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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 11352 ***
+
+GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR
+
+
+
+BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI
+
+
+
+TRANSLATED BY ALLEN H. POWLES
+
+
+1912
+
+
+
+All the patriotic sections of the German people were greatly excited
+during the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on all
+hearts that in the settlement of the Morocco dispute no mere commercial
+or colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but that
+the honour and future of the German nation were at stake. A deep rift
+had opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action
+of the Government. Public opinion, which was clearly in favour of
+asserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our political
+position, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would have
+demanded. I cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in an
+overwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, would
+have been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation.
+Haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic of
+the German Reichstag in modern Berlin as it was in medieval Regensburg.
+These conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages,
+which were partly written some time ago.
+
+Nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national and
+political development. At such times it is necessary to be absolutely
+clear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be
+surmounted, and the sacrifices to be made.
+
+The task I have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of all
+diplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. It is
+obvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view.
+
+Our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past,
+have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nation
+which, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must,
+and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulness
+of my German heart that I have recorded my convictions. I believe that
+thus I shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers'
+hearts, and strengthen the national purpose.
+
+THE AUTHOR.
+
+_October, 1911_
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+Power of the peace idea--Causes of the love of peace in Germany--
+  German consciousness of strength--Lack of definite political aims
+ --Perilous situation of Germany and the conditions of successful
+  self-assertion--Need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to
+  explain the tasks and aims of Germany in the light of history
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR
+
+Pacific ideals and arbitration--The biological necessity of war--The
+  duty of self-assertion--The right of conquest--The struggle for
+  employment--War a moral obligation--Beneficent results of war
+ --War from the Christian and from the materialist standpoints--
+  Arbitration and international law--Destructiveness and immorality
+  of peace aspirations--Real and Utopian humanity--Dangerous
+  results of peace aspirations in Germany--The duty of
+  the State
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR
+
+Bismarck and the justification of war--The duty to fight--The teaching
+  of history--War only justifiable on adequate grounds--The
+  foundations of political morality--Political and individual morality
+ --The grounds for making war--The decision to make war--The
+  responsibility of the statesman
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
+
+The ways of Providence in history--Christianity and the Germans--
+  The Empire and the Papacy--Breach between the German World
+  Empire and the revived spiritual power--Rise of the great States
+  of Europe and political downfall of Germany after the Thirty
+  Years' War--Rise of the Prussian State--The epoch of the Revolution
+  and the War of Liberation--Intellectual supremacy of
+  Germany--After the War of Liberation--Germany under William
+  I. and Bismarck--Change in the conception of the State and
+  the principle of nationality--New economic developments and
+  the World Power of England--Rise of other World Powers--
+  Socialism, and how to overcome it--German science and art--
+  Internal disintegration of Germany and her latent strength
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION
+
+Grounds of the intellectual supremacy of Germany--Germany's role
+  as spiritual and intellectual leader--Conquest of religious and
+  social obstacles--Inadequacy of our present political position--
+  To secure what we have won our first duty--Necessity of increasing
+  our political power--Necessity of colonial expansion--
+  Menace to our aspirations from hostile Powers
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL
+
+Points of view for judging of the political situation--The States of the
+  Triple Alliance--The political interests of France and Russia--
+  The Russo-French Alliance--The policy of Great Britain--
+  America and the rising World Powers of the Far East--The importance
+  of Turkey--Spain and the minor States of Europe--Perilous
+  position of Germany--World power or downfall--Increase
+  of political power: how to obtain it--German colonial
+  policy--The principle of the balance of power in Europe--Neutral
+  States--The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs
+  of other States--Germany and the rules of international politics
+ --The foundations of our internal strength
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY FOR WAR
+
+Its necessity--Its twofold aspect--The educational importance of
+  military efficiency--Different military systems--Change in the
+  nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization--
+  Variety of methods of preparation for war--The armaments of
+  minor States--The armaments of the Great Powers--Harmonious
+  development of all elements of strength--Influence on armaments
+  of different conceptions of the duties of the State--Permanent
+  factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness--
+  Statecraft in this connection
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR
+
+Our opponents--The French army--The military power of Russia--
+  The land forces of England--The military power of Germany and
+  Austria; of Italy--The Turkish army--The smaller Balkan States
+ --The Roumanian army--The armies of the lesser States of Central
+  Europe--Greece and Spain--The fleets of the principal naval
+  Powers--The enmity of France--The hostility of England--
+  Russia's probable behaviour in a war against Germany--The
+  military situation of Germany--Her isolation--What will be at
+  stake in our next war--Preparation for war
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+THE NEXT NAVAL WAR
+
+England's preparations for a naval war against Germany--Germany's
+  first measures against England--England and the neutrality of the
+  small neighbouring States--The importance of Denmark--Commercial
+  mobilization--The two kinds of blockade: The close
+  blockade and the extended blockade--England's attack on our
+  coasts--Co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--The decisive
+  battle and its importance--Participation of France and Russia in
+  a German-English war
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+THE CRUCIAL QUESTION
+
+Reciprocal relations of land and sea power--The governing points of
+  view in respect of war preparations--Carrying out of universal
+  military service--The value of intellectual superiority--Masses,
+  weapons, and transport in modern war--Tactical efficiency and
+  the quality of the troops--The advantage of the offensive--Points
+  to be kept in view in war preparations--Refutation of the prevailing
+  restricted notions on this head--The _Ersatzreserve_--New
+  formations--Employment of the troops of the line and the new
+  formations--Strengthening of the standing army--The importance
+  of personality
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+ARMY ORGANIZATION
+
+Not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further
+  development--Fighting power and tactical efficiency--Strength of the
+  peace establishment--Number of officers and N.C.O.'s, especially in the
+  infantry--Relations of the different arms to each other--Distribution
+  of machine guns--Proportion between infantry and artillery--Lessons to
+  be learned from recent wars with regard to this--Superiority at the
+  decisive point--The strength of the artillery and tactical
+  efficiency--Tactical efficiency of modern armies--Tactical efficiency
+  and the marching depth of an army corps--Importance of the internal
+  organization of tactical units--Organization and distribution of field
+  artillery; of heavy field howitzers--Field pioneers and fortress
+  pioneers--Tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--Increase of the
+  cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--Tactical organization of the
+  cavalry--Development of the air-fleet--Summary of the necessary
+  requirements--Different ways of carrying them out--Importance of
+  governing points of view for war preparations
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+TRAINING AND EDUCATION
+
+The spirit of training--Self-dependence and the employment of masses--
+  Education in self-dependence--Defects in our training for war on the
+  grand scale--Need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to
+  the training of our commanders--Practical training of the artillery--
+  Training in tactical efficiency--Practice in marching under war
+  conditions--Training of the train officers and column leaders--
+  Control of the General Staff by the higher commanders--Value of
+  manoeuvres: how to arrange them--Preliminary theoretical training of
+  the higher commanders--Training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the
+  pioneers and commissariat troops--Promotion of intellectual development
+  in the army--Training in the military academy
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR
+
+The position of a World Power implies naval strength--Development
+  of German naval ideals--The task of the German fleet; its strength
+ --Importance of coast defences--Necessity of accelerating our
+  naval armaments--The building of the fleet--The institution of
+  the air-fleet--Preliminary measures for a war on commerce--
+  Mobilization--General points of view with regard to preparations
+  for the naval war--Lost opportunities in the past
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION
+
+The universal importance of national education--Its value for the
+  army--Hurtful influences at work on it--Duties of the State with
+  regard to national health--Work and sport--The importance of
+  the school--The inadequacy of our national schools--Military
+  education and education in the national schools--Methods of
+  instruction in the latter--Necessity for their reform--Continuation
+  schools--Influence of national education on the Russo-Japanese
+  War--Other means of national education--The propaganda of
+  action
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+Duties of the State in regard to war preparations--The State and
+  national credit--The financial capacity of Germany--Necessity of
+  new sources of revenue--The imperial right of inheritance--Policy
+  of interests and alliances--Moulding and exploitation of the
+  political situation--The laws of political conduct--Interaction of
+  military and political war preparations--Political preparations
+  for our next war--Governing factors in the conduct of German policy
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+The latest political events--Conduct of the German Imperial Government
+ --The arrangement with France--Anglo-French relations and
+  the attitude of England--The requirements of the situation
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has
+been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way
+which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining
+the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in
+Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal
+enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With the
+increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of
+sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great
+conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our
+future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a
+solution at the present time.
+
+We have been capable of soaring upwards. Mighty deeds raised Germany
+from political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of European
+nations. But we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and to
+advance along the path of development in politics and culture. We
+tremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands from
+us. Yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from our
+glorious past. How rightly Fichte once judged his countrymen when he
+said the German can never wish for a thing by itself; he must always
+wish for its contrary also.
+
+The Germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlike
+nation of Europe. For a long time they have proved themselves to be the
+ruling people of the Continent by the power of their arms and the
+loftiness of their ideas. Germans have bled and conquered on countless
+battlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shown
+that the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. In
+striking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become a
+peace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. A rude shock is
+needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their
+military strength.
+
+This strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes.
+
+It springs first from the good-natured character of the German people,
+which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations and
+partisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. It is connected
+with another characteristic of the German nature. Our aim is to be just,
+and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchange
+relations share this aim. We are always ready to consider the peaceful
+assurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign Press to be no less
+genuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resist
+the view that the political world is only ruled by interests and never
+from ideal aims of philanthropy. "Justice," Goethe says aptly, "is a
+quality and a phantom of the Germans." We are always inclined to assume
+that disputes between States can find a peaceful solution on the basis
+of justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is.
+
+An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted
+in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed
+in commercial life.
+
+The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world.
+Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhaps
+the greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty years
+Germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion
+of her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line,
+we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the
+world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great
+industrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are established
+all over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of the
+globe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands of
+Germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Under
+these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides.
+
+Our trade and our industries--owners no less than employés--do not want
+this development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is the
+essential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition will
+be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have
+never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained
+by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce.
+
+Universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, for
+war in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limited
+circles, but the whole nation suffers alike. All families and all
+classes have to pay the same toll of human lives. Finally comes the
+effect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of the
+times--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of an
+aspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfold
+in peace.
+
+Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem
+entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire
+received with "astonishment and indignation" from Frederick the Great,
+that "the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power";
+that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans,
+cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the
+greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. We regard our
+warlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is the
+special duty of the German Reichstag to lighten so far as possible. We
+seem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament is
+not an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of our
+national health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige.
+We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it
+as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power.
+
+Besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continued
+justification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate and
+often unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the German people.
+The agelong dream of the German nation was realized in the political
+union of the greater part of the German races and in the founding of the
+German Empire. Since then there lives in the hearts of all (I would not
+exclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proud
+consciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increased
+political power. This consciousness is supported by the fixed
+determination never to abandon these acquisitions. The conviction is
+universal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the whole
+nation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. We all wish, indeed, to be
+able to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict,
+and we live in the belief that the power of our State will steadily
+increase without our needing to fight for it. We do not at the bottom of
+our hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with a
+certain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to let
+ourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow.
+Every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. Not
+merely in the North, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race with
+glorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner of
+Prussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of all
+thought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in the
+South also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of petty
+nationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the German stock live
+in the heart of the people. Here and there, maybe, such emotions slumber
+in the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer and
+more luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animated
+by latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousness
+await their awakening.
+
+Thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below the
+surface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. It fritters
+itself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. We no
+longer have a clearly defined political and national aim, which grips
+the imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unity
+of action. Such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in the
+yearnings for German unity, for the fulfilment of the Barbarossa legend.
+A great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems to
+me to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in the
+world is threatened by external complications, the greater is this
+danger.
+
+Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding all
+peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that
+their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often
+pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific
+settlement.
+
+In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful
+methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable,
+our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result of
+our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also
+because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual
+upstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, and
+now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for
+centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect. We have thus
+injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. It must be
+reserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situation
+thus affected, but one point can be mentioned without further
+consideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties is
+adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the
+Germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces
+brought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of this
+struggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation.
+We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset by
+the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this
+struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry
+through a Seven Years' War for our position as a World Power, if we gain
+a start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which will
+fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces
+of the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops,
+but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for
+all their dearest possessions.
+
+These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the
+standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great
+tasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before the
+German people as the greatest civilized people known to history.
+
+From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations for
+peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of
+the German people, according to their true moral significance. I must
+try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of
+nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true
+civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality.
+I must endeavour to develop from the history of the German past in its
+connection with the conditions of the present those aspects of the
+question which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. The
+historical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according to
+inward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drastic
+obligations. No one need passively submit to the pressure of
+circumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at the
+parting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or to
+decadence. "A favoured position in the world will only become effective
+in the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it." It
+seemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this parting
+of the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light I
+may on the different paths which are open to our people. A nation must
+fully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can it
+take deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and,
+looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for any
+sacrifices which the present or future may demand.
+
+These sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financial
+sphere, depend mainly on the idea of what Germany is called upon to
+strive for and attain in the present and the future. Only those who
+share my conception of the duties and obligations of the German people,
+and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing the
+sword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusions
+in the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financial
+demands which spring out of it. It is only in their logical connection
+with the entire development, political and moral, of the State that the
+military requirements find their motive and their justification.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+
+THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR
+
+Since 1795, when Immanuel Kant published in his old age his treatise on
+"Perpetual Peace," many have considered it an established fact that war
+is the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. In spite of
+all that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the struggle
+between nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization is
+credited with a power to which war must yield. But, undisturbed by such
+human theories and the change of times, war has again and again marched
+from country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved its
+destructive as well as creative and purifying power. It has not
+succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. Long periods of
+war, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on the
+contrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, from
+the political intercourse of nations.
+
+This wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. The
+maintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanship
+should aim. This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days a
+quite peculiar power over men's spirits. This aspiration finds its
+public expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the Press of
+every country and of every party opens its columns to it. The current in
+this direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of Governments
+profess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peace
+is the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out the
+aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all Governments exert
+themselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish the
+conflagration.
+
+Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action.
+They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote
+their own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at the
+Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the
+United States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried to
+conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and
+foremost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany. No
+practical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved.
+
+We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts.
+This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as the
+weaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest
+need of international protection, have been completely passed over in
+the American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be
+assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans,
+with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced
+"perfidious Albion" to accede to the proposals. We may suppose that
+England intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, but
+that America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of
+sovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out her
+plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America.
+Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over
+the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for
+themselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts
+of President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace,
+and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of
+the United States an era in the history of mankind.
+
+This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and
+marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been
+shown by a race of Epigoni. "It has always been," H. von Treitschke
+tells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played
+with the dream of perpetual peace."
+
+Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours to
+diminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which war
+entails are justifiable. It is an incontestable fact that war
+temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic
+development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the
+primitive brutality of man. It is therefore a most desirable
+consummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible,
+and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily
+in the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential nature
+of war. All that the Hague Peace Congress has accomplished in this
+limited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war,
+universal acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the object
+is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place in
+historical development.
+
+This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws
+which rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the first
+importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be
+dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow,
+which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real
+civilization. "War is the father of all things." [A] The sages of
+antiquity long before Darwin recognized this.
+
+[Footnote A: (Heraclitus of Ephesus).]
+
+The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all
+healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the
+result of contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not
+merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "To supplant or
+to be supplanted is the essence of life," says Goethe, and the strong
+life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good
+everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the
+most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the
+universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. This struggle is
+regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and
+by the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animal
+world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the human
+race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances.
+The man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means to
+assert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the
+individual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness of
+right. The life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined,
+doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent
+the less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour,
+envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. Still more
+often, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures of
+a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment.
+
+There can be no doubt on this point. The nation is made up of
+individuals, the State of communities. The motive which influences each
+member is prominent in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle for
+possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the
+relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only
+as it is compatible with advantage. So long as there are men who have
+human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive
+for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests
+come into being and occasions for making war arise.
+
+"The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law
+of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and
+institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the
+intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The
+extrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the external
+development of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal
+development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggle
+of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward
+development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of
+nations--war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist?
+In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat
+of the other! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Clauss Wagner, "Der Krieg als schaffendes Weltprinzip."]
+
+That social system in which the most efficient personalities possess the
+greatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocial
+struggle. In the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquer
+which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral,
+material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend
+itself. War will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions,
+enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus
+promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual
+and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which
+render possible a general progressive development. They confer victory
+because the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war,
+inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy
+budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "War," says A.
+W. von Schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in
+Nature."
+
+Now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may exist
+between peoples and States, like that between the fellow-members of a
+society, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need not
+always degenerate Into war. Struggle and war are not identical. This
+rivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as the
+intrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results.
+Above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the State stands the
+law, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that the
+right shall prevail. Behind the law stands the State, armed with power,
+which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively to
+promote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. But there is no
+impartial power that stands above the rivalry of States to restrain
+injustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote the
+highest ends of mankind. Between States the only check on injustice is
+force, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own
+part and promote its own ends and ideals. If in doing so it comes into
+conflict with the ideals and views of other States, it must either
+submit and concede the precedence to the rival people or State, or
+appeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i.e., of
+war--in order to make its own views prevail. No power exists which can
+judge between States, and makes its judgments prevail. Nothing, in fact,
+is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress the
+ascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay.
+
+It will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form a
+superior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is
+stronger. This attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the more
+intensive vitality will prevail. The allied opponents have the seeds of
+corruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporary
+reverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory over
+numerical superiority. The history of Germany is an eloquent example of
+this truth.
+
+Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct of
+self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a
+natural condition of existence. "Man is a fighter." Self-sacrifice is a
+renunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or in
+the life of States, which are agglomerations of individuals. The first
+and paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence.
+By self-assertion alone can the State maintain the conditions of life
+for its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man is
+entitled to claim from it. This duty of self-assertion is by no means
+satisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes the
+obligation to assure the possibility of life and development to the
+whole body of the nation embraced by the State.
+
+Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a
+given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they
+require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population.
+Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must,
+as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say,
+by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity.
+
+The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first the
+procedure is pacific. Over-populated countries pour a stream of
+emigrants into other States and territories. These submit to the
+legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditions
+of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants,
+with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest.
+
+The right of colonization is also recognized. Vast territories inhabited
+by uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized States, and
+made subject to their rule. Higher civilization and the correspondingly
+greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. This right
+is, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determine
+what degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. The
+impossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these international
+relations has been the cause of many wars. The subjugated nation does
+not recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilized
+nation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence.
+This situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions of
+civilization have changed in the course of time. The subject nation has,
+perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and the
+difference in civilization has consequently lessened. Such a state of
+things is growing ripe in British India.
+
+Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. It
+may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races,
+and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which the
+mother-country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to
+acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of
+self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign
+soil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right.
+The threatened people will see the point of Goethe's lines:
+
+  "That which them didst inherit from thy sires,
+  In order to possess it, must be won."
+
+The procedure of Italy in Tripoli furnishes an example of such
+conditions, while Germany in the Morocco question could not rouse
+herself to a similar resolution.[C]
+
+[Footnote C: This does not imply that Germany could and ought to have
+occupied part of Morocco. On more than one ground I think that it was
+imperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this State on the basis
+of the Algeçiras Convention. Among other advantages, which need not be
+discussed here, Germany would have had the country secured to her as a
+possible sphere of colonization. That would have set up justifiable
+claims for the future.]
+
+In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at
+once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided
+by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since
+its decisions rest on the very nature of things.
+
+Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a
+convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the
+same result.
+
+In America, England, Germany, to mention only the chief commercial
+countries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of the
+population. The native population cannot consume all the products of
+this work. The industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. Work
+and employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladly
+accept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country.
+But this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itself
+from such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. We
+find, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries into
+existence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the other
+hand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, to
+crush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumer
+for itself or win fresh ones. It is an embittered struggle which rages
+in the market of the world. It has already often assumed definite
+hostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensify
+this struggle. Great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shut
+their doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on the
+down-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourable
+conditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goods
+cheaper than those imported from the old industrial States. These latter
+will see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus it
+may well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactory
+conditions of life to its workers. Such a State runs the danger not only
+of losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of also
+gradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and political
+world through diminishing production and lessened profits.
+
+In this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. We
+cannot reject the possibility that a State, under the necessity of
+providing remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war.
+If more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stake
+in Morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, Germany
+would hardly have conceded to France the most favourable position in the
+Morocco market without a struggle. England, doubtless, would not shrink
+from a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of the
+South African goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened her
+Indian market, the control of which is the foundation of her world
+sovereignty. The knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biological
+laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from
+international relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is not
+only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an
+indispensable factor in civilization.
+
+The attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connected
+with the view of life generally.
+
+If we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as something
+purely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outward
+decay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man can
+attain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possible
+diminution of all bodily suffering. The State will be regarded as a sort
+of assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possession
+and enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. We must endorse the
+view which Wilhelm von Humboldt professed in his treatise on the limits
+of the activity of the State.[D] The compulsory functions of the State
+must be limited to the assurance of property and life. The State will be
+considered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shun
+war as the greatest conceivable evil.
+
+[Footnote D: W. von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der
+Wirksamkelt des Staates zu bestimmen."]
+
+If, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of States as merely
+a fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not rest
+on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers,
+and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of the
+chequered conditions of life, the task of the State will appear in a
+very different light. The State will not be to us merely a legal and
+social insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have the
+one object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reach
+of the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising the
+intellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, and
+of securing for them that influence on the world which tends to the
+combined progress of humanity. We shall see in the State, as Fichte
+taught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is to
+put into practice the moral duty on earth. "The State," says Treitschke,
+"is a moral community. It is called upon to educate the human race by
+positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should
+develop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike for
+nation and individuals, the highest moral task."
+
+This highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. Man
+can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a
+community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He must
+be in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individual
+out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and
+makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The State
+alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest
+degree of life.[E]
+
+[Footnote E: To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and
+thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to
+error, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, by
+Implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Any
+action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State
+and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide
+domain of Utopias.]
+
+War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it
+is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation.
+As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls
+for war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it.
+
+If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, we
+shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its
+political power increases. The higher object at which it aims is
+closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It is
+only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that
+creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most
+splendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilities
+and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which
+power creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, and
+recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is
+content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace on
+sluggard's couch it lies," then its citizens become stunted. The efforts
+of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost.
+This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small
+States, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls victim to the
+same curse.
+
+All petty and personal interests force their way to the front during a
+long period of peace. Selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxury
+obliterates idealism. Money acquires an excessive and unjustifiable
+power, and character does not obtain due respect:
+
+
+  "Man is stunted by peaceful days,
+  In idle repose his courage decays.
+  Law is the weakling's game.
+  Law makes the world the same.
+  But in war man's strength is seen,
+  War ennobles all that is mean;
+  Even the coward belies his name."
+                 SCHILLER: _Braut v. Messina_.
+
+"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social
+petrifaction and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of the
+goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience.
+War alone teaches this lesson." [F]
+
+[Footnote F: Kuno Fischer, "Hegel," i., p. 737.]
+
+War, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and to
+expand national power than any other means known to history. It
+certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at
+the same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. This
+is especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regarded
+not merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as the
+expression of the united will of a whole nation.
+
+All petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the grave
+decision which a war involves. The common danger unites all in a common
+effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedly
+spurned. This union contains a liberating power which produces happy and
+permanent results in the national life. We need only recall the uniting
+power of the War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and their
+historical consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every war
+vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the sham
+reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are
+unmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth,
+and honour come to the front and are put into play. "A thousand touching
+traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous war
+awakes in noble nations." [G]
+
+[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 482.]
+
+Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "War," he
+said, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment
+constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it;
+every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues."
+
+"At the moment when the State cries out that its very life is at stake,
+social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. The individual
+must forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body.
+He should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison with
+the welfare of the community. War is elevating, because the individual
+disappears before the great conception of the State. The devotion of the
+members of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidly
+conspicuous as in war.... What a perversion of morality to wish to
+abolish heroism among men!" [H]
+
+[Footnote H: Treitschke, "Politik" i., p. 74.]
+
+Even defeat may bear a rich harvest. It often, indeed, passes an
+irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads to
+a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous
+constitution. "I recognize in the effect of war upon national
+character," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "one of the most salutary
+elements in the moulding of the human race."
+
+The individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge his
+life on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the cause
+which he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals to
+personal morality. Similarly, nations and States can achieve no loftier
+consummation than to stake their whole power on upholding their
+independence, their honour, and their reputation.
+
+Such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. The
+possibility of war is required to give the national character that
+stimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nations
+enabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by the
+fullest development of their moral forces. An intellectual and vigorous
+nation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a Phaecian
+existence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace.
+
+From this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily
+detrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics.
+The States which from various considerations are always active in this
+direction are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United States
+of America, e.g., in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal
+peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to
+money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred
+million dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incur
+a great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with England
+or Japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance of
+contest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stress
+of great political emotions, without which the moral development of the
+national character is impossible. If they advance farther on this road,
+they will one day pay dearly for such a policy.
+
+Again, from the Christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion.
+Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God above
+all things, and thy neighbour as thyself." This law can claim no
+significance for the relations of one country to another, since its
+application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love
+which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love
+for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead
+men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature
+cannot be political. Its object is to promote morality of the
+individual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in the
+interests of the community. It tells us to love our individual enemies,
+but does not remove the conception of enmity. Christ Himself said: "I am
+not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." His teaching can never be
+adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. There
+never was a religion which was more combative than Christianity. Combat,
+moral combat, is its very essence. If we transfer the ideas of
+Christianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the power
+of the State--power in the widest sense, not merely from the material
+aspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancement
+of humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be made
+which a war demands. Thus, according to Christianity, we cannot
+disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally
+and historically.
+
+Again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, the
+purely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. The
+individual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour,
+since it may cost him life and prosperity. The State, however, as such
+can also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wage
+war, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives and
+happiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved.
+
+The loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamental
+notion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness,
+the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing the
+minority in their own interests. Thus, those who from the materialistic
+standpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency from
+motives of self-interest.
+
+Reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, but
+that it is justifiable from every point of view. The practical methods
+which the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the prevention
+of war are shown to be absolutely ineffective.
+
+It is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement of
+rights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, but
+also the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullest
+assertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time on
+this basis to settle the disputes which arise between the various
+countries by Arbitration Courts, and so to render war impossible. The
+politician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestly
+believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted.
+
+Two questions in this connection are at once suggested: On what right is
+the finding of this Arbitration Court based? and what sanctions insure
+that the parties will accept this finding?
+
+To the first question the answer is that such a right does not, and
+cannot, exist. The conception of right is twofold. It signifies,
+firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is right
+and good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the State, either
+written or sanctioned by tradition. In its first meaning it is an
+indefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it is
+variable and capable of development. The right determined by law is only
+an attempt to secure a right in itself. In this sense right is the
+system of social aims secured by compulsion. It is therefore impossible
+that a written law should meet all the special points of a particular
+case. The application of the legal right must always be qualified in
+order to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. A certain
+freedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to the
+administration of justice. The established law, within a given and
+restricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just.
+
+The conception of this right is still more obscured by the complex
+nature of the consciousness of right and wrong. A quite different
+consciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whether
+persons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in most
+varied forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, and
+frequently in opposition to, the established law. In Christian countries
+murder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is a
+sacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as a
+crime. It is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions of
+right.
+
+There is yet another cause of uncertainty. The moral consciousness of
+the same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs and
+schools of philosophy. The established law can seldom keep pace with
+this inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lags
+behind. A condition of things arises where the living moral
+consciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, where
+legal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and Mephistopheles'
+scoffing words are true:
+
+  "Laws are transmitted, as one sees,
+  Just like inherited disease.
+  They're handed down from race to race,
+  And noiseless glide from place to place.
+  Reason they turn to nonsense; worse,
+  They make beneficence a curse!
+  Ah me! That you're a grandson you
+  As long as you're alive shall rue."
+                             _Faust_ (translation by Sir T. Martin).
+
+Thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the
+same ideas in their private and social intercourse. The conception of
+the constitutional State in the strictest sense is an impossibility, and
+would lead to an intolerable state of things. The hard and fast
+principle must be modified by the progressive development of the fixed
+law, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and of
+self-help allowed by the community. If sometimes between individuals the
+duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a
+universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated
+relations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its own
+conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which
+spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical
+life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification,
+and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and
+none can say that one nation has a better right than the other. There
+never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here and
+there particular relations can be brought under definite international
+laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification.
+Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international
+code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own
+conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest
+ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an
+injustice, and thus dishonour itself.
+
+Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring
+people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and
+is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in
+the civilized world. Every Arbitration Court must originate in a certain
+political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must
+treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the
+contracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. In this way every
+progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may
+easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the
+expansion of the young and vigorous State in favour of one which is
+sinking in the scale of civilization.
+
+These considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question:
+How can the judgment of the Arbitration Court be enforced if any State
+refuses to submit to it? Where does the power reside which insures the
+execution of this judgment when pronounced?
+
+In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908
+that the High Court of International Justice established by the second
+Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding
+decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion.
+The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this
+idea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that
+public opinion must represent the view which the American plutocrats
+think most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that the
+widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material
+prosperity, commerce, and money-making. As a matter of fact, public
+opinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only be
+employed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided.
+
+We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the
+separate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empire
+existed. Such an empire never can or will arise again. Even if it did,
+it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all
+human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the
+unchecked rivalry of different groups.
+
+So long as we live under such a State system as at present, the German
+Imperial Chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared,
+in his speech in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that treaties for
+arbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainable
+legal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between two
+countries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. Such a treaty merely
+proved that between the two contracting States no serious inducement to
+break the peace could be imagined. It therefore only confirmed the
+relations already existing. "If these relations change, if differences
+develop between the two nations which affect their national existence,
+which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then every
+arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke."
+
+It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an Arbitration
+Court can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlike
+decision, even as regards the State in whose favour it is pronounced. If
+we imagine, for example, that Silesia had fallen to Frederick the Great
+by the finding of a Court of Arbitration, and not by a war of
+unparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have been
+equally important for Prussia and for Germany? No one will maintain this.
+
+The material increase in power which accrued to Frederick's country by
+the acquisition of Silesia is not to be underestimated. But far more
+important was the circumstance that this country could not be conquered
+by the strongest European coalition, and that it vindicated its position
+as the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. It was
+war which laid the foundations of Prussia's power, which amassed a
+heritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. War
+forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could grow
+up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. Here once
+more war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons of
+history we shall see the same result again and again.
+
+If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite
+aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only
+be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as
+unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It
+is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice
+their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and
+thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed to
+obviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts of
+Arbitration--that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formal
+law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The
+weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and
+vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment
+on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most
+disastrous consequences for humanity generally.
+
+With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate
+appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral
+and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration.
+So, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highest
+material blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; for
+the maintenance of national character and political independence; for
+the expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of the
+national welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nations
+according to the scale of their importance in civilization; for
+intellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for the
+honour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressive
+development is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home and
+abroad is only a question of time. History speaks with no uncertain
+voice on this subject. It shows that valour is a necessary condition of
+progress. Where with growing civilization and increasing material
+prosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and the
+resolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, there
+the nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their own
+politically or racially.
+
+"A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political
+world when national character and military tradition act and react upon
+each." These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war,
+and he is incontestably right.
+
+These efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merely
+lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature where the
+struggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damaging
+and unnerving effect. The apostles of peace draw large sections of a
+nation into the spell of their Utopian efforts, and they thus introduce
+an element of weakness into the national life; they cripple the
+justifiable national pride in independence, and support a nerveless
+opportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higher
+humanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its own
+weakness. They thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, just
+as the Prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in
+1805 and 1806, and brought the State to the brink of destruction.
+
+The functions of true humanity are twofold. On the one hand there is the
+promotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well as
+of political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform development
+of character; on the other hand there is the practical realization of
+ideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual and
+of the community.
+
+It seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards the
+suppression of war with those of the Social Democratic Labour party,
+which goes hand in hand with them. The aims of both parties are Utopian.
+The organized Labour party strives after an ideal whose realization is
+only conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work are
+settled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when the
+cost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. Until this is the case
+the prices of the international market determine the standard of wages.
+The nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settle
+independently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing its
+position in the international market in competition with nations who
+work longer hours and at lower rates. Want of employment and extreme
+misery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. On the
+other hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, by
+excluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration of
+products and a profound demoralization of the working population.
+
+The case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. Its execution, as
+we saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is as
+impossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. A State
+which disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouring
+countries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guiding
+rule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, and
+become the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours.
+
+We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts after
+peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with
+arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most
+countries. "God will see to it," says Treitschke,[I] "that war always
+recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!"
+
+[Footnote I: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 76.]
+
+Nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in Germany no inconsiderable
+danger. We Germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpractical
+dreams. "The accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universal
+attribute with us, as in France." [J] We lack the true feeling for
+political exigencies. A deep social and religious gulf divides the
+German people into different political groups, which are bitterly
+antagonistic to each other. The traditional feuds in the political world
+still endure. The agitation for peace introduces a new element of
+weakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our national
+and party life.
+
+[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 81.]
+
+It is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believe
+in the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that the
+general good is being advanced by them. Equally true is it, however,
+that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfish
+political projects. Its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes its
+danger.
+
+Every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionary
+schemes. They must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as an
+unhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Our
+people must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or may
+be the goal of a policy_. The policy of a great State has positive aims.
+It will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that is
+possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentous
+questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation,
+the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this
+conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the
+idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating
+law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of the
+peace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words:
+
+  "Dreams of a peaceful day?
+  Let him dream who may!
+  'War' is our rallying cry,
+  Onward to victory!"
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+
+THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR
+
+Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that no
+one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of
+intentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseen
+what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation,
+and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. In
+his "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect:
+"Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a
+nation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as to
+anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [A]
+
+[Footnote A: "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93.]
+
+We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to be
+regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it
+as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out
+for so long. It is difficult to gauge its true import. The notion of
+forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must not
+think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to
+be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the
+pressure of the whole political situation.
+
+Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict
+letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the
+decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own
+initiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterances
+cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle
+of political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only
+run counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we exclude
+from politics that independence of action which is the true motive
+force.
+
+The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the
+natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the
+controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. It
+does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are
+unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourable
+position affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statecraft
+becomes a tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its
+ends. "Men make history," [B] as Bismarck's actions clearly show.
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 28.]
+
+No doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit of
+a peaceful solution. The death of some one man, the setting of some
+great ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to change
+it fundamentally. But the great disputes in the life of a nation cannot
+be settled so simply. The man who wished to bring the question to a
+decisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for the
+moment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels,
+and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilable
+interests. With the death of King Edward VII. of England the policy of
+isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against
+Germany, has broken down. The antagonism of Germany and England, based
+on the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, still
+persists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not always
+profitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening the
+tension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of Germany.
+
+It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should
+depend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would be
+thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many
+unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less
+dependent on chance.
+
+It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician
+Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war
+should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been
+attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a
+weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated
+should determine political action.
+
+For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look
+to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the
+conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and
+sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value
+is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct
+estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of
+the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness
+of decision.
+
+If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged
+right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as
+necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country
+the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister
+cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far
+more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater
+sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and
+courage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment.
+In the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought never
+to be brought about falls to the ground. And yet this theory has in our
+day found many supporters, especially in Germany.
+
+Even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war is
+impossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banished
+from the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should be
+postponed so long as possible.[C]
+
+[Footnote C: Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on
+March 30, 1911. In his speech of November 9, 1911, the Imperial
+Chancellor referred to the above-quoted words of Prince Bismarck
+in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the Morocco question.]
+
+Those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude as
+the supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as
+a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing
+importance. According to this view, a war recognized as inevitable must
+be postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to use
+exceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary and
+justifiable aspirations by force of arms.
+
+Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion
+that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the
+chief duty, of any policy.
+
+To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite
+answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only
+the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring
+about a war.
+
+Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that
+wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the
+happiest results, both politically and socially. A feeble policy has
+always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to
+take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to
+adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as
+to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter.
+Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most
+striking examples of this.
+
+The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful
+and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the
+steps of his glorious ancestor. "He noticed how his state occupied an
+untenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers,
+and showed his determination to give a definite character (_décider cet
+être_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge
+the territory of the State and _corriger la figure de la Prusse_, if
+Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name
+of 'Kingdom.'" [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity,
+and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. None of
+the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he
+postpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be the
+aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself
+favourable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The whole
+history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally
+would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of
+decision which he showed.
+
+[Footnote D Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 51.]
+
+We see a quite different development under the reign of Frederick
+William III., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our
+nation cannot be too often reminded.
+
+It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided.
+Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the Prussian
+Government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied
+Russians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great
+moral cost. According to all human calculation, the participation of
+Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive
+superiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and
+would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the
+moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had
+ingrained on her by his wars. At the darkest moment of defeat they shone
+most brightly. In spite of the political downfall, the effects of
+Frederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired
+his State and his people. This is clearly seen in the quite different
+attitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under the
+degrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny. The power which had been
+acquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself
+more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it
+was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible
+the heroic revival of 1813.
+
+The German wars of Unification also belong to the category of wars
+which, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest.
+The instability and political weakness which the Prussian Government
+showed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of Olmütz in 1850, had
+deeply shaken the political and national importance of Prussia. On the
+other hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once more
+her duties as a nation, when King William I. and Bismarck were at the
+helm, was soon abundantly manifest. Bismarck, by bringing about our
+wars of Unification in order to improve radically an untenable position
+and secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled the
+long-felt wish of the German people, and raised Germany to the
+undisputed rank of a first-class European Power. The military successes
+and the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for an
+unparalleled material prosperity. It is difficult to imagine how
+pitiable the progress of the German people would have been had not these
+wars been brought about by a deliberate policy.
+
+The most recent history tells the same story. If we judge the Japanese
+standpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fight
+Russia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morally
+justifiable. It was immensely daring to challenge the Russian giant, but
+the purely military conditions were favourable, and the Japanese nation,
+which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed an
+extended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to open
+new channels for her superabundant activities. Japan, from her own point
+of view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power in
+Eastern Asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of Russia. The Japanese
+statesmen were justified by the result. The victorious campaign created
+wider conditions of life for the Japanese people and State, and at one
+blow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics,
+and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to great
+material advancement. If this war had been avoided from weakness or
+philanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters would
+have taken a very different turn. The growing power of Russia in the
+Amur district and in Korea would have repelled or at least hindered the
+Japanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attained
+through this war, glorious alike for military prowess and political
+foresight.
+
+The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has
+always led to happy results. Even an unsuccessfully waged war may
+sometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vital
+interests without a blow. We find an example of this in the recent
+heroic struggle of the small Boer States against the British Empire. In
+this struggle they were inevitably defeated. It was easy to foresee that
+an armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces of
+England and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally could
+not bear heavy losses. But yet--if all indications are not
+misleading--the blood shed by the Boer people will yield a free and
+prosperous future. In spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic;
+men like President Stein, Botha, and De Wett, with their gallant
+followers, performed many great military feats. The whole nation
+combined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which Byron
+sings:
+
+  "For freedom's battle once begun,
+  Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son,
+  Though baffled oft, is ever won."
+
+Inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any later
+developments, have been won by this struggle. The Boers have maintained
+their place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselves
+superior to the English. It was only after many glorious victories that
+they yielded to a crushingly superior force. They accumulated a store of
+fame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, a
+power to be reckoned with. The result of this development is that the
+Boers are now the foremost people in South Africa, and that England
+preferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by their
+continual hostility. This laid the foundation for the United Free States
+of South Africa.[E]
+
+[Footnote E: "War and the Arme Blanche," by Erskine Childers: "The truth
+came like a flash ... that all along we had been conquering the
+country, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215).
+
+"To ... aim at so cowing the Boer national spirit, as to gain a
+permanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyond
+our power to achieve. Peaceable political fusion under our own flag
+was the utmost we could secure. That means a conditional surrender,
+or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). Lord Roberts wrote
+a very appreciative introduction to this book without any protest
+against the opinions expressed in it.]
+
+President Kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and not
+Cecil Rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, be
+known in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of South Africa,
+who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value the
+inestimable moral qualities according to their real importance.
+
+The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been
+deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest
+results. War, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of political
+agent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but in
+every case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery.
+He who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility.
+
+It is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision except
+from the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existing
+conditions which have created national armies. Absolute clearness of
+vision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken,
+and what political aims justify the use of armed force.
+
+This question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactory
+answer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty of
+the State.
+
+If this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual and
+moral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moral
+education of the human race, then the State's own acts must necessarily
+conform to the moral laws. But the acts of the State cannot be judged by
+the standard of individual morality. If the State wished to conform to
+this standard it would often find itself at variance with its own
+particular duties. The morality of the State must be developed out of
+its own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in the
+personality of the man and his duties towards society. The morality of
+the State must be judged by the nature and _raison d'être_ of the State,
+and not of the individual citizen. But the end-all and be-all of a State
+is power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face
+should not meddle in politics." [F]
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.]
+
+Machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policy
+was the advancement of power. This term, however, has acquired, since
+the German Reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewd
+Florentine. To him power was desirable in itself; for us "the State is
+not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and
+promote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by being
+applied for the greatest good of mankind." [G]
+
+[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.]
+
+The criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in the
+last resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed his
+own nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection." [H] If the
+same standard is applied to the State, then "its highest moral duty is
+to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the
+higher community of which he is a member; but the State is itself the
+highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty
+of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of
+sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for there
+is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot
+sacrifice itself to something higher. When a State sees its downfall
+staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A
+sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts
+the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a
+State." [I]
+
+[Footnote H: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote I: _Ibid_., i., p 3.]
+
+I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political
+morality better than in the words of our great national historian. But
+we can reach the same conclusions by another road. The individual is
+responsible only for himself. If, either from weakness or from moral
+reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the
+consequences of his actions recoil only on him. The situation is quite
+different in the case of a State. It represents the ramifying and often
+conflicting interests of a community. Should it from any reason neglect
+the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal
+personality, but it injures also the body of private interests
+which it represents. This incalculably far-reaching detriment affects
+not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of
+individuals and the community. Accordingly it is a moral duty of the
+State to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and
+promoter of all higher interests. This duty it cannot fulfil unless it
+possesses the needful power.
+
+The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first
+and foremost duty of the State. This aspect of the question supplies a
+fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can be
+estimated. The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this
+duty, and thus served the interests of the community? And this not
+merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material
+interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the
+State, and thus indirectly its higher aims.
+
+It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that
+numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the
+community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only
+natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be
+erroneous. Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must
+be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy.
+"Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most
+contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." [J] This
+argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads
+logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means;
+that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures
+are permissible.
+
+[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.]
+
+A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for
+political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must
+be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. So far as I
+know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel
+bound to attempt one at this point. War, with which I am dealing at
+present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it
+pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the
+seriousness of warlike measures. I must deviate here a little from my
+main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of
+political morality.
+
+The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is
+generally assumed. The power of the State does not rest exclusively on
+the factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth,
+and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements,
+which are reciprocally related to the material. The energy with which a
+State promotes its own interests and represents the rights of its
+citizens in foreign States, the determination which it displays to
+support them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor of
+strength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselves
+to let things come to a crisis in a like case. Similarly a reliable and
+honourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with allies
+as well as with foes. A statesman is thus under no obligation to deceive
+deliberately. He can from the political standpoint avoid all
+negotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he will
+thereby serve the reputation and power of his State no less than when he
+holds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, and
+renounces all political formulas and phrases.
+
+In antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and the
+Jesuits have tried to justify regicide.[K] At the present day political
+murder is universally condemned from the standpoint of political
+morality. The same holds good of preconcerted political deception. A
+State which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute.
+The man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in a
+contradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims,
+since he denies it by his actions. It is not, of course, necessary that
+a man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to an
+opponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point.
+But it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise crafty
+deceptions. A fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic of
+great statesmen. Subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit of
+diplomacy.
+
+[Footnote K: Mariana, "De rege et regis institutione." Toledo, 1598.]
+
+Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latent
+war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a
+position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and
+deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties
+are determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflict
+between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and
+prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it
+is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately
+moral nature of that end.
+
+Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action.
+But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are
+of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are
+conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of
+things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the
+infringement of the right appears morally justified. York's decision to
+conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of
+right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made
+under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the
+Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral. Now it is always
+justifiable to terminate an immoral situation.
+
+As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument
+shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultima
+ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other
+States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful
+methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw,
+rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. War
+therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is
+not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the
+ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparently
+trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully
+justifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the State, and consequently
+its moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential part
+of its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there
+is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword
+must be drawn to do so.
+
+In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is
+whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the
+power of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether the
+inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict
+greater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantages
+which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not
+declared. A further point to be considered is whether the general
+position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military
+success. With these considerations of expediency certain other weighty
+aspects of the question must also be faced.
+
+It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in looking
+only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of
+the existing generation. Such policy would be opposed to all that
+constitutes the essential nature of the State. Its conduct must be
+guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is
+gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the
+future. "The true greatness of the State is that it links the past with
+the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to
+regard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life." [L]
+
+[Footnote L: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.]
+
+The law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and in
+the decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than the
+sacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "I cannot conceive,"
+Zelter once wrote to Goethe, "how any right deed can be performed
+without sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very opposite
+of what is desirable."
+
+A second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely that
+which Zelter rightly emphasizes. A great end cannot be attained except
+by staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certainty
+of success can ever be anticipated. Every undertaking implies a greater
+or less venture. The daily intercourse of civic life teaches us this
+lesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must be
+taken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguely
+estimated. In questions of comparatively trifling importance much may be
+done by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce a
+satisfactory status. The solution of such problems is the sphere of
+diplomatic activity. The state of things is quite different when vital
+questions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, but
+will guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party.
+Then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmen
+to act. Men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun the
+solemn decision of war. In such questions any reluctance to face the
+opponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt at
+a temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of political
+prestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made good
+in another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the State,
+the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations.
+
+Not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such a
+case. The mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention to
+wage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. This
+intention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiations
+without arms are like music-books without instruments," as Frederick the
+Great said. It is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to which
+the opponent's purpose yields. When, therefore, the threat of war is
+insufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin;
+the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the
+_duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike.
+
+Finally, there is a third point to be considered. Cases may occur where
+war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no
+prospect of success. The responsibility of this has also to be borne. So
+at least Frederick the Great thought. His brother Henry, after the
+battle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the
+Marquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France. Again,
+after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but
+the King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. He knew better what
+suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to
+die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. President
+Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States of
+America on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "It
+must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran,
+"that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men
+and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the
+sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war
+is in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the most
+prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice....
+It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than
+not to have fought at all."
+
+To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher
+sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in
+itself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by the
+consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when
+the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and
+military situation.
+
+It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy,
+especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only
+heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the
+reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to
+fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties.
+
+No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain
+circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ
+war as a political means. So long as all human progress and all natural
+development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage
+in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible.
+
+When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting
+any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has
+forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually
+acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there
+are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only
+await the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the State
+towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of
+success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable.
+When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by
+affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements
+of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to
+promote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced the
+more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be
+obtained with comparatively small sacrifices.
+
+These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active
+policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and
+concentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truth
+of Schiller's lines:
+
+  "The chance that once thou hast refused
+  Will never through the centuries recur."
+
+The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take
+the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the
+future to the present need of peace.
+
+It is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficult
+to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist
+which justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all the
+greater because the historical significance of the act must be
+considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its
+justification.
+
+War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successes
+which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries.
+The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long
+epochs.[M]
+
+[Footnote M: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 2.]
+54
+The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a
+great State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries;
+but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and
+keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical
+imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can
+at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [N]
+
+[Footnote N: Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft," p. 30.]
+
+He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State,
+and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way
+settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of
+political morality.
+
+He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be
+fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his
+hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the
+fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point
+he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true
+interests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the
+definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing
+favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the
+hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise
+with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther
+once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write
+and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much
+greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business
+of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and
+the marches, etc.--that is what the petty and simple do who only look
+with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or
+saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to
+save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the
+sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It
+will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful
+and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."[O]
+
+[Footnote O: Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation."]
+
+Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to
+further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of
+war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State
+and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political
+purposes correspond to these problems.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+
+A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL
+DEVELOPMENT
+
+The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is
+consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. The
+same holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were,
+personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely
+various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable
+of the most different achievements, and serving the most multifarious
+purposes in the great evolution of human existence.
+
+Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the
+materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation
+to-day.
+
+According to it, all that happens in the world is a necessary
+consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become
+conscious. It denies the difference between the empiric and the
+intelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom.
+
+This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seems
+everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the
+insufficient human intelligence. The existence of the universe is
+opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are
+incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and
+time.
+
+The essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. We
+recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; the
+impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our
+understanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quite
+impossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear--although no
+demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual laws
+beyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to a
+conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual
+change. Even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden
+moral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread of
+civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and
+higher forms of life.
+
+It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in every
+individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too
+limited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge of
+things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to
+understand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may also
+term the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidance
+for our further investigation and procedure.
+
+The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the history
+of the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What is
+true," Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised and
+supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by
+its history."
+
+The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, the
+laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces
+have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work
+towards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We are
+here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget
+that States are personalities endowed with very different human
+attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that
+these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of
+States as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very different
+effect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour to
+grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the
+naturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we
+wish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study the
+history of the German people in its connection with that of the other
+European States, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto
+followed, and what guidance the past gives for Our future policy. From
+the time of their first appearance in history the Germans showed
+themselves a first-class civilized people.
+
+When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians
+there were two main elements which shaped the future of the West,
+Christianity and the Germans. The Christian teaching preached equal
+rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and
+slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the
+attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the
+grave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man,
+and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the
+individual conscience, the starting-point of all development. It thus
+gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose
+morality rested solely on the relations with the state. Simultaneously
+with this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North poured
+victoriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decaying
+nations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep their
+nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. The
+States which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized how
+difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a
+higher. The Germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. The
+German element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and
+offered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture of
+German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did
+the growing nations appear.
+
+In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world.
+The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germans
+with the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated
+itself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the
+Alps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea of
+the Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued to
+flourish.
+
+In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until A.D. 1453. In the West,
+however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476.
+Italy had fallen into the hands of the East Goths and Lombards
+successively. The Visigoths had established their dominion in Spain, and
+the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul.
+
+A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with his
+powerful hand, extended the Frankish Empire far beyond the boundaries of
+Gaul. By the subjugation of the Saxons he became lord of the country
+between the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy by
+the conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the Western
+Roman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. His
+successors clung to this claim; but the Frankish Empire soon fell to
+pieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards became
+France, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the later
+Germany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy and
+Spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually
+amalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East Frankish
+Empire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained
+their Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerful
+German [A] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of Charles the Great to
+the Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first _German_ King who
+took this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in a
+quarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of the
+Church, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in
+order to prove their pretended title to that country.
+
+[Footnote A: German (Deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular,"
+opposed to "foreign"--_e.g._, the Latin Church dialect. It was first
+used as the name of a people, in the tenth century A.D.]
+
+The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living in
+Rome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of a
+Church which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way
+of the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldest
+creations of the human intellect--to found and maintain a
+world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers.
+
+Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. The
+freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual
+dominion. In the portentous struggle of the two Powers for the
+supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire,
+the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widely
+different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a
+homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of the
+estates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axe
+of Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church.
+
+The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German power
+lay on the ground in fragments. A period of almost complete anarchy
+followed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad
+characteristics of the German people, contributed to extend this
+destruction to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the German
+people deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power was
+budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetry
+was passing through a first classical period. Every German country was
+ringing with song; the depth of German sentiment found universal
+expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealism
+inspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empire
+every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above
+the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The material
+prosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better
+regulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the Hanseatic League bore
+its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great
+trade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice and
+Genoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never again
+attained.
+
+Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in the
+breasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, and
+was destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in
+the spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church had
+lost much of her influence on men's minds. On the other hand, a refining
+movement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit of
+antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to
+the Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined by
+everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich von
+Hutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed," rang loud through the
+districts of Germany.
+
+Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, which
+conceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe to
+her foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerly
+in the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shed
+it's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for
+national independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequences
+for the development of humanity had been fought out since the Persian
+wars. In this cause the German people nearly disappeared, and lost all
+political importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned to
+foreign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church did
+not remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and the
+Staufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a
+mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself.
+Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won an
+undisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritual
+freedom was established. This most important element of civilization was
+retained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become ever
+since the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace of
+Westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious
+freedom.
+
+The States of the Latin race on their side now put forward strong claims
+to the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas of
+freedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled among
+themselves about the predominance. At the same time, in Germanized
+England a firs-class Protestant power was being developed, and the age
+of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the Reformation
+and the Thirty Years' War, opened new and unsuspected paths to human
+intellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a fresh
+stimulus. Gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the
+newly-discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fell
+to the lot of the Germanic and the southern part to that of the Latin
+race. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, and
+consequently, of world politics. Germany remained excluded from this
+great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes
+and religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, the
+Low Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repel
+the inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the French
+ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by these
+wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world.
+Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in
+political power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States,
+which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the German cause.
+But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre of
+Protestant power was established in the North--i.e., Prussia.
+
+After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back the
+Slavs, who poured in from the East, in wrestling large tracts from them,
+and in completely Germanizing them. This struggle, like that with the
+niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which
+extended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and successfully planted
+Germanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finally
+victorious also against Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic.
+In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strong
+political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an
+influential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germany
+devolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to Catholic
+Austria grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into an
+independent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a German
+population, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' War
+Prussia broke away from Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confronted
+France and Russia as an independent Protestant State.
+
+But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once more
+slowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy has exhausted the
+resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of the
+monarchy, _L'état c'est moi,_ carried to an extreme, provoked a
+tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous
+revolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more specially in
+Germany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism.
+The German Empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary States survived,
+among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again under
+Napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and
+bore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain,
+and even to the inhospitable plains of Russia, which by a gradual
+political absorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of power
+in wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to an
+important place among the European nations. Austria, which had become
+more and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before the
+mighty Corsican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her
+dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught.
+
+But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest
+humiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of
+the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the
+Protestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm,
+won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and for
+Germany, and paved the way for further world-wide historical
+developments.
+
+While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular
+despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights,_ another
+quite different revolution was working in Prussia--the revolution of
+_duty_. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately
+to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State.
+Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposition
+to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the idea
+of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to
+sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the
+clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis
+on which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same time
+Stein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in Prussia.
+
+While measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thus
+being adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was to
+depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a
+German Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in the
+domain of art and science, where German character and endeavour found
+the deepest and fullest expression. A great change had been effected in
+this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year
+1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and
+deeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised their
+minds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlit
+heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and
+superiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and science
+became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this
+dismembered people, and decided the victory of Protestantism in German
+life." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte", i., p. 88.]
+
+Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she
+developed the root-idea of the Reformation into the right of
+unrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [C] Moral obligations, such as no
+nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the
+philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs
+of her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies was
+realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classical
+literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as
+the political work of the Prussian monarchy", [D] and of those men of
+action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin.
+
+[Footnote C: _Ibid.,_ i., p. 90.]
+
+[Footnote D: _Ibid._]
+
+The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an event
+in the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the great
+annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last
+abortion of the revolution--a
+
+  "Part of the power that still
+  Produces Good, while still devising Ill";
+
+on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Let
+man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the
+religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual
+change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; who
+gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect,
+and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people to
+consciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed that
+the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain;
+a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify
+to the divinity in man.
+
+The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to
+whom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate of
+the Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront of
+humanity.
+
+Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation
+could give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, and
+Goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of
+Liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny.
+
+We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great
+struggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, and
+weakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed
+the German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure
+enthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expression
+in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of
+thousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took a
+prominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost to
+their mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria and
+Russia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties.
+
+Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing up
+from the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that no
+longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came to
+the front, King William I. and the hero of the Saxon forest. Resolutely
+they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from
+ignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of the
+popular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters with
+Austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and left
+the German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a
+Great Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the
+vast majority of the German peoples united under the Imperial crown
+which the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire was
+revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria,
+and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the North
+Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from the
+ashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old German
+Confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs.
+
+It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of Germany
+vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the
+economic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on all
+sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed in
+between France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed
+to gather the full fruits of our victories. The short-sightedness and
+party feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag--the old hereditary failings
+of our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intense
+love of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behind
+in the race with other countries.
+
+In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious
+Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found
+the second largest colonial Empire in the world; England appropriated
+the most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a
+comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content
+with some modest strips of territory. In addition to, and in connection
+with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward.
+
+Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Frederick the Great,
+and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conception
+of the State has completely changed since the turn of the century. The
+patrimonial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary possession of
+the Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents the
+reverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant of
+the State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is the
+key to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of the
+State the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the
+tendency is as follows: Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and
+the nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquire
+a uniform national character and common national interests.
+
+This new order of things entirely altered the basis of international
+relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerce
+and trade also developed on wholly new lines.
+
+After 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and trade
+restrictions--were gradually removed. Landed property ceased to be a
+monopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "England
+introduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machinery
+into industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by
+steamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the same
+time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and
+chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton.
+There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in
+the widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension of
+colonization over Polynesia, etc." England at the same time girdled the
+earth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort of
+world-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not,
+indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone
+days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests
+dependent on herself.
+
+Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, linking the West
+and the East, the United States of North America have risen to be an
+industrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported by
+exceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing
+character of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitable
+recognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on the
+point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy.
+
+
+Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but has
+extended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressing
+farther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossed
+swords with the States of the Mongolian race. This vast population,
+which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands of
+years of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, and
+categorically claims its share in international life. The entrance of
+Japan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms.
+"Asia for the Asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her
+breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power has
+emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a European foe.
+China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mighty
+movement is thrilling Asia--the awakening of a new epoch.
+
+Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the
+civilized countries of Europe, are threatening from Asia, the old cradle
+of the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forces
+which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of the
+French Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized
+the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a
+consciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers,
+originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material
+position, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, and
+seek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. They do not
+wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically
+recognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, in
+which they themselves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not only
+perpetually menace State and society, but endanger in the separate
+countries the industries from which they live, since they threaten to
+destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by
+continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany this
+movement has affected large sections of the population.
+
+Until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture and
+cattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of German
+industries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in
+connection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade has
+marvellously increased. Germany has become an industrial and trading
+nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds
+work and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost its
+leading position in the economic life of the people. The artisan
+class has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in trade
+unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the
+international social democracy. It is hostile to the national class
+distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of
+the State.
+
+It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous
+agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the
+anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law of
+self-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certain
+point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizen
+may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an
+opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly
+devotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grant
+this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of
+capital.
+
+Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, it
+may create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employment
+to all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislation
+against every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age,
+or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of
+work, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him from
+working.
+
+The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of three
+victorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large for
+present purposes, although without the conscious intention of the State.
+German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a
+market for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervened
+with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. As
+Scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of
+man, so the Emperor William I. recognized the duty of the State towards
+those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The position
+of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social
+legislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now
+existed.
+
+A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats
+indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the
+working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing
+State and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and
+progress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, How
+to win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willing
+workers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny.
+
+Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of
+all progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world.
+Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last
+century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a
+prominent position through the universality of her philosophy and her
+thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things.
+
+The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature are
+attested by the fact that the annual export of German books to foreign
+countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that
+of France, England, and America combined. It is only in the domain of
+the exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to give
+precedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win a
+leading position. It shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions,
+and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our
+political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The German
+Empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only are
+the social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, are
+divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter
+enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish
+denominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between North
+and South has prevented the population from growing into a completely
+united body.
