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we could attack the Russian ships in vastly +superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the +North Sea. For these operations it is of the first importance that the +Danish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell into +the hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would be +almost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the +passive protection of our coast batteries. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + + +THE CRUCIAL QUESTION + +I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some +detail, because I thought that our general political and military +position can only be properly estimated by considering the various +phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities +and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on +our coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction be +decided in which our preparations for war ought to move. + +The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war +with England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall +need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from +a hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on an +ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If an +Anglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatened +our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by +sea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armies +advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined +fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be +rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land. + +We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on +land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all +circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the +Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before +we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy +based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in +Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her +triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own +country. + +But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by +the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing +with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land +army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting +the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally +necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every +attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled. + +At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the +conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk +of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay +the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample +scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put +aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost +energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole +future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the +broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the +individual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere is +critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as +a World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the Triple +Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey, +threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which +destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing +ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, if +we wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we are +Germans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out our +preparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to our +national duty. + +I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated +merely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in the +cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer +the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the +future. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to +desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour +something of what we have lost in the last years. + +Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on +the continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problem +of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great +numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainly +exist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance, +whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to +Irredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondary +importance. + +The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make +the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate +the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make +universal service an existing fact. + +The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a +splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has +in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and +has brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification. +Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed +in a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mighty +political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our +greatness was founded. + +France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in +Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000. +Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. But since +the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very +various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are +also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to +the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself +successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the +inner line, even though England took part in the war. + +Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of +universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued +to carry it out effectively. The country where universal service exists +is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only +kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the +able-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little use +has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army. + +In this direction some reorganization is required which will +energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army, +such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand, +we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers. + +Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not +shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make +up our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by +150,000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not be +forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could +not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased army +only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and +Landwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recur +to the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the new +Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wish +to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even +if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that +we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the +superior forces of our opponents. + +We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we +must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These +means can only be found in the spiritual domain. + +History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have +only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been +equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party +exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases +it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment, +greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able +strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Rome +conquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great with +inferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent history +shows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over a +crushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a great +commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear. +Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the +hostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisive +factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory +or defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and +keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a +real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which +would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should we +then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy +which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be +possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a +considerable numerical superiority. + +[Footnote A: _Cf_. v. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.] + +The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery +with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships, +and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable +opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast +with the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certain +spiritual servility and inferiority. + +Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which +the ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is to +prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to +apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of +superiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the material +advantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushed +by their weight of numbers. + +We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by +uninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight the +probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new +paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. New +goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches +us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress, +in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritual +capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be +sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action, +are the soil in which great successes ripen. + +It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the +nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas +which will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughly +ventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege" +("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results of +my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration +of the essential questions of the future. + +In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extent +unprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness +will exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means of +communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. These +three momentous factors will mark the war of the future. + +"Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain +elements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they can +be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical +efficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the country +during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are +therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower +and less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they require +for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into +effective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible to +morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may +prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run +short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority +over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions. + +The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer +range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting +claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner than +formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far +wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. The +soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which +he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all +circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing +which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious +movement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances. +Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short, +while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands +made on them have become considerably greater. + +Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and +feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main +roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign, +aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their +use, and the commanders counted upon them. + +The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great +superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and +tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists. + +The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy, +and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than +they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior +force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective +troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile +army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it +before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the +field. + +Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly +shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary +conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare. + +In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength +which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action. +Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack +to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a +superior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which is +the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place +which is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked party +can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the +intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold +out promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attacking +General strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his +troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature +guarantees. + +This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancing +armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it +will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take +proper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, the +prospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable, +especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at +his disposal. + +Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility +of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all +the more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is +impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and +completely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisive +direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of +the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and +its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations. +If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior +numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his +numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory +over the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law, +Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and striking +strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in +mere numbers. + +No further proof is required that the superiority of the attack +increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and +to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of +concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the +enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very +appreciable. + +We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the +superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it +is incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise the +tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and +especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements +and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to +act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the +manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be +superior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has +objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks +by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It +must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since +a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods. + +This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which I +have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face +the future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raise +the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else +must give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all our +measures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, and +thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too +easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of +a collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions would +have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying +principle. + +The requirements which I have described as the most essential are +somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a +resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age. + +The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, the +smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not +merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as +such. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will be +suffocated by their own fat," said General v. Brandenstein, the great +organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of +the French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the +whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure +the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his +own movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the course +of military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tactical +efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it +certainly will prove in the wars of the future. + +A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of +public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have +conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential +contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained, +and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It would +be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is +recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached +on them. + +This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is +attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military +service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less, +and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had +to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a +good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_, +which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no +means helped by the very brief training which these units at best +receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity +for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy +strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be +indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the +field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain +the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass +would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to +some degree the task of making good the losses. + +A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops. +Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are +already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full +strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on +mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according +to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much +inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which +were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this, +notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new +French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere +of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their +duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered +territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact, +they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the +field army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and +mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By acting +at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually +become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of +offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset +of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied +with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be. + +Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such +troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive +operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated +as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some +are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical +conception. + +For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars +only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks +for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if +necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and +more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical +striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater +numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the +decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever +before. + +The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are +placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this +principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that +he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong +advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and +therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his +army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be +employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as +much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the +numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the +actual war. + +It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to +render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a +mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their +_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to +them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of +efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered. + +Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An +increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more +than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is +supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the +establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient +will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality, +not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If we +wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening +the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of +professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This step +is the more necessary because the present available cadres are +insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide +for their thorough training. + +The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with +an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. We +shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the +efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be +improved by organization, equipment, and training. + +I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the +questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of +military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt +original action--I mean the importance of personality. + +From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of +his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune, +and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a given +general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left +to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in +the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the +face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other +age, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics has +abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left +to himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In the +strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of +that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before +from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in the +artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly +emphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations have +increased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far less +able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the +field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates. +These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations. + +When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his +ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the +reserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment +to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot +be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Even +the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now +wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have +to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing +touch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on the +commander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy, +deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from +him. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All this +puts a heavy strain on personality. + +It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of +self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct +advantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to +attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And this +object can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in the +sphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can be +improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the +conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in +which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and +more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp. +Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune +are produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkward +and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same +process is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mental +development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the +personality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsman +Bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of +leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. General +Chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute +determination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks of +the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and +thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is it +essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in +high command. In a long military life ideas all too early grow +stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought +and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of such +development cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of the +army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a +one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of +actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akin +to this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en +masse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatest +value. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual +independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and +solving new problems by original methods. + +It has often been said that one man is as good as another; that +personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is +erroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real +struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is +enough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility and +danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a +chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross. + +That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the +important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is the +only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to +break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and +success. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. that for the +highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time +of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men +around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition +those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of +need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. This +is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and +distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action, +appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of +the stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved: + + "Folk and thrall and victor can + Witness bear in every zone: + Fortune's greatest gift to man + Is personality alone." + + + + +CHAPTER X + + + +ARMY ORGANIZATION + +I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it +is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with +this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. I +shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in +my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we +wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions +which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It will +be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially +noteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come into +opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further +from my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based on +theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely +presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and +of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political +disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is, +in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something +already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent +historical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to the +future, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-defined +lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most +important that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall not +look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future. + +The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I have +already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the +greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position +to carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore, +fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, as +already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the +arming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops, +and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly +have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of +their peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter how +essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary +cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches +so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in +war-time. + +The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the +non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of +the troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline, +decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the +troops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number of +permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in +proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the +demands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officers +and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred +to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern +tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his +influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing +_personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to the +infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a +sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the more +important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers +and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on +the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and +non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is a +question of training, and does not come into the present discussion. + +The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a +sense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospects +which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect +the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to +keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary +advantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, the +financial question is all-important. The career of the officer offers +to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and +self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the +service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as +they now are. The infantry officer especially must have a better +position. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur +greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer +has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most +strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It would +be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than +the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm +more attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for +which there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be well +supplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must be +counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service. +By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the +chief arm. + +If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition +and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the +troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in +action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on +conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical +proportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally the +cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the +proportion which artillery must bear to infantry. + +With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent +replace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weapons +of defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourable +conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful +attack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder that +impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, this +auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and +employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into +large units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching +columns. + +The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance. + +Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooth +their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly. +This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry +must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting +instruments in the whole army. + +If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the +result. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to +modern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greater +superiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of front +in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close +tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire. +This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the +conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as +before. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in +a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The +troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en échelon _than in the +last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate +the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be +settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the +experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will +most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in +the domain of military science. + +If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an +infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of +artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern +artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must +advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the +artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path +between these two extremes. + +If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or, +better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the +guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially +adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the +conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is +reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we +must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into +account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If +we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper +strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such +infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position +taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that +section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions, +requires greater numbers and depth than before. + +In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of +the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian +campaign. + +Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period +extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not +rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original +strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans +on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so +decisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would have +shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the +contest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the former +case the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery, +under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak +infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under +the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was +too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched +enemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of +infantry were needed at Wörth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite of +the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker +enemy of equal class. + +Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English in +artillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state of +things was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery was +extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russian +field guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, the +Japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also, +because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite +superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillery +was scattered along the whole of their broad front. + +The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the +arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these +units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be +appropriately determined. + +The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or +superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly +mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and +corps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucial +test. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpected +concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the +superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way. +If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine +against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies +a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it is +assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and +that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so +slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then +equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese were +tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they +were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive +directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical +superiority of the Russian army as a whole. + +If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the +artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy +within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a +considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful. +In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded +the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the +artillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the +separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of +the army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excess +in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is +restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then +artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to +victory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forces +for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces +along the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often be +weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage +may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a +position. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering +concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. This +victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere. + +The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater +marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of +the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the +columns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossal +armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly +live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from +the rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies; +but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be +maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go +to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead. +Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct +communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught +animals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons of +provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily, +must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of +food. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a +certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport +waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to +the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the +night's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained +if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient +quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry +with them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid +down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusually +lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the +troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thus +the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly +dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A careful +calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to +average 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from an +army--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25 +kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps on +the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle +troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps. + +This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily +affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and +rations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyed +railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of +columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared +by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time +the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the +troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption +continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In order +to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any +crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample +stock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of the +necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must be +taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of +tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done by +special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the +organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a +distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by +forced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increase +the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It is +further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very +long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other +provisions compressed into the smallest space. + +An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps, +and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army +with its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it the +troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is far +more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any +other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the +decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent. + +However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained +if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed +from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out. +Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within +these limits. + +Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army +corresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened by +a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it +will considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, the +necessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantry +is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to +deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack +and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to +strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the +artillery. + +In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division +is very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as to +permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of +reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units. +This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional +organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet +appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the +existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been +drawn up by competent officers. + +The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two +infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The +formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix +the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his +own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a +reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of +some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity +for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a +wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this +procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible, +even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the +brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken +by the enemy and the course of the battle. + +Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its +application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of +cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution +which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that +the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of +two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry +these duties out. + +This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts +the most generally accepted military principles. + +The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as +is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate +divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal +of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the +subdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack +must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best +formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops +to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result +there. + +A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by +the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action +two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of +course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not +always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely +the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ +them as their particular character demands. + +The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and +divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding +formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately +according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the +undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders +of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the +commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of +enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for +himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one +division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to +withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one +division only, the same division must always be subjected to this +reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether +this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least +worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not +be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each +division. + +The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous +question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the +whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement +would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a +position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They +can also, however, be combined under the command of the +General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first +arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the +great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is +dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left +but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the +indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are +inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers +is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is +planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that +the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line +by a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach +single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army +corps temporarily. + +There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally +used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the +spot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into the +advance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's field +artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in +such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers. +It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this +problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long +unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their +effectiveness doubtful. + +No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased +their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort +to every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, be +overestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite _sui generis_. +The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions +strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line +in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns. +It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective +12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I +can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty +was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. The +Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their +howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but +break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs, +the question of concentration seems to me very important for us. + +Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the +heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus best +serve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which he +wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain +that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the +army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries will +be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General. +There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the +deciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knows +that. + +I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the +heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batteries +which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed +under the orders of the corps commanders _(Truppenführer)_ if they are +to become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artillery +of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot +artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres. +It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does +not feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinction +between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical. + +This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the +heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the +Commander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and +manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the +present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy +artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. This +disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned +permanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being united +in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, they +would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely +the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies. + +The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more +effective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies not +merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but +the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the +advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We were +taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway +communications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vital +importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the +discharge of these necessary functions. + +Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was +organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations, +but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system +can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them. + +The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by +the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and +so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train +adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years' +service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building, +fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on +fortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer's +duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for +the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the +actual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training +for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation. + +Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the late +Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable +service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. This +follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--a +rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training +for their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and develop +more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better +proportion to its value. + +In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are +directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical +efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly +serve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of the +enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening +movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy +unawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. I +refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet. + +The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry out +reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must +operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the +regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility. + +Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the +war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned +them in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen if +we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize +that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and +that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited +efficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous, +because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little +from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal. +There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and +1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is +misleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it +crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on +the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly +antiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independent +movements. What they then did must not be compared with what will be +required from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces were +really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived +notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their +employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of +their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa, +notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must be +studied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that an +increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course, +only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped +with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate +independently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the +fulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, when +the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting +force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. This +is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's +communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand, +the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive +than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if +cavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry is +undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of +the enemy. + +Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists, +another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful +service. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in +war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have +repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted. + +The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of the +divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time +being. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in +a high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that +the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on +modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over +the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue. + +I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are +attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that +the division with its three parts would have the control of three +batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each +brigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. once +made, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalry +usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing +momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with +the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously, +therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the +artillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when +it is important to make a decisive attack. + +The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed +by the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yet +exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of +military science will play in future wars.[A] It is therefore necessary +to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special +weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration +from the technical side. + +[Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators in +Tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were no +opponents in the air.] + +The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of +handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting +strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of +the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking +successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers. + +The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading +idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once +thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since +tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the +technical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne in +mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our +opponents. + +If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the +necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed +changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve +the efficiency of our army. + +The whole organization must be such that the column length of the army +corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the +supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots. + +In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as +being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition +must be observed. + +The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially +strengthened. + +The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to +concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up +the units. + +The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so +organized as to insure their efficiency in war. + +The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so +elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the +troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained. + +The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making +it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy. + +Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every +nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to +take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in +the decisive field war. + +The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present +organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be +carried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which, +without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to +make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition. +The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit +political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so +strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when +all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. They +comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen, +although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often +surpassed all expectations. + +But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is +necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to +achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to +public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake +there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as +unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the +principles of a sound military organization. + +The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in +various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject, +and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive +consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration. + +One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of +three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous +intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in +every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the +extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jäger +battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the +hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried +out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the +drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within +the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing +the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being +thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more +ways. + +The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only +be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the +enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to +each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present. +But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that +new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be +taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this +means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the +artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited, +without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the +quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle +should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. All +that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat +waggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when a +battle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troops +and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than +the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of +ammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will be +inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the +fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can +only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be +reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, the +required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought +forward by stages in good time. + +A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division +had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light field +howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that +they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the +formations of the division. The strength of the artillery must be +regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the +entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavy +field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the +orders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as +"army" artillery. + +It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached +from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent +in war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with the +infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres +with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional +cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. On +the other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the _Truppenführer_ +are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders; +but this objection does not seem very pertinent. + +Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the +arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging +to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under +the commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would be +withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments +strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended for +divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six +squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. If +the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only +be able to receive two squadrons. + +In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry +would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it; +but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army +cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult +task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one +to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame for +such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who +did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. The +whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. If +it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the +arm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There are +various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry +can be guaranteed. + +The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached +to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in +co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make +appropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restricted +to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which +require to be surmounted. + +The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the +organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. In +military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual +factors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that my +opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect +of affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main +leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by +question of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part of +that general combination of things which only really comes into view in +actual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must be +rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced. +Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means +of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient +account of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made such +progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much +importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort, +the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which +they employ. + +A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are +essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out; +under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer +of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way +or that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from +a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the +importance of the separate co-operating factors. + + + + "For he who grasps the problem as a whole + Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul" + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + + +TRAINING AND EDUCATION + +Our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the German +army into the most effective tool of German policy, and into a school of +health and strength for our nation. We must also try to get ahead of our +rivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do full +justice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all our +efforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units and +strengthening their loyal German feelings. + +Diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at the +present day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, for +there are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. If we +wish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training must +break with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the war +of the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops as +well as on the officers. + +It is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the use +of modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily from +the introduction of these means of war. But if we survey the sphere of +training as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us as +peculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands which +will be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" to +an extent hitherto unknown. + +The necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantry +and artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle; +in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategical +duties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in the +case of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vast +extent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and the +difficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving direct +orders. Wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare, +we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldier +in the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of the +enemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles huge +hosts. In battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity of +action can only be attained at the present time by independent +co-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme. + +The employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of moving +and feeding the troops. It is one thing to lead 100,000 or perhaps +200,000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate them +for a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800,000 men on a scene of war +stripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have been +destroyed by modern explosives. In the first case the military empiric +may be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively a +scientifically educated General and a staff who have also studied and +mastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. The problems of +the future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able to +operate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision. + +The necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universally +recognized. To be sure, the old traditions die slowly. Here and there an +undeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method of +education, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised more +than is justified by its value. The cavalry is not yet completely +awakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises on +the parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, oblivious +of the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they were +still the old arm which Napoleon or Frederick the Great commanded. Even +the artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions; +technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom of +operations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still in +vogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of fire +with a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. Even in +theory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. Many +conservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. Obsolete ideas +have not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations and +ordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on the +whole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility and +self-reliance must be encouraged. In this respect the army is on the +right road, and if it continues on it and continually resists the +temptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for the +sake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually the +highest results will be attained, provided that competent military +criticism has been equally encouraged. + +In this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficient +attention has been given to the fact that the main features of war have +completely changed. Although in the next war men will have to be handled +by millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted on +lines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modern +conditions. Our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. Most of +the practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades and +divisions--i.e., in formations which could never occur in the great +decisive campaigns of the future. From time to time--financial grounds +unfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre is +held, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of +"masses." Sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled for +combined training under veteran Generals, who soon afterwards leave the +service, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience which +they may have gained. + +It cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres are +extraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troops +themselves', but they are not a direct training for the command of +armies in modern warfare. Even the so-called "Imperial Manoeuvres" only +correspond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war, +since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, and +seldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc., the troops which would +be essential in real warfare. A glance at the Imperial Manoeuvres of +1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never have +been carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed under +the conditions of war. It is an absolute necessity that our officers +should learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are the +rule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. In +theory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken into +account; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theory +are posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and the +divisions. That they would in reality all have to circulate with a +pendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that the +magazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent farther +back, that the position of the field bakeries is of extreme +importance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome, +and so are very seldom considered. + +In great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected in +Russia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariat +arrangements are rarely worked out in detail; I should almost doubt +whether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazine +feeding" has ever been entertained. Even smaller opportunities of being +acquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinary +manoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoretical +lines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding a +large army and to master the subject efficiently. + +The friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be brought +home to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such things +cannot be learnt from books. + +These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations, +but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an +army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is +obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. When, in 1870, +some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the +advance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not +masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war +and the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operations +to succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army. All +these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our General +Staff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no means +the common property of the army. + +On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres +must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered +conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. The +troops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency, +and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for +carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two +pivots. But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the +great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. The paths +we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal. + +All methods of training and education must be in accordance with these +views. + +I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and +cavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question at +length in special treatises.[A] In the case of the artillery alone, some +remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm +seem necessary. + +[Footnote A: v. Bernhardi: "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie," 1910 +"Unsere Kavallerie im nächsten Krieg," 1899; "Reiterdienst," 1910.] + +The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partly +expressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: all +preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one +side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or +infantry at the decisive point. This principle is universally +acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice. +The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their +tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical +requirements subservient to this idea. The ever-recurring tendency to +fight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. On the +defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking +artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most +dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its +chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible, +from masked positions. The principle of keeping the artillery divisions +close together on the battlefield and combining the fire in one +direction, must not be carried to an extreme. The artillery certainly +must be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see that +there is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but in +particular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this idea +will be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than by +explaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leaving +to them the duty of carrying it out. Accordingly, it is important that +the personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognized +more fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action is +indispensable. The great extent of the battlefields and the natural +endeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack will +often force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behind +the other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against the +tactically most important objective. This result is hard to attain by a +centralization of command, and is best realized by the independent +action of tactically trained subordinates. + +This is not the place to enter into technical details, and I will only +mention some points which appear especially important. + +The Bz shell _(Granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and its +use should not form part of the training. It requires, in order to +attain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming as +is very seldom possible in actual warfare. + +No very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. It seems +to be retained in France and to have shown satisfactory results with us; +but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of the +shooting-range directly to serious warfare. No doubt its use, if +successful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especially +in the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. In any case, +practice with Az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance. + +The Az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of an +offensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations. + +Care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements and +complications of strategy and devices. Only the simplest methods can be +successfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten. + +The important point in the general training of the artillery is that +text-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should be +relegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics should +be given a more prominent position. In this way only can the artillery +do really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must not +be neglected in the reports. That would mean rejecting the good and the +evil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenient +must be distinctly opposed. + +Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres +of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large +expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. They must, in my +opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their +possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks. +They lead to pronounced tactics of position _(Stellungstaktik)_ which +are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual +war--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a +definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in +search of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt on +these manoeuvres. They could be made more instructive if the tactical +limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these +manoeuvres--viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive +arm--cannot be thus remedied. The usual result is that favourable +artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to +under some tactical pretence. + +After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may +be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of the +various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them +into line with modern conditions. If, however, the troops are to be +educated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new ground +must be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubted +superiority over our opponents can be attained. Considerable +difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to +amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties +are not, in my opinion, insurmountable. + +There are two chief points: first, the practice of marching and +operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with +well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a +reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more +thorough education of the chief commanders. + +As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know, +has never yet been attempted. But if we consider, firstly, how valuable +more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of +the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we +shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for +the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage +over our supposed antagonist. + +The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally +also be carried out in smaller formation. It is, moreover, very +important to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--in +long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in +the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such +movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them. + +Training marches with full military stores, etc., in columns of 20 to 25 +kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond to +the daily needs of real warfare. Should it not be possible to assemble +two army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march can +be obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitable +intervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed. +This does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare, +but it is useful as a makeshift. The waggons for the troops would have +to be hired, as On manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to save +expense. The supplies could be brought on army transport trains, which +would represent the pioneer convoys _(Verpflegungsstaffel)_, and would +regulate their pace accordingly. + +Marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with food +supplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be of +considerable value provided that care is taken to execute the march in +the shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed by +bringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is only +properly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continued +for several days. It is naturally not enough to undertake these +manoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if they +are intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army. +Finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns, +sometimes in army formation. The flank marches of separate columns will, +of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice in +feeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march on +the side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence brought +up to the troops at the close of the march. Flank marches in army +formation will have some value, even apart from any training in the +commissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marching +columns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. But +this exercise will have its full value only when the regulation +commissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with them +and furnish the supplies. + +I also consider that operative movements in army formation extending +over several days are desirable. Practice must be given in moving +backwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flank +movements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rear +being blocked when necessary. Then only can all the difficulties which +occur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen where +the lever must be applied in order to remove them. In this way alone can +the higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting such +operations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of a +hostile attack. An army so disciplined would, I imagine, acquire a +pronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experiments +in such operations in actual war. The major strategic movements on both +sides in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that. + +I recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost a +great deal of money and could never all be carried out systematically +one after the other. I wished, however, to ventilate the subject, +firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study the +points of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do; +secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carry +out in practice one or other of them--at the Imperial Manoeuvres, for +example, or on some other occasion. How much could be saved in money +alone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentioned +country manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? From reasons of economy +all the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employed +on such manoeuvres. It would be useful, however, if, in addition to one +detachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the other +groups were present and were moved along at the proper distance from +each other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from the +kitchen waggon. It would thus be possible to get a sort of presentation +of the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuable +experience. It is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange such +manoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and many +obstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out, +and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions; +but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not be +wholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matters +which are really essential. They would, at any rate, be far more +valuable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced by +exercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings in +the country, which are of no real utility, or than many other military +institutions which are only remotely connected with the object of +training under active service conditions. All that does not directly +promote this object must be erased from our system of education at a +time when the highest values are at stake. + +Even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often be +carried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because it +is not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of the +troops. + +It must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so that +eventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becoming +practically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troops +may become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but since +such practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they must +also be worked out beforehand theoretically. It is not at all sufficient +that the officers on the General Staff and the Intendants have a mastery +of these subjects. The rank and file must be well up in them; but +especially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--that +is to say, the transport officers of the standing army and those +officers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as column +commanders. + +The practical service in the transport battalions and the duties +performed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who are +assigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object. +They learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of the +system as a whole. It would therefore be advisable that all these +officers should go through a special preliminary course for this +service, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would be +explained to them by the officers of the General Staff and the higher +transport service officers, and they would then learn by practical +examples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the most +varied positions with precise regard to distances and time. This would +be far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainings +in driving, etc., on which so much time is wasted. The technical +driver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is not +easy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to be +able, when occasion arises, to act independently. + +While, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must be +thoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of a +scientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples out +of military history, the importance of these matters can be explained, +is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. I have shown +elsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically in +the arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operative +capabilities of the army depend on this system. Its nature, however, +cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspiration +when mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must be +gained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of the +importance which this service has attained under modern conditions is +that officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully without +having made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter. + +The transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinary +importance in the general system of modern warfare. It should be +appreciated accordingly. Every active transport service officer ought, +after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the senior +officers on the furlough establishment intended for transport service +ought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. If +these educational courses were held in the autumn in the training camps +of the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimable +advantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay. + +The results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, when +the superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do not +make demands contrary to the nature of the case, and therefore +impossible to be met. They should therefore be obliged to undergo a +thorough education in the practical duties of the General Staff, and not +merely in leading troops in action. + +This reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how, +generally, the training of the superior officers for the great war +should be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with a +view to the training. The essential contradiction between our obsolete +method of training and the completely altered demands of a new era +appears here with peculiar distinctness. + +A large part of our superior commanders pass through the General Staff, +while part have attended at least the military academy; but when these +men reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has long +become out of date. The continuation school is missing. It can be +replaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficient +time for this, and often a lack of interest. The daily duties of +training troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs great +determination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his own +scientific education. The result is, that comparatively few of our +superior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less an +independently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the great +scale. This would cost dearly in real war. Experience shows that it is +not enough that the officers of the General Staff attached to the leader +are competent to fill up this gap. The leader, if he cannot himself +grasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believes +he is directing and is himself being directed. This is a far from +healthy condition. Our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned, +only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and from +the tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. The +minor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most important +feature in present-day warfare--i.e., the sudden concentration of +larger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from space +considerations, of timely counter-movements on the other. The minor +manoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. The commanders learn +to form decisions and to give orders, and these are two important +matters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grand +scale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditions +of warfare. + +Brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merely +encourage wrong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is, +fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds. +Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders. +The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in +them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those +of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger +scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the +operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled +to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. The +great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for +only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the +collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual +warfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weighty +consideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought before +their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern +warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations. + +The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of +small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly +strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important +military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this +direction. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they +conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all our +resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a +modern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a +rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of +the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too +small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional +manoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this change +could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: a +great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system +if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and +execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word. + +It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training +on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to +educate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres can +only show their full value if the officers of every rank who take part +in them have already had a competent training in theory. + +To encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thus +one of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. These +must not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of the +troops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves and +their subordinates for leadership in the great war. Strategic war games +on a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by the +commanding Generals, and in the army-inspections by the Inspectors, seem +to me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. All +superior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiency +in superior commands. The threads of all this training will meet in the +hands of the Chief of the General Army Staff as the strategically +responsible authority. + +It seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance to +decide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not for +their posts. The circumstances that a man is an energetic commander of +a division, or as General in command maintains discipline in his army +corps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader of +an army. Military history supplies many instances of this. + +No proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfare +the reconnoitring and screening units require special training. The +possibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degree +dependent on their activity. I have for years pointed out the absolute +necessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for their +profession, and I can only repeat the demand that our cavalry +riding-schools should be organized also as places of scientific +education. I will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulk +of the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisional +cavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. These exercises do not +correspond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrong +notions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command finds +out who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalry +division on manoeuvres. + +The centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing of +operations and on the skilful transition from strategical independence +to combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry lies +in these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-grounds +than systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. The perpetual +subject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement between +two divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. Any +unprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to this +result, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may be +regarded as a serious preparation for war. + +It is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, always +acts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annually +extensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definite +effect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which +_always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself, +but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is only +rarely necessary in war. This clearly demonstrates the unsystematic and +antiquated methods of all our training. + +Practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on a +large scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry. +Co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soon +as aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as an +integral factor of army organization. The airship division and the +cavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command, +especially for screening purposes, which are all-important. + +The methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully to +modern requirements have been pointed out by General v. Beseler. This +arm need only be developed further in the direction which this +distinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of the +next war. + +In the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the support +of the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in the +construction of similar positions. Tactical requirements must, however, +be insisted upon in this connection. The whole training must be guided +by considerations of tactics. This is the main point. As regards sieges, +especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since the +object is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take the +fortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery. + +The duties of the Army Service Corps[B] are clear. They must, on the one +hand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especially +for the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to give +every kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they must +look after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. The +rapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedy +repair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on military +railways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are the +duties for which these troops must be trained. A thorough knowledge and +mastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensable +qualifications in their case also. They can only meet their many-sided +and all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methods +and system of army movements on every scale. It is highly important, +therefore, that the officers of the Army Service Corps should be +thoroughly trained in military science. + +[Footnote B: _Verkehrstruppen_.] + +Thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectual +development of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of the +close connection of the multifarious duties of war. This appreciation is +requisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of the +service; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to some +degree the non-commissioned officers also. It will bear good fruit in +the training of the men. The higher the stage on which the teacher +stands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the more +complete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly and +successfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, and +the more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respect +which are the firmest foundations of discipline. All the means employed +to improve the education of our establishment of officers in the science +of war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient service +on every other field of practical activity. Intellectual exercise gives +tone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war and +its requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education and +bent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in their +reciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. The +effort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers' +corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards, +and must find its expression in a school of military education of a +higher class than exists at present. + +A military academy as such was contemplated by Scharnhorst. To-day it +assumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the General +Staff. Instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of its +former importance. The instruction in military history was entirely +divested of its scientific character by the method of application +employed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. In this way the +meaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day, +so far as I know, the lectures on military history primarily serve +purposes of directly professional education. I cannot say how far the +language teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. At any rate, it +culminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues a +directly practical end. This development was in a certain sense +necessary. A quite specifically professional education of the officers +of the General Staff is essential under present conditions. I will not +decide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and truly +academical character of the institution. In any case, we need in the +army of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for the +independent study of military science from the higher standpoint, and +provides at the same time a comprehensive general education. I believe +that the military academy could be developed into such an institution, +without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of the +officers for service on the General Staff. By the side of the military +sciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures on +general scientific subjects might be organized, to which admission +should be free. In similar lectures the great military problems might be +discussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearers +might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to +politics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, the +importance of free personality under the pressure of necessary +phenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as into +the duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint. + +Limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are now +arranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, and +the institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture, +intended not only to educate officers of the General Staff, but to train +men who are competent to discharge the highest military and civic +duties--this is what is required for the highest military educational +institution of the German army. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + + +PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR + +"Germany's future lies on the sea." A proud saying, which contains a +great truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished future +and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy +and act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they are +supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at least +that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest +opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his +position as a World Power. + +Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on +a world policy if our political and military superiority on the +continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yet +reached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now take +steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our +pretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the +full security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts and +repel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economic +necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needs +be--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and +this, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness of +Germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea +trade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be +always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Our +efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of +hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish +to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined +ultimately to support this world policy. + +Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first +ventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving for +limited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. was destined +to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's +history, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activity +must be set down as fruitless. + +We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most varied +considerations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was first +drawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906, +and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, of +course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. The +needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard +for the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on the +claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations. +At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the +coasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguard +this commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon +shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for +Germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the +Government, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party was +content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this +object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by +artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places. + +This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convinced +of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high +seas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the +aggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it was +thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called +_Ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact +that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies, +and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank. +This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a +fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the +costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a +large number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fighting +capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed +torpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on a +fallacy--that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an +extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing +population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political +and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and +on its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded +with actual needs. + +The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most +inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already +stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the +midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our +strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly +effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard +for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our +commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only +object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an +instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and +supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such +limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A +few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in +war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible, +destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is +obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the +defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on +permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed +that sufficiently. + +The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at +sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded +commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies. + +It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for +defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our +political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed +according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive, +when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success; +on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained +in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the +Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We +must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise +which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale. + +The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be +calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that +we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are +weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger, +unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all +circumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our +strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing +reasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance +of victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflicting +such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests +to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own +position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses. + +This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that +the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the +necessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probably +that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of +victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle +for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase +their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even +beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates. + +We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for +many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. We +may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast +fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend +ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown +in the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out and +exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against +all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast; +our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually +inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to +challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the lines +that our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as a +base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the +offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break +harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for +this class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with +a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by +the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alone +cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break +through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able +to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purpose +permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow +mines to be placed. + +I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the +North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these +requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be +to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our +naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade, +although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further +development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the +background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only +action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success +presupposes the existence of some such fortress. + +But the question must be looked at from another aspect. + +The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the +unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is +determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power. +Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from +claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless, +the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked +menacing utterances from various English statesmen. + +If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military +preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates +attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the +English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase +the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly +intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken; +the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the German +coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and +to isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as +a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite +impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and +protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly +well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt +would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German +naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes +for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an +English attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able +to postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned that +the recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we must +make up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext or +other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very +favourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage. +Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon +upon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war. + +Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our +coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical +principles. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in +order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our +fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would be +justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by +loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the +greatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, of +existence. + +Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or +definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole +nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who +live on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows the +absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with +our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the +decisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot, +perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not +check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to +replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case. + +The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance, +in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the +Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military +requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain +secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of +Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more +possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in +the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our +battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot +give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is +feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal +might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success +depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous +unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict +heavy losses upon him. + +As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the +completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and +the usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in its +present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. There +can be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of the +Kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbach +class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be +considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in a +worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of the +Hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the +Prince class (_Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich_) fulfil their purpose +neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Even +the armoured cruisers _Fürst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau,_ and +_Scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements. +If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the +time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these +totally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--by +new and thoroughly effective ships. + +Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon +will admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever so +strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and +all financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships, +which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities. +That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the line +have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisers +are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. But +superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible +readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made +to do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possess +a certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the English +heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and +to equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerful +artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the +more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way +that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or +straight ahead. + +Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part +in strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet, +therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority of +England--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because, +so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of +superiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high +standard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence of +construction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep this +position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to +the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying +to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must also +devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these +vessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing this +branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every +direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with +increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with +these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on +the enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would be +extraordinarily advantageous to us. + +Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the +development of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to make +airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they +could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes, +they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet would +then, as already explained in Chapter VIII., be able to report +successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the +battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the +approach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able to +prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus +facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse or +frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If our +airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side, +could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English +coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when +fighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly be +doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to +perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over +the English would contribute largely to equalize the difference in +strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war. +It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field +because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can +compete for the palm of victory on equal terms. + +Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be +carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be +especially effective in a struggle against England, as that country +needs imports more than any other. Consequently great results would +follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing +his navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have been +discussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative to +organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended +for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity +unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. The +auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the +open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice, +when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so. + +A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must +be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace. +History tells us what to expect from the English on this head. + +In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 to +September 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houses +were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were +killed. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of +England is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and +in the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence shows +distinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of the +seas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11 +and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarly +bombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under the +hypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the +foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well +not to forget them. + +The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also +Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships, +suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians. + +Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as +was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain +conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal +violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the +above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course +of action politically justifiable. + +A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first +place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful +inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the +tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability +of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation +of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack +becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are +granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack +in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable +carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be +formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken +of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties +concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of +States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such +cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it, +as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limit +the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the +very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would +have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most +extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in +1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful +from the standpoint of political morality. + +These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we +must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without +warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right. +Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such +eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the +reservists. + +Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to +secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all +circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready +for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension. +The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole +_matériel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for +instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the +mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in +force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple +precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to +the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as +is done in England. + +When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are +required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the +navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the +resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since +the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the +expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic +preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the +self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet +must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast +defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our +requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be +provisionally dropped. + +In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should +limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary, +devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest +stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in +case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition +that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act +contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on +us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform +tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we +have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships. + +I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is to +be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases +quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general +situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in +the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war. +My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid +foundation without which any successful action against the superior +forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail +to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible. + +It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry +out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever +may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though +this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for +the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on +strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a +successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain +a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we +must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers. + +Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and +German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we +must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the +coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the +pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be +met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion. + +The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness +for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the +first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the +long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define +and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free +hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing +more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious +mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France +was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was +favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has, +indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace +and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this +difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between +resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against +numerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles the +supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her +assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and +thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North +America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed, +threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequences +of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her +former American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is +far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas +than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. It +is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty, +and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we +might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have +wished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866 +nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would +fall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman is +shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake +what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best +course. Just Fate decides the issue. + +The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that +we started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we have +made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the +Brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of +decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters +concerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to develop +systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties +which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we +have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it. + +This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never let +the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views +which must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good time +those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even +though they make heavy financial calls on our resources. + +This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our +naval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for +lost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty +devotedly. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + + + +THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION + +The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which +we can only assert our place among the Great Powers and secure the +conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of +treasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. We shall be +compelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, special +measures which will enable us to be more or less a match for our +enemies--I mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of the +army. We must always bear in mind in the present that we have to provide +for the future. + +Apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget to +develop the elements on which not only our military strength, but also +the political power of the State ultimately rest. We must maintain the +physical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done if +we aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widest +sense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions and +demands of existence. + +While it is the duty of the State to guide her citizens to the highest +moral and mental development, on the other hand the elements of +strength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the State. +Only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can the +State achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interested +in promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. Her duty and +her justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from the +fulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highest +sense true to it. + +It is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely military +standpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development of +our growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. For while +the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction, +the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment in +very great numbers possible. Thus the full consummation of military +training cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equipped +physically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentiments +worthy of the honourable profession of arms. + +We have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raise +the culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best of +our power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independent +individual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence on +the men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limited +if it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligent +material. This fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims which +modern war will make on the individual fighter. In order to meet these +demands fully, the people must be properly educated. + +Each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure of +independent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. In +the open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed duty +has been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources; +he may often have to take over the command of his own section if the +losses among his superiors are heavy. The artilleryman will have to work +his gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains have +fallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders are +often left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and the +sapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himself +unexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource left +beyond his own professional knowledge and determination. + +But not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility of +the individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique will +probably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. This change +is due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greater +efficiency of the firearms. All movements in large masses are more +exacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments, +since they are never carried out so smoothly. The shelter and food of +great masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth of +the marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to the +difficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregular +hours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. The increased range of +modern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combination +with the larger fronts, necessitates wide détours whenever the troops +attempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on the +battlefield. + +In the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the army +has been enormously increased. The State, however, has done little to +prepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies are +making themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a very +detrimental influence on their education. I specially refer to the +ever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patriotic +feeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the population +into the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development. +This result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. At the +present day, out of all the German-born military units, over 6.14 per +cent. come from the large towns, 7.37 per cent, from the medium-sized +towns, 22.34 per cent. from the small or country towns, and 64.15 per +cent. from the rural districts; while the distribution of the population +between town and country is quite different. According to the census of +1905, the rural population amounted to 42.5 per cent., the small or +country towns to 25.5 per cent., the medium-sized towns to 12.9 per +cent., and the large towns to 19.1 per cent. of the entire number of +inhabitants. The proportion has probably changed since that year still +more unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns have +increased in population. These figures clearly show the physical +deterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to our +national life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellect +and compact unity of the nation. The rural population forms part and +parcel of the army. A thousand bonds unite the troops and the families +of their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone who +studies the inner life of our army is aware of this. The interest felt +in the soldier's life is intense. It is the same spirit, transmitted +from one to another. The relation of the army to the population of the +great cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of their +sons into the army is quite different. A certain opposition exists +between the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who, +from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation. +Similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened, +and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutely +hostile to the service. + +It is in the direct interests of the State to raise the physical health +of the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order to +enable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effect +of military training more extensively to bear on the town population, +and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. Nothing +promotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of military +service. + +So far as I can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself which +exercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing to +its monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditions +of life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. Apart from many +forms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health, +the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housing +conditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. This +latter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the rural +districts, and, in combination with the other influences of the great +city, produces far more harmful results. + +It is therefore the unmistakable duty of the State, first, to fight +alcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing all +kinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sell +them; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all efforts +to improve the housing conditions of the working population, and to +withdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life of +amusements. In Munich, Bavarian officers have recently made a +praiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men past +the age of attendance at school with health-producing military +exercises. The young men's clubs which Field-Marshal v.d. Goltz is +trying to establish aim at similar objects. Such undertakings ought to +be vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by the +State, from purely physical as well as social considerations. The +gymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has an +undoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deserves +every encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others, +the system of universal service should have been made an effective +reality. It is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect of +military service on the physical development of the recruits. The +authorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed to +make the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers than +hitherto. + +On the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against two +tendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hours +for factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sport +with an exaggerated value for the national health. As already pointed +out, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendant +on working together in large numbers that are prejudicial. + +The wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderate +degree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work are +present, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a complete +miscomprehension of the real value of work. It is in itself the greatest +blessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it no +longer as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning a +livelihood and paying for amusements. Strenuous labour alone produces +men and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to win +their living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have often +achieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality. + +So long as the Dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict with +the sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against the +Spanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now, +when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead a +politically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars, +their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take a +part in the struggle of the civilized nations. In Germany that stock +which was destined to bring back our country from degradation to +historical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the Rhine +or the Danube, but on the sterile sands of the March. + +We must preserve the stern, industrious, old-Prussian feeling, and carry +the rest of Germany with us to Kant's conception of life; we must +continuously steel our strength by great political and economic +endeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained, +or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only we +shall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in the +world. + +Where Nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growing +wealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life of +pleasure rather than of work, society and the State must vie in taking +care that work does not become play, or play work. It is work, regarded +as a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. Sport, which is spreading +more and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation, +not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. We must never +forget this. Hard, laborious work has made Germany great; in England, on +the contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health of +the nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place of +serious work it has greatly injured the English nation. The English +nation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard of +labour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the English +trades unions--and of the security of its military position, has more +and more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and it +may well be asked whether, under these conditions, England will show +herself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself in +the future. If, further, the political rivalry with the great and +ambitious republic in America be removed by an Arbitration Treaty, this +circumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads to +progress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which develop +physique. + +The physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless it +comes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while, +if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations, +the result must be injurious in the long-run. + +We must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physically +healthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and the +whole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour to +promote their spiritual development in every way. The means for doing so +is the school. Military education under the present-day conditions, +which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aims +satisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, and +an improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material. + +The national school is not sufficient for this requirement. The general +regulations which settle the national school system in Prussia date from +the year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account of +the modern development which has been so rapid of late years. It is only +natural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and the +essentials of military education. Present-day military education +requires complete individualization and a conscious development of manly +feeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching in +classes, and there is no distinction between the sexes. This is directly +prescribed by the rules. + +In the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of the +superiors by specially detached officers and selected experienced +non-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quite +small sections; while each one receives individual attention from the +non-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superior +officers. In a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teach +as many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers as +many as 120 children are divided into two classes. A separation of the +sexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. As a rule, +therefore, the instruction is given in common. It is certain that, under +such conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual is +possible. All that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanically +and inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch of +knowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boys +and girls, still less of individuals. + +Such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a military +education. The principles which regulate the teaching in the two places +are quite different. That is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction. + +The military education aims at training the moral personality to +independent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patriotic +feelings among the men. Instruction in a sense of duty and in our +national history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professional +teaching. Great attention is given to educate each individual in logical +reasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts. + +In the national school these views are completely relegated to the +background--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but as +the practical result of the conditions. The chief stress in such a +school is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting some +facility in reading, writing, and ciphering. The so-called _Realign_ +(history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite into +the background. Only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly are +devoted to all the _Realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in the +lower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hours +are assigned to religious instruction in every standard. There is no +idea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. Not a word in the +General Regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this; +and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods of +religious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for the +development of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. As for +influencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars to +any extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts it +altogether out of the question. + +While the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instruction +is thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given, +especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. Beginning with +the lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years), +stories not only from the New Testament, but also from the Old Testament +are drummed into the heads of the scholars. Similarly every Saturday the +portions of Scripture appointed for the next Sunday are read out and +explained to all the children. Instruction in the Catechism begins also +in the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children must +learn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. It is a +significant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid +"the memorizing of the General Confession and other parts of the +liturgical service," as "also the learning by heart of the Pericopes." +On the other hand, the institution of Public Worship is to be explained +to the children. This illustrates the spirit in which this instruction +has to be imparted according to the regulations. + +It is really amazing to read these regulations. The object of +Evangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to the +comprehension of the Holy Scriptures and to the creed of the +congregation," in order that they "may be enabled to read the Scriptures +independently and to take an active part both in the life and the +religious worship of the congregation." Requirements are laid down which +entirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to the +comprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, and +presuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. Not a word, +however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, that +is, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought into +prominence. The teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impress +religious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course of +instruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formal +religiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if not +deliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moral +influence. A real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of such +instruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their Confirmation +to have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so they +remain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to the +religious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. Nor +does the instruction for Confirmation do much to alter that, for it is +usually conceived in the same spirit. + +All other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to the +young minds some high ideals--more especially our own country's +history--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort of +instruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is of +inestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. It is the +more regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed by +the regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, is +totally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some real +service to the country. It is quite refreshing to read in the new +regulations for middle schools of February 10,1910, that by religious +instruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should be +awakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aim +at exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of the +fatherland." + +The method of religious instruction which is adopted in the national +school is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. Religious instruction +can only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectual +growth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. To make +it the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in the +national schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to be +directed at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mystical +intuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has a +confusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. Even the +missionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate his +pupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart to +them subtle religious ideas. Yet every Saturday the appointed passages +of Scripture (the Pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children. + +Religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. Up +to that point the teacher should be content, from the religious +standpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with the +simplest ideas of the Deity, but in other respects to endeavour to +awaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasp +loftier conceptions. The national school stands in total contradiction +to this intellectual development. This is in conformity to regulations, +for the same children who read the Bible independently are only to be +led to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are daily +around them." In the course of eight years they learn a smattering of +reading, writing, and ciphering.[A] It is significant of the knowledge +of our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-three +recruits of one company to whom the question was put who Bismarck was, +not a single one could answer. That the scholars acquire even a general +idea of their duties to the country and the State is quite out of the +question. It is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of the +children by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught in +common. One thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those of +girls; and, although I consider it important that patriotic feelings +should be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmit +them to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a different +way from the boys. When the instruction is common to both, the treatment +of the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. It is +quite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in the +religious field when so little has been achieved in every other field. + +This pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal that +Frederick the Great set up. He declared that the duty of the State was +"to educate the young generation to independent thinking and +self-devoted love of country." + +[Footnote A: Recently a boy was discharged from a well-known national +school as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualified +to the office of a Head Forester. He showed that he could not copy +correctly, to say nothing of writing by himself.] + +Our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reform +if it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education, +but for life generally. It sends children out into the world with +undeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elements +of knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, but +easy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. As a +matter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the national +schoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instruction +as a recruit. + +It is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform. +I will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important from +the standpoint of a citizen and a soldier. + +First and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. The number +of teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholars +diminished. It is worth while considering in this connection the +feasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years. +Then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the object +of developing the children's minds, and formal religious instruction +should only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. Finally, +the _Realien,_ especially the history of our own country, should claim +more attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in every +way; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religion +should be more prominent than the formal contents. The training of the +national school teacher must be placed on a new basis. At present it +absolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of the +school itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds and +feelings of their pupils. It must be reckoned a distinct disadvantage +for the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age of +fourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which the +reasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselves +and on any chance influences. In the interval between school life and +military service the young people not only forget all that they learnt, +perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkingly +adopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from a +lack of counteracting ideals. + +A compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity of +the age. It is also urgently required from the military standpoint. Such +a school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to prevent +the scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him for +a special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism and +sense of citizenship. To do this, it is necessary to explain to him the +relation of the State to the individual, and to explain, by reference to +our national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion to +the State. The duties of the individual to the State should be placed in +the foreground. This instruction must be inspired by the spirit which +animated Schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of Prussia, and +culminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in the +strength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the great +whole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employed +for higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishes +in feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in the +love for the fatherland and for the State, which is a haven for every +faith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose. + +Only if national education works in this sense will it train up men to +fill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school of +arms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which great +deeds spring. What can be effected by the spirit of a nation we have +learnt from the history of the War of Liberation, that never-failing +source of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centre +of history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools. + +We can study it also by an example from most recent history, in the +Russo-Japanese War. "The education of the whole Japanese people, +beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic and +warlike spirit. That education, combined with the rapidly acquired +successes in culture and warfare, aroused in the Japanese a marvellous +confidence in their own strength. They served with pride in the ranks of +the army, and dreamed of heroic deeds.... All the thoughts of the +nation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course of +several years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of a +powerful army and a strong fleet."