+
+So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of
+sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into
+narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in
+her nationality, her intellectual development, in her science,
+industries, and trade.
+
+And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future?
+What duties are enforced on us by the past?
+
+It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the
+German State answers this question, depend not only our own further
+development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of
+the world.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION
+
+Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical
+development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of
+human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire of
+Central Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seeds
+of intellectual and moral development were sown by the German
+intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with
+irresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for the
+entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German
+people.
+
+This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on
+the freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have ever
+and again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nation
+whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as
+the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the
+intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free
+and natural development. The Germans have thus always been the
+standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark
+against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worsted
+in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best
+heart's blood in the cause. Intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruled
+the Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this
+people--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the
+political attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth
+century. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed
+into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need of
+a free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengaged
+itself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened into
+world-historical importance.
+
+Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, on
+which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must
+rest: the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation,
+which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked
+all free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop to
+the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mind
+the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time
+pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On this
+substructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose
+deepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result of
+free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a
+foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way and
+that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and
+knowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress.
+Reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religious
+reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion,
+and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not
+attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results
+of natural philosophy.
+
+The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle
+for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. We
+are thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannot
+shrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is
+being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human
+efforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part
+in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special
+qualities.
+
+No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate
+all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own
+spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it
+received. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culture
+with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the great
+community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "Depth of
+conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the
+limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to
+traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all
+nations and ages--this has at all times been the German characteristic;
+this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture." [A] To no
+nation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self
+"that which is given to mankind as a whole." We often see in other
+nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same
+capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which
+specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and
+imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position.
+
+[Footnote A: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 95.]
+
+There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge
+our highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we can
+mount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of science
+and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics
+touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results
+of scientific inquiry.
+
+First and foremost it is German science which must regain its
+superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate
+our birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of the
+perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over
+Nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more
+useful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutions
+of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrict
+ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit
+civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create
+conditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can
+find its expression.
+
+It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which
+exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition
+not only our future development, but the higher life generally. These
+problems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply and
+permanently than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the
+empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany.
+The German nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, which
+works slowly in opposition to the different movements. The Germans thus
+seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great
+controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into
+the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of
+evolution.
+
+We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no
+doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the
+community and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts to
+find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class
+with healthy and patriotic ambitions.
+
+It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty,
+requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed
+upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation,
+and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity
+which is lamentably deficient to-day.
+
+No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The old
+antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in
+Germany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and
+political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute
+liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the
+conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present there
+appears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism of
+Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of
+the Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movement
+can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect
+of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is
+rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially all
+denominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must never
+renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To
+do so would mean loss of prestige.
+
+Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of human
+civilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir of
+a great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no less
+significance in the sphere of its international relations. These
+problems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply the
+intellectual development, and on their solution depends the position of
+Germany in the world.
+
+The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms
+and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered
+geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the
+Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large
+number of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other
+States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have
+developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national
+customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of
+her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most
+characteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie
+outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the
+strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against
+the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves
+are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism,
+which seems to have lost its old victorious strength.
+
+Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the
+overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign
+countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is
+absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even
+to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its
+increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of
+living.
+
+This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation,
+or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its
+intellectual importance.
+
+At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course of
+centuries grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of all
+political significance, a large section of our people did not feel this
+insufficiency. Even during the age of our classical literature the
+patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the
+thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of German
+genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 195.]
+
+Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines:
+
+  "German majesty and honour
+  Fall not with the princes' crown;
+  When amid the flames of war
+  German Empire crashes down,
+  German greatness stands unscathed." [C]
+
+[Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905
+by Bernhard Suphan.]
+
+The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds
+different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence
+of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since
+we must now take into consideration the immense development of Germany
+in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old
+importance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from the
+vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due
+measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political
+federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can
+only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act
+in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties
+towards the human race.
+
+Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding
+the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a
+foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the
+ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to
+imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched
+again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly
+threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely
+repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics
+from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance
+westwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. On
+the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions
+which were once under German influence are now once more subject to
+Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Russian
+Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The
+German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs;
+Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic
+workmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia.
+Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic
+flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an
+obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of
+self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined
+whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is
+not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will
+be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict
+grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and
+show less determination to protect the German soil at all costs.
+
+The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their
+struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their
+nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot
+withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our
+trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but
+they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America.
+The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish,
+and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the
+Government must reckon.
+
+Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to
+preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of
+universal culture.
+
+Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and
+in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the
+world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful
+as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are
+contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while
+the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we
+wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our
+civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back
+in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world.
+
+Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1,
+1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is
+already large enough and does not need expansion.... We shall have to
+consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... We
+have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to
+take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should
+receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [D]
+
+[Footnote D: This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister
+Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."]
+
+That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed.
+
+If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we
+survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must
+admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not
+here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of
+the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language.
+
+England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from
+the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies which
+are directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in the
+interest of English industries and English capital. The work of
+civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has
+always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her
+sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by
+transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent
+culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy
+self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as
+Canada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they
+will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not
+only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the
+present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in
+the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to
+secure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is a
+great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and
+it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence.
+
+The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by
+them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister,
+Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Ten
+years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France
+has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in
+every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be
+spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown
+in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of
+Heaven." [E]
+
+[Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."]
+
+The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German
+policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading
+thought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputes
+under which the partition of Africa and the last phase of French
+colonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents to
+Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distant
+and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of
+the country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, it
+is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run,
+since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed,
+tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned
+colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have
+obtained the best shares."
+
+This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with
+mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital
+powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for
+colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria,
+has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and
+prides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte
+and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the
+Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France
+in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy
+alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany.
+
+The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of
+attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In the
+face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its
+importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place
+in the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspire
+to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the
+limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach this
+goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never
+again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be
+opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international
+politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair
+rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality
+and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to
+them.
+
+Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a
+fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity.
+
+The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and
+improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of
+great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely
+extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary
+capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more
+brilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have
+returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The
+increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to
+a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative
+industrial occupation.
+
+There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid
+development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the
+import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale
+of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of
+life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which
+England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take
+much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to
+close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order to
+encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of
+other countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends
+on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question
+of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall
+very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population
+means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the
+question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of
+population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and
+home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation
+will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for
+the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We
+shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to
+surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in
+the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a
+home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland.
+There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the
+unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from
+building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and
+at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers,
+may keep our sea communications open.
+
+We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial
+possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are
+only used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think of
+colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal
+population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and
+immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which
+retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance
+for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each
+nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is
+quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count
+among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be."
+[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 8.]
+
+We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our
+requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our
+growing working population, but would supply raw materials and
+foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that
+immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying
+unproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We
+find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers,
+and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign
+masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged,
+do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will
+depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world
+speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the
+German Empire?
+
+These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from
+the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its
+present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this
+point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and
+hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political
+relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course
+of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to
+political paralysis at the time when the great European States built
+themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not
+enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in
+politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long
+concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural
+development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power,
+international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What
+we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior
+force of hostile interests and Powers.
+
+It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths
+we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our
+forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the
+straight road of our intended development.
+
+The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an
+advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension,
+it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often
+follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to
+stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every
+occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will
+be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+
+WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL
+
+In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its
+history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted
+to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the
+Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions,
+must be the basis of our future development.
+
+The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international
+relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the
+impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character
+and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even
+at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and
+our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it
+will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us.
+
+  "The man of sense will by the forelock clutch
+  Whatever lies within his power,
+  Stick fast to it, and neither shirk,
+  Nor from his enterprise be thrust,
+  But, having once begun to work,
+  Go working on because he must."
+                               _Faust_
+                      (translated by Sir Theodore Martin).
+
+The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the
+hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing
+territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of
+both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of
+these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity,
+examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which
+concern us are weighed one against the other.
+
+These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly
+to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the
+States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must
+try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the
+day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations
+of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion.
+We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions
+of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and
+therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines
+of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a
+country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or
+timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not
+seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy
+is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men
+who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and
+often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such
+digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his
+opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the
+student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep
+his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must
+therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense
+clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions.
+
+We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps.
+
+On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive
+alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In
+this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably
+unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately
+connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States
+combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the
+North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical
+national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to
+shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred
+battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the
+bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the
+Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of
+Slavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories.
+There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the
+struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and
+commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those
+of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react
+detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between
+Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of
+overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its
+political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be
+assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so
+long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the
+Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy
+to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during
+the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered
+such an alliance possible.
+
+The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of
+Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show
+many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough
+to influence the political position of the Empire.
+
+Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The
+antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will
+diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a
+natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by
+Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its
+political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from
+her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her
+true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is
+the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power.
+That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor
+Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a
+permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in
+Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural
+colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by
+Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us,
+even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this
+annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We
+should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the
+Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and
+France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance.
+
+
+The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive
+character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but
+does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not
+guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential
+interests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in
+its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events.
+Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences," pointed out that
+this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the
+future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her
+Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with
+England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance.
+The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an
+undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct
+opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in
+order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This
+undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as
+the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the
+encroachment of Italy into those regions.
+
+The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has
+suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in
+the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy
+look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to
+the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not
+regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied
+armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We
+must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the
+Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we
+calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own
+political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to
+strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an
+essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of
+the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then
+will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real
+meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative
+results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital
+interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with
+sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not
+concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the
+consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or,
+indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would
+probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria.
+Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of
+Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and
+incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a
+contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we
+must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France.
+
+England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts
+to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in
+Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which
+secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in
+commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's
+Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in
+combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the
+coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against
+England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding
+such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She
+is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of
+the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make
+overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies
+can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It is
+our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can.
+
+France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European
+Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of
+_revanche_. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she
+has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the
+humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the
+defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she
+wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and,
+if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe
+which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune
+smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too
+weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all
+protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for
+this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, are
+inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this
+latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped,
+and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to
+Germany than from Russia.
+
+The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring
+a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The
+establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of
+a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political
+annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers,
+so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible
+illusion as to its extent and meaning.
+
+Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to
+approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her
+North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that
+strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of
+colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French
+sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France
+will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her
+best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in
+every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the
+Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed
+them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance
+which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable
+that she will maintain honourably and with no _arrière-pensée_ the
+obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco.
+The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the
+French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The French
+policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on
+the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite
+unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can
+be negotiated before the question between them has been once more
+decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France
+sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but
+strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the
+East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others.
+
+The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and
+of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is
+following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to
+an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central
+Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _status
+quo_. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with
+Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be
+overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any
+aggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seems
+likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more
+reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanying
+events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of
+internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable,
+therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention
+in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept
+away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose,
+meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and
+an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although
+this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions
+of Germany in North Persia.
+
+It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is
+adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the
+mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether
+in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the
+direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the
+dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate
+to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has
+long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the
+Baltic.
+
+Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean,
+and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European
+policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself,
+also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years
+been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into
+Central Europe.
+
+Pan-Slavism is still hard at work.
+
+It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement
+and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Her
+present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the
+present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong
+monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the
+internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation
+is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry
+is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from
+what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a
+healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Government
+has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed
+expectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under the
+stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an
+attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad.
+Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in
+the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China,
+must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly,
+Turkey.
+
+Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the
+Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not
+identical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive
+war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She
+wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of
+Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and
+East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on
+advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed.
+Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with
+Germany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of the
+German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore
+always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths.
+
+England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian
+Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the
+spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France
+she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany
+under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms.
+
+The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the
+heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So,
+also, no natural community of interests exists between England and
+France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to
+any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an
+Anglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostility
+to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two
+States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might
+mask the real objects.
+
+This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very
+comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made
+astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which
+commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which
+England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may
+well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political
+and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition
+in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The
+American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and
+will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the
+point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far
+as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite
+of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily
+directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in
+order to understand the line of thought which guides the English
+politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found
+in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the
+world.
+
+Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of
+view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of
+Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the
+other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North
+America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenest
+competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The
+annexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty with
+Japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two
+nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked,
+and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union
+are so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vast
+distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very
+bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly has
+always diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as quite recently
+in the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the object
+clearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearing
+the consequences of such collision. The American competition in trade
+and industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated as
+inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense,
+according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty by
+which a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established.
+
+England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America.
+The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in the
+further development of things, be so accentuated that England will be
+forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an
+undisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action.
+The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strained
+to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the Arbitration
+Treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does not
+consider that the present political relations of the two nations are
+permanent.
+
+There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly
+threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India
+and Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation for
+independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the
+Low-German element in South Africa.
+
+Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English
+position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national
+movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it
+clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement.
+She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine
+the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support,
+and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in
+opposition to the Caliphate.
+
+The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where
+some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England,
+so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, has
+attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But
+now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows
+itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism,
+thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of
+Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave
+danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in
+the world.
+
+While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and
+abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together,
+either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto.
+Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union has
+definitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the Imperial
+Conference in 1911 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated.
+.... When the question of imperial defence came up, the policy was
+rejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the oversea
+dominions in every imaginable eventuality." The great self-ruled
+colonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour of
+need, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employed
+wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not
+approve." [A] There are clear indications that the policy of the
+dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is
+contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and
+Australia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV., into independent
+nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal
+independence.
+
+[Footnote A: Th. Schiemann in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of July 5, 1911.]
+
+All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of
+England's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitude
+towards Germany.
+
+England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her
+imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must
+be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must
+not be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be
+destroyed.
+
+A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great
+English colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distant
+parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of
+expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet
+might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory
+which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of
+England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability of
+expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can
+no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall
+victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered.
+
+The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the
+German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer
+a prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without any
+excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet,
+contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a
+correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French
+fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely
+getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other
+contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable
+means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years
+to come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importance
+of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia.
+
+The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters.
+It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance of
+power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one
+of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled
+and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's
+stage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes
+undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This
+policy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each
+other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directly
+from this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen
+France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State
+which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born
+rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the
+East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus
+the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England's
+most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and
+self-evident.
+
+The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would
+chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is
+the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of
+the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English
+point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war.
+England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a
+large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before
+the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and
+to some extent a great benefit, to English industries.
+
+After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite
+comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check
+the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in
+large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is
+building, and attack the objectionable neighbour.
+
+English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt
+to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the
+most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance--Germany, England, and
+America--has been suggested.[B] But for such a union with Germany to be
+possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German
+development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our
+colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial
+and industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her
+traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the
+Great Powers in the world.
+
+[Footnote B: "The United States and the War Cloud in Europe," by Th.
+Schiemann, _McClure's Magazine_, June, 1910.]
+
+It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent
+to that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacit
+approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of
+the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements
+of English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and
+the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable
+indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy.
+The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every
+expansion of Germany's power were openly shown in the very recent
+Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on
+the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without
+a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp.
+
+A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which
+no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep
+the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our
+political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves
+with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and
+Utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter
+the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixity
+of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a
+vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire.
+
+On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part in
+English policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the one
+side, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out
+her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her
+fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the
+political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy
+in the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political,
+notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically
+with those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this.
+
+No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has at
+present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in
+the sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding with
+Germany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely that
+the Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of
+England. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded in
+inflicting a political and military defeat on Germany.
+
+For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations about
+Arbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany.
+There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us
+in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutely
+opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement
+in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the
+nature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen
+competition between the two countries, especially in South America;
+there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political
+complications.
+
+Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only
+in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China.
+In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and
+seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to
+count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitude
+to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions
+in East Asia. If the two nations joined hands--a hardly probable
+eventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain an
+independent position between them. The political rivalry between
+the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they are
+antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other
+in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to
+retain their possessions in Asia.
+
+While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present
+directly influence our policy, Turkey--the predominant Power of the Near
+East--is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is
+emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest
+course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple
+Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which
+threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage.
+Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against
+Russia and against England--the two States, that is, with whose
+hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can
+threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short
+sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no
+sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a
+war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to
+the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding
+position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important
+key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong
+to Russia or England.
+
+If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so
+long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern
+basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters.
+Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a
+development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be
+strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite
+impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position,
+while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her.
+From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the
+Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of
+Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be.
+
+Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent
+importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her
+Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German
+policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres
+of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means
+negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey;
+Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for
+Germany.
+
+Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared
+neutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20, 1815, under the
+collective guarantee [C] of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in the
+Treaties of London of November 15,1831, and of April 19,1839, on the
+part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself.
+
+[Footnote C: By a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of the
+contracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all
+agree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the _right_ to
+interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced.]
+
+If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the
+continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance
+and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement
+balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we
+take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be
+guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple
+Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In
+consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France,
+and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to
+Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not
+inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all
+considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political
+superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in
+strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English
+landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy
+really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior
+forces will be united against Germany and Austria.
+
+Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily
+difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our
+nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an
+extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we
+are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets
+for our growing industries. But at every step which we take in this
+direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet
+have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes,
+by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further
+expansion of German international influence and of German maritime
+power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the
+English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved
+in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not
+neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her
+extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance,
+will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off
+the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be
+only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be
+paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces
+in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against
+France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps
+with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on
+the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position
+lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion
+barred.
+
+Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the
+international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out,
+cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment,
+though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the
+one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and
+warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with
+which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where
+their interests clash.
+
+With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but
+not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently
+peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden,
+but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisis
+in the history of the German nation.
+
+We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our
+position among the Powers of _Europe_; we now must decide whether we
+wish to develop into and maintain a _World Empire_, and procure for
+German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been
+hitherto withheld from them.
+
+Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make
+the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we
+willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower
+in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is
+involved in our decision.
+
+"To be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day,
+disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests
+and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official
+peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history
+inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the
+narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region
+of realities.
+
+There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and
+development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the _status
+quo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever
+seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and
+temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to
+gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the
+trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior
+tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the
+powers of a continuous development.
+
+We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing
+still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression,
+and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with
+our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are
+straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to
+extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and
+advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with
+peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to
+continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon
+us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our
+arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and
+we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be
+sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and
+the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritual
+and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German
+thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind.
+
+If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a
+catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to
+attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at
+the risk of a war with numerically superior foes.
+
+Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by
+acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German
+colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from
+Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual
+incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former
+South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of
+Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish
+population.
+
+Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our
+political power in other ways.
+
+In the first place, our political position would be considerably
+consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that
+France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find
+ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another _we
+must square our account with France_ if we wish for a free hand in our
+international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a
+sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all
+cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by
+force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never
+again come across our path.
+
+Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political
+power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case
+of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with
+armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
+our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same
+lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be
+presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good
+policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and
+the Triple Alliance has already been discussed.
+
+Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the
+Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as
+mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan
+Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further
+intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in
+Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence,
+in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the
+integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their
+independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best
+secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might
+eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central
+European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by
+this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily
+unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be
+essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the
+expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the
+geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of
+the political community based on it.
+
+We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial
+territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our
+population. Very recent events have shown that, under certain
+circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa
+by pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugal
+might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the
+Portuguese colonies. We may assume that some understanding exists
+between England and Germany which contemplates a division of the
+Portuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_.
+It cannot, indeed, be certain that England, if the contingency arrives,
+would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually
+exists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even been
+often said, although disputed in other quarters, that Great Britain,
+after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of the
+Portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugal
+the possession of _all_ her colonies.
+
+Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our
+African territory would be possible. These need not be discussed here
+more particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of
+a successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of
+territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require
+countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there
+are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the
+settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our
+overflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generally
+speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our
+industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the
+growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This
+represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us
+from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization.
+
+A part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditions
+point--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of
+the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of
+providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but
+remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign
+countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our
+exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture.
+
+An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity.
+It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace
+the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for
+the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. This
+notion is only justified in a certain sense. In the first place, such a
+policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow
+population in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee the
+certainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. It secures to
+all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means
+competition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political power
+which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the
+economic relations. The principle of the open door prevails
+everywhere--in Egypt, Manchuria, in the Congo State, in Morocco--and
+everywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: in
+Manchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and in
+Morocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fall
+naturally to that State which is practically dominant; its products are
+bought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power of
+the State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar
+advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be
+evaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best be
+regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonial
+policy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies or its own
+and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets
+lie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations.
+
+The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many
+old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European
+policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in
+Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost
+sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely
+disregarded.
+
+The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling
+that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for
+the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the
+limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays
+the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence
+in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory
+of balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power,
+and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain
+guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The
+conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a close
+community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into
+political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort
+of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a
+State-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five
+Great Powers--England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which
+latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866
+Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power.
+
+"Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among
+the nations." "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a
+real equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated,"[D] This
+condition does not exist between the European nations. England by
+herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow
+themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of
+French. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by
+special alliances. One result only has been obtained--the hindrance of
+the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in
+particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power
+can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing
+state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of
+rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually
+ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers
+which stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England's
+policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and
+to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order
+herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and
+the sovereignty of the world.
+
+[Footnote D: Treitschke.]
+
+We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present
+distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a
+State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of
+course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just
+basis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of one
+embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is
+established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in
+this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central
+European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in
+one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase
+our own power.
+
+A further question, suggested by the present political position, is
+whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning
+of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a
+different conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be,
+permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one
+contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of
+Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory
+is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State from
+which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has
+no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This
+argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that,
+in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last
+mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the
+neutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic,
+since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral
+country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to
+the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest
+moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development
+presupposes such competition.
+
+[Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without
+guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.]
+
+Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal
+affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the
+State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and
+powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference
+in the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances of
+such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in the
+private affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but
+none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval
+preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international
+intercourse that between the States of one and the same political system
+a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The
+unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to
+political intercourse under all conditions involves serious
+difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first
+preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord
+Palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false is
+the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States
+of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for
+international politics can be laid down.
+
+After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals;
+and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his
+affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the
+individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates
+the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the
+State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But
+no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide
+whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its
+own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State
+renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should
+circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party
+disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat
+to the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every State
+acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of
+another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an
+interference may become." On the other hand, it must be remembered that
+the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still
+graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international
+right, but simply and solely on power and expediency.
+
+I have gone closely into these questions of international policy
+because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly
+influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and
+may give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential that
+we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by
+considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only
+depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must
+remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any
+circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that
+the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as
+possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions
+possible. "No man," so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3,
+1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to
+make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take
+advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position."
+
+If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which
+guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our
+forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts.
+
+The political and national development of the German people has always,
+so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the
+hereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism of
+the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties,
+the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national
+objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often,
+also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is
+painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so
+restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in
+fruitless quarrels among themselves.
+
+Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome
+these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy,
+consistent development of our power.
+
+It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual and
+social life arising from the like variety of the German nationality and
+political system offers valuable advantages. It presents countless
+centres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a high
+spiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development.
+But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference of
+this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics.
+
+Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions
+which are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugal
+forces of the German nature--the common system of defence of our country
+by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong
+national empire.
+
+No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its own
+destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to
+no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. A
+glance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which
+is forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day.
+
+The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the common
+interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions,
+as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful
+personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to
+stir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality,
+and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union.
+
+We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of
+acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends
+through and for our people.
+
+Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German character
+to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development
+of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific,
+and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State is
+beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the
+independence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills and
+stunts the independence of free men." [F] This independence of the
+individual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the State,
+forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central
+power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our
+social conditions.
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 2.]
+
+We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense,
+together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism,
+not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in
+the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our
+great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great
+part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the
+contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our
+political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the
+nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably
+beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once
+again, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament will
+be heard:
+
+  "O Germany, thy oaks still stand,
+  But thou art fallen, glorious land!"
+                                 KÖRNER.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+
+THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR
+
+Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture
+to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by
+formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will be
+impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future
+without an appeal to arms.
+
+Knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the political
+situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible
+for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an
+army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to
+battle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time
+down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of
+need.
+
+Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for
+warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of
+the situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested in
+the Reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to
+understand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic
+misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these
+for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country)
+cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand,
+brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great
+wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is
+often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national
+duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our
+people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be
+ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to
+discharge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of
+preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are
+passing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable to
+consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so
+much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect;
+we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true
+interests of the country better than by improving its military
+capabilities.
+
+Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it must
+maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national
+asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the
+war and supply the requisite means.
+
+This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in
+national development.
+
+As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold
+the field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, do
+not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of
+victory--so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with the
+people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is
+capable of wielding the sword with success.
+
+Military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but it
+develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the
+occupations of peace. It educates a man to the full mastery of his body,
+to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental
+powers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him to
+order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respect
+and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work.
+
+It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service
+deprives economic life of forces which could have been more
+appropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. These forces are
+not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life.
+Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly
+repay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. It
+is therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of its
+countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of
+war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and
+improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which
+the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly
+an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and
+educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus
+promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than
+achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which
+certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the
+national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them
+a number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency to
+luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations.
+Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level
+as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must
+complete and assist the other. But a people which does not willingly
+bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service
+renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and
+assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are
+one-sided and evanescent.
+
+It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligations
+towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all
+tendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. The
+method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power
+can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depends
+largely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical and
+political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently
+ranges between very wide extremes.
+
+In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military
+training was almost exclusively left to the individual. That was
+sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made
+them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to
+hard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination,
+subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military
+system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the
+conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made
+to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account
+of political possibilities. The great European States maintain standing
+armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or
+shorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenary
+army, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filled
+by volunteers.
+
+In these various ways different degrees of military efficiency are
+obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and
+intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the
+requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities
+become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency.
+
+When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that
+with growing civilization the requisite military capacities are always
+changing. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldiers
+who fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different from
+those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have the
+physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities
+expected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to the
+individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of
+warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in
+the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it
+is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. The
+preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military
+sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized
+State from those in countries, standing on a lower level of
+civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war
+is fought under relatively simple conditions.
+
+The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less
+developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form
+of military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising
+herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps
+in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and
+proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and
+educational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, by
+employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it
+never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development.
+
+When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find
+ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical
+and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact
+with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself.
+
+A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard
+to the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed in
+the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other
+ways. We see the individual States--according to their geographical
+position, their relations to other States and the military strength of
+their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater
+or less importance in the political system of the world--making their
+military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and
+expenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life of
+civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its
+emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is
+everywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a _means_ of
+attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength.
+
+Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position
+and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify
+her policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only
+with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling
+a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a
+continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. As
+a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental
+European war against her will.
+
+So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties,
+and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays
+most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to
+develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the
+security afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America,
+again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest
+limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval
+power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the
+continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any
+considerable forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea
+conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has
+acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly
+with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made
+concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her
+position in the world.
+
+While in some States a restriction of armaments is natural and
+justifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerve
+to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of
+Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political
+pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they
+are no longer justified by the size of her population and her
+international importance. France affords a conspicuous example of
+self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral
+duties.
+
+In the other European States, as in France, external political
+conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate
+the method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, which
+necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own
+justification.
+
+A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of
+nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in
+the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength
+to safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, under
+certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and
+political schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be
+deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements
+of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and
+maintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of all
+opposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases.
+
+A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on the
+friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as
+fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international
+conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support
+from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and under
+what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the
+consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own
+sphere of power.
+
+This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State
+is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace
+the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary
+expenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it is
+itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the
+largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another
+aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power of
+such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison
+with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable
+military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a
+view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military
+preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a
+defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent
+interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision
+will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a
+real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective
+addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist.
+The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary
+State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain
+influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local
+conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of
+the country.
+
+It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the
+utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such
+is, in fact, the case.
+
+In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with the
+political and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy,
+preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland,
+situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political
+independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Germany and the
+navy of England.
+
+The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on
+its own power.
+
+The power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies will
+have a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans and
+military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes;
+but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations
+alone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent and
+unqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless,
+and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and
+shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed.
+
+The military power of an independent State in the true sense must
+guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests
+of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of
+development. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be
+considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military
+efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions
+must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object
+thereby to be gained. This object--of which each individual must be
+conscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises
+the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of
+the State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen.
+
+A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital
+factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the
+healthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope in
+international competition. This is also an essential condition for the
+unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where the
+natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by external
+circumstances, nation and State are stunted and individual growth is set
+back.
+
+Increasing political power and the consequent multiplication of
+possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the
+intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by
+every phase of history.
+
+The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself
+first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of
+statesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by force
+of arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty of
+every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale
+commensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemy
+cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On the
+contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most
+strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for
+the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than
+ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very
+important factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits,
+which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of
+superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be
+spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a
+small, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War has
+proved this once more.
+
+Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of
+every State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert
+_power_, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of its
+personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the
+narrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible nor
+profitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined
+by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious
+development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military
+elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system
+cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. It
+needs a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. In
+the Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attacking
+strength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, because
+its foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political and
+moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas.
+
+The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the
+political necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree of
+warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may
+be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State's
+duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst out
+whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is
+brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of
+the State and of the army.
+
+It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties
+of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. The
+social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the
+duty of the State in a quite different light from the political
+_dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing
+of things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to the
+welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons
+on the horizon of the future.
+
+Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the
+nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these
+momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and
+experienced thinkers.
+
+First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in
+the present political world, even though all the elements for it are
+present.
+
+Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to
+40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so
+much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are
+annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is
+set up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would be
+available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would not
+mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say
+a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on
+active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from
+such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the
+continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike
+weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the
+individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the
+highest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the
+beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre
+cannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been
+ordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of the
+strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the
+rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins his
+service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier.
+With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we
+merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. We
+must not regard the present only, but provide for the future.
+
+The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makes
+the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes
+of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of
+arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity
+of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is
+sinning against his country.
+
+The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations,
+oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of
+things--these turn the scale.
+
+When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last century
+undertook the reorganization of the Prussian army, no political tension
+existed. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King had
+perceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet the
+requirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his
+people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations
+without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun.
+In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has
+powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being
+under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful
+co-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed was
+universally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, and
+accorded with traditional German sentiment.
+
+While the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of the
+political influences of the day, the military power of the probable
+opponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink without
+jeopardizing the national safety.
+
+Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries
+of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all
+these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the
+hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an
+obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as
+up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by
+every means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the army
+must be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, in
+which a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may be
+attained.
+
+Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree
+regulated by the political position of the State. If the State has
+satisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping
+its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive
+character. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous of
+expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must
+adopt a predominantly offensive military system.
+
+Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are
+dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide
+scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where
+the discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may lead
+to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war,
+and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In
+this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so
+clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that
+the majority of the nation accept his view. There are always and
+everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own,
+and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses.
+
+Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command
+of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful
+position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the
+population in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is
+too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets
+public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles,
+feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, which
+was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in the
+military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary
+unanimity.
+
+Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political independence
+rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of
+self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly
+supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it
+should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great
+duties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic
+evasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at
+home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects
+of our policy.
+
+To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion,
+as King William I. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the
+control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray
+too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly
+great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany.
+He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of
+inflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people.
+
+One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that
+permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake
+of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the
+taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious
+benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct
+disadvantages.
+
+The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by
+the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the
+sacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefully
+in view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the
+conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But
+where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual
+enforcement of universal service or of the requirements on which
+readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in
+order to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in order
+to maintain its vitality.
+
+One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction
+preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing
+conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military
+authorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy,
+since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon.
+Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty to
+perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit.
+
+It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to
+disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of
+the preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarily
+available. "No expenditure without security," runs the formula in which
+this policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security is
+fixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the duties
+which must be fulfilled--as Treitschke, our great historian and national
+politician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the great
+Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by
+sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically
+indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the
+nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that
+the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He
+can only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the Ministers
+for Commerce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to break
+down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the
+individual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to create
+favourable conditions for profitable business. A great impulse must
+thrill the whole productive and financial circles of the State, if the
+duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled.
+
+Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls for
+very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the
+entire social and political life of the people and on the financial
+policy of the State.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+
+THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR
+
+The social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defend
+itself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strength
+of the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors which
+determine the conditions of preparation for war.
+
+I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres
+of policy and progress which our history and our national character
+impose on us. My next task is to observe the possible military
+combinations which we must be prepared to face.
+
+In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can
+judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political
+intentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movements
+will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and
+this war will decide our future.
+
+It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our
+probable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessary
+basis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves the
+intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable
+efficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is
+determined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions
+clash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as to
+the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data
+available.
+
+If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups
+of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results:
+According to the recent communications of the French Finance Minister
+Klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan),
+the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910
+amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial
+Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to
+the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service
+auxiliaire "--that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in
+for service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to the
+information of the same Minister, including field army and reserves,
+consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. A reduction from
+this number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sources
+put down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army and
+reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000.
+
+To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1,700,000
+Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per
+cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made.
+
+If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will
+correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength
+of separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the
+2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to the
+infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a
+considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the
+transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers,
+70,000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical
+service, etc.), 90,000.
+
+No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per
+cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the
+birth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly,
+it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. Recourse already has been had to the
+expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of
+filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less
+efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves.
+
+Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the
+plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians
+and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with
+them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and
+trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited
+conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria.
+The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and
+conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops are
+in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops
+stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers
+against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are
+heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the
+Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the
+climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops.
+The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the
+march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value.
+There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with
+every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative
+proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native
+Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before
+Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the
+native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War,
+Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians.
+An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age
+available for military service. The Commission appointed for the purpose
+reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in
+the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined
+some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. They
+could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen
+the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in
+the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the
+formation of reserves.
+
+As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in her
+West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops
+available. As the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000,
+these figures may be considerably raised.
+
+Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalese
+sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912
+a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to
+Algeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black
+troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. There
+is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being
+transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient
+number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3,
+stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the
+Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France.
+Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a
+strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be
+available for a European war is still remote. But it cannot be
+questioned that they will be so some day.
+
+Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops in
+Europe contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but
+the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the
+territory termed "Morocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to
+come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale.
+The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in
+organizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the
+command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco.
+
+The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great addition
+to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the
+country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and France will
+certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in
+military matters.
+
+For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the
+reinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained from
+Algeria and Tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription is
+universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000
+men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have
+witnessed their exploits on the battlefields of Weissenburg and Wörth.
+At least one strong division of Turcos is already available.
+
+Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the military
+power of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are not
+published, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information is
+forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service,
+but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According to
+the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the
+Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of
+Cossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formed
+into 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe;
+3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry is
+divided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independent
+regiments.
+
+In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures
+42,000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strength
+of 20,000. Each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry
+divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive
+at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions,
+sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be added
+unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the
+war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000.
+
+This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. The
+Siberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would
+certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For the
+maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to
+leave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least one
+division at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. This
+would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men; so that
+we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army,
+1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of
+Cossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men,
+and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case
+of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men
+available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank
+for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed
+to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a
+certain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not known
+which of these formations would be really raised in event of
+mobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be
+put into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces which
+must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could
+easily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whether
+arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in
+sufficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empire
+like Russia in this respect.
+
+Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to
+England, the third member of the Triple Entente.
+
+The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into two
+divisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed by
+the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have
+at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of
+formation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns any
+European theatre of war.
+
+The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinet
+divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the
+native troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army,
+a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total
+of 300,000. It is now 270,000 strong, and is destined exclusively for
+home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very
+highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We
+have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army.
+This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which seven
+are with the colours and five in the reserve. The annual supply of
+recruits is 35,000. The regular reserve is now 136,000 strong. There is
+also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted
+for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the
+figure of 200,000.
+
+Of the regular English army, 134,000 men are stationed in England,
+74,500 in India (where, in combination with 159,000 native troops, they
+form the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39,000 in different
+stations--Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the other
+Colonies and Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt
+are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in
+the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong)
+one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in
+view of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of the
+English is precarious. The 11,000 troops now stationed in South Africa
+are to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. In
+event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there.
+
+For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account the
+regular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regular
+field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted
+brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and
+trains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form part
+of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. They consist of a
+very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for
+coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with
+some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home
+Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing
+its organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of this
+army can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150,000 men may
+be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troops
+compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the
+Colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutes
+the weak point in the British armament. England can employ her regular
+army in a Continental war so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies.
+This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war
+break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and
+especially in Egypt.
+
+Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente can
+put into the field, Germany can command an active army of 589,705 men
+(on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about
+25,500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a peace footing is
+361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. The combined war strength
+of the two States may be estimated as follows:
+
+In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and
+non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an
+average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of
+3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we
+have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment to
+it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French
+can match with about the same figures.
+
+The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,000. Liability to
+serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the
+Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a
+total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent.,
+911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained
+Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to
+911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a
+grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as
+Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe.
+
+In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available
+for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would
+be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available,
+partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion.
+However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never
+reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia
+present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the
+enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent
+generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the
+addition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would
+not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field.
+
+In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must
+be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are already
+reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple
+Alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the
+field against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France are
+available against Germany.
+
+[Footnote A: Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne."]
+
+The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000
+men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry,
+in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of
+Bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regiments
+in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are
+united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field
+artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193
+field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountain
+batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies.
+Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regiment
+and an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28,000 men.
+
+On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. Some 70,000
+men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. The
+militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might
+be mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9
+army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the
+Territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions.
+
+As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48
+officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500
+native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned
+officers and privates of Italian birth, and 3,800 natives.
+
+Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it is
+questionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value.
+It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence,
+while the protection of Tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim a
+powerful army if it is to be held against France.
+
+The Turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joined
+the coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents.
+
+The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275,000
+men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it:
+
+I. The Active Army (Nizam):
+
+  Infantry              133,000
+  Cavalry                26,000
+  Artillery              43,000
+  Pioneers                4,500
+  Special troops          7,500
+  Train formations        3,000
+  Mechanics               3,000
+
+A total, that is, of 220,000 men.
+
+2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. Within
+this limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns for
+short trainings.
+
+3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military employés, officials,
+and others, more than 30,000.
+
+The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. We
+need only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia,
+Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in a
+European theatre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be
+regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for
+local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior.
+To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplest
+process. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the
+Turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. Turkey thus is
+a very valuable ally to whichever party she joins.
+
+The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies into
+the field.
+
+Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons
+and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and
+home duties.
+
+Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing;
+this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The
+war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000
+rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4
+guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and
+228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (third
+line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the
+militia, an uncertain quantity.
+
+The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not
+known how they are distributed among the various branches of the
+service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including
+infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine
+guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and
+national militia, which latter is only available for home service and
+comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be
+400,000 strong.
+
+Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power
+in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to
+their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia
+cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of
+their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods.
+
+In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the
+permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. The
+infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent
+cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery
+14,000 men with 700 officers.
+
+For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000
+men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry,
+7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is
+therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part
+of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves
+and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000
+trained men available for service.
+
+Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chiefly
+concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into
+relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European
+States may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if
+they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a
+European war.
+
+Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under
+consideration, and then Belgium.
+
+Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men.
+The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive
+war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns
+and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a
+total of 141,000 men.
+
+The Landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36
+12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total
+strength of 69,000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000
+men.
+
+The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which
+varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally
+available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400
+garrison artillery, and I,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport
+troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000
+infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400
+artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of
+15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There
+is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active
+and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot
+artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers,
+including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder,
+Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Völkerack and Haringvliet there are various
+outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present
+unimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications
+in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland).
+
+Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English
+landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. It
+would easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us.
+
+
+Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows:
+26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison
+artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service.
+
+On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising
+74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers
+and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry
+divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each
+of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1
+squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a
+garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde
+civique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as
+a very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are
+the fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast
+fortifications.
+
+Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great
+military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong
+fortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of
+strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This
+State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry,
+2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the
+strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. In war-time an army of 62,000
+men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically
+of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special
+arms.
+
+Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises units
+from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as
+well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which
+is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There
+are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students
+from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age.
+
+The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can,
+accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case
+of war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head.
+
+In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might in
+combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to
+Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men
+can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the
+Landwehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm.
+
+Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently
+stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active
+army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is
+so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could
+at most be put into the field.
+
+As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the
+accompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affords
+a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that,
+numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours.
+This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of
+really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four
+battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have
+ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned
+battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The
+comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable,
+that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be
+noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really
+have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be
+counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the
+number of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto known
+about the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respect
+of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important
+factor if allied with the English.
+
+         |Battle-   |Armoured |Armoured| Armoured |Protected |Number   |N S
+Nation.  |ships     |Coast    |Gunboats| Cruisers |Cruisers  |of       |u u
+         |above     |Defence  |and     |          |          |Torpedo  |m b
+         |5,000     |Vessels  |Armoured|          |          |Vessels  |b m
+         |Tons.     |from     |Ships   |          |          |         |e a
+         |          |3000 Tons|under   |          |          |         |r r
+         |          |to 5,000 |3,000   |          |          |         |  i
+         |          |Tons     |Tons    |          |          |         |  i
+         +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n
+         |No|Displ. |No|Displ.|No|Displ|No|Displ. |No|Displ. |    |From|f e
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |200+|80- |  s
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |Tons| 200|
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |Tons|
+---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+---
+GERMANY: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |25|332,410| 5|20,600| -| --- |10|114,590|33|122,130| 117|  70| 12
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building|12|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | 4|   --- | 7|   --- |  14| -- | --
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ENGLAND: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |50|793,260| -|  --- | -| --- |38|484,970|66|333,540| 223|  36| 53
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building|12|286,640| -|  --- | -| --- | 6|145,320|20|101,320|  51| -- | 19
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+FRANCE:  |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |22|314,930| -|  --- | -| --- |22|214,670|10| 50,780|  71| 191| 52
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4| 93,880| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  13| -- | 19
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ITALY:   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    | 8| 96,980| -|  --- | -| --- |10| 79,530| 4| 10,040|  53|  39|  7
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4| 84,000| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3| 10,200|  14|  28| 13
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+AUSTRIA- |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ HUNGARY |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |11|102,620| -|  --- | -| --- | 3| 18,870| 4| 10,590|  18|  66|  7
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 5| 94,500| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3|   --- |   6| -- | --
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+RUSSIA:  |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Baltic   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ Fleet   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Ready  | 4| 62,300| -|  --- | 1|1,760| 6| 64,950| 4| 27,270|  60|  19| 13
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 8|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |   1| -- |  1
+Black Sea|  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ Fleet   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Ready  | 6| 72,640| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3| 13,620|  17|  10|  4
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  14| -- |  7
+Siberian |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Fleet  |--|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 2|  9,180|  20|   7| 13
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+UNITED   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ STATES: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |30|434,890| 4|13,120| -| --- |14|181,260|16| 65,270|  40|  28| 19
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 7|190,000| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  14| -- | 20
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+JAPAN:   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |13|194,690| 2| 8,540| -| --- |13|139,830|12| 49,170|  59|  49| 12
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 3|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | 4|107,120| 3| 15,000|   2| -- |  1
+---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+---
+
+Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leave
+a certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be stronger
+than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in
+event of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further assume
+that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-European
+stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together
+can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships
+alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by
+a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia
+joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition
+to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since
+the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships,
+and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our
+coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the
+other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of
+the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be
+superior to us.
+
+As regards _matériel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is
+distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our
+equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a
+superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless
+energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up
+some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these
+advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of
+an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English.
+
+Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under
+certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in
+this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente
+can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time.
+
+If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of
+the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany,
+we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in
+every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are
+very different.
+
+If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed
+she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member
+of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course,
+very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost
+equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization
+and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The
+French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united
+spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of
+the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too,
+has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to
+double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the
+French succeed in making a large African army available for a European
+theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with
+ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind,
+for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may
+safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if
+only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well
+that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of
+her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by
+the exercise of extraordinary efforts.
+
+It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military
+power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself
+desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably
+not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her
+own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured
+the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too
+high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has
+all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war,
+and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must
+expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple
+Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have
+struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination
+with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would
+attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland,
+and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the
+fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the
+considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and
+threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of
+the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without
+difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would
+enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would
+enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine,
+after investing Metz and Diedenhofen.
+
+[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.]
+
+England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must
+reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of
+an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only
+serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign.
+English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not
+coincident with those of France.
+
+The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea
+commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any
+further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy
+our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the
+supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium
+between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in
+order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never
+impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the
+private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her
+plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political
+position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war
+against us.
+
+If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on
+this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the
+first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by
+the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely
+compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might
+consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied
+by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in
+India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European
+war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might
+interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was
+important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall
+any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case
+of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea
+will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm
+resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial
+centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will
+throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of
+her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English
+policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other
+hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only
+so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval
+bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this
+because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's
+battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation
+will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a
+definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It is
+very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively
+acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South
+Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and
+stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the
+offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the
+generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale,
+held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not,
+according to available information, show the English army in a
+favourable light so far as strategical ability went.
+
+If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's
+probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian
+standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than
+a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the
+Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to
+join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of
+communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of
+power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is
+as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory
+over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople,
+but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia
+in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation
+for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could
+be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire.
+
+Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an
+offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite
+different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war.
+Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against
+complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not
+shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for
+political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such
+a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion
+in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast
+Empire the social and also political education, especially among the
+peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy
+seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have
+acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools
+have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind
+anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their
+interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote
+their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the
+Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of
+a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive
+war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an
+extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people
+showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be
+involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never
+bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary
+elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every
+weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in
+internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the
+community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the
+moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out
+their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of
+arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we
+have already mentioned.
+
+Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole
+power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a
+certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by
+defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater
+exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks,
+nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's
+political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another
+sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her
+losses on another frontier.
+
+Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia
+will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars
+against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented
+the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign
+revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and
+battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all
+probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats
+favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against
+Russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coûte_.
+
+If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole
+position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in
+the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile
+forces which would cripple the conduct of the war.
+
+So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese
+War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle
+showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest
+losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian
+army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but
+essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of
+the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong;
+indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every
+grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above
+mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian
+generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and
+that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must
+therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack.
+
+When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we
+cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military
+difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel
+successfully the attack of our opponents.
+
+In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our
+country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no
+opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the
+government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our
+western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north
+through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is
+there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper
+bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned
+through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country
+offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves
+resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their
+army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in
+their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten.
+
+The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and
+the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a
+prey to our enemies.
+
+The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a
+strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland.
+England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire
+oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east
+alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are
+encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides.
+This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so
+presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our
+opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan.
+
+If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact
+that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in
+carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia
+have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will
+sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of
+any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an
+extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by
+the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not
+merely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is a
+cause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound
+to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase
+of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct
+of Italy at the conference of Algeçiras sufficiently demonstrated. It
+even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always
+reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a
+defensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France and
+England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how
+difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with
+France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we
+think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which
+is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt
+whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were
+allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests
+are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the
+same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria.
+Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate
+State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements,
+patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to
+the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of
+such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that
+might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration.
+
+We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of
+standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the
+Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the
+struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own
+resolution for victory.
+
+Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our
+political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can
+only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and
+by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect
+continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their
+interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest,
+since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and
+obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable,
+then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own
+resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of
+desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would
+destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize
+the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would
+shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus
+check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for
+which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war
+will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind.
+This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power
+or downfall!" will be our rallying cry.
+
+Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident
+intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the
+end, come what may.
+
+We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted
+campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our
+enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to
+defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last
+is won.
+
+It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numerical
+equality with our opponents. On the contrary, we must strive to call up
+the entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the great
+decision which impends. We must try also to gain a certain superiority
+over our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold some
+winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. We
+must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only by
+continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our
+preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future
+makes on us. A nation of 65,000,000 which stakes _all_ her forces on
+winning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot be
+conquered. But it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblance
+of power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content with
+half-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only be
+attained by the exertion and development of all her powers.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+
+THE NEXT NAVAL WAR
+
+In the next European land war we shall probably face our foes with
+Austria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the day
+against any opposing forces. In a naval war we shall be thrown on our
+own resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against the
+superior forces which will certainly press us hard.
+
+There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for,
+although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack
+would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking
+our political power. It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack
+_us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France. The English have,
+besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should
+always be held before our eyes. They talk so much of a possible German
+attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question
+is from the opposite point of view. Again, the preparations which they
+are making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly have
+contemplated an attack on Germany. These preparations are like a
+strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves
+no doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbour of Rosyth is
+admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can mean
+nothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especially
+strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the
+Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These are
+measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand
+an inquiry into the military position thus created.
+
+The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since
+1902. Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it
+is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time.
+This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the
+circumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusively
+directed against Germany.
+
+We must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us to
+believe--reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, and
+shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. It will be
+so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the
+offensive against the English fleet. But we must contemplate the
+possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning
+the freedom of the seas, if England attacks us. We shall now discuss
+this possibility. On this matter I am expressing my personal views only,
+which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest
+exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed
+antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. I shall not
+betray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any. But I
+consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand
+what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met.
+
+In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong
+enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question
+remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure
+protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to
+become its master?
+
+The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack,
+instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the
+war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English
+fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its
+superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective
+blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that
+such an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does not
+seem to me to promise any great success.
+
+The English have secured themselves against such attacks by
+comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seems
+dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall
+urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings.
+Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than
+formerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English
+merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under such
+circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign
+service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's
+warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of
+these ships will certainly be a difficult task.
+
+The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and
+energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes
+which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will
+usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the
+few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing
+our vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken against
+neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable
+results can be expected from a war against England's trade. On the
+contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at
+her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must be
+ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England's
+custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests
+are at stake.
+
+Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire
+with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by
+the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to
+English vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they
+can be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has
+no knowledge of their existence.
+
+It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation
+from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications
+will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way
+would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral
+Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the
+great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be
+discovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remain
+suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of
+trade.
+
+It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such
+communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect
+of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to block
+these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the
+States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether
+they would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity,
+or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography
+dictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with England
+and a Continental war with their German neighbours--two possibilities,
+each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay much
+attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was
+at issue is hardly credible.
+
+The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot be
+foreseen. It would probably depend on the general political position and
+the attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest. The
+policy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor. One
+can easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch are
+seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on
+their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea
+side. They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which
+obviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sided
+with our enemies.
+
+I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities
+which might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to a
+sympathetic understanding by the war. I will only point out how
+widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the
+Continental war and on the political relations generally. The attitude
+of Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the
+Baltic must mainly depend on her. It is vital to us that these
+communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this.
+The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly important
+for the conduct of the war. Free commerce with Sweden is essential for
+us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish
+iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted.
+
+It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the
+interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by
+diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. We
+cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands.
+
+Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus
+raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer
+greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us
+assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only
+trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--a
+condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and
+should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any
+case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on
+which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and
+also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial
+products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They
+must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the
+Government must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry of
+Commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in
+collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which
+our commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort of
+commercial mobilization.
+
+These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us
+in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a
+defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our
+coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack.
+
+Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade
+closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish
+straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she
+can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the
+Continent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotland
+and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea
+commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping.
+
+A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of
+the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a
+blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base
+and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since all
+the English naval ports are considerably farther than this from our
+coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously
+increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich has
+recently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. It is considered
+the best harbourage on the English coast, and is hardly 300 nautical
+miles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities of
+fortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distance
+from the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes of
+blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless
+count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutch
+coast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means.
+Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as
+Heligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all
+attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. This
+task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by
+night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on
+board.
+
+Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy,
+if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the
+offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain
+an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive
+operations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts
+must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We must
+endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly
+with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the
+blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as
+possible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces,
+for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there
+is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the
+enemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end.
+And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold
+attack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionally
+favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the
+fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy
+losses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring,
+to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place
+or another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and
+the battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behind
+the farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold the
+high seas in full strength. The forces of the defending party, however,
+lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight.
+
+Such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party.
+We may therefore fairly assume that the English would decide in favour
+of the second kind. At all events, the harbour constructions, partly
+building, partly projected, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were chosen with
+an eye to this line of blockade. It would entail in the north the
+barring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasible
+from the military aspect. Only a small force is required to seal up the
+Channel, as the navigation route is very narrow. In addition to all
+this, the great English naval depots--Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, and
+Plymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediately
+behind it. Besides, every advance against this line from the north is
+flanked by Sheerness and Harwich, so that a retreat to the German coast
+might be barred. The conditions for the northern line of blockade will
+be no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. The
+blockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour of
+Rosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the Orkney
+Isles. Every attacking fleet from the German north coast will be
+unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cut
+off from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to the
+English superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading
+fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the
+Baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here we
+should have a tolerably secure retreat. This accentuates once more the
+supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage
+through the Sound and the Great Belt. The command of these straits will
+not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the
+sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading
+fleet.
+
+In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade
+offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are
+well worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, it
+prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed
+by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the
+blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or
+three divisions.
+
+As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let
+herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests
+of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory
+arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As
+regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous
+conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily
+divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the
+superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea.
+Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending
+party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction
+with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be
+deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are
+the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be
+employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled.
+
+This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But
+it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the
+close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet
+more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in
+far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the
+threatened flank of our attacking fleet.
+
+After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a
+mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision
+of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event
+of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt
+to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They
+could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our
+naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and
+Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these
+places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea.
+
+It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate
+against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford
+extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by
+protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the
+communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack
+will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast
+fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely
+defensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon
+the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the
+fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should
+inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength
+between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must
+be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast
+fortifications hold out.
+
+No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a
+defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows.
+Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments
+for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative
+movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures
+for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers.
+The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we
+shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy
+"scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleet
+must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the
+enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by
+attacking them directly.
+
+If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they
+would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English
+force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus
+contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing
+forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected
+to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be
+dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a
+balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in
+mind.
+
+So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for,
+starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines would
+be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully
+than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they
+would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant English
+coast.
+
+Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and
+nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the
+boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in
+hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the
+science of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is the
+only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we
+may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea.
+
+In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to
+be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a
+World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England.
+
+This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of
+Germany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the
+common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win
+recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This was
+the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under
+Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her
+history; and the great Republic of the United States of North America
+strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right
+of nations for which every people craves." [A]
+
+[Footnote A: Schiemann.]
+
+In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this
+vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us
+in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which,
+in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy,
+has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the
+unscrupulous suppression of her rivals.
+
+If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English and
+takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage
+than a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold our
+allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her
+forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the
+two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea,
+since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean
+interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful
+issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then
+despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak,
+on land--i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be
+compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet
+to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to
+the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an
+absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports and
+destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife with
+France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the
+French position as a Great Power. If France, with her falling
+birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her
+place in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanent
+political subservience. Those are the stakes.
+
+The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated.
+That is the less dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present
+still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French.
+We could operate against it on the inner line--i.e., we could use the
+opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the
+Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we could attack the Russian ships in vastly
+superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the
+North Sea. For these operations it is of the first importance that the
+Danish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell into
+the hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would be
+almost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the
+passive protection of our coast batteries.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+
+THE CRUCIAL QUESTION
+
+I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some
+detail, because I thought that our general political and military
+position can only be properly estimated by considering the various
+phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities
+and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on
+our coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction be
+decided in which our preparations for war ought to move.
+
+The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war
+with England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall
+need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from
+a hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on an
+ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If an
+Anglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatened
+our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by
+sea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armies
+advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined
+fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be
+rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land.
+
+We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on
+land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all
+circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the
+Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before
+we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy
+based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in
+Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her
+triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own
+country.
+
+But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by
+the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing
+with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land
+army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting
+the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally
+necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every
+attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled.
+
+At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the
+conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk
+of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay
+the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample
+scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put
+aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost
+energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole
+future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the
+broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the
+individual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere is
+critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as
+a World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the Triple
+Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey,
+threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which
+destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing
+ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, if
+we wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we are
+Germans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out our
+preparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to our
+national duty.
+
+I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated
+merely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in the
+cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer
+the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the
+future. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to
+desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour
+something of what we have lost in the last years.
+
+Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on
+the continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problem
+of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great
+numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainly
+exist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance,
+whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to
+Irredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondary
+importance.
+
+The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make
+the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate
+the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make
+universal service an existing fact.
+
+The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a
+splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has
+in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and
+has brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification.
+Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed
+in a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mighty
+political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our
+greatness was founded.
+
+France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in
+Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000.
+Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. But since
+the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very
+various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are
+also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to
+the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself
+successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the
+inner line, even though England took part in the war.
+
+Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of
+universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued
+to carry it out effectively. The country where universal service exists
+is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only
+kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the
+able-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little use
+has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army.
+
+In this direction some reorganization is required which will
+energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army,
+such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand,
+we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers.
+
+Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not
+shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make
+up our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by
+150,000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not be
+forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could
+not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased army
+only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and
+Landwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recur
+to the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the new
+Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wish
+to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even
+if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that
+we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the
+superior forces of our opponents.
+
+We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we
+must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These
+means can only be found in the spiritual domain.
+
+History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have
+only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been
+equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party
+exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases
+it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment,
+greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able
+strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Rome
+conquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great with
+inferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent history
+shows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over a
+crushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a great
+commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear.
+Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the
+hostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisive
+factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory
+or defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and
+keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a
+real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which
+would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should we
+then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy
+which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be
+possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a
+considerable numerical superiority.
+
+[Footnote A: _Cf_. v. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.]
+
+The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery
+with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships,
+and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable
+opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast
+with the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certain
+spiritual servility and inferiority.
+
+Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which
+the ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is to
+prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to
+apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of
+superiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the material
+advantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushed
+by their weight of numbers.
+
+We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by
+uninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight the
+probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new
+paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. New
+goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches
+us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress,
+in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritual
+capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be
+sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action,
+are the soil in which great successes ripen.
+
+It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the
+nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas
+which will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughly
+ventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege"
+("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results of
+my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration
+of the essential questions of the future.
+
+In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extent
+unprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness
+will exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means of
+communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. These
+three momentous factors will mark the war of the future.
+
+"Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain
+elements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they can
+be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical
+efficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the country
+during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are
+therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower
+and less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they require
+for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into
+effective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible to
+morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may
+prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run
+short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority
+over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions.
+
+The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer
+range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting
+claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner than
+formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far
+wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. The
+soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which
+he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all
+circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing
+which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious
+movement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances.
+Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short,
+while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands
+made on them have become considerably greater.
+
+Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and
+feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main
+roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign,
+aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their
+use, and the commanders counted upon them.
+
+The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great
+superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and
+tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists.
+
+The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy,
+and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than
+they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior
+force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective
+troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile
+army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it
+before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the
+field.
+
+Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly
+shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary
+conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare.
+
+In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength
+which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action.
+Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack
+to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a
+superior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which is
+the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place
+which is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked party
+can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the
+intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold
+out promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attacking
+General strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his
+troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature
+guarantees.
+
+This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancing
+armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it
+will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take
+proper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, the
+prospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable,
+especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at
+his disposal.
+
+Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility
+of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all
+the more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is
+impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and
+completely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisive
+direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of
+the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and
+its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations.
+If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior
+numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his
+numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory
+over the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law,
+Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and striking
+strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in
+mere numbers.
+
+No further proof is required that the superiority of the attack
+increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and
+to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of
+concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the
+enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very
+appreciable.
+
+We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the
+superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it
+is incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise the
+tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and
+especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements
+and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to
+act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the
+manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be
+superior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has
+objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks
+by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It
+must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since
+a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods.
+
+This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which I
+have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face
+the future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raise
+the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else
+must give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all our
+measures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, and
+thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too
+easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of
+a collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions would
+have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying
+principle.
+
+The requirements which I have described as the most essential are
+somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a
+resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age.
+
+The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, the
+smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not
+merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as
+such. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will be
+suffocated by their own fat," said General v. Brandenstein, the great
+organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of
+the French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the
+whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure
+the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his
+own movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the course
+of military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tactical
+efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it
+certainly will prove in the wars of the future.
+
+A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of
+public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have
+conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential
+contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained,
+and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It would
+be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is
+recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached
+on them.
+
+This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is
+attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military
+service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less,
+and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had
+to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a
+good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_,
+which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no
+means helped by the very brief training which these units at best
+receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity
+for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy
+strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be
+indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the
+field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain
+the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass
+would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to
+some degree the task of making good the losses.
+
+A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops.
+Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are
+already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full
+strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on
+mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according
+to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much
+inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which
+were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this,
+notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new
+French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere
+of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their
+duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered
+territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact,
+they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the
+field army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and
+mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By acting
+at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually
+become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of
+offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset
+of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied
+with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be.
+
+Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such
+troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive
+operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated
+as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some
+are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical
+conception.
+
+For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars
+only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks
+for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if
+necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and
+more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical
+striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater
+numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the
+decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever
+before.
+
+The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are
+placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this
+principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that
+he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong
+advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and
+therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his
+army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be
+employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as
+much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the
+numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the
+actual war.
+
+It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to
+render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a
+mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their
+_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to
+them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of
+efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered.
+
+Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An
+increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more
+than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is
+supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the
+establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient
+will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality,
+not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If we
+wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening
+the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of
+professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This step
+is the more necessary because the present available cadres are
+insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide
+for their thorough training.
+
+The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with
+an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. We
+shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the
+efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be
+improved by organization, equipment, and training.
+
+I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the
+questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of
+military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt
+original action--I mean the importance of personality.
+
+From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of
+his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune,
+and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a given
+general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left
+to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in
+the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the
+face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other
+age, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics has
+abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left
+to himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In the
+strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of
+that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before
+from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in the
+artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly
+emphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations have
+increased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far less
+able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the
+field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates.
+These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations.
+
+When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his
+ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the
+reserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment
+to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot
+be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Even
+the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now
+wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have
+to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing
+touch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on the
+commander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy,
+deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from
+him. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All this
+puts a heavy strain on personality.
+
+It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of
+self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct
+advantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to
+attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And this
+object can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in the
+sphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can be
+improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the
+conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in
+which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and
+more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp.
+Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune
+are produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkward
+and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same
+process is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mental
+development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the
+personality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsman
+Bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of
+leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. General
+Chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute
+determination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks of
+the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and
+thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is it
+essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in
+high command. In a long military life ideas all too early grow
+stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought
+and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of such
+development cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of the
+army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a
+one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of
+actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akin
+to this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en
+masse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatest
+value. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual
+independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and
+solving new problems by original methods.
+
+It has often been said that one man is as good as another; that
+personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is
+erroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real
+struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is
+enough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility and
+danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a
+chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross.
+
+That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the
+important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is the
+only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to
+break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and
+success. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. that for the
+highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time
+of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men
+around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition
+those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of
+need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. This
+is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and
+distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action,
+appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of
+the stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved:
+
+  "Folk and thrall and victor can
+  Witness bear in every zone:
+  Fortune's greatest gift to man
+  Is personality alone."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+
+ARMY ORGANIZATION
+
+I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it
+is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with
+this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. I
+shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in
+my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we
+wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions
+which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It will
+be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially
+noteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come into
+opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further
+from my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based on
+theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely
+presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and
+of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political
+disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is,
+in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something
+already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent
+historical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to the
+future, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-defined
+lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most
+important that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall not
+look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future.
+
+The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I have
+already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the
+greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position
+to carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore,
+fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, as
+already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the
+arming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops,
+and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly
+have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of
+their peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter how
+essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary
+cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches
+so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in
+war-time.
+
+The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the
+non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of
+the troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline,
+decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the
+troops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number of
+permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in
+proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the
+demands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officers
+and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred
+to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern
+tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his
+influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing
+_personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to the
+infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a
+sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the more
+important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers
+and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on
+the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and
+non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is a
+question of training, and does not come into the present discussion.
+
+The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a
+sense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospects
+which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect
+the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to
+keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary
+advantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, the
+financial question is all-important. The career of the officer offers
+to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and
+self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the
+service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as
+they now are. The infantry officer especially must have a better
+position. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur
+greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer
+has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most
+strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It would
+be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than
+the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm
+more attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for
+which there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be well
+supplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must be
+counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service.
+By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the
+chief arm.
+
+If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition
+and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the
+troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in
+action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on
+conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical
+proportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally the
+cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the
+proportion which artillery must bear to infantry.
+
+With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent
+replace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weapons
+of defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourable
+conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful
+attack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder that
+impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, this
+auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and
+employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into
+large units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching
+columns.
+
+The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance.
+
+Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooth
+their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly.
+This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry
+must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting
+instruments in the whole army.
+
+If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the
+result. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to
+modern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greater
+superiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of front
+in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close
+tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire.
+This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the
+conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as
+before. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in
+a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The
+troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en échelon _than in the
+last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate
+the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be
+settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the
+experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will
+most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in
+the domain of military science.
+
+If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an
+infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of
+artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern
+artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must
+advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the
+artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path
+between these two extremes.
+
+If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or,
+better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the
+guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially
+adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the
+conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is
+reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we
+must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into
+account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If
+we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper
+strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such
+infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position
+taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that
+section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions,
+requires greater numbers and depth than before.
+
+In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of
+the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian
+campaign.
+
+Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period
+extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not
+rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original
+strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans
+on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so
+decisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would have
+shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the
+contest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the former
+case the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery,
+under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak
+infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under
+the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was
+too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched
+enemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of
+infantry were needed at Wörth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite of
+the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker
+enemy of equal class.
+
+Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English in
+artillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state of
+things was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery was
+extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russian
+field guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, the
+Japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also,
+because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite
+superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillery
+was scattered along the whole of their broad front.
+
+The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the
+arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these
+units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be
+appropriately determined.
+
+The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or
+superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly
+mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and
+corps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucial
+test. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpected
+concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the
+superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way.
+If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine
+against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies
+a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it is
+assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and
+that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so
+slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then
+equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese were
+tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they
+were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive
+directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical
+superiority of the Russian army as a whole.
+
+If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the
+artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy
+within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a
+considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful.
+In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded
+the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the
+artillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the
+separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of
+the army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excess
+in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is
+restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then
+artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to
+victory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forces
+for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces
+along the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often be
+weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage
+may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a
+position. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering
+concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. This
+victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere.
+
+The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater
+marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of
+the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the
+columns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossal
+armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly
+live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from
+the rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies;
+but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be
+maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go
+to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead.
+Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct
+communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught
+animals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons of
+provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily,
+must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of
+food. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a
+certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport
+waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to
+the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the
+night's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained
+if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient
+quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry
+with them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid
+down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusually
+lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the
+troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thus
+the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly
+dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A careful
+calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to
+average 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from an
+army--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25
+kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps on
+the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle
+troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps.
+
+This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily
+affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and
+rations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyed
+railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of
+columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared
+by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time
+the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the
+troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption
+continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In order
+to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any
+crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample
+stock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of the
+necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must be
+taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of
+tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done by
+special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the
+organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a
+distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by
+forced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increase
+the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It is
+further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very
+long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other
+provisions compressed into the smallest space.
+
+An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps,
+and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army
+with its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it the
+troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is far
+more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any
+other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the
+decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent.
+
+However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained
+if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed
+from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out.
+Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within
+these limits.
+
+Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army
+corresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened by
+a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it
+will considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, the
+necessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantry
+is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to
+deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack
+and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to
+strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the
+artillery.
+
+In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division
+is very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as to
+permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of
+reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units.
+This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional
+organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet
+appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the
+existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been
+drawn up by competent officers.
+
+The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two
+infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The
+formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix
+the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his
+own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a
+reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of
+some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity
+for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a
+wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this
+procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible,
+even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the
+brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken
+by the enemy and the course of the battle.
+
+Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its
+application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of
+cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution
+which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that
+the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of
+two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry
+these duties out.
+
+This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts
+the most generally accepted military principles.
+
+The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as
+is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate
+divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal
+of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the
+subdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack
+must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best
+formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops
+to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result
+there.
+
+A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by
+the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action
+two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of
+course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not
+always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely
+the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ
+them as their particular character demands.
+
+The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and
+divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding
+formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately
+according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the
+undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders
+of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the
+commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of
+enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for
+himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one
+division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to
+withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one
+division only, the same division must always be subjected to this
+reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether
+this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least
+worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not
+be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each
+division.
+
+The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous
+question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the
+whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement
+would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a
+position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They
+can also, however, be combined under the command of the
+General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first
+arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the
+great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is
+dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left
+but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the
+indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are
+inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers
+is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is
+planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that
+the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line
+by a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach
+single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army
+corps temporarily.
+
+There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally
+used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the
+spot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into the
+advance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's field
+artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in
+such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers.
+It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this
+problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long
+unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their
+effectiveness doubtful.
+
+No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased
+their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort
+to every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, be
+overestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite _sui generis_.
+The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions
+strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line
+in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns.
+It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective
+12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I
+can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty
+was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. The
+Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their
+howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but
+break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs,
+the question of concentration seems to me very important for us.
+
+Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the
+heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus best
+serve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which he
+wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain
+that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the
+army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries will
+be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General.
+There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the
+deciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knows
+that.
+
+I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the
+heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batteries
+which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed
+under the orders of the corps commanders _(Truppenführer)_ if they are
+to become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artillery
+of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot
+artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres.
+It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does
+not feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinction
+between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical.
+
+This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the
+heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the
+Commander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and
+manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the
+present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy
+artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. This
+disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned
+permanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being united
+in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, they
+would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely
+the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies.
+
+The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more
+effective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies not
+merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but
+the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the
+advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We were
+taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway
+communications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vital
+importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the
+discharge of these necessary functions.
+
+Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was
+organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations,
+but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system
+can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them.
+
+The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by
+the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and
+so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train
+adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years'
+service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building,
+fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on
+fortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer's
+duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for
+the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the
+actual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training
+for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation.
+
+Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the late
+Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable
+service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. This
+follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--a
+rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training
+for their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and develop
+more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better
+proportion to its value.
+
+In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are
+directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical
+efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly
+serve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of the
+enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening
+movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy
+unawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. I
+refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet.
+
+The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry out
+reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must
+operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the
+regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility.
+
+Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the
+war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned
+them in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen if
+we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize
+that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and
+that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited
+efficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous,
+because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little
+from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal.
+There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and
+1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is
+misleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it
+crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on
+the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly
+antiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independent
+movements. What they then did must not be compared with what will be
+required from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces were
+really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived
+notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their
+employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of
+their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa,
+notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must be
+studied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that an
+increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course,
+only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped
+with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate
+independently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the
+fulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, when
+the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting
+force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. This
+is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's
+communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand,
+the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive
+than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if
+cavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry is
+undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of
+the enemy.
+
+Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists,
+another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful
+service. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in
+war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have
+repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted.
+
+The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of the
+divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time
+being. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in
+a high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that
+the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on
+modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over
+the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue.
+
+I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are
+attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that
+the division with its three parts would have the control of three
+batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each
+brigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. once
+made, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalry
+usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing
+momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with
+the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously,
+therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the
+artillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when
+it is important to make a decisive attack.
+
+The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed
+by the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yet
+exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of
+military science will play in future wars.[A] It is therefore necessary
+to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special
+weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration
+from the technical side.
+
+[Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators in
+Tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were no
+opponents in the air.]
+
+The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of
+handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting
+strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of
+the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking
+successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers.
+
+The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading
+idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once
+thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since
+tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the
+technical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne in
+mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our
+opponents.
+
+If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the
+necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed
+changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve
+the efficiency of our army.
+
+The whole organization must be such that the column length of the army
+corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the
+supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots.
+
+In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as
+being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition
+must be observed.
+
+The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially
+strengthened.
+
+The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to
+concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up
+the units.
+
+The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so
+organized as to insure their efficiency in war.
+
+The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so
+elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the
+troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained.
+
+The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making
+it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy.
+
+Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every
+nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to
+take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in
+the decisive field war.
+
+The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present
+organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be
+carried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which,
+without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to
+make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition.
+The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit
+political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so
+strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when
+all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. They
+comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen,
+although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often
+surpassed all expectations.
+
+But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is
+necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to
+achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to
+public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake
+there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as
+unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the
+principles of a sound military organization.
+
+The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in
+various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject,
+and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive
+consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration.
+
+One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of
+three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous
+intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in
+every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the
+extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jäger
+battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the
+hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried
+out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the
+drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within
+the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing
+the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being
+thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more
+ways.
+
+The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only
+be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the
+enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to
+each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present.
+But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that
+new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be
+taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this
+means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the
+artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited,
+without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the
+quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle
+should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. All
+that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat
+waggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when a
+battle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troops
+and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than
+the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of
+ammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will be
+inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the
+fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can
+only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be
+reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, the
+required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought
+forward by stages in good time.
+
+A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division
+had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light field
+howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that
+they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the
+formations of the division. The strength of the artillery must be
+regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the
+entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavy
+field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the
+orders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as
+"army" artillery.
+
+It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached
+from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent
+in war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with the
+infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres
+with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional
+cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. On
+the other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the _Truppenführer_
+are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders;
+but this objection does not seem very pertinent.
+
+Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the
+arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging
+to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under
+the commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would be
+withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments
+strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended for
+divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six
+squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. If
+the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only
+be able to receive two squadrons.
+
+In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry
+would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it;
+but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army
+cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult
+task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one
+to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame for
+such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who
+did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. The
+whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. If
+it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the
+arm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There are
+various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry
+can be guaranteed.
+
+The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached
+to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in
+co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make
+appropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restricted
+to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which
+require to be surmounted.
+
+The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the
+organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. In
+military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual
+factors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that my
+opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect
+of affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main
+leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by
+question of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part of
+that general combination of things which only really comes into view in
+actual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must be
+rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced.
+Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means
+of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient
+account of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made such
+progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much
+importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort,
+the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which
+they employ.
+
+A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are
+essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out;
+under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer
+of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way
+or that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from
+a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the
+importance of the separate co-operating factors.
+
+
+
+  "For he who grasps the problem as a whole
+  Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul"
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+
+TRAINING AND EDUCATION
+
+Our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the German
+army into the most effective tool of German policy, and into a school of
+health and strength for our nation. We must also try to get ahead of our
+rivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do full
+justice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all our
+efforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units and
+strengthening their loyal German feelings.
+
+Diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at the
+present day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, for
+there are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. If we
+wish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training must
+break with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the war
+of the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops as
+well as on the officers.
+
+It is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the use
+of modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily from
+the introduction of these means of war. But if we survey the sphere of
+training as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us as
+peculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands which
+will be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" to
+an extent hitherto unknown.
+
+The necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantry
+and artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle;
+in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategical
+duties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in the
+case of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vast
+extent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and the
+difficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving direct
+orders. Wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare,
+we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldier
+in the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of the
+enemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles huge
+hosts. In battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity of
+action can only be attained at the present time by independent
+co-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme.
+
+The employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of moving
+and feeding the troops. It is one thing to lead 100,000 or perhaps
+200,000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate them
+for a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800,000 men on a scene of war
+stripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have been
+destroyed by modern explosives. In the first case the military empiric
+may be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively a
+scientifically educated General and a staff who have also studied and
+mastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. The problems of
+the future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able to
+operate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision.
+
+The necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universally
+recognized. To be sure, the old traditions die slowly. Here and there an
+undeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method of
+education, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised more
+than is justified by its value. The cavalry is not yet completely
+awakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises on
+the parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, oblivious
+of the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they were
+still the old arm which Napoleon or Frederick the Great commanded. Even
+the artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions;
+technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom of
+operations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still in
+vogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of fire
+with a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. Even in
+theory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. Many
+conservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. Obsolete ideas
+have not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations and
+ordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on the
+whole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility and
+self-reliance must be encouraged. In this respect the army is on the
+right road, and if it continues on it and continually resists the
+temptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for the
+sake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually the
+highest results will be attained, provided that competent military
+criticism has been equally encouraged.
+
+In this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficient
+attention has been given to the fact that the main features of war have
+completely changed. Although in the next war men will have to be handled
+by millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted on
+lines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modern
+conditions. Our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. Most of
+the practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades and
+divisions--i.e., in formations which could never occur in the great
+decisive campaigns of the future. From time to time--financial grounds
+unfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre is
+held, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of
+"masses." Sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled for
+combined training under veteran Generals, who soon afterwards leave the
+service, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience which
+they may have gained.
+
+It cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres are
+extraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troops
+themselves', but they are not a direct training for the command of
+armies in modern warfare. Even the so-called "Imperial Manoeuvres" only
+correspond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war,
+since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, and
+seldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc., the troops which would
+be essential in real warfare. A glance at the Imperial Manoeuvres of
+1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never have
+been carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed under
+the conditions of war. It is an absolute necessity that our officers
+should learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are the
+rule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. In
+theory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken into
+account; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theory
+are posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and the
+divisions. That they would in reality all have to circulate with a
+pendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that the
+magazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent farther
+back, that the position of the field bakeries is of extreme
+importance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome,
+and so are very seldom considered.
+
+In great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected in
+Russia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariat
+arrangements are rarely worked out in detail; I should almost doubt
+whether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazine
+feeding" has ever been entertained. Even smaller opportunities of being
+acquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinary
+manoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoretical
+lines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding a
+large army and to master the subject efficiently.
+
+The friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be brought
+home to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such things
+cannot be learnt from books.
+
+These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations,
+but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an
+army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is
+obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. When, in 1870,
+some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the
+advance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not
+masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war
+and the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operations
+to succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army. All
+these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our General
+Staff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no means
+the common property of the army.
+
+On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres
+must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered
+conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. The
+troops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency,
+and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for
+carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two
+pivots. But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the
+great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. The paths
+we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal.
+
+All methods of training and education must be in accordance with these
+views.
+
+I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and
+cavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question at
+length in special treatises.[A] In the case of the artillery alone, some
+remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm
+seem necessary.
+
+[Footnote A: v. Bernhardi: "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie," 1910
+"Unsere Kavallerie im nächsten Krieg," 1899; "Reiterdienst," 1910.]
+
+The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partly
+expressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: all
+preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one
+side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or
+infantry at the decisive point. This principle is universally
+acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice.
+The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their
+tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical
+requirements subservient to this idea. The ever-recurring tendency to
+fight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. On the
+defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking
+artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most
+dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its
+chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible,
+from masked positions. The principle of keeping the artillery divisions
+close together on the battlefield and combining the fire in one
+direction, must not be carried to an extreme. The artillery certainly
+must be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see that
+there is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but in
+particular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this idea
+will be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than by
+explaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leaving
+to them the duty of carrying it out. Accordingly, it is important that
+the personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognized
+more fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action is
+indispensable. The great extent of the battlefields and the natural
+endeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack will
+often force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behind
+the other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against the
+tactically most important objective. This result is hard to attain by a
+centralization of command, and is best realized by the independent
+action of tactically trained subordinates.
+
+This is not the place to enter into technical details, and I will only
+mention some points which appear especially important.
+
+The Bz shell _(Granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and its
+use should not form part of the training. It requires, in order to
+attain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming as
+is very seldom possible in actual warfare.
+
+No very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. It seems
+to be retained in France and to have shown satisfactory results with us;
+but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of the
+shooting-range directly to serious warfare. No doubt its use, if
+successful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especially
+in the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. In any case,
+practice with Az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance.
+
+The Az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of an
+offensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations.
+
+Care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements and
+complications of strategy and devices. Only the simplest methods can be
+successfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten.
+
+The important point in the general training of the artillery is that
+text-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should be
+relegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics should
+be given a more prominent position. In this way only can the artillery
+do really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must not
+be neglected in the reports. That would mean rejecting the good and the
+evil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenient
+must be distinctly opposed.
+
+Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres
+of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large
+expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. They must, in my
+opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their
+possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks.
+They lead to pronounced tactics of position _(Stellungstaktik)_ which
+are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual
+war--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a
+definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in
+search of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt on
+these manoeuvres. They could be made more instructive if the tactical
+limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these
+manoeuvres--viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive
+arm--cannot be thus remedied. The usual result is that favourable
+artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to
+under some tactical pretence.
+
+After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may
+be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of the
+various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them
+into line with modern conditions. If, however, the troops are to be
+educated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new ground
+must be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubted
+superiority over our opponents can be attained. Considerable
+difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to
+amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties
+are not, in my opinion, insurmountable.
+
+There are two chief points: first, the practice of marching and
+operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with
+well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a
+reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more
+thorough education of the chief commanders.
+
+As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know,
+has never yet been attempted. But if we consider, firstly, how valuable
+more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of
+the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we
+shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for
+the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage
+over our supposed antagonist.
+
+The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally
+also be carried out in smaller formation. It is, moreover, very
+important to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--in
+long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in
+the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such
+movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them.
+
+Training marches with full military stores, etc., in columns of 20 to 25
+kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond to
+the daily needs of real warfare. Should it not be possible to assemble
+two army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march can
+be obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitable
+intervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed.
+This does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare,
+but it is useful as a makeshift. The waggons for the troops would have
+to be hired, as On manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to save
+expense. The supplies could be brought on army transport trains, which
+would represent the pioneer convoys _(Verpflegungsstaffel)_, and would
+regulate their pace accordingly.
+
+Marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with food
+supplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be of
+considerable value provided that care is taken to execute the march in
+the shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed by
+bringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is only
+properly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continued
+for several days. It is naturally not enough to undertake these
+manoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if they
+are intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army.
+Finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns,
+sometimes in army formation. The flank marches of separate columns will,
+of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice in
+feeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march on
+the side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence brought
+up to the troops at the close of the march. Flank marches in army
+formation will have some value, even apart from any training in the
+commissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marching
+columns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. But
+this exercise will have its full value only when the regulation
+commissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with them
+and furnish the supplies.
+
+I also consider that operative movements in army formation extending
+over several days are desirable. Practice must be given in moving
+backwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flank
+movements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rear
+being blocked when necessary. Then only can all the difficulties which
+occur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen where
+the lever must be applied in order to remove them. In this way alone can
+the higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting such
+operations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of a
+hostile attack. An army so disciplined would, I imagine, acquire a
+pronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experiments
+in such operations in actual war. The major strategic movements on both
+sides in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that.
+
+I recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost a
+great deal of money and could never all be carried out systematically
+one after the other. I wished, however, to ventilate the subject,
+firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study the
+points of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do;
+secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carry
+out in practice one or other of them--at the Imperial Manoeuvres, for
+example, or on some other occasion. How much could be saved in money
+alone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentioned
+country manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? From reasons of economy
+all the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employed
+on such manoeuvres. It would be useful, however, if, in addition to one
+detachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the other
+groups were present and were moved along at the proper distance from
+each other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from the
+kitchen waggon. It would thus be possible to get a sort of presentation
+of the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuable
+experience. It is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange such
+manoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and many
+obstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out,
+and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions;
+but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not be
+wholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matters
+which are really essential. They would, at any rate, be far more
+valuable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced by
+exercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings in
+the country, which are of no real utility, or than many other military
+institutions which are only remotely connected with the object of
+training under active service conditions. All that does not directly
+promote this object must be erased from our system of education at a
+time when the highest values are at stake.
+
+Even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often be
+carried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because it
+is not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of the
+troops.
+
+It must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so that
+eventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becoming
+practically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troops
+may become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but since
+such practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they must
+also be worked out beforehand theoretically. It is not at all sufficient
+that the officers on the General Staff and the Intendants have a mastery
+of these subjects. The rank and file must be well up in them; but
+especially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--that
+is to say, the transport officers of the standing army and those
+officers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as column
+commanders.
+
+The practical service in the transport battalions and the duties
+performed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who are
+assigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object.
+They learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of the
+system as a whole. It would therefore be advisable that all these
+officers should go through a special preliminary course for this
+service, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would be
+explained to them by the officers of the General Staff and the higher
+transport service officers, and they would then learn by practical
+examples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the most
+varied positions with precise regard to distances and time. This would
+be far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainings
+in driving, etc., on which so much time is wasted. The technical
+driver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is not
+easy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to be
+able, when occasion arises, to act independently.
+
+While, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must be
+thoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of a
+scientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples out
+of military history, the importance of these matters can be explained,
+is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. I have shown
+elsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically in
+the arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operative
+capabilities of the army depend on this system. Its nature, however,
+cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspiration
+when mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must be
+gained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of the
+importance which this service has attained under modern conditions is
+that officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully without
+having made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter.
+
+The transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinary
+importance in the general system of modern warfare. It should be
+appreciated accordingly. Every active transport service officer ought,
+after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the senior
+officers on the furlough establishment intended for transport service
+ought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. If
+these educational courses were held in the autumn in the training camps
+of the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimable
+advantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay.
+
+The results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, when
+the superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do not
+make demands contrary to the nature of the case, and therefore
+impossible to be met. They should therefore be obliged to undergo a
+thorough education in the practical duties of the General Staff, and not
+merely in leading troops in action.
+
+This reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how,
+generally, the training of the superior officers for the great war
+should be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with a
+view to the training. The essential contradiction between our obsolete
+method of training and the completely altered demands of a new era
+appears here with peculiar distinctness.
+
+A large part of our superior commanders pass through the General Staff,
+while part have attended at least the military academy; but when these
+men reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has long
+become out of date. The continuation school is missing. It can be
+replaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficient
+time for this, and often a lack of interest. The daily duties of
+training troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs great
+determination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his own
+scientific education. The result is, that comparatively few of our
+superior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less an
+independently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the great
+scale. This would cost dearly in real war. Experience shows that it is
+not enough that the officers of the General Staff attached to the leader
+are competent to fill up this gap. The leader, if he cannot himself
+grasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believes
+he is directing and is himself being directed. This is a far from
+healthy condition. Our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned,
+only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and from
+the tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. The
+minor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most important
+feature in present-day warfare--i.e., the sudden concentration of
+larger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from space
+considerations, of timely counter-movements on the other. The minor
+manoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. The commanders learn
+to form decisions and to give orders, and these are two important
+matters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grand
+scale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditions
+of warfare.
+
+Brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merely
+encourage wrong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is,
+fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds.
+Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders.
+The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in
+them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those
+of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger
+scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the
+operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled
+to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. The
+great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for
+only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the
+collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual
+warfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weighty
+consideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought before
+their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern
+warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations.
+
+The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of
+small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly
+strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important
+military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this
+direction. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they
+conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all our
+resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a
+modern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a
+rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of
+the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too
+small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional
+manoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this change
+could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: a
+great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system
+if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and
+execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word.
+
+It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training
+on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to
+educate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres can
+only show their full value if the officers of every rank who take part
+in them have already had a competent training in theory.
+
+To encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thus
+one of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. These
+must not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of the
+troops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves and
+their subordinates for leadership in the great war. Strategic war games
+on a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by the
+commanding Generals, and in the army-inspections by the Inspectors, seem
+to me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. All
+superior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiency
+in superior commands. The threads of all this training will meet in the
+hands of the Chief of the General Army Staff as the strategically
+responsible authority.
+
+It seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance to
+decide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not for
+their posts. The circumstances that a man is an energetic commander of
+a division, or as General in command maintains discipline in his army
+corps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader of
+an army. Military history supplies many instances of this.
+
+No proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfare
+the reconnoitring and screening units require special training. The
+possibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degree
+dependent on their activity. I have for years pointed out the absolute
+necessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for their
+profession, and I can only repeat the demand that our cavalry
+riding-schools should be organized also as places of scientific
+education. I will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulk
+of the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisional
+cavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. These exercises do not
+correspond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrong
+notions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command finds
+out who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalry
+division on manoeuvres.
+
+The centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing of
+operations and on the skilful transition from strategical independence
+to combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry lies
+in these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-grounds
+than systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. The perpetual
+subject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement between
+two divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. Any
+unprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to this
+result, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may be
+regarded as a serious preparation for war.
+
+It is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, always
+acts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annually
+extensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definite
+effect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which
+_always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself,
+but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is only
+rarely necessary in war. This clearly demonstrates the unsystematic and
+antiquated methods of all our training.
+
+Practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on a
+large scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry.
+Co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soon
+as aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as an
+integral factor of army organization. The airship division and the
+cavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command,
+especially for screening purposes, which are all-important.
+
+The methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully to
+modern requirements have been pointed out by General v. Beseler. This
+arm need only be developed further in the direction which this
+distinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of the
+next war.
+
+In the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the support
+of the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in the
+construction of similar positions. Tactical requirements must, however,
+be insisted upon in this connection. The whole training must be guided
+by considerations of tactics. This is the main point. As regards sieges,
+especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since the
+object is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take the
+fortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery.
+
+The duties of the Army Service Corps[B] are clear. They must, on the one
+hand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especially
+for the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to give
+every kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they must
+look after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. The
+rapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedy
+repair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on military
+railways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are the
+duties for which these troops must be trained. A thorough knowledge and
+mastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensable
+qualifications in their case also. They can only meet their many-sided
+and all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methods
+and system of army movements on every scale. It is highly important,
+therefore, that the officers of the Army Service Corps should be
+thoroughly trained in military science.
+
+[Footnote B: _Verkehrstruppen_.]
+
+Thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectual
+development of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of the
+close connection of the multifarious duties of war. This appreciation is
+requisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of the
+service; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to some
+degree the non-commissioned officers also. It will bear good fruit in
+the training of the men. The higher the stage on which the teacher
+stands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the more
+complete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly and
+successfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, and
+the more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respect
+which are the firmest foundations of discipline. All the means employed
+to improve the education of our establishment of officers in the science
+of war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient service
+on every other field of practical activity. Intellectual exercise gives
+tone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war and
+its requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education and
+bent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in their
+reciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. The
+effort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers'
+corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards,
+and must find its expression in a school of military education of a
+higher class than exists at present.
+
+A military academy as such was contemplated by Scharnhorst. To-day it
+assumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the General
+Staff. Instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of its
+former importance. The instruction in military history was entirely
+divested of its scientific character by the method of application
+employed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. In this way the
+meaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day,
+so far as I know, the lectures on military history primarily serve
+purposes of directly professional education. I cannot say how far the
+language teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. At any rate, it
+culminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues a
+directly practical end. This development was in a certain sense
+necessary. A quite specifically professional education of the officers
+of the General Staff is essential under present conditions. I will not
+decide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and truly
+academical character of the institution. In any case, we need in the
+army of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for the
+independent study of military science from the higher standpoint, and
+provides at the same time a comprehensive general education. I believe
+that the military academy could be developed into such an institution,
+without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of the
+officers for service on the General Staff. By the side of the military
+sciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures on
+general scientific subjects might be organized, to which admission
+should be free. In similar lectures the great military problems might be
+discussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearers
+might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to
+politics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, the
+importance of free personality under the pressure of necessary
+phenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as into
+the duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint.
+
+Limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are now
+arranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, and
+the institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture,
+intended not only to educate officers of the General Staff, but to train
+men who are competent to discharge the highest military and civic
+duties--this is what is required for the highest military educational
+institution of the German army.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+
+PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR
+
+"Germany's future lies on the sea." A proud saying, which contains a
+great truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished future
+and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy
+and act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they are
+supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at least
+that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest
+opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his
+position as a World Power.
+
+Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on
+a world policy if our political and military superiority on the
+continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yet
+reached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now take
+steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our
+pretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the
+full security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts and
+repel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economic
+necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needs
+be--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and
+this, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness of
+Germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea
+trade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be
+always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Our
+efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of
+hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish
+to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined
+ultimately to support this world policy.
+
+Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first
+ventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving for
+limited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. was destined
+to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's
+history, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activity
+must be set down as fruitless.
+
+We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most varied
+considerations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was first
+drawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906,
+and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, of
+course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. The
+needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard
+for the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on the
+claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations.
+At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the
+coasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguard
+this commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon
+shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for
+Germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the
+Government, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party was
+content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this
+object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by
+artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places.
+
+This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convinced
+of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high
+seas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the
+aggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it was
+thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called
+_Ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact
+that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies,
+and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank.
+This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a
+fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the
+costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a
+large number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fighting
+capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed
+torpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on a
+fallacy--that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an
+extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing
+population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political
+and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and
+on its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded
+with actual needs.
+
+The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most
+inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already
+stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the
+midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our
+strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly
+effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard
+for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our
+commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only
+object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an
+instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and
+supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such
+limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A
+few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in
+war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible,
+destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is
+obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the
+defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on
+permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed
+that sufficiently.
+
+The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at
+sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded
+commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies.
+
+It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for
+defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our
+political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed
+according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive,
+when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success;
+on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained
+in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the
+Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We
+must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise
+which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale.
+
+The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be
+calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that
+we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are
+weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger,
+unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all
+circumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our
+strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing
+reasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance
+of victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflicting
+such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests
+to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own
+position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses.
+
+This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that
+the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the
+necessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probably
+that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of
+victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle
+for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase
+their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even
+beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates.
+
+We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for
+many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. We
+may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast
+fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend
+ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown
+in the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out and
+exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against
+all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast;
+our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually
+inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to
+challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the lines
+that our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as a
+base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the
+offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break
+harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for
+this class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with
+a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by
+the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alone
+cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break
+through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able
+to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purpose
+permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow
+mines to be placed.
+
+I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the
+North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these
+requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be
+to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our
+naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade,
+although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further
+development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the
+background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only
+action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success
+presupposes the existence of some such fortress.
+
+But the question must be looked at from another aspect.
+
+The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the
+unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is
+determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power.
+Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from
+claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless,
+the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked
+menacing utterances from various English statesmen.
+
+If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military
+preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates
+attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the
+English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase
+the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly
+intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken;
+the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the German
+coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and
+to isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as
+a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite
+impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and
+protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly
+well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt
+would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German
+naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes
+for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an
+English attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able
+to postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned that
+the recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we must
+make up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext or
+other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very
+favourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage.
+Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon
+upon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war.
+
+Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our
+coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical
+principles. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in
+order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our
+fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would be
+justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by
+loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the
+greatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, of
+existence.
+
+Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or
+definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole
+nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who
+live on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows the
+absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with
+our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the
+decisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot,
+perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not
+check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to
+replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case.
+
+The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance,
+in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the
+Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military
+requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain
+secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of
+Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more
+possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in
+the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our
+battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot
+give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is
+feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal
+might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success
+depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous
+unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict
+heavy losses upon him.
+
+As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the
+completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and
+the usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in its
+present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. There
+can be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of the
+Kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbach
+class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be
+considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in a
+worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of the
+Hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the
+Prince class (_Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich_) fulfil their purpose
+neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Even
+the armoured cruisers _Fürst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau,_ and
+_Scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements.
+If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the
+time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these
+totally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--by
+new and thoroughly effective ships.
+
+Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon
+will admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever so
+strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and
+all financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships,
+which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities.
+That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the line
+have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisers
+are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. But
+superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible
+readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made
+to do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possess
+a certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the English
+heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and
+to equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerful
+artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the
+more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way
+that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or
+straight ahead.
+
+Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part
+in strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet,
+therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority of
+England--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because,
+so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of
+superiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high
+standard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence of
+construction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep this
+position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to
+the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying
+to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must also
+devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these
+vessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing this
+branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every
+direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with
+increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with
+these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on
+the enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would be
+extraordinarily advantageous to us.
+
+Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the
+development of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to make
+airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they
+could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes,
+they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet would
+then, as already explained in Chapter VIII., be able to report
+successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the
+battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the
+approach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able to
+prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus
+facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse or
+frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If our
+airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side,
+could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English
+coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when
+fighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly be
+doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to
+perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over
+the English would contribute largely to equalize the difference in
+strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war.
+It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field
+because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can
+compete for the palm of victory on equal terms.
+
+Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be
+carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be
+especially effective in a struggle against England, as that country
+needs imports more than any other. Consequently great results would
+follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing
+his navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have been
+discussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative to
+organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended
+for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity
+unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. The
+auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the
+open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice,
+when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so.
+
+A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must
+be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace.
+History tells us what to expect from the English on this head.
+
+In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 to
+September 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houses
+were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were
+killed. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of
+England is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and
+in the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence shows
+distinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of the
+seas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11
+and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarly
+bombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under the
+hypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the
+foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well
+not to forget them.
+
+The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also
+Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships,
+suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians.
+
+Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as
+was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain
+conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal
+violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the
+above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course
+of action politically justifiable.
+
+A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first
+place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful
+inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the
+tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability
+of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation
+of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack
+becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are
+granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack
+in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable
+carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be
+formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken
+of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties
+concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of
+States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such
+cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it,
+as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limit
+the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the
+very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would
+have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most
+extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in
+1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful
+from the standpoint of political morality.
+
+These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we
+must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without
+warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right.
+Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such
+eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the
+reservists.
+
+Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to
+secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all
+circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready
+for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension.
+The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole
+_matériel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for
+instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the
+mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in
+force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple
+precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to
+the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as
+is done in England.
+
+When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are
+required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the
+navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the
+resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since
+the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the
+expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic
+preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the
+self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet
+must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast
+defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our
+requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be
+provisionally dropped.
+
+In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should
+limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary,
+devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest
+stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in
+case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition
+that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act
+contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on
+us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform
+tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we
+have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships.
+
+I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is to
+be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases
+quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general
+situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in
+the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war.
+My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid
+foundation without which any successful action against the superior
+forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail
+to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible.
+
+It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry
+out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever
+may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though
+this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for
+the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on
+strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a
+successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain
+a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we
+must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers.
+
+Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and
+German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we
+must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the
+coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the
+pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be
+met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion.
+
+The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness
+for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the
+first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the
+long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define
+and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free
+hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing
+more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious
+mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France
+was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was
+favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has,
+indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace
+and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this
+difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between
+resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against
+numerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles the
+supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her
+assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and
+thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North
+America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed,
+threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequences
+of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her
+former American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is
+far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas
+than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. It
+is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty,
+and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we
+might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have
+wished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866
+nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would
+fall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman is
+shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake
+what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best
+course. Just Fate decides the issue.
+
+The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that
+we started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we have
+made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the
+Brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of
+decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters
+concerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to develop
+systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties
+which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we
+have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it.
+
+This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never let
+the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views
+which must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good time
+those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even
+though they make heavy financial calls on our resources.
+
+This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our
+naval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for
+lost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty
+devotedly.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+
+
+THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION
+
+The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which
+we can only assert our place among the Great Powers and secure the
+conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of
+treasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. We shall be
+compelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, special
+measures which will enable us to be more or less a match for our
+enemies--I mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of the
+army. We must always bear in mind in the present that we have to provide
+for the future.
+
+Apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget to
+develop the elements on which not only our military strength, but also
+the political power of the State ultimately rest. We must maintain the
+physical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done if
+we aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widest
+sense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions and
+demands of existence.
+
+While it is the duty of the State to guide her citizens to the highest
+moral and mental development, on the other hand the elements of
+strength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the State.
+Only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can the
+State achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interested
+in promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. Her duty and
+her justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from the
+fulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highest
+sense true to it.
+
+It is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely military
+standpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development of
+our growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. For while
+the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction,
+the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment in
+very great numbers possible. Thus the full consummation of military
+training cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equipped
+physically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentiments
+worthy of the honourable profession of arms.
+
+We have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raise
+the culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best of
+our power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independent
+individual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence on
+the men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limited
+if it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligent
+material. This fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims which
+modern war will make on the individual fighter. In order to meet these
+demands fully, the people must be properly educated.
+
+Each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure of
+independent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. In
+the open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed duty
+has been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources;
+he may often have to take over the command of his own section if the
+losses among his superiors are heavy. The artilleryman will have to work
+his gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains have
+fallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders are
+often left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and the
+sapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himself
+unexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource left
+beyond his own professional knowledge and determination.
+
+But not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility of
+the individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique will
+probably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. This change
+is due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greater
+efficiency of the firearms. All movements in large masses are more
+exacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments,
+since they are never carried out so smoothly. The shelter and food of
+great masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth of
+the marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to the
+difficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregular
+hours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. The increased range of
+modern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combination
+with the larger fronts, necessitates wide détours whenever the troops
+attempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on the
+battlefield.
+
+In the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the army
+has been enormously increased. The State, however, has done little to
+prepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies are
+making themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a very
+detrimental influence on their education. I specially refer to the
+ever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patriotic
+feeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the population
+into the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development.
+This result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. At the
+present day, out of all the German-born military units, over 6.14 per
+cent. come from the large towns, 7.37 per cent, from the medium-sized
+towns, 22.34 per cent. from the small or country towns, and 64.15 per
+cent. from the rural districts; while the distribution of the population
+between town and country is quite different. According to the census of
+1905, the rural population amounted to 42.5 per cent., the small or
+country towns to 25.5 per cent., the medium-sized towns to 12.9 per
+cent., and the large towns to 19.1 per cent. of the entire number of
+inhabitants. The proportion has probably changed since that year still
+more unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns have
+increased in population. These figures clearly show the physical
+deterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to our
+national life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellect
+and compact unity of the nation. The rural population forms part and
+parcel of the army. A thousand bonds unite the troops and the families
+of their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone who
+studies the inner life of our army is aware of this. The interest felt
+in the soldier's life is intense. It is the same spirit, transmitted
+from one to another. The relation of the army to the population of the
+great cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of their
+sons into the army is quite different. A certain opposition exists
+between the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who,
+from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation.
+Similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened,
+and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutely
+hostile to the service.
+
+It is in the direct interests of the State to raise the physical health
+of the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order to
+enable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effect
+of military training more extensively to bear on the town population,
+and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. Nothing
+promotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of military
+service.
+
+So far as I can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself which
+exercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing to
+its monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditions
+of life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. Apart from many
+forms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health,
+the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housing
+conditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. This
+latter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the rural
+districts, and, in combination with the other influences of the great
+city, produces far more harmful results.
+
+It is therefore the unmistakable duty of the State, first, to fight
+alcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing all
+kinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sell
+them; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all efforts
+to improve the housing conditions of the working population, and to
+withdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life of
+amusements. In Munich, Bavarian officers have recently made a
+praiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men past
+the age of attendance at school with health-producing military
+exercises. The young men's clubs which Field-Marshal v.d. Goltz is
+trying to establish aim at similar objects. Such undertakings ought to
+be vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by the
+State, from purely physical as well as social considerations. The
+gymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has an
+undoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deserves
+every encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others,
+the system of universal service should have been made an effective
+reality. It is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect of
+military service on the physical development of the recruits. The
+authorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed to
+make the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers than
+hitherto.
+
+On the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against two
+tendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hours
+for factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sport
+with an exaggerated value for the national health. As already pointed
+out, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendant
+on working together in large numbers that are prejudicial.
+
+The wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderate
+degree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work are
+present, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a complete
+miscomprehension of the real value of work. It is in itself the greatest
+blessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it no
+longer as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning a
+livelihood and paying for amusements. Strenuous labour alone produces
+men and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to win
+their living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have often
+achieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality.
+
+So long as the Dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict with
+the sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against the
+Spanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now,
+when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead a
+politically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars,
+their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take a
+part in the struggle of the civilized nations. In Germany that stock
+which was destined to bring back our country from degradation to
+historical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the Rhine
+or the Danube, but on the sterile sands of the March.
+
+We must preserve the stern, industrious, old-Prussian feeling, and carry
+the rest of Germany with us to Kant's conception of life; we must
+continuously steel our strength by great political and economic
+endeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained,
+or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only we
+shall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in the
+world.
+
+Where Nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growing
+wealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life of
+pleasure rather than of work, society and the State must vie in taking
+care that work does not become play, or play work. It is work, regarded
+as a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. Sport, which is spreading
+more and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation,
+not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. We must never
+forget this. Hard, laborious work has made Germany great; in England, on
+the contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health of
+the nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place of
+serious work it has greatly injured the English nation. The English
+nation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard of
+labour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the English
+trades unions--and of the security of its military position, has more
+and more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and it
+may well be asked whether, under these conditions, England will show
+herself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself in
+the future. If, further, the political rivalry with the great and
+ambitious republic in America be removed by an Arbitration Treaty, this
+circumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads to
+progress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which develop
+physique.
+
+The physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless it
+comes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while,
+if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations,
+the result must be injurious in the long-run.
+
+We must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physically
+healthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and the
+whole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour to
+promote their spiritual development in every way. The means for doing so
+is the school. Military education under the present-day conditions,
+which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aims
+satisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, and
+an improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material.
+
+The national school is not sufficient for this requirement. The general
+regulations which settle the national school system in Prussia date from
+the year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account of
+the modern development which has been so rapid of late years. It is only
+natural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and the
+essentials of military education. Present-day military education
+requires complete individualization and a conscious development of manly
+feeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching in
+classes, and there is no distinction between the sexes. This is directly
+prescribed by the rules.
+
+In the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of the
+superiors by specially detached officers and selected experienced
+non-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quite
+small sections; while each one receives individual attention from the
+non-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superior
+officers. In a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teach
+as many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers as
+many as 120 children are divided into two classes. A separation of the
+sexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. As a rule,
+therefore, the instruction is given in common. It is certain that, under
+such conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual is
+possible. All that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanically
+and inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch of
+knowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boys
+and girls, still less of individuals.
+
+Such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a military
+education. The principles which regulate the teaching in the two places
+are quite different. That is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction.
+
+The military education aims at training the moral personality to
+independent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patriotic
+feelings among the men. Instruction in a sense of duty and in our
+national history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professional
+teaching. Great attention is given to educate each individual in logical
+reasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts.
+
+In the national school these views are completely relegated to the
+background--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but as
+the practical result of the conditions. The chief stress in such a
+school is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting some
+facility in reading, writing, and ciphering. The so-called _Realign_
+(history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite into
+the background. Only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly are
+devoted to all the _Realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in the
+lower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hours
+are assigned to religious instruction in every standard. There is no
+idea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. Not a word in the
+General Regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this;
+and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods of
+religious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for the
+development of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. As for
+influencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars to
+any extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts it
+altogether out of the question.
+
+While the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instruction
+is thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given,
+especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. Beginning with
+the lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years),
+stories not only from the New Testament, but also from the Old Testament
+are drummed into the heads of the scholars. Similarly every Saturday the
+portions of Scripture appointed for the next Sunday are read out and
+explained to all the children. Instruction in the Catechism begins also
+in the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children must
+learn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. It is a
+significant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid
+"the memorizing of the General Confession and other parts of the
+liturgical service," as "also the learning by heart of the Pericopes."
+On the other hand, the institution of Public Worship is to be explained
+to the children. This illustrates the spirit in which this instruction
+has to be imparted according to the regulations.
+
+It is really amazing to read these regulations. The object of
+Evangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to the
+comprehension of the Holy Scriptures and to the creed of the
+congregation," in order that they "may be enabled to read the Scriptures
+independently and to take an active part both in the life and the
+religious worship of the congregation." Requirements are laid down which
+entirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to the
+comprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, and
+presuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. Not a word,
+however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, that
+is, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought into
+prominence. The teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impress
+religious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course of
+instruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formal
+religiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if not
+deliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moral
+influence. A real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of such
+instruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their Confirmation
+to have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so they
+remain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to the
+religious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. Nor
+does the instruction for Confirmation do much to alter that, for it is
+usually conceived in the same spirit.
+
+All other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to the
+young minds some high ideals--more especially our own country's
+history--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort of
+instruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is of
+inestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. It is the
+more regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed by
+the regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, is
+totally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some real
+service to the country. It is quite refreshing to read in the new
+regulations for middle schools of February 10,1910, that by religious
+instruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should be
+awakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aim
+at exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of the
+fatherland."
+
+The method of religious instruction which is adopted in the national
+school is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. Religious instruction
+can only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectual
+growth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. To make
+it the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in the
+national schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to be
+directed at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mystical
+intuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has a
+confusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. Even the
+missionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate his
+pupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart to
+them subtle religious ideas. Yet every Saturday the appointed passages
+of Scripture (the Pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children.
+
+Religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. Up
+to that point the teacher should be content, from the religious
+standpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with the
+simplest ideas of the Deity, but in other respects to endeavour to
+awaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasp
+loftier conceptions. The national school stands in total contradiction
+to this intellectual development. This is in conformity to regulations,
+for the same children who read the Bible independently are only to be
+led to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are daily
+around them." In the course of eight years they learn a smattering of
+reading, writing, and ciphering.[A] It is significant of the knowledge
+of our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-three
+recruits of one company to whom the question was put who Bismarck was,
+not a single one could answer. That the scholars acquire even a general
+idea of their duties to the country and the State is quite out of the
+question. It is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of the
+children by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught in
+common. One thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those of
+girls; and, although I consider it important that patriotic feelings
+should be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmit
+them to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a different
+way from the boys. When the instruction is common to both, the treatment
+of the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. It is
+quite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in the
+religious field when so little has been achieved in every other field.
+
+This pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal that
+Frederick the Great set up. He declared that the duty of the State was
+"to educate the young generation to independent thinking and
+self-devoted love of country."
+
+[Footnote A: Recently a boy was discharged from a well-known national
+school as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualified
+to the office of a Head Forester. He showed that he could not copy
+correctly, to say nothing of writing by himself.]
+
+Our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reform
+if it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education,
+but for life generally. It sends children out into the world with
+undeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elements
+of knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, but
+easy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. As a
+matter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the national
+schoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instruction
+as a recruit.
+
+It is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform.
+I will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important from
+the standpoint of a citizen and a soldier.
+
+First and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. The number
+of teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholars
+diminished. It is worth while considering in this connection the
+feasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years.
+Then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the object
+of developing the children's minds, and formal religious instruction
+should only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. Finally,
+the _Realien,_ especially the history of our own country, should claim
+more attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in every
+way; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religion
+should be more prominent than the formal contents. The training of the
+national school teacher must be placed on a new basis. At present it
+absolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of the
+school itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds and
+feelings of their pupils. It must be reckoned a distinct disadvantage
+for the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age of
+fourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which the
+reasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselves
+and on any chance influences. In the interval between school life and
+military service the young people not only forget all that they learnt,
+perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkingly
+adopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from a
+lack of counteracting ideals.
+
+A compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity of
+the age. It is also urgently required from the military standpoint. Such
+a school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to prevent
+the scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him for
+a special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism and
+sense of citizenship. To do this, it is necessary to explain to him the
+relation of the State to the individual, and to explain, by reference to
+our national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion to
+the State. The duties of the individual to the State should be placed in
+the foreground. This instruction must be inspired by the spirit which
+animated Schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of Prussia, and
+culminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in the
+strength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the great
+whole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employed
+for higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishes
+in feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in the
+love for the fatherland and for the State, which is a haven for every
+faith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose.
+
+Only if national education works in this sense will it train up men to
+fill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school of
+arms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which great
+deeds spring. What can be effected by the spirit of a nation we have
+learnt from the history of the War of Liberation, that never-failing
+source of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centre
+of history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools.
+
+We can study it also by an example from most recent history, in the
+Russo-Japanese War. "The education of the whole Japanese people,
+beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic and
+warlike spirit. That education, combined with the rapidly acquired
+successes in culture and warfare, aroused in the Japanese a marvellous
+confidence in their own strength. They served with pride in the ranks of
+the army, and dreamed of heroic deeds.... All the thoughts of the
+nation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course of
+several years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of a
+powerful army and a strong fleet."[B] This was the spirit that led the
+Japanese to victory. "The day when the young Japanese enlisted was
+observed as a festival in his family."[B]
+
+In Russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that
+"Patriotism was an obsolete notion," "war was a crime and an
+anachronism," that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was the
+greatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourable
+trade."[B] Thus the Russian army marched to battle without any
+enthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of the
+great racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity." Already eaten
+up by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, without
+energy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspired
+leaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent.
+
+[Footnote B: "The Work of the Russian General Staff," from the Russian by
+Freiheu v. Tettau.]
+
+I have examined these conditions closely because I attach great
+importance to the national school and the continuation school as a means
+to the military education of our people. I am convinced that only the
+army of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything really
+great. I understand, of course, that the school alone, however high its
+efficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, in
+view of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every means
+if we wish to accomplish something great. The direct influence of school
+ends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at first
+make itself felt very gradually. Later generations will reap the fruits
+of its sowing. Its efficiency must be aided by other influences which
+will not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughout
+their lives. Now, there are two means available which can work upon
+public opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation;
+one is the Press, the other is a policy of action. If the Government
+wishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to secure
+a narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further its
+great political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong and
+national Press, through which it must present its views and aims
+vigorously and openly. The Government will never be able to count upon a
+well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or
+necessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is being
+systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy
+preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the
+same note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as the
+object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military
+spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an
+imperial policy.
+
+It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war
+as an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with the
+duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country.
+
+A parliamentary Government, which always represents merely a temporary
+majority, may leave the party Press to defend and back its views; but a
+Government like the German, which traces its justification to the fact
+that it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. Its point of view
+does not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course,
+conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. It
+must therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as on
+particular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims as
+widely understood as possible. I regard it, therefore, as one of the
+most important duties of a Government like ours to use the Press freely
+and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. I do not mean that a few
+large political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be well
+supplied with news, but that the views of the Government should find
+comprehensive expression in the local Press. It would be an advantage,
+in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certain
+announcements of the Government, in order that the reader might not have
+such a one-sided account of public affairs as the party Press supplies.
+It would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, as
+justifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health.
+Epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old Europe more dangerous and
+damaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the State to
+preserve the moral healthiness of the nation.
+
+More important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the Press is
+the _propaganda of action._ Nothing controls the spirit of the multitude
+so effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceived
+in a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. Such education by a powerful
+policy is an absolute necessity for the German people. This nation
+possesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritual
+energy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairy
+laid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. In addition to
+this, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national and
+religious unity of the nation created in the system of small States and
+in confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency to
+particularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nation
+was no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. Yet the heart
+of this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even though
+such aims can only be attended by danger. We must not be misled in this
+respect by the Press, which often represents a most one-sided,
+self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or even
+Anti-German lines rather than national. The soul of our nation is not
+reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on the
+necessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and
+comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness.
+
+On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the
+Powers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance,
+every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the
+people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their
+forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again and
+again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this
+yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the
+clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with
+him.
+
+He is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors of
+national psychology; Bismarck possessed this art, and used k with a
+master-hand. True, he found ready to hand one idea which was common to
+all--the sincere wish for German unification and the German Empire; but
+the German nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which lead
+to the realization of this idea. Only under compulsion and after a hard
+struggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation was
+fired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to which
+the great statesman was so surely leading it. Success was the foundation
+on which Bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the German Empire. Even
+in the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of the
+people by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of all
+opposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them serve
+his own great aims. He, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, and
+the motto _Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him;
+but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and of
+world-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that no
+statesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands the
+soul of his people.
+
+This knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with the
+Great Elector, Frederick the Incomparable, Scharnhorst and Blücher; for
+even that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of a
+political idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground at
+the Congress of Vienna.
+
+The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things
+recognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influence
+over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by
+continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its
+interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions.
+Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to
+great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high
+aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to
+prepare their minds to it:
+
+  "The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims."
+
+We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed on
+the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous
+duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the
+whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of
+warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for
+the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices.
+
+We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization
+to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only
+fulfil it by the sword.
+
+
+Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most
+effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military
+duty? Such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for the
+strength and honour of the German people.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+
+
+FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that
+the political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitude
+of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the
+preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself.
+
+But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and
+moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military
+authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still
+further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of
+the State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must be
+made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the
+national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the
+tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further,
+as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of
+mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure
+under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the
+material and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations for
+war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made
+to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as
+possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come.
+If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in
+whom confidence can be reposed should war break out.
+
+
+I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the
+commercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere of
+commercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which the
+desired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Government
+and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regards
+finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may
+go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national
+household in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, on
+the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money
+required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions.
+
+The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financial
+economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the
+current incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, the
+indebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive
+and military capabilities.
+
+As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a great
+civilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never be
+brought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure for
+necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military
+forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general
+progress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion
+to the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly based
+on war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our
+forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the
+effeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is only
+one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one
+vice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of all
+culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the
+individual for itself.[A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepest
+gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an
+epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of
+the last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in
+Prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large
+sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the
+Government.
+
+Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of
+demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations
+contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to
+the great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day look
+contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut
+their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties
+imposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial
+pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in
+our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity
+and energy."[B]
+
+[Footnote A: Treitschke.]
+
+[Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte."]
+
+Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but is
+bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens,
+since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important,
+however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national
+property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities.
+
+This property is to a certain extent determined by the natural
+productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. But
+these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour
+of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced.
+Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and secure
+labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour
+conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by
+concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate
+German trade by vigorous political representation of German interests
+abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits
+from international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural production
+by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable
+protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on
+foreign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fishery
+would add to this.[D]
+
+[Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by international
+commerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling.]
+
+[Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from
+foreign countries.]
+
+From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase
+permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the
+annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be
+met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Home
+production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95
+per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, the
+production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two
+double-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered
+that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two
+million tons.
+
+A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national
+prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own
+colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense
+quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually
+independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to
+transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by
+effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less
+we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards,
+[E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the
+State will improve.
+
+[Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons
+of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of
+copper, etc.]
+
+If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of national
+productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the
+reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial
+position. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a
+two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays.
+The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very
+easily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it is
+a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to
+improve the financial position. The experiences of history leave no
+doubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of a
+nation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once is
+shaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the State
+creditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holds
+out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its
+creditors far better security than a weaker military power. If our
+credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened
+political position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our army
+and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible
+liquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first to
+improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to
+keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go.
+
+The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task.