[B] This was the spirit that led the +Japanese to victory. "The day when the young Japanese enlisted was +observed as a festival in his family."[B] + +In Russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that +"Patriotism was an obsolete notion," "war was a crime and an +anachronism," that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was the +greatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourable +trade."[B] Thus the Russian army marched to battle without any +enthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of the +great racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity." Already eaten +up by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, without +energy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspired +leaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent. + +[Footnote B: "The Work of the Russian General Staff," from the Russian by +Freiheu v. Tettau.] + +I have examined these conditions closely because I attach great +importance to the national school and the continuation school as a means +to the military education of our people. I am convinced that only the +army of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything really +great. I understand, of course, that the school alone, however high its +efficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, in +view of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every means +if we wish to accomplish something great. The direct influence of school +ends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at first +make itself felt very gradually. Later generations will reap the fruits +of its sowing. Its efficiency must be aided by other influences which +will not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughout +their lives. Now, there are two means available which can work upon +public opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation; +one is the Press, the other is a policy of action. If the Government +wishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to secure +a narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further its +great political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong and +national Press, through which it must present its views and aims +vigorously and openly. The Government will never be able to count upon a +well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or +necessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is being +systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy +preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the +same note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as the +object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military +spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an +imperial policy. + +It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war +as an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with the +duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country. + +A parliamentary Government, which always represents merely a temporary +majority, may leave the party Press to defend and back its views; but a +Government like the German, which traces its justification to the fact +that it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. Its point of view +does not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course, +conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. It +must therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as on +particular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims as +widely understood as possible. I regard it, therefore, as one of the +most important duties of a Government like ours to use the Press freely +and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. I do not mean that a few +large political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be well +supplied with news, but that the views of the Government should find +comprehensive expression in the local Press. It would be an advantage, +in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certain +announcements of the Government, in order that the reader might not have +such a one-sided account of public affairs as the party Press supplies. +It would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, as +justifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health. +Epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old Europe more dangerous and +damaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the State to +preserve the moral healthiness of the nation. + +More important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the Press is +the _propaganda of action._ Nothing controls the spirit of the multitude +so effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceived +in a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. Such education by a powerful +policy is an absolute necessity for the German people. This nation +possesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritual +energy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairy +laid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. In addition to +this, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national and +religious unity of the nation created in the system of small States and +in confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency to +particularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nation +was no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. Yet the heart +of this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even though +such aims can only be attended by danger. We must not be misled in this +respect by the Press, which often represents a most one-sided, +self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or even +Anti-German lines rather than national. The soul of our nation is not +reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on the +necessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and +comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. + +On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the +Powers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance, +every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the +people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their +forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again and +again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this +yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the +clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with +him. + +He is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors of +national psychology; Bismarck possessed this art, and used k with a +master-hand. True, he found ready to hand one idea which was common to +all--the sincere wish for German unification and the German Empire; but +the German nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which lead +to the realization of this idea. Only under compulsion and after a hard +struggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation was +fired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to which +the great statesman was so surely leading it. Success was the foundation +on which Bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the German Empire. Even +in the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of the +people by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of all +opposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them serve +his own great aims. He, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, and +the motto _Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him; +but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and of +world-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that no +statesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands the +soul of his people. + +This knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with the +Great Elector, Frederick the Incomparable, Scharnhorst and Blücher; for +even that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of a +political idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground at +the Congress of Vienna. + +The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things +recognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influence +over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by +continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its +interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions. +Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to +great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high +aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to +prepare their minds to it: + + "The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims." + +We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed on +the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous +duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the +whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of +warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for +the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices. + +We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization +to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only +fulfil it by the sword. + + +Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most +effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military +duty? Such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for the +strength and honour of the German people. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + + + +FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR + +From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that +the political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitude +of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the +preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself. + +But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and +moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military +authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still +further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of +the State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must be +made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the +national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the +tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further, +as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of +mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure +under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the +material and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations for +war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made +to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as +possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come. +If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in +whom confidence can be reposed should war break out. + + +I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the +commercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere of +commercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which the +desired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Government +and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regards +finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may +go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national +household in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, on +the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money +required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions. + +The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financial +economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the +current incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, the +indebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive +and military capabilities. + +As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a great +civilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never be +brought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure for +necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military +forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general +progress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion +to the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly based +on war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our +forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the +effeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is only +one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one +vice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of all +culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the +individual for itself.[A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepest +gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an +epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of +the last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in +Prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large +sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the +Government. + +Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of +demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations +contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to +the great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day look +contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut +their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties +imposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial +pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in +our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity +and energy."[B] + +[Footnote A: Treitschke.] + +[Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte."] + +Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but is +bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens, +since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important, +however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national +property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities. + +This property is to a certain extent determined by the natural +productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. But +these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour +of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced. +Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and secure +labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour +conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by +concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate +German trade by vigorous political representation of German interests +abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits +from international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural production +by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable +protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on +foreign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fishery +would add to this.[D] + +[Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by international +commerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling.] + +[Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from +foreign countries.] + +From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase +permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the +annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be +met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Home +production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95 +per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, the +production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two +double-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered +that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two +million tons. + +A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national +prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own +colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense +quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually +independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to +transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by +effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less +we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards, +[E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the +State will improve. + +[Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons +of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of +copper, etc.] + +If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of national +productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the +reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial +position. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a +two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays. +The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very +easily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it is +a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to +improve the financial position. The experiences of history leave no +doubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of a +nation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once is +shaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the State +creditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holds +out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its +creditors far better security than a weaker military power. If our +credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened +political position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our army +and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible +liquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first to +improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to +keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go. + +The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task. + +It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits of +possible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and +1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from +20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same +proportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there is +a huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the German +Empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per +head of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the same +basis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germany +only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and +navy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the +individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in Germany and France, the +outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our most +probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their +armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger +politically. + +Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase +of wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades and +industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a +setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again. + +The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the +Empire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports has +increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the +year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14 +1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of the +imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the +exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... The value of the import of +raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in +1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of +such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The import +of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a +value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of +manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of the +import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3 +milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food +remained at about the same figure. + +The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in +Germany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amounted +in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2 +million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The +quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in +1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35 +million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from +6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119 +million marks.... From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany +has increased by 127 per cent.; in England only by about 59 per cent. +The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172 +per cent.; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[F] + +[Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin.] + +Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financial +position of the Empire has considerably improved since the Imperial +Finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may very +soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent. + +It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth +of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive +capitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked +extent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of national +wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number of +taxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6,000 to 100,000 +marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., +from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per +cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. In these classes, +therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater +proportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100,000 +to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on +an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in +the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. In the class of 500,000 +marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per +cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in +the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually, +it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. This means +per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an +increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an +increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks +and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year. + +We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and +annually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister has +estimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three +years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliards +yearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give some +instances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory at +Essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent., +the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the +annual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from +1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown by +the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has +reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and +poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement +in prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of a +healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment +are considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants +left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's +unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in +the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 per +cent. (in France it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of +workmen's unions were unemployed. + +Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national +debt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empire +in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the +national debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in-- + + Marks +Prussia 9,421,770,800 +Bavaria 2,165,942,900 +Saxony 893,042,600 +Würtemberg 606,042,800 +Baden 557,859,000 +Hesse 428,664,400 +Alsace-Lorraine 31,758,100 +Hamburg 684,891,200 +Lübeck 666,888,400 +Bremen 263,431,400 + +Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains, +forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railways +reached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in-- + + Marks, +Prussia (Hesse) 9,888 +Bavaria 1,694 +Saxony 1,035 +Würtemburg 685 +Baden 727 +Alsace-Lorraine 724 + +--a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15,062 milliard +marks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of +1911 for Prussia alone 11,050 milliards. Nevertheless, the national +debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously +because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and +presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in +debt. + +The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10,000 +inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the +whole Empire to some 5,000 million marks. This means that interest +yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many +communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions, +are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or +even 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributed +according to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middle +class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources of +wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative +income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on +the Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into +property. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to pay +for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the +protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization, +so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the +opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on +the altar of patriotism. + +The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown how +party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was +not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his +neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial +sacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be +made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But a +considerable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if we +wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of +our country without a blow. + +Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedy +introduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), in +order to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue would +oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would +furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to +diminish our burden of debt. + +If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters, +depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they +could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their +favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in as +heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based +on official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place to +examine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high a +figure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large +under any circumstances. + +Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that +is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the +nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first +instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to +paying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a +private gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to be +recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable +to fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceeds +principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing +the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely +important. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility +that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other +important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on +land and sea. + +There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be +urged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It is +argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth, +that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course +of time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that the +independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the +ideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement that +relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will, +is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According to +our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his +fortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which he +bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to +any other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his natural +heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he +wishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he is +interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things, +that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession is +based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual +than his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait. +The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in +which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are +alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of +this sort."[F] + +[Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910.] + +Both objections are unconvincing. + +So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to +liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met +otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directly +beneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay less +taxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in +the hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right of +succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the +State be prevented in other ways. The science of finance could +unquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme to +its extreme logical conclusion. + +The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true sense +of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a +will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. If +such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of +certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof +in life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probably +the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties +would actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law," +which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and +is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual +than the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is the +root from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and the +defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that in +the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and +that the significance of the State for the individual, no less than for +the family, should be thoroughly understood. + +These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty +enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperial +right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help +and the whole future of Germany is at stake. + +If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally +large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a +law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our +sorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be good +prospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Government +does not disguise the true state of the political position. + +Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We see +that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against +the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and +are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts are +also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as +to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which +England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world +policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if +she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has +built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has +secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious +careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this +English policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guided +exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means +of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill. + +There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements +have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit +reservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic +stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting +party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really +benefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed. +Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on which +those of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes on +the honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when +concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so +as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arise +which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The +country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical +sense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his life +long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever +induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[A] + +The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or +alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if +he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an +arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is, +as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States, +from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the +happiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in the +east will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank on +the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria and +outflank any Russian attack on Galicia. + +Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will +never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a +permanent political system. + +"There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as +effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal +interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the +other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." These +are the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher +_pace_ Bismarck. + +We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but +must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable +attitude of the other States by reference to their own interests. +Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to the +diplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself, +seeks nothing but his own advantage." It will prove waste labour to +attempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions or +an attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, the +weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale. + +When Napoleon III. planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect an +alliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually in +Paris to conclude the military negotiations.[B] These probably were +going on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand. +Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussian +flag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman less +biassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austria +nor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war +under unfavourable conditions. + +[Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attaché +in Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, and +pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of +Prussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was better +informed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the +conditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by Archduke +Albert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor had +made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military +calculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the former +Minister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)] + +France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests, +unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did not +satisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomatic +arrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests in +Morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her +interest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that country +for herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will not +allow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerce +and German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the French +standpoint she is right. + +The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own +interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different +Great Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt, +however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political +grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible +only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State with +which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its +opponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to +further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone +and of being left isolated in the hour of danger. + +A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking +chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keep +this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances +and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above +all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take +bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility +of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under +favourable conditions. "The great art of policy," writes Frederick the +Great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to +one's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage from +favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." Even in +his Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered +all his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but +boldness alone can acquire." "I give you a problem to solve," he said to +his councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. was announced. +"When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?" + +Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct +summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate +estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the +interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and +daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws +of political and military success. + +The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blinded +by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able +to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success. +"The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim +which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which +shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more +despised than by the great Prussian King," so H. v. Treitschke tells us. +"Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with +remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the +political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss +the golden opportunity. + +It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize +that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist +policy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets up +personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real +current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures, +as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia. + +A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these +great duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are based +on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the +possibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers the +result to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageous +circumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe +to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led. + +In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan +had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as +military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and +assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her +policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at +the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment +of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She +had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance +with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to +place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover, +compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of +the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against +Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations +required by the political position had been made, although the conflict +had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous +retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no +doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made +resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the +campaign by the offensive. + +England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and +consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to +her aims or suited to give weight to political demands. + +Two points stand out clearly from this consideration. + +First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and +political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war +are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong +enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing +which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be +developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The +obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace +as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister +and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the +all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain +influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, +and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military +situation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister who +conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is +in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of +the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he +must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by +war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has +of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the +realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the +opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of +compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a +permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of +recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one, +but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to +end in political and moral defeat. + +The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and +hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and +shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always +creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory, +tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy, +which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts +favourably on the military situation. + +In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can +only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution +join hands. + +If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next +war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion: +the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the +necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions +are to be created for the inevitably threatening war. + +So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two +fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war +from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was +comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various +strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small +compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the +other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive +action on both sides. To-day the situation is different. + +We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expect +not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of +English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch +neutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England may +land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war +with us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a +position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather +be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and +south-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is also +increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of +the European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menaced +in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet. + +All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur +simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations +they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the +military aspect. The military situation thus created is very +unfavourable. + +If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the +army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the +situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the +stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure, +and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must +count. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one +also. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have +to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be +directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and +all necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops of +the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected +along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when +occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the same +principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in +readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport +arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many +different lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements for +unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the +most various political prospects. We should in any case be forced to +adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present +conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent +an invasion by one or other of our enemies. + +No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good +prospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led against +a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. A +military investigation of the situation shows that a plan +of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents, +under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and +has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind. + +The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy +which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to +overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. On +this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of +Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Of +course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an +unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which +the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If we +attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help, +and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy +to fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the +cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be +reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral. + +This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring +about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor +England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as +we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by +diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows. + +If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate +an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her +interests or those of England, that both these States would feel +themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are +offered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentively +studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on +this point. + +In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we +should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of +circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to +struggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to state +clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own +interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Such +political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid +foundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and +realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great +results. + +It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and +measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a +favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous +to Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. This +requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic +position which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said: +Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must +keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as +time goes on. + +Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire +settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons +emigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and England +to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the +Mediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. The +effort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured the +Italian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in the +least the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to the +Triple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. The +importance of these considerations will continue to be felt. + +Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, and +Russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of +present-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in +England and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the +Central European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder +of abandoning her in Morocco. + +There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; in +Central Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clash +in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and China +is forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to some +degree ties her hands. + +All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if it +is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than +recent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy can +count on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on an +army whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficiently +valued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. We +have amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops, +the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst +them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are +soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world, +provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The German +nation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height of +its great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in +its soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this +people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a +worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on +in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will +achieve a truly magnificent result. + +In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces, +and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger, +our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future; +but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless it +wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the +brave words of Goethe: + + "Bid defiance to every power! + Ever valiant, never cower! + To the brave soldier open flies + The golden gate of Paradise." + + + + +EPILOGUE + +After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-German +convention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; the +Turko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensions +which point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and, +lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real +offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France and +England. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently +between the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has been +foreseen and provided for. + +I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first +occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the +Anglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks. + +The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed, +have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a +collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this +object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed +that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was +determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the +attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered +correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain +was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for +war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance +on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this +crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the +concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable +moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait +until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and +Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the +other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it +can actively support the Rhine army. + +This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government, +but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined, +that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes. + + +It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as +regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our +manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of +territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not +inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in +obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the +possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can +never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were +compelled to abandon. + +I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial +concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed +force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo +region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of +November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their +present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from +this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no +doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession +for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish +_enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has +at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case +of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese. + +It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial +arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for +a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be +assumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has +carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a +moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because +she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a +desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea, +in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v. +Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not, +therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to +revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, +the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France. + +The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first an +actual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by the +expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn +from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position. +But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not +merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but +primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its +entirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement +means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly +surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the +sovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent +infraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we had +weighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty such +action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the +notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such +explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front. + +An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islam +have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, of +course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey have +suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in +the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance +for us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco convention +precipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundly +the solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which France +obtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realize +the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the +Mediterranean. + +The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep +rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the +mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large +sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in +spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily +supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this +weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the +Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better +has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great +disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical +times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire +must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to +ride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war +removes all further doubt on this point. + +The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the +view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the +various chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by a +firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder +any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have +done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance, +and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no +doubt on this point.[A] + +[Footnote A: Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.] + +The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all +pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead +in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive +intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would +support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the +limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with +England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered +by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new +acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new +colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and +that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form +objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear +commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once +more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates. + +In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count +on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a +_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at +most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may +fairly imagine we have some prospect of success. + +If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in +the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world +generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more +face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the +world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any +case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide +that the hour of attack has come. + +We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike +preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down. +All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to +represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the +people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to +military and political success, without carrying still further the +disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and +frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between +Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will +prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy +which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers +threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs +and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any +conventional scruples distract it from this object. + +Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged +basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of +sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation +calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it +to the happy goal. + +The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever. +England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her +interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles +question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of +her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great +Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and +difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has +considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before +it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will +probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in +sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted +German policy can utilize in order to influence the general political +situation in the interests of our Fatherland. + +If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of +Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the +future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with +confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to +fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz +Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God: + + "From the height of the starry sky + May thy ringing sword flash bright; + Let every craven cry + Be silenced by thy might!" + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Germany and the Next War +by Friedrich von Bernhardi + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 11352 *** diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Germany and the Next War + +Author: Friedrich von Bernhardi + +Release Date: February 28, 2004 [EBook #11352] +[Date last updated: August 18, 2005] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Bonny Fafard and PG Distributed Proofreaders + + + + +GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR + + + +BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI + + + +TRANSLATED BY ALLEN H. POWLES + + +1912 + + + +All the patriotic sections of the German people were greatly excited +during the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on all +hearts that in the settlement of the Morocco dispute no mere commercial +or colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but that +the honour and future of the German nation were at stake. A deep rift +had opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action +of the Government. Public opinion, which was clearly in favour of +asserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our political +position, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would have +demanded. I cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in an +overwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, would +have been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation. +Haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic of +the German Reichstag in modern Berlin as it was in medieval Regensburg. +These conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages, +which were partly written some time ago. + +Nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national and +political development. At such times it is necessary to be absolutely +clear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be +surmounted, and the sacrifices to be made. + +The task I have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of all +diplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. It is +obvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view. + +Our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past, +have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nation +which, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must, +and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulness +of my German heart that I have recorded my convictions. I believe that +thus I shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers' +hearts, and strengthen the national purpose. + +THE AUTHOR. + +_October, 1911_ + + + + +CONTENTS + +PREFACE + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Power of the peace idea--Causes of the love of peace in Germany-- + German consciousness of strength--Lack of definite political aims + --Perilous situation of Germany and the conditions of successful + self-assertion--Need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to + explain the tasks and aims of Germany in the light of history + + +CHAPTER I +THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR + +Pacific ideals and arbitration--The biological necessity of war--The + duty of self-assertion--The right of conquest--The struggle for + employment--War a moral obligation--Beneficent results of war + --War from the Christian and from the materialist standpoints-- + Arbitration and international law--Destructiveness and immorality + of peace aspirations--Real and Utopian humanity--Dangerous + results of peace aspirations in Germany--The duty of + the State + + +CHAPTER II +THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR + +Bismarck and the justification of war--The duty to fight--The teaching + of history--War only justifiable on adequate grounds--The + foundations of political morality--Political and individual morality + --The grounds for making war--The decision to make war--The + responsibility of the statesman + + +CHAPTER III +A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT + +The ways of Providence in history--Christianity and the Germans-- + The Empire and the Papacy--Breach between the German World + Empire and the revived spiritual power--Rise of the great States + of Europe and political downfall of Germany after the Thirty + Years' War--Rise of the Prussian State--The epoch of the Revolution + and the War of Liberation--Intellectual supremacy of + Germany--After the War of Liberation--Germany under William + I. and Bismarck--Change in the conception of the State and + the principle of nationality--New economic developments and + the World Power of England--Rise of other World Powers-- + Socialism, and how to overcome it--German science and art-- + Internal disintegration of Germany and her latent strength + + +CHAPTER IV +GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION + +Grounds of the intellectual supremacy of Germany--Germany's role + as spiritual and intellectual leader--Conquest of religious and + social obstacles--Inadequacy of our present political position-- + To secure what we have won our first duty--Necessity of increasing + our political power--Necessity of colonial expansion-- + Menace to our aspirations from hostile Powers + + +CHAPTER V +WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL + +Points of view for judging of the political situation--The States of the + Triple Alliance--The political interests of France and Russia-- + The Russo-French Alliance--The policy of Great Britain-- + America and the rising World Powers of the Far East--The importance + of Turkey--Spain and the minor States of Europe--Perilous + position of Germany--World power or downfall--Increase + of political power: how to obtain it--German colonial + policy--The principle of the balance of power in Europe--Neutral + States--The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs + of other States--Germany and the rules of international politics + --The foundations of our internal strength + + +CHAPTER VI +THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY FOR WAR + +Its necessity--Its twofold aspect--The educational importance of + military efficiency--Different military systems--Change in the + nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization-- + Variety of methods of preparation for war--The armaments of + minor States--The armaments of the Great Powers--Harmonious + development of all elements of strength--Influence on armaments + of different conceptions of the duties of the State--Permanent + factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness-- + Statecraft in this connection + + +CHAPTER VII +THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR + +Our opponents--The French army--The military power of Russia-- + The land forces of England--The military power of Germany and + Austria; of Italy--The Turkish army--The smaller Balkan States + --The Roumanian army--The armies of the lesser States of Central + Europe--Greece and Spain--The fleets of the principal naval + Powers--The enmity of France--The hostility of England-- + Russia's probable behaviour in a war against Germany--The + military situation of Germany--Her isolation--What will be at + stake in our next war--Preparation for war + + +CHAPTER VIII +THE NEXT NAVAL WAR + +England's preparations for a naval war against Germany--Germany's + first measures against England--England and the neutrality of the + small neighbouring States--The importance of Denmark--Commercial + mobilization--The two kinds of blockade: The close + blockade and the extended blockade--England's attack on our + coasts--Co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--The decisive + battle and its importance--Participation of France and Russia in + a German-English war + + +CHAPTER IX +THE CRUCIAL QUESTION + +Reciprocal relations of land and sea power--The governing points of + view in respect of war preparations--Carrying out of universal + military service--The value of intellectual superiority--Masses, + weapons, and transport in modern war--Tactical efficiency and + the quality of the troops--The advantage of the offensive--Points + to be kept in view in war preparations--Refutation of the prevailing + restricted notions on this head--The _Ersatzreserve_--New + formations--Employment of the troops of the line and the new + formations--Strengthening of the standing army--The importance + of personality + + +CHAPTER X +ARMY ORGANIZATION + +Not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further + development--Fighting power and tactical efficiency--Strength of the + peace establishment--Number of officers and N.C.O.'s, especially in the + infantry--Relations of the different arms to each other--Distribution + of machine guns--Proportion between infantry and artillery--Lessons to + be learned from recent wars with regard to this--Superiority at the + decisive point--The strength of the artillery and tactical + efficiency--Tactical efficiency of modern armies--Tactical efficiency + and the marching depth of an army corps--Importance of the internal + organization of tactical units--Organization and distribution of field + artillery; of heavy field howitzers--Field pioneers and fortress + pioneers--Tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--Increase of the + cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--Tactical organization of the + cavalry--Development of the air-fleet--Summary of the necessary + requirements--Different ways of carrying them out--Importance of + governing points of view for war preparations + + +CHAPTER XI +TRAINING AND EDUCATION + +The spirit of training--Self-dependence and the employment of masses-- + Education in self-dependence--Defects in our training for war on the + grand scale--Need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to + the training of our commanders--Practical training of the artillery-- + Training in tactical efficiency--Practice in marching under war + conditions--Training of the train officers and column leaders-- + Control of the General Staff by the higher commanders--Value of + manoeuvres: how to arrange them--Preliminary theoretical training of + the higher commanders--Training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the + pioneers and commissariat troops--Promotion of intellectual development + in the army--Training in the military academy + + +CHAPTER XII +PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR + +The position of a World Power implies naval strength--Development + of German naval ideals--The task of the German fleet; its strength + --Importance of coast defences--Necessity of accelerating our + naval armaments--The building of the fleet--The institution of + the air-fleet--Preliminary measures for a war on commerce-- + Mobilization--General points of view with regard to preparations + for the naval war--Lost opportunities in the past + + +CHAPTER XIII +THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION + +The universal importance of national education--Its value for the + army--Hurtful influences at work on it--Duties of the State with + regard to national health--Work and sport--The importance of + the school--The inadequacy of our national schools--Military + education and education in the national schools--Methods of + instruction in the latter--Necessity for their reform--Continuation + schools--Influence of national education on the Russo-Japanese + War--Other means of national education--The propaganda of + action + + +CHAPTER XIV +FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR + +Duties of the State in regard to war preparations--The State and + national credit--The financial capacity of Germany--Necessity of + new sources of revenue--The imperial right of inheritance--Policy + of interests and alliances--Moulding and exploitation of the + political situation--The laws of political conduct--Interaction of + military and political war preparations--Political preparations + for our next war--Governing factors in the conduct of German policy + + +EPILOGUE + +The latest political events--Conduct of the German Imperial Government + --The arrangement with France--Anglo-French relations and + the attitude of England--The requirements of the situation + + + + +GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR + + + +INTRODUCTION + +The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has +been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way +which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining +the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in +Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal +enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With the +increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of +sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great +conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our +future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a +solution at the present time. + +We have been capable of soaring upwards. Mighty deeds raised Germany +from political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of European +nations. But we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and to +advance along the path of development in politics and culture. We +tremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands from +us. Yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from our +glorious past. How rightly Fichte once judged his countrymen when he +said the German can never wish for a thing by itself; he must always +wish for its contrary also. + +The Germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlike +nation of Europe. For a long time they have proved themselves to be the +ruling people of the Continent by the power of their arms and the +loftiness of their ideas. Germans have bled and conquered on countless +battlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shown +that the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. In +striking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become a +peace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. A rude shock is +needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their +military strength. + +This strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes. + +It springs first from the good-natured character of the German people, +which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations and +partisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. It is connected +with another characteristic of the German nature. Our aim is to be just, +and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchange +relations share this aim. We are always ready to consider the peaceful +assurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign Press to be no less +genuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resist +the view that the political world is only ruled by interests and never +from ideal aims of philanthropy. "Justice," Goethe says aptly, "is a +quality and a phantom of the Germans." We are always inclined to assume +that disputes between States can find a peaceful solution on the basis +of justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is. + +An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted +in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed +in commercial life. + +The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world. +Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhaps +the greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty years +Germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion +of her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line, +we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the +world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great +industrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are established +all over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of the +globe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands of +Germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Under +these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides. + +Our trade and our industries--owners no less than employés--do not want +this development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is the +essential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition will +be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have +never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained +by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce. + +Universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, for +war in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limited +circles, but the whole nation suffers alike. All families and all +classes have to pay the same toll of human lives. Finally comes the +effect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of the +times--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of an +aspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfold +in peace. + +Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem +entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire +received with "astonishment and indignation" from Frederick the Great, +that "the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power"; +that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans, +cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the +greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. We regard our +warlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is the +special duty of the German Reichstag to lighten so far as possible. We +seem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament is +not an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of our +national health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige. +We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it +as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. + +Besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continued +justification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate and +often unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the German people. +The agelong dream of the German nation was realized in the political +union of the greater part of the German races and in the founding of the +German Empire. Since then there lives in the hearts of all (I would not +exclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proud +consciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increased +political power. This consciousness is supported by the fixed +determination never to abandon these acquisitions. The conviction is +universal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the whole +nation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. We all wish, indeed, to be +able to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict, +and we live in the belief that the power of our State will steadily +increase without our needing to fight for it. We do not at the bottom of +our hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with a +certain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to let +ourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow. +Every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. Not +merely in the North, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race with +glorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner of +Prussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of all +thought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in the +South also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of petty +nationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the German stock live +in the heart of the people. Here and there, maybe, such emotions slumber +in the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer and +more luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animated +by latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousness +await their awakening. + +Thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below the +surface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. It fritters +itself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. We no +longer have a clearly defined political and national aim, which grips +the imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unity +of action. Such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in the +yearnings for German unity, for the fulfilment of the Barbarossa legend. +A great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems to +me to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in the +world is threatened by external complications, the greater is this +danger. + +Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding all +peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that +their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often +pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific +settlement. + +In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful +methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable, +our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result of +our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also +because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual +upstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, and +now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for +centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect. We have thus +injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. It must be +reserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situation +thus affected, but one point can be mentioned without further +consideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties is +adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the +Germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces +brought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of this +struggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation. +We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset by +the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this +struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry +through a Seven Years' War for our position as a World Power, if we gain +a start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which will +fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces +of the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops, +but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for +all their dearest possessions. + +These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the +standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great +tasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before the +German people as the greatest civilized people known to history. + +From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations for +peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of +the German people, according to their true moral significance. I must +try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of +nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true +civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality. +I must endeavour to develop from the history of the German past in its +connection with the conditions of the present those aspects of the +question which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. The +historical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according to +inward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drastic +obligations. No one need passively submit to the pressure of +circumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at the +parting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or to +decadence. "A favoured position in the world will only become effective +in the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it." It +seemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this parting +of the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light I +may on the different paths which are open to our people. A nation must +fully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can it +take deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and, +looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for any +sacrifices which the present or future may demand. + +These sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financial +sphere, depend mainly on the idea of what Germany is called upon to +strive for and attain in the present and the future. Only those who +share my conception of the duties and obligations of the German people, +and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing the +sword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusions +in the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financial +demands which spring out of it. It is only in their logical connection +with the entire development, political and moral, of the State that the +military requirements find their motive and their justification. + + + + +CHAPTER I + + + +THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR + +Since 1795, when Immanuel Kant published in his old age his treatise on +"Perpetual Peace," many have considered it an established fact that war +is the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. In spite of +all that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the struggle +between nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization is +credited with a power to which war must yield. But, undisturbed by such +human theories and the change of times, war has again and again marched +from country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved its +destructive as well as creative and purifying power. It has not +succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. Long periods of +war, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on the +contrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, from +the political intercourse of nations. + +This wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. The +maintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanship +should aim. This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days a +quite peculiar power over men's spirits. This aspiration finds its +public expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the Press of +every country and of every party opens its columns to it. The current in +this direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of Governments +profess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peace +is the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out the +aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all Governments exert +themselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish the +conflagration. + +Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action. +They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote +their own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at the +Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the +United States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried to +conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and +foremost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany. No +practical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved. + +We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts. +This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as the +weaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest +need of international protection, have been completely passed over in +the American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be +assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans, +with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced +"perfidious Albion" to accede to the proposals. We may suppose that +England intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, but +that America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of +sovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out her +plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America. +Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over +the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for +themselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts +of President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace, +and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for Foreign +Affairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of +the United States an era in the history of mankind. + +This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and +marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been +shown by a race of Epigoni. "It has always been," H. von Treitschke +tells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played +with the dream of perpetual peace." + +Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours to +diminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which war +entails are justifiable. It is an incontestable fact that war +temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic +development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the +primitive brutality of man. It is therefore a most desirable +consummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible, +and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily +in the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential nature +of war. All that the Hague Peace Congress has accomplished in this +limited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war, +universal acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the object +is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place in +historical development. + +This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws +which rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the first +importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be +dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, +which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real +civilization. "War is the father of all things." [A] The sages of +antiquity long before Darwin recognized this. + +[Footnote A: (Heraclitus of Ephesus).] + +The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all +healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the +result of contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not +merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "To supplant or +to be supplanted is the essence of life," says Goethe, and the strong +life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good +everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the +most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the +universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. This struggle is +regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and +by the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animal +world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the human +race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances. +The man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means to +assert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the +individual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness of +right. The life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined, +doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent +the less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour, +envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. Still more +often, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures of +a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment. + +There can be no doubt on this point. The nation is made up of +individuals, the State of communities. The motive which influences each +member is prominent in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle for +possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the +relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only +as it is compatible with advantage. So long as there are men who have +human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive +for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests +come into being and occasions for making war arise. + +"The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law +of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and +institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the +intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The +extrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the external +development of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal +development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggle +of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward +development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of +nations--war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist? +In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat +of the other! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates." [B] + +[Footnote B: Clauss Wagner, "Der Krieg als schaffendes Weltprinzip."] + +That social system in which the most efficient personalities possess the +greatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocial +struggle. In the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquer +which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral, +material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend +itself. War will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions, +enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus +promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual +and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which +render possible a general progressive development. They confer victory +because the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war, +inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy +budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "War," says A. +W. von Schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in +Nature." + +Now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may exist +between peoples and States, like that between the fellow-members of a +society, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need not +always degenerate Into war. Struggle and war are not identical. This +rivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as the +intrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results. +Above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the State stands the +law, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that the +right shall prevail. Behind the law stands the State, armed with power, +which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively to +promote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. But there is no +impartial power that stands above the rivalry of States to restrain +injustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote the +highest ends of mankind. Between States the only check on injustice is +force, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own +part and promote its own ends and ideals. If in doing so it comes into +conflict with the ideals and views of other States, it must either +submit and concede the precedence to the rival people or State, or +appeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i.e., of +war--in order to make its own views prevail. No power exists which can +judge between States, and makes its judgments prevail. Nothing, in fact, +is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress the +ascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay. + +It will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form a +superior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is +stronger. This attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the more +intensive vitality will prevail. The allied opponents have the seeds of +corruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporary +reverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory over +numerical superiority. The history of Germany is an eloquent example of +this truth. + +Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct of +self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a +natural condition of existence. "Man is a fighter." Self-sacrifice is a +renunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or in +the life of States, which are agglomerations of individuals. The first +and paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence. +By self-assertion alone can the State maintain the conditions of life +for its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man is +entitled to claim from it. This duty of self-assertion is by no means +satisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes the +obligation to assure the possibility of life and development to the +whole body of the nation embraced by the State. + +Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a +given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they +require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. +Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, +as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say, +by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. + +The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first the +procedure is pacific. Over-populated countries pour a stream of +emigrants into other States and territories. These submit to the +legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditions +of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants, +with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest. + +The right of colonization is also recognized. Vast territories inhabited +by uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized States, and +made subject to their rule. Higher civilization and the correspondingly +greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. This right +is, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determine +what degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. The +impossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these international +relations has been the cause of many wars. The subjugated nation does +not recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilized +nation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence. +This situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions of +civilization have changed in the course of time. The subject nation has, +perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and the +difference in civilization has consequently lessened. Such a state of +things is growing ripe in British India. + +Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. It +may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races, +and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which the +mother-country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to +acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of +self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign +soil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right. +The threatened people will see the point of Goethe's lines: + + "That which them didst inherit from thy sires, + In order to possess it, must be won." + +The procedure of Italy in Tripoli furnishes an example of such +conditions, while Germany in the Morocco question could not rouse +herself to a similar resolution.[C] + +[Footnote C: This does not imply that Germany could and ought to have +occupied part of Morocco. On more than one ground I think that it was +imperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this State on the basis +of the Algeçiras Convention. Among other advantages, which need not be +discussed here, Germany would have had the country secured to her as a +possible sphere of colonization. That would have set up justifiable +claims for the future.] + +In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at +once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided +by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since +its decisions rest on the very nature of things. + +Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a +convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the +same result. + +In America, England, Germany, to mention only the chief commercial +countries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of the +population. The native population cannot consume all the products of +this work. The industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. Work +and employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladly +accept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country. +But this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itself +from such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. We +find, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries into +existence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the other +hand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, to +crush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumer +for itself or win fresh ones. It is an embittered struggle which rages +in the market of the world. It has already often assumed definite +hostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensify +this struggle. Great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shut +their doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on the +down-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourable +conditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goods +cheaper than those imported from the old industrial States. These latter +will see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus it +may well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactory +conditions of life to its workers. Such a State runs the danger not only +of losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of also +gradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and political +world through diminishing production and lessened profits. + +In this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. We +cannot reject the possibility that a State, under the necessity of +providing remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war. +If more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stake +in Morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, Germany +would hardly have conceded to France the most favourable position in the +Morocco market without a struggle. England, doubtless, would not shrink +from a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of the +South African goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened her +Indian market, the control of which is the foundation of her world +sovereignty. The knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biological +laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from +international relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is not +only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an +indispensable factor in civilization. + +The attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connected +with the view of life generally. + +If we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as something +purely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outward +decay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man can +attain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possible +diminution of all bodily suffering. The State will be regarded as a sort +of assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possession +and enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. We must endorse the +view which Wilhelm von Humboldt professed in his treatise on the limits +of the activity of the State.[D] The compulsory functions of the State +must be limited to the assurance of property and life. The State will be +considered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shun +war as the greatest conceivable evil. + +[Footnote D: W. von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der +Wirksamkelt des Staates zu bestimmen."] + +If, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of States as merely +a fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not rest +on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers, +and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of the +chequered conditions of life, the task of the State will appear in a +very different light. The State will not be to us merely a legal and +social insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have the +one object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reach +of the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising the +intellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, and +of securing for them that influence on the world which tends to the +combined progress of humanity. We shall see in the State, as Fichte +taught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is to +put into practice the moral duty on earth. "The State," says Treitschke, +"is a moral community. It is called upon to educate the human race by +positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should +develop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike for +nation and individuals, the highest moral task." + +This highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. Man +can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a +community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He must +be in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individual +out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and +makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The State +alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest +degree of life.[E] + +[Footnote E: To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and +thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to +error, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, by +Implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Any +action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State +and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide +domain of Utopias.] + +War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it +is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation. +As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls +for war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it. + +If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, we +shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its +political power increases. The higher object at which it aims is +closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It is +only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that +creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most +splendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilities +and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which +power creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, and +recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is +content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace on +sluggard's couch it lies," then its citizens become stunted. The efforts +of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost. +This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small +States, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls victim to the +same curse. + +All petty and personal interests force their way to the front during a +long period of peace. Selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxury +obliterates idealism. Money acquires an excessive and unjustifiable +power, and character does not obtain due respect: + + + "Man is stunted by peaceful days, + In idle repose his courage decays. + Law is the weakling's game. + Law makes the world the same. + But in war man's strength is seen, + War ennobles all that is mean; + Even the coward belies his name." + SCHILLER: _Braut v. Messina_. + +"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social +petrifaction and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of the +goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience. +War alone teaches this lesson." [F] + +[Footnote F: Kuno Fischer, "Hegel," i., p. 737.] + +War, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and to +expand national power than any other means known to history. It +certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at +the same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. This +is especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regarded +not merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as the +expression of the united will of a whole nation. + +All petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the grave +decision which a war involves. The common danger unites all in a common +effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedly +spurned. This union contains a liberating power which produces happy and +permanent results in the national life. We need only recall the uniting +power of the War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and their +historical consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every war +vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the sham +reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are +unmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth, +and honour come to the front and are put into play. "A thousand touching +traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous war +awakes in noble nations." [G] + +[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 482.] + +Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "War," he +said, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment +constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it; +every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues." + +"At the moment when the State cries out that its very life is at stake, +social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. The individual +must forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body. +He should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison with +the welfare of the community. War is elevating, because the individual +disappears before the great conception of the State. The devotion of the +members of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidly +conspicuous as in war.... What a perversion of morality to wish to +abolish heroism among men!" [H] + +[Footnote H: Treitschke, "Politik" i., p. 74.] + +Even defeat may bear a rich harvest. It often, indeed, passes an +irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads to +a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous +constitution. "I recognize in the effect of war upon national +character," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "one of the most salutary +elements in the moulding of the human race." + +The individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge his +life on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the cause +which he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals to +personal morality. Similarly, nations and States can achieve no loftier +consummation than to stake their whole power on upholding their +independence, their honour, and their reputation. + +Such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. The +possibility of war is required to give the national character that +stimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nations +enabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by the +fullest development of their moral forces. An intellectual and vigorous +nation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a Phaecian +existence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace. + +From this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily +detrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics. +The States which from various considerations are always active in this +direction are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United States +of America, e.g., in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal +peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to +money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred +million dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incur +a great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with England +or Japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance of +contest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stress +of great political emotions, without which the moral development of the +national character is impossible. If they advance farther on this road, +they will one day pay dearly for such a policy. + +Again, from the Christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion. +Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God above +all things, and thy neighbour as thyself." This law can claim no +significance for the relations of one country to another, since its +application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love +which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love +for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead +men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature +cannot be political. Its object is to promote morality of the +individual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in the +interests of the community. It tells us to love our individual enemies, +but does not remove the conception of enmity. Christ Himself said: "I am +not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." His teaching can never be +adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. There +never was a religion which was more combative than Christianity. Combat, +moral combat, is its very essence. If we transfer the ideas of +Christianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the power +of the State--power in the widest sense, not merely from the material +aspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancement +of humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be made +which a war demands. Thus, according to Christianity, we cannot +disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally +and historically. + +Again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, the +purely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. The +individual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour, +since it may cost him life and prosperity. The State, however, as such +can also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wage +war, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives and +happiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved. + +The loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamental +notion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness, +the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing the +minority in their own interests. Thus, those who from the materialistic +standpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency from +motives of self-interest. + +Reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, but +that it is justifiable from every point of view. The practical methods +which the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the prevention +of war are shown to be absolutely ineffective. + +It is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement of +rights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, but +also the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullest +assertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time on +this basis to settle the disputes which arise between the various +countries by Arbitration Courts, and so to render war impossible. The +politician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestly +believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted. + +Two questions in this connection are at once suggested: On what right is +the finding of this Arbitration Court based? and what sanctions insure +that the parties will accept this finding? + +To the first question the answer is that such a right does not, and +cannot, exist. The conception of right is twofold. It signifies, +firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is right +and good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the State, either +written or sanctioned by tradition. In its first meaning it is an +indefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it is +variable and capable of development. The right determined by law is only +an attempt to secure a right in itself. In this sense right is the +system of social aims secured by compulsion. It is therefore impossible +that a written law should meet all the special points of a particular +case. The application of the legal right must always be qualified in +order to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. A certain +freedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to the +administration of justice. The established law, within a given and +restricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just. + +The conception of this right is still more obscured by the complex +nature of the consciousness of right and wrong. A quite different +consciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whether +persons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in most +varied forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, and +frequently in opposition to, the established law. In Christian countries +murder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is a +sacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as a +crime. It is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions of +right. + +There is yet another cause of uncertainty. The moral consciousness of +the same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs and +schools of philosophy. The established law can seldom keep pace with +this inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lags +behind. A condition of things arises where the living moral +consciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, where +legal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and Mephistopheles' +scoffing words are true: + + "Laws are transmitted, as one sees, + Just like inherited disease. + They're handed down from race to race, + And noiseless glide from place to place. + Reason they turn to nonsense; worse, + They make beneficence a curse! + Ah me! That you're a grandson you + As long as you're alive shall rue." + _Faust_ (translation by Sir T. Martin). + +Thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the +same ideas in their private and social intercourse. The conception of +the constitutional State in the strictest sense is an impossibility, and +would lead to an intolerable state of things. The hard and fast +principle must be modified by the progressive development of the fixed +law, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and of +self-help allowed by the community. If sometimes between individuals the +duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a +universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated +relations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its own +conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which +spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical +life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification, +and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and +none can say that one nation has a better right than the other. There +never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here and +there particular relations can be brought under definite international +laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification. +Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international +code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own +conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest +ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an +injustice, and thus dishonour itself. + +Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring +people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and +is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in +the civilized world. Every Arbitration Court must originate in a certain +political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must +treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the +contracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. In this way every +progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may +easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the +expansion of the young and vigorous State in favour of one which is +sinking in the scale of civilization. + +These considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question: +How can the judgment of the Arbitration Court be enforced if any State +refuses to submit to it? Where does the power reside which insures the +execution of this judgment when pronounced? + +In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908 +that the High Court of International Justice established by the second +Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding +decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. +The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this +idea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that +public opinion must represent the view which the American plutocrats +think most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that the +widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material +prosperity, commerce, and money-making. As a matter of fact, public +opinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only be +employed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided. + +We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the +separate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empire +existed. Such an empire never can or will arise again. Even if it did, +it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all +human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the +unchecked rivalry of different groups. + +So long as we live under such a State system as at present, the German +Imperial Chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared, +in his speech in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that treaties for +arbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainable +legal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between two +countries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. Such a treaty merely +proved that between the two contracting States no serious inducement to +break the peace could be imagined. It therefore only confirmed the +relations already existing. "If these relations change, if differences +develop between the two nations which affect their national existence, +which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then every +arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke." + +It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an Arbitration +Court can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlike +decision, even as regards the State in whose favour it is pronounced. If +we imagine, for example, that Silesia had fallen to Frederick the Great +by the finding of a Court of Arbitration, and not by a war of +unparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have been +equally important for Prussia and for Germany? No one will maintain this. + +The material increase in power which accrued to Frederick's country by +the acquisition of Silesia is not to be underestimated. But far more +important was the circumstance that this country could not be conquered +by the strongest European coalition, and that it vindicated its position +as the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. It was +war which laid the foundations of Prussia's power, which amassed a +heritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. War +forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could grow +up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. Here once +more war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons of +history we shall see the same result again and again. + +If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite +aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only +be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as +unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It +is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice +their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and +thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed to +obviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts of +Arbitration--that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formal +law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The +weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and +vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment +on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most +disastrous consequences for humanity generally. + +With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate +appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral +and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration. +So, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highest +material blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; for +the maintenance of national character and political independence; for +the expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of the +national welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nations +according to the scale of their importance in civilization; for +intellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for the +honour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressive +development is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home and +abroad is only a question of time. History speaks with no uncertain +voice on this subject. It shows that valour is a necessary condition of +progress. Where with growing civilization and increasing material +prosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and the +resolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, there +the nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their own +politically or racially. + +"A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political +world when national character and military tradition act and react upon +each." These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war, +and he is incontestably right. + +These efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merely +lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature where the +struggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damaging +and unnerving effect. The apostles of peace draw large sections of a +nation into the spell of their Utopian efforts, and they thus introduce +an element of weakness into the national life; they cripple the +justifiable national pride in independence, and support a nerveless +opportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higher +humanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its own +weakness. They thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, just +as the Prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in +1805 and 1806, and brought the State to the brink of destruction. + +The functions of true humanity are twofold. On the one hand there is the +promotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well as +of political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform development +of character; on the other hand there is the practical realization of +ideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual and +of the community. + +It seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards the +suppression of war with those of the Social Democratic Labour party, +which goes hand in hand with them. The aims of both parties are Utopian. +The organized Labour party strives after an ideal whose realization is +only conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work are +settled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when the +cost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. Until this is the case +the prices of the international market determine the standard of wages. +The nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settle +independently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing its +position in the international market in competition with nations who +work longer hours and at lower rates. Want of employment and extreme +misery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. On the +other hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, by +excluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration of +products and a profound demoralization of the working population. + +The case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. Its execution, as +we saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is as +impossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. A State +which disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouring +countries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guiding +rule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, and +become the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours. + +We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts after +peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with +arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most +countries. "God will see to it," says Treitschke,[I] "that war always +recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!" + +[Footnote I: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 76.] + +Nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in Germany no inconsiderable +danger. We Germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpractical +dreams. "The accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universal +attribute with us, as in France." [J] We lack the true feeling for +political exigencies. A deep social and religious gulf divides the +German people into different political groups, which are bitterly +antagonistic to each other. The traditional feuds in the political world +still endure. The agitation for peace introduces a new element of +weakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our national +and party life. + +[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 81.] + +It is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believe +in the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that the +general good is being advanced by them. Equally true is it, however, +that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfish +political projects. Its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes its +danger. + +Every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionary +schemes. They must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as an +unhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Our +people must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or may +be the goal of a policy_. The policy of a great State has positive aims. +It will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that is +possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentous +questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation, +the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this +conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the +idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating +law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of the +peace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words: + + "Dreams of a peaceful day? + Let him dream who may! + 'War' is our rallying cry, + Onward to victory!" + + + + +CHAPTER II + + + +THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR + +Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that no +one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of +intentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseen +what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation, +and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. In +his "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect: +"Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a +nation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as to +anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [A] + +[Footnote A: "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93.] + +We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to be +regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it +as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out +for so long. It is difficult to gauge its true import. The notion of +forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must not +think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to +be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the +pressure of the whole political situation. + +Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict +letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the +decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own +initiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterances +cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle +of political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only +run counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we exclude +from politics that independence of action which is the true motive +force. + +The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the +natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the +controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. It +does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are +unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourable +position affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statecraft +becomes a tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its +ends. "Men make history," [B] as Bismarck's actions clearly show. + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 28.] + +No doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit of +a peaceful solution. The death of some one man, the setting of some +great ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to change +it fundamentally. But the great disputes in the life of a nation cannot +be settled so simply. The man who wished to bring the question to a +decisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for the +moment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels, +and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilable +interests. With the death of King Edward VII. of England the policy of +isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against +Germany, has broken down. The antagonism of Germany and England, based +on the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, still +persists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not always +profitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening the +tension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of Germany. + +It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should +depend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would be +thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many +unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less +dependent on chance. + +It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician +Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war +should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been +attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a +weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated +should determine political action. + +For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look +to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the +conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and +sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value +is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct +estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of +the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness +of decision. + +If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged +right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as +necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country +the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister +cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far +more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater +sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and +courage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment. +In the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought never +to be brought about falls to the ground. And yet this theory has in our +day found many supporters, especially in Germany. + +Even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war is +impossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banished +from the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should be +postponed so long as possible.[C] + +[Footnote C: Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on +March 30, 1911. In his speech of November 9, 1911, the Imperial +Chancellor referred to the above-quoted words of Prince Bismarck +in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the Morocco question.] + +Those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude as +the supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as +a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing +importance. According to this view, a war recognized as inevitable must +be postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to use +exceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary and +justifiable aspirations by force of arms. + +Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion +that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the +chief duty, of any policy. + +To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite +answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only +the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring +about a war. + +Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that +wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the +happiest results, both politically and socially. A feeble policy has +always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to +take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to +adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as +to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter. +Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most +striking examples of this. + +The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful +and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the +steps of his glorious ancestor. "He noticed how his state occupied an +untenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers, +and showed his determination to give a definite character (_décider cet +être_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge +the territory of the State and _corriger la figure de la Prusse_, if +Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name +of 'Kingdom.'" [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity, +and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. None of +the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he +postpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be the +aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself +favourable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The whole +history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally +would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of +decision which he showed. + +[Footnote D Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 51.] + +We see a quite different development under the reign of Frederick +William III., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our +nation cannot be too often reminded. + +It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided. +Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the Prussian +Government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied +Russians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great +moral cost. According to all human calculation, the participation of +Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive +superiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and +would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the +moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had +ingrained on her by his wars. At the darkest moment of defeat they shone +most brightly. In spite of the political downfall, the effects of +Frederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired +his State and his people. This is clearly seen in the quite different +attitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under the +degrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny. The power which had been +acquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself +more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it +was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible +the heroic revival of 1813. + +The German wars of Unification also belong to the category of wars +which, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest. +The instability and political weakness which the Prussian Government +showed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of Olmütz in 1850, had +deeply shaken the political and national importance of Prussia. On the +other hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once more +her duties as a nation, when King William I. and Bismarck were at the +helm, was soon abundantly manifest. Bismarck, by bringing about our +wars of Unification in order to improve radically an untenable position +and secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled the +long-felt wish of the German people, and raised Germany to the +undisputed rank of a first-class European Power. The military successes +and the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for an +unparalleled material prosperity. It is difficult to imagine how +pitiable the progress of the German people would have been had not these +wars been brought about by a deliberate policy. + +The most recent history tells the same story. If we judge the Japanese +standpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fight +Russia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morally +justifiable. It was immensely daring to challenge the Russian giant, but +the purely military conditions were favourable, and the Japanese nation, +which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed an +extended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to open +new channels for her superabundant activities. Japan, from her own point +of view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power in +Eastern Asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of Russia. The Japanese +statesmen were justified by the result. The victorious campaign created +wider conditions of life for the Japanese people and State, and at one +blow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics, +and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to great +material advancement. If this war had been avoided from weakness or +philanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters would +have taken a very different turn. The growing power of Russia in the +Amur district and in Korea would have repelled or at least hindered the +Japanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attained +through this war, glorious alike for military prowess and political +foresight. + +The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has +always led to happy results. Even an unsuccessfully waged war may +sometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vital +interests without a blow. We find an example of this in the recent +heroic struggle of the small Boer States against the British Empire. In +this struggle they were inevitably defeated. It was easy to foresee that +an armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces of +England and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally could +not bear heavy losses. But yet--if all indications are not +misleading--the blood shed by the Boer people will yield a free and +prosperous future. In spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic; +men like President Stein, Botha, and De Wett, with their gallant +followers, performed many great military feats. The whole nation +combined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which Byron +sings: + + "For freedom's battle once begun, + Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, + Though baffled oft, is ever won." + +Inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any later +developments, have been won by this struggle. The Boers have maintained +their place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselves +superior to the English. It was only after many glorious victories that +they yielded to a crushingly superior force. They accumulated a store of +fame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, a +power to be reckoned with. The result of this development is that the +Boers are now the foremost people in South Africa, and that England +preferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by their +continual hostility. This laid the foundation for the United Free States +of South Africa.[E] + +[Footnote E: "War and the Arme Blanche," by Erskine Childers: "The truth +came like a flash ... that all along we had been conquering the +country, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215). + +"To ... aim at so cowing the Boer national spirit, as to gain a +permanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyond +our power to achieve. Peaceable political fusion under our own flag +was the utmost we could secure. That means a conditional surrender, +or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). Lord Roberts wrote +a very appreciative introduction to this book without any protest +against the opinions expressed in it.] + +President Kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and not +Cecil Rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, be +known in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of South Africa, +who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value the +inestimable moral qualities according to their real importance. + +The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been +deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest +results. War, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of political +agent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but in +every case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery. +He who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility. + +It is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision except +from the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existing +conditions which have created national armies. Absolute clearness of +vision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken, +and what political aims justify the use of armed force. + +This question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactory +answer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty of +the State. + +If this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual and +moral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moral +education of the human race, then the State's own acts must necessarily +conform to the moral laws. But the acts of the State cannot be judged by +the standard of individual morality. If the State wished to conform to +this standard it would often find itself at variance with its own +particular duties. The morality of the State must be developed out of +its own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in the +personality of the man and his duties towards society. The morality of +the State must be judged by the nature and _raison d'être_ of the State, +and not of the individual citizen. But the end-all and be-all of a State +is power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face +should not meddle in politics." [F] + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] + +Machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policy +was the advancement of power. This term, however, has acquired, since +the German Reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewd +Florentine. To him power was desirable in itself; for us "the State is +not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and +promote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by being +applied for the greatest good of mankind." [G] + +[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] + +The criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in the +last resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed his +own nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection." [H] If the +same standard is applied to the State, then "its highest moral duty is +to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the +higher community of which he is a member; but the State is itself the +highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty +of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of +sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for there +is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot +sacrifice itself to something higher. When a State sees its downfall +staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A +sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts +the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a +State." [I] + +[Footnote H: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote I: _Ibid_., i., p 3.] + +I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political +morality better than in the words of our great national historian. But +we can reach the same conclusions by another road. The individual is +responsible only for himself. If, either from weakness or from moral +reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the +consequences of his actions recoil only on him. The situation is quite +different in the case of a State. It represents the ramifying and often +conflicting interests of a community. Should it from any reason neglect +the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal +personality, but it injures also the body of private interests +which it represents. This incalculably far-reaching detriment affects +not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of +individuals and the community. Accordingly it is a moral duty of the +State to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and +promoter of all higher interests. This duty it cannot fulfil unless it +possesses the needful power. + +The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first +and foremost duty of the State. This aspect of the question supplies a +fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can be +estimated. The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this +duty, and thus served the interests of the community? And this not +merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material +interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the +State, and thus indirectly its higher aims. + +It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that +numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the +community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only +natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be +erroneous. Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must +be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy. +"Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most +contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." [J] This +argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads +logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means; +that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures +are permissible. + +[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] + +A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for +political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must +be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. So far as I +know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel +bound to attempt one at this point. War, with which I am dealing at +present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it +pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the +seriousness of warlike measures. I must deviate here a little from my +main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of +political morality. + +The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is +generally assumed. The power of the State does not rest exclusively on +the factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth, +and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements, +which are reciprocally related to the material. The energy with which a +State promotes its own interests and represents the rights of its +citizens in foreign States, the determination which it displays to +support them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor of +strength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselves +to let things come to a crisis in a like case. Similarly a reliable and +honourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with allies +as well as with foes. A statesman is thus under no obligation to deceive +deliberately. He can from the political standpoint avoid all +negotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he will +thereby serve the reputation and power of his State no less than when he +holds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, and +renounces all political formulas and phrases. + +In antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and the +Jesuits have tried to justify regicide.[K] At the present day political +murder is universally condemned from the standpoint of political +morality. The same holds good of preconcerted political deception. A +State which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute. +The man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in a +contradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims, +since he denies it by his actions. It is not, of course, necessary that +a man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to an +opponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point. +But it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise crafty +deceptions. A fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic of +great statesmen. Subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit of +diplomacy. + +[Footnote K: Mariana, "De rege et regis institutione." Toledo, 1598.] + +Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latent +war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a +position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and +deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties +are determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflict +between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and +prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it +is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately +moral nature of that end. + +Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action. +But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are +of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are +conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of +things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the +infringement of the right appears morally justified. York's decision to +conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of +right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made +under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the +Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral. Now it is always +justifiable to terminate an immoral situation. + +As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument +shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultima +ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other +States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful +methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw, +rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. War +therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is +not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the +ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparently +trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully +justifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the State, and consequently +its moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential part +of its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there +is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword +must be drawn to do so. + +In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is +whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the +power of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether the +inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict +greater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantages +which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not +declared. A further point to be considered is whether the general +position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military +success. With these considerations of expediency certain other weighty +aspects of the question must also be faced. + +It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in looking +only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of +the existing generation. Such policy would be opposed to all that +constitutes the essential nature of the State. Its conduct must be +guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is +gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the +future. "The true greatness of the State is that it links the past with +the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to +regard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life." [L] + +[Footnote L: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] + +The law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and in +the decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than the +sacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "I cannot conceive," +Zelter once wrote to Goethe, "how any right deed can be performed +without sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very opposite +of what is desirable." + +A second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely that +which Zelter rightly emphasizes. A great end cannot be attained except +by staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certainty +of success can ever be anticipated. Every undertaking implies a greater +or less venture. The daily intercourse of civic life teaches us this +lesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must be +taken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguely +estimated. In questions of comparatively trifling importance much may be +done by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce a +satisfactory status. The solution of such problems is the sphere of +diplomatic activity. The state of things is quite different when vital +questions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, but +will guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party. +Then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmen +to act. Men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun the +solemn decision of war. In such questions any reluctance to face the +opponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt at +a temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of political +prestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made good +in another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the State, +the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations. + +Not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such a +case. The mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention to +wage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. This +intention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiations +without arms are like music-books without instruments," as Frederick the +Great said. It is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to which +the opponent's purpose yields. When, therefore, the threat of war is +insufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin; +the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the +_duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike. + +Finally, there is a third point to be considered. Cases may occur where +war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no +prospect of success. The responsibility of this has also to be borne. So +at least Frederick the Great thought. His brother Henry, after the +battle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the +Marquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France. Again, +after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but +the King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. He knew better what +suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to +die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. President +Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States of +America on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "It +must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran, +"that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men +and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the +sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war +is in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the most +prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice.... +It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than +not to have fought at all." + +To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher +sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in +itself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by the +consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when +the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and +military situation. + +It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy, +especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only +heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the +reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to +fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties. + +No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain +circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ +war as a political means. So long as all human progress and all natural +development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage +in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible. + +When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting +any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has +forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually +acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there +are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only +await the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the State +towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of +success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable. +When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by +affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements +of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to +promote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced the +more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be +obtained with comparatively small sacrifices. + +These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active +policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and +concentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truth +of Schiller's lines: + + "The chance that once thou hast refused + Will never through the centuries recur." + +The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take +the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the +future to the present need of peace. + +It is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficult +to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist +which justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all the +greater because the historical significance of the act must be +considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its +justification. + +War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successes +which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries. +The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long +epochs.