+
+It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits of
+possible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and
+1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from
+20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same
+proportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there is
+a huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the German
+Empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per
+head of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the same
+basis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germany
+only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and
+navy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the
+individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in Germany and France, the
+outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our most
+probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their
+armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger
+politically.
+
+Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase
+of wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades and
+industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a
+setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again.
+
+The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the
+Empire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports has
+increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the
+year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14
+1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of the
+imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the
+exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... The value of the import of
+raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in
+1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of
+such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The import
+of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a
+value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of
+manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of the
+import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3
+milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food
+remained at about the same figure.
+
+The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in
+Germany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amounted
+in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2
+million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The
+quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in
+1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35
+million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from
+6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119
+million marks.... From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany
+has increased by 127 per cent.; in England only by about 59 per cent.
+The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172
+per cent.; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin.]
+
+Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financial
+position of the Empire has considerably improved since the Imperial
+Finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may very
+soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent.
+
+It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth
+of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive
+capitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked
+extent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of national
+wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number of
+taxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6,000 to 100,000
+marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent.,
+from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per
+cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. In these classes,
+therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater
+proportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100,000
+to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on
+an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in
+the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. In the class of 500,000
+marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per
+cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in
+the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually,
+it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. This means
+per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an
+increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an
+increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks
+and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year.
+
+We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and
+annually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister has
+estimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three
+years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliards
+yearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give some
+instances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory at
+Essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent.,
+the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the
+annual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from
+1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown by
+the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has
+reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and
+poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement
+in prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of a
+healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment
+are considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants
+left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's
+unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in
+the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 per
+cent. (in France it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of
+workmen's unions were unemployed.
+
+Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national
+debt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empire
+in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the
+national debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in--
+
+                                         Marks
+Prussia                                  9,421,770,800
+Bavaria                                  2,165,942,900
+Saxony                                     893,042,600
+Würtemberg                                 606,042,800
+Baden                                      557,859,000
+Hesse                                      428,664,400
+Alsace-Lorraine                            31,758,100
+Hamburg                                    684,891,200
+Lübeck                                     666,888,400
+Bremen                                     263,431,400
+
+Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains,
+forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railways
+reached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in--
+
+                                       Marks,
+Prussia (Hesse)                        9,888
+Bavaria                                1,694
+Saxony                                 1,035
+Würtemburg                               685
+Baden                                    727
+Alsace-Lorraine                          724
+
+--a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15,062 milliard
+marks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of
+1911 for Prussia alone 11,050 milliards. Nevertheless, the national
+debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously
+because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and
+presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in
+debt.
+
+The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10,000
+inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the
+whole Empire to some 5,000 million marks. This means that interest
+yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many
+communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions,
+are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or
+even 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributed
+according to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middle
+class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources of
+wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative
+income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on
+the Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into
+property. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to pay
+for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the
+protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization,
+so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the
+opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on
+the altar of patriotism.
+
+The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown how
+party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was
+not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his
+neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial
+sacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be
+made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But a
+considerable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if we
+wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of
+our country without a blow.
+
+Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedy
+introduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), in
+order to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue would
+oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would
+furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to
+diminish our burden of debt.
+
+If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters,
+depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they
+could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their
+favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in as
+heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based
+on official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place to
+examine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high a
+figure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large
+under any circumstances.
+
+Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that
+is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the
+nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first
+instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to
+paying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a
+private gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to be
+recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable
+to fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceeds
+principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing
+the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely
+important. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility
+that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other
+important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on
+land and sea.
+
+There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be
+urged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It is
+argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth,
+that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course
+of time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that the
+independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the
+ideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement that
+relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will,
+is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According to
+our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his
+fortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which he
+bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to
+any other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his natural
+heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he
+wishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he is
+interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things,
+that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession is
+based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual
+than his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait.
+The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in
+which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are
+alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of
+this sort."[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910.]
+
+Both objections are unconvincing.
+
+So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to
+liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met
+otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directly
+beneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay less
+taxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in
+the hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right of
+succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the
+State be prevented in other ways. The science of finance could
+unquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme to
+its extreme logical conclusion.
+
+The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true sense
+of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a
+will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. If
+such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of
+certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof
+in life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probably
+the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties
+would actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law,"
+which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and
+is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual
+than the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is the
+root from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and the
+defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that in
+the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and
+that the significance of the State for the individual, no less than for
+the family, should be thoroughly understood.
+
+These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty
+enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperial
+right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help
+and the whole future of Germany is at stake.
+
+If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally
+large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a
+law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our
+sorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be good
+prospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Government
+does not disguise the true state of the political position.
+
+Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We see
+that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against
+the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and
+are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts are
+also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as
+to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which
+England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world
+policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if
+she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has
+built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has
+secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious
+careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this
+English policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guided
+exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means
+of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill.
+
+There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements
+have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit
+reservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic
+stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting
+party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really
+benefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed.
+Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on which
+those of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes on
+the honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when
+concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so
+as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arise
+which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The
+country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical
+sense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his life
+long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever
+induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[A]
+
+The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or
+alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if
+he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an
+arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is,
+as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States,
+from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the
+happiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in the
+east will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank on
+the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria and
+outflank any Russian attack on Galicia.
+
+Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will
+never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a
+permanent political system.
+
+"There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as
+effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal
+interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the
+other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." These
+are the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher
+_pace_ Bismarck.
+
+We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but
+must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable
+attitude of the other States by reference to their own interests.
+Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to the
+diplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself,
+seeks nothing but his own advantage." It will prove waste labour to
+attempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions or
+an attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, the
+weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale.
+
+When Napoleon III. planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect an
+alliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually in
+Paris to conclude the military negotiations.[B] These probably were
+going on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand.
+Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussian
+flag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman less
+biassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austria
+nor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war
+under unfavourable conditions.
+
+[Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attaché
+in Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, and
+pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of
+Prussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was better
+informed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the
+conditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by Archduke
+Albert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor had
+made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military
+calculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the former
+Minister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)]
+
+France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests,
+unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did not
+satisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomatic
+arrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests in
+Morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her
+interest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that country
+for herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will not
+allow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerce
+and German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the French
+standpoint she is right.
+
+The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own
+interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different
+Great Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt,
+however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political
+grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible
+only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State with
+which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its
+opponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to
+further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone
+and of being left isolated in the hour of danger.
+
+A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking
+chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keep
+this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances
+and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above
+all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take
+bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility
+of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under
+favourable conditions. "The great art of policy," writes Frederick the
+Great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to
+one's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage from
+favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." Even in
+his Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered
+all his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but
+boldness alone can acquire." "I give you a problem to solve," he said to
+his councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. was announced.
+"When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?"
+
+Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct
+summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate
+estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the
+interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and
+daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws
+of political and military success.
+
+The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blinded
+by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able
+to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success.
+"The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim
+which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which
+shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more
+despised than by the great Prussian King," so H. v. Treitschke tells us.
+"Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with
+remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the
+political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss
+the golden opportunity.
+
+It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize
+that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist
+policy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets up
+personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real
+current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures,
+as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia.
+
+A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these
+great duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are based
+on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the
+possibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers the
+result to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageous
+circumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe
+to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led.
+
+In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan
+had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as
+military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and
+assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her
+policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at
+the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment
+of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She
+had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance
+with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to
+place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover,
+compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of
+the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against
+Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations
+required by the political position had been made, although the conflict
+had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous
+retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no
+doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made
+resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the
+campaign by the offensive.
+
+England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and
+consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to
+her aims or suited to give weight to political demands.
+
+Two points stand out clearly from this consideration.
+
+First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and
+political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war
+are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong
+enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing
+which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be
+developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The
+obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace
+as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister
+and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the
+all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain
+influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs,
+and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military
+situation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister who
+conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is
+in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of
+the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he
+must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by
+war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has
+of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the
+realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the
+opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of
+compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a
+permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of
+recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one,
+but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to
+end in political and moral defeat.
+
+The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and
+hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and
+shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always
+creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory,
+tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy,
+which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts
+favourably on the military situation.
+
+In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can
+only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution
+join hands.
+
+If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next
+war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion:
+the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the
+necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions
+are to be created for the inevitably threatening war.
+
+So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two
+fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war
+from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was
+comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various
+strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small
+compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the
+other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive
+action on both sides. To-day the situation is different.
+
+We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expect
+not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of
+English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch
+neutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England may
+land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war
+with us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a
+position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather
+be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and
+south-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is also
+increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of
+the European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menaced
+in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet.
+
+All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur
+simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations
+they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the
+military aspect. The military situation thus created is very
+unfavourable.
+
+If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the
+army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the
+situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the
+stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure,
+and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must
+count. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one
+also. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have
+to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be
+directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and
+all necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops of
+the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected
+along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when
+occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the same
+principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in
+readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport
+arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many
+different lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements for
+unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the
+most various political prospects. We should in any case be forced to
+adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present
+conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent
+an invasion by one or other of our enemies.
+
+No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good
+prospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led against
+a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. A
+military investigation of the situation shows that a plan
+of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents,
+under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and
+has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind.
+
+The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy
+which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to
+overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. On
+this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of
+Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Of
+course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an
+unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which
+the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If we
+attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help,
+and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy
+to fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the
+cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be
+reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral.
+
+This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring
+about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor
+England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as
+we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by
+diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows.
+
+If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate
+an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her
+interests or those of England, that both these States would feel
+themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are
+offered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentively
+studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on
+this point.
+
+In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we
+should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of
+circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to
+struggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to state
+clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own
+interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Such
+political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid
+foundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and
+realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great
+results.
+
+It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and
+measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a
+favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous
+to Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. This
+requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic
+position which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said:
+Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must
+keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as
+time goes on.
+
+Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire
+settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons
+emigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and England
+to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the
+Mediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. The
+effort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured the
+Italian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in the
+least the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to the
+Triple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. The
+importance of these considerations will continue to be felt.
+
+Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, and
+Russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of
+present-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in
+England and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the
+Central European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder
+of abandoning her in Morocco.
+
+There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; in
+Central Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clash
+in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and China
+is forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to some
+degree ties her hands.
+
+All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if it
+is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than
+recent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy can
+count on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on an
+army whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficiently
+valued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. We
+have amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops,
+the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst
+them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are
+soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world,
+provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The German
+nation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height of
+its great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in
+its soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this
+people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a
+worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on
+in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will
+achieve a truly magnificent result.
+
+In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces,
+and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger,
+our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future;
+but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless it
+wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the
+brave words of Goethe:
+
+  "Bid defiance to every power!
+  Ever valiant, never cower!
+  To the brave soldier open flies
+  The golden gate of Paradise."
+
+
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-German
+convention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; the
+Turko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensions
+which point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and,
+lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real
+offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France and
+England. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently
+between the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has been
+foreseen and provided for.
+
+I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first
+occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the
+Anglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks.
+
+The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed,
+have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a
+collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this
+object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed
+that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was
+determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the
+attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered
+correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain
+was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for
+war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance
+on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this
+crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the
+concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable
+moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait
+until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and
+Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the
+other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it
+can actively support the Rhine army.
+
+This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government,
+but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined,
+that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes.
+
+
+It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as
+regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our
+manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of
+territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not
+inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in
+obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the
+possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can
+never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were
+compelled to abandon.
+
+I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial
+concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed
+force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo
+region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of
+November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their
+present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from
+this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no
+doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession
+for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish
+_enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has
+at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case
+of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese.
+
+It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial
+arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for
+a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be
+assumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has
+carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a
+moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because
+she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a
+desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea,
+in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v.
+Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not,
+therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to
+revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect,
+the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France.
+
+The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first an
+actual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by the
+expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn
+from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position.
+But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not
+merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but
+primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its
+entirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement
+means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly
+surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the
+sovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent
+infraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we had
+weighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty such
+action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the
+notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such
+explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front.
+
+An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islam
+have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, of
+course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey have
+suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in
+the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance
+for us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco convention
+precipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundly
+the solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which France
+obtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realize
+the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the
+Mediterranean.
+
+The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep
+rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the
+mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large
+sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in
+spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily
+supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this
+weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the
+Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better
+has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great
+disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical
+times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire
+must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to
+ride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war
+removes all further doubt on this point.
+
+The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the
+view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the
+various chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by a
+firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder
+any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have
+done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance,
+and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no
+doubt on this point.[A]
+
+[Footnote A: Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.]
+
+The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all
+pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead
+in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive
+intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would
+support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the
+limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with
+England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered
+by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new
+acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new
+colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and
+that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form
+objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear
+commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once
+more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates.
+
+In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count
+on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a
+_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at
+most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may
+fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.
+
+If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in
+the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world
+generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more
+face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the
+world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any
+case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide
+that the hour of attack has come.
+
+We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike
+preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down.
+All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to
+represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the
+people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to
+military and political success, without carrying still further the
+disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and
+frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between
+Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will
+prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy
+which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers
+threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs
+and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any
+conventional scruples distract it from this object.
+
+Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged
+basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of
+sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation
+calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it
+to the happy goal.
+
+The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever.
+England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her
+interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles
+question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of
+her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great
+Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and
+difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has
+considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before
+it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will
+probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in
+sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted
+German policy can utilize in order to influence the general political
+situation in the interests of our Fatherland.
+
+If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of
+Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the
+future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with
+confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to
+fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz
+Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God:
+
+  "From the height of the starry sky
+  May thy ringing sword flash bright;
+  Let every craven cry
+  Be silenced by thy might!"
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Germany and the Next War
+by Friedrich von Bernhardi
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 11352 ***
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+Project Gutenberg's Germany and the Next War, by Friedrich von Bernhardi
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
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+Title: Germany and the Next War
+
+Author: Friedrich von Bernhardi
+
+Release Date: February 28, 2004 [EBook #11352]
+[Date last updated: August 18, 2005]
+
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+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR ***
+
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+
+
+Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Bonny Fafard and PG Distributed Proofreaders
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+GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR
+
+
+
+BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI
+
+
+
+TRANSLATED BY ALLEN H. POWLES
+
+
+1912
+
+
+
+All the patriotic sections of the German people were greatly excited
+during the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on all
+hearts that in the settlement of the Morocco dispute no mere commercial
+or colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but that
+the honour and future of the German nation were at stake. A deep rift
+had opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action
+of the Government. Public opinion, which was clearly in favour of
+asserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our political
+position, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would have
+demanded. I cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in an
+overwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, would
+have been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation.
+Haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic of
+the German Reichstag in modern Berlin as it was in medieval Regensburg.
+These conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages,
+which were partly written some time ago.
+
+Nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national and
+political development. At such times it is necessary to be absolutely
+clear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be
+surmounted, and the sacrifices to be made.
+
+The task I have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of all
+diplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. It is
+obvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view.
+
+Our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past,
+have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nation
+which, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must,
+and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulness
+of my German heart that I have recorded my convictions. I believe that
+thus I shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers'
+hearts, and strengthen the national purpose.
+
+THE AUTHOR.
+
+_October, 1911_
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+Power of the peace idea--Causes of the love of peace in Germany--
+  German consciousness of strength--Lack of definite political aims
+ --Perilous situation of Germany and the conditions of successful
+  self-assertion--Need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to
+  explain the tasks and aims of Germany in the light of history
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR
+
+Pacific ideals and arbitration--The biological necessity of war--The
+  duty of self-assertion--The right of conquest--The struggle for
+  employment--War a moral obligation--Beneficent results of war
+ --War from the Christian and from the materialist standpoints--
+  Arbitration and international law--Destructiveness and immorality
+  of peace aspirations--Real and Utopian humanity--Dangerous
+  results of peace aspirations in Germany--The duty of
+  the State
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR
+
+Bismarck and the justification of war--The duty to fight--The teaching
+  of history--War only justifiable on adequate grounds--The
+  foundations of political morality--Political and individual morality
+ --The grounds for making war--The decision to make war--The
+  responsibility of the statesman
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
+
+The ways of Providence in history--Christianity and the Germans--
+  The Empire and the Papacy--Breach between the German World
+  Empire and the revived spiritual power--Rise of the great States
+  of Europe and political downfall of Germany after the Thirty
+  Years' War--Rise of the Prussian State--The epoch of the Revolution
+  and the War of Liberation--Intellectual supremacy of
+  Germany--After the War of Liberation--Germany under William
+  I. and Bismarck--Change in the conception of the State and
+  the principle of nationality--New economic developments and
+  the World Power of England--Rise of other World Powers--
+  Socialism, and how to overcome it--German science and art--
+  Internal disintegration of Germany and her latent strength
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION
+
+Grounds of the intellectual supremacy of Germany--Germany's role
+  as spiritual and intellectual leader--Conquest of religious and
+  social obstacles--Inadequacy of our present political position--
+  To secure what we have won our first duty--Necessity of increasing
+  our political power--Necessity of colonial expansion--
+  Menace to our aspirations from hostile Powers
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL
+
+Points of view for judging of the political situation--The States of the
+  Triple Alliance--The political interests of France and Russia--
+  The Russo-French Alliance--The policy of Great Britain--
+  America and the rising World Powers of the Far East--The importance
+  of Turkey--Spain and the minor States of Europe--Perilous
+  position of Germany--World power or downfall--Increase
+  of political power: how to obtain it--German colonial
+  policy--The principle of the balance of power in Europe--Neutral
+  States--The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs
+  of other States--Germany and the rules of international politics
+ --The foundations of our internal strength
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY FOR WAR
+
+Its necessity--Its twofold aspect--The educational importance of
+  military efficiency--Different military systems--Change in the
+  nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization--
+  Variety of methods of preparation for war--The armaments of
+  minor States--The armaments of the Great Powers--Harmonious
+  development of all elements of strength--Influence on armaments
+  of different conceptions of the duties of the State--Permanent
+  factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness--
+  Statecraft in this connection
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR
+
+Our opponents--The French army--The military power of Russia--
+  The land forces of England--The military power of Germany and
+  Austria; of Italy--The Turkish army--The smaller Balkan States
+ --The Roumanian army--The armies of the lesser States of Central
+  Europe--Greece and Spain--The fleets of the principal naval
+  Powers--The enmity of France--The hostility of England--
+  Russia's probable behaviour in a war against Germany--The
+  military situation of Germany--Her isolation--What will be at
+  stake in our next war--Preparation for war
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+THE NEXT NAVAL WAR
+
+England's preparations for a naval war against Germany--Germany's
+  first measures against England--England and the neutrality of the
+  small neighbouring States--The importance of Denmark--Commercial
+  mobilization--The two kinds of blockade: The close
+  blockade and the extended blockade--England's attack on our
+  coasts--Co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--The decisive
+  battle and its importance--Participation of France and Russia in
+  a German-English war
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+THE CRUCIAL QUESTION
+
+Reciprocal relations of land and sea power--The governing points of
+  view in respect of war preparations--Carrying out of universal
+  military service--The value of intellectual superiority--Masses,
+  weapons, and transport in modern war--Tactical efficiency and
+  the quality of the troops--The advantage of the offensive--Points
+  to be kept in view in war preparations--Refutation of the prevailing
+  restricted notions on this head--The _Ersatzreserve_--New
+  formations--Employment of the troops of the line and the new
+  formations--Strengthening of the standing army--The importance
+  of personality
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+ARMY ORGANIZATION
+
+Not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further
+  development--Fighting power and tactical efficiency--Strength of the
+  peace establishment--Number of officers and N.C.O.'s, especially in the
+  infantry--Relations of the different arms to each other--Distribution
+  of machine guns--Proportion between infantry and artillery--Lessons to
+  be learned from recent wars with regard to this--Superiority at the
+  decisive point--The strength of the artillery and tactical
+  efficiency--Tactical efficiency of modern armies--Tactical efficiency
+  and the marching depth of an army corps--Importance of the internal
+  organization of tactical units--Organization and distribution of field
+  artillery; of heavy field howitzers--Field pioneers and fortress
+  pioneers--Tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--Increase of the
+  cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--Tactical organization of the
+  cavalry--Development of the air-fleet--Summary of the necessary
+  requirements--Different ways of carrying them out--Importance of
+  governing points of view for war preparations
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+TRAINING AND EDUCATION
+
+The spirit of training--Self-dependence and the employment of masses--
+  Education in self-dependence--Defects in our training for war on the
+  grand scale--Need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to
+  the training of our commanders--Practical training of the artillery--
+  Training in tactical efficiency--Practice in marching under war
+  conditions--Training of the train officers and column leaders--
+  Control of the General Staff by the higher commanders--Value of
+  manoeuvres: how to arrange them--Preliminary theoretical training of
+  the higher commanders--Training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the
+  pioneers and commissariat troops--Promotion of intellectual development
+  in the army--Training in the military academy
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR
+
+The position of a World Power implies naval strength--Development
+  of German naval ideals--The task of the German fleet; its strength
+ --Importance of coast defences--Necessity of accelerating our
+  naval armaments--The building of the fleet--The institution of
+  the air-fleet--Preliminary measures for a war on commerce--
+  Mobilization--General points of view with regard to preparations
+  for the naval war--Lost opportunities in the past
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION
+
+The universal importance of national education--Its value for the
+  army--Hurtful influences at work on it--Duties of the State with
+  regard to national health--Work and sport--The importance of
+  the school--The inadequacy of our national schools--Military
+  education and education in the national schools--Methods of
+  instruction in the latter--Necessity for their reform--Continuation
+  schools--Influence of national education on the Russo-Japanese
+  War--Other means of national education--The propaganda of
+  action
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+Duties of the State in regard to war preparations--The State and
+  national credit--The financial capacity of Germany--Necessity of
+  new sources of revenue--The imperial right of inheritance--Policy
+  of interests and alliances--Moulding and exploitation of the
+  political situation--The laws of political conduct--Interaction of
+  military and political war preparations--Political preparations
+  for our next war--Governing factors in the conduct of German policy
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+The latest political events--Conduct of the German Imperial Government
+ --The arrangement with France--Anglo-French relations and
+  the attitude of England--The requirements of the situation
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has
+been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way
+which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining
+the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in
+Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal
+enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With the
+increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of
+sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great
+conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our
+future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a
+solution at the present time.
+
+We have been capable of soaring upwards. Mighty deeds raised Germany
+from political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of European
+nations. But we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and to
+advance along the path of development in politics and culture. We
+tremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands from
+us. Yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from our
+glorious past. How rightly Fichte once judged his countrymen when he
+said the German can never wish for a thing by itself; he must always
+wish for its contrary also.
+
+The Germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlike
+nation of Europe. For a long time they have proved themselves to be the
+ruling people of the Continent by the power of their arms and the
+loftiness of their ideas. Germans have bled and conquered on countless
+battlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shown
+that the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. In
+striking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become a
+peace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. A rude shock is
+needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their
+military strength.
+
+This strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes.
+
+It springs first from the good-natured character of the German people,
+which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations and
+partisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. It is connected
+with another characteristic of the German nature. Our aim is to be just,
+and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchange
+relations share this aim. We are always ready to consider the peaceful
+assurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign Press to be no less
+genuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resist
+the view that the political world is only ruled by interests and never
+from ideal aims of philanthropy. "Justice," Goethe says aptly, "is a
+quality and a phantom of the Germans." We are always inclined to assume
+that disputes between States can find a peaceful solution on the basis
+of justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is.
+
+An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted
+in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed
+in commercial life.
+
+The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world.
+Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhaps
+the greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty years
+Germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion
+of her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line,
+we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the
+world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great
+industrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are established
+all over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of the
+globe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands of
+Germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Under
+these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides.
+
+Our trade and our industries--owners no less than employés--do not want
+this development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is the
+essential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition will
+be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have
+never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained
+by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce.
+
+Universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, for
+war in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limited
+circles, but the whole nation suffers alike. All families and all
+classes have to pay the same toll of human lives. Finally comes the
+effect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of the
+times--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of an
+aspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfold
+in peace.
+
+Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem
+entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire
+received with "astonishment and indignation" from Frederick the Great,
+that "the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power";
+that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans,
+cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the
+greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. We regard our
+warlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is the
+special duty of the German Reichstag to lighten so far as possible. We
+seem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament is
+not an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of our
+national health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige.
+We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it
+as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power.
+
+Besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continued
+justification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate and
+often unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the German people.
+The agelong dream of the German nation was realized in the political
+union of the greater part of the German races and in the founding of the
+German Empire. Since then there lives in the hearts of all (I would not
+exclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proud
+consciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increased
+political power. This consciousness is supported by the fixed
+determination never to abandon these acquisitions. The conviction is
+universal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the whole
+nation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. We all wish, indeed, to be
+able to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict,
+and we live in the belief that the power of our State will steadily
+increase without our needing to fight for it. We do not at the bottom of
+our hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with a
+certain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to let
+ourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow.
+Every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. Not
+merely in the North, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race with
+glorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner of
+Prussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of all
+thought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in the
+South also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of petty
+nationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the German stock live
+in the heart of the people. Here and there, maybe, such emotions slumber
+in the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer and
+more luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animated
+by latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousness
+await their awakening.
+
+Thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below the
+surface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. It fritters
+itself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. We no
+longer have a clearly defined political and national aim, which grips
+the imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unity
+of action. Such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in the
+yearnings for German unity, for the fulfilment of the Barbarossa legend.
+A great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems to
+me to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in the
+world is threatened by external complications, the greater is this
+danger.
+
+Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding all
+peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that
+their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often
+pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific
+settlement.
+
+In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful
+methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable,
+our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result of
+our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also
+because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual
+upstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, and
+now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for
+centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect. We have thus
+injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. It must be
+reserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situation
+thus affected, but one point can be mentioned without further
+consideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties is
+adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the
+Germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces
+brought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of this
+struggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation.
+We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset by
+the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this
+struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry
+through a Seven Years' War for our position as a World Power, if we gain
+a start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which will
+fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces
+of the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops,
+but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for
+all their dearest possessions.
+
+These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the
+standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great
+tasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before the
+German people as the greatest civilized people known to history.
+
+From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations for
+peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of
+the German people, according to their true moral significance. I must
+try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of
+nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true
+civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality.
+I must endeavour to develop from the history of the German past in its
+connection with the conditions of the present those aspects of the
+question which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. The
+historical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according to
+inward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drastic
+obligations. No one need passively submit to the pressure of
+circumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at the
+parting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or to
+decadence. "A favoured position in the world will only become effective
+in the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it." It
+seemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this parting
+of the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light I
+may on the different paths which are open to our people. A nation must
+fully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can it
+take deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and,
+looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for any
+sacrifices which the present or future may demand.
+
+These sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financial
+sphere, depend mainly on the idea of what Germany is called upon to
+strive for and attain in the present and the future. Only those who
+share my conception of the duties and obligations of the German people,
+and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing the
+sword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusions
+in the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financial
+demands which spring out of it. It is only in their logical connection
+with the entire development, political and moral, of the State that the
+military requirements find their motive and their justification.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+
+THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR
+
+Since 1795, when Immanuel Kant published in his old age his treatise on
+"Perpetual Peace," many have considered it an established fact that war
+is the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. In spite of
+all that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the struggle
+between nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization is
+credited with a power to which war must yield. But, undisturbed by such
+human theories and the change of times, war has again and again marched
+from country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved its
+destructive as well as creative and purifying power. It has not
+succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. Long periods of
+war, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on the
+contrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, from
+the political intercourse of nations.
+
+This wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. The
+maintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanship
+should aim. This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days a
+quite peculiar power over men's spirits. This aspiration finds its
+public expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the Press of
+every country and of every party opens its columns to it. The current in
+this direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of Governments
+profess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peace
+is the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out the
+aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all Governments exert
+themselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish the
+conflagration.
+
+Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action.
+They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote
+their own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at the
+Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the
+United States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried to
+conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and
+foremost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany. No
+practical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved.
+
+We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts.
+This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as the
+weaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest
+need of international protection, have been completely passed over in
+the American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be
+assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans,
+with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced
+"perfidious Albion" to accede to the proposals. We may suppose that
+England intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, but
+that America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of
+sovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out her
+plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America.
+Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over
+the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for
+themselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts
+of President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace,
+and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of
+the United States an era in the history of mankind.
+
+This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and
+marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been
+shown by a race of Epigoni. "It has always been," H. von Treitschke
+tells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played
+with the dream of perpetual peace."
+
+Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours to
+diminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which war
+entails are justifiable. It is an incontestable fact that war
+temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic
+development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the
+primitive brutality of man. It is therefore a most desirable
+consummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible,
+and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily
+in the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential nature
+of war. All that the Hague Peace Congress has accomplished in this
+limited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war,
+universal acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the object
+is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place in
+historical development.
+
+This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws
+which rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the first
+importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be
+dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow,
+which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real
+civilization. "War is the father of all things." [A] The sages of
+antiquity long before Darwin recognized this.
+
+[Footnote A: (Heraclitus of Ephesus).]
+
+The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all
+healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the
+result of contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not
+merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "To supplant or
+to be supplanted is the essence of life," says Goethe, and the strong
+life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good
+everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the
+most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the
+universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. This struggle is
+regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and
+by the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animal
+world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the human
+race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances.
+The man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means to
+assert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the
+individual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness of
+right. The life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined,
+doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent
+the less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour,
+envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. Still more
+often, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures of
+a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment.
+
+There can be no doubt on this point. The nation is made up of
+individuals, the State of communities. The motive which influences each
+member is prominent in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle for
+possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the
+relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only
+as it is compatible with advantage. So long as there are men who have
+human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive
+for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests
+come into being and occasions for making war arise.
+
+"The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law
+of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and
+institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the
+intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The
+extrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the external
+development of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal
+development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggle
+of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward
+development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of
+nations--war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist?
+In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat
+of the other! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Clauss Wagner, "Der Krieg als schaffendes Weltprinzip."]
+
+That social system in which the most efficient personalities possess the
+greatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocial
+struggle. In the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquer
+which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral,
+material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend
+itself. War will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions,
+enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus
+promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual
+and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which
+render possible a general progressive development. They confer victory
+because the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war,
+inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy
+budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "War," says A.
+W. von Schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in
+Nature."
+
+Now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may exist
+between peoples and States, like that between the fellow-members of a
+society, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need not
+always degenerate Into war. Struggle and war are not identical. This
+rivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as the
+intrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results.
+Above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the State stands the
+law, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that the
+right shall prevail. Behind the law stands the State, armed with power,
+which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively to
+promote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. But there is no
+impartial power that stands above the rivalry of States to restrain
+injustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote the
+highest ends of mankind. Between States the only check on injustice is
+force, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own
+part and promote its own ends and ideals. If in doing so it comes into
+conflict with the ideals and views of other States, it must either
+submit and concede the precedence to the rival people or State, or
+appeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i.e., of
+war--in order to make its own views prevail. No power exists which can
+judge between States, and makes its judgments prevail. Nothing, in fact,
+is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress the
+ascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay.
+
+It will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form a
+superior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is
+stronger. This attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the more
+intensive vitality will prevail. The allied opponents have the seeds of
+corruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporary
+reverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory over
+numerical superiority. The history of Germany is an eloquent example of
+this truth.
+
+Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct of
+self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a
+natural condition of existence. "Man is a fighter." Self-sacrifice is a
+renunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or in
+the life of States, which are agglomerations of individuals. The first
+and paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence.
+By self-assertion alone can the State maintain the conditions of life
+for its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man is
+entitled to claim from it. This duty of self-assertion is by no means
+satisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes the
+obligation to assure the possibility of life and development to the
+whole body of the nation embraced by the State.
+
+Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a
+given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they
+require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population.
+Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must,
+as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say,
+by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity.
+
+The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first the
+procedure is pacific. Over-populated countries pour a stream of
+emigrants into other States and territories. These submit to the
+legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditions
+of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants,
+with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest.
+
+The right of colonization is also recognized. Vast territories inhabited
+by uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized States, and
+made subject to their rule. Higher civilization and the correspondingly
+greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. This right
+is, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determine
+what degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. The
+impossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these international
+relations has been the cause of many wars. The subjugated nation does
+not recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilized
+nation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence.
+This situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions of
+civilization have changed in the course of time. The subject nation has,
+perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and the
+difference in civilization has consequently lessened. Such a state of
+things is growing ripe in British India.
+
+Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. It
+may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races,
+and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which the
+mother-country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to
+acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of
+self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign
+soil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right.
+The threatened people will see the point of Goethe's lines:
+
+  "That which them didst inherit from thy sires,
+  In order to possess it, must be won."
+
+The procedure of Italy in Tripoli furnishes an example of such
+conditions, while Germany in the Morocco question could not rouse
+herself to a similar resolution.[C]
+
+[Footnote C: This does not imply that Germany could and ought to have
+occupied part of Morocco. On more than one ground I think that it was
+imperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this State on the basis
+of the Algeçiras Convention. Among other advantages, which need not be
+discussed here, Germany would have had the country secured to her as a
+possible sphere of colonization. That would have set up justifiable
+claims for the future.]
+
+In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at
+once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided
+by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since
+its decisions rest on the very nature of things.
+
+Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a
+convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the
+same result.
+
+In America, England, Germany, to mention only the chief commercial
+countries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of the
+population. The native population cannot consume all the products of
+this work. The industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. Work
+and employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladly
+accept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country.
+But this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itself
+from such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. We
+find, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries into
+existence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the other
+hand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, to
+crush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumer
+for itself or win fresh ones. It is an embittered struggle which rages
+in the market of the world. It has already often assumed definite
+hostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensify
+this struggle. Great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shut
+their doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on the
+down-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourable
+conditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goods
+cheaper than those imported from the old industrial States. These latter
+will see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus it
+may well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactory
+conditions of life to its workers. Such a State runs the danger not only
+of losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of also
+gradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and political
+world through diminishing production and lessened profits.
+
+In this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. We
+cannot reject the possibility that a State, under the necessity of
+providing remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war.
+If more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stake
+in Morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, Germany
+would hardly have conceded to France the most favourable position in the
+Morocco market without a struggle. England, doubtless, would not shrink
+from a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of the
+South African goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened her
+Indian market, the control of which is the foundation of her world
+sovereignty. The knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biological
+laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from
+international relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is not
+only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an
+indispensable factor in civilization.
+
+The attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connected
+with the view of life generally.
+
+If we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as something
+purely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outward
+decay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man can
+attain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possible
+diminution of all bodily suffering. The State will be regarded as a sort
+of assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possession
+and enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. We must endorse the
+view which Wilhelm von Humboldt professed in his treatise on the limits
+of the activity of the State.[D] The compulsory functions of the State
+must be limited to the assurance of property and life. The State will be
+considered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shun
+war as the greatest conceivable evil.
+
+[Footnote D: W. von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der
+Wirksamkelt des Staates zu bestimmen."]
+
+If, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of States as merely
+a fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not rest
+on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers,
+and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of the
+chequered conditions of life, the task of the State will appear in a
+very different light. The State will not be to us merely a legal and
+social insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have the
+one object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reach
+of the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising the
+intellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, and
+of securing for them that influence on the world which tends to the
+combined progress of humanity. We shall see in the State, as Fichte
+taught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is to
+put into practice the moral duty on earth. "The State," says Treitschke,
+"is a moral community. It is called upon to educate the human race by
+positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should
+develop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike for
+nation and individuals, the highest moral task."
+
+This highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. Man
+can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a
+community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He must
+be in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individual
+out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and
+makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The State
+alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest
+degree of life.[E]
+
+[Footnote E: To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and
+thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to
+error, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, by
+Implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Any
+action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State
+and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide
+domain of Utopias.]
+
+War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it
+is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation.
+As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls
+for war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it.
+
+If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, we
+shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its
+political power increases. The higher object at which it aims is
+closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It is
+only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that
+creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most
+splendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilities
+and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which
+power creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, and
+recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is
+content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace on
+sluggard's couch it lies," then its citizens become stunted. The efforts
+of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost.
+This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small
+States, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls victim to the
+same curse.
+
+All petty and personal interests force their way to the front during a
+long period of peace. Selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxury
+obliterates idealism. Money acquires an excessive and unjustifiable
+power, and character does not obtain due respect:
+
+
+  "Man is stunted by peaceful days,
+  In idle repose his courage decays.
+  Law is the weakling's game.
+  Law makes the world the same.
+  But in war man's strength is seen,
+  War ennobles all that is mean;
+  Even the coward belies his name."
+                 SCHILLER: _Braut v. Messina_.
+
+"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social
+petrifaction and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of the
+goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience.
+War alone teaches this lesson." [F]
+
+[Footnote F: Kuno Fischer, "Hegel," i., p. 737.]
+
+War, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and to
+expand national power than any other means known to history. It
+certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at
+the same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. This
+is especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regarded
+not merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as the
+expression of the united will of a whole nation.
+
+All petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the grave
+decision which a war involves. The common danger unites all in a common
+effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedly
+spurned. This union contains a liberating power which produces happy and
+permanent results in the national life. We need only recall the uniting
+power of the War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and their
+historical consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every war
+vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the sham
+reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are
+unmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth,
+and honour come to the front and are put into play. "A thousand touching
+traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous war
+awakes in noble nations." [G]
+
+[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 482.]
+
+Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "War," he
+said, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment
+constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it;
+every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues."
+
+"At the moment when the State cries out that its very life is at stake,
+social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. The individual
+must forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body.
+He should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison with
+the welfare of the community. War is elevating, because the individual
+disappears before the great conception of the State. The devotion of the
+members of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidly
+conspicuous as in war.... What a perversion of morality to wish to
+abolish heroism among men!" [H]
+
+[Footnote H: Treitschke, "Politik" i., p. 74.]
+
+Even defeat may bear a rich harvest. It often, indeed, passes an
+irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads to
+a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous
+constitution. "I recognize in the effect of war upon national
+character," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "one of the most salutary
+elements in the moulding of the human race."
+
+The individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge his
+life on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the cause
+which he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals to
+personal morality. Similarly, nations and States can achieve no loftier
+consummation than to stake their whole power on upholding their
+independence, their honour, and their reputation.
+
+Such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. The
+possibility of war is required to give the national character that
+stimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nations
+enabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by the
+fullest development of their moral forces. An intellectual and vigorous
+nation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a Phaecian
+existence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace.
+
+From this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily
+detrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics.
+The States which from various considerations are always active in this
+direction are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United States
+of America, e.g., in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal
+peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to
+money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred
+million dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incur
+a great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with England
+or Japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance of
+contest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stress
+of great political emotions, without which the moral development of the
+national character is impossible. If they advance farther on this road,
+they will one day pay dearly for such a policy.
+
+Again, from the Christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion.
+Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God above
+all things, and thy neighbour as thyself." This law can claim no
+significance for the relations of one country to another, since its
+application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love
+which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love
+for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead
+men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature
+cannot be political. Its object is to promote morality of the
+individual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in the
+interests of the community. It tells us to love our individual enemies,
+but does not remove the conception of enmity. Christ Himself said: "I am
+not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." His teaching can never be
+adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. There
+never was a religion which was more combative than Christianity. Combat,
+moral combat, is its very essence. If we transfer the ideas of
+Christianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the power
+of the State--power in the widest sense, not merely from the material
+aspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancement
+of humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be made
+which a war demands. Thus, according to Christianity, we cannot
+disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally
+and historically.
+
+Again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, the
+purely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. The
+individual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour,
+since it may cost him life and prosperity. The State, however, as such
+can also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wage
+war, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives and
+happiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved.
+
+The loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamental
+notion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness,
+the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing the
+minority in their own interests. Thus, those who from the materialistic
+standpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency from
+motives of self-interest.
+
+Reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, but
+that it is justifiable from every point of view. The practical methods
+which the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the prevention
+of war are shown to be absolutely ineffective.
+
+It is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement of
+rights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, but
+also the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullest
+assertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time on
+this basis to settle the disputes which arise between the various
+countries by Arbitration Courts, and so to render war impossible. The
+politician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestly
+believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted.
+
+Two questions in this connection are at once suggested: On what right is
+the finding of this Arbitration Court based? and what sanctions insure
+that the parties will accept this finding?
+
+To the first question the answer is that such a right does not, and
+cannot, exist. The conception of right is twofold. It signifies,
+firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is right
+and good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the State, either
+written or sanctioned by tradition. In its first meaning it is an
+indefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it is
+variable and capable of development. The right determined by law is only
+an attempt to secure a right in itself. In this sense right is the
+system of social aims secured by compulsion. It is therefore impossible
+that a written law should meet all the special points of a particular
+case. The application of the legal right must always be qualified in
+order to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. A certain
+freedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to the
+administration of justice. The established law, within a given and
+restricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just.
+
+The conception of this right is still more obscured by the complex
+nature of the consciousness of right and wrong. A quite different
+consciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whether
+persons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in most
+varied forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, and
+frequently in opposition to, the established law. In Christian countries
+murder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is a
+sacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as a
+crime. It is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions of
+right.
+
+There is yet another cause of uncertainty. The moral consciousness of
+the same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs and
+schools of philosophy. The established law can seldom keep pace with
+this inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lags
+behind. A condition of things arises where the living moral
+consciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, where
+legal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and Mephistopheles'
+scoffing words are true:
+
+  "Laws are transmitted, as one sees,
+  Just like inherited disease.
+  They're handed down from race to race,
+  And noiseless glide from place to place.
+  Reason they turn to nonsense; worse,
+  They make beneficence a curse!
+  Ah me! That you're a grandson you
+  As long as you're alive shall rue."
+                             _Faust_ (translation by Sir T. Martin).
+
+Thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the
+same ideas in their private and social intercourse. The conception of
+the constitutional State in the strictest sense is an impossibility, and
+would lead to an intolerable state of things. The hard and fast
+principle must be modified by the progressive development of the fixed
+law, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and of
+self-help allowed by the community. If sometimes between individuals the
+duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a
+universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated
+relations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its own
+conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which
+spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical
+life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification,
+and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and
+none can say that one nation has a better right than the other. There
+never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here and
+there particular relations can be brought under definite international
+laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification.
+Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international
+code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own
+conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest
+ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an
+injustice, and thus dishonour itself.
+
+Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring
+people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and
+is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in
+the civilized world. Every Arbitration Court must originate in a certain
+political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must
+treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the
+contracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. In this way every
+progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may
+easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the
+expansion of the young and vigorous State in favour of one which is
+sinking in the scale of civilization.
+
+These considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question:
+How can the judgment of the Arbitration Court be enforced if any State
+refuses to submit to it? Where does the power reside which insures the
+execution of this judgment when pronounced?
+
+In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908
+that the High Court of International Justice established by the second
+Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding
+decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion.
+The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this
+idea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that
+public opinion must represent the view which the American plutocrats
+think most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that the
+widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material
+prosperity, commerce, and money-making. As a matter of fact, public
+opinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only be
+employed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided.
+
+We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the
+separate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empire
+existed. Such an empire never can or will arise again. Even if it did,
+it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all
+human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the
+unchecked rivalry of different groups.
+
+So long as we live under such a State system as at present, the German
+Imperial Chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared,
+in his speech in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that treaties for
+arbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainable
+legal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between two
+countries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. Such a treaty merely
+proved that between the two contracting States no serious inducement to
+break the peace could be imagined. It therefore only confirmed the
+relations already existing. "If these relations change, if differences
+develop between the two nations which affect their national existence,
+which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then every
+arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke."
+
+It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an Arbitration
+Court can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlike
+decision, even as regards the State in whose favour it is pronounced. If
+we imagine, for example, that Silesia had fallen to Frederick the Great
+by the finding of a Court of Arbitration, and not by a war of
+unparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have been
+equally important for Prussia and for Germany? No one will maintain this.
+
+The material increase in power which accrued to Frederick's country by
+the acquisition of Silesia is not to be underestimated. But far more
+important was the circumstance that this country could not be conquered
+by the strongest European coalition, and that it vindicated its position
+as the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. It was
+war which laid the foundations of Prussia's power, which amassed a
+heritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. War
+forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could grow
+up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. Here once
+more war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons of
+history we shall see the same result again and again.
+
+If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite
+aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only
+be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as
+unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It
+is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice
+their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and
+thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed to
+obviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts of
+Arbitration--that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formal
+law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The
+weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and
+vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment
+on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most
+disastrous consequences for humanity generally.
+
+With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate
+appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral
+and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration.
+So, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highest
+material blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; for
+the maintenance of national character and political independence; for
+the expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of the
+national welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nations
+according to the scale of their importance in civilization; for
+intellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for the
+honour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressive
+development is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home and
+abroad is only a question of time. History speaks with no uncertain
+voice on this subject. It shows that valour is a necessary condition of
+progress. Where with growing civilization and increasing material
+prosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and the
+resolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, there
+the nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their own
+politically or racially.
+
+"A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political
+world when national character and military tradition act and react upon
+each." These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war,
+and he is incontestably right.
+
+These efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merely
+lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature where the
+struggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damaging
+and unnerving effect. The apostles of peace draw large sections of a
+nation into the spell of their Utopian efforts, and they thus introduce
+an element of weakness into the national life; they cripple the
+justifiable national pride in independence, and support a nerveless
+opportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higher
+humanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its own
+weakness. They thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, just
+as the Prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in
+1805 and 1806, and brought the State to the brink of destruction.
+
+The functions of true humanity are twofold. On the one hand there is the
+promotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well as
+of political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform development
+of character; on the other hand there is the practical realization of
+ideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual and
+of the community.
+
+It seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards the
+suppression of war with those of the Social Democratic Labour party,
+which goes hand in hand with them. The aims of both parties are Utopian.
+The organized Labour party strives after an ideal whose realization is
+only conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work are
+settled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when the
+cost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. Until this is the case
+the prices of the international market determine the standard of wages.
+The nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settle
+independently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing its
+position in the international market in competition with nations who
+work longer hours and at lower rates. Want of employment and extreme
+misery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. On the
+other hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, by
+excluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration of
+products and a profound demoralization of the working population.
+
+The case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. Its execution, as
+we saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is as
+impossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. A State
+which disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouring
+countries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guiding
+rule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, and
+become the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours.
+
+We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts after
+peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with
+arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most
+countries. "God will see to it," says Treitschke,[I] "that war always
+recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!"
+
+[Footnote I: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 76.]
+
+Nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in Germany no inconsiderable
+danger. We Germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpractical
+dreams. "The accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universal
+attribute with us, as in France." [J] We lack the true feeling for
+political exigencies. A deep social and religious gulf divides the
+German people into different political groups, which are bitterly
+antagonistic to each other. The traditional feuds in the political world
+still endure. The agitation for peace introduces a new element of
+weakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our national
+and party life.
+
+[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 81.]
+
+It is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believe
+in the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that the
+general good is being advanced by them. Equally true is it, however,
+that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfish
+political projects. Its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes its
+danger.
+
+Every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionary
+schemes. They must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as an
+unhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Our
+people must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or may
+be the goal of a policy_. The policy of a great State has positive aims.
+It will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that is
+possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentous
+questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation,
+the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this
+conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the
+idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating
+law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of the
+peace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words:
+
+  "Dreams of a peaceful day?
+  Let him dream who may!
+  'War' is our rallying cry,
+  Onward to victory!"
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+
+THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR
+
+Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that no
+one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of
+intentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseen
+what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation,
+and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. In
+his "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect:
+"Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a
+nation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as to
+anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [A]
+
+[Footnote A: "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93.]
+
+We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to be
+regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it
+as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out
+for so long. It is difficult to gauge its true import. The notion of
+forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must not
+think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to
+be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the
+pressure of the whole political situation.
+
+Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict
+letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the
+decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own
+initiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterances
+cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle
+of political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only
+run counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we exclude
+from politics that independence of action which is the true motive
+force.
+
+The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the
+natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the
+controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. It
+does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are
+unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourable
+position affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statecraft
+becomes a tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its
+ends. "Men make history," [B] as Bismarck's actions clearly show.
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 28.]
+
+No doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit of
+a peaceful solution. The death of some one man, the setting of some
+great ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to change
+it fundamentally. But the great disputes in the life of a nation cannot
+be settled so simply. The man who wished to bring the question to a
+decisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for the
+moment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels,
+and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilable
+interests. With the death of King Edward VII. of England the policy of
+isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against
+Germany, has broken down. The antagonism of Germany and England, based
+on the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, still
+persists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not always
+profitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening the
+tension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of Germany.
+
+It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should
+depend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would be
+thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many
+unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less
+dependent on chance.
+
+It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician
+Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war
+should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been
+attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a
+weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated
+should determine political action.
+
+For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look
+to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the
+conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and
+sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value
+is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct
+estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of
+the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness
+of decision.
+
+If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged
+right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as
+necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country
+the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister
+cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far
+more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater
+sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and
+courage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment.
+In the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought never
+to be brought about falls to the ground. And yet this theory has in our
+day found many supporters, especially in Germany.
+
+Even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war is
+impossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banished
+from the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should be
+postponed so long as possible.[C]
+
+[Footnote C: Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on
+March 30, 1911. In his speech of November 9, 1911, the Imperial
+Chancellor referred to the above-quoted words of Prince Bismarck
+in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the Morocco question.]
+
+Those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude as
+the supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as
+a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing
+importance. According to this view, a war recognized as inevitable must
+be postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to use
+exceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary and
+justifiable aspirations by force of arms.
+
+Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion
+that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the
+chief duty, of any policy.
+
+To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite
+answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only
+the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring
+about a war.
+
+Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that
+wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the
+happiest results, both politically and socially. A feeble policy has
+always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to
+take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to
+adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as
+to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter.
+Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most
+striking examples of this.
+
+The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful
+and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the
+steps of his glorious ancestor. "He noticed how his state occupied an
+untenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers,
+and showed his determination to give a definite character (_décider cet
+être_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge
+the territory of the State and _corriger la figure de la Prusse_, if
+Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name
+of 'Kingdom.'" [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity,
+and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. None of
+the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he
+postpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be the
+aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself
+favourable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The whole
+history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally
+would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of
+decision which he showed.
+
+[Footnote D Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 51.]
+
+We see a quite different development under the reign of Frederick
+William III., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our
+nation cannot be too often reminded.
+
+It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided.
+Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the Prussian
+Government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied
+Russians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great
+moral cost. According to all human calculation, the participation of
+Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive
+superiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and
+would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the
+moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had
+ingrained on her by his wars. At the darkest moment of defeat they shone
+most brightly. In spite of the political downfall, the effects of
+Frederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired
+his State and his people. This is clearly seen in the quite different
+attitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under the
+degrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny. The power which had been
+acquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself
+more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it
+was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible
+the heroic revival of 1813.
+
+The German wars of Unification also belong to the category of wars
+which, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest.
+The instability and political weakness which the Prussian Government
+showed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of Olmütz in 1850, had
+deeply shaken the political and national importance of Prussia. On the
+other hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once more
+her duties as a nation, when King William I. and Bismarck were at the
+helm, was soon abundantly manifest. Bismarck, by bringing about our
+wars of Unification in order to improve radically an untenable position
+and secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled the
+long-felt wish of the German people, and raised Germany to the
+undisputed rank of a first-class European Power. The military successes
+and the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for an
+unparalleled material prosperity. It is difficult to imagine how
+pitiable the progress of the German people would have been had not these
+wars been brought about by a deliberate policy.
+
+The most recent history tells the same story. If we judge the Japanese
+standpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fight
+Russia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morally
+justifiable. It was immensely daring to challenge the Russian giant, but
+the purely military conditions were favourable, and the Japanese nation,
+which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed an
+extended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to open
+new channels for her superabundant activities. Japan, from her own point
+of view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power in
+Eastern Asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of Russia. The Japanese
+statesmen were justified by the result. The victorious campaign created
+wider conditions of life for the Japanese people and State, and at one
+blow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics,
+and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to great
+material advancement. If this war had been avoided from weakness or
+philanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters would
+have taken a very different turn. The growing power of Russia in the
+Amur district and in Korea would have repelled or at least hindered the
+Japanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attained
+through this war, glorious alike for military prowess and political
+foresight.
+
+The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has
+always led to happy results. Even an unsuccessfully waged war may
+sometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vital
+interests without a blow. We find an example of this in the recent
+heroic struggle of the small Boer States against the British Empire. In
+this struggle they were inevitably defeated. It was easy to foresee that
+an armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces of
+England and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally could
+not bear heavy losses. But yet--if all indications are not
+misleading--the blood shed by the Boer people will yield a free and
+prosperous future. In spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic;
+men like President Stein, Botha, and De Wett, with their gallant
+followers, performed many great military feats. The whole nation
+combined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which Byron
+sings:
+
+  "For freedom's battle once begun,
+  Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son,
+  Though baffled oft, is ever won."
+
+Inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any later
+developments, have been won by this struggle. The Boers have maintained
+their place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselves
+superior to the English. It was only after many glorious victories that
+they yielded to a crushingly superior force. They accumulated a store of
+fame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, a
+power to be reckoned with. The result of this development is that the
+Boers are now the foremost people in South Africa, and that England
+preferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by their
+continual hostility. This laid the foundation for the United Free States
+of South Africa.[E]
+
+[Footnote E: "War and the Arme Blanche," by Erskine Childers: "The truth
+came like a flash ... that all along we had been conquering the
+country, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215).
+
+"To ... aim at so cowing the Boer national spirit, as to gain a
+permanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyond
+our power to achieve. Peaceable political fusion under our own flag
+was the utmost we could secure. That means a conditional surrender,
+or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). Lord Roberts wrote
+a very appreciative introduction to this book without any protest
+against the opinions expressed in it.]
+
+President Kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and not
+Cecil Rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, be
+known in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of South Africa,
+who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value the
+inestimable moral qualities according to their real importance.
+
+The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been
+deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest
+results. War, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of political
+agent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but in
+every case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery.
+He who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility.
+
+It is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision except
+from the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existing
+conditions which have created national armies. Absolute clearness of
+vision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken,
+and what political aims justify the use of armed force.
+
+This question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactory
+answer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty of
+the State.
+
+If this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual and
+moral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moral
+education of the human race, then the State's own acts must necessarily
+conform to the moral laws. But the acts of the State cannot be judged by
+the standard of individual morality. If the State wished to conform to
+this standard it would often find itself at variance with its own
+particular duties. The morality of the State must be developed out of
+its own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in the
+personality of the man and his duties towards society. The morality of
+the State must be judged by the nature and _raison d'être_ of the State,
+and not of the individual citizen. But the end-all and be-all of a State
+is power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face
+should not meddle in politics." [F]
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.]
+
+Machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policy
+was the advancement of power. This term, however, has acquired, since
+the German Reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewd
+Florentine. To him power was desirable in itself; for us "the State is
+not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and
+promote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by being
+applied for the greatest good of mankind." [G]
+
+[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.]
+
+The criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in the
+last resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed his
+own nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection." [H] If the
+same standard is applied to the State, then "its highest moral duty is
+to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the
+higher community of which he is a member; but the State is itself the
+highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty
+of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of
+sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for there
+is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot
+sacrifice itself to something higher. When a State sees its downfall
+staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A
+sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts
+the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a
+State." [I]
+
+[Footnote H: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote I: _Ibid_., i., p 3.]
+
+I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political
+morality better than in the words of our great national historian. But
+we can reach the same conclusions by another road. The individual is
+responsible only for himself. If, either from weakness or from moral
+reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the
+consequences of his actions recoil only on him. The situation is quite
+different in the case of a State. It represents the ramifying and often
+conflicting interests of a community. Should it from any reason neglect
+the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal
+personality, but it injures also the body of private interests
+which it represents. This incalculably far-reaching detriment affects
+not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of
+individuals and the community. Accordingly it is a moral duty of the
+State to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and
+promoter of all higher interests. This duty it cannot fulfil unless it
+possesses the needful power.
+
+The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first
+and foremost duty of the State. This aspect of the question supplies a
+fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can be
+estimated. The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this
+duty, and thus served the interests of the community? And this not
+merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material
+interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the
+State, and thus indirectly its higher aims.
+
+It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that
+numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the
+community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only
+natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be
+erroneous. Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must
+be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy.
+"Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most
+contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." [J] This
+argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads
+logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means;
+that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures
+are permissible.
+
+[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.]
+
+A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for
+political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must
+be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. So far as I
+know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel
+bound to attempt one at this point. War, with which I am dealing at
+present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it
+pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the
+seriousness of warlike measures. I must deviate here a little from my
+main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of
+political morality.
+
+The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is
+generally assumed. The power of the State does not rest exclusively on
+the factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth,
+and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements,
+which are reciprocally related to the material. The energy with which a
+State promotes its own interests and represents the rights of its
+citizens in foreign States, the determination which it displays to
+support them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor of
+strength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselves
+to let things come to a crisis in a like case. Similarly a reliable and
+honourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with allies
+as well as with foes. A statesman is thus under no obligation to deceive
+deliberately. He can from the political standpoint avoid all
+negotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he will
+thereby serve the reputation and power of his State no less than when he
+holds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, and
+renounces all political formulas and phrases.
+
+In antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and the
+Jesuits have tried to justify regicide.[K] At the present day political
+murder is universally condemned from the standpoint of political
+morality. The same holds good of preconcerted political deception. A
+State which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute.
+The man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in a
+contradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims,
+since he denies it by his actions. It is not, of course, necessary that
+a man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to an
+opponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point.
+But it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise crafty
+deceptions. A fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic of
+great statesmen. Subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit of
+diplomacy.
+
+[Footnote K: Mariana, "De rege et regis institutione." Toledo, 1598.]
+
+Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latent
+war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a
+position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and
+deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties
+are determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflict
+between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and
+prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it
+is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately
+moral nature of that end.
+
+Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action.
+But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are
+of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are
+conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of
+things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the
+infringement of the right appears morally justified. York's decision to
+conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of
+right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made
+under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the
+Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral. Now it is always
+justifiable to terminate an immoral situation.
+
+As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument
+shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultima
+ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other
+States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful
+methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw,
+rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. War
+therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is
+not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the
+ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparently
+trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully
+justifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the State, and consequently
+its moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential part
+of its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there
+is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword
+must be drawn to do so.
+
+In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is
+whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the
+power of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether the
+inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict
+greater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantages
+which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not
+declared. A further point to be considered is whether the general
+position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military
+success. With these considerations of expediency certain other weighty
+aspects of the question must also be faced.
+
+It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in looking
+only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of
+the existing generation. Such policy would be opposed to all that
+constitutes the essential nature of the State. Its conduct must be
+guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is
+gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the
+future. "The true greatness of the State is that it links the past with
+the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to
+regard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life." [L]
+
+[Footnote L: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.]
+
+The law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and in
+the decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than the
+sacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "I cannot conceive,"
+Zelter once wrote to Goethe, "how any right deed can be performed
+without sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very opposite
+of what is desirable."
+
+A second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely that
+which Zelter rightly emphasizes. A great end cannot be attained except
+by staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certainty
+of success can ever be anticipated. Every undertaking implies a greater
+or less venture. The daily intercourse of civic life teaches us this
+lesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must be
+taken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguely
+estimated. In questions of comparatively trifling importance much may be
+done by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce a
+satisfactory status. The solution of such problems is the sphere of
+diplomatic activity. The state of things is quite different when vital
+questions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, but
+will guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party.
+Then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmen
+to act. Men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun the
+solemn decision of war. In such questions any reluctance to face the
+opponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt at
+a temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of political
+prestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made good
+in another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the State,
+the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations.
+
+Not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such a
+case. The mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention to
+wage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. This
+intention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiations
+without arms are like music-books without instruments," as Frederick the
+Great said. It is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to which
+the opponent's purpose yields. When, therefore, the threat of war is
+insufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin;
+the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the
+_duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike.
+
+Finally, there is a third point to be considered. Cases may occur where
+war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no
+prospect of success. The responsibility of this has also to be borne. So
+at least Frederick the Great thought. His brother Henry, after the
+battle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the
+Marquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France. Again,
+after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but
+the King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. He knew better what
+suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to
+die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. President
+Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States of
+America on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "It
+must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran,
+"that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men
+and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the
+sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war
+is in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the most
+prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice....
+It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than
+not to have fought at all."
+
+To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher
+sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in
+itself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by the
+consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when
+the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and
+military situation.
+
+It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy,
+especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only
+heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the
+reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to
+fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties.
+
+No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain
+circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ
+war as a political means. So long as all human progress and all natural
+development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage
+in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible.
+
+When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting
+any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has
+forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually
+acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there
+are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only
+await the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the State
+towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of
+success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable.
+When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by
+affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements
+of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to
+promote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced the
+more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be
+obtained with comparatively small sacrifices.
+
+These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active
+policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and
+concentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truth
+of Schiller's lines:
+
+  "The chance that once thou hast refused
+  Will never through the centuries recur."
+
+The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take
+the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the
+future to the present need of peace.
+
+It is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficult
+to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist
+which justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all the
+greater because the historical significance of the act must be
+considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its
+justification.
+
+War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successes
+which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries.
+The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long
+epochs.[M]
+
+[Footnote M: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 2.]
+54
+The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a
+great State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries;
+but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and
+keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical
+imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can
+at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [N]
+
+[Footnote N: Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft," p. 30.]
+
+He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State,
+and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way
+settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of
+political morality.
+
+He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be
+fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his
+hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the
+fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point
+he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true
+interests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the
+definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing
+favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the
+hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise
+with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther
+once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write
+and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much
+greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business
+of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and
+the marches, etc.--that is what the petty and simple do who only look
+with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or
+saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to
+save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the
+sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It
+will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful
+and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."[O]
+
+[Footnote O: Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation."]
+
+Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to
+further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of
+war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State
+and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political
+purposes correspond to these problems.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+
+A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL
+DEVELOPMENT
+
+The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is
+consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. The
+same holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were,
+personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely
+various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable
+of the most different achievements, and serving the most multifarious
+purposes in the great evolution of human existence.
+
+Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the
+materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation
+to-day.
+
+According to it, all that happens in the world is a necessary
+consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become
+conscious. It denies the difference between the empiric and the
+intelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom.
+
+This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seems
+everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the
+insufficient human intelligence. The existence of the universe is
+opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are
+incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and
+time.
+
+The essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. We
+recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; the
+impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our
+understanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quite
+impossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear--although no
+demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual laws
+beyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to a
+conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual
+change. Even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden
+moral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread of
+civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and
+higher forms of life.
+
+It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in every
+individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too
+limited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge of
+things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to
+understand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may also
+term the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidance
+for our further investigation and procedure.
+
+The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the history
+of the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What is
+true," Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised and
+supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by
+its history."
+
+The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, the
+laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces
+have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work
+towards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We are
+here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget
+that States are personalities endowed with very different human
+attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that
+these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of
+States as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very different
+effect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour to
+grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the
+naturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we
+wish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study the
+history of the German people in its connection with that of the other
+European States, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto
+followed, and what guidance the past gives for Our future policy. From
+the time of their first appearance in history the Germans showed
+themselves a first-class civilized people.
+
+When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians
+there were two main elements which shaped the future of the West,
+Christianity and the Germans. The Christian teaching preached equal
+rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and
+slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the
+attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the
+grave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man,
+and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the
+individual conscience, the starting-point of all development. It thus
+gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose
+morality rested solely on the relations with the state. Simultaneously
+with this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North poured
+victoriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decaying
+nations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep their
+nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. The
+States which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized how
+difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a
+higher. The Germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. The
+German element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and
+offered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture of
+German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did
+the growing nations appear.
+
+In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world.
+The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germans
+with the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated
+itself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the
+Alps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea of
+the Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued to
+flourish.
+
+In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until A.D. 1453. In the West,
+however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476.
+Italy had fallen into the hands of the East Goths and Lombards
+successively. The Visigoths had established their dominion in Spain, and
+the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul.
+
+A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with his
+powerful hand, extended the Frankish Empire far beyond the boundaries of
+Gaul. By the subjugation of the Saxons he became lord of the country
+between the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy by
+the conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the Western
+Roman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. His
+successors clung to this claim; but the Frankish Empire soon fell to
+pieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards became
+France, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the later
+Germany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy and
+Spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually
+amalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East Frankish
+Empire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained
+their Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerful
+German [A] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of Charles the Great to
+the Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first _German_ King who
+took this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in a
+quarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of the
+Church, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in
+order to prove their pretended title to that country.
+
+[Footnote A: German (Deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular,"
+opposed to "foreign"--_e.g._, the Latin Church dialect. It was first
+used as the name of a people, in the tenth century A.D.]
+
+The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living in
+Rome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of a
+Church which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way
+of the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldest
+creations of the human intellect--to found and maintain a
+world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers.
+
+Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. The
+freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual
+dominion. In the portentous struggle of the two Powers for the
+supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire,
+the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widely
+different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a
+homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of the
+estates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axe
+of Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church.
+
+The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German power
+lay on the ground in fragments. A period of almost complete anarchy
+followed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad
+characteristics of the German people, contributed to extend this
+destruction to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the German
+people deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power was
+budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetry
+was passing through a first classical period. Every German country was
+ringing with song; the depth of German sentiment found universal
+expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealism
+inspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empire
+every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above
+the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The material
+prosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better
+regulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the Hanseatic League bore
+its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great
+trade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice and
+Genoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never again
+attained.
+
+Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in the
+breasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, and
+was destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in
+the spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church had
+lost much of her influence on men's minds. On the other hand, a refining
+movement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit of
+antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to
+the Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined by
+everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich von
+Hutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed," rang loud through the
+districts of Germany.
+
+Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, which
+conceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe to
+her foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerly
+in the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shed
+it's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for
+national independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequences
+for the development of humanity had been fought out since the Persian
+wars. In this cause the German people nearly disappeared, and lost all
+political importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned to
+foreign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church did
+not remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and the
+Staufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a
+mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself.
+Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won an
+undisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritual
+freedom was established. This most important element of civilization was
+retained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become ever
+since the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace of
+Westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious
+freedom.
+
+The States of the Latin race on their side now put forward strong claims
+to the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas of
+freedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled among
+themselves about the predominance. At the same time, in Germanized
+England a firs-class Protestant power was being developed, and the age
+of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the Reformation
+and the Thirty Years' War, opened new and unsuspected paths to human
+intellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a fresh
+stimulus. Gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the
+newly-discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fell
+to the lot of the Germanic and the southern part to that of the Latin
+race. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, and
+consequently, of world politics. Germany remained excluded from this
+great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes
+and religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, the
+Low Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repel
+the inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the French
+ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by these
+wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world.
+Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in
+political power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States,
+which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the German cause.
+But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre of
+Protestant power was established in the North--i.e., Prussia.
+
+After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back the
+Slavs, who poured in from the East, in wrestling large tracts from them,
+and in completely Germanizing them. This struggle, like that with the
+niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which
+extended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and successfully planted
+Germanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finally
+victorious also against Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic.
+In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strong
+political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an
+influential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germany
+devolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to Catholic
+Austria grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into an
+independent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a German
+population, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' War
+Prussia broke away from Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confronted
+France and Russia as an independent Protestant State.
+
+But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once more
+slowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy has exhausted the
+resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of the
+monarchy, _L'état c'est moi,_ carried to an extreme, provoked a
+tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous
+revolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more specially in
+Germany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism.
+The German Empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary States survived,
+among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again under
+Napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and
+bore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain,
+and even to the inhospitable plains of Russia, which by a gradual
+political absorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of power
+in wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to an
+important place among the European nations. Austria, which had become
+more and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before the
+mighty Corsican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her
+dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught.
+
+But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest
+humiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of
+the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the
+Protestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm,
+won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and for
+Germany, and paved the way for further world-wide historical
+developments.
+
+While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular
+despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights,_ another
+quite different revolution was working in Prussia--the revolution of
+_duty_. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately
+to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State.
+Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposition
+to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the idea
+of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to
+sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the
+clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis
+on which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same time
+Stein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in Prussia.
+
+While measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thus
+being adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was to
+depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a
+German Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in the
+domain of art and science, where German character and endeavour found
+the deepest and fullest expression. A great change had been effected in
+this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year
+1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and
+deeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised their
+minds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlit
+heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and
+superiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and science
+became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this
+dismembered people, and decided the victory of Protestantism in German
+life." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte", i., p. 88.]
+
+Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she
+developed the root-idea of the Reformation into the right of
+unrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [C] Moral obligations, such as no
+nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the
+philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs
+of her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies was
+realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classical
+literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as
+the political work of the Prussian monarchy", [D] and of those men of
+action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin.
+
+[Footnote C: _Ibid.,_ i., p. 90.]
+
+[Footnote D: _Ibid._]
+
+The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an event
+in the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the great
+annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last
+abortion of the revolution--a
+
+  "Part of the power that still
+  Produces Good, while still devising Ill";
+
+on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Let
+man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the
+religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual
+change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; who
+gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect,
+and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people to
+consciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed that
+the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain;
+a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify
+to the divinity in man.
+
+The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to
+whom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate of
+the Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront of
+humanity.
+
+Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation
+could give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, and
+Goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of
+Liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny.
+
+We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great
+struggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, and
+weakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed
+the German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure
+enthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expression
+in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of
+thousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took a
+prominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost to
+their mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria and
+Russia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties.
+
+Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing up
+from the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that no
+longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came to
+the front, King William I. and the hero of the Saxon forest. Resolutely
+they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from
+ignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of the
+popular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters with
+Austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and left
+the German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a
+Great Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the
+vast majority of the German peoples united under the Imperial crown
+which the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire was
+revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria,
+and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the North
+Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from the
+ashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old German
+Confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs.
+
+It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of Germany
+vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the
+economic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on all
+sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed in
+between France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed
+to gather the full fruits of our victories. The short-sightedness and
+party feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag--the old hereditary failings
+of our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intense
+love of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behind
+in the race with other countries.
+
+In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious
+Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found
+the second largest colonial Empire in the world; England appropriated
+the most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a
+comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content
+with some modest strips of territory. In addition to, and in connection
+with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward.
+
+Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Frederick the Great,
+and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conception
+of the State has completely changed since the turn of the century. The
+patrimonial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary possession of
+the Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents the
+reverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant of
+the State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is the
+key to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of the
+State the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the
+tendency is as follows: Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and
+the nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquire
+a uniform national character and common national interests.
+
+This new order of things entirely altered the basis of international
+relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerce
+and trade also developed on wholly new lines.
+
+After 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and trade
+restrictions--were gradually removed. Landed property ceased to be a
+monopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "England
+introduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machinery
+into industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by
+steamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the same
+time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and
+chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton.
+There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in
+the widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension of
+colonization over Polynesia, etc." England at the same time girdled the
+earth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort of
+world-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not,
+indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone
+days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests
+dependent on herself.
+
+Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, linking the West
+and the East, the United States of North America have risen to be an
+industrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported by
+exceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing
+character of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitable
+recognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on the
+point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy.
+
+
+Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but has
+extended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressing
+farther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossed
+swords with the States of the Mongolian race. This vast population,
+which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands of
+years of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, and
+categorically claims its share in international life. The entrance of
+Japan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms.
+"Asia for the Asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her
+breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power has
+emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a European foe.
+China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mighty
+movement is thrilling Asia--the awakening of a new epoch.
+
+Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the
+civilized countries of Europe, are threatening from Asia, the old cradle
+of the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forces
+which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of the
+French Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized
+the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a
+consciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers,
+originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material
+position, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, and
+seek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. They do not
+wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically
+recognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, in
+which they themselves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not only
+perpetually menace State and society, but endanger in the separate
+countries the industries from which they live, since they threaten to
+destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by
+continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany this
+movement has affected large sections of the population.
+
+Until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture and
+cattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of German
+industries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in
+connection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade has
+marvellously increased. Germany has become an industrial and trading
+nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds
+work and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost its
+leading position in the economic life of the people. The artisan
+class has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in trade
+unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the
+international social democracy. It is hostile to the national class
+distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of
+the State.
+
+It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous
+agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the
+anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law of
+self-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certain
+point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizen
+may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an
+opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly
+devotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grant
+this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of
+capital.
+
+Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, it
+may create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employment
+to all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislation
+against every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age,
+or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of
+work, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him from
+working.
+
+The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of three
+victorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large for
+present purposes, although without the conscious intention of the State.
+German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a
+market for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervened
+with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. As
+Scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of
+man, so the Emperor William I. recognized the duty of the State towards
+those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The position
+of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social
+legislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now
+existed.
+
+A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats
+indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the
+working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing
+State and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and
+progress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, How
+to win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willing
+workers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny.
+
+Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of
+all progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world.
+Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last
+century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a
+prominent position through the universality of her philosophy and her
+thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things.
+
+The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature are
+attested by the fact that the annual export of German books to foreign
+countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that
+of France, England, and America combined. It is only in the domain of
+the exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to give
+precedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win a
+leading position. It shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions,
+and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our
+political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The German
+Empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only are
+the social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, are
+divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter
+enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish
+denominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between North
+and South has prevented the population from growing into a completely
+united body.
+
+So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of
+sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into
+narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in
+her nationality, her intellectual development, in her science,
+industries, and trade.
+
+And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future?
+What duties are enforced on us by the past?
+
+It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the
+German State answers this question, depend not only our own further
+development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of
+the world.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION
+
+Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical
+development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of
+human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire of
+Central Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seeds
+of intellectual and moral development were sown by the German
+intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with
+irresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for the
+entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German
+people.
+
+This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on
+the freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have ever
+and again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nation
+whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as
+the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the
+intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free
+and natural development. The Germans have thus always been the
+standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark
+against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worsted
+in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best
+heart's blood in the cause. Intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruled
+the Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this
+people--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the
+political attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth
+century. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed
+into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need of
+a free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengaged
+itself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened into
+world-historical importance.
+
+Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, on
+which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must
+rest: the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation,
+which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked
+all free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop to
+the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mind
+the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time
+pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On this
+substructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose
+deepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result of
+free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a
+foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way and
+that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and
+knowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress.
+Reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religious
+reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion,
+and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not
+attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results
+of natural philosophy.
+
+The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle
+for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. We
+are thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannot
+shrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is
+being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human
+efforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part
+in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special
+qualities.
+
+No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate
+all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own
+spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it
+received. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culture
+with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the great
+community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "Depth of
+conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the
+limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to
+traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all
+nations and ages--this has at all times been the German characteristic;
+this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture." [A] To no
+nation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self
+"that which is given to mankind as a whole." We often see in other
+nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same
+capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which
+specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and
+imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position.
+
+[Footnote A: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 95.]
+
+There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge
+our highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we can
+mount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of science
+and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics
+touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results
+of scientific inquiry.
+
+First and foremost it is German science which must regain its
+superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate
+our birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of the
+perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over
+Nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more
+useful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutions
+of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrict
+ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit
+civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create
+conditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can
+find its expression.
+
+It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which
+exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition
+not only our future development, but the higher life generally. These
+problems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply and
+permanently than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the
+empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany.
+The German nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, which
+works slowly in opposition to the different movements. The Germans thus
+seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great
+controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into
+the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of
+evolution.
+
+We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no
+doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the
+community and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts to
+find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class
+with healthy and patriotic ambitions.
+
+It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty,
+requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed
+upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation,
+and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity
+which is lamentably deficient to-day.
+
+No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The old
+antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in
+Germany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and
+political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute
+liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the
+conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present there
+appears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism of
+Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of
+the Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movement
+can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect
+of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is
+rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially all
+denominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must never
+renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To
+do so would mean loss of prestige.
+
+Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of human
+civilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir of
+a great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no less
+significance in the sphere of its international relations. These
+problems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply the
+intellectual development, and on their solution depends the position of
+Germany in the world.
+
+The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms
+and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered
+geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the
+Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large
+number of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other
+States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have
+developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national
+customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of
+her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most
+characteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie
+outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the
+strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against
+the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves
+are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism,
+which seems to have lost its old victorious strength.
+
+Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the
+overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign
+countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is
+absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even
+to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its
+increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of
+living.
+
+This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation,
+or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its
+intellectual importance.
+
+At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course of
+centuries grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of all
+political significance, a large section of our people did not feel this
+insufficiency. Even during the age of our classical literature the
+patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the
+thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of German
+genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 195.]
+
+Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines:
+
+  "German majesty and honour
+  Fall not with the princes' crown;
+  When amid the flames of war
+  German Empire crashes down,
+  German greatness stands unscathed." [C]
+
+[Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905
+by Bernhard Suphan.]
+
+The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds
+different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence
+of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since
+we must now take into consideration the immense development of Germany
+in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old
+importance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from the
+vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due
+measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political
+federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can
+only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act
+in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties
+towards the human race.
+
+Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding
+the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a
+foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the
+ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to
+imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched
+again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly
+threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely
+repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics
+from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance
+westwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. On
+the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions
+which were once under German influence are now once more subject to
+Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Russian
+Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The
+German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs;
+Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic
+workmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia.
+Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic
+flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an
+obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of
+self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined
+whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is
+not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will
+be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict
+grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and
+show less determination to protect the German soil at all costs.
+
+The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their
+struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their
+nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot
+withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our
+trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but
+they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America.
+The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish,
+and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the
+Government must reckon.
+
+Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to
+preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of
+universal culture.
+
+Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and
+in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the
+world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful
+as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are
+contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while
+the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we
+wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our
+civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back
+in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world.
+
+Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1,
+1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is
+already large enough and does not need expansion.... We shall have to
+consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... We
+have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to
+take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should
+receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [D]
+
+[Footnote D: This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister
+Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."]
+
+That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed.
+
+If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we
+survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must
+admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not
+here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of
+the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language.
+
+England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from
+the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies which
+are directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in the
+interest of English industries and English capital. The work of
+civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has
+always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her
+sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by
+transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent
+culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy
+self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as
+Canada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they
+will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not
+only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the
+present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in
+the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to
+secure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is a
+great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and
+it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence.
+
+The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by
+them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister,
+Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Ten
+years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France
+has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in
+every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be
+spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown
+in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of
+Heaven." [E]
+
+[Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."]
+
+The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German
+policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading
+thought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputes
+under which the partition of Africa and the last phase of French
+colonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents to
+Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distant
+and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of
+the country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, it
+is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run,
+since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed,
+tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned
+colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have
+obtained the best shares."
+
+This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with
+mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital
+powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for
+colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria,
+has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and
+prides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte
+and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the
+Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France
+in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy
+alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany.
+
+The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of
+attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In the
+face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its
+importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place
+in the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspire
+to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the
+limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach this
+goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never
+again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be
+opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international
+politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair
+rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality
+and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to
+them.
+
+Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a
+fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity.
+
+The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and
+improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of
+great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely
+extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary
+capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more
+brilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have
+returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The
+increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to
+a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative
+industrial occupation.
+
+There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid
+development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the
+import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale
+of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of
+life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which
+England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take
+much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to
+close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order to
+encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of
+other countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends
+on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question
+of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall
+very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population
+means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the
+question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of
+population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and
+home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation
+will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for
+the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We
+shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to
+surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in
+the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a
+home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland.
+There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the
+unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from
+building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and
+at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers,
+may keep our sea communications open.
+
+We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial
+possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are
+only used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think of
+colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal
+population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and
+immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which
+retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance
+for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each
+nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is
+quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count
+among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be."
+[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 8.]
+
+We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our
+requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our
+growing working population, but would supply raw materials and
+foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that
+immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying
+unproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We
+find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers,
+and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign
+masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged,
+do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will
+depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world
+speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the
+German Empire?
+
+These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from
+the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its
+present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this
+point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and
+hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political
+relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course
+of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to
+political paralysis at the time when the great European States built
+themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not
+enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in
+politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long
+concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural
+development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power,
+international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What
+we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior
+force of hostile interests and Powers.
+
+It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths
+we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our
+forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the
+straight road of our intended development.
+
+The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an
+advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension,
+it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often
+follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to
+stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every
+occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will
+be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+
+WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL
+
+In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its
+history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted
+to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the
+Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions,
+must be the basis of our future development.
+
+The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international
+relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the
+impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character
+and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even
+at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and
+our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it
+will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us.
+
+  "The man of sense will by the forelock clutch
+  Whatever lies within his power,
+  Stick fast to it, and neither shirk,
+  Nor from his enterprise be thrust,
+  But, having once begun to work,
+  Go working on because he must."
+                               _Faust_
+                      (translated by Sir Theodore Martin).
+
+The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the
+hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing
+territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of
+both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of
+these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity,
+examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which
+concern us are weighed one against the other.
+
+These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly
+to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the
+States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must
+try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the
+day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations
+of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion.
+We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions
+of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and
+therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines
+of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a
+country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or
+timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not
+seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy
+is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men
+who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and
+often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such
+digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his
+opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the
+student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep
+his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must
+therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense
+clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions.
+
+We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps.
+
+On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive
+alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In
+this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably
+unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately
+connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States
+combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the
+North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical
+national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to
+shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred
+battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the
+bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the
+Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of
+Slavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories.
+There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the
+struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and
+commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those
+of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react
+detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between
+Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of
+overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its
+political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be
+assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so
+long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the
+Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy
+to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during
+the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered
+such an alliance possible.
+
+The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of
+Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show
+many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough
+to influence the political position of the Empire.
+
+Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The
+antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will
+diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a
+natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by
+Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its
+political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from
+her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her
+true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is
+the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power.
+That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor
+Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a
+permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in
+Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural
+colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by
+Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us,
+even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this
+annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We
+should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the
+Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and
+France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance.
+
+
+The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive
+character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but
+does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not
+guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential
+interests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in
+its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events.
+Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences," pointed out that
+this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the
+future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her
+Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with
+England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance.
+The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an
+undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct
+opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in
+order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This
+undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as
+the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the
+encroachment of Italy into those regions.
+
+The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has
+suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in
+the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy
+look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to
+the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not
+regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied
+armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We
+must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the
+Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we
+calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own
+political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to
+strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an
+essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of
+the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then
+will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real
+meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative
+results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital
+interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with
+sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not
+concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the
+consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or,
+indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would
+probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria.
+Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of
+Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and
+incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a
+contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we
+must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France.
+
+England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts
+to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in
+Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which
+secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in
+commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's
+Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in
+combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the
+coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against
+England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding
+such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She
+is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of
+the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make
+overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies
+can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It is
+our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can.
+
+France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European
+Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of
+_revanche_. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she
+has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the
+humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the
+defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she
+wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and,
+if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe
+which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune
+smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too
+weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all
+protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for
+this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, are
+inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this
+latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped,
+and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to
+Germany than from Russia.
+
+The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring
+a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The
+establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of
+a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political
+annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers,
+so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible
+illusion as to its extent and meaning.
+
+Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to
+approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her
+North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that
+strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of
+colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French
+sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France
+will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her
+best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in
+every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the
+Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed
+them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance
+which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable
+that she will maintain honourably and with no _arrière-pensée_ the
+obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco.
+The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the
+French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The French
+policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on
+the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite
+unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can
+be negotiated before the question between them has been once more
+decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France
+sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but
+strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the
+East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others.
+
+The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and
+of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is
+following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to
+an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central
+Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _status
+quo_. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with
+Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be
+overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any
+aggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seems
+likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more
+reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanying
+events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of
+internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable,
+therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention
+in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept
+away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose,
+meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and
+an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although
+this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions
+of Germany in North Persia.
+
+It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is
+adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the
+mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether
+in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the
+direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the
+dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate
+to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has
+long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the
+Baltic.
+
+Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean,
+and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European
+policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself,
+also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years
+been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into
+Central Europe.
+
+Pan-Slavism is still hard at work.
+
+It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement
+and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Her
+present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the
+present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong
+monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the
+internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation
+is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry
+is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from
+what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a
+healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Government
+has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed
+expectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under the
+stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an
+attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad.
+Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in
+the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China,
+must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly,
+Turkey.
+
+Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the
+Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not
+identical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive
+war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She
+wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of
+Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and
+East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on
+advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed.
+Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with
+Germany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of the
+German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore
+always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths.
+
+England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian
+Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the
+spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France
+she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany
+under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms.
+
+The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the
+heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So,
+also, no natural community of interests exists between England and
+France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to
+any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an
+Anglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostility
+to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two
+States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might
+mask the real objects.
+
+This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very
+comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made
+astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which
+commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which
+England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may
+well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political
+and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition
+in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The
+American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and
+will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the
+point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far
+as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite
+of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily
+directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in
+order to understand the line of thought which guides the English
+politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found
+in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the
+world.
+
+Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of
+view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of
+Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the
+other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North
+America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenest
+competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The
+annexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty with
+Japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two
+nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked,
+and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union
+are so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vast
+distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very
+bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly has
+always diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as quite recently
+in the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the object
+clearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearing
+the consequences of such collision. The American competition in trade
+and industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated as
+inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense,
+according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty by
+which a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established.
+
+England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America.
+The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in the
+further development of things, be so accentuated that England will be
+forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an
+undisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action.
+The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strained
+to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the Arbitration
+Treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does not
+consider that the present political relations of the two nations are
+permanent.
+
+There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly
+threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India
+and Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation for
+independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the
+Low-German element in South Africa.
+
+Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English
+position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national
+movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it
+clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement.
+She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine
+the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support,
+and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in
+opposition to the Caliphate.
+
+The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where
+some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England,
+so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, has
+attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But
+now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows
+itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism,
+thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of
+Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave
+danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in
+the world.
+
+While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and
+abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together,
+either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto.
+Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union has
+definitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the Imperial
+Conference in 1911 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated.
+.... When the question of imperial defence came up, the policy was
+rejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the oversea
+dominions in every imaginable eventuality." The great self-ruled
+colonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour of
+need, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employed
+wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not
+approve." [A] There are clear indications that the policy of the
+dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is
+contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and
+Australia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV., into independent
+nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal
+independence.
+
+[Footnote A: Th. Schiemann in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of July 5, 1911.]
+
+All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of
+England's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitude
+towards Germany.
+
+England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her
+imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must
+be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must
+not be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be
+destroyed.
+
+A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great
+English colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distant
+parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of
+expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet
+might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory
+which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of
+England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability of
+expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can
+no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall
+victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered.
+
+The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the
+German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer
+a prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without any
+excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet,
+contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a
+correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French
+fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely
+getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other
+contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable
+means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years
+to come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importance
+of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia.
+
+The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters.
+It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance of
+power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one
+of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled
+and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's
+stage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes
+undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This
+policy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each
+other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directly
+from this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen
+France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State
+which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born
+rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the
+East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus
+the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England's
+most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and
+self-evident.
+
+The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would
+chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is
+the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of
+the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English
+point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war.
+England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a
+large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before
+the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and
+to some extent a great benefit, to English industries.
+
+After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite
+comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check
+the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in
+large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is
+building, and attack the objectionable neighbour.
+
+English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt
+to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the
+most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance--Germany, England, and
+America--has been suggested.[B] But for such a union with Germany to be
+possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German
+development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our
+colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial
+and industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her
+traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the
+Great Powers in the world.
+
+[Footnote B: "The United States and the War Cloud in Europe," by Th.
+Schiemann, _McClure's Magazine_, June, 1910.]
+
+It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent
+to that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacit
+approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of
+the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements
+of English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and
+the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable
+indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy.
+The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every
+expansion of Germany's power were openly shown in the very recent
+Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on
+the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without
+a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp.
+
+A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which
+no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep
+the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our
+political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves
+with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and
+Utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter
+the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixity
+of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a
+vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire.
+
+On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part in
+English policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the one
+side, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out
+her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her
+fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the
+political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy
+in the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political,
+notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically
+with those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this.
+
+No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has at
+present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in
+the sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding with
+Germany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely that
+the Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of
+England. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded in
+inflicting a political and military defeat on Germany.
+
+For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations about
+Arbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany.
+There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us
+in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutely
+opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement
+in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the
+nature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen
+competition between the two countries, especially in South America;
+there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political
+complications.
+
+Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only
+in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China.
+In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and
+seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to
+count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitude
+to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions
+in East Asia. If the two nations joined hands--a hardly probable
+eventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain an
+independent position between them. The political rivalry between
+the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they are
+antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other
+in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to
+retain their possessions in Asia.
+
+While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present
+directly influence our policy, Turkey--the predominant Power of the Near
+East--is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is
+emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest
+course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple
+Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which
+threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage.
+Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against
+Russia and against England--the two States, that is, with whose
+hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can
+threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short
+sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no
+sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a
+war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to
+the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding
+position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important
+key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong
+to Russia or England.
+
+If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so
+long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern
+basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters.
+Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a
+development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be
+strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite
+impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position,
+while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her.
+From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the
+Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of
+Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be.
+
+Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent
+importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her
+Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German
+policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres
+of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means
+negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey;
+Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for
+Germany.
+
+Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared
+neutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20, 1815, under the
+collective guarantee [C] of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in the
+Treaties of London of November 15,1831, and of April 19,1839, on the
+part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself.
+
+[Footnote C: By a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of the
+contracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all
+agree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the _right_ to
+interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced.]
+
+If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the
+continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance
+and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement
+balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we
+take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be
+guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple
+Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In
+consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France,
+and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to
+Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not
+inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all
+considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political
+superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in
+strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English
+landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy
+really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior
+forces will be united against Germany and Austria.
+
+Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily
+difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our
+nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an
+extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we
+are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets
+for our growing industries. But at every step which we take in this
+direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet
+have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes,
+by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further
+expansion of German international influence and of German maritime
+power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the
+English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved
+in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not
+neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her
+extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance,
+will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off
+the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be
+only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be
+paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces
+in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against
+France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps
+with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on
+the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position
+lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion
+barred.
+
+Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the
+international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out,
+cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment,
+though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the
+one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and
+warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with
+which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where
+their interests clash.
+
+With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but
+not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently
+peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden,
+but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisis
+in the history of the German nation.
+
+We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our
+position among the Powers of _Europe_; we now must decide whether we
+wish to develop into and maintain a _World Empire_, and procure for
+German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been
+hitherto withheld from them.
+
+Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make
+the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we
+willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower
+in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is
+involved in our decision.
+
+"To be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day,
+disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests
+and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official
+peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history
+inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the
+narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region
+of realities.
+
+There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and
+development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the _status
+quo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever
+seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and
+temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to
+gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the
+trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior
+tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the
+powers of a continuous development.
+
+We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing
+still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression,
+and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with
+our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are
+straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to
+extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and
+advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with
+peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to
+continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon
+us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our
+arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and
+we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be
+sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and
+the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritual
+and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German
+thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind.
+
+If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a
+catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to
+attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at
+the risk of a war with numerically superior foes.
+
+Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by
+acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German
+colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from
+Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual
+incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former
+South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of
+Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish
+population.
+
+Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our
+political power in other ways.
+
+In the first place, our political position would be considerably
+consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that
+France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find
+ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another _we
+must square our account with France_ if we wish for a free hand in our
+international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a
+sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all
+cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by
+force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never
+again come across our path.
+
+Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political
+power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case
+of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with
+armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
+our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same
+lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be
+presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good
+policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and
+the Triple Alliance has already been discussed.
+
+Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the
+Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as
+mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan
+Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further
+intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in
+Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence,
+in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the
+integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their
+independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best
+secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might
+eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central
+European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by
+this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily
+unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be
+essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the
+expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the
+geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of
+the political community based on it.
+
+We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial
+territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our
+population. Very recent events have shown that, under certain
+circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa
+by pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugal
+might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the
+Portuguese colonies. We may assume that some understanding exists
+between England and Germany which contemplates a division of the
+Portuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_.
+It cannot, indeed, be certain that England, if the contingency arrives,
+would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually
+exists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even been
+often said, although disputed in other quarters, that Great Britain,
+after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of the
+Portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugal
+the possession of _all_ her colonies.
+
+Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our
+African territory would be possible. These need not be discussed here
+more particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of
+a successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of
+territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require
+countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there
+are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the
+settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our
+overflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generally
+speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our
+industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the
+growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This
+represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us
+from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization.
+
+A part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditions
+point--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of
+the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of
+providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but
+remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign
+countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our
+exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture.
+
+An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity.
+It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace
+the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for
+the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. This
+notion is only justified in a certain sense. In the first place, such a
+policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow
+population in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee the
+certainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. It secures to
+all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means
+competition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political power
+which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the
+economic relations. The principle of the open door prevails
+everywhere--in Egypt, Manchuria, in the Congo State, in Morocco--and
+everywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: in
+Manchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and in
+Morocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fall
+naturally to that State which is practically dominant; its products are
+bought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power of
+the State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar
+advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be
+evaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best be
+regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonial
+policy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies or its own
+and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets
+lie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations.
+
+The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many
+old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European
+policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in
+Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost
+sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely
+disregarded.
+
+The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling
+that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for
+the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the
+limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays
+the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence
+in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory
+of balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power,
+and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain
+guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The
+conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a close
+community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into
+political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort
+of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a
+State-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five
+Great Powers--England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which
+latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866
+Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power.
+
+"Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among
+the nations." "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a
+real equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated,"[D] This
+condition does not exist between the European nations. England by
+herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow
+themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of
+French. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by
+special alliances. One result only has been obtained--the hindrance of
+the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in
+particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power
+can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing
+state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of
+rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually
+ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers
+which stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England's
+policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and
+to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order
+herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and
+the sovereignty of the world.
+
+[Footnote D: Treitschke.]
+
+We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present
+distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a
+State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of
+course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just
+basis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of one
+embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is
+established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in
+this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central
+European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in
+one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase
+our own power.
+
+A further question, suggested by the present political position, is
+whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning
+of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a
+different conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be,
+permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one
+contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of
+Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory
+is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State from
+which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has
+no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This
+argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that,
+in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last
+mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the
+neutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic,
+since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral
+country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to
+the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest
+moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development
+presupposes such competition.
+
+[Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without
+guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.]
+
+Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal
+affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the
+State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and
+powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference
+in the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances of
+such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in the
+private affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but
+none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval
+preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international
+intercourse that between the States of one and the same political system
+a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The
+unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to
+political intercourse under all conditions involves serious
+difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first
+preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord
+Palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false is
+the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States
+of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for
+international politics can be laid down.
+
+After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals;
+and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his
+affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the
+individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates
+the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the
+State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But
+no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide
+whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its
+own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State
+renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should
+circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party
+disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat
+to the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every State
+acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of
+another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an
+interference may become." On the other hand, it must be remembered that
+the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still
+graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international
+right, but simply and solely on power and expediency.
+
+I have gone closely into these questions of international policy
+because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly
+influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and
+may give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential that
+we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by
+considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only
+depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must
+remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any
+circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that
+the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as
+possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions
+possible. "No man," so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3,
+1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to
+make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take
+advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position."
+
+If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which
+guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our
+forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts.
+
+The political and national development of the German people has always,
+so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the
+hereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism of
+the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties,
+the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national
+objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often,
+also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is
+painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so
+restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in
+fruitless quarrels among themselves.
+
+Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome
+these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy,
+consistent development of our power.
+
+It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual and
+social life arising from the like variety of the German nationality and
+political system offers valuable advantages. It presents countless
+centres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a high
+spiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development.
+But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference of
+this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics.
+
+Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions
+which are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugal
+forces of the German nature--the common system of defence of our country
+by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong
+national empire.
+
+No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its own
+destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to
+no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. A
+glance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which
+is forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day.
+
+The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the common
+interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions,
+as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful
+personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to
+stir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality,
+and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union.
+
+We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of
+acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends
+through and for our people.
+
+Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German character
+to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development
+of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific,
+and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State is
+beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the
+independence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills and
+stunts the independence of free men." [F] This independence of the
+individual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the State,
+forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central
+power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our
+social conditions.
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 2.]
+
+We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense,
+together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism,
+not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in
+the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our
+great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great
+part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the
+contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our
+political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the
+nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably
+beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once
+again, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament will
+be heard:
+
+  "O Germany, thy oaks still stand,
+  But thou art fallen, glorious land!"
+                                 KÖRNER.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+
+THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR
+
+Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture
+to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by
+formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will be
+impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future
+without an appeal to arms.
+
+Knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the political
+situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible
+for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an
+army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to
+battle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time
+down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of
+need.
+
+Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for
+warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of
+the situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested in
+the Reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to
+understand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic
+misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these
+for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country)
+cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand,
+brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great
+wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is
+often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national
+duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our
+people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be
+ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to
+discharge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of
+preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are
+passing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable to
+consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so
+much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect;
+we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true
+interests of the country better than by improving its military
+capabilities.
+
+Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it must
+maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national
+asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the
+war and supply the requisite means.
+
+This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in
+national development.
+
+As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold
+the field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, do
+not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of
+victory--so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with the
+people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is
+capable of wielding the sword with success.
+
+Military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but it
+develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the
+occupations of peace. It educates a man to the full mastery of his body,
+to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental
+powers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him to
+order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respect
+and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work.
+
+It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service
+deprives economic life of forces which could have been more
+appropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. These forces are
+not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life.
+Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly
+repay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. It
+is therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of its
+countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of
+war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and
+improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which
+the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly
+an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and
+educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus
+promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than
+achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which
+certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the
+national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them
+a number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency to
+luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations.
+Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level
+as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must
+complete and assist the other. But a people which does not willingly
+bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service
+renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and
+assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are
+one-sided and evanescent.
+
+It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligations
+towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all
+tendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. The
+method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power
+can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depends
+largely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical and
+political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently
+ranges between very wide extremes.
+
+In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military
+training was almost exclusively left to the individual. That was
+sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made
+them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to
+hard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination,
+subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military
+system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the
+conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made
+to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account
+of political possibilities. The great European States maintain standing
+armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or
+shorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenary
+army, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filled
+by volunteers.
+
+In these various ways different degrees of military efficiency are
+obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and
+intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the
+requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities
+become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency.
+
+When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that
+with growing civilization the requisite military capacities are always
+changing. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldiers
+who fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different from
+those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have the
+physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities
+expected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to the
+individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of
+warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in
+the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it
+is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. The
+preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military
+sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized
+State from those in countries, standing on a lower level of
+civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war
+is fought under relatively simple conditions.
+
+The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less
+developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form
+of military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising
+herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps
+in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and
+proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and
+educational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, by
+employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it
+never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development.
+
+When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find
+ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical
+and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact
+with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself.
+
+A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard
+to the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed in
+the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other
+ways. We see the individual States--according to their geographical
+position, their relations to other States and the military strength of
+their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater
+or less importance in the political system of the world--making their
+military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and
+expenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life of
+civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its
+emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is
+everywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a _means_ of
+attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength.
+
+Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position
+and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify
+her policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only
+with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling
+a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a
+continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. As
+a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental
+European war against her will.
+
+So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties,
+and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays
+most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to
+develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the
+security afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America,
+again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest
+limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval
+power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the
+continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any
+considerable forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea
+conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has
+acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly
+with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made
+concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her
+position in the world.
+
+While in some States a restriction of armaments is natural and
+justifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerve
+to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of
+Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political
+pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they
+are no longer justified by the size of her population and her
+international importance. France affords a conspicuous example of
+self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral
+duties.
+
+In the other European States, as in France, external political
+conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate
+the method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, which
+necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own
+justification.
+
+A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of
+nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in
+the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength
+to safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, under
+certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and
+political schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be
+deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements
+of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and
+maintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of all
+opposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases.
+
+A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on the
+friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as
+fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international
+conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support
+from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and under
+what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the
+consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own
+sphere of power.
+
+This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State
+is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace
+the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary
+expenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it is
+itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the
+largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another
+aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power of
+such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison
+with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable
+military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a
+view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military
+preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a
+defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent
+interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision
+will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a
+real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective
+addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist.
+The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary
+State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain
+influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local
+conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of
+the country.
+
+It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the
+utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such
+is, in fact, the case.
+
+In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with the
+political and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy,
+preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland,
+situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political
+independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Germany and the
+navy of England.
+
+The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on
+its own power.
+
+The power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies will
+have a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans and
+military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes;
+but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations
+alone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent and
+unqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless,
+and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and
+shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed.
+
+The military power of an independent State in the true sense must
+guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests
+of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of
+development. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be
+considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military
+efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions
+must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object
+thereby to be gained. This object--of which each individual must be
+conscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises
+the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of
+the State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen.
+
+A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital
+factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the
+healthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope in
+international competition. This is also an essential condition for the
+unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where the
+natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by external
+circumstances, nation and State are stunted and individual growth is set
+back.
+
+Increasing political power and the consequent multiplication of
+possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the
+intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by
+every phase of history.
+
+The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself
+first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of
+statesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by force
+of arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty of
+every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale
+commensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemy
+cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On the
+contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most
+strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for
+the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than
+ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very
+important factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits,
+which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of
+superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be
+spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a
+small, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War has
+proved this once more.
+
+Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of
+every State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert
+_power_, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of its
+personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the
+narrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible nor
+profitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined
+by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious
+development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military
+elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system
+cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. It
+needs a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. In
+the Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attacking
+strength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, because
+its foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political and
+moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas.
+
+The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the
+political necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree of
+warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may
+be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State's
+duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst out
+whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is
+brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of
+the State and of the army.
+
+It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties
+of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. The
+social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the
+duty of the State in a quite different light from the political
+_dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing
+of things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to the
+welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons
+on the horizon of the future.
+
+Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the
+nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these
+momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and
+experienced thinkers.
+
+First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in
+the present political world, even though all the elements for it are
+present.
+
+Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to
+40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so
+much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are
+annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is
+set up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would be
+available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would not
+mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say
+a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on
+active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from
+such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the
+continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike
+weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the
+individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the
+highest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the
+beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre
+cannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been
+ordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of the
+strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the
+rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins his
+service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier.
+With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we
+merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. We
+must not regard the present only, but provide for the future.
+
+The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makes
+the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes
+of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of
+arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity
+of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is
+sinning against his country.
+
+The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations,
+oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of
+things--these turn the scale.
+
+When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last century
+undertook the reorganization of the Prussian army, no political tension
+existed. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King had
+perceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet the
+requirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his
+people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations
+without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun.
+In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has
+powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being
+under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful
+co-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed was
+universally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, and
+accorded with traditional German sentiment.
+
+While the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of the
+political influences of the day, the military power of the probable
+opponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink without
+jeopardizing the national safety.
+
+Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries
+of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all
+these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the
+hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an
+obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as
+up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by
+every means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the army
+must be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, in
+which a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may be
+attained.
+
+Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree
+regulated by the political position of the State. If the State has
+satisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping
+its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive
+character. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous of
+expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must
+adopt a predominantly offensive military system.
+
+Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are
+dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide
+scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where
+the discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may lead
+to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war,
+and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In
+this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so
+clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that
+the majority of the nation accept his view. There are always and
+everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own,
+and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses.
+
+Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command
+of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful
+position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the
+population in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is
+too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets
+public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles,
+feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, which
+was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in the
+military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary
+unanimity.
+
+Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political independence
+rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of
+self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly
+supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it
+should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great
+duties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic
+evasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at
+home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects
+of our policy.
+
+To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion,
+as King William I. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the
+control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray
+too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly
+great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany.
+He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of
+inflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people.
+
+One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that
+permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake
+of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the
+taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious
+benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct
+disadvantages.
+
+The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by
+the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the
+sacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefully
+in view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the
+conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But
+where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual
+enforcement of universal service or of the requirements on which
+readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in
+order to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in order
+to maintain its vitality.
+
+One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction
+preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing
+conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military
+authorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy,
+since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon.
+Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty to
+perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit.
+
+It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to
+disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of
+the preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarily
+available. "No expenditure without security," runs the formula in which
+this policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security is
+fixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the duties
+which must be fulfilled--as Treitschke, our great historian and national
+politician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the great
+Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by
+sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically
+indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the
+nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that
+the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He
+can only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the Ministers
+for Commerce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to break
+down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the
+individual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to create
+favourable conditions for profitable business. A great impulse must
+thrill the whole productive and financial circles of the State, if the
+duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled.
+
+Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls for
+very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the
+entire social and political life of the people and on the financial
+policy of the State.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+
+THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR
+
+The social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defend
+itself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strength
+of the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors which
+determine the conditions of preparation for war.
+
+I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres
+of policy and progress which our history and our national character
+impose on us. My next task is to observe the possible military
+combinations which we must be prepared to face.
+
+In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can
+judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political
+intentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movements
+will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and
+this war will decide our future.
+
+It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our
+probable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessary
+basis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves the
+intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable
+efficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is
+determined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions
+clash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as to
+the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data
+available.
+
+If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups
+of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results:
+According to the recent communications of the French Finance Minister
+Klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan),
+the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910
+amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial
+Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to
+the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service
+auxiliaire "--that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in
+for service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to the
+information of the same Minister, including field army and reserves,
+consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. A reduction from
+this number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sources
+put down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army and
+reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000.
+
+To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1,700,000
+Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per
+cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made.
+
+If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will
+correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength
+of separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the
+2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to the
+infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a
+considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the
+transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers,
+70,000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical
+service, etc.), 90,000.
+
+No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per
+cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the
+birth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly,
+it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. Recourse already has been had to the
+expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of
+filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less
+efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves.
+
+Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the
+plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians
+and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with
+them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and
+trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited
+conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria.
+The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and
+conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops are
+in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops
+stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers
+against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are
+heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the
+Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the
+climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops.
+The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the
+march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value.
+There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with
+every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative
+proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native
+Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before
+Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the
+native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War,
+Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians.
+An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age
+available for military service. The Commission appointed for the purpose
+reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in
+the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined
+some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. They
+could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen
+the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in
+the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the
+formation of reserves.
+
+As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in her
+West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops
+available. As the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000,
+these figures may be considerably raised.
+
+Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalese
+sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912
+a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to
+Algeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black
+troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. There
+is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being
+transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient
+number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3,
+stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the
+Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France.
+Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a
+strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be
+available for a European war is still remote. But it cannot be
+questioned that they will be so some day.
+
+Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops in
+Europe contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but
+the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the
+territory termed "Morocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to
+come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale.
+The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in
+organizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the
+command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco.
+
+The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great addition
+to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the
+country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and France will
+certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in
+military matters.
+
+For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the
+reinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained from
+Algeria and Tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription is
+universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000
+men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have
+witnessed their exploits on the battlefields of Weissenburg and Wörth.
+At least one strong division of Turcos is already available.
+
+Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the military
+power of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are not
+published, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information is
+forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service,
+but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According to
+the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the
+Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of
+Cossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formed
+into 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe;
+3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry is
+divided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independent
+regiments.
+
+In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures
+42,000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strength
+of 20,000. Each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry
+divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive
+at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions,
+sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be added
+unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the
+war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000.
+
+This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. The
+Siberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would
+certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For the
+maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to
+leave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least one
+division at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. This
+would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men; so that
+we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army,
+1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of
+Cossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men,
+and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case
+of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men
+available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank
+for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed
+to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a
+certain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not known
+which of these formations would be really raised in event of
+mobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be
+put into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces which
+must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could
+easily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whether
+arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in
+sufficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empire
+like Russia in this respect.
+
+Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to
+England, the third member of the Triple Entente.
+
+The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into two
+divisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed by
+the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have
+at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of
+formation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns any
+European theatre of war.
+
+The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinet
+divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the
+native troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army,
+a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total
+of 300,000. It is now 270,000 strong, and is destined exclusively for
+home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very
+highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We
+have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army.
+This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which seven
+are with the colours and five in the reserve. The annual supply of
+recruits is 35,000. The regular reserve is now 136,000 strong. There is
+also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted
+for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the
+figure of 200,000.
+
+Of the regular English army, 134,000 men are stationed in England,
+74,500 in India (where, in combination with 159,000 native troops, they
+form the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39,000 in different
+stations--Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the other
+Colonies and Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt
+are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in
+the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong)
+one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in
+view of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of the
+English is precarious. The 11,000 troops now stationed in South Africa
+are to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. In
+event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there.
+
+For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account the
+regular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regular
+field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted
+brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and
+trains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form part
+of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. They consist of a
+very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for
+coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with
+some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home
+Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing
+its organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of this
+army can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150,000 men may
+be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troops
+compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the
+Colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutes
+the weak point in the British armament. England can employ her regular
+army in a Continental war so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies.
+This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war
+break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and
+especially in Egypt.
+
+Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente can
+put into the field, Germany can command an active army of 589,705 men
+(on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about
+25,500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a peace footing is
+361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. The combined war strength
+of the two States may be estimated as follows:
+
+In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and
+non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an
+average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of
+3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we
+have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment to
+it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French
+can match with about the same figures.
+
+The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,000. Liability to
+serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the
+Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a
+total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent.,
+911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained
+Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to
+911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a
+grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as
+Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe.
+
+In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available
+for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would
+be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available,
+partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion.
+However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never
+reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia
+present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the
+enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent
+generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the
+addition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would
+not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field.
+
+In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must
+be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are already
+reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple
+Alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the
+field against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France are
+available against Germany.
+
+[Footnote A: Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne."]
+
+The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000
+men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry,
+in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of
+Bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regiments
+in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are
+united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field
+artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193
+field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountain
+batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies.
+Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regiment
+and an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28,000 men.
+
+On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. Some 70,000
+men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. The
+militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might
+be mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9
+army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the
+Territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions.
+
+As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48
+officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500
+native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned
+officers and privates of Italian birth, and 3,800 natives.
+
+Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it is
+questionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value.
+It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence,
+while the protection of Tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim a
+powerful army if it is to be held against France.
+
+The Turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joined
+the coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents.
+
+The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275,000
+men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it:
+
+I. The Active Army (Nizam):
+
+  Infantry              133,000
+  Cavalry                26,000
+  Artillery              43,000
+  Pioneers                4,500
+  Special troops          7,500
+  Train formations        3,000
+  Mechanics               3,000
+
+A total, that is, of 220,000 men.
+
+2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. Within
+this limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns for
+short trainings.
+
+3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military employés, officials,
+and others, more than 30,000.
+
+The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. We
+need only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia,
+Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in a
+European theatre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be
+regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for
+local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior.
+To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplest
+process. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the
+Turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. Turkey thus is
+a very valuable ally to whichever party she joins.
+
+The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies into
+the field.
+
+Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons
+and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and
+home duties.
+
+Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing;
+this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The
+war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000
+rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4
+guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and
+228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (third
+line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the
+militia, an uncertain quantity.
+
+The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not
+known how they are distributed among the various branches of the
+service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including
+infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine
+guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and
+national militia, which latter is only available for home service and
+comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be
+400,000 strong.
+
+Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power
+in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to
+their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia
+cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of
+their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods.
+
+In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the
+permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. The
+infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent
+cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery
+14,000 men with 700 officers.
+
+For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000
+men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry,
+7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is
+therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part
+of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves
+and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000
+trained men available for service.
+
+Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chiefly
+concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into
+relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European
+States may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if
+they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a
+European war.
+
+Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under
+consideration, and then Belgium.
+
+Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men.
+The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive
+war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns
+and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a
+total of 141,000 men.
+
+The Landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36
+12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total
+strength of 69,000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000
+men.
+
+The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which
+varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally
+available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400
+garrison artillery, and I,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport
+troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000
+infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400
+artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of
+15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There
+is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active
+and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot
+artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers,
+including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder,
+Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Völkerack and Haringvliet there are various
+outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present
+unimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications
+in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland).
+
+Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English
+landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. It
+would easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us.
+
+
+Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows:
+26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison
+artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service.
+
+On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising
+74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers
+and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry
+divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each
+of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1
+squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a
+garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde
+civique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as
+a very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are
+the fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast
+fortifications.
+
+Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great
+military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong
+fortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of
+strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This
+State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry,
+2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the
+strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. In war-time an army of 62,000
+men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically
+of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special
+arms.
+
+Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises units
+from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as
+well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which
+is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There
+are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students
+from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age.
+
+The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can,
+accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case
+of war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head.
+
+In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might in
+combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to
+Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men
+can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the
+Landwehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm.
+
+Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently
+stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active
+army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is
+so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could
+at most be put into the field.
+
+As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the
+accompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affords
+a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that,
+numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours.
+This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of
+really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four
+battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have
+ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned
+battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The
+comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable,
+that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be
+noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really
+have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be
+counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the
+number of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto known
+about the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respect
+of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important
+factor if allied with the English.
+
+         |Battle-   |Armoured |Armoured| Armoured |Protected |Number   |N S
+Nation.  |ships     |Coast    |Gunboats| Cruisers |Cruisers  |of       |u u
+         |above     |Defence  |and     |          |          |Torpedo  |m b
+         |5,000     |Vessels  |Armoured|          |          |Vessels  |b m
+         |Tons.     |from     |Ships   |          |          |         |e a
+         |          |3000 Tons|under   |          |          |         |r r
+         |          |to 5,000 |3,000   |          |          |         |  i
+         |          |Tons     |Tons    |          |          |         |  i
+         +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n
+         |No|Displ. |No|Displ.|No|Displ|No|Displ. |No|Displ. |    |From|f e
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |200+|80- |  s
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |Tons| 200|
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |Tons|
+---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+---
+GERMANY: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |25|332,410| 5|20,600| -| --- |10|114,590|33|122,130| 117|  70| 12
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building|12|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | 4|   --- | 7|   --- |  14| -- | --
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ENGLAND: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |50|793,260| -|  --- | -| --- |38|484,970|66|333,540| 223|  36| 53
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building|12|286,640| -|  --- | -| --- | 6|145,320|20|101,320|  51| -- | 19
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+FRANCE:  |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |22|314,930| -|  --- | -| --- |22|214,670|10| 50,780|  71| 191| 52
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4| 93,880| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  13| -- | 19
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ITALY:   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    | 8| 96,980| -|  --- | -| --- |10| 79,530| 4| 10,040|  53|  39|  7
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4| 84,000| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3| 10,200|  14|  28| 13
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+AUSTRIA- |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ HUNGARY |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |11|102,620| -|  --- | -| --- | 3| 18,870| 4| 10,590|  18|  66|  7
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 5| 94,500| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3|   --- |   6| -- | --
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+RUSSIA:  |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Baltic   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ Fleet   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Ready  | 4| 62,300| -|  --- | 1|1,760| 6| 64,950| 4| 27,270|  60|  19| 13
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 8|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |   1| -- |  1
+Black Sea|  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ Fleet   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Ready  | 6| 72,640| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3| 13,620|  17|  10|  4
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  14| -- |  7
+Siberian |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Fleet  |--|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 2|  9,180|  20|   7| 13
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+UNITED   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ STATES: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |30|434,890| 4|13,120| -| --- |14|181,260|16| 65,270|  40|  28| 19
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 7|190,000| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  14| -- | 20
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+JAPAN:   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |13|194,690| 2| 8,540| -| --- |13|139,830|12| 49,170|  59|  49| 12
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 3|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | 4|107,120| 3| 15,000|   2| -- |  1
+---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+---
+
+Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leave
+a certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be stronger
+than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in
+event of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further assume
+that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-European
+stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together
+can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships
+alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by
+a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia
+joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition
+to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since
+the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships,
+and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our
+coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the
+other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of
+the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be
+superior to us.
+
+As regards _matériel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is
+distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our
+equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a
+superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless
+energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up
+some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these
+advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of
+an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English.
+
+Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under
+certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in
+this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente
+can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time.
+
+If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of
+the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany,
+we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in
+every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are
+very different.
+
+If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed
+she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member
+of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course,
+very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost
+equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization
+and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The
+French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united
+spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of
+the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too,
+has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to
+double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the
+French succeed in making a large African army available for a European
+theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with
+ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind,
+for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may
+safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if
+only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well
+that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of
+her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by
+the exercise of extraordinary efforts.
+
+It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military
+power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself
+desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably
+not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her
+own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured
+the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too
+high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has
+all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war,
+and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must
+expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple
+Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have
+struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination
+with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would
+attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland,
+and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the
+fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the
+considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and
+threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of
+the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without
+difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would
+enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would
+enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine,
+after investing Metz and Diedenhofen.
+
+[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.]
+
+England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must
+reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of
+an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only
+serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign.
+English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not
+coincident with those of France.
+
+The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea
+commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any
+further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy
+our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the
+supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium
+between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in
+order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never
+impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the
+private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her
+plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political
+position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war
+against us.
+
+If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on
+this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the
+first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by
+the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely
+compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might
+consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied
+by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in
+India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European
+war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might
+interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was
+important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall
+any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case
+of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea
+will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm
+resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial
+centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will
+throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of
+her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English
+policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other
+hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only
+so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval
+bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this
+because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's
+battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation
+will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a
+definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It is
+very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively
+acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South
+Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and
+stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the
+offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the
+generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale,
+held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not,
+according to available information, show the English army in a
+favourable light so far as strategical ability went.
+
+If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's
+probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian
+standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than
+a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the
+Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to
+join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of
+communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of
+power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is
+as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory
+over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople,
+but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia
+in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation
+for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could
+be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire.
+
+Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an
+offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite
+different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war.
+Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against
+complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not
+shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for
+political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such
+a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion
+in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast
+Empire the social and also political education, especially among the
+peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy
+seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have
+acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools
+have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind
+anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their
+interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote
+their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the
+Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of
+a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive
+war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an
+extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people
+showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be
+involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never
+bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary
+elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every
+weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in
+internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the
+community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the
+moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out
+their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of
+arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we
+have already mentioned.