[M] + +[Footnote M: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 2.] +54 +The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a +great State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries; +but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and +keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical +imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can +at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [N] + +[Footnote N: Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft," p. 30.] + +He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State, +and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way +settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of +political morality. + +He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be +fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his +hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the +fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point +he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true +interests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the +definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing +favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the +hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise +with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther +once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write +and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much +greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business +of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and +the marches, etc.--that is what the petty and simple do who only look +with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or +saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to +save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the +sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It +will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful +and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."[O] + +[Footnote O: Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation."] + +Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to +further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of +war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State +and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political +purposes correspond to these problems. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + + +A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL +DEVELOPMENT + +The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is +consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. The +same holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were, +personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely +various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable +of the most different achievements, and serving the most multifarious +purposes in the great evolution of human existence. + +Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the +materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation +to-day. + +According to it, all that happens in the world is a necessary +consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become +conscious. It denies the difference between the empiric and the +intelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom. + +This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seems +everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the +insufficient human intelligence. The existence of the universe is +opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are +incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and +time. + +The essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. We +recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; the +impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our +understanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quite +impossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear--although no +demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual laws +beyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to a +conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual +change. Even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden +moral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread of +civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and +higher forms of life. + +It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in every +individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too +limited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge of +things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to +understand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may also +term the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidance +for our further investigation and procedure. + +The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the history +of the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What is +true," Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised and +supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by +its history." + +The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, the +laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces +have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work +towards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We are +here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget +that States are personalities endowed with very different human +attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that +these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of +States as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very different +effect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour to +grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the +naturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we +wish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study the +history of the German people in its connection with that of the other +European States, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto +followed, and what guidance the past gives for Our future policy. From +the time of their first appearance in history the Germans showed +themselves a first-class civilized people. + +When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians +there were two main elements which shaped the future of the West, +Christianity and the Germans. The Christian teaching preached equal +rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and +slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the +attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the +grave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man, +and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the +individual conscience, the starting-point of all development. It thus +gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose +morality rested solely on the relations with the state. Simultaneously +with this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North poured +victoriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decaying +nations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep their +nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. The +States which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized how +difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a +higher. The Germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. The +German element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and +offered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture of +German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did +the growing nations appear. + +In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world. +The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germans +with the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated +itself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the +Alps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea of +the Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued to +flourish. + +In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until A.D. 1453. In the West, +however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476. +Italy had fallen into the hands of the East Goths and Lombards +successively. The Visigoths had established their dominion in Spain, and +the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul. + +A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with his +powerful hand, extended the Frankish Empire far beyond the boundaries of +Gaul. By the subjugation of the Saxons he became lord of the country +between the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy by +the conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the Western +Roman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. His +successors clung to this claim; but the Frankish Empire soon fell to +pieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards became +France, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the later +Germany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy and +Spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually +amalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East Frankish +Empire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained +their Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerful +German [A] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of Charles the Great to +the Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first _German_ King who +took this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in a +quarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of the +Church, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in +order to prove their pretended title to that country. + +[Footnote A: German (Deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular," +opposed to "foreign"--_e.g._, the Latin Church dialect. It was first +used as the name of a people, in the tenth century A.D.] + +The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living in +Rome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of a +Church which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way +of the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldest +creations of the human intellect--to found and maintain a +world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers. + +Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. The +freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual +dominion. In the portentous struggle of the two Powers for the +supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire, +the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widely +different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a +homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of the +estates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axe +of Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church. + +The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German power +lay on the ground in fragments. A period of almost complete anarchy +followed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad +characteristics of the German people, contributed to extend this +destruction to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the German +people deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power was +budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetry +was passing through a first classical period. Every German country was +ringing with song; the depth of German sentiment found universal +expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealism +inspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empire +every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above +the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The material +prosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better +regulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the Hanseatic League bore +its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great +trade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice and +Genoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never again +attained. + +Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in the +breasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, and +was destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in +the spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church had +lost much of her influence on men's minds. On the other hand, a refining +movement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit of +antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to +the Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined by +everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich von +Hutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed," rang loud through the +districts of Germany. + +Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, which +conceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe to +her foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerly +in the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shed +it's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for +national independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequences +for the development of humanity had been fought out since the Persian +wars. In this cause the German people nearly disappeared, and lost all +political importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned to +foreign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church did +not remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and the +Staufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a +mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself. +Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won an +undisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritual +freedom was established. This most important element of civilization was +retained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become ever +since the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace of +Westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious +freedom. + +The States of the Latin race on their side now put forward strong claims +to the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas of +freedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled among +themselves about the predominance. At the same time, in Germanized +England a firs-class Protestant power was being developed, and the age +of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the Reformation +and the Thirty Years' War, opened new and unsuspected paths to human +intellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a fresh +stimulus. Gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the +newly-discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fell +to the lot of the Germanic and the southern part to that of the Latin +race. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, and +consequently, of world politics. Germany remained excluded from this +great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes +and religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, the +Low Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repel +the inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the French +ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by these +wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world. +Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in +political power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States, +which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the German cause. +But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre of +Protestant power was established in the North--i.e., Prussia. + +After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back the +Slavs, who poured in from the East, in wrestling large tracts from them, +and in completely Germanizing them. This struggle, like that with the +niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which +extended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and successfully planted +Germanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finally +victorious also against Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic. +In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strong +political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an +influential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germany +devolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to Catholic +Austria grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into an +independent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a German +population, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' War +Prussia broke away from Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confronted +France and Russia as an independent Protestant State. + +But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once more +slowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy has exhausted the +resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of the +monarchy, _L'état c'est moi,_ carried to an extreme, provoked a +tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous +revolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more specially in +Germany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism. +The German Empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary States survived, +among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again under +Napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and +bore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain, +and even to the inhospitable plains of Russia, which by a gradual +political absorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of power +in wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to an +important place among the European nations. Austria, which had become +more and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before the +mighty Corsican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her +dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught. + +But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest +humiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of +the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the +Protestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm, +won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and for +Germany, and paved the way for further world-wide historical +developments. + +While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular +despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights,_ another +quite different revolution was working in Prussia--the revolution of +_duty_. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately +to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State. +Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposition +to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the idea +of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to +sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the +clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis +on which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same time +Stein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in Prussia. + +While measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thus +being adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was to +depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a +German Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in the +domain of art and science, where German character and endeavour found +the deepest and fullest expression. A great change had been effected in +this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year +1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and +deeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised their +minds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlit +heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and +superiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and science +became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this +dismembered people, and decided the victory of Protestantism in German +life." [B] + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte", i., p. 88.] + +Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she +developed the root-idea of the Reformation into the right of +unrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [C] Moral obligations, such as no +nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the +philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs +of her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies was +realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classical +literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as +the political work of the Prussian monarchy", [D] and of those men of +action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin. + +[Footnote C: _Ibid.,_ i., p. 90.] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid._] + +The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an event +in the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the great +annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last +abortion of the revolution--a + + "Part of the power that still + Produces Good, while still devising Ill"; + +on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Let +man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the +religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual +change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; who +gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect, +and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people to +consciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed that +the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain; +a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify +to the divinity in man. + +The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to +whom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate of +the Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront of +humanity. + +Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation +could give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, and +Goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of +Liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny. + +We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great +struggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, and +weakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed +the German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure +enthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expression +in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of +thousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took a +prominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost to +their mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria and +Russia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties. + +Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing up +from the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that no +longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came to +the front, King William I. and the hero of the Saxon forest. Resolutely +they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from +ignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of the +popular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters with +Austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and left +the German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a +Great Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the +vast majority of the German peoples united under the Imperial crown +which the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire was +revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, +and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the North +Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from the +ashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old German +Confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs. + +It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of Germany +vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the +economic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on all +sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed in +between France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed +to gather the full fruits of our victories. The short-sightedness and +party feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag--the old hereditary failings +of our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intense +love of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behind +in the race with other countries. + +In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious +Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found +the second largest colonial Empire in the world; England appropriated +the most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a +comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content +with some modest strips of territory. In addition to, and in connection +with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward. + +Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Frederick the Great, +and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conception +of the State has completely changed since the turn of the century. The +patrimonial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary possession of +the Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents the +reverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant of +the State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is the +key to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of the +State the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the +tendency is as follows: Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and +the nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquire +a uniform national character and common national interests. + +This new order of things entirely altered the basis of international +relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerce +and trade also developed on wholly new lines. + +After 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and trade +restrictions--were gradually removed. Landed property ceased to be a +monopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "England +introduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machinery +into industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by +steamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the same +time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and +chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton. +There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in +the widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension of +colonization over Polynesia, etc." England at the same time girdled the +earth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort of +world-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not, +indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone +days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests +dependent on herself. + +Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, linking the West +and the East, the United States of North America have risen to be an +industrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported by +exceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing +character of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitable +recognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on the +point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy. + + +Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but has +extended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressing +farther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossed +swords with the States of the Mongolian race. This vast population, +which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands of +years of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, and +categorically claims its share in international life. The entrance of +Japan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms. +"Asia for the Asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her +breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power has +emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a European foe. +China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mighty +movement is thrilling Asia--the awakening of a new epoch. + +Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the +civilized countries of Europe, are threatening from Asia, the old cradle +of the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forces +which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of the +French Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized +the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a +consciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers, +originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material +position, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, and +seek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. They do not +wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically +recognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, in +which they themselves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not only +perpetually menace State and society, but endanger in the separate +countries the industries from which they live, since they threaten to +destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by +continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany this +movement has affected large sections of the population. + +Until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture and +cattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of German +industries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in +connection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade has +marvellously increased. Germany has become an industrial and trading +nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds +work and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost its +leading position in the economic life of the people. The artisan +class has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in trade +unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the +international social democracy. It is hostile to the national class +distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of +the State. + +It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous +agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the +anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law of +self-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certain +point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizen +may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an +opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly +devotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grant +this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of +capital. + +Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, it +may create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employment +to all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislation +against every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age, +or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of +work, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him from +working. + +The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of three +victorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large for +present purposes, although without the conscious intention of the State. +German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a +market for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervened +with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. As +Scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of +man, so the Emperor William I. recognized the duty of the State towards +those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The position +of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social +legislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now +existed. + +A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats +indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the +working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing +State and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and +progress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, How +to win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willing +workers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny. + +Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of +all progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world. +Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last +century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a +prominent position through the universality of her philosophy and her +thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things. + +The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature are +attested by the fact that the annual export of German books to foreign +countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that +of France, England, and America combined. It is only in the domain of +the exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to give +precedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win a +leading position. It shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions, +and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our +political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The German +Empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only are +the social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, are +divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter +enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish +denominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between North +and South has prevented the population from growing into a completely +united body. + +So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of +sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into +narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in +her nationality, her intellectual development, in her science, +industries, and trade. + +And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future? +What duties are enforced on us by the past? + +It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the +German State answers this question, depend not only our own further +development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of +the world. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + + +GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION + +Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical +development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of +human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire of +Central Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seeds +of intellectual and moral development were sown by the German +intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with +irresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for the +entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German +people. + +This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on +the freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have ever +and again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nation +whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as +the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the +intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free +and natural development. The Germans have thus always been the +standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark +against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worsted +in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best +heart's blood in the cause. Intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruled +the Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this +people--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the +political attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth +century. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed +into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need of +a free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengaged +itself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened into +world-historical importance. + +Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, on +which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must +rest: the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation, +which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked +all free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop to +the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mind +the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time +pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On this +substructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose +deepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result of +free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a +foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way and +that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and +knowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress. +Reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religious +reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion, +and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not +attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results +of natural philosophy. + +The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle +for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. We +are thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannot +shrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is +being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human +efforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part +in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special +qualities. + +No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate +all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own +spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it +received. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culture +with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the great +community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "Depth of +conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the +limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to +traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all +nations and ages--this has at all times been the German characteristic; +this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture." [A] To no +nation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self +"that which is given to mankind as a whole." We often see in other +nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same +capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which +specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and +imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position. + +[Footnote A: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 95.] + +There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge +our highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we can +mount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of science +and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics +touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results +of scientific inquiry. + +First and foremost it is German science which must regain its +superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate +our birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of the +perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over +Nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more +useful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutions +of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrict +ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit +civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create +conditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can +find its expression. + +It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which +exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition +not only our future development, but the higher life generally. These +problems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply and +permanently than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the +empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany. +The German nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, which +works slowly in opposition to the different movements. The Germans thus +seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great +controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into +the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of +evolution. + +We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no +doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the +community and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts to +find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class +with healthy and patriotic ambitions. + +It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty, +requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed +upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation, +and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity +which is lamentably deficient to-day. + +No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The old +antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in +Germany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and +political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute +liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the +conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present there +appears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism of +Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of +the Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movement +can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect +of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is +rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially all +denominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must never +renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To +do so would mean loss of prestige. + +Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of human +civilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir of +a great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no less +significance in the sphere of its international relations. These +problems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply the +intellectual development, and on their solution depends the position of +Germany in the world. + +The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms +and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered +geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the +Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large +number of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other +States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have +developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national +customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of +her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most +characteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie +outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the +strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against +the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves +are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism, +which seems to have lost its old victorious strength. + +Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the +overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign +countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is +absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even +to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its +increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of +living. + +This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, +or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its +intellectual importance. + +At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course of +centuries grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of all +political significance, a large section of our people did not feel this +insufficiency. Even during the age of our classical literature the +patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the +thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of German +genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship." [B] + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 195.] + +Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines: + + "German majesty and honour + Fall not with the princes' crown; + When amid the flames of war + German Empire crashes down, + German greatness stands unscathed." [C] + +[Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905 +by Bernhard Suphan.] + +The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds +different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence +of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since +we must now take into consideration the immense development of Germany +in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old +importance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from the +vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due +measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political +federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can +only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act +in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties +towards the human race. + +Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding +the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a +foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the +ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to +imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched +again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly +threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely +repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics +from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance +westwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. On +the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions +which were once under German influence are now once more subject to +Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Russian +Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The +German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs; +Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic +workmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia. +Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic +flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an +obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of +self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined +whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is +not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will +be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict +grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and +show less determination to protect the German soil at all costs. + +The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their +struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their +nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot +withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our +trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but +they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. +The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, +and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the +Government must reckon. + +Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to +preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of +universal culture. + +Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and +in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the +world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful +as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are +contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while +the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we +wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our +civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back +in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world. + +Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1, +1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is +already large enough and does not need expansion.... We shall have to +consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... We +have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to +take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should +receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [D] + +[Footnote D: This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister +Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."] + +That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed. + +If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we +survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must +admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not +here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of +the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language. + +England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from +the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies which +are directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in the +interest of English industries and English capital. The work of +civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has +always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her +sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by +transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent +culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy +self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as +Canada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they +will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not +only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the +present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in +the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to +secure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is a +great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and +it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence. + +The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by +them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister, +Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Ten +years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France +has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in +every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be +spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown +in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of +Heaven." [E] + +[Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."] + +The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German +policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading +thought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputes +under which the partition of Africa and the last phase of French +colonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents to +Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distant +and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of +the country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, it +is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run, +since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed, +tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned +colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have +obtained the best shares." + +This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with +mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital +powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for +colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria, +has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and +prides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte +and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the +Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France +in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy +alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany. + +The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of +attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In the +face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its +importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place +in the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspire +to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the +limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach this +goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never +again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be +opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international +politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair +rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality +and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to +them. + +Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a +fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity. + +The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and +improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of +great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely +extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary +capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more +brilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have +returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The +increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to +a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative +industrial occupation. + +There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid +development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the +import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale +of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of +life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which +England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take +much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to +close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order to +encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of +other countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends +on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question +of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall +very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population +means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the +question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of +population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and +home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation +will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for +the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We +shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to +surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in +the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a +home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland. +There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the +unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from +building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and +at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers, +may keep our sea communications open. + +We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial +possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are +only used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think of +colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal +population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and +immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which +retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance +for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each +nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is +quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count +among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be." +[F] + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 8.] + +We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our +requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our +growing working population, but would supply raw materials and +foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that +immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying +unproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We +find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers, +and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign +masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged, +do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will +depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world +speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the +German Empire? + +These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from +the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its +present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this +point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and +hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political +relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course +of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to +political paralysis at the time when the great European States built +themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not +enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in +politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long +concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural +development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power, +international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What +we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior +force of hostile interests and Powers. + +It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths +we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our +forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the +straight road of our intended development. + +The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an +advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension, +it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often +follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to +stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every +occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will +be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + + +WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL + +In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its +history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted +to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the +Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, +must be the basis of our future development. + +The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international +relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the +impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character +and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even +at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and +our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it +will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us. + + "The man of sense will by the forelock clutch + Whatever lies within his power, + Stick fast to it, and neither shirk, + Nor from his enterprise be thrust, + But, having once begun to work, + Go working on because he must." + _Faust_ + (translated by Sir Theodore Martin). + +The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the +hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing +territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of +both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of +these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity, +examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which +concern us are weighed one against the other. + +These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly +to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the +States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must +try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the +day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations +of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion. +We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions +of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and +therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines +of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a +country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or +timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not +seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy +is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men +who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and +often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such +digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his +opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the +student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep +his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must +therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense +clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions. + +We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps. + +On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive +alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In +this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably +unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately +connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States +combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the +North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical +national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to +shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred +battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the +bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the +Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of +Slavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories. +There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the +struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and +commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those +of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react +detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between +Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of +overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its +political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be +assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so +long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the +Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy +to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during +the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered +such an alliance possible. + +The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of +Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show +many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough +to influence the political position of the Empire. + +Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The +antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will +diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a +natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by +Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its +political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from +her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her +true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is +the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power. +That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor +Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a +permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in +Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural +colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by +Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, +even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this +annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We +should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the +Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and +France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance. + + +The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive +character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but +does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not +guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential +interests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in +its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events. +Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences," pointed out that +this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the +future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her +Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with +England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance. +The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an +undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct +opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in +order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This +undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as +the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the +encroachment of Italy into those regions. + +The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has +suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in +the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy +look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to +the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not +regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied +armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We +must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the +Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we +calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own +political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to +strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an +essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of +the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then +will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real +meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative +results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital +interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with +sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not +concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the +consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, +indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would +probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria. +Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of +Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and +incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a +contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we +must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France. + +England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts +to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in +Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which +secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in +commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's +Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in +combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the +coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against +England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding +such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She +is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of +the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make +overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies +can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It is +our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can. + +France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European +Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of +_revanche_. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she +has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the +humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the +defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she +wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and, +if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe +which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune +smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too +weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all +protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for +this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, are +inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this +latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, +and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to +Germany than from Russia. + +The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring +a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The +establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of +a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political +annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, +so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible +illusion as to its extent and meaning. + +Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to +approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her +North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that +strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of +colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French +sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France +will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her +best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in +every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the +Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed +them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance +which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable +that she will maintain honourably and with no _arrière-pensée_ the +obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco. +The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the +French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The French +policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on +the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite +unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can +be negotiated before the question between them has been once more +decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France +sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but +strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the +East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others. + +The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and +of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is +following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to +an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central +Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _status +quo_. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with +Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be +overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any +aggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seems +likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more +reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanying +events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of +internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable, +therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention +in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept +away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose, +meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and +an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although +this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions +of Germany in North Persia. + +It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is +adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the +mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether +in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the +direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the +dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate +to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has +long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the +Baltic. + +Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, +and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European +policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself, +also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years +been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into +Central Europe. + +Pan-Slavism is still hard at work. + +It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement +and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Her +present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the +present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong +monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the +internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation +is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry +is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from +what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a +healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Government +has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed +expectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under the +stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an +attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad. +Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in +the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China, +must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly, +Turkey. + +Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the +Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not +identical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive +war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She +wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of +Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and +East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on +advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed. +Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with +Germany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of the +German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore +always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths. + +England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian +Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the +spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France +she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany +under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms. + +The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the +heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So, +also, no natural community of interests exists between England and +France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to +any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an +Anglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostility +to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two +States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might +mask the real objects. + +This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very +comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made +astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which +commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which +England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may +well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political +and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition +in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The +American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and +will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the +point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far +as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite +of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily +directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in +order to understand the line of thought which guides the English +politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found +in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the +world. + +Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of +view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of +Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the +other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North +America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenest +competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The +annexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty with +Japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two +nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked, +and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union +are so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vast +distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very +bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly has +always diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as quite recently +in the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the object +clearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearing +the consequences of such collision. The American competition in trade +and industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated as +inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense, +according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty by +which a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established. + +England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America. +The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in the +further development of things, be so accentuated that England will be +forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an +undisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action. +The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strained +to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the Arbitration +Treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does not +consider that the present political relations of the two nations are +permanent. + +There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly +threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India +and Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation for +independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the +Low-German element in South Africa. + +Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English +position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national +movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it +clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement. +She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine +the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support, +and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in +opposition to the Caliphate. + +The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where +some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England, +so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, has +attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But +now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows +itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism, +thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of +Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave +danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in +the world. + +While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and +abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together, +either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto. +Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union has +definitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the Imperial +Conference in 1911 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated. +.... When the question of imperial defence came up, the policy was +rejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the oversea +dominions in every imaginable eventuality." The great self-ruled +colonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour of +need, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employed +wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not +approve." [A] There are clear indications that the policy of the +dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is +contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and +Australia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV., into independent +nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal +independence. + +[Footnote A: Th. Schiemann in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of July 5, 1911.] + +All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of +England's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitude +towards Germany. + +England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her +imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must +be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must +not be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be +destroyed. + +A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great +English colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distant +parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of +expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet +might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory +which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of +England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability of +expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can +no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall +victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered. + +The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the +German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer +a prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without any +excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet, +contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a +correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French +fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely +getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other +contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable +means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years +to come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importance +of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia. + +The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters. +It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance of +power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one +of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled +and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's +stage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes +undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This +policy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each +other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directly +from this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen +France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State +which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born +rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the +East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus +the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England's +most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and +self-evident. + +The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would +chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is +the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of +the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English +point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war. +England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a +large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before +the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and +to some extent a great benefit, to English industries. + +After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite +comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check +the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in +large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is +building, and attack the objectionable neighbour. + +English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt +to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the +most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance--Germany, England, and +America--has been suggested.[B] But for such a union with Germany to be +possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German +development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our +colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial +and industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her +traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the +Great Powers in the world. + +[Footnote B: "The United States and the War Cloud in Europe," by Th. +Schiemann, _McClure's Magazine_, June, 1910.] + +It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent +to that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacit +approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of +the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements +of English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and +the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable +indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy. +The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every +expansion of Germany's power were openly shown in the very recent +Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on +the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without +a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp. + +A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which +no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep +the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our +political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves +with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and +Utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter +the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixity +of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a +vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire. + +On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part in +English policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the one +side, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out +her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her +fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the +political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy +in the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political, +notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically +with those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this. + +No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has at +present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in +the sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding with +Germany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely that +the Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of +England. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded in +inflicting a political and military defeat on Germany. + +For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations about +Arbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany. +There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us +in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutely +opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement +in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the +nature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen +competition between the two countries, especially in South America; +there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political +complications. + +Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only +in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China. +In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and +seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to +count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitude +to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions +in East Asia. If the two nations joined hands--a hardly probable +eventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain an +independent position between them. The political rivalry between +the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they are +antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other +in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to +retain their possessions in Asia. + +While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present +directly influence our policy, Turkey--the predominant Power of the Near +East--is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is +emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest +course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple +Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which +threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. +Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against +Russia and against England--the two States, that is, with whose +hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can +threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short +sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no +sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a +war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to +the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding +position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important +key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong +to Russia or England. + +If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so +long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern +basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters. +Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a +development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be +strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite +impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position, +while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her. +From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the +Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of +Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be. + +Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent +importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her +Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German +policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres +of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means +negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey; +Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for +Germany. + +Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared +neutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20, 1815, under the +collective guarantee [C] of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in the +Treaties of London of November 15,1831, and of April 19,1839, on the +part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself. + +[Footnote C: By a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of the +contracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all +agree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the _right_ to +interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced.] + +If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the +continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance +and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement +balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we +take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be +guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple +Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In +consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France, +and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to +Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not +inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all +considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political +superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in +strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English +landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy +really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior +forces will be united against Germany and Austria. + +Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily +difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our +nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an +extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we +are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets +for our growing industries. But at every step which we take in this +direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet +have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, +by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further +expansion of German international influence and of German maritime +power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the +English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved +in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not +neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her +extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, +will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off +the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be +only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be +paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces +in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against +France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps +with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on +the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position +lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion +barred. + +Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the +international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, +cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, +though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the +one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and +warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with +which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where +their interests clash. + +With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but +not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently +peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, +but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisis +in the history of the German nation. + +We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our +position among the Powers of _Europe_; we now must decide whether we +wish to develop into and maintain a _World Empire_, and procure for +German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been +hitherto withheld from them. + +Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make +the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we +willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower +in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is +involved in our decision. + +"To be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day, +disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests +and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official +peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history +inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the +narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region +of realities. + +There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and +development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the _status +quo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever +seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and +temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to +gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the +trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior +tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the +powers of a continuous development. + +We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing +still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, +and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with +our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are +straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to +extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and +advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with +peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to +continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon +us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our +arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and +we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be +sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and +the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritual +and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German +thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind. + +If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a +catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to +attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at +the risk of a war with numerically superior foes. + +Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by +acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German +colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from +Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual +incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former +South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of +Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish +population. + +Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our +political power in other ways. + +In the first place, our political position would be considerably +consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that +France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find +ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another _we +must square our account with France_ if we wish for a free hand in our +international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a +sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all +cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by +force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never +again come across our path. + +Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political +power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case +of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with +armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by +our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same +lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be +presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good +policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and +the Triple Alliance has already been discussed. + +Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the +Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as +mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan +Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further +intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in +Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence, +in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the +integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their +independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best +secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might +eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central +European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by +this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily +unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be +essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the +expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the +geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of +the political community based on it. + +We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial +territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our +population. Very recent events have shown that, under certain +circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa +by pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugal +might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the +Portuguese colonies. We may assume that some understanding exists +between England and Germany which contemplates a division of the +Portuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_. +It cannot, indeed, be certain that England, if the contingency arrives, +would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually +exists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even been +often said, although disputed in other quarters, that Great Britain, +after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of the +Portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugal +the possession of _all_ her colonies. + +Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our +African territory would be possible. These need not be discussed here +more particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of +a successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of +territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require +countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there +are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the +settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our +overflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generally +speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our +industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the +growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This +represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us +from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization. + +A part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditions +point--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of +the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of +providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but +remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign +countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our +exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture. + +An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity. +It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace +the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for +the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. This +notion is only justified in a certain sense. In the first place, such a +policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow +population in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee the +certainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. It secures to +all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means +competition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political power +which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the +economic relations. The principle of the open door prevails +everywhere--in Egypt, Manchuria, in the Congo State, in Morocco--and +everywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: in +Manchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and in +Morocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fall +naturally to that State which is practically dominant; its products are +bought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power of +the State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar +advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be +evaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best be +regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonial +policy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies or its own +and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets +lie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations. + +The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many +old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European +policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in +Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost +sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely +disregarded. + +The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling +that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for +the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the +limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays +the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence +in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory +of balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power, +and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain +guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The +conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a close +community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into +political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort +of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a +State-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five +Great Powers--England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which +latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866 +Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power. + +"Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among +the nations." "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a +real equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated,"[D] This +condition does not exist between the European nations. England by +herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow +themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of +French. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by +special alliances. One result only has been obtained--the hindrance of +the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in +particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power +can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing +state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of +rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually +ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers +which stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England's +policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and +to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order +herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and +the sovereignty of the world. + +[Footnote D: Treitschke.] + +We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present +distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a +State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of +course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just +basis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of one +embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is +established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in +this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central +European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in +one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase +our own power. + +A further question, suggested by the present political position, is +whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning +of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a +different conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be, +permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one +contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of +Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory +is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State from +which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has +no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This +argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, +in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last +mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the +neutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic, +since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral +country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to +the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest +moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development +presupposes such competition. + +[Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without +guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.] + +Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal +affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the +State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and +powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference +in the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances of +such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in the +private affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but +none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval +preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international +intercourse that between the States of one and the same political system +a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The +unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to +political intercourse under all conditions involves serious +difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first +preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord +Palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false is +the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States +of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for +international politics can be laid down. + +After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals; +and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his +affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the +individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates +the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the +State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But +no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide +whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its +own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State +renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should +circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party +disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat +to the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every State +acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of +another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an +interference may become." On the other hand, it must be remembered that +the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still +graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international +right, but simply and solely on power and expediency. + +I have gone closely into these questions of international policy +because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly +influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and +may give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential that +we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by +considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only +depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must +remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any +circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that +the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as +possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions +possible. "No man," so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3, +1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to +make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take +advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position." + +If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which +guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our +forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts. + +The political and national development of the German people has always, +so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the +hereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism of +the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, +the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national +objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, +also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is +painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so +restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in +fruitless quarrels among themselves. + +Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome +these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy, +consistent development of our power. + +It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual and +social life arising from the like variety of the German nationality and +political system offers valuable advantages. It presents countless +centres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a high +spiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development. +But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference of +this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics. + +Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions +which are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugal +forces of the German nature--the common system of defence of our country +by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong +national empire. + +No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its own +destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to +no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. A +glance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which +is forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day. + +The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the common +interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions, +as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful +personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to +stir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality, +and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union. + +We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of +acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends +through and for our people. + +Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German character +to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development +of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific, +and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State is +beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the +independence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills and +stunts the independence of free men." [F] This independence of the +individual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the State, +forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central +power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our +social conditions. + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 2.] + +We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, +together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, +not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in +the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our +great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great +part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the +contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our +political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the +nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably +beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once +again, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament will +be heard: + + "O Germany, thy oaks still stand, + But thou art fallen, glorious land!" + KÖRNER. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + + +THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR + +Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture +to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by +formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will be +impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future +without an appeal to arms. + +Knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the political +situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible +for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an +army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to +battle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time +down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of +need. + +Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for +warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of +the situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested in +the Reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to +understand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic +misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these +for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country) +cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand, +brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great +wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is +often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national +duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our +people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be +ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to +discharge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of +preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are +passing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable to +consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so +much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect; +we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true +interests of the country better than by improving its military +capabilities. + +Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it must +maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national +asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the +war and supply the requisite means. + +This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in +national development. + +As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold +the field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, do +not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of +victory--so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with the +people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is +capable of wielding the sword with success. + +Military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but it +develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the +occupations of peace. It educates a man to the full mastery of his body, +to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental +powers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him to +order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respect +and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work. + +It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service +deprives economic life of forces which could have been more +appropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. These forces are +not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life. +Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly +repay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. It +is therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of its +countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of +war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and +improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which +the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly +an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and +educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus +promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than +achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which +certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the +national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them +a number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency to +luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations. +Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level +as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must +complete and assist the other. But a people which does not willingly +bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service +renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and +assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are +one-sided and evanescent. + +It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligations +towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all +tendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. The +method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power +can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depends +largely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical and +political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently +ranges between very wide extremes. + +In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military +training was almost exclusively left to the individual. That was +sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made +them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to +hard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination, +subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military +system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the +conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made +to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account +of political possibilities. The great European States maintain standing +armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or +shorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenary +army, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filled +by volunteers. + +In these various ways different degrees of military efficiency are +obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and +intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the +requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities +become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency. + +When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that +with growing civilization the requisite military capacities are always +changing. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldiers +who fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different from +those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have the +physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities +expected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to the +individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of +warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in +the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it +is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. The +preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military +sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized +State from those in countries, standing on a lower level of +civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war +is fought under relatively simple conditions. + +The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less +developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form +of military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising +herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps +in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and +proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and +educational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, by +employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it +never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development. + +When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find +ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical +and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact +with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself. + +A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard +to the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed in +the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other +ways. We see the individual States--according to their geographical +position, their relations to other States and the military strength of +their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater +or less importance in the political system of the world--making their +military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and +expenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life of +civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its +emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is +everywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a _means_ of +attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength. + +Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position +and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify +her policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only +with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling +a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a +continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. As +a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental +European war against her will. + +So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties, +and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays +most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to +develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the +security afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America, +again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest +limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval +power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the +continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any +considerable forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea +conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has +acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly +with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made +concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her +position in the world. + +While in some States a restriction of armaments is natural and +justifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerve +to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of +Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political +pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they +are no longer justified by the size of her population and her +international importance. France affords a conspicuous example of +self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral +duties. + +In the other European States, as in France, external political +conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate +the method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, which +necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own +justification. + +A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of +nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in +the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength +to safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, under +certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and +political schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be +deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements +of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and +maintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of all +opposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases. + +A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on the +friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as +fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international +conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support +from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and under +what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the +consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own +sphere of power. + +This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State +is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace +the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary +expenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it is +itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the +largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another +aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power of +such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison +with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable +military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a +view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military +preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a +defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent +interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision +will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a +real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective +addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist. +The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary +State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain +influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local +conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of +the country. + +It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the +utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such +is, in fact, the case. + +In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with the +political and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy, +preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland, +situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political +independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Germany and the +navy of England. + +The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on +its own power. + +The power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies will +have a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans and +military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes; +but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations +alone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent and +unqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless, +and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and +shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed. + +The military power of an independent State in the true sense must +guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests +of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of +development. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be +considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military +efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions +must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object +thereby to be gained. This object--of which each individual must be +conscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises +the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of +the State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen. + +A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital +factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the +healthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope in +international competition. This is also an essential condition for the +unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where the +natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by external +circumstances, nation and State are stunted and individual growth is set +back. + +Increasing political power and the consequent multiplication of +possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the +intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by +every phase of history. + +The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself +first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of +statesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by force +of arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty of +every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale +commensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemy +cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On the +contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most +strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for +the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than +ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very +important factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits, +which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of +superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be +spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a +small, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War has +proved this once more. + +Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of +every State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert +_power_, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of its +personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the +narrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible nor +profitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined +by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious +development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military +elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system +cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. It +needs a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. In +the Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attacking +strength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, because +its foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political and +moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas. + +The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the +political necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree of +warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may +be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State's +duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst out +whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is +brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of +the State and of the army. + +It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties +of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. The +social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the +duty of the State in a quite different light from the political +_dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing +of things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to the +welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons +on the horizon of the future. + +Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the +nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these +momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and +experienced thinkers. + +First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in +the present political world, even though all the elements for it are +present. + +Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to +40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so +much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are +annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is +set up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would be +available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would not +mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say +a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on +active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from +such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the +continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike +weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the +individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the +highest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the +beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre +cannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been +ordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of the +strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the +rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins his +service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier. +With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we +merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. We +must not regard the present only, but provide for the future. + +The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makes +the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes +of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of +arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity +of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is +sinning against his country. + +The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations, +oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of +things--these turn the scale. + +When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last century +undertook the reorganization of the Prussian army, no political tension +existed. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King had +perceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet the +requirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his +people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations +without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun. +In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has +powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being +under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful +co-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed was +universally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, and +accorded with traditional German sentiment. + +While the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of the +political influences of the day, the military power of the probable +opponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink without +jeopardizing the national safety. + +Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries +of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all +these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the +hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an +obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as +up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by +every means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the army +must be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, in +which a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may be +attained. + +Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree +regulated by the political position of the State. If the State has +satisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping +its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive +character. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous of +expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must +adopt a predominantly offensive military system. + +Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are +dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide +scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where +the discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may lead +to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war, +and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In +this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so +clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that +the majority of the nation accept his view. There are always and +everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own, +and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses. + +Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command +of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful +position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the +population in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is +too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets +public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles, +feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, which +was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in the +military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary +unanimity. + +Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political independence +rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of +self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly +supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it +should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great +duties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic +evasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at +home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects +of our policy. + +To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion, +as King William I. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the +control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray +too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly +great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany. +He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of +inflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people. + +One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that +permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake +of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the +taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious +benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct +disadvantages. + +The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by +the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the +sacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefully +in view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the +conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But +where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual +enforcement of universal service or of the requirements on which +readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in +order to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in order +to maintain its vitality. + +One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction +preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing +conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military +authorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy, +since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon. +Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty to +perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit. + +It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to +disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of +the preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarily +available. "No expenditure without security," runs the formula in which +this policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security is +fixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the duties +which must be fulfilled--as Treitschke, our great historian and national +politician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the great +Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by +sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically +indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the +nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that +the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He +can only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the Ministers +for Commerce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to break +down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the +individual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to create +favourable conditions for profitable business. A great impulse must +thrill the whole productive and financial circles of the State, if the +duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled. + +Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls for +very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the +entire social and political life of the people and on the financial +policy of the State. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + + +THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR + +The social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defend +itself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strength +of the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors which +determine the conditions of preparation for war. + +I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres +of policy and progress which our history and our national character +impose on us. My next task is to observe the possible military +combinations which we must be prepared to face. + +In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can +judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political +intentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movements +will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and +this war will decide our future. + +It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our +probable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessary +basis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves the +intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable +efficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is +determined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions +clash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as to +the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data +available. + +If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups +of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results: +According to the recent communications of the French Finance Minister +Klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan), +the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910 +amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial +Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to +the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service +auxiliaire "--that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in +for service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to the +information of the same Minister, including field army and reserves, +consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. A reduction from +this number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sources +put down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army and +reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000. + +To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1,700,000 +Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per +cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made. + +If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will +correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength +of separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the +2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to the +infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a +considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the +transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers, +70,000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical +service, etc.), 90,000. + +No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per +cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the +birth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly, +it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. Recourse already has been had to the +expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of +filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less +efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves. + +Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the +plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians +and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with +them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and +trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited +conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria. +The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and +conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops are +in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops +stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers +against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are +heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the +Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the +climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops. +The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the +march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value. +There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with +every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative +proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native +Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before +Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the +native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War, +Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians. +An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age +available for military service. The Commission appointed for the purpose +reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in +the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined +some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. They +could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen +the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in +the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the +formation of reserves. + +As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in her +West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops +available. As the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000, +these figures may be considerably raised. + +Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalese +sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912 +a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to +Algeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black +troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. There +is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being +transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient +number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3, +stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the +Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France. +Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a +strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be +available for a European war is still remote. But it cannot be +questioned that they will be so some day. + +Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops in +Europe contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but +the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the +territory termed "Morocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to +come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale. +The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in +organizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the +command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco. + +The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great addition +to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the +country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and France will +certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in +military matters. + +For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the +reinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained from +Algeria and Tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription is +universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000 +men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have +witnessed their exploits on the battlefields of Weissenburg and Wörth. +At least one strong division of Turcos is already available. + +Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the military +power of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are not +published, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information is +forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service, +but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According to +the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the +Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of +Cossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formed +into 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe; +3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry is +divided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independent +regiments. + +In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures +42,000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strength +of 20,000. Each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry +divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive +at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions, +sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be added +unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the +war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000. + +This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. The +Siberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would +certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For the +maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to +leave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least one +division at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. This +would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men; so that +we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army, +1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of +Cossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men, +and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case +of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men +available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank +for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed +to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a +certain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not known +which of these formations would be really raised in event of +mobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be +put into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces which +must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could +easily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whether +arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in +sufficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empire +like Russia in this respect. + +Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to +England, the third member of the Triple Entente. + +The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into two +divisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed by +the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have +at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of +formation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns any +European theatre of war. + +The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinet +divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the +native troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army, +a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total +of 300,000. It is now 270,000 strong, and is destined exclusively for +home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very +highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We +have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army. +This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which seven +are with the colours and five in the reserve. The annual supply of +recruits is 35,000. The regular reserve is now 136,000 strong. There is +also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted +for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the +figure of 200,000. + +Of the regular English army, 134,000 men are stationed in England, +74,500 in India (where, in combination with 159,000 native troops, they +form the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39,000 in different +stations--Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the other +Colonies and Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt +are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in +the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong) +one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in +view of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of the +English is precarious. The 11,000 troops now stationed in South Africa +are to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. In +event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there. + +For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account the +regular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regular +field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted +brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and +trains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form part +of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. They consist of a +very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for +coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with +some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home +Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing +its organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of this +army can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150,000 men may +be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troops +compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the +Colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutes +the weak point in the British armament. England can employ her regular +army in a Continental war so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies. +This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war +break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and +especially in Egypt. + +Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente can +put into the field, Germany can command an active army of 589,705 men +(on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about +25,500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a peace footing is +361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. The combined war strength +of the two States may be estimated as follows: + +In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and +non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an +average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of +3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we +have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment to +it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French +can match with about the same figures. + +The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,000. Liability to +serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the +Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a +total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent., +911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained +Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to +911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a +grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as +Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe. + +In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available +for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would +be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available, +partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion. +However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never +reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia +present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the +enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent +generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the +addition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would +not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field. + +In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must +be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are already +reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple +Alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the +field against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France are +available against Germany. + +[Footnote A: Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne."] + +The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000 +men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry, +in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of +Bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regiments +in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are +united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field +artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193 +field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountain +batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies. +Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regiment +and an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28,000 men. + +On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. Some 70,000 +men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. The +militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might +be mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9 +army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the +Territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions. + +As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48 +officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500 +native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned +officers and privates of Italian birth, and 3,800 natives. + +Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it is +questionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value. +It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence, +while the protection of Tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim a +powerful army if it is to be held against France. + +The Turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joined +the coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents. + +The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275,000 +men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it: + +I. The Active Army (Nizam): + + Infantry 133,000 + Cavalry 26,000 + Artillery 43,000 + Pioneers 4,500 + Special troops 7,500 + Train formations 3,000 + Mechanics 3,000 + +A total, that is, of 220,000 men. + +2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. Within +this limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns for +short trainings. + +3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military employés, officials, +and others, more than 30,000. + +The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. We +need only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia, +Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in a +European theatre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be +regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for +local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior. +To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplest +process. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the +Turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. Turkey thus is +a very valuable ally to whichever party she joins. + +The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies into +the field. + +Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons +and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and +home duties. + +Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing; +this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The +war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000 +rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4 +guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and +228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (third +line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the +militia, an uncertain quantity. + +The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not +known how they are distributed among the various branches of the +service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including +infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine +guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and +national militia, which latter is only available for home service and +comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be +400,000 strong. + +Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power +in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to +their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia +cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of +their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods. + +In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the +permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. The +infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent +cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery +14,000 men with 700 officers. + +For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000 +men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry, +7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is +therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part +of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves +and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000 +trained men available for service. + +Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chiefly +concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into +relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European +States may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if +they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a +European war. + +Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under +consideration, and then Belgium. + +Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men. +The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive +war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns +and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a +total of 141,000 men. + +The Landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36 +12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total +strength of 69,000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000 +men. + +The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which +varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally +available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400 +garrison artillery, and I,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport +troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000 +infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400 +artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of +15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There +is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active +and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot +artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers, +including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder, +Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Völkerack and Haringvliet there are various +outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present +unimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications +in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland). + +Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English +landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. It +would easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us. + + +Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows: +26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison +artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service. + +On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising +74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers +and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry +divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each +of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1 +squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a +garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde +civique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as +a very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are +the fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast +fortifications. + +Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great +military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong +fortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of +strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This +State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, +2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the +strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. In war-time an army of 62,000 +men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically +of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special +arms. + +Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises units +from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as +well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which +is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There +are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students +from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age. + +The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can, +accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case +of war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head. + +In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might in +combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to +Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men +can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the +Landwehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm. + +Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently +stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active +army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is +so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could +at most be put into the field. + +As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the +accompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affords +a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that, +numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours. +This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of +really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four +battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have +ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned +battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The +comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, +that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be +noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really +have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be +counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the +number of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto known +about the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respect +of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important +factor if allied with the English. + + |Battle- |Armoured |Armoured| Armoured |Protected |Number |N S +Nation. |ships |Coast |Gunboats| Cruisers |Cruisers |of |u u + |above |Defence |and | | |Torpedo |m b + |5,000 |Vessels |Armoured| | |Vessels |b m + |Tons. |from |Ships | | | |e a + | |3000 Tons|under | | | |r r + | |to 5,000 |3,000 | | | | i + | |Tons |Tons | | | | i + +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n + |No|Displ. |No|Displ.|No|Displ|No|Displ. |No|Displ. | |From|f e + | | | | | | | | | | |200+|80- | s + | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| 200| + | | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| +---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- +GERMANY: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |25|332,410| 5|20,600| -| --- |10|114,590|33|122,130| 117| 70| 12 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building|12| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4| --- | 7| --- | 14| -- | -- + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +ENGLAND: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |50|793,260| -| --- | -| --- |38|484,970|66|333,540| 223| 36| 53 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building|12|286,640| -| --- | -| --- | 6|145,320|20|101,320| 51| -- | 19 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +FRANCE: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |22|314,930| -| --- | -| --- |22|214,670|10| 50,780| 71| 191| 52 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| 93,880| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 13| -- | 19 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +ITALY: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready | 8| 96,980| -| --- | -| --- |10| 79,530| 4| 10,040| 53| 39| 7 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| 84,000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 10,200| 14| 28| 13 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +AUSTRIA- | | | | | | | | | | | | | + HUNGARY | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |11|102,620| -| --- | -| --- | 3| 18,870| 4| 10,590| 18| 66| 7 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 5| 94,500| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| --- | 6| -- | -- + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +RUSSIA: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Baltic | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Ready | 4| 62,300| -| --- | 1|1,760| 6| 64,950| 4| 27,270| 60| 19| 13 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 8| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 1| -- | 1 +Black Sea| | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Ready | 6| 72,640| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 13,620| 17| 10| 4 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 7 +Siberian | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet |--| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 2| 9,180| 20| 7| 13 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +UNITED | | | | | | | | | | | | | + STATES: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |30|434,890| 4|13,120| -| --- |14|181,260|16| 65,270| 40| 28| 19 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 7|190,000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 20 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +JAPAN: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |13|194,690| 2| 8,540| -| --- |13|139,830|12| 49,170| 59| 49| 12 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 3| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4|107,120| 3| 15,000| 2| -- | 1 +---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- + +Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leave +a certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be stronger +than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in +event of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further assume +that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-European +stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together +can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships +alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by +a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia +joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition +to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since +the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships, +and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our +coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the +other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of +the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be +superior to us. + +As regards _matériel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is +distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our +equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a +superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless +energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up +some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these +advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of +an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English. + +Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under +certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in +this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente +can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time. + +If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of +the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany, +we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in +every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are +very different. + +If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed +she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member +of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course, +very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost +equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization +and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The +French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united +spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of +the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too, +has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to +double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the +French succeed in making a large African army available for a European +theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with +ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind, +for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may +safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if +only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well +that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of +her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by +the exercise of extraordinary efforts. + +It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military +power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself +desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably +not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her +own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured +the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too +high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has +all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, +and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must +expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple +Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have +struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination +with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would +attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, +and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the +fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the +considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and +threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of +the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without +difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would +enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would +enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, +after investing Metz and Diedenhofen. + +[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.] + +England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must +reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of +an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only +serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign. +English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not +coincident with those of France. + +The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea +commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any +further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy +our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the +supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium +between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in +order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never +impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the +private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her +plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political +position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war +against us. + +If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on +this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the +first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by +the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely +compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might +consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied +by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in +India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European +war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might +interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was +important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall +any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case +of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea +will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm +resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial +centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will +throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of +her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English +policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other +hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only +so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval +bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this +because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's +battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation +will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a +definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It is +very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively +acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South +Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and +stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the +offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the +generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale, +held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, +according to available information, show the English army in a +favourable light so far as strategical ability went. + +If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's +probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian +standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than +a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the +Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to +join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of +communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of +power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is +as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory +over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, +but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia +in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation +for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could +be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire. + +Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an +offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite +different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war. +Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against +complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not +shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for +political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such +a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion +in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast +Empire the social and also political education, especially among the +peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy +seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have +acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools +have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind +anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their +interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote +their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the +Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of +a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive +war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an +extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people +showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be +involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never +bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary +elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every +weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in +internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the +community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the +moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out +their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of +arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we +have already mentioned. + +Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole +power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a +certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by +defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater +exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks, +nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's +political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another +sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her +losses on another frontier. + +Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia +will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars +against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented +the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign +revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and +battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all +probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats +favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against +Russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coûte_. + +If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole +position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in +the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile +forces which would cripple the conduct of the war. + +So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese +War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle +showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest +losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian +army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but +essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of +the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; +indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every +grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above +mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian +generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and +that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must +therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack. + +When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we +cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military +difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel +successfully the attack of our opponents. + +In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our +country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no +opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the +government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our +western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north +through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is +there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper +bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned +through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country +offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves +resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their +army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in +their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten. + +The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and +the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a +prey to our enemies. + +The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a +strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland. +England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire +oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east +alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are +encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides. +This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so +presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our +opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan. + +If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact +that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in +carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia +have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will +sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of +any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an +extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by +the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not +merely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is a +cause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound +to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase +of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct +of Italy at the conference of Algeçiras sufficiently demonstrated. It +even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always +reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a +defensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France and +England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how +difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with +France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we +think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which +is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt +whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were +allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests +are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the +same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria. +Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate +State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements, +patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to +the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of +such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that +might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration. + +We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of +standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the +Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the +struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own +resolution for victory. + +Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our +political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can +only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and +by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect +continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their +interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, +since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and +obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, +then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own +resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of +desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would +destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize +the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would +shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus +check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for +which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war +will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. +This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power +or downfall!" will be our rallying cry. + +Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident +intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the +end, come what may. + +We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted +campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our +enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to +defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last +is won. + +It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numerical +equality with our opponents. On the contrary, we must strive to call up +the entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the great +decision which impends. We must try also to gain a certain superiority +over our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold some +winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. We +must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only by +continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our +preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future +makes on us. A nation of 65,000,000 which stakes _all_ her forces on +winning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot be +conquered. But it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblance +of power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content with +half-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only be +attained by the exertion and development of all her powers. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + + +THE NEXT NAVAL WAR + +In the next European land war we shall probably face our foes with +Austria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the day +against any opposing forces. In a naval war we shall be thrown on our +own resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against the +superior forces which will certainly press us hard. + +There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for, +although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack +would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking +our political power. It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack +_us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France. The English have, +besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should +always be held before our eyes. They talk so much of a possible German +attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question +is from the opposite point of view. Again, the preparations which they +are making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly have +contemplated an attack on Germany. These preparations are like a +strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves +no doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbour of Rosyth is +admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can mean +nothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especially +strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the +Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These are +measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand +an inquiry into the military position thus created. + +The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since +1902. Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it +is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time. +This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the +circumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusively +directed against Germany. + +We must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us to +believe--reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, and +shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. It will be +so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the +offensive against the English fleet. But we must contemplate the +possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning +the freedom of the seas, if England attacks us. We shall now discuss +this possibility. On this matter I am expressing my personal views only, +which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest +exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed +antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. I shall not +betray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any. But I +consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand +what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met. + +In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong +enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question +remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure +protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to +become its master? + +The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, +instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the +war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English +fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its +superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective +blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that +such an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does not +seem to me to promise any great success. + +The English have secured themselves against such attacks by +comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seems +dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall +urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings. +Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than +formerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English +merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under such +circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign +service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's +warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of +these ships will certainly be a difficult task. + +The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and +energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes +which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will +usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the +few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing +our vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken against +neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable +results can be expected from a war against England's trade. On the +contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at +her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must be +ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England's +custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests +are at stake. + +Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire +with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by +the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to +English vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they +can be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has +no knowledge of their existence. + +It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation +from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications +will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way +would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral +Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the +great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be +discovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remain +suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of +trade. + +It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such +communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect +of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to block +these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the +States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether +they would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity, +or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography +dictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with England +and a Continental war with their German neighbours--two possibilities, +each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay much +attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was +at issue is hardly credible. + +The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot be +foreseen. It would probably depend on the general political position and +the attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest. The +policy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor. One +can easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch are +seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on +their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea +side. They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which +obviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sided +with our enemies. + +I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities +which might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to a +sympathetic understanding by the war. I will only point out how +widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the +Continental war and on the political relations generally. The attitude +of Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the +Baltic must mainly depend on her. It is vital to us that these +communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this. +The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly important +for the conduct of the war. Free commerce with Sweden is essential for +us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish +iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted. + +It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the +interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by +diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. We +cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands. + +Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus +raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer +greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us +assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only +trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--a +condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and +should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any +case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on +which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and +also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial +products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They +must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the +Government must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry of +Commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in +collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which +our commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort of +commercial mobilization. + +These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us +in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a +defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our +coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack. + +Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade +closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish +straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she +can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the +Continent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotland +and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea +commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping. + +A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of +the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a +blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base +and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since all +the English naval ports are considerably farther than this from our +coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously +increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich has +recently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. It is considered +the best harbourage on the English coast, and is hardly 300 nautical +miles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities of +fortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distance +from the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes of +blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless +count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutch +coast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means. +Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as +Heligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all +attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. This +task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by +night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on +board. + +Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy, +if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the +offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain +an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive +operations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts +must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We must +endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly +with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the +blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as +possible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces, +for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there +is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the +enemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end. +And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold +attack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionally +favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the +fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy +losses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring, +to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place +or another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and +the battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behind +the farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold the +high seas in full strength. The forces of the defending party, however, +lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight. + +Such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party. +We may therefore fairly assume that the English would decide in favour +of the second kind. At all events, the harbour constructions, partly +building, partly projected, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were chosen with +an eye to this line of blockade. It would entail in the north the +barring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasible +from the military aspect. Only a small force is required to seal up the +Channel, as the navigation route is very narrow. In addition to all +this, the great English naval depots--Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, and +Plymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediately +behind it. Besides, every advance against this line from the north is +flanked by Sheerness and Harwich, so that a retreat to the German coast +might be barred. The conditions for the northern line of blockade will +be no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. The +blockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour of +Rosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the Orkney +Isles. Every attacking fleet from the German north coast will be +unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cut +off from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to the +English superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading +fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the +Baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here we +should have a tolerably secure retreat. This accentuates once more the +supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage +through the Sound and the Great Belt. The command of these straits will +not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the +sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading +fleet. + +In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade +offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are +well worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, it +prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed +by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the +blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or +three divisions. + +As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let +herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests +of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory +arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As +regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous +conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily +divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the +superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea. +Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending +party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction +with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be +deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are +the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be +employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled. + +This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But +it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the +close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet +more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in +far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the +threatened flank of our attacking fleet. + +After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a +mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision +of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event +of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt +to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They +could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our +naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and +Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these +places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea. + +It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate +against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford +extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by +protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the +communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack +will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast +fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely +defensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon +the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the +fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should +inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength +between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must +be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast +fortifications hold out. + +No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a +defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows. +Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments +for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative +movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures +for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers. +The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we +shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy +"scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleet +must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the +enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by +attacking them directly. + +If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they +would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English +force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus +contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing +forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected +to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be +dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a +balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in +mind. + +So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for, +starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines would +be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully +than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they +would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant English +coast. + +Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and +nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the +boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in +hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the +science of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is the +only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we +may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea. + +In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to +be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a +World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England. + +This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of +Germany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the +common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win +recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This was +the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under +Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her +history; and the great Republic of the United States of North America +strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right +of nations for which every people craves." [A] + +[Footnote A: Schiemann.] + +In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this +vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us +in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which, +in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy, +has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the +unscrupulous suppression of her rivals. + +If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English and +takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage +than a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold our +allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her +forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the +two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea, +since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean +interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful +issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then +despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak, +on land--i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be +compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet +to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to +the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an +absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports and +destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife with +France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the +French position as a Great Power. If France, with her falling +birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her +place in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanent +political subservience. Those are the stakes. + +The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated. +That is the less dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present +still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French. +We could operate against it on the inner line--i.e., we could use the +opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the +Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we could attack the Russian ships in vastly +superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the +North Sea. For these operations it is of the first importance that the +Danish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell into +the hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would be +almost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the +passive protection of our coast batteries. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + + +THE CRUCIAL QUESTION + +I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some +detail, because I thought that our general political and military +position can only be properly estimated by considering the various +phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities +and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on +our coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction be +decided in which our preparations for war ought to move. + +The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war +with England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall +need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from +a hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on an +ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If an +Anglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatened +our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by +sea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armies +advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined +fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be +rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land. + +We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on +land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all +circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the +Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before +we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy +based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in +Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her +triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own +country. + +But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by +the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing +with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land +army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting +the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally +necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every +attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled. + +At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the +conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk +of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay +the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample +scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put +aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost +energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole +future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the +broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the +individual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere is +critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as +a World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the Triple +Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey, +threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which +destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing +ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, if +we wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we are +Germans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out our +preparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to our +national duty. + +I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated +merely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in the +cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer +the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the +future. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to +desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour +something of what we have lost in the last years. + +Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on +the continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problem +of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great +numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainly +exist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance, +whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to +Irredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondary +importance. + +The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make +the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate +the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make +universal service an existing fact. + +The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a +splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has +in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and +has brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification. +Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed +in a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mighty +political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our +greatness was founded. + +France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in +Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000. +Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. But since +the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very +various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are +also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to +the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself +successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the +inner line, even though England took part in the war. + +Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of +universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued +to carry it out effectively. The country where universal service exists +is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only +kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the +able-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little use +has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army. + +In this direction some reorganization is required which will +energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army, +such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand, +we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers. + +Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not +shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make +up our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by +150,000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not be +forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could +not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased army +only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and +Landwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recur +to the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the new +Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wish +to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even +if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that +we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the +superior forces of our opponents. + +We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we +must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These +means can only be found in the spiritual domain. + +History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have +only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been +equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party +exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases +it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment, +greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able +strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Rome +conquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great with +inferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent history +shows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over a +crushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a great +commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear. +Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the +hostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisive +factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory +or defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and +keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a +real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which +would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should we +then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy +which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be +possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a +considerable numerical superiority. + +[Footnote A: _Cf_. v. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.] + +The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery +with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships, +and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable +opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast +with the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certain +spiritual servility and inferiority. + +Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which +the ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is to +prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to +apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of +superiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the material +advantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushed +by their weight of numbers. + +We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by +uninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight the +probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new +paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. New +goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches +us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress, +in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritual +capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be +sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action, +are the soil in which great successes ripen. + +It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the +nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas +which will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughly +ventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege" +("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results of +my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration +of the essential questions of the future. + +In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extent +unprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness +will exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means of +communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. These +three momentous factors will mark the war of the future. + +"Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain +elements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they can +be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical +efficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the country +during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are +therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower +and less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they require +for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into +effective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible to +morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may +prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run +short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority +over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions. + +The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer +range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting +claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner than +formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far +wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. The +soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which +he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all +circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing +which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious +movement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances. +Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short, +while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands +made on them have become considerably greater. + +Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and +feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main +roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign, +aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their +use, and the commanders counted upon them. + +The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great +superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and +tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists. + +The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy, +and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than +they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior +force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective +troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile +army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it +before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the +field. + +Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly +shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary +conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare. + +In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength +which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action. +Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack +to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a +superior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which is +the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place +which is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked party +can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the +intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold +out promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attacking +General strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his +troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature +guarantees. + +This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancing +armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it +will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take +proper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, the +prospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable, +especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at +his disposal. + +Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility +of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all +the more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is +impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and +completely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisive +direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of +the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and +its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations. +If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior +numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his +numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory +over the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law, +Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and striking +strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in +mere numbers. + +No further proof is required that the superiority of the attack +increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and +to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of +concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the +enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very +appreciable. + +We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the +superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it +is incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise the +tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and +especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements +and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to +act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the +manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be +superior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has +objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks +by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It +must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since +a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods. + +This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which I +have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face +the future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raise +the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else +must give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all our +measures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, and +thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too +easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of +a collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions would +have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying +principle. + +The requirements which I have described as the most essential are +somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a +resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age. + +The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, the +smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not +merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as +such. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will be +suffocated by their own fat," said General v. Brandenstein, the great +organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of +the French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the +whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure +the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his +own movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the course +of military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tactical +efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it +certainly will prove in the wars of the future. + +A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of +public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have +conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential +contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained, +and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It would +be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is +recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached +on them. + +This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is +attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military +service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less, +and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had +to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a +good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_, +which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no +means helped by the very brief training which these units at best +receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity +for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy +strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be +indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the +field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain +the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass +would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to +some degree the task of making good the losses. + +A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops. +Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are +already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full +strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on +mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according +to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much +inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which +were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this, +notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new +French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere +of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their +duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered +territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact, +they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the +field army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and +mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By acting +at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually +become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of +offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset +of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied +with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be. + +Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such +troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive +operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated +as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some +are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical +conception. + +For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars +only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks +for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if +necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and +more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical +striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater +numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the +decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever +before. + +The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are +placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this +principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that +he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong +advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and +therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his +army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be +employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as +much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the +numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the +actual war. + +It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to +render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a +mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their +_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to +them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of +efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered. + +Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An +increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more +than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is +supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the +establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient +will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality, +not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If we +wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening +the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of +professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This step +is the more necessary because the present available cadres are +insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide +for their thorough training. + +The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with +an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. We +shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the +efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be +improved by organization, equipment, and training. + +I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the +questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of +military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt +original action--I mean the importance of personality. + +From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of +his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune, +and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a given +general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left +to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in +the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the +face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other +age, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics has +abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left +to himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In the +strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of +that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before +from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in the +artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly +emphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations have +increased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far less +able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the +field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates. +These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations. + +When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his +ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the +reserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment +to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot +be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Even +the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now +wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have +to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing +touch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on the +commander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy, +deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from +him. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All this +puts a heavy strain on personality. + +It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of +self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct +advantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to +attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And this +object can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in the +sphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can be +improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the +conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in +which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and +more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp. +Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune +are produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkward +and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same +process is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mental +development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the +personality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsman +Bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of +leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. General +Chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute +determination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks of +the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and +thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is it +essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in +high command. In a long military life ideas all too early grow +stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought +and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of such +development cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of the +army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a +one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of +actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akin +to this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en +masse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatest +value. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual +independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and +solving new problems by original methods. + +It has often been said that one man is as good as another; that +personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is +erroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real +struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is +enough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility and +danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a +chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross. + +That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the +important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is the +only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to +break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and +success. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. that for the +highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time +of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men +around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition +those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of +need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. This +is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and +distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action, +appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of +the stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved: + + "Folk and thrall and victor can + Witness bear in every zone: + Fortune's greatest gift to man + Is personality alone." + + + + +CHAPTER X + + + +ARMY ORGANIZATION + +I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it +is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with +this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. I +shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in +my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we +wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions +which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It will +be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially +noteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come into +opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further +from my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based on +theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely +presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and +of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political +disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is, +in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something +already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent +historical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to the +future, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-defined +lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most +important that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall not +look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future. + +The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I have +already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the +greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position +to carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore, +fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, as +already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the +arming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops, +and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly +have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of +their peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter how +essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary +cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches +so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in +war-time. + +The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the +non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of +the troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline, +decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the +troops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number of +permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in +proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the +demands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officers +and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred +to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern +tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his +influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing +_personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to the +infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a +sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the more +important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers +and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on +the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and +non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is a +question of training, and does not come into the present discussion. + +The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a +sense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospects +which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect +the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to +keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary +advantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, the +financial question is all-important. The career of the officer offers +to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and +self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the +service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as +they now are. The infantry officer especially must have a better +position. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur +greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer +has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most +strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It would +be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than +the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm +more attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for +which there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be well +supplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must be +counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service. +By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the +chief arm. + +If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition +and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the +troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in +action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on +conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical +proportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally the +cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the +proportion which artillery must bear to infantry. + +With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent +replace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weapons +of defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourable +conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful +attack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder that +impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, this +auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and +employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into +large units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching +columns. + +The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance. + +Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooth +their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly. +This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry +must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting +instruments in the whole army. + +If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the +result. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to +modern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greater +superiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of front +in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close +tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire. +This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the +conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as +before. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in +a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The +troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en échelon _than in the +last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate +the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be +settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the +experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will +most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in +the domain of military science. + +If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an +infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of +artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern +artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must +advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the +artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path +between these two extremes. + +If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or, +better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the +guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially +adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the +conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is +reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we +must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into +account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If +we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper +strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such +infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position +taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that +section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions, +requires greater numbers and depth than before. + +In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of +the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian +campaign. + +Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period +extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not +rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original +strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans +on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so +decisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would have +shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the +contest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the former +case the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery, +under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak +infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under +the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was +too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched +enemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of +infantry were needed at Wörth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite of +the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker +enemy of equal class. + +Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English in +artillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state of +things was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery was +extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russian +field guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, the +Japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also, +because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite +superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillery +was scattered along the whole of their broad front. + +The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the +arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these +units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be +appropriately determined. + +The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or +superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly +mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and +corps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucial +test. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpected +concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the +superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way. +If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine +against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies +a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it is +assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and +that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so +slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then +equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese were +tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they +were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive +directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical +superiority of the Russian army as a whole. + +If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the +artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy +within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a +considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful. +In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded +the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the +artillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the +separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of +the army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excess +in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is +restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then +artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to +victory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forces +for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces +along the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often be +weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage +may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a +position. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering +concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. This +victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere. + +The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater +marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of +the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the +columns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossal +armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly +live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from +the rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies; +but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be +maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go +to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead. +Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct +communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught +animals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons of +provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily, +must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of +food. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a +certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport +waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to +the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the +night's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained +if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient +quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry +with them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid +down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusually +lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the +troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thus +the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly +dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A careful +calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to +average 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from an +army--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25 +kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps on +the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle +troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps. + +This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily +affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and +rations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyed +railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of +columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared +by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time +the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the +troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption +continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In order +to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any +crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample +stock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of the +necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must be +taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of +tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done by +special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the +organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a +distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by +forced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increase +the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It is +further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very +long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other +provisions compressed into the smallest space. + +An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps, +and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army +with its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it the +troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is far +more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any +other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the +decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent. + +However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained +if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed +from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out. +Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within +these limits. + +Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army +corresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened by +a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it +will considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, the +necessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantry +is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to +deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack +and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to +strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the +artillery. + +In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division +is very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as to +permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of +reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units. +This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional +organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet +appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the +existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been +drawn up by competent officers. + +The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two +infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The +formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix +the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his +own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a +reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of +some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity +for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a +wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this +procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible, +even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the +brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken +by the enemy and the course of the battle. + +Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its +application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of +cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution +which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that +the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of +two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry +these duties out. + +This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts +the most generally accepted military principles. + +The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as +is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate +divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal +of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the +subdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack +must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best +formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops +to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result +there. + +A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by +the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action +two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of +course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not +always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely +the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ +them as their particular character demands. + +The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and +divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding +formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately +according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the +undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders +of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the +commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of +enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for +himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one +division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to +withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one +division only, the same division must always be subjected to this +reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether +this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least +worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not +be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each +division. + +The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous +question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the +whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement +would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a +position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They +can also, however, be combined under the command of the +General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first +arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the +great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is +dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left +but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the +indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are +inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers +is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is +planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that +the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line +by a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach +single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army +corps temporarily. + +There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally +used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the +spot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into the +advance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's field +artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in +such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers. +It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this +problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long +unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their +effectiveness doubtful. + +No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased +their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort +to every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, be +overestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite _sui generis_. +The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions +strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line +in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns. +It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective +12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I +can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty +was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. The +Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their +howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but +break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs, +the question of concentration seems to me very important for us. + +Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the +heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus best +serve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which he +wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain +that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the +army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries will +be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General. +There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the +deciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knows +that. + +I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the +heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batteries +which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed +under the orders of the corps commanders _(Truppenführer)_ if they are +to become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artillery +of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot +artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres. +It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does +not feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinction +between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical. + +This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the +heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the +Commander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and +manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the +present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy +artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. This +disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned +permanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being united +in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, they +would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely +the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies. + +The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more +effective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies not +merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but +the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the +advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We were +taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway +communications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vital +importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the +discharge of these necessary functions. + +Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was +organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations, +but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system +can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them. + +The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by +the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and +so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train +adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years' +service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building, +fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on +fortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer's +duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for +the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the +actual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training +for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation. + +Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the late +Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable +service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. This +follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--a +rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training +for their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and develop +more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better +proportion to its value. + +In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are +directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical +efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly +serve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of the +enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening +movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy +unawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. I +refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet. + +The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry out +reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must +operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the +regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility. + +Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the +war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned +them in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen if +we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize +that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and +that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited +efficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous, +because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little +from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal. +There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and +1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is +misleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it +crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on +the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly +antiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independent +movements. What they then did must not be compared with what will be +required from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces were +really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived +notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their +employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of +their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa, +notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must be +studied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that an +increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course, +only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped +with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate +independently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the +fulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, when +the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting +force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. This +is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's +communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand, +the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive +than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if +cavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry is +undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of +the enemy. + +Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists, +another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful +service. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in +war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have +repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted. + +The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of the +divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time +being. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in +a high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that +the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on +modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over +the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue. + +I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are +attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that +the division with its three parts would have the control of three +batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each +brigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. once +made, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalry +usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing +momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with +the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously, +therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the +artillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when +it is important to make a decisive attack. + +The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed +by the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yet +exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of +military science will play in future wars.[A] It is therefore necessary +to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special +weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration +from the technical side. + +[Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators in +Tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were no +opponents in the air.] + +The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of +handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting +strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of +the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking +successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers. + +The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading +idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once +thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since +tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the +technical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne in +mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our +opponents. + +If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the +necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed +changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve +the efficiency of our army. + +The whole organization must be such that the column length of the army +corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the +supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots. + +In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as +being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition +must be observed. + +The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially +strengthened. + +The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to +concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up +the units. + +The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so +organized as to insure their efficiency in war. + +The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so +elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the +troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained. + +The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making +it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy. + +Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every +nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to +take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in +the decisive field war. + +The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present +organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be +carried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which, +without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to +make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition. +The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit +political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so +strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when +all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. They +comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen, +although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often +surpassed all expectations. + +But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is +necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to +achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to +public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake +there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as +unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the +principles of a sound military organization. + +The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in +various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject, +and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive +consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration. + +One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of +three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous +intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in +every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the +extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jäger +battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the +hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried +out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the +drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within +the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing +the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being +thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more +ways. + +The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only +be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the +enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to +each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present. +But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that +new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be +taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this +means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the +artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited, +without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the +quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle +should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. All +that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat +waggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when a +battle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troops +and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than +the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of +ammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will be +inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the +fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can +only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be +reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, the +required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought +forward by stages in good time. + +A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division +had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light field +howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that +they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the +formations of the division. The strength of the artillery must be +regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the +entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavy +field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the +orders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as +"army" artillery. + +It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached +from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent +in war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with the +infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres +with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional +cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. On +the other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the _Truppenführer_ +are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders; +but this objection does not seem very pertinent. + +Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the +arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging +to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under +the commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would be +withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments +strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended for +divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six +squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. If +the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only +be able to receive two squadrons. + +In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry +would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it; +but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army +cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult +task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one +to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame for +such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who +did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. The +whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. If +it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the +arm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There are +various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry +can be guaranteed. + +The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached +to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in +co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make +appropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restricted +to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which +require to be surmounted. + +The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the +organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. In +military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual +factors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that my +opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect +of affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main +leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by +question of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part of +that general combination of things which only really comes into view in +actual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must be +rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced. +Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means +of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient +account of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made such +progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much +importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort, +the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which +they employ. + +A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are +essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out; +under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer +of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way +or that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from +a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the +importance of the separate co-operating factors. + + + + "For he who grasps the problem as a whole + Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul" + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + + +TRAINING AND EDUCATION + +Our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the German +army into the most effective tool of German policy, and into a school of +health and strength for our nation. We must also try to get ahead of our +rivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do full +justice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all our +efforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units and +strengthening their loyal German feelings. + +Diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at the +present day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, for +there are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. If we +wish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training must +break with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the war +of the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops as +well as on the officers. + +It is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the use +of modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily from +the introduction of these means of war. But if we survey the sphere of +training as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us as +peculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands which +will be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" to +an extent hitherto unknown. + +The necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantry +and artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle; +in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategical +duties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in the +case of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vast +extent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and the +difficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving direct +orders. Wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare, +we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldier +in the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of the +enemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles huge +hosts. In battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity of +action can only be attained at the present time by independent +co-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme. + +The employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of moving +and feeding the troops. It is one thing to lead 100,000 or perhaps +200,000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate them +for a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800,000 men on a scene of war +stripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have been +destroyed by modern explosives. In the first case the military empiric +may be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively a +scientifically educated General and a staff who have also studied and +mastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. The problems of +the future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able to +operate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision. + +The necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universally +recognized. To be sure, the old traditions die slowly. Here and there an +undeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method of +education, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised more +than is justified by its value. The cavalry is not yet completely +awakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises on +the parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, oblivious +of the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they were +still the old arm which Napoleon or Frederick the Great commanded. Even +the artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions; +technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom of +operations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still in +vogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of fire +with a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. Even in +theory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. Many +conservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. Obsolete ideas +have not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations and +ordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on the +whole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility and +self-reliance must be encouraged. In this respect the army is on the +right road, and if it continues on it and continually resists the +temptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for the +sake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually the +highest results will be attained, provided that competent military +criticism has been equally encouraged. + +In this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficient +attention has been given to the fact that the main features of war have +completely changed. Although in the next war men will have to be handled +by millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted on +lines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modern +conditions. Our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. Most of +the practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades and +divisions--i.e., in formations which could never occur in the great +decisive campaigns of the future. From time to time--financial grounds +unfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre is +held, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of +"masses." Sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled for +combined training under veteran Generals, who soon afterwards leave the +service, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience which +they may have gained. + +It cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres are +extraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troops +themselves', but they are not a direct training for the command of +armies in modern warfare. Even the so-called "Imperial Manoeuvres" only +correspond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war, +since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, and +seldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc., the troops which would +be essential in real warfare. A glance at the Imperial Manoeuvres of +1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never have +been carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed under +the conditions of war. It is an absolute necessity that our officers +should learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are the +rule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. In +theory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken into +account; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theory +are posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and the +divisions. That they would in reality all have to circulate with a +pendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that the +magazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent farther +back, that the position of the field bakeries is of extreme +importance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome, +and so are very seldom considered. + +In great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected in +Russia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariat +arrangements are rarely worked out in detail; I should almost doubt +whether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazine +feeding" has ever been entertained. Even smaller opportunities of being +acquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinary +manoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoretical +lines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding a +large army and to master the subject efficiently. + +The friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be brought +home to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such things +cannot be learnt from books. + +These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations, +but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an +army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is +obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. When, in 1870, +some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the +advance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not +masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war +and the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operations +to succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army. All +these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our General +Staff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no means +the common property of the army. + +On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres +must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered +conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. The +troops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency, +and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for +carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two +pivots. But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the +great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. The paths +we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal. + +All methods of training and education must be in accordance with these +views. + +I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and +cavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question at +length in special treatises.[A] In the case of the artillery alone, some +remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm +seem necessary. + +[Footnote A: v. Bernhardi: "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie," 1910 +"Unsere Kavallerie im nächsten Krieg," 1899; "Reiterdienst," 1910.] + +The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partly +expressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: all +preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one +side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or +infantry at the decisive point. This principle is universally +acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice. +The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their +tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical +requirements subservient to this idea. The ever-recurring tendency to +fight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. On the +defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking +artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most +dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its +chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible, +from masked positions. The principle of keeping the artillery divisions +close together on the battlefield and combining the fire in one +direction, must not be carried to an extreme. The artillery certainly +must be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see that +there is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but in +particular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this idea +will be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than by +explaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leaving +to them the duty of carrying it out. Accordingly, it is important that +the personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognized +more fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action is +indispensable. The great extent of the battlefields and the natural +endeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack will +often force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behind +the other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against the +tactically most important objective. This result is hard to attain by a +centralization of command, and is best realized by the independent +action of tactically trained subordinates. + +This is not the place to enter into technical details, and I will only +mention some points which appear especially important. + +The Bz shell _(Granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and its +use should not form part of the training. It requires, in order to +attain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming as +is very seldom possible in actual warfare. + +No very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. It seems +to be retained in France and to have shown satisfactory results with us; +but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of the +shooting-range directly to serious warfare. No doubt its use, if +successful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especially +in the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. In any case, +practice with Az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance. + +The Az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of an +offensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations. + +Care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements and +complications of strategy and devices. Only the simplest methods can be +successfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten. + +The important point in the general training of the artillery is that +text-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should be +relegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics should +be given a more prominent position. In this way only can the artillery +do really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must not +be neglected in the reports. That would mean rejecting the good and the +evil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenient +must be distinctly opposed. + +Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres +of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large +expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. They must, in my +opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their +possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks. +They lead to pronounced tactics of position _(Stellungstaktik)_ which +are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual +war--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a +definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in +search of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt on +these manoeuvres. They could be made more instructive if the tactical +limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these +manoeuvres--viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive +arm--cannot be thus remedied. The usual result is that favourable +artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to +under some tactical pretence. + +After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may +be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of the +various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them +into line with modern conditions. If, however, the troops are to be +educated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new ground +must be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubted +superiority over our opponents can be attained. Considerable +difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to +amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties +are not, in my opinion, insurmountable. + +There are two chief points: first, the practice of marching and +operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with +well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a +reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more +thorough education of the chief commanders. + +As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know, +has never yet been attempted. But if we consider, firstly, how valuable +more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of +the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we +shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for +the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage +over our supposed antagonist. + +The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally +also be carried out in smaller formation. It is, moreover, very +important to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--in +long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in +the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such +movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them. + +Training marches with full military stores, etc., in columns of 20 to 25 +kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond to +the daily needs of real warfare. Should it not be possible to assemble +two army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march can +be obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitable +intervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed. +This does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare, +but it is useful as a makeshift. The waggons for the troops would have +to be hired, as On manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to save +expense. The supplies could be brought on army transport trains, which +would represent the pioneer convoys _(Verpflegungsstaffel)_, and would +regulate their pace accordingly. + +Marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with food +supplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be of +considerable value provided that care is taken to execute the march in +the shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed by +bringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is only +properly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continued +for several days. It is naturally not enough to undertake these +manoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if they +are intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army. +Finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns, +sometimes in army formation. The flank marches of separate columns will, +of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice in +feeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march on +the side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence brought +up to the troops at the close of the march. Flank marches in army +formation will have some value, even apart from any training in the +commissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marching +columns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. But +this exercise will have its full value only when the regulation +commissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with them +and furnish the supplies. + +I also consider that operative movements in army formation extending +over several days are desirable. Practice must be given in moving +backwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flank +movements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rear +being blocked when necessary. Then only can all the difficulties which +occur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen where +the lever must be applied in order to remove them. In this way alone can +the higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting such +operations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of a +hostile attack. An army so disciplined would, I imagine, acquire a +pronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experiments +in such operations in actual war. The major strategic movements on both +sides in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that. + +I recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost a +great deal of money and could never all be carried out systematically +one after the other. I wished, however, to ventilate the subject, +firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study the +points of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do; +secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carry +out in practice one or other of them--at the Imperial Manoeuvres, for +example, or on some other occasion. How much could be saved in money +alone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentioned +country manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? From reasons of economy +all the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employed +on such manoeuvres. It would be useful, however, if, in addition to one +detachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the other +groups were present and were moved along at the proper distance from +each other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from the +kitchen waggon. It would thus be possible to get a sort of presentation +of the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuable +experience. It is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange such +manoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and many +obstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out, +and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions; +but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not be +wholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matters +which are really essential. They would, at any rate, be far more +valuable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced by +exercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings in +the country, which are of no real utility, or than many other military +institutions which are only remotely connected with the object of +training under active service conditions. All that does not directly +promote this object must be erased from our system of education at a +time when the highest values are at stake. + +Even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often be +carried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because it +is not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of the +troops. + +It must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so that +eventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becoming +practically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troops +may become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but since +such practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they must +also be worked out beforehand theoretically. It is not at all sufficient +that the officers on the General Staff and the Intendants have a mastery +of these subjects. The rank and file must be well up in them; but +especially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--that +is to say, the transport officers of the standing army and those +officers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as column +commanders. + +The practical service in the transport battalions and the duties +performed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who are +assigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object. +They learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of the +system as a whole. It would therefore be advisable that all these +officers should go through a special preliminary course for this +service, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would be +explained to them by the officers of the General Staff and the higher +transport service officers, and they would then learn by practical +examples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the most +varied positions with precise regard to distances and time. This would +be far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainings +in driving, etc., on which so much time is wasted. The technical +driver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is not +easy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to be +able, when occasion arises, to act independently. + +While, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must be +thoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of a +scientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples out +of military history, the importance of these matters can be explained, +is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. I have shown +elsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically in +the arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operative +capabilities of the army depend on this system. Its nature, however, +cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspiration +when mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must be +gained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of the +importance which this service has attained under modern conditions is +that officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully without +having made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter. + +The transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinary +importance in the general system of modern warfare. It should be +appreciated accordingly. Every active transport service officer ought, +after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the senior +officers on the furlough establishment intended for transport service +ought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. If +these educational courses were held in the autumn in the training camps +of the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimable +advantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay. + +The results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, when +the superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do not +make demands contrary to the nature of the case, and therefore +impossible to be met. They should therefore be obliged to undergo a +thorough education in the practical duties of the General Staff, and not +merely in leading troops in action. + +This reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how, +generally, the training of the superior officers for the great war +should be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with a +view to the training. The essential contradiction between our obsolete +method of training and the completely altered demands of a new era +appears here with peculiar distinctness. + +A large part of our superior commanders pass through the General Staff, +while part have attended at least the military academy; but when these +men reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has long +become out of date. The continuation school is missing. It can be +replaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficient +time for this, and often a lack of interest. The daily duties of +training troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs great +determination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his own +scientific education. The result is, that comparatively few of our +superior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less an +independently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the great +scale. This would cost dearly in real war. Experience shows that it is +not enough that the officers of the General Staff attached to the leader +are competent to fill up this gap. The leader, if he cannot himself +grasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believes +he is directing and is himself being directed. This is a far from +healthy condition. Our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned, +only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and from +the tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. The +minor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most important +feature in present-day warfare--i.e., the sudden concentration of +larger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from space +considerations, of timely counter-movements on the other. The minor +manoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. The commanders learn +to form decisions and to give orders, and these are two important +matters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grand +scale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditions +of warfare. + +Brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merely +encourage wrong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is, +fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds. +Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders. +The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in +them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those +of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger +scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the +operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled +to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. The +great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for +only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the +collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual +warfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weighty +consideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought before +their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern +warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations. + +The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of +small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly +strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important +military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this +direction. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they +conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all our +resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a +modern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a +rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of +the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too +small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional +manoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this change +could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: a +great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system +if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and +execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word. + +It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training +on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to +educate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres can +only show their full value if the officers of every rank who take part +in them have already had a competent training in theory. + +To encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thus +one of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. These +must not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of the +troops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves and +their subordinates for leadership in the great war. Strategic war games +on a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by the +commanding Generals, and in the army-inspections by the Inspectors, seem +to me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. All +superior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiency +in superior commands. The threads of all this training will meet in the +hands of the Chief of the General Army Staff as the strategically +responsible authority. + +It seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance to +decide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not for +their posts. The circumstances that a man is an energetic commander of +a division, or as General in command maintains discipline in his army +corps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader of +an army. Military history supplies many instances of this. + +No proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfare +the reconnoitring and screening units require special training. The +possibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degree +dependent on their activity. I have for years pointed out the absolute +necessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for their +profession, and I can only repeat the demand that our cavalry +riding-schools should be organized also as places of scientific +education. I will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulk +of the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisional +cavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. These exercises do not +correspond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrong +notions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command finds +out who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalry +division on manoeuvres. + +The centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing of +operations and on the skilful transition from strategical independence +to combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry lies +in these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-grounds +than systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. The perpetual +subject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement between +two divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. Any +unprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to this +result, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may be +regarded as a serious preparation for war. + +It is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, always +acts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annually +extensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definite +effect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which +_always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself, +but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is only +rarely necessary in war. This clearly demonstrates the unsystematic and +antiquated methods of all our training. + +Practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on a +large scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry. +Co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soon +as aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as an +integral factor of army organization. The airship division and the +cavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command, +especially for screening purposes, which are all-important. + +The methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully to +modern requirements have been pointed out by General v. Beseler. This +arm need only be developed further in the direction which this +distinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of the +next war. + +In the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the support +of the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in the +construction of similar positions. Tactical requirements must, however, +be insisted upon in this connection. The whole training must be guided +by considerations of tactics. This is the main point. As regards sieges, +especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since the +object is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take the +fortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery. + +The duties of the Army Service Corps[B] are clear. They must, on the one +hand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especially +for the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to give +every kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they must +look after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. The +rapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedy +repair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on military +railways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are the +duties for which these troops must be trained. A thorough knowledge and +mastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensable +qualifications in their case also. They can only meet their many-sided +and all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methods +and system of army movements on every scale. It is highly important, +therefore, that the officers of the Army Service Corps should be +thoroughly trained in military science. + +[Footnote B: _Verkehrstruppen_.] + +Thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectual +development of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of the +close connection of the multifarious duties of war. This appreciation is +requisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of the +service; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to some +degree the non-commissioned officers also. It will bear good fruit in +the training of the men. The higher the stage on which the teacher +stands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the more +complete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly and +successfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, and +the more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respect +which are the firmest foundations of discipline. All the means employed +to improve the education of our establishment of officers in the science +of war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient service +on every other field of practical activity. Intellectual exercise gives +tone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war and +its requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education and +bent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in their +reciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. The +effort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers' +corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards, +and must find its expression in a school of military education of a +higher class than exists at present. + +A military academy as such was contemplated by Scharnhorst. To-day it +assumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the General +Staff. Instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of its +former importance. The instruction in military history was entirely +divested of its scientific character by the method of application +employed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. In this way the +meaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day, +so far as I know, the lectures on military history primarily serve +purposes of directly professional education. I cannot say how far the +language teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. At any rate, it +culminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues a +directly practical end. This development was in a certain sense +necessary. A quite specifically professional education of the officers +of the General Staff is essential under present conditions. I will not +decide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and truly +academical character of the institution. In any case, we need in the +army of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for the +independent study of military science from the higher standpoint, and +provides at the same time a comprehensive general education. I believe +that the military academy could be developed into such an institution, +without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of the +officers for service on the General Staff. By the side of the military +sciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures on +general scientific subjects might be organized, to which admission +should be free. In similar lectures the great military problems might be +discussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearers +might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to +politics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, the +importance of free personality under the pressure of necessary +phenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as into +the duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint. + +Limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are now +arranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, and +the institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture, +intended not only to educate officers of the General Staff, but to train +men who are competent to discharge the highest military and civic +duties--this is what is required for the highest military educational +institution of the German army. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + + +PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR + +"Germany's future lies on the sea." A proud saying, which contains a +great truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished future +and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy +and act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they are +supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at least +that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest +opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his +position as a World Power. + +Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on +a world policy if our political and military superiority on the +continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yet +reached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now take +steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our +pretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the +full security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts and +repel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economic +necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needs +be--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and +this, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness of +Germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea +trade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be +always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Our +efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of +hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish +to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined +ultimately to support this world policy. + +Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first +ventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving for +limited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. was destined +to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's +history, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activity +must be set down as fruitless. + +We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most varied +considerations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was first +drawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906, +and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, of +course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. The +needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard +for the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on the +claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations. +At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the +coasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguard +this commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon +shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for +Germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the +Government, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party was +content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this +object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by +artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places. + +This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convinced +of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high +seas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the +aggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it was +thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called +_Ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact +that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies, +and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank. +This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a +fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the +costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a +large number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fighting +capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed +torpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on a +fallacy--that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an +extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing +population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political +and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and +on its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded +with actual needs. + +The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most +inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already +stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the +midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our +strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly +effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard +for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our +commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only +object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an +instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and +supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such +limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A +few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in +war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible, +destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is +obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the +defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on +permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed +that sufficiently. + +The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at +sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded +commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies. + +It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for +defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our +political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed +according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive, +when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success; +on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained +in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the +Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We +must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise +which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale. + +The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be +calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that +we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are +weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger, +unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all +circumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our +strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing +reasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance +of victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflicting +such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests +to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own +position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses. + +This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that +the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the +necessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probably +that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of +victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle +for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase +their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even +beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates. + +We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for +many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. We +may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast +fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend +ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown +in the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out and +exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against +all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast; +our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually +inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to +challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the lines +that our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as a +base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the +offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break +harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for +this class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with +a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by +the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alone +cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break +through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able +to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purpose +permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow +mines to be placed. + +I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the +North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these +requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be +to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our +naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade, +although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further +development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the +background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only +action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success +presupposes the existence of some such fortress. + +But the question must be looked at from another aspect. + +The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the +unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is +determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power. +Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from +claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless, +the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked +menacing utterances from various English statesmen. + +If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military +preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates +attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the +English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase +the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly +intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken; +the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the German +coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and +to isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as +a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite +impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and +protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly +well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt +would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German +naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes +for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an +English attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able +to postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned that +the recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we must +make up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext or +other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very +favourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage. +Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon +upon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war. + +Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our +coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical +principles. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in +order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our +fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would be +justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by +loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the +greatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, of +existence. + +Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or +definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole +nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who +live on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows the +absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with +our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the +decisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot, +perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not +check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to +replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case. + +The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance, +in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the +Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military +requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain +secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of +Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more +possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in +the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our +battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot +give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is +feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal +might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success +depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous +unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict +heavy losses upon him. + +As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the +completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and +the usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in its +present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. There +can be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of the +Kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbach +class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be +considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in a +worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of the +Hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the +Prince class (_Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich_) fulfil their purpose +neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Even +the armoured cruisers _Fürst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau,_ and +_Scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements. +If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the +time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these +totally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--by +new and thoroughly effective ships. + +Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon +will admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever so +strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and +all financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships, +which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities. +That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the line +have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisers +are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. But +superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible +readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made +to do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possess +a certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the English +heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and +to equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerful +artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the +more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way +that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or +straight ahead. + +Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part +in strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet, +therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority of +England--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because, +so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of +superiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high +standard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence of +construction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep this +position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to +the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying +to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must also +devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these +vessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing this +branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every +direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with +increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with +these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on +the enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would be +extraordinarily advantageous to us. + +Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the +development of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to make +airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they +could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes, +they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet would +then, as already explained in Chapter VIII., be able to report +successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the +battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the +approach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able to +prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus +facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse or +frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If our +airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side, +could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English +coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when +fighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly be +doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to +perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over +the English would contribute largely to equalize the difference in +strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war. +It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field +because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can +compete for the palm of victory on equal terms. + +Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be +carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be +especially effective in a struggle against England, as that country +needs imports more than any other. Consequently great results would +follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing +his navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have been +discussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative to +organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended +for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity +unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. The +auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the +open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice, +when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so. + +A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must +be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace. +History tells us what to expect from the English on this head. + +In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 to +September 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houses +were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were +killed. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of +England is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and +in the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence shows +distinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of the +seas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11 +and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarly +bombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under the +hypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the +foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well +not to forget them. + +The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also +Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships, +suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians. + +Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as +was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain +conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal +violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the +above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course +of action politically justifiable. + +A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first +place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful +inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the +tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability +of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation +of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack +becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are +granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack +in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable +carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be +formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken +of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties +concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of +States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such +cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it, +as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limit +the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the +very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would +have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most +extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in +1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful +from the standpoint of political morality. + +These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we +must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without +warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right. +Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such +eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the +reservists. + +Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to +secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all +circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready +for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension. +The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole +_matériel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for +instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the +mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in +force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple +precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to +the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as +is done in England. + +When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are +required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the +navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the +resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since +the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the +expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic +preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the +self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet +must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast +defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our +requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be +provisionally dropped. + +In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should +limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary, +devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest +stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in +case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition +that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act +contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on +us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform +tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we +have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships. + +I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is to +be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases +quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general +situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in +the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war. +My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid +foundation without which any successful action against the superior +forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail +to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible. + +It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry +out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever +may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though +this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for +the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on +strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a +successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain +a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we +must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers. + +Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and +German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we +must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the +coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the +pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be +met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion. + +The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness +for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the +first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the +long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define +and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free +hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing +more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious +mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France +was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was +favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has, +indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace +and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this +difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between +resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against +numerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles the +supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her +assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and +thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North +America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed, +threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequences +of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her +former American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is +far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas +than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. It +is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty, +and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we +might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have +wished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866 +nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would +fall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman is +shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake +what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best +course. Just Fate decides the issue. + +The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that +we started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we have +made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the +Brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of +decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters +concerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to develop +systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties +which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we +have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it. + +This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never let +the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views +which must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good time +those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even +though they make heavy financial calls on our resources. + +This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our +naval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for +lost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty +devotedly. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + + + +THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION + +The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which +we can only assert our place among the Great Powers and secure the +conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of +treasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. We shall be +compelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, special +measures which will enable us to be more or less a match for our +enemies--I mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of the +army. We must always bear in mind in the present that we have to provide +for the future. + +Apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget to +develop the elements on which not only our military strength, but also +the political power of the State ultimately rest. We must maintain the +physical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done if +we aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widest +sense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions and +demands of existence. + +While it is the duty of the State to guide her citizens to the highest +moral and mental development, on the other hand the elements of +strength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the State. +Only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can the +State achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interested +in promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. Her duty and +her justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from the +fulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highest +sense true to it. + +It is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely military +standpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development of +our growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. For while +the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction, +the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment in +very great numbers possible. Thus the full consummation of military +training cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equipped +physically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentiments +worthy of the honourable profession of arms. + +We have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raise +the culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best of +our power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independent +individual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence on +the men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limited +if it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligent +material. This fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims which +modern war will make on the individual fighter. In order to meet these +demands fully, the people must be properly educated. + +Each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure of +independent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. In +the open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed duty +has been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources; +he may often have to take over the command of his own section if the +losses among his superiors are heavy. The artilleryman will have to work +his gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains have +fallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders are +often left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and the +sapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himself +unexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource left +beyond his own professional knowledge and determination. + +But not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility of +the individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique will +probably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. This change +is due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greater +efficiency of the firearms. All movements in large masses are more +exacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments, +since they are never carried out so smoothly. The shelter and food of +great masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth of +the marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to the +difficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregular +hours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. The increased range of +modern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combination +with the larger fronts, necessitates wide détours whenever the troops +attempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on the +battlefield. + +In the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the army +has been enormously increased. The State, however, has done little to +prepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies are +making themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a very +detrimental influence on their education. I specially refer to the +ever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patriotic +feeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the population +into the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development. +This result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. At the +present day, out of all the German-born military units, over 6.14 per +cent. come from the large towns, 7.37 per cent, from the medium-sized +towns, 22.34 per cent. from the small or country towns, and 64.15 per +cent. from the rural districts; while the distribution of the population +between town and country is quite different. According to the census of +1905, the rural population amounted to 42.5 per cent., the small or +country towns to 25.5 per cent., the medium-sized towns to 12.9 per +cent., and the large towns to 19.1 per cent. of the entire number of +inhabitants. The proportion has probably changed since that year still +more unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns have +increased in population. These figures clearly show the physical +deterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to our +national life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellect +and compact unity of the nation. The rural population forms part and +parcel of the army. A thousand bonds unite the troops and the families +of their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone who +studies the inner life of our army is aware of this. The interest felt +in the soldier's life is intense. It is the same spirit, transmitted +from one to another. The relation of the army to the population of the +great cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of their +sons into the army is quite different. A certain opposition exists +between the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who, +from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation. +Similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened, +and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutely +hostile to the service. + +It is in the direct interests of the State to raise the physical health +of the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order to +enable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effect +of military training more extensively to bear on the town population, +and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. Nothing +promotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of military +service. + +So far as I can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself which +exercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing to +its monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditions +of life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. Apart from many +forms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health, +the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housing +conditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. This +latter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the rural +districts, and, in combination with the other influences of the great +city, produces far more harmful results. + +It is therefore the unmistakable duty of the State, first, to fight +alcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing all +kinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sell +them; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all efforts +to improve the housing conditions of the working population, and to +withdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life of +amusements. In Munich, Bavarian officers have recently made a +praiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men past +the age of attendance at school with health-producing military +exercises. The young men's clubs which Field-Marshal v.d. Goltz is +trying to establish aim at similar objects. Such undertakings ought to +be vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by the +State, from purely physical as well as social considerations. The +gymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has an +undoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deserves +every encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others, +the system of universal service should have been made an effective +reality. It is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect of +military service on the physical development of the recruits. The +authorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed to +make the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers than +hitherto. + +On the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against two +tendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hours +for factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sport +with an exaggerated value for the national health. As already pointed +out, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendant +on working together in large numbers that are prejudicial. + +The wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderate +degree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work are +present, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a complete +miscomprehension of the real value of work. It is in itself the greatest +blessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it no +longer as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning a +livelihood and paying for amusements. Strenuous labour alone produces +men and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to win +their living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have often +achieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality. + +So long as the Dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict with +the sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against the +Spanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now, +when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead a +politically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars, +their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take a +part in the struggle of the civilized nations. In Germany that stock +which was destined to bring back our country from degradation to +historical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the Rhine +or the Danube, but on the sterile sands of the March. + +We must preserve the stern, industrious, old-Prussian feeling, and carry +the rest of Germany with us to Kant's conception of life; we must +continuously steel our strength by great political and economic +endeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained, +or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only we +shall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in the +world. + +Where Nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growing +wealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life of +pleasure rather than of work, society and the State must vie in taking +care that work does not become play, or play work. It is work, regarded +as a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. Sport, which is spreading +more and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation, +not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. We must never +forget this. Hard, laborious work has made Germany great; in England, on +the contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health of +the nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place of +serious work it has greatly injured the English nation. The English +nation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard of +labour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the English +trades unions--and of the security of its military position, has more +and more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and it +may well be asked whether, under these conditions, England will show +herself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself in +the future. If, further, the political rivalry with the great and +ambitious republic in America be removed by an Arbitration Treaty, this +circumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads to +progress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which develop +physique. + +The physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless it +comes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while, +if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations, +the result must be injurious in the long-run. + +We must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physically +healthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and the +whole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour to +promote their spiritual development in every way. The means for doing so +is the school. Military education under the present-day conditions, +which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aims +satisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, and +an improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material. + +The national school is not sufficient for this requirement. The general +regulations which settle the national school system in Prussia date from +the year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account of +the modern development which has been so rapid of late years. It is only +natural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and the +essentials of military education. Present-day military education +requires complete individualization and a conscious development of manly +feeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching in +classes, and there is no distinction between the sexes. This is directly +prescribed by the rules. + +In the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of the +superiors by specially detached officers and selected experienced +non-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quite +small sections; while each one receives individual attention from the +non-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superior +officers. In a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teach +as many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers as +many as 120 children are divided into two classes. A separation of the +sexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. As a rule, +therefore, the instruction is given in common. It is certain that, under +such conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual is +possible. All that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanically +and inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch of +knowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boys +and girls, still less of individuals. + +Such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a military +education. The principles which regulate the teaching in the two places +are quite different. That is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction. + +The military education aims at training the moral personality to +independent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patriotic +feelings among the men. Instruction in a sense of duty and in our +national history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professional +teaching. Great attention is given to educate each individual in logical +reasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts. + +In the national school these views are completely relegated to the +background--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but as +the practical result of the conditions. The chief stress in such a +school is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting some +facility in reading, writing, and ciphering. The so-called _Realign_ +(history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite into +the background. Only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly are +devoted to all the _Realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in the +lower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hours +are assigned to religious instruction in every standard. There is no +idea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. Not a word in the +General Regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this; +and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods of +religious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for the +development of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. As for +influencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars to +any extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts it +altogether out of the question. + +While the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instruction +is thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given, +especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. Beginning with +the lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years), +stories not only from the New Testament, but also from the Old Testament +are drummed into the heads of the scholars. Similarly every Saturday the +portions of Scripture appointed for the next Sunday are read out and +explained to all the children. Instruction in the Catechism begins also +in the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children must +learn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. It is a +significant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid +"the memorizing of the General Confession and other parts of the +liturgical service," as "also the learning by heart of the Pericopes." +On the other hand, the institution of Public Worship is to be explained +to the children. This illustrates the spirit in which this instruction +has to be imparted according to the regulations. + +It is really amazing to read these regulations. The object of +Evangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to the +comprehension of the Holy Scriptures and to the creed of the +congregation," in order that they "may be enabled to read the Scriptures +independently and to take an active part both in the life and the +religious worship of the congregation." Requirements are laid down which +entirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to the +comprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, and +presuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. Not a word, +however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, that +is, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought into +prominence. The teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impress +religious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course of +instruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formal +religiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if not +deliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moral +influence. A real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of such +instruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their Confirmation +to have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so they +remain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to the +religious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. Nor +does the instruction for Confirmation do much to alter that, for it is +usually conceived in the same spirit. + +All other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to the +young minds some high ideals--more especially our own country's +history--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort of +instruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is of +inestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. It is the +more regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed by +the regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, is +totally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some real +service to the country. It is quite refreshing to read in the new +regulations for middle schools of February 10,1910, that by religious +instruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should be +awakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aim +at exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of the +fatherland." + +The method of religious instruction which is adopted in the national +school is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. Religious instruction +can only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectual +growth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. To make +it the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in the +national schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to be +directed at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mystical +intuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has a +confusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. Even the +missionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate his +pupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart to +them subtle religious ideas. Yet every Saturday the appointed passages +of Scripture (the Pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children. + +Religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. Up +to that point the teacher should be content, from the religious +standpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with the +simplest ideas of the Deity, but in other respects to endeavour to +awaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasp +loftier conceptions. The national school stands in total contradiction +to this intellectual development. This is in conformity to regulations, +for the same children who read the Bible independently are only to be +led to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are daily +around them." In the course of eight years they learn a smattering of +reading, writing, and ciphering.[A] It is significant of the knowledge +of our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-three +recruits of one company to whom the question was put who Bismarck was, +not a single one could answer. That the scholars acquire even a general +idea of their duties to the country and the State is quite out of the +question. It is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of the +children by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught in +common. One thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those of +girls; and, although I consider it important that patriotic feelings +should be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmit +them to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a different +way from the boys. When the instruction is common to both, the treatment +of the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. It is +quite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in the +religious field when so little has been achieved in every other field. + +This pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal that +Frederick the Great set up. He declared that the duty of the State was +"to educate the young generation to independent thinking and +self-devoted love of country." + +[Footnote A: Recently a boy was discharged from a well-known national +school as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualified +to the office of a Head Forester. He showed that he could not copy +correctly, to say nothing of writing by himself.] + +Our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reform +if it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education, +but for life generally. It sends children out into the world with +undeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elements +of knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, but +easy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. As a +matter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the national +schoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instruction +as a recruit. + +It is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform. +I will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important from +the standpoint of a citizen and a soldier. + +First and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. The number +of teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholars +diminished. It is worth while considering in this connection the +feasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years. +Then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the object +of developing the children's minds, and formal religious instruction +should only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. Finally, +the _Realien,_ especially the history of our own country, should claim +more attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in every +way; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religion +should be more prominent than the formal contents. The training of the +national school teacher must be placed on a new basis. At present it +absolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of the +school itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds and +feelings of their pupils. It must be reckoned a distinct disadvantage +for the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age of +fourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which the +reasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselves +and on any chance influences. In the interval between school life and +military service the young people not only forget all that they learnt, +perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkingly +adopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from a +lack of counteracting ideals. + +A compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity of +the age. It is also urgently required from the military standpoint. Such +a school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to prevent +the scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him for +a special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism and +sense of citizenship. To do this, it is necessary to explain to him the +relation of the State to the individual, and to explain, by reference to +our national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion to +the State. The duties of the individual to the State should be placed in +the foreground. This instruction must be inspired by the spirit which +animated Schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of Prussia, and +culminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in the +strength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the great +whole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employed +for higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishes +in feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in the +love for the fatherland and for the State, which is a haven for every +faith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose. + +Only if national education works in this sense will it train up men to +fill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school of +arms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which great +deeds spring. What can be effected by the spirit of a nation we have +learnt from the history of the War of Liberation, that never-failing +source of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centre +of history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools. + +We can study it also by an example from most recent history, in the +Russo-Japanese War. "The education of the whole Japanese people, +beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic and +warlike spirit. That education, combined with the rapidly acquired +successes in culture and warfare, aroused in the Japanese a marvellous +confidence in their own strength. They served with pride in the ranks of +the army, and dreamed of heroic deeds.... All the thoughts of the +nation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course of +several years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of a +powerful army and a strong fleet."[B] This was the spirit that led the +Japanese to victory. "The day when the young Japanese enlisted was +observed as a festival in his family."[B] + +In Russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that +"Patriotism was an obsolete notion," "war was a crime and an +anachronism," that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was the +greatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourable +trade."[B] Thus the Russian army marched to battle without any +enthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of the +great racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity." Already eaten +up by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, without +energy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspired +leaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent. + +[Footnote B: "The Work of the Russian General Staff," from the Russian by +Freiheu v. Tettau.] + +I have examined these conditions closely because I attach great +importance to the national school and the continuation school as a means +to the military education of our people. I am convinced that only the +army of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything really +great. I understand, of course, that the school alone, however high its +efficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, in +view of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every means +if we wish to accomplish something great. The direct influence of school +ends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at first +make itself felt very gradually. Later generations will reap the fruits +of its sowing. Its efficiency must be aided by other influences which +will not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughout +their lives. Now, there are two means available which can work upon +public opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation; +one is the Press, the other is a policy of action. If the Government +wishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to secure +a narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further its +great political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong and +national Press, through which it must present its views and aims +vigorously and openly. The Government will never be able to count upon a +well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or +necessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is being +systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy +preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the +same note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as the +object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military +spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an +imperial policy. + +It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war +as an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with the +duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country. + +A parliamentary Government, which always represents merely a temporary +majority, may leave the party Press to defend and back its views; but a +Government like the German, which traces its justification to the fact +that it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. Its point of view +does not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course, +conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. It +must therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as on +particular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims as +widely understood as possible. I regard it, therefore, as one of the +most important duties of a Government like ours to use the Press freely +and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. I do not mean that a few +large political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be well +supplied with news, but that the views of the Government should find +comprehensive expression in the local Press. It would be an advantage, +in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certain +announcements of the Government, in order that the reader might not have +such a one-sided account of public affairs as the party Press supplies. +It would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, as +justifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health. +Epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old Europe more dangerous and +damaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the State to +preserve the moral healthiness of the nation. + +More important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the Press is +the _propaganda of action._ Nothing controls the spirit of the multitude +so effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceived +in a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. Such education by a powerful +policy is an absolute necessity for the German people. This nation +possesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritual +energy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairy +laid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. In addition to +this, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national and +religious unity of the nation created in the system of small States and +in confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency to +particularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nation +was no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. Yet the heart +of this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even though +such aims can only be attended by danger. We must not be misled in this +respect by the Press, which often represents a most one-sided, +self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or even +Anti-German lines rather than national. The soul of our nation is not +reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on the +necessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and +comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. + +On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the +Powers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance, +every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the +people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their +forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again and +again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this +yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the +clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with +him. + +He is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors of +national psychology; Bismarck possessed this art, and used k with a +master-hand. True, he found ready to hand one idea which was common to +all--the sincere wish for German unification and the German Empire; but +the German nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which lead +to the realization of this idea. Only under compulsion and after a hard +struggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation was +fired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to which +the great statesman was so surely leading it. Success was the foundation +on which Bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the German Empire. Even +in the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of the +people by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of all +opposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them serve +his own great aims. He, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, and +the motto _Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him; +but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and of +world-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that no +statesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands the +soul of his people. + +This knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with the +Great Elector, Frederick the Incomparable, Scharnhorst and Blücher; for +even that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of a +political idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground at +the Congress of Vienna. + +The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things +recognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influence +over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by +continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its +interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions. +Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to +great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high +aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to +prepare their minds to it: + + "The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims." + +We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed on +the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous +duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the +whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of +warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for +the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices. + +We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization +to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only +fulfil it by the sword. + + +Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most +effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military +duty? Such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for the +strength and honour of the German people. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + + + +FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR + +From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that +the political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitude +of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the +preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself. + +But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and +moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military +authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still +further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of +the State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must be +made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the +national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the +tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further, +as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of +mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure +under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the +material and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations for +war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made +to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as +possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come. +If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in +whom confidence can be reposed should war break out. + + +I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the +commercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere of +commercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which the +desired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Government +and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regards +finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may +go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national +household in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, on +the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money +required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions. + +The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financial +economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the +current incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, the +indebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive +and military capabilities. + +As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a great +civilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never be +brought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure for +necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military +forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general +progress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion +to the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly based +on war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our +forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the +effeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is only +one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one +vice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of all +culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the +individual for itself.[A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepest +gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an +epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of +the last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in +Prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large +sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the +Government. + +Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of +demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations +contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to +the great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day look +contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut +their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties +imposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial +pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in +our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity +and energy."[B] + +[Footnote A: Treitschke.] + +[Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte."] + +Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but is +bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens, +since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important, +however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national +property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities. + +This property is to a certain extent determined by the natural +productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. But +these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour +of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced. +Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and secure +labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour +conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by +concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate +German trade by vigorous political representation of German interests +abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits +from international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural production +by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable +protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on +foreign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fishery +would add to this.[D] + +[Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by international +commerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling.] + +[Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from +foreign countries.] + +From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase +permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the +annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be +met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Home +production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95 +per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, the +production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two +double-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered +that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two +million tons. + +A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national +prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own +colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense +quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually +independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to +transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by +effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less +we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards, +[E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the +State will improve. + +[Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons +of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of +copper, etc.] + +If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of national +productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the +reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial +position. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a +two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays. +The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very +easily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it is +a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to +improve the financial position. The experiences of history leave no +doubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of a +nation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once is +shaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the State +creditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holds +out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its +creditors far better security than a weaker military power. If our +credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened +political position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our army +and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible +liquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first to +improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to +keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go. + +The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task. + +It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits of +possible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and +1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from +20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same +proportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there is +a huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the German +Empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per +head of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the same +basis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germany +only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and +navy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the +individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in Germany and France, the +outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our most +probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their +armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger +politically. + +Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase +of wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades and +industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a +setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again. + +The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the +Empire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports has +increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the +year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14 +1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of the +imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the +exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... The value of the import of +raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in +1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of +such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The import +of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a +value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of +manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of the +import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3 +milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food +remained at about the same figure. + +The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in +Germany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amounted +in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2 +million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The +quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in +1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35 +million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from +6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119 +million marks.... From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany +has increased by 127 per cent.; in England only by about 59 per cent. +The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172 +per cent.; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[F] + +[Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin.] + +Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financial +position of the Empire has considerably improved since the Imperial +Finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may very +soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent. + +It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth +of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive +capitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked +extent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of national +wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number of +taxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6,000 to 100,000 +marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., +from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per +cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. In these classes, +therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater +proportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100,000 +to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on +an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in +the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. In the class of 500,000 +marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per +cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in +the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually, +it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. This means +per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an +increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an +increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks +and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year. + +We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and +annually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister has +estimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three +years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliards +yearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give some +instances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory at +Essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent., +the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the +annual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from +1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown by +the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has +reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and +poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement +in prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of a +healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment +are considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants +left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's +unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in +the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 per +cent. (in France it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of +workmen's unions were unemployed. + +Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national +debt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empire +in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the +national debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in-- + + Marks +Prussia 9,421,770,800 +Bavaria 2,165,942,900 +Saxony 893,042,600 +Würtemberg 606,042,800 +Baden 557,859,000 +Hesse 428,664,400 +Alsace-Lorraine 31,758,100 +Hamburg 684,891,200 +Lübeck 666,888,400 +Bremen 263,431,400 + +Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains, +forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railways +reached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in-- + + Marks, +Prussia (Hesse) 9,888 +Bavaria 1,694 +Saxony 1,035 +Würtemburg 685 +Baden 727 +Alsace-Lorraine 724 + +--a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15,062 milliard +marks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of +1911 for Prussia alone 11,050 milliards. Nevertheless, the national +debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously +because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and +presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in +debt. + +The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10,000 +inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the +whole Empire to some 5,000 million marks. This means that interest +yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many +communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions, +are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or +even 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributed +according to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middle +class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources of +wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative +income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on +the Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into +property. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to pay +for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the +protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization, +so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the +opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on +the altar of patriotism. + +The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown how +party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was +not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his +neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial +sacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be +made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But a +considerable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if we +wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of +our country without a blow. + +Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedy +introduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), in +order to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue would +oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would +furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to +diminish our burden of debt. + +If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters, +depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they +could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their +favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in as +heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based +on official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place to +examine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high a +figure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large +under any circumstances. + +Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that +is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the +nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first +instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to +paying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a +private gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to be +recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable +to fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceeds +principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing +the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely +important. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility +that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other +important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on +land and sea. + +There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be +urged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It is +argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth, +that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course +of time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that the +independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the +ideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement that +relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will, +is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According to +our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his +fortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which he +bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to +any other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his natural +heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he +wishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he is +interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things, +that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession is +based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual +than his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait. +The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in +which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are +alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of +this sort."[F] + +[Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910.] + +Both objections are unconvincing. + +So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to +liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met +otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directly +beneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay less +taxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in +the hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right of +succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the +State be prevented in other ways. The science of finance could +unquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme to +its extreme logical conclusion. + +The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true sense +of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a +will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. If +such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of +certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof +in life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probably +the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties +would actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law," +which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and +is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual +than the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is the +root from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and the +defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that in +the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and +that the significance of the State for the individual, no less than for +the family, should be thoroughly understood. + +These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty +enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperial +right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help +and the whole future of Germany is at stake. + +If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally +large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a +law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our +sorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be good +prospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Government +does not disguise the true state of the political position. + +Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We see +that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against +the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and +are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts are +also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as +to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which +England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world +policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if +she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has +built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has +secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious +careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this +English policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guided +exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means +of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill. + +There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements +have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit +reservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic +stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting +party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really +benefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed. +Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on which +those of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes on +the honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when +concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so +as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arise +which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The +country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical +sense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his life +long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever +induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[A] + +The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or +alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if +he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an +arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is, +as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States, +from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the +happiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in the +east will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank on +the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria and +outflank any Russian attack on Galicia. + +Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will +never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a +permanent political system. + +"There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as +effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal +interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the +other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." These +are the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher +_pace_ Bismarck. + +We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but +must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable +attitude of the other States by reference to their own interests. +Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to the +diplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself, +seeks nothing but his own advantage." It will prove waste labour to +attempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions or +an attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, the +weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale. + +When Napoleon III. planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect an +alliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually in +Paris to conclude the military negotiations.[B] These probably were +going on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand. +Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussian +flag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman less +biassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austria +nor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war +under unfavourable conditions. + +[Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attaché +in Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, and +pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of +Prussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was better +informed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the +conditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by Archduke +Albert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor had +made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military +calculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the former +Minister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)] + +France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests, +unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did not +satisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomatic +arrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests in +Morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her +interest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that country +for herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will not +allow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerce +and German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the French +standpoint she is right. + +The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own +interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different +Great Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt, +however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political +grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible +only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State with +which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its +opponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to +further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone +and of being left isolated in the hour of danger. + +A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking +chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keep +this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances +and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above +all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take +bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility +of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under +favourable conditions. "The great art of policy," writes Frederick the +Great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to +one's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage from +favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." Even in +his Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered +all his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but +boldness alone can acquire." "I give you a problem to solve," he said to +his councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. was announced. +"When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?" + +Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct +summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate +estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the +interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and +daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws +of political and military success. + +The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blinded +by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able +to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success. +"The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim +which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which +shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more +despised than by the great Prussian King," so H. v. Treitschke tells us. +"Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with +remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the +political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss +the golden opportunity. + +It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize +that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist +policy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets up +personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real +current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures, +as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia. + +A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these +great duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are based +on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the +possibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers the +result to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageous +circumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe +to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led. + +In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan +had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as +military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and +assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her +policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at +the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment +of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She +had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance +with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to +place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover, +compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of +the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against +Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations +required by the political position had been made, although the conflict +had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous +retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no +doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made +resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the +campaign by the offensive. + +England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and +consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to +her aims or suited to give weight to political demands. + +Two points stand out clearly from this consideration. + +First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and +political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war +are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong +enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing +which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be +developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The +obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace +as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister +and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the +all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain +influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, +and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military +situation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister who +conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is +in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of +the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he +must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by +war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has +of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the +realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the +opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of +compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a +permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of +recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one, +but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to +end in political and moral defeat. + +The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and +hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and +shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always +creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory, +tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy, +which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts +favourably on the military situation. + +In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can +only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution +join hands. + +If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next +war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion: +the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the +necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions +are to be created for the inevitably threatening war. + +So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two +fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war +from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was +comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various +strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small +compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the +other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive +action on both sides. To-day the situation is different. + +We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expect +not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of +English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch +neutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England may +land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war +with us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a +position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather +be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and +south-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is also +increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of +the European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menaced +in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet. + +All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur +simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations +they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the +military aspect. The military situation thus created is very +unfavourable. + +If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the +army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the +situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the +stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure, +and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must +count. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one +also. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have +to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be +directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and +all necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops of +the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected +along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when +occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the same +principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in +readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport +arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many +different lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements for +unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the +most various political prospects. We should in any case be forced to +adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present +conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent +an invasion by one or other of our enemies. + +No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good +prospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led against +a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. A +military investigation of the situation shows that a plan +of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents, +under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and +has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind. + +The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy +which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to +overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. On +this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of +Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Of +course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an +unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which +the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If we +attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help, +and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy +to fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the +cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be +reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral. + +This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring +about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor +England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as +we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by +diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows. + +If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate +an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her +interests or those of England, that both these States would feel +themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are +offered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentively +studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on +this point. + +In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we +should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of +circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to +struggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to state +clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own +interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Such +political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid +foundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and +realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great +results. + +It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and +measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a +favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous +to Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. This +requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic +position which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said: +Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must +keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as +time goes on. + +Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire +settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons +emigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and England +to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the +Mediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. The +effort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured the +Italian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in the +least the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to the +Triple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. The +importance of these considerations will continue to be felt. + +Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, and +Russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of +present-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in +England and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the +Central European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder +of abandoning her in Morocco. + +There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; in +Central Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clash +in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and China +is forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to some +degree ties her hands. + +All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if it +is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than +recent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy can +count on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on an +army whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficiently +valued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. We +have amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops, +the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst +them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are +soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world, +provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The German +nation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height of +its great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in +its soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this +people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a +worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on +in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will +achieve a truly magnificent result. + +In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces, +and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger, +our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future; +but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless it +wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the +brave words of Goethe: + + "Bid defiance to every power! + Ever valiant, never cower! + To the brave soldier open flies + The golden gate of Paradise." + + + + +EPILOGUE + +After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-German +convention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; the +Turko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensions +which point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and, +lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real +offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France and +England. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently +between the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has been +foreseen and provided for. + +I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first +occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the +Anglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks. + +The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed, +have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a +collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this +object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed +that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was +determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the +attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered +correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain +was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for +war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance +on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this +crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the +concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable +moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait +until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and +Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the +other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it +can actively support the Rhine army. + +This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government, +but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined, +that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes. + + +It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as +regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our +manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of +territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not +inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in +obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the +possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can +never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were +compelled to abandon. + +I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial +concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed +force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo +region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of +November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their +present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from +this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no +doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession +for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish +_enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has +at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case +of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese. + +It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial +arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for +a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be +assumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has +carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a +moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because +she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a +desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea, +in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v. +Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not, +therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to +revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, +the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France. + +The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first an +actual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by the +expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn +from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position. +But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not +merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but +primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its +entirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement +means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly +surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the +sovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent +infraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we had +weighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty such +action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the +notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such +explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front. + +An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islam +have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, of +course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey have +suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in +the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance +for us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco convention +precipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundly +the solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which France +obtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realize +the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the +Mediterranean. + +The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep +rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the +mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large +sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in +spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily +supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this +weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the +Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better +has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great +disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical +times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire +must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to +ride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war +removes all further doubt on this point. + +The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the +view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the +various chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by a +firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder +any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have +done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance, +and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no +doubt on this point.[A] + +[Footnote A: Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.] + +The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all +pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead +in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive +intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would +support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the +limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with +England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered +by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new +acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new +colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and +that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form +objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear +commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once +more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates. + +In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count +on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a +_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at +most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may +fairly imagine we have some prospect of success. + +If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in +the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world +generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more +face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the +world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any +case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide +that the hour of attack has come. + +We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike +preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down. +All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to +represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the +people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to +military and political success, without carrying still further the +disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and +frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between +Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will +prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy +which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers +threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs +and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any +conventional scruples distract it from this object. + +Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged +basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of +sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation +calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it +to the happy goal. + +The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever. +England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her +interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles +question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of +her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great +Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and +difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has +considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before +it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will +probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in +sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted +German policy can utilize in order to influence the general political +situation in the interests of our Fatherland. + +If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of +Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the +future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with +confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to +fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz +Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God: + + "From the height of the starry sky + May thy ringing sword flash bright; + Let every craven cry + Be silenced by thy might!" + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Germany and the Next War +by Friedrich von Bernhardi + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 11352-8.txt or 11352-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/1/3/5/11352/ + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Bonny Fafard and PG Distributed Proofreaders + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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For +example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at: + + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234 + +or filename 24689 would be found at: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689 + +An alternative method of locating eBooks: + https://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL + + diff --git a/old/11352-8.zip b/old/11352-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b75a681 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/11352-8.zip diff --git a/old/11352.txt b/old/11352.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78d018e --- /dev/null +++ b/old/11352.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10596 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Germany and the Next War, by Friedrich von Bernhardi + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Germany and the Next War + +Author: Friedrich von Bernhardi + +Release Date: February 28, 2004 [EBook #11352] +[Date last updated: August 18, 2005] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Bonny Fafard and PG Distributed Proofreaders + + + + +GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR + + + +BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI + + + +TRANSLATED BY ALLEN H. POWLES + + +1912 + + + +All the patriotic sections of the German people were greatly excited +during the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on all +hearts that in the settlement of the Morocco dispute no mere commercial +or colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but that +the honour and future of the German nation were at stake. A deep rift +had opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action +of the Government. Public opinion, which was clearly in favour of +asserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our political +position, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would have +demanded. I cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in an +overwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, would +have been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation. +Haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic of +the German Reichstag in modern Berlin as it was in medieval Regensburg. +These conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages, +which were partly written some time ago. + +Nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national and +political development. At such times it is necessary to be absolutely +clear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be +surmounted, and the sacrifices to be made. + +The task I have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of all +diplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. It is +obvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view. + +Our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past, +have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nation +which, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must, +and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulness +of my German heart that I have recorded my convictions. I believe that +thus I shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers' +hearts, and strengthen the national purpose. + +THE AUTHOR. + +_October, 1911_ + + + + +CONTENTS + +PREFACE + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Power of the peace idea--Causes of the love of peace in Germany-- + German consciousness of strength--Lack of definite political aims + --Perilous situation of Germany and the conditions of successful + self-assertion--Need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to + explain the tasks and aims of Germany in the light of history + + +CHAPTER I +THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR + +Pacific ideals and arbitration--The biological necessity of war--The + duty of self-assertion--The right of conquest--The struggle for + employment--War a moral obligation--Beneficent results of war + --War from the Christian and from the materialist standpoints-- + Arbitration and international law--Destructiveness and immorality + of peace aspirations--Real and Utopian humanity--Dangerous + results of peace aspirations in Germany--The duty of + the State + + +CHAPTER II +THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR + +Bismarck and the justification of war--The duty to fight--The teaching + of history--War only justifiable on adequate grounds--The + foundations of political morality--Political and individual morality + --The grounds for making war--The decision to make war--The + responsibility of the statesman + + +CHAPTER III +A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT + +The ways of Providence in history--Christianity and the Germans-- + The Empire and the Papacy--Breach between the German World + Empire and the revived spiritual power--Rise of the great States + of Europe and political downfall of Germany after the Thirty + Years' War--Rise of the Prussian State--The epoch of the Revolution + and the War of Liberation--Intellectual supremacy of + Germany--After the War of Liberation--Germany under William + I. and Bismarck--Change in the conception of the State and + the principle of nationality--New economic developments and + the World Power of England--Rise of other World Powers-- + Socialism, and how to overcome it--German science and art-- + Internal disintegration of Germany and her latent strength + + +CHAPTER IV +GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION + +Grounds of the intellectual supremacy of Germany--Germany's role + as spiritual and intellectual leader--Conquest of religious and + social obstacles--Inadequacy of our present political position-- + To secure what we have won our first duty--Necessity of increasing + our political power--Necessity of colonial expansion-- + Menace to our aspirations from hostile Powers + + +CHAPTER V +WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL + +Points of view for judging of the political situation--The States of the + Triple Alliance--The political interests of France and Russia-- + The Russo-French Alliance--The policy of Great Britain-- + America and the rising World Powers of the Far East--The importance + of Turkey--Spain and the minor States of Europe--Perilous + position of Germany--World power or downfall--Increase + of political power: how to obtain it--German colonial + policy--The principle of the balance of power in Europe--Neutral + States--The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs + of other States--Germany and the rules of international politics + --The foundations of our internal strength + + +CHAPTER VI +THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY FOR WAR + +Its necessity--Its twofold aspect--The educational importance of + military efficiency--Different military systems--Change in the + nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization-- + Variety of methods of preparation for war--The armaments of + minor States--The armaments of the Great Powers--Harmonious + development of all elements of strength--Influence on armaments + of different conceptions of the duties of the State--Permanent + factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness-- + Statecraft in this connection + + +CHAPTER VII +THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR + +Our opponents--The French army--The military power of Russia-- + The land forces of England--The military power of Germany and + Austria; of Italy--The Turkish army--The smaller Balkan States + --The Roumanian army--The armies of the lesser States of Central + Europe--Greece and Spain--The fleets of the principal naval + Powers--The enmity of France--The hostility of England-- + Russia's probable behaviour in a war against Germany--The + military situation of Germany--Her isolation--What will be at + stake in our next war--Preparation for war + + +CHAPTER VIII +THE NEXT NAVAL WAR + +England's preparations for a naval war against Germany--Germany's + first measures against England--England and the neutrality of the + small neighbouring States--The importance of Denmark--Commercial + mobilization--The two kinds of blockade: The close + blockade and the extended blockade--England's attack on our + coasts--Co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--The decisive + battle and its importance--Participation of France and Russia in + a German-English war + + +CHAPTER IX +THE CRUCIAL QUESTION + +Reciprocal relations of land and sea power--The governing points of + view in respect of war preparations--Carrying out of universal + military service--The value of intellectual superiority--Masses, + weapons, and transport in modern war--Tactical efficiency and + the quality of the troops--The advantage of the offensive--Points + to be kept in view in war preparations--Refutation of the prevailing + restricted notions on this head--The _Ersatzreserve_--New + formations--Employment of the troops of the line and the new + formations--Strengthening of the standing army--The importance + of personality + + +CHAPTER X +ARMY ORGANIZATION + +Not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further + development--Fighting power and tactical efficiency--Strength of the + peace establishment--Number of officers and N.C.O.'s, especially in the + infantry--Relations of the different arms to each other--Distribution + of machine guns--Proportion between infantry and artillery--Lessons to + be learned from recent wars with regard to this--Superiority at the + decisive point--The strength of the artillery and tactical + efficiency--Tactical efficiency of modern armies--Tactical efficiency + and the marching depth of an army corps--Importance of the internal + organization of tactical units--Organization and distribution of field + artillery; of heavy field howitzers--Field pioneers and fortress + pioneers--Tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--Increase of the + cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--Tactical organization of the + cavalry--Development of the air-fleet--Summary of the necessary + requirements--Different ways of carrying them out--Importance of + governing points of view for war preparations + + +CHAPTER XI +TRAINING AND EDUCATION + +The spirit of training--Self-dependence and the employment of masses-- + Education in self-dependence--Defects in our training for war on the + grand scale--Need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to + the training of our commanders--Practical training of the artillery-- + Training in tactical efficiency--Practice in marching under war + conditions--Training of the train officers and column leaders-- + Control of the General Staff by the higher commanders--Value of + manoeuvres: how to arrange them--Preliminary theoretical training of + the higher commanders--Training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the + pioneers and commissariat troops--Promotion of intellectual development + in the army--Training in the military academy + + +CHAPTER XII +PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR + +The position of a World Power implies naval strength--Development + of German naval ideals--The task of the German fleet; its strength + --Importance of coast defences--Necessity of accelerating our + naval armaments--The building of the fleet--The institution of + the air-fleet--Preliminary measures for a war on commerce-- + Mobilization--General points of view with regard to preparations + for the naval war--Lost opportunities in the past + + +CHAPTER XIII +THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION + +The universal importance of national education--Its value for the + army--Hurtful influences at work on it--Duties of the State with + regard to national health--Work and sport--The importance of + the school--The inadequacy of our national schools--Military + education and education in the national schools--Methods of + instruction in the latter--Necessity for their reform--Continuation + schools--Influence of national education on the Russo-Japanese + War--Other means of national education--The propaganda of + action + + +CHAPTER XIV +FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR + +Duties of the State in regard to war preparations--The State and + national credit--The financial capacity of Germany--Necessity of + new sources of revenue--The imperial right of inheritance--Policy + of interests and alliances--Moulding and exploitation of the + political situation--The laws of political conduct--Interaction of + military and political war preparations--Political preparations + for our next war--Governing factors in the conduct of German policy + + +EPILOGUE + +The latest political events--Conduct of the German Imperial Government + --The arrangement with France--Anglo-French relations and + the attitude of England--The requirements of the situation + + + + +GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR + + + +INTRODUCTION + +The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has +been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way +which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining +the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in +Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal +enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With the +increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of +sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great +conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our +future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a +solution at the present time. + +We have been capable of soaring upwards. Mighty deeds raised Germany +from political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of European +nations. But we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and to +advance along the path of development in politics and culture. We +tremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands from +us. Yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from our +glorious past. How rightly Fichte once judged his countrymen when he +said the German can never wish for a thing by itself; he must always +wish for its contrary also. + +The Germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlike +nation of Europe. For a long time they have proved themselves to be the +ruling people of the Continent by the power of their arms and the +loftiness of their ideas. Germans have bled and conquered on countless +battlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shown +that the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. In +striking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become a +peace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. A rude shock is +needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their +military strength. + +This strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes. + +It springs first from the good-natured character of the German people, +which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations and +partisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. It is connected +with another characteristic of the German nature. Our aim is to be just, +and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchange +relations share this aim. We are always ready to consider the peaceful +assurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign Press to be no less +genuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resist +the view that the political world is only ruled by interests and never +from ideal aims of philanthropy. "Justice," Goethe says aptly, "is a +quality and a phantom of the Germans." We are always inclined to assume +that disputes between States can find a peaceful solution on the basis +of justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is. + +An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted +in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed +in commercial life. + +The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world. +Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhaps +the greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty years +Germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion +of her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line, +we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the +world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great +industrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are established +all over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of the +globe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands of +Germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Under +these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides. + +Our trade and our industries--owners no less than employes--do not want +this development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is the +essential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition will +be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have +never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained +by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce. + +Universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, for +war in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limited +circles, but the whole nation suffers alike. All families and all +classes have to pay the same toll of human lives. Finally comes the +effect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of the +times--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of an +aspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfold +in peace. + +Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem +entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire +received with "astonishment and indignation" from Frederick the Great, +that "the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power"; +that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans, +cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the +greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. We regard our +warlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is the +special duty of the German Reichstag to lighten so far as possible. We +seem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament is +not an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of our +national health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige. +We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it +as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. + +Besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continued +justification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate and +often unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the German people. +The agelong dream of the German nation was realized in the political +union of the greater part of the German races and in the founding of the +German Empire. Since then there lives in the hearts of all (I would not +exclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proud +consciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increased +political power. This consciousness is supported by the fixed +determination never to abandon these acquisitions. The conviction is +universal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the whole +nation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. We all wish, indeed, to be +able to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict, +and we live in the belief that the power of our State will steadily +increase without our needing to fight for it. We do not at the bottom of +our hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with a +certain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to let +ourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow. +Every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. Not +merely in the North, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race with +glorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner of +Prussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of all +thought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in the +South also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of petty +nationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the German stock live +in the heart of the people. Here and there, maybe, such emotions slumber +in the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer and +more luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animated +by latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousness +await their awakening. + +Thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below the +surface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. It fritters +itself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. We no +longer have a clearly defined political and national aim, which grips +the imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unity +of action. Such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in the +yearnings for German unity, for the fulfilment of the Barbarossa legend. +A great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems to +me to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in the +world is threatened by external complications, the greater is this +danger. + +Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding all +peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that +their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often +pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific +settlement. + +In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful +methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable, +our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result of +our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also +because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual +upstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, and +now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for +centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect. We have thus +injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. It must be +reserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situation +thus affected, but one point can be mentioned without further +consideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties is +adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the +Germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces +brought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of this +struggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation. +We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset by +the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this +struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry +through a Seven Years' War for our position as a World Power, if we gain +a start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which will +fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces +of the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops, +but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for +all their dearest possessions. + +These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the +standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great +tasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before the +German people as the greatest civilized people known to history. + +From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations for +peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of +the German people, according to their true moral significance. I must +try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of +nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true +civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality. +I must endeavour to develop from the history of the German past in its +connection with the conditions of the present those aspects of the +question which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. The +historical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according to +inward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drastic +obligations. No one need passively submit to the pressure of +circumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at the +parting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or to +decadence. "A favoured position in the world will only become effective +in the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it." It +seemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this parting +of the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light I +may on the different paths which are open to our people. A nation must +fully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can it +take deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and, +looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for any +sacrifices which the present or future may demand. + +These sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financial +sphere, depend mainly on the idea of what Germany is called upon to +strive for and attain in the present and the future. Only those who +share my conception of the duties and obligations of the German people, +and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing the +sword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusions +in the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financial +demands which spring out of it. It is only in their logical connection +with the entire development, political and moral, of the State that the +military requirements find their motive and their justification. + + + + +CHAPTER I + + + +THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR + +Since 1795, when Immanuel Kant published in his old age his treatise on +"Perpetual Peace," many have considered it an established fact that war +is the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. In spite of +all that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the struggle +between nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization is +credited with a power to which war must yield. But, undisturbed by such +human theories and the change of times, war has again and again marched +from country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved its +destructive as well as creative and purifying power. It has not +succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. Long periods of +war, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on the +contrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, from +the political intercourse of nations. + +This wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. The +maintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanship +should aim. This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days a +quite peculiar power over men's spirits. This aspiration finds its +public expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the Press of +every country and of every party opens its columns to it. The current in +this direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of Governments +profess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peace +is the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out the +aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all Governments exert +themselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish the +conflagration. + +Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action. +They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote +their own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at the +Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the +United States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried to +conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and +foremost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany. No +practical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved. + +We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts. +This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as the +weaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest +need of international protection, have been completely passed over in +the American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be +assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans, +with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced +"perfidious Albion" to accede to the proposals. We may suppose that +England intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, but +that America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of +sovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out her +plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America. +Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over +the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for +themselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts +of President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace, +and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for Foreign +Affairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of +the United States an era in the history of mankind. + +This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and +marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been +shown by a race of Epigoni. "It has always been," H. von Treitschke +tells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played +with the dream of perpetual peace." + +Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours to +diminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which war +entails are justifiable. It is an incontestable fact that war +temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic +development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the +primitive brutality of man. It is therefore a most desirable +consummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible, +and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily +in the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential nature +of war. All that the Hague Peace Congress has accomplished in this +limited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war, +universal acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the object +is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place in +historical development. + +This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws +which rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the first +importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be +dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, +which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real +civilization. "War is the father of all things." [A] The sages of +antiquity long before Darwin recognized this. + +[Footnote A: (Heraclitus of Ephesus).] + +The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all +healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the +result of contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not +merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "To supplant or +to be supplanted is the essence of life," says Goethe, and the strong +life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good +everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the +most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the +universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. This struggle is +regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and +by the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animal +world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the human +race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances. +The man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means to +assert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the +individual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness of +right. The life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined, +doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent +the less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour, +envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. Still more +often, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures of +a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment. + +There can be no doubt on this point. The nation is made up of +individuals, the State of communities. The motive which influences each +member is prominent in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle for +possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the +relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only +as it is compatible with advantage. So long as there are men who have +human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive +for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests +come into being and occasions for making war arise. + +"The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law +of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and +institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the +intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The +extrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the external +development of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal +development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggle +of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward +development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of +nations--war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist? +In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat +of the other! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates." [B] + +[Footnote B: Clauss Wagner, "Der Krieg als schaffendes Weltprinzip."] + +That social system in which the most efficient personalities possess the +greatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocial +struggle. In the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquer +which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral, +material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend +itself. War will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions, +enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus +promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual +and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which +render possible a general progressive development. They confer victory +because the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war, +inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy +budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "War," says A. +W. von Schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in +Nature." + +Now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may exist +between peoples and States, like that between the fellow-members of a +society, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need not +always degenerate Into war. Struggle and war are not identical. This +rivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as the +intrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results. +Above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the State stands the +law, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that the +right shall prevail. Behind the law stands the State, armed with power, +which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively to +promote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. But there is no +impartial power that stands above the rivalry of States to restrain +injustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote the +highest ends of mankind. Between States the only check on injustice is +force, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own +part and promote its own ends and ideals. If in doing so it comes into +conflict with the ideals and views of other States, it must either +submit and concede the precedence to the rival people or State, or +appeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i.e., of +war--in order to make its own views prevail. No power exists which can +judge between States, and makes its judgments prevail. Nothing, in fact, +is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress the +ascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay. + +It will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form a +superior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is +stronger. This attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the more +intensive vitality will prevail. The allied opponents have the seeds of +corruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporary +reverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory over +numerical superiority. The history of Germany is an eloquent example of +this truth. + +Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct of +self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a +natural condition of existence. "Man is a fighter." Self-sacrifice is a +renunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or in +the life of States, which are agglomerations of individuals. The first +and paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence. +By self-assertion alone can the State maintain the conditions of life +for its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man is +entitled to claim from it. This duty of self-assertion is by no means +satisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes the +obligation to assure the possibility of life and development to the +whole body of the nation embraced by the State. + +Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a +given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they +require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. +Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, +as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say, +by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. + +The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first the +procedure is pacific. Over-populated countries pour a stream of +emigrants into other States and territories. These submit to the +legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditions +of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants, +with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest. + +The right of colonization is also recognized. Vast territories inhabited +by uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized States, and +made subject to their rule. Higher civilization and the correspondingly +greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. This right +is, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determine +what degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. The +impossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these international +relations has been the cause of many wars. The subjugated nation does +not recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilized +nation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence. +This situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions of +civilization have changed in the course of time. The subject nation has, +perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and the +difference in civilization has consequently lessened. Such a state of +things is growing ripe in British India. + +Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. It +may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races, +and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which the +mother-country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to +acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of +self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign +soil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right. +The threatened people will see the point of Goethe's lines: + + "That which them didst inherit from thy sires, + In order to possess it, must be won." + +The procedure of Italy in Tripoli furnishes an example of such +conditions, while Germany in the Morocco question could not rouse +herself to a similar resolution.[C] + +[Footnote C: This does not imply that Germany could and ought to have +occupied part of Morocco. On more than one ground I think that it was +imperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this State on the basis +of the Algeciras Convention. Among other advantages, which need not be +discussed here, Germany would have had the country secured to her as a +possible sphere of colonization. That would have set up justifiable +claims for the future.] + +In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at +once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided +by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since +its decisions rest on the very nature of things. + +Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a +convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the +same result. + +In America, England, Germany, to mention only the chief commercial +countries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of the +population. The native population cannot consume all the products of +this work. The industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. Work +and employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladly +accept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country. +But this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itself +from such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. We +find, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries into +existence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the other +hand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, to +crush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumer +for itself or win fresh ones. It is an embittered struggle which rages +in the market of the world. It has already often assumed definite +hostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensify +this struggle. Great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shut +their doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on the +down-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourable +conditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goods +cheaper than those imported from the old industrial States. These latter +will see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus it +may well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactory +conditions of life to its workers. Such a State runs the danger not only +of losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of also +gradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and political +world through diminishing production and lessened profits. + +In this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. We +cannot reject the possibility that a State, under the necessity of +providing remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war. +If more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stake +in Morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, Germany +would hardly have conceded to France the most favourable position in the +Morocco market without a struggle. England, doubtless, would not shrink +from a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of the +South African goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened her +Indian market, the control of which is the foundation of her world +sovereignty. The knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biological +laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from +international relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is not +only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an +indispensable factor in civilization. + +The attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connected +with the view of life generally. + +If we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as something +purely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outward +decay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man can +attain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possible +diminution of all bodily suffering. The State will be regarded as a sort +of assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possession +and enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. We must endorse the +view which Wilhelm von Humboldt professed in his treatise on the limits +of the activity of the State.[D] The compulsory functions of the State +must be limited to the assurance of property and life. The State will be +considered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shun +war as the greatest conceivable evil. + +[Footnote D: W. von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der +Wirksamkelt des Staates zu bestimmen."] + +If, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of States as merely +a fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not rest +on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers, +and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of the +chequered conditions of life, the task of the State will appear in a +very different light. The State will not be to us merely a legal and +social insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have the +one object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reach +of the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising the +intellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, and +of securing for them that influence on the world which tends to the +combined progress of humanity. We shall see in the State, as Fichte +taught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is to +put into practice the moral duty on earth. "The State," says Treitschke, +"is a moral community. It is called upon to educate the human race by +positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should +develop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike for +nation and individuals, the highest moral task." + +This highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. Man +can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a +community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He must +be in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individual +out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and +makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The State +alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest +degree of life.