+
+Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole
+power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a
+certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by
+defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater
+exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks,
+nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's
+political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another
+sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her
+losses on another frontier.
+
+Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia
+will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars
+against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented
+the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign
+revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and
+battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all
+probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats
+favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against
+Russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coûte_.
+
+If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole
+position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in
+the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile
+forces which would cripple the conduct of the war.
+
+So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese
+War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle
+showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest
+losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian
+army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but
+essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of
+the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong;
+indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every
+grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above
+mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian
+generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and
+that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must
+therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack.
+
+When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we
+cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military
+difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel
+successfully the attack of our opponents.
+
+In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our
+country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no
+opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the
+government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our
+western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north
+through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is
+there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper
+bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned
+through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country
+offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves
+resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their
+army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in
+their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten.
+
+The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and
+the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a
+prey to our enemies.
+
+The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a
+strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland.
+England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire
+oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east
+alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are
+encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides.
+This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so
+presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our
+opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan.
+
+If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact
+that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in
+carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia
+have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will
+sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of
+any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an
+extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by
+the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not
+merely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is a
+cause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound
+to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase
+of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct
+of Italy at the conference of Algeçiras sufficiently demonstrated. It
+even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always
+reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a
+defensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France and
+England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how
+difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with
+France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we
+think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which
+is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt
+whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were
+allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests
+are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the
+same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria.
+Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate
+State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements,
+patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to
+the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of
+such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that
+might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration.
+
+We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of
+standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the
+Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the
+struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own
+resolution for victory.
+
+Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our
+political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can
+only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and
+by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect
+continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their
+interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest,
+since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and
+obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable,
+then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own
+resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of
+desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would
+destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize
+the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would
+shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus
+check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for
+which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war
+will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind.
+This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power
+or downfall!" will be our rallying cry.
+
+Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident
+intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the
+end, come what may.
+
+We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted
+campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our
+enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to
+defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last
+is won.
+
+It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numerical
+equality with our opponents. On the contrary, we must strive to call up
+the entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the great
+decision which impends. We must try also to gain a certain superiority
+over our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold some
+winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. We
+must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only by
+continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our
+preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future
+makes on us. A nation of 65,000,000 which stakes _all_ her forces on
+winning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot be
+conquered. But it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblance
+of power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content with
+half-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only be
+attained by the exertion and development of all her powers.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+
+THE NEXT NAVAL WAR
+
+In the next European land war we shall probably face our foes with
+Austria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the day
+against any opposing forces. In a naval war we shall be thrown on our
+own resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against the
+superior forces which will certainly press us hard.
+
+There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for,
+although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack
+would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking
+our political power. It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack
+_us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France. The English have,
+besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should
+always be held before our eyes. They talk so much of a possible German
+attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question
+is from the opposite point of view. Again, the preparations which they
+are making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly have
+contemplated an attack on Germany. These preparations are like a
+strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves
+no doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbour of Rosyth is
+admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can mean
+nothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especially
+strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the
+Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These are
+measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand
+an inquiry into the military position thus created.
+
+The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since
+1902. Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it
+is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time.
+This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the
+circumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusively
+directed against Germany.
+
+We must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us to
+believe--reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, and
+shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. It will be
+so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the
+offensive against the English fleet. But we must contemplate the
+possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning
+the freedom of the seas, if England attacks us. We shall now discuss
+this possibility. On this matter I am expressing my personal views only,
+which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest
+exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed
+antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. I shall not
+betray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any. But I
+consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand
+what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met.
+
+In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong
+enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question
+remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure
+protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to
+become its master?
+
+The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack,
+instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the
+war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English
+fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its
+superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective
+blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that
+such an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does not
+seem to me to promise any great success.
+
+The English have secured themselves against such attacks by
+comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seems
+dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall
+urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings.
+Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than
+formerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English
+merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under such
+circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign
+service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's
+warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of
+these ships will certainly be a difficult task.
+
+The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and
+energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes
+which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will
+usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the
+few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing
+our vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken against
+neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable
+results can be expected from a war against England's trade. On the
+contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at
+her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must be
+ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England's
+custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests
+are at stake.
+
+Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire
+with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by
+the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to
+English vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they
+can be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has
+no knowledge of their existence.
+
+It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation
+from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications
+will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way
+would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral
+Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the
+great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be
+discovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remain
+suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of
+trade.
+
+It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such
+communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect
+of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to block
+these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the
+States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether
+they would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity,
+or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography
+dictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with England
+and a Continental war with their German neighbours--two possibilities,
+each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay much
+attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was
+at issue is hardly credible.
+
+The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot be
+foreseen. It would probably depend on the general political position and
+the attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest. The
+policy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor. One
+can easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch are
+seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on
+their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea
+side. They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which
+obviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sided
+with our enemies.
+
+I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities
+which might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to a
+sympathetic understanding by the war. I will only point out how
+widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the
+Continental war and on the political relations generally. The attitude
+of Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the
+Baltic must mainly depend on her. It is vital to us that these
+communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this.
+The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly important
+for the conduct of the war. Free commerce with Sweden is essential for
+us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish
+iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted.
+
+It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the
+interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by
+diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. We
+cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands.
+
+Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus
+raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer
+greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us
+assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only
+trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--a
+condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and
+should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any
+case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on
+which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and
+also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial
+products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They
+must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the
+Government must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry of
+Commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in
+collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which
+our commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort of
+commercial mobilization.
+
+These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us
+in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a
+defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our
+coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack.
+
+Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade
+closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish
+straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she
+can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the
+Continent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotland
+and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea
+commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping.
+
+A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of
+the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a
+blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base
+and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since all
+the English naval ports are considerably farther than this from our
+coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously
+increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich has
+recently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. It is considered
+the best harbourage on the English coast, and is hardly 300 nautical
+miles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities of
+fortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distance
+from the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes of
+blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless
+count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutch
+coast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means.
+Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as
+Heligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all
+attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. This
+task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by
+night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on
+board.
+
+Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy,
+if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the
+offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain
+an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive
+operations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts
+must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We must
+endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly
+with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the
+blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as
+possible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces,
+for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there
+is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the
+enemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end.
+And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold
+attack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionally
+favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the
+fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy
+losses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring,
+to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place
+or another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and
+the battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behind
+the farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold the
+high seas in full strength. The forces of the defending party, however,
+lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight.
+
+Such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party.
+We may therefore fairly assume that the English would decide in favour
+of the second kind. At all events, the harbour constructions, partly
+building, partly projected, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were chosen with
+an eye to this line of blockade. It would entail in the north the
+barring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasible
+from the military aspect. Only a small force is required to seal up the
+Channel, as the navigation route is very narrow. In addition to all
+this, the great English naval depots--Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, and
+Plymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediately
+behind it. Besides, every advance against this line from the north is
+flanked by Sheerness and Harwich, so that a retreat to the German coast
+might be barred. The conditions for the northern line of blockade will
+be no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. The
+blockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour of
+Rosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the Orkney
+Isles. Every attacking fleet from the German north coast will be
+unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cut
+off from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to the
+English superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading
+fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the
+Baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here we
+should have a tolerably secure retreat. This accentuates once more the
+supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage
+through the Sound and the Great Belt. The command of these straits will
+not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the
+sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading
+fleet.
+
+In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade
+offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are
+well worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, it
+prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed
+by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the
+blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or
+three divisions.
+
+As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let
+herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests
+of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory
+arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As
+regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous
+conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily
+divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the
+superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea.
+Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending
+party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction
+with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be
+deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are
+the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be
+employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled.
+
+This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But
+it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the
+close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet
+more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in
+far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the
+threatened flank of our attacking fleet.
+
+After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a
+mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision
+of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event
+of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt
+to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They
+could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our
+naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and
+Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these
+places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea.
+
+It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate
+against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford
+extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by
+protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the
+communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack
+will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast
+fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely
+defensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon
+the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the
+fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should
+inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength
+between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must
+be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast
+fortifications hold out.
+
+No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a
+defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows.
+Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments
+for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative
+movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures
+for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers.
+The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we
+shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy
+"scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleet
+must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the
+enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by
+attacking them directly.
+
+If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they
+would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English
+force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus
+contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing
+forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected
+to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be
+dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a
+balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in
+mind.
+
+So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for,
+starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines would
+be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully
+than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they
+would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant English
+coast.
+
+Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and
+nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the
+boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in
+hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the
+science of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is the
+only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we
+may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea.
+
+In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to
+be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a
+World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England.
+
+This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of
+Germany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the
+common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win
+recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This was
+the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under
+Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her
+history; and the great Republic of the United States of North America
+strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right
+of nations for which every people craves." [A]
+
+[Footnote A: Schiemann.]
+
+In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this
+vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us
+in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which,
+in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy,
+has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the
+unscrupulous suppression of her rivals.
+
+If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English and
+takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage
+than a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold our
+allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her
+forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the
+two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea,
+since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean
+interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful
+issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then
+despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak,
+on land--i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be
+compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet
+to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to
+the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an
+absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports and
+destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife with
+France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the
+French position as a Great Power. If France, with her falling
+birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her
+place in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanent
+political subservience. Those are the stakes.
+
+The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated.
+That is the less dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present
+still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French.
+We could operate against it on the inner line--i.e., we could use the
+opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the
+Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we could attack the Russian ships in vastly
+superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the
+North Sea. For these operations it is of the first importance that the
+Danish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell into
+the hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would be
+almost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the
+passive protection of our coast batteries.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+
+THE CRUCIAL QUESTION
+
+I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some
+detail, because I thought that our general political and military
+position can only be properly estimated by considering the various
+phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities
+and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on
+our coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction be
+decided in which our preparations for war ought to move.
+
+The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war
+with England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall
+need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from
+a hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on an
+ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If an
+Anglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatened
+our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by
+sea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armies
+advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined
+fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be
+rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land.
+
+We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on
+land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all
+circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the
+Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before
+we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy
+based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in
+Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her
+triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own
+country.
+
+But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by
+the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing
+with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land
+army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting
+the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally
+necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every
+attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled.
+
+At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the
+conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk
+of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay
+the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample
+scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put
+aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost
+energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole
+future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the
+broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the
+individual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere is
+critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as
+a World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the Triple
+Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey,
+threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which
+destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing
+ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, if
+we wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we are
+Germans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out our
+preparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to our
+national duty.
+
+I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated
+merely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in the
+cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer
+the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the
+future. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to
+desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour
+something of what we have lost in the last years.
+
+Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on
+the continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problem
+of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great
+numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainly
+exist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance,
+whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to
+Irredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondary
+importance.
+
+The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make
+the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate
+the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make
+universal service an existing fact.
+
+The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a
+splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has
+in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and
+has brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification.
+Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed
+in a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mighty
+political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our
+greatness was founded.
+
+France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in
+Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000.
+Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. But since
+the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very
+various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are
+also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to
+the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself
+successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the
+inner line, even though England took part in the war.
+
+Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of
+universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued
+to carry it out effectively. The country where universal service exists
+is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only
+kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the
+able-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little use
+has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army.
+
+In this direction some reorganization is required which will
+energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army,
+such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand,
+we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers.
+
+Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not
+shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make
+up our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by
+150,000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not be
+forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could
+not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased army
+only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and
+Landwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recur
+to the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the new
+Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wish
+to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even
+if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that
+we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the
+superior forces of our opponents.
+
+We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we
+must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These
+means can only be found in the spiritual domain.
+
+History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have
+only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been
+equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party
+exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases
+it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment,
+greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able
+strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Rome
+conquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great with
+inferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent history
+shows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over a
+crushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a great
+commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear.
+Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the
+hostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisive
+factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory
+or defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and
+keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a
+real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which
+would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should we
+then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy
+which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be
+possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a
+considerable numerical superiority.
+
+[Footnote A: _Cf_. v. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.]
+
+The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery
+with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships,
+and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable
+opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast
+with the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certain
+spiritual servility and inferiority.
+
+Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which
+the ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is to
+prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to
+apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of
+superiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the material
+advantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushed
+by their weight of numbers.
+
+We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by
+uninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight the
+probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new
+paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. New
+goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches
+us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress,
+in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritual
+capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be
+sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action,
+are the soil in which great successes ripen.
+
+It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the
+nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas
+which will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughly
+ventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege"
+("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results of
+my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration
+of the essential questions of the future.
+
+In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extent
+unprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness
+will exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means of
+communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. These
+three momentous factors will mark the war of the future.
+
+"Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain
+elements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they can
+be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical
+efficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the country
+during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are
+therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower
+and less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they require
+for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into
+effective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible to
+morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may
+prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run
+short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority
+over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions.
+
+The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer
+range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting
+claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner than
+formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far
+wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. The
+soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which
+he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all
+circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing
+which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious
+movement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances.
+Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short,
+while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands
+made on them have become considerably greater.
+
+Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and
+feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main
+roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign,
+aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their
+use, and the commanders counted upon them.
+
+The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great
+superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and
+tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists.
+
+The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy,
+and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than
+they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior
+force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective
+troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile
+army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it
+before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the
+field.
+
+Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly
+shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary
+conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare.
+
+In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength
+which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action.
+Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack
+to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a
+superior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which is
+the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place
+which is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked party
+can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the
+intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold
+out promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attacking
+General strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his
+troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature
+guarantees.
+
+This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancing
+armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it
+will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take
+proper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, the
+prospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable,
+especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at
+his disposal.
+
+Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility
+of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all
+the more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is
+impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and
+completely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisive
+direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of
+the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and
+its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations.
+If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior
+numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his
+numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory
+over the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law,
+Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and striking
+strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in
+mere numbers.
+
+No further proof is required that the superiority of the attack
+increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and
+to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of
+concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the
+enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very
+appreciable.
+
+We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the
+superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it
+is incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise the
+tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and
+especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements
+and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to
+act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the
+manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be
+superior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has
+objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks
+by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It
+must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since
+a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods.
+
+This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which I
+have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face
+the future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raise
+the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else
+must give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all our
+measures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, and
+thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too
+easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of
+a collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions would
+have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying
+principle.
+
+The requirements which I have described as the most essential are
+somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a
+resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age.
+
+The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, the
+smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not
+merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as
+such. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will be
+suffocated by their own fat," said General v. Brandenstein, the great
+organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of
+the French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the
+whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure
+the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his
+own movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the course
+of military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tactical
+efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it
+certainly will prove in the wars of the future.
+
+A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of
+public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have
+conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential
+contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained,
+and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It would
+be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is
+recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached
+on them.
+
+This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is
+attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military
+service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less,
+and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had
+to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a
+good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_,
+which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no
+means helped by the very brief training which these units at best
+receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity
+for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy
+strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be
+indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the
+field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain
+the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass
+would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to
+some degree the task of making good the losses.
+
+A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops.
+Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are
+already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full
+strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on
+mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according
+to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much
+inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which
+were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this,
+notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new
+French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere
+of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their
+duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered
+territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact,
+they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the
+field army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and
+mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By acting
+at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually
+become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of
+offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset
+of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied
+with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be.
+
+Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such
+troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive
+operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated
+as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some
+are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical
+conception.
+
+For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars
+only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks
+for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if
+necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and
+more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical
+striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater
+numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the
+decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever
+before.
+
+The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are
+placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this
+principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that
+he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong
+advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and
+therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his
+army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be
+employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as
+much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the
+numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the
+actual war.
+
+It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to
+render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a
+mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their
+_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to
+them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of
+efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered.
+
+Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An
+increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more
+than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is
+supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the
+establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient
+will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality,
+not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If we
+wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening
+the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of
+professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This step
+is the more necessary because the present available cadres are
+insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide
+for their thorough training.
+
+The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with
+an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. We
+shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the
+efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be
+improved by organization, equipment, and training.
+
+I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the
+questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of
+military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt
+original action--I mean the importance of personality.
+
+From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of
+his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune,
+and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a given
+general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left
+to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in
+the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the
+face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other
+age, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics has
+abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left
+to himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In the
+strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of
+that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before
+from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in the
+artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly
+emphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations have
+increased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far less
+able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the
+field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates.
+These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations.
+
+When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his
+ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the
+reserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment
+to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot
+be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Even
+the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now
+wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have
+to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing
+touch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on the
+commander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy,
+deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from
+him. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All this
+puts a heavy strain on personality.
+
+It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of
+self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct
+advantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to
+attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And this
+object can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in the
+sphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can be
+improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the
+conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in
+which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and
+more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp.
+Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune
+are produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkward
+and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same
+process is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mental
+development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the
+personality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsman
+Bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of
+leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. General
+Chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute
+determination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks of
+the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and
+thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is it
+essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in
+high command. In a long military life ideas all too early grow
+stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought
+and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of such
+development cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of the
+army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a
+one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of
+actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akin
+to this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en
+masse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatest
+value. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual
+independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and
+solving new problems by original methods.
+
+It has often been said that one man is as good as another; that
+personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is
+erroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real
+struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is
+enough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility and
+danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a
+chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross.
+
+That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the
+important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is the
+only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to
+break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and
+success. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. that for the
+highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time
+of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men
+around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition
+those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of
+need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. This
+is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and
+distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action,
+appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of
+the stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved:
+
+  "Folk and thrall and victor can
+  Witness bear in every zone:
+  Fortune's greatest gift to man
+  Is personality alone."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+
+ARMY ORGANIZATION
+
+I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it
+is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with
+this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. I
+shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in
+my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we
+wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions
+which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It will
+be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially
+noteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come into
+opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further
+from my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based on
+theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely
+presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and
+of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political
+disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is,
+in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something
+already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent
+historical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to the
+future, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-defined
+lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most
+important that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall not
+look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future.
+
+The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I have
+already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the
+greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position
+to carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore,
+fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, as
+already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the
+arming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops,
+and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly
+have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of
+their peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter how
+essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary
+cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches
+so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in
+war-time.
+
+The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the
+non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of
+the troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline,
+decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the
+troops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number of
+permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in
+proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the
+demands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officers
+and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred
+to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern
+tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his
+influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing
+_personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to the
+infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a
+sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the more
+important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers
+and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on
+the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and
+non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is a
+question of training, and does not come into the present discussion.
+
+The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a
+sense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospects
+which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect
+the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to
+keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary
+advantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, the
+financial question is all-important. The career of the officer offers
+to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and
+self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the
+service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as
+they now are. The infantry officer especially must have a better
+position. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur
+greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer
+has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most
+strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It would
+be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than
+the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm
+more attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for
+which there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be well
+supplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must be
+counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service.
+By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the
+chief arm.
+
+If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition
+and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the
+troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in
+action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on
+conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical
+proportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally the
+cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the
+proportion which artillery must bear to infantry.
+
+With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent
+replace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weapons
+of defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourable
+conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful
+attack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder that
+impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, this
+auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and
+employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into
+large units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching
+columns.
+
+The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance.
+
+Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooth
+their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly.
+This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry
+must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting
+instruments in the whole army.
+
+If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the
+result. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to
+modern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greater
+superiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of front
+in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close
+tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire.
+This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the
+conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as
+before. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in
+a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The
+troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en échelon _than in the
+last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate
+the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be
+settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the
+experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will
+most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in
+the domain of military science.
+
+If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an
+infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of
+artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern
+artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must
+advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the
+artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path
+between these two extremes.
+
+If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or,
+better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the
+guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially
+adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the
+conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is
+reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we
+must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into
+account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If
+we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper
+strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such
+infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position
+taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that
+section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions,
+requires greater numbers and depth than before.
+
+In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of
+the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian
+campaign.
+
+Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period
+extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not
+rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original
+strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans
+on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so
+decisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would have
+shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the
+contest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the former
+case the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery,
+under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak
+infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under
+the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was
+too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched
+enemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of
+infantry were needed at Wörth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite of
+the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker
+enemy of equal class.
+
+Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English in
+artillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state of
+things was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery was
+extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russian
+field guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, the
+Japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also,
+because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite
+superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillery
+was scattered along the whole of their broad front.
+
+The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the
+arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these
+units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be
+appropriately determined.
+
+The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or
+superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly
+mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and
+corps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucial
+test. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpected
+concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the
+superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way.
+If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine
+against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies
+a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it is
+assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and
+that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so
+slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then
+equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese were
+tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they
+were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive
+directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical
+superiority of the Russian army as a whole.
+
+If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the
+artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy
+within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a
+considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful.
+In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded
+the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the
+artillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the
+separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of
+the army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excess
+in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is
+restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then
+artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to
+victory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forces
+for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces
+along the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often be
+weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage
+may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a
+position. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering
+concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. This
+victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere.
+
+The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater
+marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of
+the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the
+columns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossal
+armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly
+live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from
+the rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies;
+but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be
+maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go
+to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead.
+Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct
+communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught
+animals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons of
+provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily,
+must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of
+food. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a
+certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport
+waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to
+the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the
+night's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained
+if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient
+quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry
+with them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid
+down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusually
+lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the
+troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thus
+the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly
+dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A careful
+calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to
+average 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from an
+army--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25
+kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps on
+the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle
+troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps.
+
+This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily
+affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and
+rations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyed
+railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of
+columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared
+by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time
+the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the
+troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption
+continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In order
+to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any
+crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample
+stock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of the
+necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must be
+taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of
+tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done by
+special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the
+organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a
+distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by
+forced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increase
+the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It is
+further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very
+long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other
+provisions compressed into the smallest space.
+
+An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps,
+and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army
+with its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it the
+troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is far
+more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any
+other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the
+decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent.
+
+However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained
+if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed
+from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out.
+Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within
+these limits.
+
+Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army
+corresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened by
+a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it
+will considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, the
+necessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantry
+is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to
+deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack
+and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to
+strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the
+artillery.
+
+In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division
+is very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as to
+permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of
+reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units.
+This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional
+organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet
+appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the
+existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been
+drawn up by competent officers.
+
+The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two
+infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The
+formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix
+the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his
+own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a
+reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of
+some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity
+for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a
+wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this
+procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible,
+even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the
+brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken
+by the enemy and the course of the battle.
+
+Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its
+application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of
+cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution
+which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that
+the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of
+two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry
+these duties out.
+
+This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts
+the most generally accepted military principles.
+
+The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as
+is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate
+divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal
+of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the
+subdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack
+must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best
+formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops
+to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result
+there.
+
+A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by
+the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action
+two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of
+course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not
+always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely
+the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ
+them as their particular character demands.
+
+The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and
+divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding
+formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately
+according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the
+undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders
+of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the
+commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of
+enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for
+himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one
+division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to
+withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one
+division only, the same division must always be subjected to this
+reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether
+this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least
+worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not
+be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each
+division.
+
+The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous
+question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the
+whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement
+would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a
+position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They
+can also, however, be combined under the command of the
+General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first
+arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the
+great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is
+dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left
+but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the
+indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are
+inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers
+is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is
+planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that
+the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line
+by a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach
+single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army
+corps temporarily.
+
+There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally
+used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the
+spot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into the
+advance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's field
+artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in
+such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers.
+It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this
+problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long
+unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their
+effectiveness doubtful.
+
+No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased
+their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort
+to every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, be
+overestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite _sui generis_.
+The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions
+strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line
+in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns.
+It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective
+12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I
+can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty
+was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. The
+Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their
+howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but
+break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs,
+the question of concentration seems to me very important for us.
+
+Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the
+heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus best
+serve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which he
+wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain
+that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the
+army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries will
+be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General.
+There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the
+deciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knows
+that.
+
+I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the
+heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batteries
+which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed
+under the orders of the corps commanders _(Truppenführer)_ if they are
+to become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artillery
+of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot
+artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres.
+It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does
+not feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinction
+between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical.
+
+This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the
+heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the
+Commander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and
+manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the
+present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy
+artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. This
+disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned
+permanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being united
+in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, they
+would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely
+the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies.
+
+The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more
+effective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies not
+merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but
+the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the
+advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We were
+taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway
+communications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vital
+importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the
+discharge of these necessary functions.
+
+Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was
+organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations,
+but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system
+can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them.
+
+The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by
+the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and
+so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train
+adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years'
+service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building,
+fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on
+fortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer's
+duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for
+the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the
+actual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training
+for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation.
+
+Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the late
+Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable
+service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. This
+follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--a
+rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training
+for their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and develop
+more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better
+proportion to its value.
+
+In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are
+directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical
+efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly
+serve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of the
+enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening
+movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy
+unawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. I
+refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet.
+
+The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry out
+reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must
+operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the
+regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility.
+
+Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the
+war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned
+them in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen if
+we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize
+that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and
+that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited
+efficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous,
+because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little
+from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal.
+There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and
+1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is
+misleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it
+crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on
+the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly
+antiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independent
+movements. What they then did must not be compared with what will be
+required from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces were
+really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived
+notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their
+employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of
+their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa,
+notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must be
+studied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that an
+increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course,
+only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped
+with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate
+independently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the
+fulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, when
+the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting
+force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. This
+is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's
+communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand,
+the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive
+than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if
+cavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry is
+undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of
+the enemy.
+
+Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists,
+another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful
+service. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in
+war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have
+repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted.
+
+The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of the
+divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time
+being. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in
+a high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that
+the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on
+modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over
+the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue.
+
+I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are
+attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that
+the division with its three parts would have the control of three
+batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each
+brigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. once
+made, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalry
+usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing
+momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with
+the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously,
+therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the
+artillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when
+it is important to make a decisive attack.
+
+The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed
+by the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yet
+exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of
+military science will play in future wars.[A] It is therefore necessary
+to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special
+weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration
+from the technical side.
+
+[Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators in
+Tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were no
+opponents in the air.]
+
+The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of
+handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting
+strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of
+the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking
+successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers.
+
+The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading
+idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once
+thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since
+tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the
+technical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne in
+mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our
+opponents.
+
+If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the
+necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed
+changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve
+the efficiency of our army.
+
+The whole organization must be such that the column length of the army
+corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the
+supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots.
+
+In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as
+being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition
+must be observed.
+
+The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially
+strengthened.
+
+The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to
+concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up
+the units.
+
+The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so
+organized as to insure their efficiency in war.
+
+The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so
+elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the
+troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained.
+
+The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making
+it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy.
+
+Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every
+nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to
+take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in
+the decisive field war.
+
+The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present
+organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be
+carried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which,
+without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to
+make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition.
+The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit
+political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so
+strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when
+all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. They
+comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen,
+although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often
+surpassed all expectations.
+
+But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is
+necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to
+achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to
+public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake
+there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as
+unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the
+principles of a sound military organization.
+
+The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in
+various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject,
+and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive
+consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration.
+
+One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of
+three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous
+intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in
+every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the
+extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jäger
+battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the
+hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried
+out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the
+drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within
+the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing
+the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being
+thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more
+ways.
+
+The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only
+be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the
+enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to
+each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present.
+But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that
+new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be
+taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this
+means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the
+artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited,
+without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the
+quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle
+should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. All
+that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat
+waggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when a
+battle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troops
+and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than
+the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of
+ammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will be
+inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the
+fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can
+only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be
+reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, the
+required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought
+forward by stages in good time.
+
+A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division
+had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light field
+howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that
+they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the
+formations of the division. The strength of the artillery must be
+regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the
+entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavy
+field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the
+orders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as
+"army" artillery.
+
+It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached
+from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent
+in war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with the
+infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres
+with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional
+cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. On
+the other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the _Truppenführer_
+are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders;
+but this objection does not seem very pertinent.
+
+Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the
+arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging
+to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under
+the commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would be
+withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments
+strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended for
+divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six
+squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. If
+the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only
+be able to receive two squadrons.
+
+In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry
+would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it;
+but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army
+cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult
+task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one
+to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame for
+such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who
+did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. The
+whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. If
+it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the
+arm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There are
+various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry
+can be guaranteed.
+
+The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached
+to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in
+co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make
+appropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restricted
+to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which
+require to be surmounted.
+
+The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the
+organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. In
+military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual
+factors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that my
+opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect
+of affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main
+leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by
+question of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part of
+that general combination of things which only really comes into view in
+actual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must be
+rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced.
+Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means
+of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient
+account of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made such
+progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much
+importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort,
+the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which
+they employ.
+
+A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are
+essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out;
+under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer
+of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way
+or that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from
+a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the
+importance of the separate co-operating factors.
+
+
+
+  "For he who grasps the problem as a whole
+  Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul"
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+
+TRAINING AND EDUCATION
+
+Our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the German
+army into the most effective tool of German policy, and into a school of
+health and strength for our nation. We must also try to get ahead of our
+rivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do full
+justice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all our
+efforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units and
+strengthening their loyal German feelings.
+
+Diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at the
+present day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, for
+there are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. If we
+wish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training must
+break with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the war
+of the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops as
+well as on the officers.
+
+It is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the use
+of modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily from
+the introduction of these means of war. But if we survey the sphere of
+training as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us as
+peculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands which
+will be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" to
+an extent hitherto unknown.
+
+The necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantry
+and artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle;
+in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategical
+duties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in the
+case of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vast
+extent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and the
+difficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving direct
+orders. Wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare,
+we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldier
+in the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of the
+enemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles huge
+hosts. In battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity of
+action can only be attained at the present time by independent
+co-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme.
+
+The employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of moving
+and feeding the troops. It is one thing to lead 100,000 or perhaps
+200,000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate them
+for a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800,000 men on a scene of war
+stripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have been
+destroyed by modern explosives. In the first case the military empiric
+may be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively a
+scientifically educated General and a staff who have also studied and
+mastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. The problems of
+the future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able to
+operate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision.
+
+The necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universally
+recognized. To be sure, the old traditions die slowly. Here and there an
+undeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method of
+education, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised more
+than is justified by its value. The cavalry is not yet completely
+awakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises on
+the parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, oblivious
+of the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they were
+still the old arm which Napoleon or Frederick the Great commanded. Even
+the artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions;
+technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom of
+operations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still in
+vogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of fire
+with a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. Even in
+theory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. Many
+conservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. Obsolete ideas
+have not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations and
+ordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on the
+whole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility and
+self-reliance must be encouraged. In this respect the army is on the
+right road, and if it continues on it and continually resists the
+temptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for the
+sake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually the
+highest results will be attained, provided that competent military
+criticism has been equally encouraged.
+
+In this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficient
+attention has been given to the fact that the main features of war have
+completely changed. Although in the next war men will have to be handled
+by millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted on
+lines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modern
+conditions. Our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. Most of
+the practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades and
+divisions--i.e., in formations which could never occur in the great
+decisive campaigns of the future. From time to time--financial grounds
+unfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre is
+held, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of
+"masses." Sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled for
+combined training under veteran Generals, who soon afterwards leave the
+service, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience which
+they may have gained.
+
+It cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres are
+extraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troops
+themselves', but they are not a direct training for the command of
+armies in modern warfare. Even the so-called "Imperial Manoeuvres" only
+correspond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war,
+since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, and
+seldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc., the troops which would
+be essential in real warfare. A glance at the Imperial Manoeuvres of
+1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never have
+been carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed under
+the conditions of war. It is an absolute necessity that our officers
+should learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are the
+rule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. In
+theory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken into
+account; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theory
+are posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and the
+divisions. That they would in reality all have to circulate with a
+pendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that the
+magazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent farther
+back, that the position of the field bakeries is of extreme
+importance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome,
+and so are very seldom considered.
+
+In great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected in
+Russia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariat
+arrangements are rarely worked out in detail; I should almost doubt
+whether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazine
+feeding" has ever been entertained. Even smaller opportunities of being
+acquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinary
+manoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoretical
+lines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding a
+large army and to master the subject efficiently.
+
+The friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be brought
+home to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such things
+cannot be learnt from books.
+
+These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations,
+but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an
+army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is
+obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. When, in 1870,
+some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the
+advance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not
+masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war
+and the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operations
+to succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army. All
+these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our General
+Staff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no means
+the common property of the army.
+
+On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres
+must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered
+conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. The
+troops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency,
+and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for
+carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two
+pivots. But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the
+great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. The paths
+we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal.
+
+All methods of training and education must be in accordance with these
+views.
+
+I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and
+cavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question at
+length in special treatises.[A] In the case of the artillery alone, some
+remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm
+seem necessary.
+
+[Footnote A: v. Bernhardi: "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie," 1910
+"Unsere Kavallerie im nächsten Krieg," 1899; "Reiterdienst," 1910.]
+
+The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partly
+expressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: all
+preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one
+side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or
+infantry at the decisive point. This principle is universally
+acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice.
+The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their
+tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical
+requirements subservient to this idea. The ever-recurring tendency to
+fight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. On the
+defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking
+artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most
+dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its
+chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible,
+from masked positions. The principle of keeping the artillery divisions
+close together on the battlefield and combining the fire in one
+direction, must not be carried to an extreme. The artillery certainly
+must be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see that
+there is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but in
+particular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this idea
+will be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than by
+explaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leaving
+to them the duty of carrying it out. Accordingly, it is important that
+the personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognized
+more fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action is
+indispensable. The great extent of the battlefields and the natural
+endeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack will
+often force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behind
+the other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against the
+tactically most important objective. This result is hard to attain by a
+centralization of command, and is best realized by the independent
+action of tactically trained subordinates.
+
+This is not the place to enter into technical details, and I will only
+mention some points which appear especially important.
+
+The Bz shell _(Granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and its
+use should not form part of the training. It requires, in order to
+attain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming as
+is very seldom possible in actual warfare.
+
+No very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. It seems
+to be retained in France and to have shown satisfactory results with us;
+but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of the
+shooting-range directly to serious warfare. No doubt its use, if
+successful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especially
+in the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. In any case,
+practice with Az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance.
+
+The Az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of an
+offensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations.
+
+Care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements and
+complications of strategy and devices. Only the simplest methods can be
+successfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten.
+
+The important point in the general training of the artillery is that
+text-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should be
+relegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics should
+be given a more prominent position. In this way only can the artillery
+do really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must not
+be neglected in the reports. That would mean rejecting the good and the
+evil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenient
+must be distinctly opposed.
+
+Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres
+of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large
+expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. They must, in my
+opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their
+possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks.
+They lead to pronounced tactics of position _(Stellungstaktik)_ which
+are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual
+war--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a
+definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in
+search of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt on
+these manoeuvres. They could be made more instructive if the tactical
+limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these
+manoeuvres--viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive
+arm--cannot be thus remedied. The usual result is that favourable
+artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to
+under some tactical pretence.
+
+After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may
+be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of the
+various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them
+into line with modern conditions. If, however, the troops are to be
+educated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new ground
+must be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubted
+superiority over our opponents can be attained. Considerable
+difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to
+amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties
+are not, in my opinion, insurmountable.
+
+There are two chief points: first, the practice of marching and
+operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with
+well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a
+reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more
+thorough education of the chief commanders.
+
+As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know,
+has never yet been attempted. But if we consider, firstly, how valuable
+more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of
+the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we
+shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for
+the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage
+over our supposed antagonist.
+
+The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally
+also be carried out in smaller formation. It is, moreover, very
+important to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--in
+long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in
+the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such
+movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them.
+
+Training marches with full military stores, etc., in columns of 20 to 25
+kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond to
+the daily needs of real warfare. Should it not be possible to assemble
+two army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march can
+be obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitable
+intervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed.
+This does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare,
+but it is useful as a makeshift. The waggons for the troops would have
+to be hired, as On manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to save
+expense. The supplies could be brought on army transport trains, which
+would represent the pioneer convoys _(Verpflegungsstaffel)_, and would
+regulate their pace accordingly.
+
+Marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with food
+supplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be of
+considerable value provided that care is taken to execute the march in
+the shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed by
+bringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is only
+properly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continued
+for several days. It is naturally not enough to undertake these
+manoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if they
+are intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army.
+Finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns,
+sometimes in army formation. The flank marches of separate columns will,
+of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice in
+feeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march on
+the side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence brought
+up to the troops at the close of the march. Flank marches in army
+formation will have some value, even apart from any training in the
+commissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marching
+columns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. But
+this exercise will have its full value only when the regulation
+commissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with them
+and furnish the supplies.
+
+I also consider that operative movements in army formation extending
+over several days are desirable. Practice must be given in moving
+backwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flank
+movements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rear
+being blocked when necessary. Then only can all the difficulties which
+occur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen where
+the lever must be applied in order to remove them. In this way alone can
+the higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting such
+operations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of a
+hostile attack. An army so disciplined would, I imagine, acquire a
+pronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experiments
+in such operations in actual war. The major strategic movements on both
+sides in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that.
+
+I recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost a
+great deal of money and could never all be carried out systematically
+one after the other. I wished, however, to ventilate the subject,
+firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study the
+points of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do;
+secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carry
+out in practice one or other of them--at the Imperial Manoeuvres, for
+example, or on some other occasion. How much could be saved in money
+alone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentioned
+country manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? From reasons of economy
+all the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employed
+on such manoeuvres. It would be useful, however, if, in addition to one
+detachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the other
+groups were present and were moved along at the proper distance from
+each other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from the
+kitchen waggon. It would thus be possible to get a sort of presentation
+of the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuable
+experience. It is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange such
+manoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and many
+obstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out,
+and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions;
+but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not be
+wholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matters
+which are really essential. They would, at any rate, be far more
+valuable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced by
+exercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings in
+the country, which are of no real utility, or than many other military
+institutions which are only remotely connected with the object of
+training under active service conditions. All that does not directly
+promote this object must be erased from our system of education at a
+time when the highest values are at stake.
+
+Even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often be
+carried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because it
+is not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of the
+troops.
+
+It must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so that
+eventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becoming
+practically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troops
+may become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but since
+such practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they must
+also be worked out beforehand theoretically. It is not at all sufficient
+that the officers on the General Staff and the Intendants have a mastery
+of these subjects. The rank and file must be well up in them; but
+especially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--that
+is to say, the transport officers of the standing army and those
+officers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as column
+commanders.
+
+The practical service in the transport battalions and the duties
+performed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who are
+assigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object.
+They learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of the
+system as a whole. It would therefore be advisable that all these
+officers should go through a special preliminary course for this
+service, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would be
+explained to them by the officers of the General Staff and the higher
+transport service officers, and they would then learn by practical
+examples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the most
+varied positions with precise regard to distances and time. This would
+be far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainings
+in driving, etc., on which so much time is wasted. The technical
+driver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is not
+easy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to be
+able, when occasion arises, to act independently.
+
+While, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must be
+thoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of a
+scientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples out
+of military history, the importance of these matters can be explained,
+is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. I have shown
+elsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically in
+the arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operative
+capabilities of the army depend on this system. Its nature, however,
+cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspiration
+when mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must be
+gained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of the
+importance which this service has attained under modern conditions is
+that officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully without
+having made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter.
+
+The transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinary
+importance in the general system of modern warfare. It should be
+appreciated accordingly. Every active transport service officer ought,
+after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the senior
+officers on the furlough establishment intended for transport service
+ought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. If
+these educational courses were held in the autumn in the training camps
+of the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimable
+advantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay.
+
+The results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, when
+the superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do not
+make demands contrary to the nature of the case, and therefore
+impossible to be met. They should therefore be obliged to undergo a
+thorough education in the practical duties of the General Staff, and not
+merely in leading troops in action.
+
+This reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how,
+generally, the training of the superior officers for the great war
+should be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with a
+view to the training. The essential contradiction between our obsolete
+method of training and the completely altered demands of a new era
+appears here with peculiar distinctness.
+
+A large part of our superior commanders pass through the General Staff,
+while part have attended at least the military academy; but when these
+men reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has long
+become out of date. The continuation school is missing. It can be
+replaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficient
+time for this, and often a lack of interest. The daily duties of
+training troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs great
+determination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his own
+scientific education. The result is, that comparatively few of our
+superior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less an
+independently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the great
+scale. This would cost dearly in real war. Experience shows that it is
+not enough that the officers of the General Staff attached to the leader
+are competent to fill up this gap. The leader, if he cannot himself
+grasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believes
+he is directing and is himself being directed. This is a far from
+healthy condition. Our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned,
+only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and from
+the tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. The
+minor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most important
+feature in present-day warfare--i.e., the sudden concentration of
+larger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from space
+considerations, of timely counter-movements on the other. The minor
+manoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. The commanders learn
+to form decisions and to give orders, and these are two important
+matters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grand
+scale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditions
+of warfare.
+
+Brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merely
+encourage wrong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is,
+fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds.
+Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders.
+The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in
+them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those
+of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger
+scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the
+operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled
+to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. The
+great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for
+only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the
+collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual
+warfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weighty
+consideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought before
+their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern
+warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations.
+
+The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of
+small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly
+strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important
+military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this
+direction. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they
+conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all our
+resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a
+modern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a
+rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of
+the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too
+small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional
+manoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this change
+could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: a
+great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system
+if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and
+execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word.
+
+It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training
+on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to
+educate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres can
+only show their full value if the officers of every rank who take part
+in them have already had a competent training in theory.
+
+To encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thus
+one of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. These
+must not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of the
+troops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves and
+their subordinates for leadership in the great war. Strategic war games
+on a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by the
+commanding Generals, and in the army-inspections by the Inspectors, seem
+to me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. All
+superior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiency
+in superior commands. The threads of all this training will meet in the
+hands of the Chief of the General Army Staff as the strategically
+responsible authority.
+
+It seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance to
+decide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not for
+their posts. The circumstances that a man is an energetic commander of
+a division, or as General in command maintains discipline in his army
+corps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader of
+an army. Military history supplies many instances of this.
+
+No proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfare
+the reconnoitring and screening units require special training. The
+possibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degree
+dependent on their activity. I have for years pointed out the absolute
+necessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for their
+profession, and I can only repeat the demand that our cavalry
+riding-schools should be organized also as places of scientific
+education. I will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulk
+of the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisional
+cavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. These exercises do not
+correspond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrong
+notions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command finds
+out who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalry
+division on manoeuvres.
+
+The centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing of
+operations and on the skilful transition from strategical independence
+to combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry lies
+in these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-grounds
+than systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. The perpetual
+subject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement between
+two divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. Any
+unprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to this
+result, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may be
+regarded as a serious preparation for war.
+
+It is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, always
+acts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annually
+extensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definite
+effect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which
+_always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself,
+but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is only
+rarely necessary in war. This clearly demonstrates the unsystematic and
+antiquated methods of all our training.
+
+Practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on a
+large scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry.
+Co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soon
+as aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as an
+integral factor of army organization. The airship division and the
+cavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command,
+especially for screening purposes, which are all-important.
+
+The methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully to
+modern requirements have been pointed out by General v. Beseler. This
+arm need only be developed further in the direction which this
+distinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of the
+next war.
+
+In the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the support
+of the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in the
+construction of similar positions. Tactical requirements must, however,
+be insisted upon in this connection. The whole training must be guided
+by considerations of tactics. This is the main point. As regards sieges,
+especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since the
+object is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take the
+fortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery.
+
+The duties of the Army Service Corps[B] are clear. They must, on the one
+hand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especially
+for the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to give
+every kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they must
+look after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. The
+rapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedy
+repair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on military
+railways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are the
+duties for which these troops must be trained. A thorough knowledge and
+mastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensable
+qualifications in their case also. They can only meet their many-sided
+and all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methods
+and system of army movements on every scale. It is highly important,
+therefore, that the officers of the Army Service Corps should be
+thoroughly trained in military science.
+
+[Footnote B: _Verkehrstruppen_.]
+
+Thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectual
+development of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of the
+close connection of the multifarious duties of war. This appreciation is
+requisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of the
+service; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to some
+degree the non-commissioned officers also. It will bear good fruit in
+the training of the men. The higher the stage on which the teacher
+stands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the more
+complete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly and
+successfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, and
+the more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respect
+which are the firmest foundations of discipline. All the means employed
+to improve the education of our establishment of officers in the science
+of war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient service
+on every other field of practical activity. Intellectual exercise gives
+tone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war and
+its requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education and
+bent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in their
+reciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. The
+effort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers'
+corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards,
+and must find its expression in a school of military education of a
+higher class than exists at present.
+
+A military academy as such was contemplated by Scharnhorst. To-day it
+assumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the General
+Staff. Instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of its
+former importance. The instruction in military history was entirely
+divested of its scientific character by the method of application
+employed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. In this way the
+meaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day,
+so far as I know, the lectures on military history primarily serve
+purposes of directly professional education. I cannot say how far the
+language teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. At any rate, it
+culminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues a
+directly practical end. This development was in a certain sense
+necessary. A quite specifically professional education of the officers
+of the General Staff is essential under present conditions. I will not
+decide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and truly
+academical character of the institution. In any case, we need in the
+army of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for the
+independent study of military science from the higher standpoint, and
+provides at the same time a comprehensive general education. I believe
+that the military academy could be developed into such an institution,
+without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of the
+officers for service on the General Staff. By the side of the military
+sciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures on
+general scientific subjects might be organized, to which admission
+should be free. In similar lectures the great military problems might be
+discussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearers
+might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to
+politics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, the
+importance of free personality under the pressure of necessary
+phenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as into
+the duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint.
+
+Limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are now
+arranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, and
+the institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture,
+intended not only to educate officers of the General Staff, but to train
+men who are competent to discharge the highest military and civic
+duties--this is what is required for the highest military educational
+institution of the German army.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+
+PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR
+
+"Germany's future lies on the sea." A proud saying, which contains a
+great truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished future
+and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy
+and act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they are
+supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at least
+that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest
+opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his
+position as a World Power.
+
+Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on
+a world policy if our political and military superiority on the
+continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yet
+reached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now take
+steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our
+pretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the
+full security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts and
+repel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economic
+necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needs
+be--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and
+this, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness of
+Germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea
+trade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be
+always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Our
+efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of
+hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish
+to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined
+ultimately to support this world policy.
+
+Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first
+ventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving for
+limited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. was destined
+to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's
+history, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activity
+must be set down as fruitless.
+
+We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most varied
+considerations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was first
+drawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906,
+and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, of
+course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. The
+needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard
+for the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on the
+claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations.
+At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the
+coasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguard
+this commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon
+shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for
+Germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the
+Government, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party was
+content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this
+object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by
+artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places.
+
+This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convinced
+of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high
+seas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the
+aggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it was
+thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called
+_Ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact
+that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies,
+and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank.
+This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a
+fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the
+costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a
+large number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fighting
+capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed
+torpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on a
+fallacy--that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an
+extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing
+population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political
+and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and
+on its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded
+with actual needs.
+
+The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most
+inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already
+stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the
+midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our
+strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly
+effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard
+for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our
+commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only
+object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an
+instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and
+supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such
+limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A
+few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in
+war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible,
+destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is
+obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the
+defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on
+permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed
+that sufficiently.
+
+The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at
+sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded
+commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies.
+
+It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for
+defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our
+political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed
+according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive,
+when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success;
+on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained
+in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the
+Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We
+must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise
+which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale.
+
+The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be
+calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that
+we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are
+weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger,
+unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all
+circumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our
+strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing
+reasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance
+of victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflicting
+such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests
+to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own
+position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses.
+
+This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that
+the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the
+necessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probably
+that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of
+victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle
+for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase
+their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even
+beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates.
+
+We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for
+many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. We
+may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast
+fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend
+ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown
+in the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out and
+exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against
+all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast;
+our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually
+inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to
+challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the lines
+that our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as a
+base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the
+offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break
+harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for
+this class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with
+a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by
+the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alone
+cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break
+through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able
+to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purpose
+permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow
+mines to be placed.
+
+I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the
+North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these
+requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be
+to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our
+naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade,
+although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further
+development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the
+background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only
+action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success
+presupposes the existence of some such fortress.
+
+But the question must be looked at from another aspect.
+
+The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the
+unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is
+determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power.
+Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from
+claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless,
+the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked
+menacing utterances from various English statesmen.
+
+If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military
+preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates
+attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the
+English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase
+the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly
+intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken;
+the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the German
+coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and
+to isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as
+a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite
+impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and
+protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly
+well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt
+would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German
+naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes
+for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an
+English attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able
+to postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned that
+the recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we must
+make up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext or
+other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very
+favourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage.
+Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon
+upon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war.
+
+Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our
+coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical
+principles. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in
+order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our
+fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would be
+justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by
+loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the
+greatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, of
+existence.
+
+Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or
+definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole
+nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who
+live on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows the
+absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with
+our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the
+decisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot,
+perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not
+check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to
+replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case.
+
+The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance,
+in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the
+Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military
+requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain
+secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of
+Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more
+possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in
+the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our
+battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot
+give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is
+feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal
+might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success
+depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous
+unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict
+heavy losses upon him.
+
+As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the
+completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and
+the usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in its
+present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. There
+can be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of the
+Kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbach
+class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be
+considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in a
+worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of the
+Hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the
+Prince class (_Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich_) fulfil their purpose
+neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Even
+the armoured cruisers _Fürst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau,_ and
+_Scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements.
+If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the
+time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these
+totally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--by
+new and thoroughly effective ships.
+
+Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon
+will admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever so
+strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and
+all financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships,
+which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities.
+That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the line
+have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisers
+are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. But
+superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible
+readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made
+to do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possess
+a certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the English
+heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and
+to equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerful
+artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the
+more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way
+that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or
+straight ahead.
+
+Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part
+in strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet,
+therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority of
+England--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because,
+so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of
+superiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high
+standard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence of
+construction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep this
+position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to
+the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying
+to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must also
+devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these
+vessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing this
+branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every
+direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with
+increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with
+these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on
+the enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would be
+extraordinarily advantageous to us.
+
+Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the
+development of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to make
+airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they
+could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes,
+they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet would
+then, as already explained in Chapter VIII., be able to report
+successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the
+battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the
+approach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able to
+prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus
+facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse or
+frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If our
+airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side,
+could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English
+coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when
+fighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly be
+doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to
+perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over
+the English would contribute largely to equalize the difference in
+strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war.
+It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field
+because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can
+compete for the palm of victory on equal terms.
+
+Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be
+carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be
+especially effective in a struggle against England, as that country
+needs imports more than any other. Consequently great results would
+follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing
+his navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have been
+discussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative to
+organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended
+for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity
+unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. The
+auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the
+open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice,
+when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so.
+
+A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must
+be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace.
+History tells us what to expect from the English on this head.
+
+In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 to
+September 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houses
+were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were
+killed. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of
+England is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and
+in the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence shows
+distinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of the
+seas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11
+and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarly
+bombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under the
+hypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the
+foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well
+not to forget them.
+
+The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also
+Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships,
+suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians.
+
+Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as
+was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain
+conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal
+violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the
+above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course
+of action politically justifiable.
+
+A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first
+place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful
+inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the
+tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability
+of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation
+of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack
+becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are
+granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack
+in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable
+carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be
+formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken
+of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties
+concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of
+States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such
+cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it,
+as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limit
+the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the
+very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would
+have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most
+extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in
+1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful
+from the standpoint of political morality.
+
+These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we
+must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without
+warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right.
+Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such
+eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the
+reservists.
+
+Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to
+secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all
+circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready
+for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension.
+The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole
+_matériel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for
+instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the
+mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in
+force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple
+precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to
+the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as
+is done in England.
+
+When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are
+required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the
+navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the
+resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since
+the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the
+expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic
+preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the
+self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet
+must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast
+defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our
+requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be
+provisionally dropped.
+
+In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should
+limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary,
+devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest
+stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in
+case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition
+that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act
+contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on
+us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform
+tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we
+have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships.
+
+I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is to
+be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases
+quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general
+situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in
+the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war.
+My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid
+foundation without which any successful action against the superior
+forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail
+to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible.
+
+It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry
+out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever
+may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though
+this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for
+the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on
+strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a
+successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain
+a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we
+must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers.
+
+Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and
+German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we
+must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the
+coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the
+pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be
+met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion.
+
+The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness
+for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the
+first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the
+long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define
+and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free
+hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing
+more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious
+mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France
+was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was
+favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has,
+indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace
+and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this
+difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between
+resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against
+numerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles the
+supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her
+assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and
+thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North
+America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed,
+threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequences
+of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her
+former American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is
+far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas
+than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. It
+is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty,
+and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we
+might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have
+wished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866
+nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would
+fall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman is
+shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake
+what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best
+course. Just Fate decides the issue.
+
+The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that
+we started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we have
+made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the
+Brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of
+decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters
+concerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to develop
+systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties
+which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we
+have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it.
+
+This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never let
+the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views
+which must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good time
+those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even
+though they make heavy financial calls on our resources.
+
+This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our
+naval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for
+lost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty
+devotedly.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+
+
+THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION
+
+The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which
+we can only assert our place among the Great Powers and secure the
+conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of
+treasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. We shall be
+compelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, special
+measures which will enable us to be more or less a match for our
+enemies--I mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of the
+army. We must always bear in mind in the present that we have to provide
+for the future.
+
+Apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget to
+develop the elements on which not only our military strength, but also
+the political power of the State ultimately rest. We must maintain the
+physical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done if
+we aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widest
+sense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions and
+demands of existence.
+
+While it is the duty of the State to guide her citizens to the highest
+moral and mental development, on the other hand the elements of
+strength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the State.
+Only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can the
+State achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interested
+in promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. Her duty and
+her justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from the
+fulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highest
+sense true to it.
+
+It is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely military
+standpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development of
+our growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. For while
+the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction,
+the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment in
+very great numbers possible. Thus the full consummation of military
+training cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equipped
+physically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentiments
+worthy of the honourable profession of arms.
+
+We have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raise
+the culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best of
+our power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independent
+individual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence on
+the men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limited
+if it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligent
+material. This fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims which
+modern war will make on the individual fighter. In order to meet these
+demands fully, the people must be properly educated.
+
+Each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure of
+independent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. In
+the open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed duty
+has been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources;
+he may often have to take over the command of his own section if the
+losses among his superiors are heavy. The artilleryman will have to work
+his gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains have
+fallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders are
+often left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and the
+sapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himself
+unexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource left
+beyond his own professional knowledge and determination.
+
+But not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility of
+the individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique will
+probably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. This change
+is due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greater
+efficiency of the firearms. All movements in large masses are more
+exacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments,
+since they are never carried out so smoothly. The shelter and food of
+great masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth of
+the marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to the
+difficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregular
+hours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. The increased range of
+modern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combination
+with the larger fronts, necessitates wide détours whenever the troops
+attempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on the
+battlefield.
+
+In the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the army
+has been enormously increased. The State, however, has done little to
+prepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies are
+making themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a very
+detrimental influence on their education. I specially refer to the
+ever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patriotic
+feeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the population
+into the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development.
+This result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. At the
+present day, out of all the German-born military units, over 6.14 per
+cent. come from the large towns, 7.37 per cent, from the medium-sized
+towns, 22.34 per cent. from the small or country towns, and 64.15 per
+cent. from the rural districts; while the distribution of the population
+between town and country is quite different. According to the census of
+1905, the rural population amounted to 42.5 per cent., the small or
+country towns to 25.5 per cent., the medium-sized towns to 12.9 per
+cent., and the large towns to 19.1 per cent. of the entire number of
+inhabitants. The proportion has probably changed since that year still
+more unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns have
+increased in population. These figures clearly show the physical
+deterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to our
+national life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellect
+and compact unity of the nation. The rural population forms part and
+parcel of the army. A thousand bonds unite the troops and the families
+of their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone who
+studies the inner life of our army is aware of this. The interest felt
+in the soldier's life is intense. It is the same spirit, transmitted
+from one to another. The relation of the army to the population of the
+great cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of their
+sons into the army is quite different. A certain opposition exists
+between the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who,
+from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation.
+Similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened,
+and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutely
+hostile to the service.
+
+It is in the direct interests of the State to raise the physical health
+of the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order to
+enable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effect
+of military training more extensively to bear on the town population,
+and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. Nothing
+promotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of military
+service.
+
+So far as I can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself which
+exercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing to
+its monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditions
+of life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. Apart from many
+forms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health,
+the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housing
+conditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. This
+latter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the rural
+districts, and, in combination with the other influences of the great
+city, produces far more harmful results.
+
+It is therefore the unmistakable duty of the State, first, to fight
+alcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing all
+kinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sell
+them; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all efforts
+to improve the housing conditions of the working population, and to
+withdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life of
+amusements. In Munich, Bavarian officers have recently made a
+praiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men past
+the age of attendance at school with health-producing military
+exercises. The young men's clubs which Field-Marshal v.d. Goltz is
+trying to establish aim at similar objects. Such undertakings ought to
+be vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by the
+State, from purely physical as well as social considerations. The
+gymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has an
+undoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deserves
+every encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others,
+the system of universal service should have been made an effective
+reality. It is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect of
+military service on the physical development of the recruits. The
+authorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed to
+make the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers than
+hitherto.
+
+On the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against two
+tendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hours
+for factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sport
+with an exaggerated value for the national health. As already pointed
+out, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendant
+on working together in large numbers that are prejudicial.
+
+The wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderate
+degree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work are
+present, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a complete
+miscomprehension of the real value of work. It is in itself the greatest
+blessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it no
+longer as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning a
+livelihood and paying for amusements. Strenuous labour alone produces
+men and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to win
+their living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have often
+achieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality.
+
+So long as the Dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict with
+the sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against the
+Spanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now,
+when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead a
+politically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars,
+their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take a
+part in the struggle of the civilized nations. In Germany that stock
+which was destined to bring back our country from degradation to
+historical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the Rhine
+or the Danube, but on the sterile sands of the March.
+
+We must preserve the stern, industrious, old-Prussian feeling, and carry
+the rest of Germany with us to Kant's conception of life; we must
+continuously steel our strength by great political and economic
+endeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained,
+or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only we
+shall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in the
+world.
+
+Where Nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growing
+wealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life of
+pleasure rather than of work, society and the State must vie in taking
+care that work does not become play, or play work. It is work, regarded
+as a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. Sport, which is spreading
+more and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation,
+not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. We must never
+forget this. Hard, laborious work has made Germany great; in England, on
+the contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health of
+the nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place of
+serious work it has greatly injured the English nation. The English
+nation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard of
+labour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the English
+trades unions--and of the security of its military position, has more
+and more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and it
+may well be asked whether, under these conditions, England will show
+herself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself in
+the future. If, further, the political rivalry with the great and
+ambitious republic in America be removed by an Arbitration Treaty, this
+circumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads to
+progress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which develop
+physique.
+
+The physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless it
+comes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while,
+if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations,
+the result must be injurious in the long-run.
+
+We must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physically
+healthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and the
+whole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour to
+promote their spiritual development in every way. The means for doing so
+is the school. Military education under the present-day conditions,
+which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aims
+satisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, and
+an improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material.
+
+The national school is not sufficient for this requirement. The general
+regulations which settle the national school system in Prussia date from
+the year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account of
+the modern development which has been so rapid of late years. It is only
+natural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and the
+essentials of military education. Present-day military education
+requires complete individualization and a conscious development of manly
+feeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching in
+classes, and there is no distinction between the sexes. This is directly
+prescribed by the rules.
+
+In the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of the
+superiors by specially detached officers and selected experienced
+non-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quite
+small sections; while each one receives individual attention from the
+non-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superior
+officers. In a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teach
+as many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers as
+many as 120 children are divided into two classes. A separation of the
+sexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. As a rule,
+therefore, the instruction is given in common. It is certain that, under
+such conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual is
+possible. All that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanically
+and inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch of
+knowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boys
+and girls, still less of individuals.
+
+Such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a military
+education. The principles which regulate the teaching in the two places
+are quite different. That is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction.
+
+The military education aims at training the moral personality to
+independent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patriotic
+feelings among the men. Instruction in a sense of duty and in our
+national history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professional
+teaching. Great attention is given to educate each individual in logical
+reasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts.
+
+In the national school these views are completely relegated to the
+background--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but as
+the practical result of the conditions. The chief stress in such a
+school is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting some
+facility in reading, writing, and ciphering. The so-called _Realign_
+(history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite into
+the background. Only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly are
+devoted to all the _Realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in the
+lower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hours
+are assigned to religious instruction in every standard. There is no
+idea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. Not a word in the
+General Regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this;
+and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods of
+religious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for the
+development of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. As for
+influencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars to
+any extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts it
+altogether out of the question.
+
+While the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instruction
+is thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given,
+especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. Beginning with
+the lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years),
+stories not only from the New Testament, but also from the Old Testament
+are drummed into the heads of the scholars. Similarly every Saturday the
+portions of Scripture appointed for the next Sunday are read out and
+explained to all the children. Instruction in the Catechism begins also
+in the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children must
+learn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. It is a
+significant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid
+"the memorizing of the General Confession and other parts of the
+liturgical service," as "also the learning by heart of the Pericopes."
+On the other hand, the institution of Public Worship is to be explained
+to the children. This illustrates the spirit in which this instruction
+has to be imparted according to the regulations.
+
+It is really amazing to read these regulations. The object of
+Evangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to the
+comprehension of the Holy Scriptures and to the creed of the
+congregation," in order that they "may be enabled to read the Scriptures
+independently and to take an active part both in the life and the
+religious worship of the congregation." Requirements are laid down which
+entirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to the
+comprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, and
+presuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. Not a word,
+however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, that
+is, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought into
+prominence. The teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impress
+religious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course of
+instruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formal
+religiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if not
+deliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moral
+influence. A real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of such
+instruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their Confirmation
+to have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so they
+remain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to the
+religious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. Nor
+does the instruction for Confirmation do much to alter that, for it is
+usually conceived in the same spirit.
+
+All other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to the
+young minds some high ideals--more especially our own country's
+history--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort of
+instruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is of
+inestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. It is the
+more regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed by
+the regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, is
+totally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some real
+service to the country. It is quite refreshing to read in the new
+regulations for middle schools of February 10,1910, that by religious
+instruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should be
+awakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aim
+at exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of the
+fatherland."
+
+The method of religious instruction which is adopted in the national
+school is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. Religious instruction
+can only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectual
+growth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. To make
+it the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in the
+national schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to be
+directed at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mystical
+intuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has a
+confusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. Even the
+missionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate his
+pupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart to
+them subtle religious ideas. Yet every Saturday the appointed passages
+of Scripture (the Pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children.
+
+Religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. Up
+to that point the teacher should be content, from the religious
+standpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with the
+simplest ideas of the Deity, but in other respects to endeavour to
+awaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasp
+loftier conceptions. The national school stands in total contradiction
+to this intellectual development. This is in conformity to regulations,
+for the same children who read the Bible independently are only to be
+led to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are daily
+around them." In the course of eight years they learn a smattering of
+reading, writing, and ciphering.[A] It is significant of the knowledge
+of our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-three
+recruits of one company to whom the question was put who Bismarck was,
+not a single one could answer. That the scholars acquire even a general
+idea of their duties to the country and the State is quite out of the
+question. It is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of the
+children by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught in
+common. One thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those of
+girls; and, although I consider it important that patriotic feelings
+should be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmit
+them to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a different
+way from the boys. When the instruction is common to both, the treatment
+of the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. It is
+quite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in the
+religious field when so little has been achieved in every other field.
+
+This pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal that
+Frederick the Great set up. He declared that the duty of the State was
+"to educate the young generation to independent thinking and
+self-devoted love of country."
+
+[Footnote A: Recently a boy was discharged from a well-known national
+school as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualified
+to the office of a Head Forester. He showed that he could not copy
+correctly, to say nothing of writing by himself.]
+
+Our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reform
+if it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education,
+but for life generally. It sends children out into the world with
+undeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elements
+of knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, but
+easy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. As a
+matter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the national
+schoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instruction
+as a recruit.
+
+It is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform.
+I will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important from
+the standpoint of a citizen and a soldier.
+
+First and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. The number
+of teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholars
+diminished. It is worth while considering in this connection the
+feasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years.
+Then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the object
+of developing the children's minds, and formal religious instruction
+should only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. Finally,
+the _Realien,_ especially the history of our own country, should claim
+more attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in every
+way; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religion
+should be more prominent than the formal contents. The training of the
+national school teacher must be placed on a new basis. At present it
+absolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of the
+school itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds and
+feelings of their pupils. It must be reckoned a distinct disadvantage
+for the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age of
+fourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which the
+reasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselves
+and on any chance influences. In the interval between school life and
+military service the young people not only forget all that they learnt,
+perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkingly
+adopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from a
+lack of counteracting ideals.
+
+A compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity of
+the age. It is also urgently required from the military standpoint. Such
+a school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to prevent
+the scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him for
+a special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism and
+sense of citizenship. To do this, it is necessary to explain to him the
+relation of the State to the individual, and to explain, by reference to
+our national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion to
+the State. The duties of the individual to the State should be placed in
+the foreground. This instruction must be inspired by the spirit which
+animated Schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of Prussia, and
+culminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in the
+strength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the great
+whole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employed
+for higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishes
+in feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in the
+love for the fatherland and for the State, which is a haven for every
+faith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose.
+
+Only if national education works in this sense will it train up men to
+fill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school of
+arms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which great
+deeds spring. What can be effected by the spirit of a nation we have
+learnt from the history of the War of Liberation, that never-failing
+source of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centre
+of history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools.
+
+We can study it also by an example from most recent history, in the
+Russo-Japanese War. "The education of the whole Japanese people,
+beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic and
+warlike spirit. That education, combined with the rapidly acquired
+successes in culture and warfare, aroused in the Japanese a marvellous
+confidence in their own strength. They served with pride in the ranks of
+the army, and dreamed of heroic deeds.... All the thoughts of the
+nation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course of
+several years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of a
+powerful army and a strong fleet."[B] This was the spirit that led the
+Japanese to victory. "The day when the young Japanese enlisted was
+observed as a festival in his family."[B]
+
+In Russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that
+"Patriotism was an obsolete notion," "war was a crime and an
+anachronism," that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was the
+greatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourable
+trade."[B] Thus the Russian army marched to battle without any
+enthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of the
+great racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity." Already eaten
+up by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, without
+energy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspired
+leaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent.
+
+[Footnote B: "The Work of the Russian General Staff," from the Russian by
+Freiheu v. Tettau.]
+
+I have examined these conditions closely because I attach great
+importance to the national school and the continuation school as a means
+to the military education of our people. I am convinced that only the
+army of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything really
+great. I understand, of course, that the school alone, however high its
+efficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, in
+view of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every means
+if we wish to accomplish something great. The direct influence of school
+ends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at first
+make itself felt very gradually. Later generations will reap the fruits
+of its sowing. Its efficiency must be aided by other influences which
+will not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughout
+their lives. Now, there are two means available which can work upon
+public opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation;
+one is the Press, the other is a policy of action. If the Government
+wishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to secure
+a narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further its
+great political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong and
+national Press, through which it must present its views and aims
+vigorously and openly. The Government will never be able to count upon a
+well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or
+necessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is being
+systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy
+preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the
+same note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as the
+object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military
+spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an
+imperial policy.
+
+It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war
+as an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with the
+duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country.
+
+A parliamentary Government, which always represents merely a temporary
+majority, may leave the party Press to defend and back its views; but a
+Government like the German, which traces its justification to the fact
+that it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. Its point of view
+does not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course,
+conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. It
+must therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as on
+particular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims as
+widely understood as possible. I regard it, therefore, as one of the
+most important duties of a Government like ours to use the Press freely
+and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. I do not mean that a few
+large political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be well
+supplied with news, but that the views of the Government should find
+comprehensive expression in the local Press. It would be an advantage,
+in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certain
+announcements of the Government, in order that the reader might not have
+such a one-sided account of public affairs as the party Press supplies.
+It would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, as
+justifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health.
+Epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old Europe more dangerous and
+damaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the State to
+preserve the moral healthiness of the nation.
+
+More important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the Press is
+the _propaganda of action._ Nothing controls the spirit of the multitude
+so effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceived
+in a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. Such education by a powerful
+policy is an absolute necessity for the German people. This nation
+possesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritual
+energy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairy
+laid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. In addition to
+this, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national and
+religious unity of the nation created in the system of small States and
+in confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency to
+particularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nation
+was no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. Yet the heart
+of this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even though
+such aims can only be attended by danger. We must not be misled in this
+respect by the Press, which often represents a most one-sided,
+self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or even
+Anti-German lines rather than national. The soul of our nation is not
+reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on the
+necessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and
+comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness.
+
+On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the
+Powers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance,
+every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the
+people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their
+forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again and
+again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this
+yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the
+clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with
+him.
+
+He is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors of
+national psychology; Bismarck possessed this art, and used k with a
+master-hand. True, he found ready to hand one idea which was common to
+all--the sincere wish for German unification and the German Empire; but
+the German nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which lead
+to the realization of this idea. Only under compulsion and after a hard
+struggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation was
+fired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to which
+the great statesman was so surely leading it. Success was the foundation
+on which Bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the German Empire. Even
+in the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of the
+people by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of all
+opposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them serve
+his own great aims. He, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, and
+the motto _Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him;
+but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and of
+world-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that no
+statesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands the
+soul of his people.
+
+This knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with the
+Great Elector, Frederick the Incomparable, Scharnhorst and Blücher; for
+even that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of a
+political idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground at
+the Congress of Vienna.
+
+The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things
+recognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influence
+over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by
+continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its
+interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions.
+Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to
+great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high
+aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to
+prepare their minds to it:
+
+  "The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims."
+
+We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed on
+the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous
+duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the
+whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of
+warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for
+the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices.
+
+We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization
+to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only
+fulfil it by the sword.
+
+
+Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most
+effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military
+duty? Such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for the
+strength and honour of the German people.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+
+
+FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that
+the political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitude
+of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the
+preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself.
+
+But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and
+moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military
+authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still
+further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of
+the State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must be
+made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the
+national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the
+tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further,
+as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of
+mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure
+under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the
+material and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations for
+war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made
+to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as
+possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come.
+If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in
+whom confidence can be reposed should war break out.
+
+
+I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the
+commercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere of
+commercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which the
+desired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Government
+and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regards
+finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may
+go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national
+household in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, on
+the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money
+required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions.
+
+The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financial
+economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the
+current incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, the
+indebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive
+and military capabilities.
+
+As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a great
+civilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never be
+brought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure for
+necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military
+forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general
+progress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion
+to the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly based
+on war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our
+forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the
+effeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is only
+one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one
+vice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of all
+culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the
+individual for itself.[A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepest
+gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an
+epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of
+the last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in
+Prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large
+sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the
+Government.
+
+Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of
+demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations
+contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to
+the great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day look
+contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut
+their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties
+imposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial
+pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in
+our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity
+and energy."[B]
+
+[Footnote A: Treitschke.]
+
+[Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte."]
+
+Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but is
+bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens,
+since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important,
+however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national
+property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities.
+
+This property is to a certain extent determined by the natural
+productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. But
+these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour
+of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced.
+Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and secure
+labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour
+conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by
+concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate
+German trade by vigorous political representation of German interests
+abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits
+from international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural production
+by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable
+protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on
+foreign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fishery
+would add to this.[D]
+
+[Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by international
+commerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling.]
+
+[Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from
+foreign countries.]
+
+From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase
+permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the
+annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be
+met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Home
+production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95
+per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, the
+production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two
+double-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered
+that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two
+million tons.
+
+A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national
+prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own
+colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense
+quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually
+independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to
+transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by
+effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less
+we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards,
+[E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the
+State will improve.
+
+[Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons
+of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of
+copper, etc.]
+
+If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of national
+productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the
+reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial
+position. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a
+two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays.
+The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very
+easily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it is
+a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to
+improve the financial position. The experiences of history leave no
+doubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of a
+nation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once is
+shaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the State
+creditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holds
+out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its
+creditors far better security than a weaker military power. If our
+credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened
+political position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our army
+and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible
+liquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first to
+improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to
+keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go.
+
+The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task.
+
+It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits of
+possible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and
+1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from
+20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same
+proportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there is
+a huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the German
+Empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per
+head of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the same
+basis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germany
+only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and
+navy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the
+individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in Germany and France, the
+outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our most
+probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their
+armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger
+politically.
+
+Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase
+of wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades and
+industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a
+setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again.
+
+The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the
+Empire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports has
+increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the
+year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14
+1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of the
+imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the
+exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... The value of the import of
+raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in
+1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of
+such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The import
+of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a
+value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of
+manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of the
+import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3
+milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food
+remained at about the same figure.
+
+The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in
+Germany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amounted
+in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2
+million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The
+quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in
+1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35
+million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from
+6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119
+million marks.... From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany
+has increased by 127 per cent.; in England only by about 59 per cent.
+The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172
+per cent.; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin.]
+
+Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financial
+position of the Empire has considerably improved since the Imperial
+Finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may very
+soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent.
+
+It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth
+of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive
+capitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked
+extent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of national
+wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number of
+taxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6,000 to 100,000
+marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent.,
+from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per
+cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. In these classes,
+therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater
+proportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100,000
+to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on
+an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in
+the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. In the class of 500,000
+marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per
+cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in
+the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually,
+it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. This means
+per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an
+increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an
+increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks
+and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year.
+
+We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and
+annually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister has
+estimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three
+years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliards
+yearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give some
+instances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory at
+Essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent.,
+the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the
+annual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from
+1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown by
+the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has
+reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and
+poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement
+in prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of a
+healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment
+are considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants
+left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's
+unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in
+the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 per
+cent. (in France it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of
+workmen's unions were unemployed.
+
+Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national
+debt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empire
+in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the
+national debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in--
+
+                                         Marks
+Prussia                                  9,421,770,800
+Bavaria                                  2,165,942,900
+Saxony                                     893,042,600
+Würtemberg                                 606,042,800
+Baden                                      557,859,000
+Hesse                                      428,664,400
+Alsace-Lorraine                            31,758,100
+Hamburg                                    684,891,200
+Lübeck                                     666,888,400
+Bremen                                     263,431,400
+
+Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains,
+forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railways
+reached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in--
+
+                                       Marks,
+Prussia (Hesse)                        9,888
+Bavaria                                1,694
+Saxony                                 1,035
+Würtemburg                               685
+Baden                                    727
+Alsace-Lorraine                          724
+
+--a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15,062 milliard
+marks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of
+1911 for Prussia alone 11,050 milliards. Nevertheless, the national
+debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously
+because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and
+presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in
+debt.
+
+The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10,000
+inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the
+whole Empire to some 5,000 million marks. This means that interest
+yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many
+communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions,
+are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or
+even 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributed
+according to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middle
+class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources of
+wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative
+income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on
+the Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into
+property. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to pay
+for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the
+protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization,
+so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the
+opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on
+the altar of patriotism.
+
+The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown how
+party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was
+not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his
+neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial
+sacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be
+made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But a
+considerable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if we
+wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of
+our country without a blow.
+
+Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedy
+introduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), in
+order to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue would
+oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would
+furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to
+diminish our burden of debt.
+
+If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters,
+depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they
+could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their
+favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in as
+heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based
+on official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place to
+examine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high a
+figure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large
+under any circumstances.
+
+Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that
+is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the
+nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first
+instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to
+paying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a
+private gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to be
+recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable
+to fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceeds
+principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing
+the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely
+important. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility
+that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other
+important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on
+land and sea.
+
+There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be
+urged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It is
+argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth,
+that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course
+of time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that the
+independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the
+ideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement that
+relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will,
+is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According to
+our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his
+fortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which he
+bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to
+any other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his natural
+heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he
+wishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he is
+interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things,
+that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession is
+based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual
+than his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait.
+The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in
+which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are
+alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of
+this sort."[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910.]
+
+Both objections are unconvincing.
+
+So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to
+liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met
+otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directly
+beneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay less
+taxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in
+the hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right of
+succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the
+State be prevented in other ways. The science of finance could
+unquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme to
+its extreme logical conclusion.
+
+The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true sense
+of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a
+will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. If
+such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of
+certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof
+in life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probably
+the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties
+would actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law,"
+which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and
+is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual
+than the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is the
+root from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and the
+defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that in
+the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and
+that the significance of the State for the individual, no less than for
+the family, should be thoroughly understood.
+
+These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty
+enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperial
+right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help
+and the whole future of Germany is at stake.
+
+If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally
+large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a
+law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our
+sorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be good
+prospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Government
+does not disguise the true state of the political position.
+
+Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We see
+that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against
+the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and
+are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts are
+also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as
+to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which
+England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world
+policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if
+she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has
+built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has
+secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious
+careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this
+English policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guided
+exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means
+of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill.
+
+There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements
+have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit
+reservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic
+stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting
+party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really
+benefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed.
+Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on which
+those of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes on
+the honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when
+concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so
+as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arise
+which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The
+country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical
+sense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his life
+long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever
+induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[A]
+
+The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or
+alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if
+he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an
+arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is,
+as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States,
+from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the
+happiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in the
+east will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank on
+the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria and
+outflank any Russian attack on Galicia.
+
+Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will
+never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a
+permanent political system.
+
+"There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as
+effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal
+interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the
+other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." These
+are the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher
+_pace_ Bismarck.
+
+We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but
+must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable
+attitude of the other States by reference to their own interests.
+Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to the
+diplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself,
+seeks nothing but his own advantage." It will prove waste labour to
+attempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions or
+an attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, the
+weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale.
+
+When Napoleon III. planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect an
+alliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually in
+Paris to conclude the military negotiations.[B] These probably were
+going on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand.
+Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussian
+flag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman less
+biassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austria
+nor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war
+under unfavourable conditions.
+
+[Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attaché
+in Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, and
+pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of
+Prussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was better
+informed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the
+conditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by Archduke
+Albert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor had
+made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military
+calculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the former
+Minister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)]
+
+France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests,
+unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did not
+satisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomatic
+arrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests in
+Morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her
+interest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that country
+for herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will not
+allow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerce
+and German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the French
+standpoint she is right.
+
+The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own
+interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different
+Great Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt,
+however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political
+grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible
+only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State with
+which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its
+opponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to
+further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone
+and of being left isolated in the hour of danger.
+
+A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking
+chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keep
+this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances
+and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above
+all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take
+bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility
+of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under
+favourable conditions. "The great art of policy," writes Frederick the
+Great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to
+one's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage from
+favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." Even in
+his Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered
+all his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but
+boldness alone can acquire." "I give you a problem to solve," he said to
+his councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. was announced.
+"When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?"
+
+Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct
+summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate
+estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the
+interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and
+daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws
+of political and military success.
+
+The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blinded
+by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able
+to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success.
+"The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim
+which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which
+shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more
+despised than by the great Prussian King," so H. v. Treitschke tells us.
+"Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with
+remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the
+political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss
+the golden opportunity.
+
+It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize
+that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist
+policy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets up
+personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real
+current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures,
+as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia.
+
+A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these
+great duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are based
+on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the
+possibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers the
+result to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageous
+circumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe
+to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led.
+
+In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan
+had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as
+military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and
+assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her
+policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at
+the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment
+of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She
+had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance
+with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to
+place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover,
+compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of
+the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against
+Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations
+required by the political position had been made, although the conflict
+had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous
+retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no
+doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made
+resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the
+campaign by the offensive.
+
+England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and
+consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to
+her aims or suited to give weight to political demands.
+
+Two points stand out clearly from this consideration.
+
+First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and
+political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war
+are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong
+enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing
+which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be
+developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The
+obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace
+as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister
+and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the
+all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain
+influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs,
+and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military
+situation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister who
+conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is
+in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of
+the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he
+must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by
+war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has
+of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the
+realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the
+opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of
+compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a
+permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of
+recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one,
+but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to
+end in political and moral defeat.
+
+The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and
+hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and
+shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always
+creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory,
+tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy,
+which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts
+favourably on the military situation.
+
+In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can
+only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution
+join hands.
+
+If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next
+war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion:
+the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the
+necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions
+are to be created for the inevitably threatening war.
+
+So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two
+fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war
+from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was
+comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various
+strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small
+compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the
+other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive
+action on both sides. To-day the situation is different.
+
+We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expect
+not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of
+English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch
+neutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England may
+land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war
+with us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a
+position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather
+be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and
+south-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is also
+increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of
+the European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menaced
+in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet.
+
+All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur
+simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations
+they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the
+military aspect. The military situation thus created is very
+unfavourable.
+
+If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the
+army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the
+situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the
+stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure,
+and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must
+count. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one
+also. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have
+to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be
+directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and
+all necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops of
+the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected
+along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when
+occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the same
+principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in
+readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport
+arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many
+different lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements for
+unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the
+most various political prospects. We should in any case be forced to
+adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present
+conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent
+an invasion by one or other of our enemies.
+
+No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good
+prospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led against
+a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. A
+military investigation of the situation shows that a plan
+of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents,
+under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and
+has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind.
+
+The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy
+which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to
+overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. On
+this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of
+Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Of
+course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an
+unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which
+the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If we
+attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help,
+and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy
+to fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the
+cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be
+reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral.
+
+This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring
+about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor
+England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as
+we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by
+diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows.
+
+If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate
+an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her
+interests or those of England, that both these States would feel
+themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are
+offered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentively
+studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on
+this point.
+
+In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we
+should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of
+circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to
+struggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to state
+clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own
+interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Such
+political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid
+foundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and
+realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great
+results.
+
+It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and
+measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a
+favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous
+to Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. This
+requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic
+position which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said:
+Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must
+keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as
+time goes on.
+
+Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire
+settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons
+emigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and England
+to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the
+Mediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. The
+effort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured the
+Italian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in the
+least the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to the
+Triple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. The
+importance of these considerations will continue to be felt.
+
+Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, and
+Russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of
+present-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in
+England and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the
+Central European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder
+of abandoning her in Morocco.
+
+There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; in
+Central Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clash
+in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and China
+is forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to some
+degree ties her hands.
+
+All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if it
+is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than
+recent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy can
+count on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on an
+army whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficiently
+valued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. We
+have amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops,
+the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst
+them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are
+soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world,
+provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The German
+nation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height of
+its great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in
+its soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this
+people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a
+worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on
+in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will
+achieve a truly magnificent result.
+
+In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces,
+and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger,
+our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future;
+but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless it
+wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the
+brave words of Goethe:
+
+  "Bid defiance to every power!
+  Ever valiant, never cower!
+  To the brave soldier open flies
+  The golden gate of Paradise."
+
+
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-German
+convention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; the
+Turko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensions
+which point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and,
+lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real
+offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France and
+England. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently
+between the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has been
+foreseen and provided for.
+
+I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first
+occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the
+Anglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks.
+
+The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed,
+have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a
+collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this
+object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed
+that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was
+determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the
+attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered
+correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain
+was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for
+war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance
+on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this
+crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the
+concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable
+moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait
+until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and
+Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the
+other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it
+can actively support the Rhine army.
+
+This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government,
+but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined,
+that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes.
+
+
+It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as
+regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our
+manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of
+territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not
+inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in
+obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the
+possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can
+never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were
+compelled to abandon.
+
+I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial
+concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed
+force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo
+region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of
+November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their
+present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from
+this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no
+doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession
+for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish
+_enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has
+at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case
+of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese.
+
+It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial
+arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for
+a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be
+assumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has
+carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a
+moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because
+she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a
+desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea,
+in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v.
+Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not,
+therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to
+revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect,
+the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France.
+
+The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first an
+actual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by the
+expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn
+from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position.
+But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not
+merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but
+primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its
+entirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement
+means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly
+surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the
+sovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent
+infraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we had
+weighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty such
+action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the
+notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such
+explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front.
+
+An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islam
+have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, of
+course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey have
+suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in
+the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance
+for us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco convention
+precipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundly
+the solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which France
+obtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realize
+the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the
+Mediterranean.
+
+The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep
+rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the
+mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large
+sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in
+spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily
+supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this
+weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the
+Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better
+has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great
+disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical
+times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire
+must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to
+ride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war
+removes all further doubt on this point.
+
+The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the
+view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the
+various chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by a
+firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder
+any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have
+done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance,
+and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no
+doubt on this point.[A]
+
+[Footnote A: Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.]
+
+The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all
+pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead
+in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive
+intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would
+support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the
+limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with
+England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered
+by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new
+acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new
+colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and
+that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form
+objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear
+commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once
+more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates.
+
+In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count
+on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a
+_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at
+most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may
+fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.
+
+If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in
+the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world
+generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more
+face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the
+world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any
+case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide
+that the hour of attack has come.
+
+We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike
+preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down.
+All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to
+represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the
+people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to
+military and political success, without carrying still further the
+disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and
+frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between
+Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will
+prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy
+which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers
+threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs
+and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any
+conventional scruples distract it from this object.
+
+Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged
+basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of
+sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation
+calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it
+to the happy goal.
+
+The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever.
+England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her
+interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles
+question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of
+her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great
+Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and
+difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has
+considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before
+it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will
+probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in
+sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted
+German policy can utilize in order to influence the general political
+situation in the interests of our Fatherland.
+
+If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of
+Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the
+future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with
+confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to
+fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz
+Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God:
+
+  "From the height of the starry sky
+  May thy ringing sword flash bright;
+  Let every craven cry
+  Be silenced by thy might!"
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Germany and the Next War
+by Friedrich von Bernhardi
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+Project Gutenberg's Germany and the Next War, by Friedrich von Bernhardi
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Germany and the Next War
+
+Author: Friedrich von Bernhardi
+
+Release Date: February 28, 2004 [EBook #11352]
+[Date last updated: August 18, 2005]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Bonny Fafard and PG Distributed Proofreaders
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR
+
+
+
+BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI
+
+
+
+TRANSLATED BY ALLEN H. POWLES
+
+
+1912
+
+
+
+All the patriotic sections of the German people were greatly excited
+during the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on all
+hearts that in the settlement of the Morocco dispute no mere commercial
+or colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but that
+the honour and future of the German nation were at stake. A deep rift
+had opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action
+of the Government. Public opinion, which was clearly in favour of
+asserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our political
+position, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would have
+demanded. I cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in an
+overwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, would
+have been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation.
+Haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic of
+the German Reichstag in modern Berlin as it was in medieval Regensburg.
+These conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages,
+which were partly written some time ago.
+
+Nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national and
+political development. At such times it is necessary to be absolutely
+clear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be
+surmounted, and the sacrifices to be made.
+
+The task I have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of all
+diplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. It is
+obvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view.
+
+Our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past,
+have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nation
+which, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must,
+and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulness
+of my German heart that I have recorded my convictions. I believe that
+thus I shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers'
+hearts, and strengthen the national purpose.
+
+THE AUTHOR.
+
+_October, 1911_
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+Power of the peace idea--Causes of the love of peace in Germany--
+  German consciousness of strength--Lack of definite political aims
+ --Perilous situation of Germany and the conditions of successful
+  self-assertion--Need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to
+  explain the tasks and aims of Germany in the light of history
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR
+
+Pacific ideals and arbitration--The biological necessity of war--The
+  duty of self-assertion--The right of conquest--The struggle for
+  employment--War a moral obligation--Beneficent results of war
+ --War from the Christian and from the materialist standpoints--
+  Arbitration and international law--Destructiveness and immorality
+  of peace aspirations--Real and Utopian humanity--Dangerous
+  results of peace aspirations in Germany--The duty of
+  the State
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR
+
+Bismarck and the justification of war--The duty to fight--The teaching
+  of history--War only justifiable on adequate grounds--The
+  foundations of political morality--Political and individual morality
+ --The grounds for making war--The decision to make war--The
+  responsibility of the statesman
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
+
+The ways of Providence in history--Christianity and the Germans--
+  The Empire and the Papacy--Breach between the German World
+  Empire and the revived spiritual power--Rise of the great States
+  of Europe and political downfall of Germany after the Thirty
+  Years' War--Rise of the Prussian State--The epoch of the Revolution
+  and the War of Liberation--Intellectual supremacy of
+  Germany--After the War of Liberation--Germany under William
+  I. and Bismarck--Change in the conception of the State and
+  the principle of nationality--New economic developments and
+  the World Power of England--Rise of other World Powers--
+  Socialism, and how to overcome it--German science and art--
+  Internal disintegration of Germany and her latent strength
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION
+
+Grounds of the intellectual supremacy of Germany--Germany's role
+  as spiritual and intellectual leader--Conquest of religious and
+  social obstacles--Inadequacy of our present political position--
+  To secure what we have won our first duty--Necessity of increasing
+  our political power--Necessity of colonial expansion--
+  Menace to our aspirations from hostile Powers
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL
+
+Points of view for judging of the political situation--The States of the
+  Triple Alliance--The political interests of France and Russia--
+  The Russo-French Alliance--The policy of Great Britain--
+  America and the rising World Powers of the Far East--The importance
+  of Turkey--Spain and the minor States of Europe--Perilous
+  position of Germany--World power or downfall--Increase
+  of political power: how to obtain it--German colonial
+  policy--The principle of the balance of power in Europe--Neutral
+  States--The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs
+  of other States--Germany and the rules of international politics
+ --The foundations of our internal strength
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY FOR WAR
+
+Its necessity--Its twofold aspect--The educational importance of
+  military efficiency--Different military systems--Change in the
+  nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization--
+  Variety of methods of preparation for war--The armaments of
+  minor States--The armaments of the Great Powers--Harmonious
+  development of all elements of strength--Influence on armaments
+  of different conceptions of the duties of the State--Permanent
+  factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness--
+  Statecraft in this connection
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR
+
+Our opponents--The French army--The military power of Russia--
+  The land forces of England--The military power of Germany and
+  Austria; of Italy--The Turkish army--The smaller Balkan States
+ --The Roumanian army--The armies of the lesser States of Central
+  Europe--Greece and Spain--The fleets of the principal naval
+  Powers--The enmity of France--The hostility of England--
+  Russia's probable behaviour in a war against Germany--The
+  military situation of Germany--Her isolation--What will be at
+  stake in our next war--Preparation for war
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+THE NEXT NAVAL WAR
+
+England's preparations for a naval war against Germany--Germany's
+  first measures against England--England and the neutrality of the
+  small neighbouring States--The importance of Denmark--Commercial
+  mobilization--The two kinds of blockade: The close
+  blockade and the extended blockade--England's attack on our
+  coasts--Co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--The decisive
+  battle and its importance--Participation of France and Russia in
+  a German-English war
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+THE CRUCIAL QUESTION
+
+Reciprocal relations of land and sea power--The governing points of
+  view in respect of war preparations--Carrying out of universal
+  military service--The value of intellectual superiority--Masses,
+  weapons, and transport in modern war--Tactical efficiency and
+  the quality of the troops--The advantage of the offensive--Points
+  to be kept in view in war preparations--Refutation of the prevailing
+  restricted notions on this head--The _Ersatzreserve_--New
+  formations--Employment of the troops of the line and the new
+  formations--Strengthening of the standing army--The importance
+  of personality
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+ARMY ORGANIZATION
+
+Not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further
+  development--Fighting power and tactical efficiency--Strength of the
+  peace establishment--Number of officers and N.C.O.'s, especially in the
+  infantry--Relations of the different arms to each other--Distribution
+  of machine guns--Proportion between infantry and artillery--Lessons to
+  be learned from recent wars with regard to this--Superiority at the
+  decisive point--The strength of the artillery and tactical
+  efficiency--Tactical efficiency of modern armies--Tactical efficiency
+  and the marching depth of an army corps--Importance of the internal
+  organization of tactical units--Organization and distribution of field
+  artillery; of heavy field howitzers--Field pioneers and fortress
+  pioneers--Tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--Increase of the
+  cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--Tactical organization of the
+  cavalry--Development of the air-fleet--Summary of the necessary
+  requirements--Different ways of carrying them out--Importance of
+  governing points of view for war preparations
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+TRAINING AND EDUCATION
+
+The spirit of training--Self-dependence and the employment of masses--
+  Education in self-dependence--Defects in our training for war on the
+  grand scale--Need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to
+  the training of our commanders--Practical training of the artillery--
+  Training in tactical efficiency--Practice in marching under war
+  conditions--Training of the train officers and column leaders--
+  Control of the General Staff by the higher commanders--Value of
+  manoeuvres: how to arrange them--Preliminary theoretical training of
+  the higher commanders--Training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the
+  pioneers and commissariat troops--Promotion of intellectual development
+  in the army--Training in the military academy
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR
+
+The position of a World Power implies naval strength--Development
+  of German naval ideals--The task of the German fleet; its strength
+ --Importance of coast defences--Necessity of accelerating our
+  naval armaments--The building of the fleet--The institution of
+  the air-fleet--Preliminary measures for a war on commerce--
+  Mobilization--General points of view with regard to preparations
+  for the naval war--Lost opportunities in the past
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION
+
+The universal importance of national education--Its value for the
+  army--Hurtful influences at work on it--Duties of the State with
+  regard to national health--Work and sport--The importance of
+  the school--The inadequacy of our national schools--Military
+  education and education in the national schools--Methods of
+  instruction in the latter--Necessity for their reform--Continuation
+  schools--Influence of national education on the Russo-Japanese
+  War--Other means of national education--The propaganda of
+  action
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+Duties of the State in regard to war preparations--The State and
+  national credit--The financial capacity of Germany--Necessity of
+  new sources of revenue--The imperial right of inheritance--Policy
+  of interests and alliances--Moulding and exploitation of the
+  political situation--The laws of political conduct--Interaction of
+  military and political war preparations--Political preparations
+  for our next war--Governing factors in the conduct of German policy
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+The latest political events--Conduct of the German Imperial Government
+ --The arrangement with France--Anglo-French relations and
+  the attitude of England--The requirements of the situation
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has
+been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way
+which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining
+the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in
+Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal
+enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With the
+increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of
+sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great
+conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our
+future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a
+solution at the present time.
+
+We have been capable of soaring upwards. Mighty deeds raised Germany
+from political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of European
+nations. But we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and to
+advance along the path of development in politics and culture. We
+tremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands from
+us. Yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from our
+glorious past. How rightly Fichte once judged his countrymen when he
+said the German can never wish for a thing by itself; he must always
+wish for its contrary also.
+
+The Germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlike
+nation of Europe. For a long time they have proved themselves to be the
+ruling people of the Continent by the power of their arms and the
+loftiness of their ideas. Germans have bled and conquered on countless
+battlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shown
+that the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. In
+striking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become a
+peace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. A rude shock is
+needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their
+military strength.
+
+This strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes.
+
+It springs first from the good-natured character of the German people,
+which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations and
+partisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. It is connected
+with another characteristic of the German nature. Our aim is to be just,
+and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchange
+relations share this aim. We are always ready to consider the peaceful
+assurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign Press to be no less
+genuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resist
+the view that the political world is only ruled by interests and never
+from ideal aims of philanthropy. "Justice," Goethe says aptly, "is a
+quality and a phantom of the Germans." We are always inclined to assume
+that disputes between States can find a peaceful solution on the basis
+of justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is.
+
+An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted
+in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed
+in commercial life.
+
+The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world.
+Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhaps
+the greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty years
+Germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion
+of her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line,
+we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the
+world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great
+industrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are established
+all over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of the
+globe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands of
+Germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Under
+these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides.
+
+Our trade and our industries--owners no less than employes--do not want
+this development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is the
+essential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition will
+be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have
+never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained
+by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce.
+
+Universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, for
+war in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limited
+circles, but the whole nation suffers alike. All families and all
+classes have to pay the same toll of human lives. Finally comes the
+effect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of the
+times--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of an
+aspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfold
+in peace.
+
+Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem
+entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire
+received with "astonishment and indignation" from Frederick the Great,
+that "the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power";
+that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans,
+cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the
+greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. We regard our
+warlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is the
+special duty of the German Reichstag to lighten so far as possible. We
+seem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament is
+not an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of our
+national health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige.
+We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it
+as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power.
+
+Besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continued
+justification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate and
+often unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the German people.
+The agelong dream of the German nation was realized in the political
+union of the greater part of the German races and in the founding of the
+German Empire. Since then there lives in the hearts of all (I would not
+exclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proud
+consciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increased
+political power. This consciousness is supported by the fixed
+determination never to abandon these acquisitions. The conviction is
+universal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the whole
+nation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. We all wish, indeed, to be
+able to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict,
+and we live in the belief that the power of our State will steadily
+increase without our needing to fight for it. We do not at the bottom of
+our hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with a
+certain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to let
+ourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow.
+Every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. Not
+merely in the North, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race with
+glorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner of
+Prussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of all
+thought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in the
+South also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of petty
+nationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the German stock live
+in the heart of the people. Here and there, maybe, such emotions slumber
+in the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer and
+more luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animated
+by latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousness
+await their awakening.
+
+Thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below the
+surface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. It fritters
+itself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. We no
+longer have a clearly defined political and national aim, which grips
+the imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unity
+of action. Such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in the
+yearnings for German unity, for the fulfilment of the Barbarossa legend.
+A great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems to
+me to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in the
+world is threatened by external complications, the greater is this
+danger.
+
+Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding all
+peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that
+their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often
+pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific
+settlement.
+
+In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful
+methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable,
+our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result of
+our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also
+because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual
+upstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, and
+now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for
+centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect. We have thus
+injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. It must be
+reserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situation
+thus affected, but one point can be mentioned without further
+consideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties is
+adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the
+Germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces
+brought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of this
+struggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation.
+We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset by
+the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this
+struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry
+through a Seven Years' War for our position as a World Power, if we gain
+a start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which will
+fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces
+of the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops,
+but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for
+all their dearest possessions.
+
+These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the
+standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great
+tasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before the
+German people as the greatest civilized people known to history.
+
+From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations for
+peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of
+the German people, according to their true moral significance. I must
+try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of
+nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true
+civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality.
+I must endeavour to develop from the history of the German past in its
+connection with the conditions of the present those aspects of the
+question which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. The
+historical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according to
+inward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drastic
+obligations. No one need passively submit to the pressure of
+circumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at the
+parting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or to
+decadence. "A favoured position in the world will only become effective
+in the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it." It
+seemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this parting
+of the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light I
+may on the different paths which are open to our people. A nation must
+fully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can it
+take deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and,
+looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for any
+sacrifices which the present or future may demand.
+
+These sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financial
+sphere, depend mainly on the idea of what Germany is called upon to
+strive for and attain in the present and the future. Only those who
+share my conception of the duties and obligations of the German people,
+and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing the
+sword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusions
+in the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financial
+demands which spring out of it. It is only in their logical connection
+with the entire development, political and moral, of the State that the
+military requirements find their motive and their justification.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+
+THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR
+
+Since 1795, when Immanuel Kant published in his old age his treatise on
+"Perpetual Peace," many have considered it an established fact that war
+is the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. In spite of
+all that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the struggle
+between nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization is
+credited with a power to which war must yield. But, undisturbed by such
+human theories and the change of times, war has again and again marched
+from country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved its
+destructive as well as creative and purifying power. It has not
+succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. Long periods of
+war, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on the
+contrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, from
+the political intercourse of nations.
+
+This wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. The
+maintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanship
+should aim. This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days a
+quite peculiar power over men's spirits. This aspiration finds its
+public expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the Press of
+every country and of every party opens its columns to it. The current in
+this direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of Governments
+profess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peace
+is the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out the
+aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all Governments exert
+themselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish the
+conflagration.
+
+Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action.
+They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote
+their own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at the
+Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the
+United States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried to
+conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and
+foremost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany. No
+practical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved.
+
+We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts.
+This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as the
+weaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest
+need of international protection, have been completely passed over in
+the American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be
+assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans,
+with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced
+"perfidious Albion" to accede to the proposals. We may suppose that
+England intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, but
+that America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of
+sovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out her
+plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America.
+Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over
+the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for
+themselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts
+of President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace,
+and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of
+the United States an era in the history of mankind.
+
+This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and
+marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been
+shown by a race of Epigoni. "It has always been," H. von Treitschke
+tells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played
+with the dream of perpetual peace."
+
+Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours to
+diminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which war
+entails are justifiable. It is an incontestable fact that war
+temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic
+development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the
+primitive brutality of man. It is therefore a most desirable
+consummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible,
+and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily
+in the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential nature
+of war. All that the Hague Peace Congress has accomplished in this
+limited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war,
+universal acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the object
+is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place in
+historical development.
+
+This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws
+which rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the first
+importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be
+dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow,
+which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real
+civilization. "War is the father of all things." [A] The sages of
+antiquity long before Darwin recognized this.
+
+[Footnote A: (Heraclitus of Ephesus).]
+
+The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all
+healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the
+result of contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not
+merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "To supplant or
+to be supplanted is the essence of life," says Goethe, and the strong
+life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good
+everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the
+most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the
+universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. This struggle is
+regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and
+by the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animal
+world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the human
+race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances.
+The man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means to
+assert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the
+individual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness of
+right. The life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined,
+doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent
+the less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour,
+envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. Still more
+often, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures of
+a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment.
+
+There can be no doubt on this point. The nation is made up of
+individuals, the State of communities. The motive which influences each
+member is prominent in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle for
+possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the
+relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only
+as it is compatible with advantage. So long as there are men who have
+human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive
+for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests
+come into being and occasions for making war arise.
+
+"The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law
+of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and
+institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the
+intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The
+extrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the external
+development of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal
+development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggle
+of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward
+development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of
+nations--war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist?
+In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat
+of the other! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Clauss Wagner, "Der Krieg als schaffendes Weltprinzip."]
+
+That social system in which the most efficient personalities possess the
+greatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocial
+struggle. In the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquer
+which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral,
+material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend
+itself. War will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions,
+enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus
+promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual
+and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which
+render possible a general progressive development. They confer victory
+because the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war,
+inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy
+budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "War," says A.
+W. von Schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in
+Nature."
+
+Now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may exist
+between peoples and States, like that between the fellow-members of a
+society, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need not
+always degenerate Into war. Struggle and war are not identical. This
+rivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as the
+intrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results.
+Above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the State stands the
+law, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that the
+right shall prevail. Behind the law stands the State, armed with power,
+which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively to
+promote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. But there is no
+impartial power that stands above the rivalry of States to restrain
+injustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote the
+highest ends of mankind. Between States the only check on injustice is
+force, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own
+part and promote its own ends and ideals. If in doing so it comes into
+conflict with the ideals and views of other States, it must either
+submit and concede the precedence to the rival people or State, or
+appeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i.e., of
+war--in order to make its own views prevail. No power exists which can
+judge between States, and makes its judgments prevail. Nothing, in fact,
+is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress the
+ascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay.
+
+It will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form a
+superior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is
+stronger. This attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the more
+intensive vitality will prevail. The allied opponents have the seeds of
+corruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporary
+reverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory over
+numerical superiority. The history of Germany is an eloquent example of
+this truth.
+
+Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct of
+self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a
+natural condition of existence. "Man is a fighter." Self-sacrifice is a
+renunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or in
+the life of States, which are agglomerations of individuals. The first
+and paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence.
+By self-assertion alone can the State maintain the conditions of life
+for its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man is
+entitled to claim from it. This duty of self-assertion is by no means
+satisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes the
+obligation to assure the possibility of life and development to the
+whole body of the nation embraced by the State.
+
+Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a
+given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they
+require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population.
+Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must,
+as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say,
+by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity.
+
+The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first the
+procedure is pacific. Over-populated countries pour a stream of
+emigrants into other States and territories. These submit to the
+legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditions
+of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants,
+with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest.
+
+The right of colonization is also recognized. Vast territories inhabited
+by uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized States, and
+made subject to their rule. Higher civilization and the correspondingly
+greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. This right
+is, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determine
+what degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. The
+impossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these international
+relations has been the cause of many wars. The subjugated nation does
+not recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilized
+nation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence.
+This situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions of
+civilization have changed in the course of time. The subject nation has,
+perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and the
+difference in civilization has consequently lessened. Such a state of
+things is growing ripe in British India.
+
+Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. It
+may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races,
+and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which the
+mother-country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to
+acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of
+self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign
+soil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right.
+The threatened people will see the point of Goethe's lines:
+
+  "That which them didst inherit from thy sires,
+  In order to possess it, must be won."
+
+The procedure of Italy in Tripoli furnishes an example of such
+conditions, while Germany in the Morocco question could not rouse
+herself to a similar resolution.[C]
+
+[Footnote C: This does not imply that Germany could and ought to have
+occupied part of Morocco. On more than one ground I think that it was
+imperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this State on the basis
+of the Algeciras Convention. Among other advantages, which need not be
+discussed here, Germany would have had the country secured to her as a
+possible sphere of colonization. That would have set up justifiable
+claims for the future.]
+
+In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at
+once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided
+by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since
+its decisions rest on the very nature of things.
+
+Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a
+convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the
+same result.
+
+In America, England, Germany, to mention only the chief commercial
+countries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of the
+population. The native population cannot consume all the products of
+this work. The industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. Work
+and employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladly
+accept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country.
+But this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itself
+from such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. We
+find, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries into
+existence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the other
+hand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, to
+crush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumer
+for itself or win fresh ones. It is an embittered struggle which rages
+in the market of the world. It has already often assumed definite
+hostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensify
+this struggle. Great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shut
+their doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on the
+down-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourable
+conditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goods
+cheaper than those imported from the old industrial States. These latter
+will see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus it
+may well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactory
+conditions of life to its workers. Such a State runs the danger not only
+of losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of also
+gradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and political
+world through diminishing production and lessened profits.
+
+In this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. We
+cannot reject the possibility that a State, under the necessity of
+providing remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war.
+If more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stake
+in Morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, Germany
+would hardly have conceded to France the most favourable position in the
+Morocco market without a struggle. England, doubtless, would not shrink
+from a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of the
+South African goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened her
+Indian market, the control of which is the foundation of her world
+sovereignty. The knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biological
+laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from
+international relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is not
+only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an
+indispensable factor in civilization.
+
+The attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connected
+with the view of life generally.
+
+If we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as something
+purely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outward
+decay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man can
+attain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possible
+diminution of all bodily suffering. The State will be regarded as a sort
+of assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possession
+and enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. We must endorse the
+view which Wilhelm von Humboldt professed in his treatise on the limits
+of the activity of the State.[D] The compulsory functions of the State
+must be limited to the assurance of property and life. The State will be
+considered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shun
+war as the greatest conceivable evil.
+
+[Footnote D: W. von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der
+Wirksamkelt des Staates zu bestimmen."]
+
+If, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of States as merely
+a fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not rest
+on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers,
+and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of the
+chequered conditions of life, the task of the State will appear in a
+very different light. The State will not be to us merely a legal and
+social insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have the
+one object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reach
+of the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising the
+intellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, and
+of securing for them that influence on the world which tends to the
+combined progress of humanity. We shall see in the State, as Fichte
+taught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is to
+put into practice the moral duty on earth. "The State," says Treitschke,
+"is a moral community. It is called upon to educate the human race by
+positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should
+develop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike for
+nation and individuals, the highest moral task."
+
+This highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. Man
+can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a
+community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He must
+be in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individual
+out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and
+makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The State
+alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest
+degree of life.[E]
+
+[Footnote E: To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and
+thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to
+error, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, by
+Implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Any
+action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State
+and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide
+domain of Utopias.]
+
+War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it
+is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation.
+As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls
+for war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it.
+
+If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, we
+shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its
+political power increases. The higher object at which it aims is
+closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It is
+only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that
+creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most
+splendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilities
+and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which
+power creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, and
+recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is
+content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace on
+sluggard's couch it lies," then its citizens become stunted. The efforts
+of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost.
+This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small
+States, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls victim to the
+same curse.
+
+All petty and personal interests force their way to the front during a
+long period of peace. Selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxury
+obliterates idealism. Money acquires an excessive and unjustifiable
+power, and character does not obtain due respect:
+
+
+  "Man is stunted by peaceful days,
+  In idle repose his courage decays.
+  Law is the weakling's game.
+  Law makes the world the same.
+  But in war man's strength is seen,
+  War ennobles all that is mean;
+  Even the coward belies his name."
+                 SCHILLER: _Braut v. Messina_.
+
+"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social
+petrifaction and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of the
+goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience.
+War alone teaches this lesson." [F]
+
+[Footnote F: Kuno Fischer, "Hegel," i., p. 737.]
+
+War, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and to
+expand national power than any other means known to history. It
+certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at
+the same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. This
+is especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regarded
+not merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as the
+expression of the united will of a whole nation.
+
+All petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the grave
+decision which a war involves. The common danger unites all in a common
+effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedly
+spurned. This union contains a liberating power which produces happy and
+permanent results in the national life. We need only recall the uniting
+power of the War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and their
+historical consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every war
+vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the sham
+reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are
+unmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth,
+and honour come to the front and are put into play. "A thousand touching
+traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous war
+awakes in noble nations." [G]
+
+[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 482.]
+
+Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "War," he
+said, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment
+constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it;
+every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues."
+
+"At the moment when the State cries out that its very life is at stake,
+social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. The individual
+must forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body.
+He should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison with
+the welfare of the community. War is elevating, because the individual
+disappears before the great conception of the State. The devotion of the
+members of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidly
+conspicuous as in war.... What a perversion of morality to wish to
+abolish heroism among men!" [H]
+
+[Footnote H: Treitschke, "Politik" i., p. 74.]
+
+Even defeat may bear a rich harvest. It often, indeed, passes an
+irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads to
+a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous
+constitution. "I recognize in the effect of war upon national
+character," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "one of the most salutary
+elements in the moulding of the human race."
+
+The individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge his
+life on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the cause
+which he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals to
+personal morality. Similarly, nations and States can achieve no loftier
+consummation than to stake their whole power on upholding their
+independence, their honour, and their reputation.
+
+Such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. The
+possibility of war is required to give the national character that
+stimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nations
+enabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by the
+fullest development of their moral forces. An intellectual and vigorous
+nation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a Phaecian
+existence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace.
+
+From this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily
+detrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics.
+The States which from various considerations are always active in this
+direction are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United States
+of America, e.g., in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal
+peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to
+money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred
+million dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incur
+a great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with England
+or Japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance of
+contest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stress
+of great political emotions, without which the moral development of the
+national character is impossible. If they advance farther on this road,
+they will one day pay dearly for such a policy.
+
+Again, from the Christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion.
+Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God above
+all things, and thy neighbour as thyself." This law can claim no
+significance for the relations of one country to another, since its
+application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love
+which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love
+for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead
+men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature
+cannot be political. Its object is to promote morality of the
+individual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in the
+interests of the community. It tells us to love our individual enemies,
+but does not remove the conception of enmity. Christ Himself said: "I am
+not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." His teaching can never be
+adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. There
+never was a religion which was more combative than Christianity. Combat,
+moral combat, is its very essence. If we transfer the ideas of
+Christianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the power
+of the State--power in the widest sense, not merely from the material
+aspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancement
+of humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be made
+which a war demands. Thus, according to Christianity, we cannot
+disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally
+and historically.
+
+Again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, the
+purely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. The
+individual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour,
+since it may cost him life and prosperity. The State, however, as such
+can also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wage
+war, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives and
+happiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved.
+
+The loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamental
+notion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness,
+the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing the
+minority in their own interests. Thus, those who from the materialistic
+standpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency from
+motives of self-interest.
+
+Reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, but
+that it is justifiable from every point of view. The practical methods
+which the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the prevention
+of war are shown to be absolutely ineffective.
+
+It is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement of
+rights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, but
+also the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullest
+assertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time on
+this basis to settle the disputes which arise between the various
+countries by Arbitration Courts, and so to render war impossible. The
+politician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestly
+believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted.
+
+Two questions in this connection are at once suggested: On what right is
+the finding of this Arbitration Court based? and what sanctions insure
+that the parties will accept this finding?
+
+To the first question the answer is that such a right does not, and
+cannot, exist. The conception of right is twofold. It signifies,
+firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is right
+and good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the State, either
+written or sanctioned by tradition. In its first meaning it is an
+indefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it is
+variable and capable of development. The right determined by law is only
+an attempt to secure a right in itself. In this sense right is the
+system of social aims secured by compulsion. It is therefore impossible
+that a written law should meet all the special points of a particular
+case. The application of the legal right must always be qualified in
+order to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. A certain
+freedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to the
+administration of justice. The established law, within a given and
+restricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just.
+
+The conception of this right is still more obscured by the complex
+nature of the consciousness of right and wrong. A quite different
+consciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whether
+persons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in most
+varied forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, and
+frequently in opposition to, the established law. In Christian countries
+murder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is a
+sacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as a
+crime. It is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions of
+right.
+
+There is yet another cause of uncertainty. The moral consciousness of
+the same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs and
+schools of philosophy. The established law can seldom keep pace with
+this inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lags
+behind. A condition of things arises where the living moral
+consciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, where
+legal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and Mephistopheles'
+scoffing words are true:
+
+  "Laws are transmitted, as one sees,
+  Just like inherited disease.
+  They're handed down from race to race,
+  And noiseless glide from place to place.
+  Reason they turn to nonsense; worse,
+  They make beneficence a curse!
+  Ah me! That you're a grandson you
+  As long as you're alive shall rue."
+                             _Faust_ (translation by Sir T. Martin).
+
+Thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the
+same ideas in their private and social intercourse. The conception of
+the constitutional State in the strictest sense is an impossibility, and
+would lead to an intolerable state of things. The hard and fast
+principle must be modified by the progressive development of the fixed
+law, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and of
+self-help allowed by the community. If sometimes between individuals the
+duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a
+universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated
+relations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its own
+conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which
+spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical
+life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification,
+and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and
+none can say that one nation has a better right than the other. There
+never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here and
+there particular relations can be brought under definite international
+laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification.
+Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international
+code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own
+conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest
+ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an
+injustice, and thus dishonour itself.
+
+Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring
+people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and
+is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in
+the civilized world. Every Arbitration Court must originate in a certain
+political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must
+treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the
+contracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. In this way every
+progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may
+easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the
+expansion of the young and vigorous State in favour of one which is
+sinking in the scale of civilization.
+
+These considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question:
+How can the judgment of the Arbitration Court be enforced if any State
+refuses to submit to it? Where does the power reside which insures the
+execution of this judgment when pronounced?
+
+In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908
+that the High Court of International Justice established by the second
+Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding
+decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion.
+The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this
+idea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that
+public opinion must represent the view which the American plutocrats
+think most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that the
+widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material
+prosperity, commerce, and money-making. As a matter of fact, public
+opinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only be
+employed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided.
+
+We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the
+separate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empire
+existed. Such an empire never can or will arise again. Even if it did,
+it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all
+human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the
+unchecked rivalry of different groups.
+
+So long as we live under such a State system as at present, the German
+Imperial Chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared,
+in his speech in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that treaties for
+arbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainable
+legal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between two
+countries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. Such a treaty merely
+proved that between the two contracting States no serious inducement to
+break the peace could be imagined. It therefore only confirmed the
+relations already existing. "If these relations change, if differences
+develop between the two nations which affect their national existence,
+which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then every
+arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke."
+
+It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an Arbitration
+Court can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlike
+decision, even as regards the State in whose favour it is pronounced. If
+we imagine, for example, that Silesia had fallen to Frederick the Great
+by the finding of a Court of Arbitration, and not by a war of
+unparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have been
+equally important for Prussia and for Germany? No one will maintain this.
+
+The material increase in power which accrued to Frederick's country by
+the acquisition of Silesia is not to be underestimated. But far more
+important was the circumstance that this country could not be conquered
+by the strongest European coalition, and that it vindicated its position
+as the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. It was
+war which laid the foundations of Prussia's power, which amassed a
+heritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. War
+forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could grow
+up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. Here once
+more war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons of
+history we shall see the same result again and again.
+
+If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite
+aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only
+be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as
+unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It
+is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice
+their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and
+thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed to
+obviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts of
+Arbitration--that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formal
+law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The
+weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and
+vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment
+on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most
+disastrous consequences for humanity generally.
+
+With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate
+appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral
+and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration.
+So, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highest
+material blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; for
+the maintenance of national character and political independence; for
+the expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of the
+national welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nations
+according to the scale of their importance in civilization; for
+intellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for the
+honour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressive
+development is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home and
+abroad is only a question of time. History speaks with no uncertain
+voice on this subject. It shows that valour is a necessary condition of
+progress. Where with growing civilization and increasing material
+prosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and the
+resolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, there
+the nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their own
+politically or racially.
+
+"A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political
+world when national character and military tradition act and react upon
+each." These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war,
+and he is incontestably right.
+
+These efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merely
+lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature where the
+struggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damaging
+and unnerving effect. The apostles of peace draw large sections of a
+nation into the spell of their Utopian efforts, and they thus introduce
+an element of weakness into the national life; they cripple the
+justifiable national pride in independence, and support a nerveless
+opportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higher
+humanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its own
+weakness. They thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, just
+as the Prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in
+1805 and 1806, and brought the State to the brink of destruction.