[E] + +[Footnote E: To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and +thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to +error, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, by +Implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Any +action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State +and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide +domain of Utopias.] + +War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it +is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation. +As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls +for war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it. + +If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, we +shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its +political power increases. The higher object at which it aims is +closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It is +only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that +creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most +splendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilities +and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which +power creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, and +recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is +content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace on +sluggard's couch it lies," then its citizens become stunted. The efforts +of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost. +This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small +States, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls victim to the +same curse. + +All petty and personal interests force their way to the front during a +long period of peace. Selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxury +obliterates idealism. Money acquires an excessive and unjustifiable +power, and character does not obtain due respect: + + + "Man is stunted by peaceful days, + In idle repose his courage decays. + Law is the weakling's game. + Law makes the world the same. + But in war man's strength is seen, + War ennobles all that is mean; + Even the coward belies his name." + SCHILLER: _Braut v. Messina_. + +"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social +petrifaction and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of the +goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience. +War alone teaches this lesson." [F] + +[Footnote F: Kuno Fischer, "Hegel," i., p. 737.] + +War, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and to +expand national power than any other means known to history. It +certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at +the same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. This +is especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regarded +not merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as the +expression of the united will of a whole nation. + +All petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the grave +decision which a war involves. The common danger unites all in a common +effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedly +spurned. This union contains a liberating power which produces happy and +permanent results in the national life. We need only recall the uniting +power of the War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and their +historical consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every war +vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the sham +reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are +unmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth, +and honour come to the front and are put into play. "A thousand touching +traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous war +awakes in noble nations." [G] + +[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 482.] + +Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "War," he +said, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment +constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it; +every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues." + +"At the moment when the State cries out that its very life is at stake, +social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. The individual +must forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body. +He should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison with +the welfare of the community. War is elevating, because the individual +disappears before the great conception of the State. The devotion of the +members of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidly +conspicuous as in war.... What a perversion of morality to wish to +abolish heroism among men!" [H] + +[Footnote H: Treitschke, "Politik" i., p. 74.] + +Even defeat may bear a rich harvest. It often, indeed, passes an +irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads to +a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous +constitution. "I recognize in the effect of war upon national +character," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "one of the most salutary +elements in the moulding of the human race." + +The individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge his +life on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the cause +which he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals to +personal morality. Similarly, nations and States can achieve no loftier +consummation than to stake their whole power on upholding their +independence, their honour, and their reputation. + +Such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. The +possibility of war is required to give the national character that +stimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nations +enabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by the +fullest development of their moral forces. An intellectual and vigorous +nation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a Phaecian +existence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace. + +From this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily +detrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics. +The States which from various considerations are always active in this +direction are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United States +of America, e.g., in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal +peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to +money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred +million dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incur +a great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with England +or Japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance of +contest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stress +of great political emotions, without which the moral development of the +national character is impossible. If they advance farther on this road, +they will one day pay dearly for such a policy. + +Again, from the Christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion. +Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God above +all things, and thy neighbour as thyself." This law can claim no +significance for the relations of one country to another, since its +application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love +which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love +for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead +men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature +cannot be political. Its object is to promote morality of the +individual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in the +interests of the community. It tells us to love our individual enemies, +but does not remove the conception of enmity. Christ Himself said: "I am +not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." His teaching can never be +adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. There +never was a religion which was more combative than Christianity. Combat, +moral combat, is its very essence. If we transfer the ideas of +Christianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the power +of the State--power in the widest sense, not merely from the material +aspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancement +of humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be made +which a war demands. Thus, according to Christianity, we cannot +disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally +and historically. + +Again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, the +purely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. The +individual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour, +since it may cost him life and prosperity. The State, however, as such +can also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wage +war, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives and +happiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved. + +The loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamental +notion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness, +the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing the +minority in their own interests. Thus, those who from the materialistic +standpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency from +motives of self-interest. + +Reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, but +that it is justifiable from every point of view. The practical methods +which the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the prevention +of war are shown to be absolutely ineffective. + +It is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement of +rights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, but +also the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullest +assertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time on +this basis to settle the disputes which arise between the various +countries by Arbitration Courts, and so to render war impossible. The +politician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestly +believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted. + +Two questions in this connection are at once suggested: On what right is +the finding of this Arbitration Court based? and what sanctions insure +that the parties will accept this finding? + +To the first question the answer is that such a right does not, and +cannot, exist. The conception of right is twofold. It signifies, +firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is right +and good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the State, either +written or sanctioned by tradition. In its first meaning it is an +indefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it is +variable and capable of development. The right determined by law is only +an attempt to secure a right in itself. In this sense right is the +system of social aims secured by compulsion. It is therefore impossible +that a written law should meet all the special points of a particular +case. The application of the legal right must always be qualified in +order to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. A certain +freedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to the +administration of justice. The established law, within a given and +restricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just. + +The conception of this right is still more obscured by the complex +nature of the consciousness of right and wrong. A quite different +consciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whether +persons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in most +varied forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, and +frequently in opposition to, the established law. In Christian countries +murder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is a +sacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as a +crime. It is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions of +right. + +There is yet another cause of uncertainty. The moral consciousness of +the same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs and +schools of philosophy. The established law can seldom keep pace with +this inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lags +behind. A condition of things arises where the living moral +consciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, where +legal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and Mephistopheles' +scoffing words are true: + + "Laws are transmitted, as one sees, + Just like inherited disease. + They're handed down from race to race, + And noiseless glide from place to place. + Reason they turn to nonsense; worse, + They make beneficence a curse! + Ah me! That you're a grandson you + As long as you're alive shall rue." + _Faust_ (translation by Sir T. Martin). + +Thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the +same ideas in their private and social intercourse. The conception of +the constitutional State in the strictest sense is an impossibility, and +would lead to an intolerable state of things. The hard and fast +principle must be modified by the progressive development of the fixed +law, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and of +self-help allowed by the community. If sometimes between individuals the +duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a +universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated +relations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its own +conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which +spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical +life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification, +and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and +none can say that one nation has a better right than the other. There +never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here and +there particular relations can be brought under definite international +laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification. +Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international +code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own +conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest +ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an +injustice, and thus dishonour itself. + +Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring +people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and +is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in +the civilized world. Every Arbitration Court must originate in a certain +political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must +treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the +contracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. In this way every +progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may +easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the +expansion of the young and vigorous State in favour of one which is +sinking in the scale of civilization. + +These considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question: +How can the judgment of the Arbitration Court be enforced if any State +refuses to submit to it? Where does the power reside which insures the +execution of this judgment when pronounced? + +In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908 +that the High Court of International Justice established by the second +Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding +decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. +The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this +idea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that +public opinion must represent the view which the American plutocrats +think most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that the +widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material +prosperity, commerce, and money-making. As a matter of fact, public +opinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only be +employed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided. + +We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the +separate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empire +existed. Such an empire never can or will arise again. Even if it did, +it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all +human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the +unchecked rivalry of different groups. + +So long as we live under such a State system as at present, the German +Imperial Chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared, +in his speech in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that treaties for +arbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainable +legal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between two +countries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. Such a treaty merely +proved that between the two contracting States no serious inducement to +break the peace could be imagined. It therefore only confirmed the +relations already existing. "If these relations change, if differences +develop between the two nations which affect their national existence, +which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then every +arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke." + +It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an Arbitration +Court can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlike +decision, even as regards the State in whose favour it is pronounced. If +we imagine, for example, that Silesia had fallen to Frederick the Great +by the finding of a Court of Arbitration, and not by a war of +unparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have been +equally important for Prussia and for Germany? No one will maintain this. + +The material increase in power which accrued to Frederick's country by +the acquisition of Silesia is not to be underestimated. But far more +important was the circumstance that this country could not be conquered +by the strongest European coalition, and that it vindicated its position +as the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. It was +war which laid the foundations of Prussia's power, which amassed a +heritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. War +forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could grow +up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. Here once +more war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons of +history we shall see the same result again and again. + +If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite +aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only +be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as +unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It +is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice +their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and +thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed to +obviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts of +Arbitration--that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formal +law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The +weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and +vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment +on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most +disastrous consequences for humanity generally. + +With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate +appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral +and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration. +So, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highest +material blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; for +the maintenance of national character and political independence; for +the expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of the +national welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nations +according to the scale of their importance in civilization; for +intellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for the +honour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressive +development is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home and +abroad is only a question of time. History speaks with no uncertain +voice on this subject. It shows that valour is a necessary condition of +progress. Where with growing civilization and increasing material +prosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and the +resolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, there +the nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their own +politically or racially. + +"A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political +world when national character and military tradition act and react upon +each." These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war, +and he is incontestably right. + +These efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merely +lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature where the +struggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damaging +and unnerving effect. The apostles of peace draw large sections of a +nation into the spell of their Utopian efforts, and they thus introduce +an element of weakness into the national life; they cripple the +justifiable national pride in independence, and support a nerveless +opportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higher +humanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its own +weakness. They thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, just +as the Prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in +1805 and 1806, and brought the State to the brink of destruction. + +The functions of true humanity are twofold. On the one hand there is the +promotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well as +of political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform development +of character; on the other hand there is the practical realization of +ideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual and +of the community. + +It seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards the +suppression of war with those of the Social Democratic Labour party, +which goes hand in hand with them. The aims of both parties are Utopian. +The organized Labour party strives after an ideal whose realization is +only conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work are +settled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when the +cost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. Until this is the case +the prices of the international market determine the standard of wages. +The nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settle +independently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing its +position in the international market in competition with nations who +work longer hours and at lower rates. Want of employment and extreme +misery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. On the +other hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, by +excluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration of +products and a profound demoralization of the working population. + +The case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. Its execution, as +we saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is as +impossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. A State +which disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouring +countries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guiding +rule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, and +become the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours. + +We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts after +peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with +arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most +countries. "God will see to it," says Treitschke,[I] "that war always +recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!" + +[Footnote I: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 76.] + +Nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in Germany no inconsiderable +danger. We Germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpractical +dreams. "The accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universal +attribute with us, as in France." [J] We lack the true feeling for +political exigencies. A deep social and religious gulf divides the +German people into different political groups, which are bitterly +antagonistic to each other. The traditional feuds in the political world +still endure. The agitation for peace introduces a new element of +weakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our national +and party life. + +[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 81.] + +It is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believe +in the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that the +general good is being advanced by them. Equally true is it, however, +that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfish +political projects. Its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes its +danger. + +Every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionary +schemes. They must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as an +unhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Our +people must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or may +be the goal of a policy_. The policy of a great State has positive aims. +It will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that is +possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentous +questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation, +the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this +conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the +idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating +law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of the +peace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words: + + "Dreams of a peaceful day? + Let him dream who may! + 'War' is our rallying cry, + Onward to victory!" + + + + +CHAPTER II + + + +THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR + +Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that no +one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of +intentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseen +what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation, +and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. In +his "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect: +"Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a +nation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as to +anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [A] + +[Footnote A: "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93.] + +We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to be +regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it +as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out +for so long. It is difficult to gauge its true import. The notion of +forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must not +think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to +be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the +pressure of the whole political situation. + +Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict +letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the +decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own +initiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterances +cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle +of political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only +run counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we exclude +from politics that independence of action which is the true motive +force. + +The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the +natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the +controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. It +does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are +unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourable +position affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statecraft +becomes a tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its +ends. "Men make history," [B] as Bismarck's actions clearly show. + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 28.] + +No doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit of +a peaceful solution. The death of some one man, the setting of some +great ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to change +it fundamentally. But the great disputes in the life of a nation cannot +be settled so simply. The man who wished to bring the question to a +decisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for the +moment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels, +and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilable +interests. With the death of King Edward VII. of England the policy of +isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against +Germany, has broken down. The antagonism of Germany and England, based +on the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, still +persists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not always +profitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening the +tension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of Germany. + +It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should +depend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would be +thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many +unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less +dependent on chance. + +It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician +Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war +should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been +attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a +weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated +should determine political action. + +For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look +to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the +conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and +sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value +is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct +estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of +the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness +of decision. + +If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged +right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as +necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country +the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister +cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far +more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater +sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and +courage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment. +In the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought never +to be brought about falls to the ground. And yet this theory has in our +day found many supporters, especially in Germany. + +Even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war is +impossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banished +from the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should be +postponed so long as possible.[C] + +[Footnote C: Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on +March 30, 1911. In his speech of November 9, 1911, the Imperial +Chancellor referred to the above-quoted words of Prince Bismarck +in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the Morocco question.] + +Those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude as +the supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as +a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing +importance. According to this view, a war recognized as inevitable must +be postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to use +exceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary and +justifiable aspirations by force of arms. + +Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion +that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the +chief duty, of any policy. + +To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite +answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only +the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring +about a war. + +Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that +wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the +happiest results, both politically and socially. A feeble policy has +always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to +take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to +adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as +to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter. +Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most +striking examples of this. + +The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful +and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the +steps of his glorious ancestor. "He noticed how his state occupied an +untenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers, +and showed his determination to give a definite character (_decider cet +etre_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge +the territory of the State and _corriger la figure de la Prusse_, if +Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name +of 'Kingdom.'" [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity, +and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. None of +the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he +postpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be the +aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself +favourable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The whole +history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally +would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of +decision which he showed. + +[Footnote D Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 51.] + +We see a quite different development under the reign of Frederick +William III., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our +nation cannot be too often reminded. + +It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided. +Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the Prussian +Government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied +Russians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great +moral cost. According to all human calculation, the participation of +Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive +superiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and +would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the +moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had +ingrained on her by his wars. At the darkest moment of defeat they shone +most brightly. In spite of the political downfall, the effects of +Frederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired +his State and his people. This is clearly seen in the quite different +attitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under the +degrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny. The power which had been +acquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself +more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it +was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible +the heroic revival of 1813. + +The German wars of Unification also belong to the category of wars +which, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest. +The instability and political weakness which the Prussian Government +showed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of Olmuetz in 1850, had +deeply shaken the political and national importance of Prussia. On the +other hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once more +her duties as a nation, when King William I. and Bismarck were at the +helm, was soon abundantly manifest. Bismarck, by bringing about our +wars of Unification in order to improve radically an untenable position +and secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled the +long-felt wish of the German people, and raised Germany to the +undisputed rank of a first-class European Power. The military successes +and the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for an +unparalleled material prosperity. It is difficult to imagine how +pitiable the progress of the German people would have been had not these +wars been brought about by a deliberate policy. + +The most recent history tells the same story. If we judge the Japanese +standpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fight +Russia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morally +justifiable. It was immensely daring to challenge the Russian giant, but +the purely military conditions were favourable, and the Japanese nation, +which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed an +extended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to open +new channels for her superabundant activities. Japan, from her own point +of view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power in +Eastern Asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of Russia. The Japanese +statesmen were justified by the result. The victorious campaign created +wider conditions of life for the Japanese people and State, and at one +blow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics, +and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to great +material advancement. If this war had been avoided from weakness or +philanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters would +have taken a very different turn. The growing power of Russia in the +Amur district and in Korea would have repelled or at least hindered the +Japanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attained +through this war, glorious alike for military prowess and political +foresight. + +The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has +always led to happy results. Even an unsuccessfully waged war may +sometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vital +interests without a blow. We find an example of this in the recent +heroic struggle of the small Boer States against the British Empire. In +this struggle they were inevitably defeated. It was easy to foresee that +an armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces of +England and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally could +not bear heavy losses. But yet--if all indications are not +misleading--the blood shed by the Boer people will yield a free and +prosperous future. In spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic; +men like President Stein, Botha, and De Wett, with their gallant +followers, performed many great military feats. The whole nation +combined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which Byron +sings: + + "For freedom's battle once begun, + Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, + Though baffled oft, is ever won." + +Inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any later +developments, have been won by this struggle. The Boers have maintained +their place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselves +superior to the English. It was only after many glorious victories that +they yielded to a crushingly superior force. They accumulated a store of +fame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, a +power to be reckoned with. The result of this development is that the +Boers are now the foremost people in South Africa, and that England +preferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by their +continual hostility. This laid the foundation for the United Free States +of South Africa.[E] + +[Footnote E: "War and the Arme Blanche," by Erskine Childers: "The truth +came like a flash ... that all along we had been conquering the +country, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215). + +"To ... aim at so cowing the Boer national spirit, as to gain a +permanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyond +our power to achieve. Peaceable political fusion under our own flag +was the utmost we could secure. That means a conditional surrender, +or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). Lord Roberts wrote +a very appreciative introduction to this book without any protest +against the opinions expressed in it.] + +President Kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and not +Cecil Rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, be +known in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of South Africa, +who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value the +inestimable moral qualities according to their real importance. + +The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been +deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest +results. War, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of political +agent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but in +every case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery. +He who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility. + +It is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision except +from the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existing +conditions which have created national armies. Absolute clearness of +vision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken, +and what political aims justify the use of armed force. + +This question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactory +answer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty of +the State. + +If this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual and +moral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moral +education of the human race, then the State's own acts must necessarily +conform to the moral laws. But the acts of the State cannot be judged by +the standard of individual morality. If the State wished to conform to +this standard it would often find itself at variance with its own +particular duties. The morality of the State must be developed out of +its own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in the +personality of the man and his duties towards society. The morality of +the State must be judged by the nature and _raison d'etre_ of the State, +and not of the individual citizen. But the end-all and be-all of a State +is power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face +should not meddle in politics." [F] + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] + +Machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policy +was the advancement of power. This term, however, has acquired, since +the German Reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewd +Florentine. To him power was desirable in itself; for us "the State is +not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and +promote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by being +applied for the greatest good of mankind." [G] + +[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] + +The criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in the +last resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed his +own nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection." [H] If the +same standard is applied to the State, then "its highest moral duty is +to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the +higher community of which he is a member; but the State is itself the +highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty +of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of +sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for there +is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot +sacrifice itself to something higher. When a State sees its downfall +staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A +sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts +the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a +State." [I] + +[Footnote H: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote I: _Ibid_., i., p 3.] + +I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political +morality better than in the words of our great national historian. But +we can reach the same conclusions by another road. The individual is +responsible only for himself. If, either from weakness or from moral +reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the +consequences of his actions recoil only on him. The situation is quite +different in the case of a State. It represents the ramifying and often +conflicting interests of a community. Should it from any reason neglect +the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal +personality, but it injures also the body of private interests +which it represents. This incalculably far-reaching detriment affects +not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of +individuals and the community. Accordingly it is a moral duty of the +State to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and +promoter of all higher interests. This duty it cannot fulfil unless it +possesses the needful power. + +The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first +and foremost duty of the State. This aspect of the question supplies a +fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can be +estimated. The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this +duty, and thus served the interests of the community? And this not +merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material +interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the +State, and thus indirectly its higher aims. + +It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that +numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the +community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only +natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be +erroneous. Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must +be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy. +"Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most +contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." [J] This +argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads +logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means; +that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures +are permissible. + +[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] + +A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for +political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must +be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. So far as I +know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel +bound to attempt one at this point. War, with which I am dealing at +present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it +pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the +seriousness of warlike measures. I must deviate here a little from my +main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of +political morality. + +The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is +generally assumed. The power of the State does not rest exclusively on +the factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth, +and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements, +which are reciprocally related to the material. The energy with which a +State promotes its own interests and represents the rights of its +citizens in foreign States, the determination which it displays to +support them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor of +strength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselves +to let things come to a crisis in a like case. Similarly a reliable and +honourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with allies +as well as with foes. A statesman is thus under no obligation to deceive +deliberately. He can from the political standpoint avoid all +negotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he will +thereby serve the reputation and power of his State no less than when he +holds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, and +renounces all political formulas and phrases. + +In antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and the +Jesuits have tried to justify regicide.[K] At the present day political +murder is universally condemned from the standpoint of political +morality. The same holds good of preconcerted political deception. A +State which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute. +The man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in a +contradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims, +since he denies it by his actions. It is not, of course, necessary that +a man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to an +opponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point. +But it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise crafty +deceptions. A fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic of +great statesmen. Subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit of +diplomacy. + +[Footnote K: Mariana, "De rege et regis institutione." Toledo, 1598.] + +Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latent +war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a +position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and +deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties +are determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflict +between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and +prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it +is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately +moral nature of that end. + +Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action. +But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are +of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are +conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of +things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the +infringement of the right appears morally justified. York's decision to +conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of +right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made +under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the +Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral. Now it is always +justifiable to terminate an immoral situation. + +As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument +shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultima +ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other +States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful +methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw, +rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. War +therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is +not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the +ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparently +trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully +justifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the State, and consequently +its moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential part +of its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there +is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword +must be drawn to do so. + +In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is +whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the +power of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether the +inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict +greater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantages +which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not +declared. A further point to be considered is whether the general +position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military +success. With these considerations of expediency certain other weighty +aspects of the question must also be faced. + +It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in looking +only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of +the existing generation. Such policy would be opposed to all that +constitutes the essential nature of the State. Its conduct must be +guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is +gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the +future. "The true greatness of the State is that it links the past with +the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to +regard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life." [L] + +[Footnote L: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] + +The law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and in +the decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than the +sacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "I cannot conceive," +Zelter once wrote to Goethe, "how any right deed can be performed +without sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very opposite +of what is desirable." + +A second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely that +which Zelter rightly emphasizes. A great end cannot be attained except +by staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certainty +of success can ever be anticipated. Every undertaking implies a greater +or less venture. The daily intercourse of civic life teaches us this +lesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must be +taken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguely +estimated. In questions of comparatively trifling importance much may be +done by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce a +satisfactory status. The solution of such problems is the sphere of +diplomatic activity. The state of things is quite different when vital +questions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, but +will guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party. +Then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmen +to act. Men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun the +solemn decision of war. In such questions any reluctance to face the +opponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt at +a temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of political +prestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made good +in another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the State, +the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations. + +Not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such a +case. The mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention to +wage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. This +intention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiations +without arms are like music-books without instruments," as Frederick the +Great said. It is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to which +the opponent's purpose yields. When, therefore, the threat of war is +insufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin; +the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the +_duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike. + +Finally, there is a third point to be considered. Cases may occur where +war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no +prospect of success. The responsibility of this has also to be borne. So +at least Frederick the Great thought. His brother Henry, after the +battle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the +Marquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France. Again, +after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but +the King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. He knew better what +suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to +die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. President +Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States of +America on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "It +must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran, +"that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men +and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the +sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war +is in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the most +prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice.... +It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than +not to have fought at all." + +To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher +sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in +itself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by the +consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when +the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and +military situation. + +It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy, +especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only +heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the +reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to +fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties. + +No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain +circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ +war as a political means. So long as all human progress and all natural +development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage +in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible. + +When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting +any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has +forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually +acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there +are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only +await the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the State +towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of +success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable. +When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by +affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements +of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to +promote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced the +more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be +obtained with comparatively small sacrifices. + +These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active +policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and +concentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truth +of Schiller's lines: + + "The chance that once thou hast refused + Will never through the centuries recur." + +The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take +the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the +future to the present need of peace. + +It is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficult +to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist +which justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all the +greater because the historical significance of the act must be +considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its +justification. + +War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successes +which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries. +The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long +epochs.[M] + +[Footnote M: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 2.] +54 +The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a +great State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries; +but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and +keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical +imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can +at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [N] + +[Footnote N: Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft," p. 30.] + +He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State, +and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way +settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of +political morality. + +He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be +fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his +hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the +fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point +he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true +interests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the +definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing +favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the +hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise +with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther +once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write +and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much +greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business +of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and +the marches, etc.--that is what the petty and simple do who only look +with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or +saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to +save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the +sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It +will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful +and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."[O] + +[Footnote O: Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation."] + +Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to +further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of +war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State +and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political +purposes correspond to these problems. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + + +A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL +DEVELOPMENT + +The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is +consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. The +same holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were, +personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely +various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable +of the most different achievements, and serving the most multifarious +purposes in the great evolution of human existence. + +Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the +materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation +to-day. + +According to it, all that happens in the world is a necessary +consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become +conscious. It denies the difference between the empiric and the +intelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom. + +This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seems +everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the +insufficient human intelligence. The existence of the universe is +opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are +incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and +time. + +The essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. We +recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; the +impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our +understanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quite +impossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear--although no +demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual laws +beyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to a +conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual +change. Even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden +moral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread of +civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and +higher forms of life. + +It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in every +individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too +limited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge of +things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to +understand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may also +term the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidance +for our further investigation and procedure. + +The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the history +of the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What is +true," Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised and +supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by +its history." + +The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, the +laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces +have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work +towards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We are +here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget +that States are personalities endowed with very different human +attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that +these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of +States as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very different +effect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour to +grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the +naturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we +wish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study the +history of the German people in its connection with that of the other +European States, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto +followed, and what guidance the past gives for Our future policy. From +the time of their first appearance in history the Germans showed +themselves a first-class civilized people. + +When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians +there were two main elements which shaped the future of the West, +Christianity and the Germans. The Christian teaching preached equal +rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and +slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the +attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the +grave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man, +and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the +individual conscience, the starting-point of all development. It thus +gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose +morality rested solely on the relations with the state. Simultaneously +with this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North poured +victoriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decaying +nations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep their +nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. The +States which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized how +difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a +higher. The Germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. The +German element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and +offered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture of +German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did +the growing nations appear. + +In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world. +The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germans +with the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated +itself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the +Alps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea of +the Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued to +flourish. + +In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until A.D. 1453. In the West, +however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476. +Italy had fallen into the hands of the East Goths and Lombards +successively. The Visigoths had established their dominion in Spain, and +the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul. + +A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with his +powerful hand, extended the Frankish Empire far beyond the boundaries of +Gaul. By the subjugation of the Saxons he became lord of the country +between the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy by +the conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the Western +Roman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. His +successors clung to this claim; but the Frankish Empire soon fell to +pieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards became +France, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the later +Germany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy and +Spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually +amalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East Frankish +Empire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained +their Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerful +German [A] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of Charles the Great to +the Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first _German_ King who +took this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in a +quarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of the +Church, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in +order to prove their pretended title to that country. + +[Footnote A: German (Deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular," +opposed to "foreign"--_e.g._, the Latin Church dialect. It was first +used as the name of a people, in the tenth century A.D.] + +The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living in +Rome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of a +Church which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way +of the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldest +creations of the human intellect--to found and maintain a +world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers. + +Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. The +freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual +dominion. In the portentous struggle of the two Powers for the +supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire, +the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widely +different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a +homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of the +estates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axe +of Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church. + +The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German power +lay on the ground in fragments. A period of almost complete anarchy +followed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad +characteristics of the German people, contributed to extend this +destruction to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the German +people deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power was +budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetry +was passing through a first classical period. Every German country was +ringing with song; the depth of German sentiment found universal +expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealism +inspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empire +every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above +the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The material +prosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better +regulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the Hanseatic League bore +its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great +trade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice and +Genoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never again +attained. + +Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in the +breasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, and +was destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in +the spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church had +lost much of her influence on men's minds. On the other hand, a refining +movement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit of +antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to +the Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined by +everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich von +Hutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed," rang loud through the +districts of Germany. + +Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, which +conceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe to +her foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerly +in the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shed +it's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for +national independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequences +for the development of humanity had been fought out since the Persian +wars. In this cause the German people nearly disappeared, and lost all +political importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned to +foreign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church did +not remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and the +Staufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a +mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself. +Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won an +undisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritual +freedom was established. This most important element of civilization was +retained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become ever +since the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace of +Westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious +freedom. + +The States of the Latin race on their side now put forward strong claims +to the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas of +freedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled among +themselves about the predominance. At the same time, in Germanized +England a firs-class Protestant power was being developed, and the age +of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the Reformation +and the Thirty Years' War, opened new and unsuspected paths to human +intellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a fresh +stimulus. Gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the +newly-discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fell +to the lot of the Germanic and the southern part to that of the Latin +race. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, and +consequently, of world politics. Germany remained excluded from this +great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes +and religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, the +Low Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repel +the inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the French +ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by these +wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world. +Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in +political power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States, +which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the German cause. +But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre of +Protestant power was established in the North--i.e., Prussia. + +After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back the +Slavs, who poured in from the East, in wrestling large tracts from them, +and in completely Germanizing them. This struggle, like that with the +niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which +extended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and successfully planted +Germanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finally +victorious also against Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic. +In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strong +political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an +influential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germany +devolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to Catholic +Austria grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into an +independent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a German +population, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' War +Prussia broke away from Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confronted +France and Russia as an independent Protestant State. + +But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once more +slowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy has exhausted the +resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of the +monarchy, _L'etat c'est moi,_ carried to an extreme, provoked a +tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous +revolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more specially in +Germany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism. +The German Empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary States survived, +among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again under +Napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and +bore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain, +and even to the inhospitable plains of Russia, which by a gradual +political absorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of power +in wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to an +important place among the European nations. Austria, which had become +more and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before the +mighty Corsican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her +dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught. + +But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest +humiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of +the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the +Protestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm, +won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and for +Germany, and paved the way for further world-wide historical +developments. + +While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular +despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights,_ another +quite different revolution was working in Prussia--the revolution of +_duty_. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately +to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State. +Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposition +to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the idea +of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to +sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the +clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis +on which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same time +Stein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in Prussia. + +While measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thus +being adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was to +depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a +German Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in the +domain of art and science, where German character and endeavour found +the deepest and fullest expression. A great change had been effected in +this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year +1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and +deeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised their +minds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlit +heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and +superiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and science +became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this +dismembered people, and decided the victory of Protestantism in German +life." [B] + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte", i., p. 88.] + +Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she +developed the root-idea of the Reformation into the right of +unrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [C] Moral obligations, such as no +nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the +philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs +of her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies was +realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classical +literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as +the political work of the Prussian monarchy", [D] and of those men of +action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin. + +[Footnote C: _Ibid.,_ i., p. 90.] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid._] + +The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an event +in the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the great +annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last +abortion of the revolution--a + + "Part of the power that still + Produces Good, while still devising Ill"; + +on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Let +man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the +religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual +change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; who +gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect, +and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people to +consciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed that +the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain; +a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify +to the divinity in man. + +The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to +whom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate of +the Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront of +humanity. + +Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation +could give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, and +Goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of +Liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny. + +We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great +struggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, and +weakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed +the German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure +enthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expression +in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of +thousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took a +prominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost to +their mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria and +Russia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties. + +Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing up +from the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that no +longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came to +the front, King William I. and the hero of the Saxon forest. Resolutely +they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from +ignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of the +popular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters with +Austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and left +the German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a +Great Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the +vast majority of the German peoples united under the Imperial crown +which the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire was +revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, +and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the North +Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from the +ashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old German +Confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs. + +It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of Germany +vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the +economic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on all +sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed in +between France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed +to gather the full fruits of our victories. The short-sightedness and +party feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag--the old hereditary failings +of our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intense +love of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behind +in the race with other countries. + +In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious +Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found +the second largest colonial Empire in the world; England appropriated +the most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a +comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content +with some modest strips of territory. In addition to, and in connection +with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward. + +Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Frederick the Great, +and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conception +of the State has completely changed since the turn of the century. The +patrimonial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary possession of +the Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents the +reverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant of +the State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is the +key to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of the +State the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the +tendency is as follows: Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and +the nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquire +a uniform national character and common national interests. + +This new order of things entirely altered the basis of international +relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerce +and trade also developed on wholly new lines. + +After 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and trade +restrictions--were gradually removed. Landed property ceased to be a +monopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "England +introduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machinery +into industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by +steamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the same +time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and +chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton. +There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in +the widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension of +colonization over Polynesia, etc." England at the same time girdled the +earth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort of +world-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not, +indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone +days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests +dependent on herself. + +Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, linking the West +and the East, the United States of North America have risen to be an +industrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported by +exceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing +character of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitable +recognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on the +point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy. + + +Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but has +extended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressing +farther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossed +swords with the States of the Mongolian race. This vast population, +which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands of +years of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, and +categorically claims its share in international life. The entrance of +Japan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms. +"Asia for the Asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her +breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power has +emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a European foe. +China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mighty +movement is thrilling Asia--the awakening of a new epoch. + +Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the +civilized countries of Europe, are threatening from Asia, the old cradle +of the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forces +which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of the +French Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized +the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a +consciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers, +originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material +position, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, and +seek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. They do not +wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically +recognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, in +which they themselves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not only +perpetually menace State and society, but endanger in the separate +countries the industries from which they live, since they threaten to +destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by +continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany this +movement has affected large sections of the population. + +Until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture and +cattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of German +industries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in +connection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade has +marvellously increased. Germany has become an industrial and trading +nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds +work and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost its +leading position in the economic life of the people. The artisan +class has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in trade +unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the +international social democracy. It is hostile to the national class +distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of +the State. + +It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous +agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the +anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law of +self-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certain +point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizen +may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an +opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly +devotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grant +this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of +capital. + +Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, it +may create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employment +to all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislation +against every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age, +or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of +work, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him from +working. + +The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of three +victorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large for +present purposes, although without the conscious intention of the State. +German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a +market for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervened +with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. As +Scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of +man, so the Emperor William I. recognized the duty of the State towards +those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The position +of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social +legislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now +existed. + +A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats +indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the +working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing +State and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and +progress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, How +to win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willing +workers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny. + +Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of +all progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world. +Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last +century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a +prominent position through the universality of her philosophy and her +thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things. + +The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature are +attested by the fact that the annual export of German books to foreign +countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that +of France, England, and America combined. It is only in the domain of +the exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to give +precedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win a +leading position. It shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions, +and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our +political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The German +Empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only are +the social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, are +divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter +enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish +denominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between North +and South has prevented the population from growing into a completely +united body. + +So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of +sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into +narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in +her nationality, her intellectual development, in her science, +industries, and trade. + +And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future? +What duties are enforced on us by the past? + +It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the +German State answers this question, depend not only our own further +development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of +the world. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + + +GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION + +Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical +development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of +human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire of +Central Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seeds +of intellectual and moral development were sown by the German +intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with +irresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for the +entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German +people. + +This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on +the freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have ever +and again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nation +whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as +the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the +intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free +and natural development. The Germans have thus always been the +standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark +against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worsted +in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best +heart's blood in the cause. Intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruled +the Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this +people--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the +political attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth +century. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed +into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need of +a free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengaged +itself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened into +world-historical importance. + +Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, on +which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must +rest: the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation, +which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked +all free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop to +the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mind +the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time +pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On this +substructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose +deepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result of +free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a +foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way and +that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and +knowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress. +Reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religious +reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion, +and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not +attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results +of natural philosophy. + +The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle +for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. We +are thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannot +shrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is +being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human +efforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part +in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special +qualities. + +No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate +all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own +spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it +received. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culture +with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the great +community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "Depth of +conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the +limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to +traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all +nations and ages--this has at all times been the German characteristic; +this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture." [A] To no +nation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self +"that which is given to mankind as a whole." We often see in other +nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same +capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which +specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and +imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position. + +[Footnote A: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 95.] + +There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge +our highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we can +mount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of science +and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics +touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results +of scientific inquiry. + +First and foremost it is German science which must regain its +superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate +our birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of the +perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over +Nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more +useful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutions +of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrict +ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit +civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create +conditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can +find its expression. + +It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which +exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition +not only our future development, but the higher life generally. These +problems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply and +permanently than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the +empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany. +The German nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, which +works slowly in opposition to the different movements. The Germans thus +seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great +controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into +the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of +evolution. + +We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no +doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the +community and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts to +find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class +with healthy and patriotic ambitions. + +It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty, +requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed +upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation, +and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity +which is lamentably deficient to-day. + +No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The old +antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in +Germany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and +political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute +liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the +conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present there +appears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism of +Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of +the Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movement +can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect +of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is +rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially all +denominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must never +renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To +do so would mean loss of prestige. + +Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of human +civilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir of +a great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no less +significance in the sphere of its international relations. These +problems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply the +intellectual development, and on their solution depends the position of +Germany in the world. + +The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms +and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered +geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the +Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large +number of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other +States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have +developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national +customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of +her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most +characteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie +outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the +strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against +the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves +are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism, +which seems to have lost its old victorious strength. + +Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the +overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign +countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is +absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even +to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its +increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of +living. + +This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, +or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its +intellectual importance. + +At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course of +centuries grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of all +political significance, a large section of our people did not feel this +insufficiency. Even during the age of our classical literature the +patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the +thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of German +genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship." [B] + +[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 195.] + +Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines: + + "German majesty and honour + Fall not with the princes' crown; + When amid the flames of war + German Empire crashes down, + German greatness stands unscathed." [C] + +[Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905 +by Bernhard Suphan.] + +The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds +different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence +of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since +we must now take into consideration the immense development of Germany +in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old +importance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from the +vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due +measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political +federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can +only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act +in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties +towards the human race. + +Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding +the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a +foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the +ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to +imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched +again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly +threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely +repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics +from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance +westwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. On +the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions +which were once under German influence are now once more subject to +Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Russian +Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The +German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs; +Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic +workmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia. +Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic +flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an +obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of +self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined +whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is +not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will +be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict +grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and +show less determination to protect the German soil at all costs. + +The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their +struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their +nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot +withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our +trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but +they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. +The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, +and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the +Government must reckon. + +Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to +preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of +universal culture. + +Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and +in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the +world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful +as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are +contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while +the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we +wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our +civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back +in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world. + +Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1, +1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is +already large enough and does not need expansion.... We shall have to +consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... We +have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to +take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should +receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [D] + +[Footnote D: This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister +Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."] + +That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed. + +If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we +survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must +admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not +here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of +the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language. + +England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from +the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies which +are directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in the +interest of English industries and English capital. The work of +civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has +always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her +sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by +transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent +culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy +self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as +Canada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they +will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not +only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the +present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in +the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to +secure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is a +great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and +it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence. + +The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by +them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister, +Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Ten +years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France +has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in +every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be +spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown +in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of +Heaven." [E] + +[Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."] + +The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German +policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading +thought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputes +under which the partition of Africa and the last phase of French +colonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents to +Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distant +and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of +the country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, it +is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run, +since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed, +tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned +colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have +obtained the best shares." + +This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with +mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital +powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for +colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria, +has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and +prides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte +and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the +Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France +in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy +alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany. + +The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of +attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In the +face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its +importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place +in the sun, as Prince Buelow used modestly to express it, but to aspire +to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the +limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach this +goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never +again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be +opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international +politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair +rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality +and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to +them. + +Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a +fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity. + +The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and +improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of +great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely +extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary +capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more +brilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have +returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The +increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to +a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative +industrial occupation. + +There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid +development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the +import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale +of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of +life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which +England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take +much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to +close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order to +encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of +other countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends +on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question +of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall +very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population +means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the +question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of +population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and +home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation +will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for +the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We +shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to +surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in +the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a +home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland. +There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the +unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from +building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and +at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers, +may keep our sea communications open. + +We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial +possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are +only used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think of +colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal +population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and +immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which +retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance +for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each +nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is +quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count +among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be." +[F] + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 8.] + +We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our +requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our +growing working population, but would supply raw materials and +foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that +immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying +unproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We +find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers, +and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign +masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged, +do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will +depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world +speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the +German Empire? + +These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from +the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its +present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this +point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and +hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political +relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course +of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to +political paralysis at the time when the great European States built +themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not +enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in +politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long +concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural +development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power, +international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What +we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior +force of hostile interests and Powers. + +It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths +we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our +forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the +straight road of our intended development. + +The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an +advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension, +it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often +follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to +stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every +occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will +be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + + +WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL + +In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its +history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted +to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the +Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, +must be the basis of our future development. + +The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international +relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the +impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character +and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even +at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and +our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it +will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us. + + "The man of sense will by the forelock clutch + Whatever lies within his power, + Stick fast to it, and neither shirk, + Nor from his enterprise be thrust, + But, having once begun to work, + Go working on because he must." + _Faust_ + (translated by Sir Theodore Martin). + +The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the +hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing +territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of +both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of +these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity, +examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which +concern us are weighed one against the other. + +These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly +to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the +States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must +try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the +day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations +of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion. +We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions +of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and +therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines +of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a +country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or +timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not +seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy +is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men +who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and +often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such +digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his +opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the +student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep +his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must +therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense +clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions. + +We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps. + +On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive +alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In +this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably +unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately +connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States +combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the +North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical +national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to +shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred +battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the +bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the +Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of +Slavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories. +There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the +struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and +commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those +of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react +detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between +Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of +overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its +political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be +assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so +long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the +Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy +to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during +the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered +such an alliance possible. + +The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of +Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show +many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough +to influence the political position of the Empire. + +Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The +antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will +diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a +natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by +Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its +political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from +her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her +true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is +the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power. +That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor +Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a +permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in +Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural +colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by +Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, +even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this +annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We +should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the +Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and +France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance. + + +The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive +character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but +does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not +guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential +interests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in +its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events. +Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences," pointed out that +this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the +future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her +Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with +England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance. +The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an +undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct +opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in +order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This +undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as +the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the +encroachment of Italy into those regions. + +The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has +suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in +the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy +look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to +the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not +regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied +armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We +must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the +Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we +calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own +political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to +strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an +essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of +the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then +will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real +meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative +results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital +interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with +sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not +concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the +consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, +indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would +probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria. +Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of +Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and +incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a +contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we +must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France. + +England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts +to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in +Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which +secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in +commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's +Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in +combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the +coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against +England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding +such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She +is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of +the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make +overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies +can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It is +our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can. + +France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European +Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of +_revanche_. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she +has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the +humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the +defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she +wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and, +if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe +which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune +smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too +weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all +protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for +this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, are +inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this +latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, +and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to +Germany than from Russia. + +The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring +a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The +establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of +a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political +annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, +so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible +illusion as to its extent and meaning. + +Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to +approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her +North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that +strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of +colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French +sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France +will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her +best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in +every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the +Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed +them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance +which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable +that she will maintain honourably and with no _arriere-pensee_ the +obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco. +The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the +French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The French +policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on +the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite +unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can +be negotiated before the question between them has been once more +decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France +sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but +strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the +East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others. + +The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and +of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is +following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to +an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central +Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _status +quo_. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with +Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be +overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any +aggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seems +likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more +reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanying +events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of +internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable, +therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention +in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept +away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose, +meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and +an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although +this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions +of Germany in North Persia. + +It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is +adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the +mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether +in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the +direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the +dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate +to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has +long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the +Baltic. + +Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, +and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European +policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself, +also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years +been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into +Central Europe. + +Pan-Slavism is still hard at work. + +It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement +and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Her +present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the +present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong +monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the +internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation +is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry +is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from +what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a +healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Government +has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed +expectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under the +stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an +attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad. +Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in +the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China, +must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly, +Turkey. + +Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the +Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not +identical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive +war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She +wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of +Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and +East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on +advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed. +Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with +Germany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of the +German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore +always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths. + +England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian +Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the +spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France +she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany +under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms. + +The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the +heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So, +also, no natural community of interests exists between England and +France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to +any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an +Anglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostility +to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two +States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might +mask the real objects. + +This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very +comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made +astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which +commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which +England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may +well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political +and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition +in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The +American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and +will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the +point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far +as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite +of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily +directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in +order to understand the line of thought which guides the English +politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found +in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the +world. + +Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of +view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of +Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the +other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North +America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenest +competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The +annexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty with +Japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two +nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked, +and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union +are so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vast +distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very +bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly has +always diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as quite recently +in the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the object +clearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearing +the consequences of such collision. The American competition in trade +and industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated as +inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense, +according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty by +which a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established. + +England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America. +The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in the +further development of things, be so accentuated that England will be +forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an +undisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action. +The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strained +to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the Arbitration +Treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does not +consider that the present political relations of the two nations are +permanent. + +There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly +threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India +and Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation for +independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the +Low-German element in South Africa. + +Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English +position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national +movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it +clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement. +She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine +the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support, +and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in +opposition to the Caliphate. + +The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where +some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England, +so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, has +attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But +now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows +itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism, +thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of +Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave +danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in +the world. + +While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and +abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together, +either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto. +Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union has +definitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the Imperial +Conference in 1911 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated. +.... When the question of imperial defence came up, the policy was +rejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the oversea +dominions in every imaginable eventuality." The great self-ruled +colonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour of +need, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employed +wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not +approve." [A] There are clear indications that the policy of the +dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is +contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and +Australia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV., into independent +nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal +independence. + +[Footnote A: Th. Schiemann in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of July 5, 1911.] + +All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of +England's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitude +towards Germany. + +England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her +imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must +be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must +not be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be +destroyed. + +A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great +English colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distant +parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of +expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet +might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory +which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of +England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability of +expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can +no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall +victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered. + +The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the +German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer +a prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without any +excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet, +contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a +correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French +fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely +getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other +contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable +means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years +to come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importance +of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia. + +The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters. +It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance of +power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one +of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled +and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's +stage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes +undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This +policy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each +other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directly +from this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen +France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State +which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born +rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the +East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus +the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England's +most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and +self-evident. + +The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would +chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is +the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of +the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English +point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war. +England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a +large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before +the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and +to some extent a great benefit, to English industries. + +After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite +comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check +the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in +large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is +building, and attack the objectionable neighbour. + +English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt +to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the +most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance--Germany, England, and +America--has been suggested.[B] But for such a union with Germany to be +possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German +development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our +colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial +and industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her +traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the +Great Powers in the world. + +[Footnote B: "The United States and the War Cloud in Europe," by Th. +Schiemann, _McClure's Magazine_, June, 1910.] + +It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent +to that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacit +approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of +the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements +of English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and +the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable +indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy. +The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every +expansion of Germany's power were openly shown in the very recent +Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on +the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without +a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp. + +A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which +no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep +the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our +political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves +with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and +Utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter +the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixity +of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a +vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire. + +On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part in +English policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the one +side, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out +her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her +fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the +political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy +in the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political, +notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically +with those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this. + +No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has at +present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in +the sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding with +Germany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely that +the Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of +England. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded in +inflicting a political and military defeat on Germany. + +For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations about +Arbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany. +There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us +in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutely +opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement +in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the +nature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen +competition between the two countries, especially in South America; +there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political +complications. + +Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only +in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China. +In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and +seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to +count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitude +to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions +in East Asia. If the two nations joined hands--a hardly probable +eventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain an +independent position between them. The political rivalry between +the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they are +antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other +in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to +retain their possessions in Asia. + +While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present +directly influence our policy, Turkey--the predominant Power of the Near +East--is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is +emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest +course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple +Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which +threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. +Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against +Russia and against England--the two States, that is, with whose +hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can +threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short +sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no +sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a +war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to +the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding +position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important +key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong +to Russia or England. + +If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so +long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern +basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters. +Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a +development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be +strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite +impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position, +while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her. +From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the +Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of +Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be. + +Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent +importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her +Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German +policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres +of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means +negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey; +Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for +Germany. + +Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared +neutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20, 1815, under the +collective guarantee [C] of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in the +Treaties of London of November 15,1831, and of April 19,1839, on the +part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself. + +[Footnote C: By a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of the +contracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all +agree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the _right_ to +interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced.] + +If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the +continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance +and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement +balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we +take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be +guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple +Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In +consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France, +and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to +Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not +inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all +considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political +superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in +strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English +landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy +really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior +forces will be united against Germany and Austria. + +Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily +difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our +nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an +extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we +are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets +for our growing industries. But at every step which we take in this +direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet +have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, +by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further +expansion of German international influence and of German maritime +power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the +English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved +in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not +neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her +extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, +will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off +the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be +only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be +paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces +in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against +France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps +with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on +the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position +lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion +barred. + +Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the +international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, +cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, +though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the +one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and +warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with +which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where +their interests clash. + +With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but +not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently +peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, +but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisis +in the history of the German nation. + +We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our +position among the Powers of _Europe_; we now must decide whether we +wish to develop into and maintain a _World Empire_, and procure for +German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been +hitherto withheld from them. + +Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make +the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we +willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower +in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is +involved in our decision. + +"To be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day, +disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests +and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official +peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history +inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the +narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region +of realities. + +There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and +development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the _status +quo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever +seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and +temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to +gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the +trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior +tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the +powers of a continuous development. + +We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing +still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, +and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with +our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are +straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to +extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and +advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with +peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to +continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon +us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our +arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and +we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be +sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and +the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritual +and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German +thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind. + +If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a +catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to +attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at +the risk of a war with numerically superior foes. + +Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by +acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German +colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from +Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual +incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former +South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of +Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish +population. + +Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our +political power in other ways. + +In the first place, our political position would be considerably +consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that +France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find +ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another _we +must square our account with France_ if we wish for a free hand in our +international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a +sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all +cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by +force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never +again come across our path. + +Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political +power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case +of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with +armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by +our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same +lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be +presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good +policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and +the Triple Alliance has already been discussed. + +Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the +Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as +mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan +Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further +intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in +Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence, +in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the +integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their +independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best +secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might +eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central +European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by +this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily +unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be +essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the +expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the +geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of +the political community based on it. + +We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial +territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our +population. Very recent events have shown that, under certain +circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa +by pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugal +might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the +Portuguese colonies. We may assume that some understanding exists +between England and Germany which contemplates a division of the +Portuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_. +It cannot, indeed, be certain that England, if the contingency arrives, +would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually +exists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even been +often said, although disputed in other quarters, that Great Britain, +after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of the +Portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugal +the possession of _all_ her colonies. + +Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our +African territory would be possible. These need not be discussed here +more particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of +a successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of +territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require +countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there +are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the +settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our +overflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generally +speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our +industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the +growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This +represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us +from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization. + +A part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditions +point--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of +the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of +providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but +remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign +countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our +exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture. + +An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity. +It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace +the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for +the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. This +notion is only justified in a certain sense. In the first place, such a +policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow +population in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee the +certainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. It secures to +all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means +competition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political power +which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the +economic relations. The principle of the open door prevails +everywhere--in Egypt, Manchuria, in the Congo State, in Morocco--and +everywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: in +Manchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and in +Morocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fall +naturally to that State which is practically dominant; its products are +bought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power of +the State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar +advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be +evaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best be +regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonial +policy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies or its own +and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets +lie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations. + +The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many +old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European +policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in +Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost +sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely +disregarded. + +The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling +that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for +the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the +limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays +the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence +in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory +of balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power, +and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain +guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The +conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a close +community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into +political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort +of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a +State-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five +Great Powers--England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which +latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866 +Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power. + +"Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among +the nations." "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a +real equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated,"[D] This +condition does not exist between the European nations. England by +herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow +themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of +French. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by +special alliances. One result only has been obtained--the hindrance of +the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in +particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power +can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing +state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of +rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually +ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers +which stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England's +policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and +to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order +herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and +the sovereignty of the world. + +[Footnote D: Treitschke.] + +We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present +distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a +State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of +course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just +basis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of one +embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is +established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in +this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central +European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in +one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase +our own power. + +A further question, suggested by the present political position, is +whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning +of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a +different conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be, +permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one +contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of +Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory +is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State from +which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has +no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This +argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, +in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last +mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the +neutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic, +since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral +country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to +the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest +moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development +presupposes such competition. + +[Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without +guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.] + +Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal +affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the +State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and +powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference +in the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances of +such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in the +private affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but +none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval +preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international +intercourse that between the States of one and the same political system +a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The +unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to +political intercourse under all conditions involves serious +difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first +preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord +Palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false is +the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States +of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for +international politics can be laid down. + +After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals; +and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his +affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the +individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates +the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the +State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But +no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide +whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its +own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State +renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should +circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party +disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat +to the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every State +acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of +another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an +interference may become." On the other hand, it must be remembered that +the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still +graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international +right, but simply and solely on power and expediency. + +I have gone closely into these questions of international policy +because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly +influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and +may give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential that +we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by +considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only +depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must +remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any +circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that +the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as +possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions +possible. "No man," so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3, +1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to +make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take +advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position." + +If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which +guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our +forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts. + +The political and national development of the German people has always, +so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the +hereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism of +the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, +the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national +objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, +also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is +painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so +restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in +fruitless quarrels among themselves. + +Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome +these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy, +consistent development of our power. + +It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual and +social life arising from the like variety of the German nationality and +political system offers valuable advantages. It presents countless +centres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a high +spiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development. +But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference of +this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics. + +Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions +which are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugal +forces of the German nature--the common system of defence of our country +by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong +national empire. + +No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its own +destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to +no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. A +glance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which +is forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day. + +The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the common +interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions, +as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful +personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to +stir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality, +and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union. + +We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of +acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends +through and for our people. + +Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German character +to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development +of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific, +and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State is +beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the +independence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills and +stunts the independence of free men." [F] This independence of the +individual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the State, +forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central +power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our +social conditions. + +[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 2.] + +We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, +together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, +not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in +the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our +great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great +part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the +contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our +political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the +nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably +beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once +again, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament will +be heard: + + "O Germany, thy oaks still stand, + But thou art fallen, glorious land!" + KOeRNER. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + + +THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR + +Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture +to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by +formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will be +impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future +without an appeal to arms. + +Knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the political +situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible +for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an +army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to +battle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time +down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of +need. + +Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for +warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of +the situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested in +the Reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to +understand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic +misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these +for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country) +cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand, +brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great +wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is +often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national +duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our +people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be +ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to +discharge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of +preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are +passing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable to +consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so +much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect; +we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true +interests of the country better than by improving its military +capabilities. + +Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it must +maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national +asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the +war and supply the requisite means. + +This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in +national development. + +As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold +the field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, do +not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of +victory--so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with the +people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is +capable of wielding the sword with success. + +Military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but it +develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the +occupations of peace. It educates a man to the full mastery of his body, +to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental +powers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him to +order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respect +and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work. + +It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service +deprives economic life of forces which could have been more +appropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. These forces are +not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life. +Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly +repay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. It +is therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of its +countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of +war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and +improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which +the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly +an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and +educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus +promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than +achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which +certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the +national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them +a number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency to +luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations. +Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level +as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must +complete and assist the other. But a people which does not willingly +bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service +renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and +assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are +one-sided and evanescent. + +It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligations +towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all +tendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. The +method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power +can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depends +largely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical and +political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently +ranges between very wide extremes. + +In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military +training was almost exclusively left to the individual. That was +sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made +them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to +hard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination, +subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military +system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the +conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made +to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account +of political possibilities. The great European States maintain standing +armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or +shorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenary +army, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filled +by volunteers. + +In these various ways different degrees of military efficiency are +obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and +intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the +requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities +become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency. + +When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that +with growing civilization the requisite military capacities are always +changing. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldiers +who fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different from +those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have the +physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities +expected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to the +individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of +warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in +the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it +is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. The +preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military +sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized +State from those in countries, standing on a lower level of +civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war +is fought under relatively simple conditions. + +The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less +developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form +of military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising +herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps +in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and +proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and +educational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, by +employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it +never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development. + +When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find +ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical +and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact +with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself. + +A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard +to the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed in +the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other +ways. We see the individual States--according to their geographical +position, their relations to other States and the military strength of +their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater +or less importance in the political system of the world--making their +military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and +expenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life of +civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its +emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is +everywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a _means_ of +attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength. + +Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position +and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify +her policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only +with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling +a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a +continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. As +a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental +European war against her will. + +So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties, +and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays +most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to +develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the +security afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America, +again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest +limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval +power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the +continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any +considerable forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea +conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has +acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly +with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made +concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her +position in the world. + +While in some States a restriction of armaments is natural and +justifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerve +to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of +Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political +pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they +are no longer justified by the size of her population and her +international importance. France affords a conspicuous example of +self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral +duties. + +In the other European States, as in France, external political +conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate +the method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, which +necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own +justification. + +A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of +nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in +the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength +to safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, under +certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and +political schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be +deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements +of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and +maintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of all +opposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases. + +A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on the +friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as +fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international +conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support +from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and under +what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the +consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own +sphere of power. + +This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State +is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace +the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary +expenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it is +itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the +largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another +aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power of +such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison +with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable +military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a +view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military +preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a +defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent +interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision +will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a +real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective +addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist. +The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary +State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain +influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local +conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of +the country. + +It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the +utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such +is, in fact, the case. + +In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with the +political and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy, +preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland, +situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political +independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Germany and the +navy of England. + +The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on +its own power. + +The power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies will +have a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans and +military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes; +but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations +alone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent and +unqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless, +and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and +shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed. + +The military power of an independent State in the true sense must +guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests +of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of +development. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be +considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military +efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions +must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object +thereby to be gained. This object--of which each individual must be +conscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises +the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of +the State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen. + +A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital +factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the +healthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope in +international competition. This is also an essential condition for the +unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where the +natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by external +circumstances, nation and State are stunted and individual growth is set +back. + +Increasing political power and the consequent multiplication of +possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the +intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by +every phase of history. + +The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself +first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of +statesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by force +of arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty of +every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale +commensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemy +cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On the +contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most +strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for +the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than +ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very +important factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits, +which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of +superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be +spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a +small, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War has +proved this once more. + +Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of +every State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert +_power_, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of its +personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the +narrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible nor +profitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined +by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious +development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military +elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system +cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. It +needs a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. In +the Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attacking +strength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, because +its foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political and +moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas. + +The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the +political necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree of +warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may +be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State's +duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst out +whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is +brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of +the State and of the army. + +It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties +of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. The +social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the +duty of the State in a quite different light from the political +_dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing +of things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to the +welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons +on the horizon of the future. + +Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the +nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these +momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and +experienced thinkers. + +First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in +the present political world, even though all the elements for it are +present. + +Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to +40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so +much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are +annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is +set up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would be +available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would not +mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say +a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on +active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from +such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the +continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike +weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the +individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the +highest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the +beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre +cannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been +ordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of the +strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the +rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins his +service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier. +With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we +merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. We +must not regard the present only, but provide for the future. + +The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makes +the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes +of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of +arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity +of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is +sinning against his country. + +The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations, +oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of +things--these turn the scale. + +When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last century +undertook the reorganization of the Prussian army, no political tension +existed. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King had +perceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet the +requirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his +people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations +without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun. +In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has +powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being +under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful +co-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed was +universally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, and +accorded with traditional German sentiment. + +While the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of the +political influences of the day, the military power of the probable +opponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink without +jeopardizing the national safety. + +Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries +of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all +these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the +hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an +obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as +up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by +every means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the army +must be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, in +which a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may be +attained. + +Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree +regulated by the political position of the State. If the State has +satisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping +its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive +character. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous of +expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must +adopt a predominantly offensive military system. + +Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are +dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide +scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where +the discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may lead +to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war, +and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In +this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so +clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that +the majority of the nation accept his view. There are always and +everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own, +and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses. + +Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command +of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful +position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the +population in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is +too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets +public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles, +feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, which +was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in the +military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary +unanimity. + +Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political independence +rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of +self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly +supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it +should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great +duties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic +evasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at +home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects +of our policy. + +To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion, +as King William I. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the +control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray +too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly +great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany. +He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of +inflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people. + +One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that +permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake +of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the +taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious +benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct +disadvantages. + +The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by +the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the +sacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefully +in view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the +conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But +where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual +enforcement of universal service or of the requirements on which +readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in +order to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in order +to maintain its vitality. + +One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction +preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing +conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military +authorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy, +since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon. +Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty to +perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit. + +It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to +disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of +the preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarily +available. "No expenditure without security," runs the formula in which +this policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security is +fixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the duties +which must be fulfilled--as Treitschke, our great historian and national +politician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the great +Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by +sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically +indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the +nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that +the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He +can only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the Ministers +for Commerce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to break +down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the +individual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to create +favourable conditions for profitable business. A great impulse must +thrill the whole productive and financial circles of the State, if the +duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled. + +Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls for +very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the +entire social and political life of the people and on the financial +policy of the State. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + + +THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR + +The social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defend +itself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strength +of the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors which +determine the conditions of preparation for war. + +I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres +of policy and progress which our history and our national character +impose on us. My next task is to observe the possible military +combinations which we must be prepared to face. + +In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can +judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political +intentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movements +will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and +this war will decide our future. + +It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our +probable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessary +basis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves the +intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable +efficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is +determined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions +clash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as to +the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data +available. + +If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups +of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results: +According to the recent communications of the French Finance Minister +Klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan), +the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910 +amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial +Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to +the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service +auxiliaire "--that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in +for service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to the +information of the same Minister, including field army and reserves, +consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. A reduction from +this number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sources +put down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army and +reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000. + +To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1,700,000 +Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per +cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made. + +If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will +correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength +of separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the +2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to the +infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a +considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the +transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers, +70,000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical +service, etc.), 90,000. + +No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per +cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the +birth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly, +it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. Recourse already has been had to the +expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of +filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less +efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves. + +Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the +plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians +and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with +them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and +trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited +conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria. +The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and +conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops are +in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops +stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers +against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are +heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the +Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the +climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops. +The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the +march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value. +There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with +every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative +proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native +Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before +Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the +native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War, +Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians. +An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age +available for military service. The Commission appointed for the purpose +reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in +the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined +some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. They +could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen +the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in +the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the +formation of reserves. + +As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in her +West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops +available. As the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000, +these figures may be considerably raised. + +Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalese +sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912 +a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to +Algeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black +troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. There +is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being +transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient +number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3, +stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the +Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France. +Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a +strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be +available for a European war is still remote. But it cannot be +questioned that they will be so some day. + +Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops in +Europe contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but +the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the +territory termed "Morocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to +come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale. +The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in +organizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the +command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco. + +The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great addition +to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the +country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and France will +certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in +military matters. + +For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the +reinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained from +Algeria and Tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription is +universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000 +men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have +witnessed their exploits on the battlefields of Weissenburg and Woerth. +At least one strong division of Turcos is already available. + +Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the military +power of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are not +published, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information is +forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service, +but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According to +the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the +Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of +Cossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formed +into 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe; +3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry is +divided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independent +regiments. + +In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures +42,000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strength +of 20,000. Each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry +divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive +at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions, +sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be added +unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the +war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000. + +This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. The +Siberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would +certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For the +maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to +leave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least one +division at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. This +would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men; so that +we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army, +1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of +Cossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men, +and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case +of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men +available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank +for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed +to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a +certain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not known +which of these formations would be really raised in event of +mobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be +put into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces which +must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could +easily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whether +arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in +sufficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empire +like Russia in this respect. + +Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to +England, the third member of the Triple Entente. + +The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into two +divisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed by +the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have +at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of +formation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns any +European theatre of war. + +The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinet +divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the +native troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army, +a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total +of 300,000. It is now 270,000 strong, and is destined exclusively for +home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very +highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We +have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army. +This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which seven +are with the colours and five in the reserve. The annual supply of +recruits is 35,000. The regular reserve is now 136,000 strong. There is +also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted +for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the +figure of 200,000. + +Of the regular English army, 134,000 men are stationed in England, +74,500 in India (where, in combination with 159,000 native troops, they +form the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39,000 in different +stations--Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the other +Colonies and Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt +are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in +the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong) +one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in +view of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of the +English is precarious. The 11,000 troops now stationed in South Africa +are to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. In +event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there. + +For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account the +regular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regular +field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted +brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and +trains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form part +of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. They consist of a +very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for +coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with +some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home +Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing +its organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of this +army can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150,000 men may +be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troops +compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the +Colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutes +the weak point in the British armament. England can employ her regular +army in a Continental war so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies. +This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war +break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and +especially in Egypt. + +Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente can +put into the field, Germany can command an active army of 589,705 men +(on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about +25,500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a peace footing is +361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. The combined war strength +of the two States may be estimated as follows: + +In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and +non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an +average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of +3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we +have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment to +it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French +can match with about the same figures. + +The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,000. Liability to +serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the +Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a +total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent., +911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained +Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to +911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a +grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as +Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe. + +In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available +for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would +be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available, +partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion. +However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never +reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia +present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the +enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent +generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the +addition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would +not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field. + +In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must +be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are already +reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple +Alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the +field against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France are +available against Germany. + +[Footnote A: Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne."] + +The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000 +men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry, +in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of +Bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regiments +in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are +united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field +artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193 +field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountain +batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies. +Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regiment +and an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28,000 men. + +On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. Some 70,000 +men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. The +militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might +be mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9 +army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the +Territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions. + +As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48 +officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500 +native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned +officers and privates of Italian birth, and 3,800 natives. + +Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it is +questionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value. +It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence, +while the protection of Tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim a +powerful army if it is to be held against France. + +The Turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joined +the coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents. + +The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275,000 +men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it: + +I. The Active Army (Nizam): + + Infantry 133,000 + Cavalry 26,000 + Artillery 43,000 + Pioneers 4,500 + Special troops 7,500 + Train formations 3,000 + Mechanics 3,000 + +A total, that is, of 220,000 men. + +2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. Within +this limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns for +short trainings. + +3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military employes, officials, +and others, more than 30,000. + +The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. We +need only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia, +Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in a +European theatre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be +regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for +local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior. +To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplest +process. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the +Turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. Turkey thus is +a very valuable ally to whichever party she joins. + +The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies into +the field. + +Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons +and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and +home duties. + +Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing; +this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The +war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000 +rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4 +guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and +228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (third +line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the +militia, an uncertain quantity. + +The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not +known how they are distributed among the various branches of the +service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including +infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine +guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and +national militia, which latter is only available for home service and +comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be +400,000 strong. + +Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power +in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to +their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia +cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of +their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods. + +In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the +permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. The +infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent +cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery +14,000 men with 700 officers. + +For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000 +men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry, +7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is +therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part +of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves +and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000 +trained men available for service. + +Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chiefly +concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into +relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European +States may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if +they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a +European war. + +Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under +consideration, and then Belgium. + +Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men. +The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive +war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns +and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a +total of 141,000 men. + +The Landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36 +12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total +strength of 69,000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000 +men. + +The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which +varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally +available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400 +garrison artillery, and I,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport +troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000 +infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400 +artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of +15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There +is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active +and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot +artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers, +including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder, +Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Voelkerack and Haringvliet there are various +outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present +unimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications +in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland). + +Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English +landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. It +would easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us. + + +Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows: +26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison +artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service. + +On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising +74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers +and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry +divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each +of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1 +squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a +garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde +civique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as +a very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are +the fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast +fortifications. + +Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great +military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong +fortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of +strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This +State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, +2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the +strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. In war-time an army of 62,000 +men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically +of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special +arms. + +Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises units +from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as +well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which +is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There +are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students +from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age. + +The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can, +accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case +of war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head. + +In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might in +combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to +Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men +can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the +Landwehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm. + +Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently +stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active +army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is +so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could +at most be put into the field. + +As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the +accompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affords +a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that, +numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours. +This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of +really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four +battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have +ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned +battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The +comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, +that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be +noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really +have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be +counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the +number of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto known +about the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respect +of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important +factor if allied with the English. + + |Battle- |Armoured |Armoured| Armoured |Protected |Number |N S +Nation. |ships |Coast |Gunboats| Cruisers |Cruisers |of |u u + |above |Defence |and | | |Torpedo |m b + |5,000 |Vessels |Armoured| | |Vessels |b m + |Tons. |from |Ships | | | |e a + | |3000 Tons|under | | | |r r + | |to 5,000 |3,000 | | | | i + | |Tons |Tons | | | | i + +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n + |No|Displ. |No|Displ.|No|Displ|No|Displ. |No|Displ. | |From|f e + | | | | | | | | | | |200+|80- | s + | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| 200| + | | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| +---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- +GERMANY: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |25|332,410| 5|20,600| -| --- |10|114,590|33|122,130| 117| 70| 12 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building|12| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4| --- | 7| --- | 14| -- | -- + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +ENGLAND: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |50|793,260| -| --- | -| --- |38|484,970|66|333,540| 223| 36| 53 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building|12|286,640| -| --- | -| --- | 6|145,320|20|101,320| 51| -- | 19 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +FRANCE: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |22|314,930| -| --- | -| --- |22|214,670|10| 50,780| 71| 191| 52 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| 93,880| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 13| -- | 19 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +ITALY: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready | 8| 96,980| -| --- | -| --- |10| 79,530| 4| 10,040| 53| 39| 7 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| 84,000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 10,200| 14| 28| 13 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +AUSTRIA- | | | | | | | | | | | | | + HUNGARY | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |11|102,620| -| --- | -| --- | 3| 18,870| 4| 10,590| 18| 66| 7 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 5| 94,500| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| --- | 6| -- | -- + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +RUSSIA: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Baltic | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Ready | 4| 62,300| -| --- | 1|1,760| 6| 64,950| 4| 27,270| 60| 19| 13 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 8| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 1| -- | 1 +Black Sea| | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Ready | 6| 72,640| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 13,620| 17| 10| 4 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 4| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 7 +Siberian | | | | | | | | | | | | | + Fleet |--| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 2| 9,180| 20| 7| 13 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +UNITED | | | | | | | | | | | | | + STATES: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |30|434,890| 4|13,120| -| --- |14|181,260|16| 65,270| 40| 28| 19 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 7|190,000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 20 + | | | | | | | | | | | | | +JAPAN: | | | | | | | | | | | | | +Ready |13|194,690| 2| 8,540| -| --- |13|139,830|12| 49,170| 59| 49| 12 +Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | + building| 3| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4|107,120| 3| 15,000| 2| -- | 1 +---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- + +Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leave +a certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be stronger +than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in +event of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further assume +that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-European +stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together +can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships +alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by +a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia +joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition +to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since +the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships, +and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our +coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the +other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of +the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be +superior to us. + +As regards _materiel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is +distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our +equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a +superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless +energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up +some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these +advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of +an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English. + +Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under +certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in +this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente +can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time. + +If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of +the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany, +we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in +every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are +very different. + +If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed +she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member +of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course, +very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost +equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization +and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The +French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united +spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of +the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too, +has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to +double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the +French succeed in making a large African army available for a European +theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with +ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind, +for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may +safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if +only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well +that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of +her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by +the exercise of extraordinary efforts. + +It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military +power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself +desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably +not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her +own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured +the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too +high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has +all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, +and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must +expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple +Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have +struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination +with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would +attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, +and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the +fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the +considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and +threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of +the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without +difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would +enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would +enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, +after investing Metz and Diedenhofen. + +[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.] + +England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must +reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of +an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only +serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign. +English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not +coincident with those of France. + +The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea +commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any +further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy +our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the +supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium +between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in +order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never +impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the +private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her +plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political +position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war +against us. + +If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on +this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the +first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by +the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely +compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might +consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied +by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in +India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European +war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might +interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was +important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall +any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case +of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea +will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm +resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial +centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will +throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of +her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English +policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other +hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only +so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval +bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this +because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's +battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation +will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a +definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It is +very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively +acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South +Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and +stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the +offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the +generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale, +held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, +according to available information, show the English army in a +favourable light so far as strategical ability went. + +If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's +probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian +standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than +a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the +Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to +join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of +communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of +power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is +as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory +over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, +but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia +in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation +for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could +be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire. + +Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an +offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite +different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war. +Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against +complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not +shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for +political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such +a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion +in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast +Empire the social and also political education, especially among the +peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy +seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have +acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools +have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind +anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their +interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote +their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the +Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of +a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive +war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an +extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people +showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be +involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never +bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary +elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every +weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in +internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the +community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the +moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out +their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of +arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we +have already mentioned. + +Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole +power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a +certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by +defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater +exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks, +nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's +political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another +sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her +losses on another frontier. + +Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia +will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars +against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented +the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign +revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and +battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all +probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats +favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against +Russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coute_. + +If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole +position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in +the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile +forces which would cripple the conduct of the war. + +So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese +War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle +showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest +losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian +army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but +essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of +the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; +indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every +grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above +mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian +generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and +that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must +therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack. + +When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we +cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military +difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel +successfully the attack of our opponents. + +In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our +country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no +opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the +government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our +western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north +through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is +there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper +bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned +through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country +offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves +resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their +army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in +their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten. + +The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and +the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a +prey to our enemies. + +The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a +strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland. +England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire +oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east +alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are +encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides. +This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so +presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our +opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan. + +If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact +that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in +carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia +have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will +sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of +any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an +extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by +the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not +merely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is a +cause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound +to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase +of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct +of Italy at the conference of Algeciras sufficiently demonstrated. It +even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always +reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a +defensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France and +England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how +difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with +France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we +think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which +is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt +whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were +allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests +are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the +same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria. +Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate +State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements, +patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to +the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of +such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that +might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration. + +We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of +standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the +Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the +struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own +resolution for victory. + +Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our +political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can +only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and +by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect +continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their +interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, +since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and +obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, +then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own +resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of +desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would +destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize +the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would +shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus +check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for +which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war +will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. +This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power +or downfall!" will be our rallying cry. + +Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident +intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the +end, come what may. + +We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted +campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our +enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to +defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last +is won. + +It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numerical +equality with our opponents. On the contrary, we must strive to call up +the entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the great +decision which impends. We must try also to gain a certain superiority +over our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold some +winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. We +must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only by +continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our +preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future +makes on us. A nation of 65,000,000 which stakes _all_ her forces on +winning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot be +conquered. But it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblance +of power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content with +half-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only be +attained by the exertion and development of all her powers. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + + +THE NEXT NAVAL WAR + +In the next European land war we shall probably face our foes with +Austria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the day +against any opposing forces. In a naval war we shall be thrown on our +own resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against the +superior forces which will certainly press us hard. + +There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for, +although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack +would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking +our political power. It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack +_us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France. The English have, +besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should +always be held before our eyes. They talk so much of a possible German +attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question +is from the opposite point of view. Again, the preparations which they +are making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly have +contemplated an attack on Germany. These preparations are like a +strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves +no doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbour of Rosyth is +admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can mean +nothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especially +strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the +Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These are +measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand +an inquiry into the military position thus created. + +The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since +1902. Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it +is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time. +This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the +circumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusively +directed against Germany. + +We must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us to +believe--reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, and +shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. It will be +so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the +offensive against the English fleet. But we must contemplate the +possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning +the freedom of the seas, if England attacks us. We shall now discuss +this possibility. On this matter I am expressing my personal views only, +which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest +exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed +antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. I shall not +betray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any. But I +consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand +what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met. + +In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong +enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question +remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure +protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to +become its master? + +The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, +instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the +war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English +fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its +superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective +blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that +such an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does not +seem to me to promise any great success. + +The English have secured themselves against such attacks by +comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seems +dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall +urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings. +Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than +formerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English +merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under such +circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign +service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's +warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of +these ships will certainly be a difficult task. + +The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and +energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes +which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will +usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the +few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing +our vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken against +neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable +results can be expected from a war against England's trade. On the +contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at +her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must be +ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England's +custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests +are at stake. + +Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire +with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by +the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to +English vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they +can be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has +no knowledge of their existence. + +It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation +from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications +will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way +would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral +Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the +great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be +discovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remain +suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of +trade. + +It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such +communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect +of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to block +these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the +States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether +they would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity, +or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography +dictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with England +and a Continental war with their German neighbours--two possibilities, +each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay much +attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was +at issue is hardly credible. + +The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot be +foreseen. It would probably depend on the general political position and +the attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest. The +policy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor. One +can easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch are +seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on +their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea +side. They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which +obviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sided +with our enemies. + +I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities +which might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to a +sympathetic understanding by the war. I will only point out how +widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the +Continental war and on the political relations generally. The attitude +of Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the +Baltic must mainly depend on her. It is vital to us that these +communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this. +The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly important +for the conduct of the war. Free commerce with Sweden is essential for +us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish +iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted. + +It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the +interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by +diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. We +cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands. + +Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus +raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer +greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us +assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only +trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--a +condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and +should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any +case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on +which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and +also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial +products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They +must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the +Government must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry of +Commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in +collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which +our commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort of +commercial mobilization. + +These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us +in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a +defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our +coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack. + +Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade +closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish +straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she +can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the +Continent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotland +and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea +commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping. + +A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of +the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a +blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base +and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since all +the English naval ports are considerably farther than this from our +coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously +increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich has +recently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. It is considered +the best harbourage on the English coast, and is hardly 300 nautical +miles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities of +fortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distance +from the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes of +blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless +count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutch +coast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means. +Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as +Heligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all +attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. This +task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by +night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on +board. + +Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy, +if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the +offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain +an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive +operations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts +must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We must +endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly +with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the +blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as +possible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces, +for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there +is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the +enemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end. +And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold +attack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionally +favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the +fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy +losses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring, +to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place +or another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and +the battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behind +the farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold the +high seas in full strength. The forces of the defending party, however, +lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight. + +Such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party. +We may therefore fairly assume that the English would decide in favour +of the second kind. At all events, the harbour constructions, partly +building, partly projected, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were chosen with +an eye to this line of blockade. It would entail in the north the +barring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasible +from the military aspect. Only a small force is required to seal up the +Channel, as the navigation route is very narrow. In addition to all +this, the great English naval depots--Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, and +Plymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediately +behind it. Besides, every advance against this line from the north is +flanked by Sheerness and Harwich, so that a retreat to the German coast +might be barred. The conditions for the northern line of blockade will +be no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. The +blockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour of +Rosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the Orkney +Isles. Every attacking fleet from the German north coast will be +unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cut +off from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to the +English superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading +fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the +Baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here we +should have a tolerably secure retreat. This accentuates once more the +supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage +through the Sound and the Great Belt. The command of these straits will +not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the +sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading +fleet. + +In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade +offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are +well worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, it +prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed +by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the +blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or +three divisions. + +As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let +herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests +of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory +arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As +regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous +conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily +divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the +superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea. +Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending +party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction +with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be +deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are +the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be +employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled. + +This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But +it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the +close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet +more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in +far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the +threatened flank of our attacking fleet. + +After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a +mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision +of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event +of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt +to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They +could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our +naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and +Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these +places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea. + +It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate +against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford +extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by +protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the +communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack +will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast +fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely +defensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon +the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the +fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should +inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength +between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must +be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast +fortifications hold out. + +No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a +defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows. +Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments +for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative +movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures +for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers. +The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we +shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy +"scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleet +must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the +enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by +attacking them directly. + +If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they +would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English +force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus +contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing +forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected +to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be +dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a +balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in +mind. + +So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for, +starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines would +be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully +than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they +would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant English +coast. + +Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and +nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the +boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in +hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the +science of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is the +only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we +may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea. + +In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to +be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a +World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England. + +This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of +Germany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the +common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win +recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This was +the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under +Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her +history; and the great Republic of the United States of North America +strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right +of nations for which every people craves." [A] + +[Footnote A: Schiemann.] + +In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this +vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us +in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which, +in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy, +has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the +unscrupulous suppression of her rivals. + +If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English and +takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage +than a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold our +allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her +forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the +two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea, +since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean +interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful +issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then +despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak, +on land--i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be +compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet +to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to +the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an +absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports and +destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife with +France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the +French position as a Great Power. If France, with her falling +birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her +place in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanent +political subservience. Those are the stakes. + +The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated. +That is the less dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present +still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French. +We could operate against it on the inner line--i.e., we could use the +opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the +Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we could attack the Russian ships in vastly +superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the +North Sea. For these operations it is of the first importance that the +Danish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell into +the hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would be +almost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the +passive protection of our coast batteries. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + + +THE CRUCIAL QUESTION + +I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some +detail, because I thought that our general political and military +position can only be properly estimated by considering the various +phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities +and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on +our coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction be +decided in which our preparations for war ought to move. + +The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war +with England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall +need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from +a hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on an +ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If an +Anglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatened +our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by +sea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armies +advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined +fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be +rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land. + +We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on +land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all +circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the +Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before +we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy +based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in +Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her +triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own +country. + +But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by +the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing +with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land +army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting +the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally +necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every +attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled. + +At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the +conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk +of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay +the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample +scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put +aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost +energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole +future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the +broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the +individual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere is +critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as +a World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the Triple +Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey, +threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which +destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing +ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, if +we wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we are +Germans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out our +preparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to our +national duty. + +I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated +merely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in the +cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer +the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the +future. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to +desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour +something of what we have lost in the last years. + +Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on +the continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problem +of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great +numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainly +exist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance, +whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to +Irredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondary +importance. + +The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make +the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate +the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make +universal service an existing fact. + +The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a +splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has +in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and +has brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification. +Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed +in a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mighty +political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our +greatness was founded. + +France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in +Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000. +Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. But since +the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very +various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are +also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to +the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself +successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the +inner line, even though England took part in the war. + +Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of +universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued +to carry it out effectively. The country where universal service exists +is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only +kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the +able-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little use +has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army. + +In this direction some reorganization is required which will +energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army, +such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand, +we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers. + +Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not +shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make +up our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by +150,000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not be +forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could +not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased army +only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and +Landwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recur +to the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the new +Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wish +to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even +if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that +we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the +superior forces of our opponents. + +We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we +must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These +means can only be found in the spiritual domain. + +History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have +only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been +equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party +exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases +it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment, +greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able +strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Rome +conquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great with +inferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent history +shows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over a +crushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a great +commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear. +Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the +hostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisive +factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory +or defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and +keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a +real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which +would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should we +then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy +which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be +possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a +considerable numerical superiority. + +[Footnote A: _Cf_. v. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.] + +The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery +with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships, +and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable +opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast +with the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certain +spiritual servility and inferiority. + +Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which +the ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is to +prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to +apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of +superiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the material +advantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushed +by their weight of numbers. + +We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by +uninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight the +probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new +paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. New +goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches +us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress, +in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritual +capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be +sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action, +are the soil in which great successes ripen. + +It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the +nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas +which will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughly +ventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege" +("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results of +my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration +of the essential questions of the future. + +In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extent +unprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness +will exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means of +communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. These +three momentous factors will mark the war of the future. + +"Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain +elements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they can +be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical +efficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the country +during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are +therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower +and less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they require +for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into +effective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible to +morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may +prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run +short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority +over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions. + +The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer +range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting +claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner than +formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far +wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. The +soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which +he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all +circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing +which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious +movement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances. +Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short, +while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands +made on them have become considerably greater. + +Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and +feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main +roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign, +aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their +use, and the commanders counted upon them. + +The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great +superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and +tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists. + +The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy, +and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than +they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior +force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective +troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile +army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it +before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the +field. + +Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly +shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary +conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare. + +In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength +which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action. +Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack +to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a +superior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which is +the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place +which is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked party +can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the +intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold +out promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attacking +General strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his +troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature +guarantees. + +This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancing +armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it +will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take +proper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, the +prospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable, +especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at +his disposal. + +Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility +of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all +the more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is +impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and +completely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisive +direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of +the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and +its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations. +If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior +numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his +numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory +over the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law, +Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and striking +strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in +mere numbers. + +No further proof is required that the superiority of the attack +increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and +to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of +concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the +enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very +appreciable. + +We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the +superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it +is incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise the +tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and +especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements +and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to +act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the +manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be +superior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has +objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks +by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It +must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since +a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods. + +This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which I +have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face +the future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raise +the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else +must give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all our +measures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, and +thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too +easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of +a collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions would +have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying +principle. + +The requirements which I have described as the most essential are +somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a +resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age. + +The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, the +smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not +merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as +such. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will be +suffocated by their own fat," said General v. Brandenstein, the great +organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of +the French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the +whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure +the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his +own movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the course +of military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tactical +efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it +certainly will prove in the wars of the future. + +A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of +public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have +conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential +contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained, +and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It would +be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is +recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached +on them. + +This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is +attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military +service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less, +and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had +to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a +good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_, +which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no +means helped by the very brief training which these units at best +receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity +for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy +strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be +indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the +field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain +the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass +would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to +some degree the task of making good the losses. + +A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops. +Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are +already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full +strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on +mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according +to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much +inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which +were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this, +notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new +French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere +of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their +duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered +territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact, +they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the +field army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and +mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By acting +at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually +become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of +offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset +of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied +with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be. + +Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such +troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive +operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated +as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some +are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical +conception. + +For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars +only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks +for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if +necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and +more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical +striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater +numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the +decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever +before. + +The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are +placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this +principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that +he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong +advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and +therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his +army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be +employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as +much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the +numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the +actual war. + +It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to +render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a +mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their +_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to +them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of +efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered. + +Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An +increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more +than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is +supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the +establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient +will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality, +not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If we +wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening +the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of +professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This step +is the more necessary because the present available cadres are +insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide +for their thorough training. + +The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with +an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. We +shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the +efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be +improved by organization, equipment, and training. + +I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the +questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of +military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt +original action--I mean the importance of personality. + +From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of +his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune, +and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a given +general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left +to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in +the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the +face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other +age, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics has +abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left +to himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In the +strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of +that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before +from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in the +artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly +emphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations have +increased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far less +able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the +field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates. +These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations. + +When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his +ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the +reserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment +to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot +be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Even +the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now +wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have +to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing +touch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on the +commander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy, +deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from +him. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All this +puts a heavy strain on personality. + +It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of +self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct +advantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to +attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And this +object can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in the +sphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can be +improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the +conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in +which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and +more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp. +Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune +are produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkward +and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same +process is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mental +development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the +personality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsman +Bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of +leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. General +Chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute +determination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks of +the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and +thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is it +essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in +high command. In a long military life ideas all too early grow +stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought +and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of such +development cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of the +army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a +one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of +actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akin +to this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en +masse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatest +value. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual +independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and +solving new problems by original methods. + +It has often been said that one man is as good as another; that +personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is +erroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real +struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is +enough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility and +danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a +chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross. + +That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the +important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is the +only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to +break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and +success. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. that for the +highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time +of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men +around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition +those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of +need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. This +is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and +distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action, +appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of +the stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved: + + "Folk and thrall and victor can + Witness bear in every zone: + Fortune's greatest gift to man + Is personality alone." + + + + +CHAPTER X + + + +ARMY ORGANIZATION + +I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it +is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with +this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. I +shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in +my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we +wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions +which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It will +be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially +noteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come into +opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further +from my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based on +theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely +presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and +of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political +disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is, +in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something +already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent +historical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to the +future, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-defined +lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most +important that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall not +look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future. + +The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I have +already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the +greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position +to carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore, +fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, as +already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the +arming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops, +and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly +have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of +their peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter how +essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary +cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches +so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in +war-time. + +The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the +non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of +the troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline, +decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the +troops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number of +permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in +proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the +demands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officers +and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred +to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern +tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his +influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing +_personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to the +infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a +sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the more +important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers +and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on +the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and +non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is a +question of training, and does not come into the present discussion. + +The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a +sense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospects +which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect +the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to +keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary +advantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, the +financial question is all-important. The career of the officer offers +to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and +self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the +service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as +they now are. The infantry officer especially must have a better +position. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur +greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer +has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most +strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It would +be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than +the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm +more attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for +which there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be well +supplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must be +counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service. +By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the +chief arm. + +If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition +and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the +troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in +action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on +conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical +proportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally the +cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the +proportion which artillery must bear to infantry. + +With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent +replace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weapons +of defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourable +conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful +attack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder that +impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, this +auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and +employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into +large units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching +columns. + +The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance. + +Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooth +their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly. +This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry +must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting +instruments in the whole army. + +If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the +result. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to +modern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greater +superiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of front +in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close +tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire. +This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the +conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as +before. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in +a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The +troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en echelon _than in the +last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate +the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be +settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the +experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will +most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in +the domain of military science. + +If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an +infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of +artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern +artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must +advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the +artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path +between these two extremes. + +If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or, +better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the +guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially +adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the +conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is +reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we +must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into +account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If +we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper +strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such +infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position +taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that +section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions, +requires greater numbers and depth than before. + +In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of +the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian +campaign. + +Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period +extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not +rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original +strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans +on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so +decisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would have +shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the +contest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the former +case the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery, +under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak +infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under +the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was +too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched +enemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of +infantry were needed at Woerth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite of +the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker +enemy of equal class. + +Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English in +artillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state of +things was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery was +extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russian +field guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, the +Japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also, +because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite +superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillery +was scattered along the whole of their broad front. + +The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the +arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these +units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be +appropriately determined. + +The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or +superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly +mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and +corps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucial +test. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpected +concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the +superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way. +If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine +against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies +a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it is +assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and +that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so +slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then +equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese were +tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they +were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive +directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical +superiority of the Russian army as a whole. + +If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the +artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy +within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a +considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful. +In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded +the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the +artillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the +separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of +the army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excess +in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is +restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then +artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to +victory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forces +for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces +along the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often be +weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage +may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a +position. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering +concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. This +victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere. + +The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater +marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of +the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the +columns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossal +armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly +live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from +the rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies; +but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be +maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go +to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead. +Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct +communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught +animals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons of +provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily, +must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of +food. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a +certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport +waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to +the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the +night's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained +if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient +quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry +with them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid +down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusually +lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the +troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thus +the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly +dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A careful +calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to +average 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from an +army--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25 +kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps on +the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle +troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps. + +This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily +affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and +rations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyed +railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of +columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared +by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time +the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the +troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption +continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In order +to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any +crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample +stock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of the +necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must be +taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of +tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done by +special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the +organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a +distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by +forced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increase +the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It is +further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very +long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other +provisions compressed into the smallest space. + +An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps, +and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army +with its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it the +troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is far +more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any +other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the +decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent. + +However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained +if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed +from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out. +Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within +these limits. + +Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army +corresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened by +a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it +will considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, the +necessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantry +is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to +deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack +and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to +strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the +artillery. + +In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division +is very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as to +permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of +reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units. +This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional +organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet +appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the +existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been +drawn up by competent officers. + +The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two +infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The +formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix +the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his +own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a +reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of +some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity +for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a +wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this +procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible, +even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the +brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken +by the enemy and the course of the battle. + +Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its +application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of +cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution +which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that +the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of +two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry +these duties out. + +This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts +the most generally accepted military principles. + +The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as +is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate +divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal +of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the +subdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack +must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best +formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops +to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result +there. + +A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by +the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action +two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of +course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not +always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely +the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ +them as their particular character demands. + +The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and +divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding +formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately +according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the +undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders +of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the +commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of +enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for +himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one +division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to +withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one +division only, the same division must always be subjected to this +reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether +this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least +worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not +be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each +division. + +The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous +question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the +whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement +would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a +position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They +can also, however, be combined under the command of the +General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first +arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the +great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is +dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left +but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the +indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are +inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers +is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is +planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that +the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line +by a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach +single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army +corps temporarily. + +There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally +used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the +spot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into the +advance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's field +artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in +such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers. +It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this +problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long +unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their +effectiveness doubtful. + +No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased +their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort +to every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, be +overestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite _sui generis_. +The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions +strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line +in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns. +It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective +12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I +can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty +was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. The +Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their +howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but +break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs, +the question of concentration seems to me very important for us. + +Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the +heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus best +serve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which he +wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain +that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the +army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries will +be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General. +There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the +deciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knows +that. + +I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the +heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batteries +which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed +under the orders of the corps commanders _(Truppenfuehrer)_ if they are +to become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artillery +of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot +artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres. +It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does +not feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinction +between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical. + +This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the +heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the +Commander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and +manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the +present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy +artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. This +disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned +permanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being united +in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, they +would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely +the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies. + +The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more +effective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies not +merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but +the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the +advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We were +taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway +communications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vital +importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the +discharge of these necessary functions. + +Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was +organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations, +but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system +can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them. + +The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by +the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and +so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train +adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years' +service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building, +fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on +fortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer's +duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for +the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the +actual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training +for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation. + +Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the late +Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable +service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. This +follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--a +rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training +for their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and develop +more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better +proportion to its value. + +In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are +directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical +efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly +serve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of the +enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening +movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy +unawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. I +refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet. + +The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry out +reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must +operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the +regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility. + +Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the +war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned +them in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen if +we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize +that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and +that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited +efficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous, +because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little +from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal. +There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and +1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is +misleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it +crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on +the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly +antiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independent +movements. What they then did must not be compared with what will be +required from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces were +really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived +notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their +employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of +their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa, +notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must be +studied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that an +increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course, +only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped +with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate +independently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the +fulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, when +the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting +force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. This +is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's +communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand, +the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive +than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if +cavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry is +undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of +the enemy. + +Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists, +another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful +service. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in +war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have +repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted. + +The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of the +divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time +being. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in +a high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that +the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on +modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over +the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue. + +I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are +attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that +the division with its three parts would have the control of three +batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each +brigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. once +made, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalry +usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing +momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with +the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously, +therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the +artillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when +it is important to make a decisive attack. + +The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed +by the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yet +exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of +military science will play in future wars.[A] It is therefore necessary +to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special +weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration +from the technical side. + +[Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators in +Tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were no +opponents in the air.] + +The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of +handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting +strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of +the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking +successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers. + +The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading +idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once +thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since +tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the +technical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne in +mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our +opponents. + +If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the +necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed +changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve +the efficiency of our army. + +The whole organization must be such that the column length of the army +corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the +supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots. + +In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as +being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition +must be observed. + +The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially +strengthened. + +The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to +concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up +the units. + +The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so +organized as to insure their efficiency in war. + +The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so +elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the +troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained. + +The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making +it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy. + +Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every +nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to +take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in +the decisive field war. + +The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present +organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be +carried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which, +without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to +make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition. +The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit +political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so +strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when +all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. They +comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen, +although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often +surpassed all expectations. + +But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is +necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to +achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to +public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake +there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as +unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the +principles of a sound military organization. + +The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in +various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject, +and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive +consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration. + +One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of +three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous +intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in +every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the +extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jaeger +battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the +hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried +out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the +drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within +the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing +the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being +thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more +ways. + +The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only +be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the +enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to +each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present. +But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that +new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be +taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this +means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the +artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited, +without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the +quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle +should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. All +that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat +waggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when a +battle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troops +and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than +the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of +ammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will be +inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the +fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can +only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be +reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, the +required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought +forward by stages in good time. + +A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division +had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light field +howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that +they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the +formations of the division. The strength of the artillery must be +regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the +entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavy +field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the +orders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as +"army" artillery. + +It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached +from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent +in war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with the +infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres +with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional +cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. On +the other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the _Truppenfuehrer_ +are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders; +but this objection does not seem very pertinent. + +Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the +arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging +to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under +the commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would be +withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments +strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended for +divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six +squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. If +the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only +be able to receive two squadrons. + +In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry +would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it; +but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army +cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult +task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one +to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame for +such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who +did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. The +whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. If +it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the +arm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There are +various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry +can be guaranteed. + +The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached +to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in +co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make +appropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restricted +to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which +require to be surmounted. + +The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the +organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. In +military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual +factors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that my +opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect +of affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main +leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by +question of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part of +that general combination of things which only really comes into view in +actual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must be +rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced. +Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means +of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient +account of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made such +progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much +importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort, +the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which +they employ. + +A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are +essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out; +under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer +of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way +or that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from +a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the +importance of the separate co-operating factors. + + + + "For he who grasps the problem as a whole + Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul" + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + + +TRAINING AND EDUCATION + +Our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the German +army into the most effective tool of German policy, and into a school of +health and strength for our nation. We must also try to get ahead of our +rivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do full +justice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all our +efforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units and +strengthening their loyal German feelings. + +Diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at the +present day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, for +there are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. If we +wish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training must +break with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the war +of the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops as +well as on the officers. + +It is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the use +of modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily from +the introduction of these means of war. But if we survey the sphere of +training as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us as +peculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands which +will be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" to +an extent hitherto unknown. + +The necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantry +and artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle; +in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategical +duties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in the +case of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vast +extent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and the +difficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving direct +orders. Wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare, +we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldier +in the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of the +enemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles huge +hosts. In battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity of +action can only be attained at the present time by independent +co-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme. + +The employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of moving +and feeding the troops. It is one thing to lead 100,000 or perhaps +200,000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate them +for a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800,000 men on a scene of war +stripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have been +destroyed by modern explosives. In the first case the military empiric +may be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively a +scientifically educated General and a staff who have also studied and +mastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. The problems of +the future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able to +operate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision. + +The necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universally +recognized. To be sure, the old traditions die slowly. Here and there an +undeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method of +education, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised more +than is justified by its value. The cavalry is not yet completely +awakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises on +the parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, oblivious +of the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they were +still the old arm which Napoleon or Frederick the Great commanded. Even +the artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions; +technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom of +operations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still in +vogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of fire +with a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. Even in +theory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. Many +conservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. Obsolete ideas +have not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations and +ordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on the +whole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility and +self-reliance must be encouraged. In this respect the army is on the +right road, and if it continues on it and continually resists the +temptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for the +sake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually the +highest results will be attained, provided that competent military +criticism has been equally encouraged. + +In this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficient +attention has been given to the fact that the main features of war have +completely changed. Although in the next war men will have to be handled +by millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted on +lines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modern +conditions. Our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. Most of +the practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades and +divisions--i.e., in formations which could never occur in the great +decisive campaigns of the future. From time to time--financial grounds +unfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre is +held, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of +"masses." Sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled for +combined training under veteran Generals, who soon afterwards leave the +service, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience which +they may have gained. + +It cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres are +extraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troops +themselves', but they are not a direct training for the command of +armies in modern warfare. Even the so-called "Imperial Manoeuvres" only +correspond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war, +since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, and +seldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc., the troops which would +be essential in real warfare. A glance at the Imperial Manoeuvres of +1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never have +been carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed under +the conditions of war. It is an absolute necessity that our officers +should learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are the +rule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. In +theory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken into +account; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theory +are posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and the +divisions. That they would in reality all have to circulate with a +pendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that the +magazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent farther +back, that the position of the field bakeries is of extreme +importance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome, +and so are very seldom considered. + +In great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected in +Russia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariat +arrangements are rarely worked out in detail; I should almost doubt +whether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazine +feeding" has ever been entertained. Even smaller opportunities of being +acquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinary +manoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoretical +lines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding a +large army and to master the subject efficiently. + +The friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be brought +home to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such things +cannot be learnt from books. + +These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations, +but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an +army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is +obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. When, in 1870, +some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the +advance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not +masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war +and the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operations +to succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army. All +these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our General +Staff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no means +the common property of the army. + +On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres +must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered +conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. The +troops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency, +and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for +carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two +pivots. But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the +great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. The paths +we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal. + +All methods of training and education must be in accordance with these +views. + +I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and +cavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question at +length in special treatises.[A] In the case of the artillery alone, some +remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm +seem necessary. + +[Footnote A: v. Bernhardi: "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie," 1910 +"Unsere Kavallerie im naechsten Krieg," 1899; "Reiterdienst," 1910.] + +The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partly +expressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: all +preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one +side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or +infantry at the decisive point. This principle is universally +acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice. +The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their +tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical +requirements subservient to this idea. The ever-recurring tendency to +fight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. On the +defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking +artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most +dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its +chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible, +from masked positions. The principle of keeping the artillery divisions +close together on the battlefield and combining the fire in one +direction, must not be carried to an extreme. The artillery certainly +must be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see that +there is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but in +particular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this idea +will be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than by +explaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leaving +to them the duty of carrying it out. Accordingly, it is important that +the personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognized +more fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action is +indispensable. The great extent of the battlefields and the natural +endeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack will +often force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behind +the other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against the +tactically most important objective. This result is hard to attain by a +centralization of command, and is best realized by the independent +action of tactically trained subordinates. + +This is not the place to enter into technical details, and I will only +mention some points which appear especially important. + +The Bz shell _(Granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and its +use should not form part of the training. It requires, in order to +attain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming as +is very seldom possible in actual warfare. + +No very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. It seems +to be retained in France and to have shown satisfactory results with us; +but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of the +shooting-range directly to serious warfare. No doubt its use, if +successful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especially +in the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. In any case, +practice with Az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance. + +The Az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of an +offensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations. + +Care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements and +complications of strategy and devices. Only the simplest methods can be +successfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten. + +The important point in the general training of the artillery is that +text-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should be +relegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics should +be given a more prominent position. In this way only can the artillery +do really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must not +be neglected in the reports. That would mean rejecting the good and the +evil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenient +must be distinctly opposed. + +Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres +of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large +expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. They must, in my +opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their +possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks. +They lead to pronounced tactics of position _(Stellungstaktik)_ which +are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual +war--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a +definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in +search of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt on +these manoeuvres. They could be made more instructive if the tactical +limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these +manoeuvres--viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive +arm--cannot be thus remedied. The usual result is that favourable +artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to +under some tactical pretence. + +After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may +be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of the +various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them +into line with modern conditions. If, however, the troops are to be +educated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new ground +must be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubted +superiority over our opponents can be attained. Considerable +difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to +amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties +are not, in my opinion, insurmountable. + +There are two chief points: first, the practice of marching and +operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with +well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a +reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more +thorough education of the chief commanders. + +As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know, +has never yet been attempted. But if we consider, firstly, how valuable +more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of +the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we +shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for +the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage +over our supposed antagonist. + +The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally +also be carried out in smaller formation. It is, moreover, very +important to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--in +long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in +the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such +movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them. + +Training marches with full military stores, etc., in columns of 20 to 25 +kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond to +the daily needs of real warfare. Should it not be possible to assemble +two army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march can +be obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitable +intervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed. +This does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare, +but it is useful as a makeshift. The waggons for the troops would have +to be hired, as On manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to save +expense. The supplies could be brought on army transport trains, which +would represent the pioneer convoys _(Verpflegungsstaffel)_, and would +regulate their pace accordingly. + +Marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with food +supplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be of +considerable value provided that care is taken to execute the march in +the shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed by +bringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is only +properly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continued +for several days. It is naturally not enough to undertake these +manoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if they +are intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army. +Finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns, +sometimes in army formation. The flank marches of separate columns will, +of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice in +feeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march on +the side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence brought +up to the troops at the close of the march. Flank marches in army +formation will have some value, even apart from any training in the +commissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marching +columns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. But +this exercise will have its full value only when the regulation +commissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with them +and furnish the supplies. + +I also consider that operative movements in army formation extending +over several days are desirable. Practice must be given in moving +backwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flank +movements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rear +being blocked when necessary. Then only can all the difficulties which +occur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen where +the lever must be applied in order to remove them. In this way alone can +the higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting such +operations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of a +hostile attack. An army so disciplined would, I imagine, acquire a +pronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experiments +in such operations in actual war. The major strategic movements on both +sides in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that. + +I recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost a +great deal of money and could never all be carried out systematically +one after the other. I wished, however, to ventilate the subject, +firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study the +points of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do; +secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carry +out in practice one or other of them--at the Imperial Manoeuvres, for +example, or on some other occasion. How much could be saved in money +alone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentioned +country manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? From reasons of economy +all the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employed +on such manoeuvres. It would be useful, however, if, in addition to one +detachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the other +groups were present and were moved along at the proper distance from +each other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from the +kitchen waggon. It would thus be possible to get a sort of presentation +of the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuable +experience. It is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange such +manoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and many +obstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out, +and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions; +but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not be +wholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matters +which are really essential. They would, at any rate, be far more +valuable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced by +exercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings in +the country, which are of no real utility, or than many other military +institutions which are only remotely connected with the object of +training under active service conditions. All that does not directly +promote this object must be erased from our system of education at a +time when the highest values are at stake. + +Even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often be +carried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because it +is not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of the +troops. + +It must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so that +eventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becoming +practically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troops +may become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but since +such practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they must +also be worked out beforehand theoretically. It is not at all sufficient +that the officers on the General Staff and the Intendants have a mastery +of these subjects. The rank and file must be well up in them; but +especially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--that +is to say, the transport officers of the standing army and those +officers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as column +commanders. + +The practical service in the transport battalions and the duties +performed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who are +assigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object. +They learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of the +system as a whole. It would therefore be advisable that all these +officers should go through a special preliminary course for this +service, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would be +explained to them by the officers of the General Staff and the higher +transport service officers, and they would then learn by practical +examples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the most +varied positions with precise regard to distances and time. This would +be far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainings +in driving, etc., on which so much time is wasted. The technical +driver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is not +easy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to be +able, when occasion arises, to act independently. + +While, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must be +thoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of a +scientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples out +of military history, the importance of these matters can be explained, +is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. I have shown +elsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically in +the arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operative +capabilities of the army depend on this system. Its nature, however, +cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspiration +when mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must be +gained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of the +importance which this service has attained under modern conditions is +that officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully without +having made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter. + +The transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinary +importance in the general system of modern warfare. It should be +appreciated accordingly. Every active transport service officer ought, +after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the senior +officers on the furlough establishment intended for transport service +ought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. If +these educational courses were held in the autumn in the training camps +of the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimable +advantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay. + +The results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, when +the superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do not +make demands contrary to the nature of the case, and therefore +impossible to be met. They should therefore be obliged to undergo a +thorough education in the practical duties of the General Staff, and not +merely in leading troops in action. + +This reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how, +generally, the training of the superior officers for the great war +should be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with a +view to the training. The essential contradiction between our obsolete +method of training and the completely altered demands of a new era +appears here with peculiar distinctness. + +A large part of our superior commanders pass through the General Staff, +while part have attended at least the military academy; but when these +men reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has long +become out of date. The continuation school is missing. It can be +replaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficient +time for this, and often a lack of interest. The daily duties of +training troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs great +determination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his own +scientific education. The result is, that comparatively few of our +superior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less an +independently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the great +scale. This would cost dearly in real war. Experience shows that it is +not enough that the officers of the General Staff attached to the leader +are competent to fill up this gap. The leader, if he cannot himself +grasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believes +he is directing and is himself being directed. This is a far from +healthy condition. Our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned, +only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and from +the tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. The +minor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most important +feature in present-day warfare--i.e., the sudden concentration of +larger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from space +considerations, of timely counter-movements on the other. The minor +manoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. The commanders learn +to form decisions and to give orders, and these are two important +matters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grand +scale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditions +of warfare. + +Brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merely +encourage wrong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is, +fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds. +Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders. +The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in +them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those +of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger +scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the +operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled +to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. The +great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for +only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the +collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual +warfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weighty +consideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought before +their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern +warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations. + +The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of +small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly +strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important +military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this +direction. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they +conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all our +resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a +modern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a +rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of +the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too +small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional +manoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this change +could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: a +great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system +if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and +execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word. + +It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training +on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to +educate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres can +only show their full value if the officers of every rank who take part +in them have already had a competent training in theory. + +To encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thus +one of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. These +must not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of the +troops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves and +their subordinates for leadership in the great war. Strategic war games +on a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by the +commanding Generals, and in the army-inspections by the Inspectors, seem +to me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. All +superior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiency +in superior commands. The threads of all this training will meet in the +hands of the Chief of the General Army Staff as the strategically +responsible authority. + +It seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance to +decide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not for +their posts. The circumstances that a man is an energetic commander of +a division, or as General in command maintains discipline in his army +corps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader of +an army. Military history supplies many instances of this. + +No proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfare +the reconnoitring and screening units require special training. The +possibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degree +dependent on their activity. I have for years pointed out the absolute +necessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for their +profession, and I can only repeat the demand that our cavalry +riding-schools should be organized also as places of scientific +education. I will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulk +of the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisional +cavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. These exercises do not +correspond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrong +notions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command finds +out who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalry +division on manoeuvres. + +The centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing of +operations and on the skilful transition from strategical independence +to combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry lies +in these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-grounds +than systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. The perpetual +subject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement between +two divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. Any +unprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to this +result, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may be +regarded as a serious preparation for war. + +It is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, always +acts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annually +extensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definite +effect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which +_always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself, +but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is only +rarely necessary in war. This clearly demonstrates the unsystematic and +antiquated methods of all our training. + +Practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on a +large scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry. +Co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soon +as aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as an +integral factor of army organization. The airship division and the +cavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command, +especially for screening purposes, which are all-important. + +The methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully to +modern requirements have been pointed out by General v. Beseler. This +arm need only be developed further in the direction which this +distinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of the +next war. + +In the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the support +of the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in the +construction of similar positions. Tactical requirements must, however, +be insisted upon in this connection. The whole training must be guided +by considerations of tactics. This is the main point. As regards sieges, +especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since the +object is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take the +fortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery. + +The duties of the Army Service Corps[B] are clear. They must, on the one +hand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especially +for the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to give +every kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they must +look after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. The +rapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedy +repair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on military +railways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are the +duties for which these troops must be trained. A thorough knowledge and +mastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensable +qualifications in their case also. They can only meet their many-sided +and all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methods +and system of army movements on every scale. It is highly important, +therefore, that the officers of the Army Service Corps should be +thoroughly trained in military science. + +[Footnote B: _Verkehrstruppen_.] + +Thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectual +development of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of the +close connection of the multifarious duties of war. This appreciation is +requisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of the +service; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to some +degree the non-commissioned officers also. It will bear good fruit in +the training of the men. The higher the stage on which the teacher +stands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the more +complete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly and +successfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, and +the more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respect +which are the firmest foundations of discipline. All the means employed +to improve the education of our establishment of officers in the science +of war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient service +on every other field of practical activity. Intellectual exercise gives +tone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war and +its requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education and +bent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in their +reciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. The +effort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers' +corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards, +and must find its expression in a school of military education of a +higher class than exists at present. + +A military academy as such was contemplated by Scharnhorst. To-day it +assumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the General +Staff. Instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of its +former importance. The instruction in military history was entirely +divested of its scientific character by the method of application +employed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. In this way the +meaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day, +so far as I know, the lectures on military history primarily serve +purposes of directly professional education. I cannot say how far the +language teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. At any rate, it +culminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues a +directly practical end. This development was in a certain sense +necessary. A quite specifically professional education of the officers +of the General Staff is essential under present conditions. I will not +decide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and truly +academical character of the institution. In any case, we need in the +army of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for the +independent study of military science from the higher standpoint, and +provides at the same time a comprehensive general education. I believe +that the military academy could be developed into such an institution, +without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of the +officers for service on the General Staff. By the side of the military +sciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures on +general scientific subjects might be organized, to which admission +should be free. In similar lectures the great military problems might be +discussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearers +might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to +politics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, the +importance of free personality under the pressure of necessary +phenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as into +the duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint. + +Limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are now +arranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, and +the institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture, +intended not only to educate officers of the General Staff, but to train +men who are competent to discharge the highest military and civic +duties--this is what is required for the highest military educational +institution of the German army. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + + +PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR + +"Germany's future lies on the sea." A proud saying, which contains a +great truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished future +and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy +and act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they are +supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at least +that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest +opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his +position as a World Power. + +Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on +a world policy if our political and military superiority on the +continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yet +reached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now take +steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our +pretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the +full security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts and +repel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economic +necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needs +be--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and +this, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness of +Germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea +trade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be +always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Our +efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of +hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish +to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined +ultimately to support this world policy. + +Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first +ventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving for +limited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. was destined +to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's +history, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activity +must be set down as fruitless. + +We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most varied +considerations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was first +drawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906, +and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, of +course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. The +needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard +for the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on the +claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations. +At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the +coasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguard +this commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon +shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for +Germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the +Government, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party was +content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this +object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by +artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places. + +This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convinced +of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high +seas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the +aggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it was +thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called +_Ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact +that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies, +and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank. +This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a +fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the +costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a +large number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fighting +capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed +torpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on a +fallacy--that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an +extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing +population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political +and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and +on its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded +with actual needs. + +The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most +inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already +stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the +midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our +strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly +effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard +for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our +commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only +object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an +instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and +supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such +limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A +few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in +war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible, +destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is +obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the +defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on +permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed +that sufficiently. + +The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at +sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded +commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies. + +It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for +defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our +political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed +according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive, +when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success; +on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained +in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the +Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We +must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise +which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale. + +The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be +calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that +we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are +weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger, +unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all +circumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our +strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing +reasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance +of victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflicting +such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests +to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own +position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses. + +This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that +the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the +necessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probably +that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of +victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle +for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase +their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even +beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates. + +We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for +many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. We +may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast +fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend +ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown +in the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out and +exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against +all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast; +our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually +inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to +challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the lines +that our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as a +base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the +offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break +harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for +this class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with +a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by +the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alone +cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break +through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able +to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purpose +permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow +mines to be placed. + +I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the +North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these +requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be +to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our +naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade, +although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further +development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the +background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only +action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success +presupposes the existence of some such fortress. + +But the question must be looked at from another aspect. + +The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the +unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is +determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power. +Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from +claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless, +the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked +menacing utterances from various English statesmen. + +If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military +preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates +attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the +English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase +the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly +intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken; +the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the German +coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and +to isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as +a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite +impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and +protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly +well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt +would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German +naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes +for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an +English attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able +to postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned that +the recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we must +make up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext or +other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very +favourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage. +Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon +upon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war. + +Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our +coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical +principles. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in +order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our +fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would be +justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by +loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the +greatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, of +existence. + +Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or +definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole +nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who +live on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows the +absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with +our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the +decisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot, +perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not +check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to +replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case. + +The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance, +in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the +Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military +requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain +secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of +Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more +possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in +the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our +battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot +give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is +feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal +might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success +depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous +unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict +heavy losses upon him. + +As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the +completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and +the usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in its +present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. There +can be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of the +Kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbach +class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be +considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in a +worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of the +Hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the +Prince class (_Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich_) fulfil their purpose +neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Even +the armoured cruisers _Fuerst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau,_ and +_Scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements. +If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the +time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these +totally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--by +new and thoroughly effective ships. + +Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon +will admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever so +strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and +all financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships, +which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities. +That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the line +have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisers +are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. But +superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible +readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made +to do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possess +a certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the English +heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and +to equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerful +artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the +more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way +that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or +straight ahead. + +Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part +in strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet, +therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority of +England--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because, +so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of +superiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high +standard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence of +construction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep this +position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to +the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying +to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must also +devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these +vessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing this +branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every +direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with +increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with +these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on +the enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would be +extraordinarily advantageous to us. + +Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the +development of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to make +airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they +could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes, +they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet would +then, as already explained in Chapter VIII., be able to report +successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the +battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the +approach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able to +prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus +facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse or +frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If our +airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side, +could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English +coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when +fighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly be +doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to +perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over +the English would contribute largely to equalize the difference in +strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war. +It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field +because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can +compete for the palm of victory on equal terms. + +Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be +carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be +especially effective in a struggle against England, as that country +needs imports more than any other. Consequently great results would +follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing +his navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have been +discussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative to +organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended +for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity +unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. The +auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the +open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice, +when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so. + +A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must +be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace. +History tells us what to expect from the English on this head. + +In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 to +September 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houses +were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were +killed. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of +England is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and +in the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence shows +distinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of the +seas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11 +and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarly +bombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under the +hypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the +foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well +not to forget them. + +The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also +Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships, +suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians. + +Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as +was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain +conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal +violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the +above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course +of action politically justifiable. + +A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first +place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful +inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the +tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability +of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation +of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack +becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are +granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack +in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable +carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be +formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken +of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties +concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of +States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such +cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it, +as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limit +the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the +very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would +have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most +extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in +1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful +from the standpoint of political morality. + +These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we +must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without +warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right. +Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such +eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the +reservists. + +Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to +secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all +circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready +for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension. +The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole +_materiel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for +instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the +mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in +force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple +precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to +the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as +is done in England. + +When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are +required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the +navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the +resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since +the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the +expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic +preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the +self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet +must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast +defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our +requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be +provisionally dropped. + +In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should +limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary, +devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest +stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in +case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition +that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act +contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on +us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform +tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we +have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships. + +I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is to +be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases +quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general +situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in +the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war. +My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid +foundation without which any successful action against the superior +forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail +to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible. + +It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry +out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever +may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though +this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for +the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on +strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a +successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain +a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we +must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers. + +Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and +German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we +must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the +coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the +pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be +met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion. + +The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness +for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the +first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the +long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define +and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free +hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing +more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious +mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France +was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was +favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has, +indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace +and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this +difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between +resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against +numerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles the +supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her +assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and +thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North +America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed, +threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequences +of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her +former American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is +far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas +than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. It +is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty, +and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we +might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have +wished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866 +nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would +fall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman is +shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake +what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best +course. Just Fate decides the issue. + +The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that +we started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we have +made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the +Brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of +decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters +concerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to develop +systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties +which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we +have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it. + +This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never let +the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views +which must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good time +those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even +though they make heavy financial calls on our resources. + +This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our +naval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for +lost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty +devotedly. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + + + +THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION + +The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which +we can only assert our place among the Great Powers and secure the +conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of +treasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. We shall be +compelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, special +measures which will enable us to be more or less a match for our +enemies--I mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of the +army. We must always bear in mind in the present that we have to provide +for the future. + +Apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget to +develop the elements on which not only our military strength, but also +the political power of the State ultimately rest. We must maintain the +physical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done if +we aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widest +sense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions and +demands of existence. + +While it is the duty of the State to guide her citizens to the highest +moral and mental development, on the other hand the elements of +strength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the State. +Only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can the +State achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interested +in promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. Her duty and +her justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from the +fulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highest +sense true to it. + +It is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely military +standpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development of +our growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. For while +the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction, +the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment in +very great numbers possible. Thus the full consummation of military +training cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equipped +physically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentiments +worthy of the honourable profession of arms. + +We have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raise +the culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best of +our power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independent +individual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence on +the men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limited +if it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligent +material. This fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims which +modern war will make on the individual fighter. In order to meet these +demands fully, the people must be properly educated. + +Each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure of +independent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. In +the open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed duty +has been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources; +he may often have to take over the command of his own section if the +losses among his superiors are heavy. The artilleryman will have to work +his gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains have +fallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders are +often left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and the +sapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himself +unexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource left +beyond his own professional knowledge and determination. + +But not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility of +the individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique will +probably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. This change +is due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greater +efficiency of the firearms. All movements in large masses are more +exacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments, +since they are never carried out so smoothly. The shelter and food of +great masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth of +the marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to the +difficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregular +hours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. The increased range of +modern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combination +with the larger fronts, necessitates wide detours whenever the troops +attempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on the +battlefield. + +In the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the army +has been enormously increased. The State, however, has done little to +prepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies are +making themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a very +detrimental influence on their education. I specially refer to the +ever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patriotic +feeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the population +into the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development. +This result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. At the +present day, out of all the German-born military units, over 6.14 per +cent. come from the large towns, 7.37 per cent, from the medium-sized +towns, 22.34 per cent. from the small or country towns, and 64.15 per +cent. from the rural districts; while the distribution of the population +between town and country is quite different. According to the census of +1905, the rural population amounted to 42.5 per cent., the small or +country towns to 25.5 per cent., the medium-sized towns to 12.9 per +cent., and the large towns to 19.1 per cent. of the entire number of +inhabitants. The proportion has probably changed since that year still +more unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns have +increased in population. These figures clearly show the physical +deterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to our +national life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellect +and compact unity of the nation. The rural population forms part and +parcel of the army. A thousand bonds unite the troops and the families +of their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone who +studies the inner life of our army is aware of this. The interest felt +in the soldier's life is intense. It is the same spirit, transmitted +from one to another. The relation of the army to the population of the +great cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of their +sons into the army is quite different. A certain opposition exists +between the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who, +from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation. +Similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened, +and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutely +hostile to the service. + +It is in the direct interests of the State to raise the physical health +of the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order to +enable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effect +of military training more extensively to bear on the town population, +and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. Nothing +promotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of military +service. + +So far as I can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself which +exercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing to +its monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditions +of life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. Apart from many +forms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health, +the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housing +conditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. This +latter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the rural +districts, and, in combination with the other influences of the great +city, produces far more harmful results. + +It is therefore the unmistakable duty of the State, first, to fight +alcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing all +kinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sell +them; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all efforts +to improve the housing conditions of the working population, and to +withdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life of +amusements. In Munich, Bavarian officers have recently made a +praiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men past +the age of attendance at school with health-producing military +exercises. The young men's clubs which Field-Marshal v.d. Goltz is +trying to establish aim at similar objects. Such undertakings ought to +be vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by the +State, from purely physical as well as social considerations. The +gymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has an +undoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deserves +every encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others, +the system of universal service should have been made an effective +reality. It is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect of +military service on the physical development of the recruits. The +authorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed to +make the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers than +hitherto. + +On the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against two +tendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hours +for factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sport +with an exaggerated value for the national health. As already pointed +out, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendant +on working together in large numbers that are prejudicial. + +The wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderate +degree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work are +present, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a complete +miscomprehension of the real value of work. It is in itself the greatest +blessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it no +longer as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning a +livelihood and paying for amusements. Strenuous labour alone produces +men and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to win +their living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have often +achieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality. + +So long as the Dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict with +the sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against the +Spanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now, +when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead a +politically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars, +their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take a +part in the struggle of the civilized nations. In Germany that stock +which was destined to bring back our country from degradation to +historical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the Rhine +or the Danube, but on the sterile sands of the March. + +We must preserve the stern, industrious, old-Prussian feeling, and carry +the rest of Germany with us to Kant's conception of life; we must +continuously steel our strength by great political and economic +endeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained, +or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only we +shall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in the +world. + +Where Nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growing +wealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life of +pleasure rather than of work, society and the State must vie in taking +care that work does not become play, or play work. It is work, regarded +as a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. Sport, which is spreading +more and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation, +not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. We must never +forget this. Hard, laborious work has made Germany great; in England, on +the contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health of +the nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place of +serious work it has greatly injured the English nation. The English +nation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard of +labour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the English +trades unions--and of the security of its military position, has more +and more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and it +may well be asked whether, under these conditions, England will show +herself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself in +the future. If, further, the political rivalry with the great and +ambitious republic in America be removed by an Arbitration Treaty, this +circumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads to +progress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which develop +physique. + +The physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless it +comes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while, +if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations, +the result must be injurious in the long-run. + +We must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physically +healthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and the +whole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour to +promote their spiritual development in every way. The means for doing so +is the school. Military education under the present-day conditions, +which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aims +satisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, and +an improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material. + +The national school is not sufficient for this requirement. The general +regulations which settle the national school system in Prussia date from +the year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account of +the modern development which has been so rapid of late years. It is only +natural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and the +essentials of military education. Present-day military education +requires complete individualization and a conscious development of manly +feeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching in +classes, and there is no distinction between the sexes. This is directly +prescribed by the rules. + +In the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of the +superiors by specially detached officers and selected experienced +non-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quite +small sections; while each one receives individual attention from the +non-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superior +officers. In a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teach +as many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers as +many as 120 children are divided into two classes. A separation of the +sexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. As a rule, +therefore, the instruction is given in common. It is certain that, under +such conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual is +possible. All that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanically +and inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch of +knowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boys +and girls, still less of individuals. + +Such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a military +education. The principles which regulate the teaching in the two places +are quite different. That is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction. + +The military education aims at training the moral personality to +independent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patriotic +feelings among the men. Instruction in a sense of duty and in our +national history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professional +teaching. Great attention is given to educate each individual in logical +reasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts. + +In the national school these views are completely relegated to the +background--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but as +the practical result of the conditions. The chief stress in such a +school is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting some +facility in reading, writing, and ciphering. The so-called _Realign_ +(history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite into +the background. Only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly are +devoted to all the _Realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in the +lower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hours +are assigned to religious instruction in every standard. There is no +idea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. Not a word in the +General Regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this; +and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods of +religious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for the +development of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. As for +influencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars to +any extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts it +altogether out of the question. + +While the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instruction +is thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given, +especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. Beginning with +the lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years), +stories not only from the New Testament, but also from the Old Testament +are drummed into the heads of the scholars. Similarly every Saturday the +portions of Scripture appointed for the next Sunday are read out and +explained to all the children. Instruction in the Catechism begins also +in the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children must +learn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. It is a +significant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid +"the memorizing of the General Confession and other parts of the +liturgical service," as "also the learning by heart of the Pericopes." +On the other hand, the institution of Public Worship is to be explained +to the children. This illustrates the spirit in which this instruction +has to be imparted according to the regulations. + +It is really amazing to read these regulations. The object of +Evangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to the +comprehension of the Holy Scriptures and to the creed of the +congregation," in order that they "may be enabled to read the Scriptures +independently and to take an active part both in the life and the +religious worship of the congregation." Requirements are laid down which +entirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to the +comprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, and +presuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. Not a word, +however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, that +is, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought into +prominence. The teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impress +religious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course of +instruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formal +religiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if not +deliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moral +influence. A real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of such +instruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their Confirmation +to have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so they +remain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to the +religious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. Nor +does the instruction for Confirmation do much to alter that, for it is +usually conceived in the same spirit. + +All other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to the +young minds some high ideals--more especially our own country's +history--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort of +instruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is of +inestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. It is the +more regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed by +the regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, is +totally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some real +service to the country. It is quite refreshing to read in the new +regulations for middle schools of February 10,1910, that by religious +instruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should be +awakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aim +at exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of the +fatherland." + +The method of religious instruction which is adopted in the national +school is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. Religious instruction +can only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectual +growth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. To make +it the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in the +national schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to be +directed at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mystical +intuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has a +confusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. Even the +missionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate his +pupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart to +them subtle religious ideas. Yet every Saturday the appointed passages +of Scripture (the Pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children. + +Religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. Up +to that point the teacher should be content, from the religious +standpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with the +simplest ideas of the Deity, but in other respects to endeavour to +awaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasp +loftier conceptions. The national school stands in total contradiction +to this intellectual development. This is in conformity to regulations, +for the same children who read the Bible independently are only to be +led to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are daily +around them." In the course of eight years they learn a smattering of +reading, writing, and ciphering.[A] It is significant of the knowledge +of our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-three +recruits of one company to whom the question was put who Bismarck was, +not a single one could answer. That the scholars acquire even a general +idea of their duties to the country and the State is quite out of the +question. It is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of the +children by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught in +common. One thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those of +girls; and, although I consider it important that patriotic feelings +should be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmit +them to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a different +way from the boys. When the instruction is common to both, the treatment +of the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. It is +quite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in the +religious field when so little has been achieved in every other field. + +This pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal that +Frederick the Great set up. He declared that the duty of the State was +"to educate the young generation to independent thinking and +self-devoted love of country." + +[Footnote A: Recently a boy was discharged from a well-known national +school as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualified +to the office of a Head Forester. He showed that he could not copy +correctly, to say nothing of writing by himself.] + +Our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reform +if it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education, +but for life generally. It sends children out into the world with +undeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elements +of knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, but +easy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. As a +matter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the national +schoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instruction +as a recruit. + +It is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform. +I will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important from +the standpoint of a citizen and a soldier. + +First and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. The number +of teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholars +diminished. It is worth while considering in this connection the +feasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years. +Then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the object +of developing the children's minds, and formal religious instruction +should only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. Finally, +the _Realien,_ especially the history of our own country, should claim +more attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in every +way; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religion +should be more prominent than the formal contents. The training of the +national school teacher must be placed on a new basis. At present it +absolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of the +school itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds and +feelings of their pupils. It must be reckoned a distinct disadvantage +for the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age of +fourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which the +reasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselves +and on any chance influences. In the interval between school life and +military service the young people not only forget all that they learnt, +perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkingly +adopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from a +lack of counteracting ideals. + +A compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity of +the age. It is also urgently required from the military standpoint. Such +a school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to prevent +the scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him for +a special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism and +sense of citizenship. To do this, it is necessary to explain to him the +relation of the State to the individual, and to explain, by reference to +our national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion to +the State. The duties of the individual to the State should be placed in +the foreground. This instruction must be inspired by the spirit which +animated Schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of Prussia, and +culminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in the +strength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the great +whole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employed +for higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishes +in feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in the +love for the fatherland and for the State, which is a haven for every +faith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose. + +Only if national education works in this sense will it train up men to +fill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school of +arms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which great +deeds spring. What can be effected by the spirit of a nation we have +learnt from the history of the War of Liberation, that never-failing +source of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centre +of history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools. + +We can study it also by an example from most recent history, in the +Russo-Japanese War. "The education of the whole Japanese people, +beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic and +warlike spirit. That education, combined with the rapidly acquired +successes in culture and warfare, aroused in the Japanese a marvellous +confidence in their own strength. They served with pride in the ranks of +the army, and dreamed of heroic deeds.... All the thoughts of the +nation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course of +several years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of a +powerful army and a strong fleet."[B] This was the spirit that led the +Japanese to victory. "The day when the young Japanese enlisted was +observed as a festival in his family."[B] + +In Russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that +"Patriotism was an obsolete notion," "war was a crime and an +anachronism," that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was the +greatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourable +trade."[B] Thus the Russian army marched to battle without any +enthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of the +great racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity." Already eaten +up by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, without +energy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspired +leaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent. + +[Footnote B: "The Work of the Russian General Staff," from the Russian by +Freiheu v. Tettau.] + +I have examined these conditions closely because I attach great +importance to the national school and the continuation school as a means +to the military education of our people. I am convinced that only the +army of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything really +great. I understand, of course, that the school alone, however high its +efficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, in +view of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every means +if we wish to accomplish something great. The direct influence of school +ends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at first +make itself felt very gradually. Later generations will reap the fruits +of its sowing. Its efficiency must be aided by other influences which +will not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughout +their lives. Now, there are two means available which can work upon +public opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation; +one is the Press, the other is a policy of action. If the Government +wishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to secure +a narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further its +great political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong and +national Press, through which it must present its views and aims +vigorously and openly. The Government will never be able to count upon a +well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or +necessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is being +systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy +preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the +same note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as the +object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military +spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an +imperial policy. + +It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war +as an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with the +duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country. + +A parliamentary Government, which always represents merely a temporary +majority, may leave the party Press to defend and back its views; but a +Government like the German, which traces its justification to the fact +that it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. Its point of view +does not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course, +conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. It +must therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as on +particular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims as +widely understood as possible. I regard it, therefore, as one of the +most important duties of a Government like ours to use the Press freely +and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. I do not mean that a few +large political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be well +supplied with news, but that the views of the Government should find +comprehensive expression in the local Press. It would be an advantage, +in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certain +announcements of the Government, in order that the reader might not have +such a one-sided account of public affairs as the party Press supplies. +It would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, as +justifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health. +Epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old Europe more dangerous and +damaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the State to +preserve the moral healthiness of the nation. + +More important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the Press is +the _propaganda of action._ Nothing controls the spirit of the multitude +so effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceived +in a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. Such education by a powerful +policy is an absolute necessity for the German people. This nation +possesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritual +energy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairy +laid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. In addition to +this, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national and +religious unity of the nation created in the system of small States and +in confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency to +particularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nation +was no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. Yet the heart +of this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even though +such aims can only be attended by danger. We must not be misled in this +respect by the Press, which often represents a most one-sided, +self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or even +Anti-German lines rather than national. The soul of our nation is not +reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on the +necessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and +comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. + +On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the +Powers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance, +every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the +people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their +forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again and +again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this +yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the +clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with +him. + +He is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors of +national psychology; Bismarck possessed this art, and used k with a +master-hand. True, he found ready to hand one idea which was common to +all--the sincere wish for German unification and the German Empire; but +the German nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which lead +to the realization of this idea. Only under compulsion and after a hard +struggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation was +fired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to which +the great statesman was so surely leading it. Success was the foundation +on which Bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the German Empire. Even +in the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of the +people by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of all +opposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them serve +his own great aims. He, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, and +the motto _Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him; +but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and of +world-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that no +statesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands the +soul of his people. + +This knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with the +Great Elector, Frederick the Incomparable, Scharnhorst and Bluecher; for +even that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of a +political idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground at +the Congress of Vienna. + +The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things +recognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influence +over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by +continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its +interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions. +Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to +great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high +aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to +prepare their minds to it: + + "The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims." + +We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed on +the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous +duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the +whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of +warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for +the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices. + +We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization +to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only +fulfil it by the sword. + + +Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most +effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military +duty? Such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for the +strength and honour of the German people. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + + + +FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR + +From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that +the political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitude +of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the +preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself. + +But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and +moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military +authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still +further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of +the State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must be +made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the +national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the +tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further, +as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of +mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure +under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the +material and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations for +war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made +to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as +possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come. +If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in +whom confidence can be reposed should war break out. + + +I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the +commercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere of +commercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which the +desired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Government +and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regards +finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may +go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national +household in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, on +the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money +required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions. + +The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financial +economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the +current incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, the +indebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive +and military capabilities. + +As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a great +civilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never be +brought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure for +necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military +forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general +progress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion +to the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly based +on war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our +forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the +effeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is only +one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one +vice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of all +culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the +individual for itself.[A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepest +gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an +epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of +the last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in +Prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large +sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the +Government. + +Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of +demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations +contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to +the great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day look +contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut +their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties +imposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial +pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in +our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity +and energy."[B] + +[Footnote A: Treitschke.] + +[Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte."] + +Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but is +bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens, +since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important, +however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national +property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities. + +This property is to a certain extent determined by the natural +productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. But +these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour +of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced. +Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and secure +labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour +conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by +concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate +German trade by vigorous political representation of German interests +abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits +from international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural production +by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable +protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on +foreign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fishery +would add to this.[D] + +[Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by international +commerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling.] + +[Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from +foreign countries.] + +From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase +permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the +annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be +met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Home +production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95 +per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, the +production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two +double-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered +that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two +million tons. + +A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national +prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own +colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense +quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually +independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to +transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by +effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less +we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards, +[E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the +State will improve. + +[Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons +of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of +copper, etc.] + +If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of national +productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the +reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial +position. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a +two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays. +The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very +easily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it is +a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to +improve the financial position. The experiences of history leave no +doubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of a +nation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once is +shaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the State +creditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holds +out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its +creditors far better security than a weaker military power. If our +credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened +political position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our army +and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible +liquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first to +improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to +keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go. + +The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task. + +It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits of +possible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and +1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from +20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same +proportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there is +a huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the German +Empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per +head of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the same +basis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germany +only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and +navy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the +individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in Germany and France, the +outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our most +probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their +armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger +politically. + +Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase +of wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades and +industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a +setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again. + +The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the +Empire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports has +increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the +year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14 +1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of the +imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the +exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... The value of the import of +raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in +1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of +such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The import +of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a +value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of +manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of the +import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3 +milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food +remained at about the same figure. + +The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in +Germany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amounted +in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2 +million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The +quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in +1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35 +million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from +6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119 +million marks.... From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany +has increased by 127 per cent.; in England only by about 59 per cent. +The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172 +per cent.; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[F] + +[Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin.] + +Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financial +position of the Empire has considerably improved since the Imperial +Finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may very +soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent. + +It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth +of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive +capitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked +extent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of national +wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number of +taxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6,000 to 100,000 +marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., +from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per +cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. In these classes, +therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater +proportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100,000 +to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on +an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in +the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. In the class of 500,000 +marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per +cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in +the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually, +it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. This means +per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an +increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an +increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks +and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year. + +We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and +annually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister has +estimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three +years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliards +yearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give some +instances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory at +Essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent., +the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the +annual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from +1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown by +the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has +reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and +poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement +in prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of a +healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment +are considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants +left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's +unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in +the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 per +cent. (in France it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of +workmen's unions were unemployed. + +Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national +debt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empire +in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the +national debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in-- + + Marks +Prussia 9,421,770,800 +Bavaria 2,165,942,900 +Saxony 893,042,600 +Wuertemberg 606,042,800 +Baden 557,859,000 +Hesse 428,664,400 +Alsace-Lorraine 31,758,100 +Hamburg 684,891,200 +Luebeck 666,888,400 +Bremen 263,431,400 + +Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains, +forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railways +reached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in-- + + Marks, +Prussia (Hesse) 9,888 +Bavaria 1,694 +Saxony 1,035 +Wuertemburg 685 +Baden 727 +Alsace-Lorraine 724 + +--a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15,062 milliard +marks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of +1911 for Prussia alone 11,050 milliards. Nevertheless, the national +debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously +because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and +presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in +debt. + +The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10,000 +inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the +whole Empire to some 5,000 million marks. This means that interest +yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many +communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions, +are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or +even 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributed +according to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middle +class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources of +wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative +income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on +the Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into +property. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to pay +for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the +protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization, +so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the +opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on +the altar of patriotism. + +The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown how +party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was +not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his +neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial +sacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be +made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But a +considerable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if we +wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of +our country without a blow. + +Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedy +introduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), in +order to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue would +oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would +furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to +diminish our burden of debt. + +If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters, +depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they +could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their +favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in as +heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based +on official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place to +examine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high a +figure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large +under any circumstances. + +Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that +is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the +nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first +instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to +paying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a +private gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to be +recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable +to fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceeds +principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing +the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely +important. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility +that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other +important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on +land and sea. + +There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be +urged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It is +argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth, +that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course +of time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that the +independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the +ideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement that +relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will, +is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According to +our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his +fortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which he +bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to +any other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his natural +heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he +wishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he is +interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things, +that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession is +based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual +than his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait. +The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in +which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are +alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of +this sort."[F] + +[Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910.] + +Both objections are unconvincing. + +So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to +liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met +otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directly +beneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay less +taxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in +the hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right of +succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the +State be prevented in other ways. The science of finance could +unquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme to +its extreme logical conclusion. + +The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true sense +of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a +will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. If +such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of +certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof +in life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probably +the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties +would actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law," +which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and +is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual +than the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is the +root from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and the +defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that in +the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and +that the significance of the State for the individual, no less than for +the family, should be thoroughly understood. + +These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty +enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperial +right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help +and the whole future of Germany is at stake. + +If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally +large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a +law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our +sorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be good +prospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Government +does not disguise the true state of the political position. + +Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We see +that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against +the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and +are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts are +also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as +to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which +England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world +policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if +she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has +built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has +secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious +careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this +English policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guided +exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means +of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill. + +There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements +have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit +reservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic +stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting +party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really +benefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed. +Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on which +those of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes on +the honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when +concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so +as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arise +which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The +country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical +sense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his life +long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever +induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[A] + +The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or +alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if +he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an +arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is, +as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States, +from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the +happiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in the +east will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank on +the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria and +outflank any Russian attack on Galicia. + +Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will +never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a +permanent political system. + +"There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as +effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal +interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the +other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." These +are the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher +_pace_ Bismarck. + +We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but +must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable +attitude of the other States by reference to their own interests. +Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to the +diplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself, +seeks nothing but his own advantage." It will prove waste labour to +attempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions or +an attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, the +weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale. + +When Napoleon III. planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect an +alliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually in +Paris to conclude the military negotiations.[B] These probably were +going on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand. +Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussian +flag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman less +biassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austria +nor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war +under unfavourable conditions. + +[Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attache +in Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, and +pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of +Prussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was better +informed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the +conditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by Archduke +Albert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor had +made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military +calculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the former +Minister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)] + +France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests, +unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did not +satisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomatic +arrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests in +Morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her +interest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that country +for herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will not +allow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerce +and German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the French +standpoint she is right. + +The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own +interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different +Great Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt, +however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political +grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible +only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State with +which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its +opponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to +further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone +and of being left isolated in the hour of danger. + +A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking +chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keep +this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances +and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above +all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take +bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility +of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under +favourable conditions. "The great art of policy," writes Frederick the +Great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to +one's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage from +favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." Even in +his Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered +all his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but +boldness alone can acquire." "I give you a problem to solve," he said to +his councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. was announced. +"When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?" + +Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct +summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate +estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the +interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and +daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws +of political and military success. + +The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blinded +by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able +to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success. +"The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim +which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which +shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more +despised than by the great Prussian King," so H. v. Treitschke tells us. +"Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with +remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the +political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss +the golden opportunity. + +It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize +that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist +policy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets up +personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real +current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures, +as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia. + +A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these +great duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are based +on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the +possibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers the +result to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageous +circumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe +to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led. + +In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan +had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as +military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and +assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her +policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at +the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment +of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She +had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance +with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to +place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover, +compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of +the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against +Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations +required by the political position had been made, although the conflict +had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous +retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no +doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made +resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the +campaign by the offensive. + +England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and +consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to +her aims or suited to give weight to political demands. + +Two points stand out clearly from this consideration. + +First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and +political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war +are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong +enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing +which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be +developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The +obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace +as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister +and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the +all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain +influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, +and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military +situation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister who +conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is +in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of +the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he +must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by +war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has +of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the +realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the +opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of +compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a +permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of +recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one, +but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to +end in political and moral defeat. + +The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and +hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and +shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always +creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory, +tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy, +which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts +favourably on the military situation. + +In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can +only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution +join hands. + +If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next +war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion: +the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the +necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions +are to be created for the inevitably threatening war. + +So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two +fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war +from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was +comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various +strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small +compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the +other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive +action on both sides. To-day the situation is different. + +We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expect +not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of +English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch +neutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England may +land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war +with us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a +position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather +be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and +south-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is also +increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of +the European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menaced +in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet. + +All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur +simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations +they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the +military aspect. The military situation thus created is very +unfavourable. + +If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the +army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the +situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the +stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure, +and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must +count. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one +also. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have +to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be +directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and +all necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops of +the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected +along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when +occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the same +principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in +readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport +arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many +different lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements for +unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the +most various political prospects. We should in any case be forced to +adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present +conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent +an invasion by one or other of our enemies. + +No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good +prospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led against +a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. A +military investigation of the situation shows that a plan +of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents, +under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and +has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind. + +The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy +which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to +overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. On +this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of +Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Of +course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an +unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which +the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If we +attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help, +and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy +to fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the +cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be +reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral. + +This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring +about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor +England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as +we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by +diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows. + +If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate +an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her +interests or those of England, that both these States would feel +themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are +offered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentively +studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on +this point. + +In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we +should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of +circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to +struggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to state +clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own +interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Such +political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid +foundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and +realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great +results. + +It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and +measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a +favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous +to Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. This +requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic +position which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said: +Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must +keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as +time goes on. + +Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire +settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons +emigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and England +to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the +Mediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. The +effort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured the +Italian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in the +least the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to the +Triple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. The +importance of these considerations will continue to be felt. + +Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, and +Russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of +present-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in +England and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the +Central European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder +of abandoning her in Morocco. + +There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; in +Central Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clash +in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and China +is forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to some +degree ties her hands. + +All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if it +is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than +recent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy can +count on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on an +army whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficiently +valued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. We +have amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops, +the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst +them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are +soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world, +provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The German +nation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height of +its great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in +its soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this +people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a +worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on +in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will +achieve a truly magnificent result. + +In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces, +and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger, +our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future; +but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless it +wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the +brave words of Goethe: + + "Bid defiance to every power! + Ever valiant, never cower! + To the brave soldier open flies + The golden gate of Paradise." + + + + +EPILOGUE + +After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-German +convention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; the +Turko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensions +which point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and, +lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real +offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France and +England. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently +between the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has been +foreseen and provided for. + +I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first +occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the +Anglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks. + +The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed, +have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a +collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this +object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed +that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was +determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the +attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered +correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain +was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for +war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance +on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this +crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the +concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable +moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait +until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and +Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the +other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it +can actively support the Rhine army. + +This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government, +but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined, +that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes. + + +It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as +regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our +manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of +territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not +inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in +obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the +possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can +never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were +compelled to abandon. + +I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial +concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed +force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo +region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of +November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their +present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from +this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no +doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession +for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish +_enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has +at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case +of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese. + +It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial +arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for +a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be +assumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has +carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a +moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because +she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a +desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea, +in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v. +Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not, +therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to +revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, +the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France. + +The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first an +actual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by the +expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn +from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position. +But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not +merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but +primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its +entirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement +means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly +surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the +sovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent +infraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we had +weighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty such +action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the +notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such +explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front. + +An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islam +have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, of +course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey have +suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in +the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance +for us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco convention +precipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundly +the solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which France +obtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realize +the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the +Mediterranean. + +The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep +rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the +mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large +sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in +spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily +supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this +weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the +Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better +has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great +disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical +times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire +must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to +ride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war +removes all further doubt on this point. + +The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the +view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the +various chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by a +firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder +any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have +done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance, +and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no +doubt on this point.[A] + +[Footnote A: Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.] + +The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all +pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead +in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive +intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would +support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the +limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with +England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered +by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new +acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new +colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and +that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form +objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear +commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once +more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates. + +In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count +on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a +_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at +most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may +fairly imagine we have some prospect of success. + +If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in +the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world +generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more +face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the +world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any +case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide +that the hour of attack has come. + +We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike +preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down. +All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to +represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the +people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to +military and political success, without carrying still further the +disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and +frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between +Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will +prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy +which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers +threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs +and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any +conventional scruples distract it from this object. + +Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged +basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of +sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation +calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it +to the happy goal. + +The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever. +England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her +interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles +question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of +her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great +Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and +difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has +considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before +it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will +probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in +sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted +German policy can utilize in order to influence the general political +situation in the interests of our Fatherland. + +If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of +Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the +future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with +confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to +fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz +Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God: + + "From the height of the starry sky + May thy ringing sword flash bright; + Let every craven cry + Be silenced by thy might!" + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Germany and the Next War +by Friedrich von Bernhardi + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 11352.txt or 11352.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/1/3/5/11352/ + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Bonny Fafard and PG Distributed Proofreaders + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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