+
+The functions of true humanity are twofold. On the one hand there is the
+promotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well as
+of political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform development
+of character; on the other hand there is the practical realization of
+ideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual and
+of the community.
+
+It seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards the
+suppression of war with those of the Social Democratic Labour party,
+which goes hand in hand with them. The aims of both parties are Utopian.
+The organized Labour party strives after an ideal whose realization is
+only conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work are
+settled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when the
+cost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. Until this is the case
+the prices of the international market determine the standard of wages.
+The nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settle
+independently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing its
+position in the international market in competition with nations who
+work longer hours and at lower rates. Want of employment and extreme
+misery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. On the
+other hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, by
+excluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration of
+products and a profound demoralization of the working population.
+
+The case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. Its execution, as
+we saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is as
+impossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. A State
+which disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouring
+countries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guiding
+rule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, and
+become the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours.
+
+We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts after
+peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with
+arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most
+countries. "God will see to it," says Treitschke,[I] "that war always
+recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!"
+
+[Footnote I: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 76.]
+
+Nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in Germany no inconsiderable
+danger. We Germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpractical
+dreams. "The accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universal
+attribute with us, as in France." [J] We lack the true feeling for
+political exigencies. A deep social and religious gulf divides the
+German people into different political groups, which are bitterly
+antagonistic to each other. The traditional feuds in the political world
+still endure. The agitation for peace introduces a new element of
+weakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our national
+and party life.
+
+[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 81.]
+
+It is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believe
+in the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that the
+general good is being advanced by them. Equally true is it, however,
+that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfish
+political projects. Its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes its
+danger.
+
+Every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionary
+schemes. They must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as an
+unhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Our
+people must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or may
+be the goal of a policy_. The policy of a great State has positive aims.
+It will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that is
+possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentous
+questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation,
+the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this
+conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the
+idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating
+law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of the
+peace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words:
+
+  "Dreams of a peaceful day?
+  Let him dream who may!
+  'War' is our rallying cry,
+  Onward to victory!"
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+
+THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR
+
+Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that no
+one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of
+intentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseen
+what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation,
+and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. In
+his "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect:
+"Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a
+nation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as to
+anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [A]
+
+[Footnote A: "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93.]
+
+We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to be
+regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it
+as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out
+for so long. It is difficult to gauge its true import. The notion of
+forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must not
+think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to
+be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the
+pressure of the whole political situation.
+
+Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict
+letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the
+decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own
+initiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterances
+cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle
+of political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only
+run counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we exclude
+from politics that independence of action which is the true motive
+force.
+
+The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the
+natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the
+controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. It
+does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are
+unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourable
+position affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statecraft
+becomes a tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its
+ends. "Men make history," [B] as Bismarck's actions clearly show.
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 28.]
+
+No doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit of
+a peaceful solution. The death of some one man, the setting of some
+great ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to change
+it fundamentally. But the great disputes in the life of a nation cannot
+be settled so simply. The man who wished to bring the question to a
+decisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for the
+moment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels,
+and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilable
+interests. With the death of King Edward VII. of England the policy of
+isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against
+Germany, has broken down. The antagonism of Germany and England, based
+on the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, still
+persists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not always
+profitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening the
+tension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of Germany.
+
+It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should
+depend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would be
+thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many
+unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less
+dependent on chance.
+
+It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician
+Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war
+should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been
+attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a
+weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated
+should determine political action.
+
+For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look
+to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the
+conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and
+sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value
+is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct
+estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of
+the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness
+of decision.
+
+If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged
+right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as
+necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country
+the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister
+cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far
+more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater
+sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and
+courage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment.
+In the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought never
+to be brought about falls to the ground. And yet this theory has in our
+day found many supporters, especially in Germany.
+
+Even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war is
+impossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banished
+from the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should be
+postponed so long as possible.[C]
+
+[Footnote C: Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on
+March 30, 1911. In his speech of November 9, 1911, the Imperial
+Chancellor referred to the above-quoted words of Prince Bismarck
+in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the Morocco question.]
+
+Those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude as
+the supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as
+a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing
+importance. According to this view, a war recognized as inevitable must
+be postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to use
+exceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary and
+justifiable aspirations by force of arms.
+
+Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion
+that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the
+chief duty, of any policy.
+
+To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite
+answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only
+the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring
+about a war.
+
+Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that
+wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the
+happiest results, both politically and socially. A feeble policy has
+always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to
+take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to
+adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as
+to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter.
+Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most
+striking examples of this.
+
+The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful
+and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the
+steps of his glorious ancestor. "He noticed how his state occupied an
+untenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers,
+and showed his determination to give a definite character (_decider cet
+etre_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge
+the territory of the State and _corriger la figure de la Prusse_, if
+Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name
+of 'Kingdom.'" [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity,
+and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. None of
+the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he
+postpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be the
+aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself
+favourable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The whole
+history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally
+would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of
+decision which he showed.
+
+[Footnote D Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 51.]
+
+We see a quite different development under the reign of Frederick
+William III., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our
+nation cannot be too often reminded.
+
+It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided.
+Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the Prussian
+Government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied
+Russians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great
+moral cost. According to all human calculation, the participation of
+Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive
+superiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and
+would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the
+moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had
+ingrained on her by his wars. At the darkest moment of defeat they shone
+most brightly. In spite of the political downfall, the effects of
+Frederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired
+his State and his people. This is clearly seen in the quite different
+attitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under the
+degrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny. The power which had been
+acquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself
+more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it
+was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible
+the heroic revival of 1813.
+
+The German wars of Unification also belong to the category of wars
+which, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest.
+The instability and political weakness which the Prussian Government
+showed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of Olmuetz in 1850, had
+deeply shaken the political and national importance of Prussia. On the
+other hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once more
+her duties as a nation, when King William I. and Bismarck were at the
+helm, was soon abundantly manifest. Bismarck, by bringing about our
+wars of Unification in order to improve radically an untenable position
+and secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled the
+long-felt wish of the German people, and raised Germany to the
+undisputed rank of a first-class European Power. The military successes
+and the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for an
+unparalleled material prosperity. It is difficult to imagine how
+pitiable the progress of the German people would have been had not these
+wars been brought about by a deliberate policy.
+
+The most recent history tells the same story. If we judge the Japanese
+standpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fight
+Russia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morally
+justifiable. It was immensely daring to challenge the Russian giant, but
+the purely military conditions were favourable, and the Japanese nation,
+which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed an
+extended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to open
+new channels for her superabundant activities. Japan, from her own point
+of view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power in
+Eastern Asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of Russia. The Japanese
+statesmen were justified by the result. The victorious campaign created
+wider conditions of life for the Japanese people and State, and at one
+blow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics,
+and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to great
+material advancement. If this war had been avoided from weakness or
+philanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters would
+have taken a very different turn. The growing power of Russia in the
+Amur district and in Korea would have repelled or at least hindered the
+Japanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attained
+through this war, glorious alike for military prowess and political
+foresight.
+
+The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has
+always led to happy results. Even an unsuccessfully waged war may
+sometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vital
+interests without a blow. We find an example of this in the recent
+heroic struggle of the small Boer States against the British Empire. In
+this struggle they were inevitably defeated. It was easy to foresee that
+an armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces of
+England and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally could
+not bear heavy losses. But yet--if all indications are not
+misleading--the blood shed by the Boer people will yield a free and
+prosperous future. In spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic;
+men like President Stein, Botha, and De Wett, with their gallant
+followers, performed many great military feats. The whole nation
+combined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which Byron
+sings:
+
+  "For freedom's battle once begun,
+  Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son,
+  Though baffled oft, is ever won."
+
+Inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any later
+developments, have been won by this struggle. The Boers have maintained
+their place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselves
+superior to the English. It was only after many glorious victories that
+they yielded to a crushingly superior force. They accumulated a store of
+fame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, a
+power to be reckoned with. The result of this development is that the
+Boers are now the foremost people in South Africa, and that England
+preferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by their
+continual hostility. This laid the foundation for the United Free States
+of South Africa.[E]
+
+[Footnote E: "War and the Arme Blanche," by Erskine Childers: "The truth
+came like a flash ... that all along we had been conquering the
+country, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215).
+
+"To ... aim at so cowing the Boer national spirit, as to gain a
+permanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyond
+our power to achieve. Peaceable political fusion under our own flag
+was the utmost we could secure. That means a conditional surrender,
+or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). Lord Roberts wrote
+a very appreciative introduction to this book without any protest
+against the opinions expressed in it.]
+
+President Kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and not
+Cecil Rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, be
+known in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of South Africa,
+who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value the
+inestimable moral qualities according to their real importance.
+
+The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been
+deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest
+results. War, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of political
+agent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but in
+every case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery.
+He who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility.
+
+It is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision except
+from the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existing
+conditions which have created national armies. Absolute clearness of
+vision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken,
+and what political aims justify the use of armed force.
+
+This question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactory
+answer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty of
+the State.
+
+If this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual and
+moral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moral
+education of the human race, then the State's own acts must necessarily
+conform to the moral laws. But the acts of the State cannot be judged by
+the standard of individual morality. If the State wished to conform to
+this standard it would often find itself at variance with its own
+particular duties. The morality of the State must be developed out of
+its own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in the
+personality of the man and his duties towards society. The morality of
+the State must be judged by the nature and _raison d'etre_ of the State,
+and not of the individual citizen. But the end-all and be-all of a State
+is power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face
+should not meddle in politics." [F]
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.]
+
+Machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policy
+was the advancement of power. This term, however, has acquired, since
+the German Reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewd
+Florentine. To him power was desirable in itself; for us "the State is
+not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and
+promote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by being
+applied for the greatest good of mankind." [G]
+
+[Footnote G: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.]
+
+The criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in the
+last resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed his
+own nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection." [H] If the
+same standard is applied to the State, then "its highest moral duty is
+to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the
+higher community of which he is a member; but the State is itself the
+highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty
+of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of
+sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for there
+is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot
+sacrifice itself to something higher. When a State sees its downfall
+staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A
+sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts
+the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a
+State." [I]
+
+[Footnote H: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote I: _Ibid_., i., p 3.]
+
+I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political
+morality better than in the words of our great national historian. But
+we can reach the same conclusions by another road. The individual is
+responsible only for himself. If, either from weakness or from moral
+reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the
+consequences of his actions recoil only on him. The situation is quite
+different in the case of a State. It represents the ramifying and often
+conflicting interests of a community. Should it from any reason neglect
+the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal
+personality, but it injures also the body of private interests
+which it represents. This incalculably far-reaching detriment affects
+not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of
+individuals and the community. Accordingly it is a moral duty of the
+State to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and
+promoter of all higher interests. This duty it cannot fulfil unless it
+possesses the needful power.
+
+The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first
+and foremost duty of the State. This aspect of the question supplies a
+fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can be
+estimated. The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this
+duty, and thus served the interests of the community? And this not
+merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material
+interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the
+State, and thus indirectly its higher aims.
+
+It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that
+numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the
+community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only
+natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be
+erroneous. Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must
+be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy.
+"Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most
+contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." [J] This
+argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads
+logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means;
+that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures
+are permissible.
+
+[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.]
+
+A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for
+political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must
+be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. So far as I
+know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel
+bound to attempt one at this point. War, with which I am dealing at
+present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it
+pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the
+seriousness of warlike measures. I must deviate here a little from my
+main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of
+political morality.
+
+The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is
+generally assumed. The power of the State does not rest exclusively on
+the factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth,
+and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements,
+which are reciprocally related to the material. The energy with which a
+State promotes its own interests and represents the rights of its
+citizens in foreign States, the determination which it displays to
+support them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor of
+strength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselves
+to let things come to a crisis in a like case. Similarly a reliable and
+honourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with allies
+as well as with foes. A statesman is thus under no obligation to deceive
+deliberately. He can from the political standpoint avoid all
+negotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he will
+thereby serve the reputation and power of his State no less than when he
+holds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, and
+renounces all political formulas and phrases.
+
+In antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and the
+Jesuits have tried to justify regicide.[K] At the present day political
+murder is universally condemned from the standpoint of political
+morality. The same holds good of preconcerted political deception. A
+State which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute.
+The man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in a
+contradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims,
+since he denies it by his actions. It is not, of course, necessary that
+a man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to an
+opponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point.
+But it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise crafty
+deceptions. A fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic of
+great statesmen. Subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit of
+diplomacy.
+
+[Footnote K: Mariana, "De rege et regis institutione." Toledo, 1598.]
+
+Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latent
+war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a
+position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and
+deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties
+are determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflict
+between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and
+prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it
+is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately
+moral nature of that end.
+
+Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action.
+But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are
+of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are
+conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of
+things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the
+infringement of the right appears morally justified. York's decision to
+conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of
+right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made
+under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the
+Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral. Now it is always
+justifiable to terminate an immoral situation.
+
+As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument
+shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultima
+ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other
+States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful
+methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw,
+rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. War
+therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is
+not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the
+ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparently
+trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully
+justifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the State, and consequently
+its moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential part
+of its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there
+is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword
+must be drawn to do so.
+
+In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is
+whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the
+power of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether the
+inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict
+greater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantages
+which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not
+declared. A further point to be considered is whether the general
+position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military
+success. With these considerations of expediency certain other weighty
+aspects of the question must also be faced.
+
+It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in looking
+only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of
+the existing generation. Such policy would be opposed to all that
+constitutes the essential nature of the State. Its conduct must be
+guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is
+gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the
+future. "The true greatness of the State is that it links the past with
+the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to
+regard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life." [L]
+
+[Footnote L: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.]
+
+The law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and in
+the decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than the
+sacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "I cannot conceive,"
+Zelter once wrote to Goethe, "how any right deed can be performed
+without sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very opposite
+of what is desirable."
+
+A second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely that
+which Zelter rightly emphasizes. A great end cannot be attained except
+by staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certainty
+of success can ever be anticipated. Every undertaking implies a greater
+or less venture. The daily intercourse of civic life teaches us this
+lesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must be
+taken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguely
+estimated. In questions of comparatively trifling importance much may be
+done by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce a
+satisfactory status. The solution of such problems is the sphere of
+diplomatic activity. The state of things is quite different when vital
+questions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, but
+will guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party.
+Then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmen
+to act. Men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun the
+solemn decision of war. In such questions any reluctance to face the
+opponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt at
+a temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of political
+prestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made good
+in another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the State,
+the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations.
+
+Not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such a
+case. The mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention to
+wage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. This
+intention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiations
+without arms are like music-books without instruments," as Frederick the
+Great said. It is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to which
+the opponent's purpose yields. When, therefore, the threat of war is
+insufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin;
+the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the
+_duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike.
+
+Finally, there is a third point to be considered. Cases may occur where
+war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no
+prospect of success. The responsibility of this has also to be borne. So
+at least Frederick the Great thought. His brother Henry, after the
+battle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the
+Marquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France. Again,
+after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but
+the King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. He knew better what
+suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to
+die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. President
+Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States of
+America on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "It
+must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran,
+"that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men
+and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the
+sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war
+is in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the most
+prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice....
+It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than
+not to have fought at all."
+
+To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher
+sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in
+itself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by the
+consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when
+the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and
+military situation.
+
+It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy,
+especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only
+heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the
+reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to
+fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties.
+
+No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain
+circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ
+war as a political means. So long as all human progress and all natural
+development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage
+in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible.
+
+When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting
+any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has
+forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually
+acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there
+are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only
+await the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the State
+towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of
+success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable.
+When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by
+affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements
+of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to
+promote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced the
+more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be
+obtained with comparatively small sacrifices.
+
+These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active
+policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and
+concentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truth
+of Schiller's lines:
+
+  "The chance that once thou hast refused
+  Will never through the centuries recur."
+
+The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take
+the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the
+future to the present need of peace.
+
+It is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficult
+to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist
+which justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all the
+greater because the historical significance of the act must be
+considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its
+justification.
+
+War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successes
+which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries.
+The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long
+epochs.[M]
+
+[Footnote M: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 2.]
+54
+The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a
+great State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries;
+but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and
+keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical
+imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can
+at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [N]
+
+[Footnote N: Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft," p. 30.]
+
+He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State,
+and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way
+settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of
+political morality.
+
+He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be
+fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his
+hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the
+fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point
+he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true
+interests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the
+definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing
+favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the
+hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise
+with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther
+once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write
+and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much
+greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business
+of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and
+the marches, etc.--that is what the petty and simple do who only look
+with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or
+saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to
+save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the
+sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It
+will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful
+and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."[O]
+
+[Footnote O: Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation."]
+
+Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to
+further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of
+war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State
+and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political
+purposes correspond to these problems.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+
+A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL
+DEVELOPMENT
+
+The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is
+consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. The
+same holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were,
+personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely
+various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable
+of the most different achievements, and serving the most multifarious
+purposes in the great evolution of human existence.
+
+Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the
+materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation
+to-day.
+
+According to it, all that happens in the world is a necessary
+consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become
+conscious. It denies the difference between the empiric and the
+intelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom.
+
+This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seems
+everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the
+insufficient human intelligence. The existence of the universe is
+opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are
+incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and
+time.
+
+The essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. We
+recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; the
+impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our
+understanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quite
+impossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear--although no
+demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual laws
+beyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to a
+conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual
+change. Even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden
+moral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread of
+civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and
+higher forms of life.
+
+It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in every
+individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too
+limited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge of
+things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to
+understand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may also
+term the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidance
+for our further investigation and procedure.
+
+The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the history
+of the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What is
+true," Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised and
+supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by
+its history."
+
+The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, the
+laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces
+have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work
+towards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We are
+here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget
+that States are personalities endowed with very different human
+attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that
+these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of
+States as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very different
+effect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour to
+grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the
+naturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we
+wish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study the
+history of the German people in its connection with that of the other
+European States, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto
+followed, and what guidance the past gives for Our future policy. From
+the time of their first appearance in history the Germans showed
+themselves a first-class civilized people.
+
+When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians
+there were two main elements which shaped the future of the West,
+Christianity and the Germans. The Christian teaching preached equal
+rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and
+slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the
+attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the
+grave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man,
+and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the
+individual conscience, the starting-point of all development. It thus
+gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose
+morality rested solely on the relations with the state. Simultaneously
+with this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North poured
+victoriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decaying
+nations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep their
+nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. The
+States which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized how
+difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a
+higher. The Germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. The
+German element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and
+offered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture of
+German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did
+the growing nations appear.
+
+In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world.
+The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germans
+with the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated
+itself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the
+Alps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea of
+the Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued to
+flourish.
+
+In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until A.D. 1453. In the West,
+however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476.
+Italy had fallen into the hands of the East Goths and Lombards
+successively. The Visigoths had established their dominion in Spain, and
+the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul.
+
+A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with his
+powerful hand, extended the Frankish Empire far beyond the boundaries of
+Gaul. By the subjugation of the Saxons he became lord of the country
+between the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy by
+the conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the Western
+Roman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. His
+successors clung to this claim; but the Frankish Empire soon fell to
+pieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards became
+France, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the later
+Germany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy and
+Spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually
+amalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East Frankish
+Empire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained
+their Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerful
+German [A] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of Charles the Great to
+the Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first _German_ King who
+took this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in a
+quarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of the
+Church, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in
+order to prove their pretended title to that country.
+
+[Footnote A: German (Deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular,"
+opposed to "foreign"--_e.g._, the Latin Church dialect. It was first
+used as the name of a people, in the tenth century A.D.]
+
+The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living in
+Rome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of a
+Church which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way
+of the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldest
+creations of the human intellect--to found and maintain a
+world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers.
+
+Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. The
+freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual
+dominion. In the portentous struggle of the two Powers for the
+supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire,
+the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widely
+different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a
+homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of the
+estates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axe
+of Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church.
+
+The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German power
+lay on the ground in fragments. A period of almost complete anarchy
+followed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad
+characteristics of the German people, contributed to extend this
+destruction to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the German
+people deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power was
+budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetry
+was passing through a first classical period. Every German country was
+ringing with song; the depth of German sentiment found universal
+expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealism
+inspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empire
+every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above
+the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The material
+prosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better
+regulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the Hanseatic League bore
+its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great
+trade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice and
+Genoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never again
+attained.
+
+Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in the
+breasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, and
+was destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in
+the spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church had
+lost much of her influence on men's minds. On the other hand, a refining
+movement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit of
+antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to
+the Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined by
+everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich von
+Hutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed," rang loud through the
+districts of Germany.
+
+Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, which
+conceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe to
+her foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerly
+in the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shed
+it's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for
+national independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequences
+for the development of humanity had been fought out since the Persian
+wars. In this cause the German people nearly disappeared, and lost all
+political importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned to
+foreign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church did
+not remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and the
+Staufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a
+mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself.
+Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won an
+undisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritual
+freedom was established. This most important element of civilization was
+retained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become ever
+since the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace of
+Westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious
+freedom.
+
+The States of the Latin race on their side now put forward strong claims
+to the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas of
+freedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled among
+themselves about the predominance. At the same time, in Germanized
+England a firs-class Protestant power was being developed, and the age
+of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the Reformation
+and the Thirty Years' War, opened new and unsuspected paths to human
+intellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a fresh
+stimulus. Gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the
+newly-discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fell
+to the lot of the Germanic and the southern part to that of the Latin
+race. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, and
+consequently, of world politics. Germany remained excluded from this
+great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes
+and religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, the
+Low Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repel
+the inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the French
+ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by these
+wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world.
+Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in
+political power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States,
+which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the German cause.
+But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre of
+Protestant power was established in the North--i.e., Prussia.
+
+After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back the
+Slavs, who poured in from the East, in wrestling large tracts from them,
+and in completely Germanizing them. This struggle, like that with the
+niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which
+extended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and successfully planted
+Germanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finally
+victorious also against Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic.
+In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strong
+political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an
+influential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germany
+devolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to Catholic
+Austria grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into an
+independent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a German
+population, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' War
+Prussia broke away from Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confronted
+France and Russia as an independent Protestant State.
+
+But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once more
+slowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy has exhausted the
+resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of the
+monarchy, _L'etat c'est moi,_ carried to an extreme, provoked a
+tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous
+revolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more specially in
+Germany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism.
+The German Empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary States survived,
+among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again under
+Napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and
+bore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain,
+and even to the inhospitable plains of Russia, which by a gradual
+political absorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of power
+in wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to an
+important place among the European nations. Austria, which had become
+more and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before the
+mighty Corsican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her
+dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught.
+
+But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest
+humiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of
+the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the
+Protestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm,
+won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and for
+Germany, and paved the way for further world-wide historical
+developments.
+
+While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular
+despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights,_ another
+quite different revolution was working in Prussia--the revolution of
+_duty_. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately
+to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State.
+Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposition
+to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the idea
+of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to
+sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the
+clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis
+on which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same time
+Stein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in Prussia.
+
+While measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thus
+being adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was to
+depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a
+German Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in the
+domain of art and science, where German character and endeavour found
+the deepest and fullest expression. A great change had been effected in
+this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year
+1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and
+deeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised their
+minds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlit
+heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and
+superiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and science
+became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this
+dismembered people, and decided the victory of Protestantism in German
+life." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte", i., p. 88.]
+
+Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she
+developed the root-idea of the Reformation into the right of
+unrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [C] Moral obligations, such as no
+nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the
+philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs
+of her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies was
+realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classical
+literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as
+the political work of the Prussian monarchy", [D] and of those men of
+action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin.
+
+[Footnote C: _Ibid.,_ i., p. 90.]
+
+[Footnote D: _Ibid._]
+
+The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an event
+in the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the great
+annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last
+abortion of the revolution--a
+
+  "Part of the power that still
+  Produces Good, while still devising Ill";
+
+on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Let
+man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the
+religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual
+change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; who
+gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect,
+and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people to
+consciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed that
+the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain;
+a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify
+to the divinity in man.
+
+The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to
+whom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate of
+the Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront of
+humanity.
+
+Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation
+could give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, and
+Goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of
+Liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny.
+
+We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great
+struggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, and
+weakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed
+the German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure
+enthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expression
+in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of
+thousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took a
+prominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost to
+their mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria and
+Russia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties.
+
+Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing up
+from the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that no
+longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came to
+the front, King William I. and the hero of the Saxon forest. Resolutely
+they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from
+ignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of the
+popular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters with
+Austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and left
+the German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a
+Great Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the
+vast majority of the German peoples united under the Imperial crown
+which the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire was
+revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria,
+and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the North
+Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from the
+ashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old German
+Confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs.
+
+It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of Germany
+vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the
+economic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on all
+sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed in
+between France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed
+to gather the full fruits of our victories. The short-sightedness and
+party feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag--the old hereditary failings
+of our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intense
+love of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behind
+in the race with other countries.
+
+In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious
+Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found
+the second largest colonial Empire in the world; England appropriated
+the most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a
+comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content
+with some modest strips of territory. In addition to, and in connection
+with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward.
+
+Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Frederick the Great,
+and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conception
+of the State has completely changed since the turn of the century. The
+patrimonial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary possession of
+the Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents the
+reverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant of
+the State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is the
+key to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of the
+State the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the
+tendency is as follows: Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and
+the nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquire
+a uniform national character and common national interests.
+
+This new order of things entirely altered the basis of international
+relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerce
+and trade also developed on wholly new lines.
+
+After 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and trade
+restrictions--were gradually removed. Landed property ceased to be a
+monopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "England
+introduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machinery
+into industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by
+steamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the same
+time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and
+chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton.
+There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in
+the widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension of
+colonization over Polynesia, etc." England at the same time girdled the
+earth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort of
+world-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not,
+indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone
+days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests
+dependent on herself.
+
+Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, linking the West
+and the East, the United States of North America have risen to be an
+industrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported by
+exceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing
+character of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitable
+recognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on the
+point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy.
+
+
+Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but has
+extended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressing
+farther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossed
+swords with the States of the Mongolian race. This vast population,
+which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands of
+years of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, and
+categorically claims its share in international life. The entrance of
+Japan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms.
+"Asia for the Asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her
+breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power has
+emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a European foe.
+China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mighty
+movement is thrilling Asia--the awakening of a new epoch.
+
+Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the
+civilized countries of Europe, are threatening from Asia, the old cradle
+of the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forces
+which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of the
+French Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized
+the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a
+consciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers,
+originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material
+position, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, and
+seek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. They do not
+wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically
+recognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, in
+which they themselves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not only
+perpetually menace State and society, but endanger in the separate
+countries the industries from which they live, since they threaten to
+destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by
+continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany this
+movement has affected large sections of the population.
+
+Until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture and
+cattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of German
+industries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in
+connection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade has
+marvellously increased. Germany has become an industrial and trading
+nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds
+work and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost its
+leading position in the economic life of the people. The artisan
+class has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in trade
+unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the
+international social democracy. It is hostile to the national class
+distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of
+the State.
+
+It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous
+agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the
+anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law of
+self-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certain
+point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizen
+may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an
+opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly
+devotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grant
+this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of
+capital.
+
+Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, it
+may create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employment
+to all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislation
+against every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age,
+or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of
+work, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him from
+working.
+
+The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of three
+victorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large for
+present purposes, although without the conscious intention of the State.
+German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a
+market for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervened
+with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. As
+Scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of
+man, so the Emperor William I. recognized the duty of the State towards
+those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The position
+of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social
+legislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now
+existed.
+
+A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats
+indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the
+working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing
+State and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and
+progress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, How
+to win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willing
+workers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny.
+
+Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of
+all progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world.
+Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last
+century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a
+prominent position through the universality of her philosophy and her
+thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things.
+
+The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature are
+attested by the fact that the annual export of German books to foreign
+countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that
+of France, England, and America combined. It is only in the domain of
+the exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to give
+precedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win a
+leading position. It shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions,
+and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our
+political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The German
+Empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only are
+the social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, are
+divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter
+enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish
+denominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between North
+and South has prevented the population from growing into a completely
+united body.
+
+So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of
+sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into
+narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in
+her nationality, her intellectual development, in her science,
+industries, and trade.
+
+And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future?
+What duties are enforced on us by the past?
+
+It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the
+German State answers this question, depend not only our own further
+development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of
+the world.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION
+
+Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical
+development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of
+human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire of
+Central Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seeds
+of intellectual and moral development were sown by the German
+intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with
+irresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for the
+entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German
+people.
+
+This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on
+the freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have ever
+and again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nation
+whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as
+the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the
+intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free
+and natural development. The Germans have thus always been the
+standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark
+against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worsted
+in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best
+heart's blood in the cause. Intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruled
+the Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this
+people--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the
+political attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth
+century. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed
+into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need of
+a free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengaged
+itself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened into
+world-historical importance.
+
+Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, on
+which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must
+rest: the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation,
+which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked
+all free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop to
+the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mind
+the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time
+pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On this
+substructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose
+deepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result of
+free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a
+foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way and
+that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and
+knowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress.
+Reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religious
+reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion,
+and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not
+attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results
+of natural philosophy.
+
+The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle
+for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. We
+are thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannot
+shrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is
+being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human
+efforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part
+in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special
+qualities.
+
+No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate
+all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own
+spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it
+received. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culture
+with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the great
+community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "Depth of
+conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the
+limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to
+traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all
+nations and ages--this has at all times been the German characteristic;
+this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture." [A] To no
+nation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self
+"that which is given to mankind as a whole." We often see in other
+nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same
+capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which
+specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and
+imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position.
+
+[Footnote A: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 95.]
+
+There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge
+our highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we can
+mount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of science
+and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics
+touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results
+of scientific inquiry.
+
+First and foremost it is German science which must regain its
+superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate
+our birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of the
+perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over
+Nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more
+useful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutions
+of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrict
+ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit
+civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create
+conditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can
+find its expression.
+
+It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which
+exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition
+not only our future development, but the higher life generally. These
+problems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply and
+permanently than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the
+empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany.
+The German nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, which
+works slowly in opposition to the different movements. The Germans thus
+seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great
+controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into
+the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of
+evolution.
+
+We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no
+doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the
+community and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts to
+find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class
+with healthy and patriotic ambitions.
+
+It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty,
+requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed
+upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation,
+and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity
+which is lamentably deficient to-day.
+
+No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The old
+antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in
+Germany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and
+political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute
+liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the
+conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present there
+appears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism of
+Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of
+the Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movement
+can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect
+of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is
+rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially all
+denominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must never
+renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To
+do so would mean loss of prestige.
+
+Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of human
+civilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir of
+a great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no less
+significance in the sphere of its international relations. These
+problems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply the
+intellectual development, and on their solution depends the position of
+Germany in the world.
+
+The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms
+and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered
+geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the
+Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large
+number of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other
+States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have
+developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national
+customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of
+her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most
+characteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie
+outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the
+strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against
+the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves
+are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism,
+which seems to have lost its old victorious strength.
+
+Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the
+overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign
+countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is
+absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even
+to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its
+increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of
+living.
+
+This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation,
+or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its
+intellectual importance.
+
+At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course of
+centuries grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of all
+political significance, a large section of our people did not feel this
+insufficiency. Even during the age of our classical literature the
+patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the
+thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of German
+genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship." [B]
+
+[Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 195.]
+
+Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines:
+
+  "German majesty and honour
+  Fall not with the princes' crown;
+  When amid the flames of war
+  German Empire crashes down,
+  German greatness stands unscathed." [C]
+
+[Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905
+by Bernhard Suphan.]
+
+The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds
+different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence
+of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since
+we must now take into consideration the immense development of Germany
+in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old
+importance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from the
+vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due
+measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political
+federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can
+only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act
+in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties
+towards the human race.
+
+Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding
+the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a
+foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the
+ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to
+imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched
+again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly
+threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely
+repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics
+from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance
+westwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. On
+the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions
+which were once under German influence are now once more subject to
+Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Russian
+Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The
+German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs;
+Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic
+workmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia.
+Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic
+flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an
+obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of
+self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined
+whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is
+not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will
+be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict
+grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and
+show less determination to protect the German soil at all costs.
+
+The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their
+struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their
+nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot
+withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our
+trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but
+they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America.
+The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish,
+and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the
+Government must reckon.
+
+Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to
+preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of
+universal culture.
+
+Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and
+in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the
+world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful
+as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are
+contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while
+the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we
+wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our
+civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back
+in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world.
+
+Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1,
+1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is
+already large enough and does not need expansion.... We shall have to
+consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... We
+have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to
+take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should
+receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [D]
+
+[Footnote D: This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister
+Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."]
+
+That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed.
+
+If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we
+survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must
+admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not
+here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of
+the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language.
+
+England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from
+the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies which
+are directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in the
+interest of English industries and English capital. The work of
+civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has
+always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her
+sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by
+transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent
+culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy
+self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as
+Canada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they
+will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not
+only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the
+present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in
+the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to
+secure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is a
+great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and
+it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence.
+
+The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by
+them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister,
+Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Ten
+years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France
+has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in
+every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be
+spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown
+in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of
+Heaven." [E]
+
+[Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."]
+
+The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German
+policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading
+thought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputes
+under which the partition of Africa and the last phase of French
+colonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents to
+Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distant
+and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of
+the country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, it
+is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run,
+since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed,
+tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned
+colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have
+obtained the best shares."
+
+This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with
+mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital
+powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for
+colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria,
+has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and
+prides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte
+and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the
+Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France
+in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy
+alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany.
+
+The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of
+attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In the
+face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its
+importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place
+in the sun, as Prince Buelow used modestly to express it, but to aspire
+to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the
+limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach this
+goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never
+again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be
+opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international
+politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair
+rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality
+and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to
+them.
+
+Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a
+fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity.
+
+The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and
+improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of
+great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely
+extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary
+capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more
+brilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have
+returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The
+increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to
+a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative
+industrial occupation.
+
+There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid
+development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the
+import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale
+of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of
+life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which
+England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take
+much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to
+close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order to
+encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of
+other countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends
+on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question
+of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall
+very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population
+means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the
+question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of
+population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and
+home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation
+will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for
+the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We
+shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to
+surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in
+the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a
+home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland.
+There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the
+unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from
+building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and
+at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers,
+may keep our sea communications open.
+
+We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial
+possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are
+only used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think of
+colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal
+population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and
+immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which
+retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance
+for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each
+nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is
+quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count
+among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be."
+[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 8.]
+
+We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our
+requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our
+growing working population, but would supply raw materials and
+foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that
+immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying
+unproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We
+find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers,
+and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign
+masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged,
+do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will
+depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world
+speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the
+German Empire?
+
+These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from
+the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its
+present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this
+point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and
+hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political
+relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course
+of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to
+political paralysis at the time when the great European States built
+themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not
+enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in
+politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long
+concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural
+development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power,
+international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What
+we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior
+force of hostile interests and Powers.
+
+It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths
+we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our
+forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the
+straight road of our intended development.
+
+The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an
+advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension,
+it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often
+follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to
+stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every
+occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will
+be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+
+WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL
+
+In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its
+history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted
+to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the
+Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions,
+must be the basis of our future development.
+
+The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international
+relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the
+impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character
+and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even
+at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and
+our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it
+will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us.
+
+  "The man of sense will by the forelock clutch
+  Whatever lies within his power,
+  Stick fast to it, and neither shirk,
+  Nor from his enterprise be thrust,
+  But, having once begun to work,
+  Go working on because he must."
+                               _Faust_
+                      (translated by Sir Theodore Martin).
+
+The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the
+hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing
+territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of
+both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of
+these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity,
+examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which
+concern us are weighed one against the other.
+
+These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly
+to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the
+States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must
+try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the
+day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations
+of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion.
+We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions
+of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and
+therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines
+of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a
+country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or
+timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not
+seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy
+is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men
+who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and
+often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such
+digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his
+opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the
+student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep
+his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must
+therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense
+clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions.
+
+We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps.
+
+On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive
+alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In
+this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably
+unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately
+connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States
+combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the
+North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical
+national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to
+shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred
+battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the
+bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the
+Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of
+Slavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories.
+There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the
+struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and
+commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those
+of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react
+detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between
+Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of
+overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its
+political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be
+assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so
+long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the
+Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy
+to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during
+the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered
+such an alliance possible.
+
+The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of
+Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show
+many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough
+to influence the political position of the Empire.
+
+Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The
+antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will
+diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a
+natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by
+Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its
+political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from
+her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her
+true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is
+the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power.
+That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor
+Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a
+permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in
+Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural
+colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by
+Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us,
+even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this
+annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We
+should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the
+Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and
+France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance.
+
+
+The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive
+character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but
+does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not
+guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential
+interests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in
+its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events.
+Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences," pointed out that
+this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the
+future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her
+Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with
+England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance.
+The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an
+undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct
+opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in
+order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This
+undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as
+the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the
+encroachment of Italy into those regions.
+
+The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has
+suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in
+the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy
+look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to
+the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not
+regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied
+armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We
+must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the
+Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we
+calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own
+political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to
+strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an
+essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of
+the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then
+will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real
+meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative
+results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital
+interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with
+sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not
+concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the
+consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or,
+indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would
+probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria.
+Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of
+Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and
+incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a
+contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we
+must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France.
+
+England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts
+to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in
+Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which
+secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in
+commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's
+Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in
+combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the
+coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against
+England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding
+such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She
+is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of
+the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make
+overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies
+can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It is
+our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can.
+
+France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European
+Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of
+_revanche_. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she
+has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the
+humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the
+defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she
+wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and,
+if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe
+which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune
+smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too
+weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all
+protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for
+this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, are
+inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this
+latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped,
+and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to
+Germany than from Russia.
+
+The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring
+a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The
+establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of
+a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political
+annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers,
+so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible
+illusion as to its extent and meaning.
+
+Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to
+approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her
+North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that
+strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of
+colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French
+sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France
+will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her
+best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in
+every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the
+Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed
+them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance
+which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable
+that she will maintain honourably and with no _arriere-pensee_ the
+obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco.
+The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the
+French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The French
+policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on
+the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite
+unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can
+be negotiated before the question between them has been once more
+decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France
+sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but
+strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the
+East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others.
+
+The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and
+of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is
+following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to
+an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central
+Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _status
+quo_. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with
+Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be
+overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any
+aggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seems
+likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more
+reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanying
+events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of
+internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable,
+therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention
+in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept
+away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose,
+meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and
+an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although
+this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions
+of Germany in North Persia.
+
+It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is
+adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the
+mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether
+in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the
+direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the
+dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate
+to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has
+long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the
+Baltic.
+
+Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean,
+and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European
+policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself,
+also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years
+been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into
+Central Europe.
+
+Pan-Slavism is still hard at work.
+
+It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement
+and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Her
+present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the
+present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong
+monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the
+internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation
+is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry
+is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from
+what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a
+healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Government
+has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed
+expectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under the
+stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an
+attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad.
+Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in
+the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China,
+must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly,
+Turkey.
+
+Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the
+Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not
+identical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive
+war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She
+wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of
+Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and
+East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on
+advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed.
+Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with
+Germany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of the
+German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore
+always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths.
+
+England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian
+Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the
+spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France
+she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany
+under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms.
+
+The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the
+heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So,
+also, no natural community of interests exists between England and
+France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to
+any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an
+Anglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostility
+to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two
+States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might
+mask the real objects.
+
+This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very
+comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made
+astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which
+commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which
+England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may
+well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political
+and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition
+in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The
+American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and
+will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the
+point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far
+as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite
+of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily
+directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in
+order to understand the line of thought which guides the English
+politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found
+in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the
+world.
+
+Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of
+view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of
+Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the
+other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North
+America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenest
+competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The
+annexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty with
+Japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two
+nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked,
+and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union
+are so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vast
+distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very
+bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly has
+always diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as quite recently
+in the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the object
+clearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearing
+the consequences of such collision. The American competition in trade
+and industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated as
+inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense,
+according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty by
+which a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established.
+
+England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America.
+The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in the
+further development of things, be so accentuated that England will be
+forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an
+undisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action.
+The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strained
+to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the Arbitration
+Treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does not
+consider that the present political relations of the two nations are
+permanent.
+
+There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly
+threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India
+and Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation for
+independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the
+Low-German element in South Africa.
+
+Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English
+position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national
+movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it
+clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement.
+She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine
+the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support,
+and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in
+opposition to the Caliphate.
+
+The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where
+some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England,
+so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, has
+attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But
+now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows
+itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism,
+thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of
+Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave
+danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in
+the world.
+
+While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and
+abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together,
+either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto.
+Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union has
+definitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the Imperial
+Conference in 1911 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated.
+.... When the question of imperial defence came up, the policy was
+rejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the oversea
+dominions in every imaginable eventuality." The great self-ruled
+colonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour of
+need, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employed
+wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not
+approve." [A] There are clear indications that the policy of the
+dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is
+contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and
+Australia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV., into independent
+nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal
+independence.
+
+[Footnote A: Th. Schiemann in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of July 5, 1911.]
+
+All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of
+England's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitude
+towards Germany.
+
+England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her
+imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must
+be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must
+not be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be
+destroyed.
+
+A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great
+English colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distant
+parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of
+expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet
+might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory
+which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of
+England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability of
+expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can
+no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall
+victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered.
+
+The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the
+German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer
+a prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without any
+excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet,
+contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a
+correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French
+fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely
+getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other
+contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable
+means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years
+to come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importance
+of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia.
+
+The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters.
+It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance of
+power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one
+of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled
+and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's
+stage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes
+undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This
+policy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each
+other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directly
+from this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen
+France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State
+which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born
+rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the
+East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus
+the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England's
+most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and
+self-evident.
+
+The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would
+chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is
+the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of
+the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English
+point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war.
+England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a
+large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before
+the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and
+to some extent a great benefit, to English industries.
+
+After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite
+comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check
+the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in
+large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is
+building, and attack the objectionable neighbour.
+
+English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt
+to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the
+most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance--Germany, England, and
+America--has been suggested.[B] But for such a union with Germany to be
+possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German
+development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our
+colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial
+and industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her
+traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the
+Great Powers in the world.
+
+[Footnote B: "The United States and the War Cloud in Europe," by Th.
+Schiemann, _McClure's Magazine_, June, 1910.]
+
+It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent
+to that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacit
+approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of
+the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements
+of English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and
+the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable
+indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy.
+The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every
+expansion of Germany's power were openly shown in the very recent
+Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on
+the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without
+a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp.
+
+A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which
+no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep
+the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our
+political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves
+with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and
+Utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter
+the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixity
+of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a
+vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire.
+
+On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part in
+English policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the one
+side, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out
+her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her
+fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the
+political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy
+in the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political,
+notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically
+with those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this.
+
+No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has at
+present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in
+the sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding with
+Germany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely that
+the Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of
+England. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded in
+inflicting a political and military defeat on Germany.
+
+For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations about
+Arbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany.
+There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us
+in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutely
+opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement
+in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the
+nature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen
+competition between the two countries, especially in South America;
+there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political
+complications.
+
+Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only
+in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China.
+In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and
+seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to
+count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitude
+to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions
+in East Asia. If the two nations joined hands--a hardly probable
+eventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain an
+independent position between them. The political rivalry between
+the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they are
+antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other
+in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to
+retain their possessions in Asia.
+
+While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present
+directly influence our policy, Turkey--the predominant Power of the Near
+East--is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is
+emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest
+course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple
+Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which
+threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage.
+Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against
+Russia and against England--the two States, that is, with whose
+hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can
+threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short
+sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no
+sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a
+war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to
+the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding
+position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important
+key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong
+to Russia or England.
+
+If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so
+long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern
+basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters.
+Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a
+development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be
+strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite
+impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position,
+while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her.
+From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the
+Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of
+Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be.
+
+Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent
+importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her
+Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German
+policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres
+of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means
+negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey;
+Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for
+Germany.
+
+Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared
+neutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20, 1815, under the
+collective guarantee [C] of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in the
+Treaties of London of November 15,1831, and of April 19,1839, on the
+part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself.
+
+[Footnote C: By a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of the
+contracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all
+agree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the _right_ to
+interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced.]
+
+If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the
+continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance
+and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement
+balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we
+take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be
+guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple
+Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In
+consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France,
+and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to
+Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not
+inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all
+considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political
+superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in
+strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English
+landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy
+really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior
+forces will be united against Germany and Austria.
+
+Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily
+difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our
+nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an
+extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we
+are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets
+for our growing industries. But at every step which we take in this
+direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet
+have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes,
+by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further
+expansion of German international influence and of German maritime
+power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the
+English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved
+in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not
+neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her
+extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance,
+will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off
+the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be
+only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be
+paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces
+in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against
+France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps
+with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on
+the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position
+lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion
+barred.
+
+Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the
+international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out,
+cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment,
+though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the
+one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and
+warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with
+which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where
+their interests clash.
+
+With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but
+not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently
+peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden,
+but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisis
+in the history of the German nation.
+
+We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our
+position among the Powers of _Europe_; we now must decide whether we
+wish to develop into and maintain a _World Empire_, and procure for
+German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been
+hitherto withheld from them.
+
+Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make
+the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we
+willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower
+in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is
+involved in our decision.
+
+"To be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day,
+disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests
+and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official
+peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history
+inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the
+narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region
+of realities.
+
+There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and
+development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the _status
+quo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever
+seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and
+temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to
+gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the
+trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior
+tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the
+powers of a continuous development.
+
+We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing
+still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression,
+and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with
+our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are
+straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to
+extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and
+advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with
+peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to
+continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon
+us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our
+arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and
+we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be
+sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and
+the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritual
+and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German
+thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind.
+
+If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a
+catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to
+attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at
+the risk of a war with numerically superior foes.
+
+Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by
+acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German
+colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from
+Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual
+incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former
+South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of
+Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish
+population.
+
+Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our
+political power in other ways.
+
+In the first place, our political position would be considerably
+consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that
+France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find
+ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another _we
+must square our account with France_ if we wish for a free hand in our
+international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a
+sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all
+cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by
+force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never
+again come across our path.
+
+Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political
+power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case
+of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with
+armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
+our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same
+lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be
+presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good
+policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and
+the Triple Alliance has already been discussed.
+
+Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the
+Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as
+mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan
+Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further
+intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in
+Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence,
+in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the
+integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their
+independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best
+secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might
+eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central
+European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by
+this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily
+unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be
+essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the
+expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the
+geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of
+the political community based on it.
+
+We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial
+territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our
+population. Very recent events have shown that, under certain
+circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa
+by pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugal
+might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the
+Portuguese colonies. We may assume that some understanding exists
+between England and Germany which contemplates a division of the
+Portuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_.
+It cannot, indeed, be certain that England, if the contingency arrives,
+would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually
+exists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even been
+often said, although disputed in other quarters, that Great Britain,
+after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of the
+Portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugal
+the possession of _all_ her colonies.
+
+Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our
+African territory would be possible. These need not be discussed here
+more particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of
+a successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of
+territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require
+countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there
+are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the
+settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our
+overflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generally
+speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our
+industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the
+growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This
+represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us
+from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization.
+
+A part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditions
+point--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of
+the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of
+providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but
+remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign
+countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our
+exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture.
+
+An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity.
+It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace
+the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for
+the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. This
+notion is only justified in a certain sense. In the first place, such a
+policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow
+population in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee the
+certainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. It secures to
+all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means
+competition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political power
+which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the
+economic relations. The principle of the open door prevails
+everywhere--in Egypt, Manchuria, in the Congo State, in Morocco--and
+everywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: in
+Manchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and in
+Morocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fall
+naturally to that State which is practically dominant; its products are
+bought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power of
+the State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar
+advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be
+evaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best be
+regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonial
+policy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies or its own
+and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets
+lie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations.
+
+The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many
+old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European
+policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in
+Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost
+sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely
+disregarded.
+
+The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling
+that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for
+the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the
+limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays
+the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence
+in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory
+of balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power,
+and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain
+guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The
+conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a close
+community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into
+political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort
+of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a
+State-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five
+Great Powers--England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which
+latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866
+Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power.
+
+"Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among
+the nations." "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a
+real equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated,"[D] This
+condition does not exist between the European nations. England by
+herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow
+themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of
+French. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by
+special alliances. One result only has been obtained--the hindrance of
+the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in
+particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power
+can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing
+state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of
+rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually
+ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers
+which stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England's
+policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and
+to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order
+herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and
+the sovereignty of the world.
+
+[Footnote D: Treitschke.]
+
+We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present
+distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a
+State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of
+course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just
+basis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of one
+embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is
+established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in
+this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central
+European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in
+one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase
+our own power.
+
+A further question, suggested by the present political position, is
+whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning
+of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a
+different conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be,
+permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one
+contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of
+Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory
+is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State from
+which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has
+no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This
+argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that,
+in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last
+mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the
+neutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic,
+since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral
+country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to
+the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest
+moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development
+presupposes such competition.
+
+[Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without
+guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.]
+
+Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal
+affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the
+State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and
+powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference
+in the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances of
+such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in the
+private affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but
+none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval
+preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international
+intercourse that between the States of one and the same political system
+a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The
+unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to
+political intercourse under all conditions involves serious
+difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first
+preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord
+Palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false is
+the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States
+of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for
+international politics can be laid down.
+
+After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals;
+and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his
+affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the
+individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates
+the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the
+State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But
+no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide
+whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its
+own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State
+renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should
+circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party
+disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat
+to the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every State
+acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of
+another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an
+interference may become." On the other hand, it must be remembered that
+the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still
+graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international
+right, but simply and solely on power and expediency.
+
+I have gone closely into these questions of international policy
+because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly
+influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and
+may give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential that
+we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by
+considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only
+depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must
+remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any
+circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that
+the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as
+possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions
+possible. "No man," so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3,
+1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to
+make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take
+advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position."
+
+If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which
+guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our
+forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts.
+
+The political and national development of the German people has always,
+so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the
+hereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism of
+the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties,
+the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national
+objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often,
+also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is
+painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so
+restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in
+fruitless quarrels among themselves.
+
+Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome
+these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy,
+consistent development of our power.
+
+It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual and
+social life arising from the like variety of the German nationality and
+political system offers valuable advantages. It presents countless
+centres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a high
+spiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development.
+But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference of
+this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics.
+
+Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions
+which are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugal
+forces of the German nature--the common system of defence of our country
+by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong
+national empire.
+
+No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its own
+destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to
+no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. A
+glance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which
+is forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day.
+
+The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the common
+interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions,
+as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful
+personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to
+stir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality,
+and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union.
+
+We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of
+acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends
+through and for our people.
+
+Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German character
+to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development
+of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific,
+and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State is
+beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the
+independence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills and
+stunts the independence of free men." [F] This independence of the
+individual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the State,
+forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central
+power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our
+social conditions.
+
+[Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 2.]
+
+We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense,
+together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism,
+not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in
+the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our
+great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great
+part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the
+contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our
+political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the
+nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably
+beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once
+again, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament will
+be heard:
+
+  "O Germany, thy oaks still stand,
+  But thou art fallen, glorious land!"
+                                 KOeRNER.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+
+THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR
+
+Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture
+to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by
+formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will be
+impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future
+without an appeal to arms.
+
+Knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the political
+situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible
+for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an
+army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to
+battle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time
+down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of
+need.
+
+Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for
+warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of
+the situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested in
+the Reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to
+understand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic
+misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these
+for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country)
+cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand,
+brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great
+wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is
+often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national
+duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our
+people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be
+ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to
+discharge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of
+preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are
+passing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable to
+consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so
+much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect;
+we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true
+interests of the country better than by improving its military
+capabilities.
+
+Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it must
+maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national
+asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the
+war and supply the requisite means.
+
+This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in
+national development.
+
+As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold
+the field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, do
+not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of
+victory--so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with the
+people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is
+capable of wielding the sword with success.
+
+Military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but it
+develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the
+occupations of peace. It educates a man to the full mastery of his body,
+to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental
+powers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him to
+order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respect
+and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work.
+
+It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service
+deprives economic life of forces which could have been more
+appropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. These forces are
+not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life.
+Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly
+repay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. It
+is therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of its
+countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of
+war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and
+improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which
+the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly
+an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and
+educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus
+promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than
+achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which
+certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the
+national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them
+a number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency to
+luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations.
+Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level
+as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must
+complete and assist the other. But a people which does not willingly
+bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service
+renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and
+assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are
+one-sided and evanescent.
+
+It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligations
+towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all
+tendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. The
+method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power
+can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depends
+largely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical and
+political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently
+ranges between very wide extremes.
+
+In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military
+training was almost exclusively left to the individual. That was
+sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made
+them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to
+hard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination,
+subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military
+system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the
+conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made
+to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account
+of political possibilities. The great European States maintain standing
+armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or
+shorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenary
+army, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filled
+by volunteers.
+
+In these various ways different degrees of military efficiency are
+obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and
+intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the
+requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities
+become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency.
+
+When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that
+with growing civilization the requisite military capacities are always
+changing. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldiers
+who fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different from
+those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have the
+physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities
+expected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to the
+individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of
+warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in
+the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it
+is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. The
+preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military
+sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized
+State from those in countries, standing on a lower level of
+civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war
+is fought under relatively simple conditions.
+
+The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less
+developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form
+of military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising
+herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps
+in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and
+proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and
+educational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, by
+employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it
+never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development.
+
+When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find
+ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical
+and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact
+with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself.
+
+A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard
+to the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed in
+the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other
+ways. We see the individual States--according to their geographical
+position, their relations to other States and the military strength of
+their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater
+or less importance in the political system of the world--making their
+military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and
+expenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life of
+civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its
+emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is
+everywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a _means_ of
+attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength.
+
+Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position
+and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify
+her policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only
+with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling
+a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a
+continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. As
+a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental
+European war against her will.
+
+So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties,
+and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays
+most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to
+develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the
+security afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America,
+again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest
+limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval
+power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the
+continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any
+considerable forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea
+conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has
+acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly
+with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made
+concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her
+position in the world.
+
+While in some States a restriction of armaments is natural and
+justifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerve
+to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of
+Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political
+pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they
+are no longer justified by the size of her population and her
+international importance. France affords a conspicuous example of
+self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral
+duties.
+
+In the other European States, as in France, external political
+conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate
+the method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, which
+necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own
+justification.
+
+A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of
+nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in
+the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength
+to safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, under
+certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and
+political schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be
+deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements
+of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and
+maintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of all
+opposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases.
+
+A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on the
+friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as
+fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international
+conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support
+from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and under
+what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the
+consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own
+sphere of power.
+
+This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State
+is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace
+the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary
+expenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it is
+itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the
+largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another
+aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power of
+such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison
+with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable
+military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a
+view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military
+preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a
+defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent
+interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision
+will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a
+real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective
+addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist.
+The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary
+State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain
+influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local
+conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of
+the country.
+
+It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the
+utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such
+is, in fact, the case.
+
+In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with the
+political and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy,
+preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland,
+situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political
+independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Germany and the
+navy of England.
+
+The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on
+its own power.
+
+The power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies will
+have a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans and
+military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes;
+but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations
+alone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent and
+unqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless,
+and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and
+shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed.
+
+The military power of an independent State in the true sense must
+guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests
+of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of
+development. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be
+considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military
+efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions
+must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object
+thereby to be gained. This object--of which each individual must be
+conscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises
+the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of
+the State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen.
+
+A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital
+factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the
+healthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope in
+international competition. This is also an essential condition for the
+unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where the
+natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by external
+circumstances, nation and State are stunted and individual growth is set
+back.
+
+Increasing political power and the consequent multiplication of
+possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the
+intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by
+every phase of history.
+
+The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself
+first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of
+statesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by force
+of arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty of
+every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale
+commensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemy
+cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On the
+contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most
+strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for
+the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than
+ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very
+important factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits,
+which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of
+superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be
+spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a
+small, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War has
+proved this once more.
+
+Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of
+every State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert
+_power_, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of its
+personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the
+narrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible nor
+profitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined
+by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious
+development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military
+elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system
+cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. It
+needs a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. In
+the Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attacking
+strength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, because
+its foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political and
+moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas.
+
+The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the
+political necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree of
+warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may
+be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State's
+duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst out
+whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is
+brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of
+the State and of the army.
+
+It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties
+of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. The
+social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the
+duty of the State in a quite different light from the political
+_dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing
+of things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to the
+welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons
+on the horizon of the future.
+
+Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the
+nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these
+momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and
+experienced thinkers.
+
+First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in
+the present political world, even though all the elements for it are
+present.
+
+Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to
+40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so
+much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are
+annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is
+set up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would be
+available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would not
+mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say
+a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on
+active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from
+such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the
+continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike
+weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the
+individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the
+highest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the
+beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre
+cannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been
+ordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of the
+strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the
+rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins his
+service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier.
+With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we
+merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. We
+must not regard the present only, but provide for the future.
+
+The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makes
+the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes
+of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of
+arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity
+of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is
+sinning against his country.
+
+The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations,
+oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of
+things--these turn the scale.
+
+When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last century
+undertook the reorganization of the Prussian army, no political tension
+existed. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King had
+perceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet the
+requirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his
+people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations
+without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun.
+In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has
+powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being
+under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful
+co-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed was
+universally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, and
+accorded with traditional German sentiment.
+
+While the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of the
+political influences of the day, the military power of the probable
+opponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink without
+jeopardizing the national safety.
+
+Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries
+of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all
+these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the
+hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an
+obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as
+up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by
+every means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the army
+must be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, in
+which a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may be
+attained.
+
+Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree
+regulated by the political position of the State. If the State has
+satisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping
+its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive
+character. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous of
+expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must
+adopt a predominantly offensive military system.
+
+Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are
+dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide
+scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where
+the discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may lead
+to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war,
+and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In
+this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so
+clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that
+the majority of the nation accept his view. There are always and
+everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own,
+and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses.
+
+Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command
+of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful
+position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the
+population in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is
+too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets
+public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles,
+feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, which
+was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in the
+military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary
+unanimity.
+
+Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political independence
+rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of
+self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly
+supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it
+should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great
+duties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic
+evasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at
+home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects
+of our policy.
+
+To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion,
+as King William I. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the
+control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray
+too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly
+great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany.
+He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of
+inflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people.
+
+One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that
+permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake
+of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the
+taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious
+benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct
+disadvantages.
+
+The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by
+the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the
+sacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefully
+in view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the
+conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But
+where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual
+enforcement of universal service or of the requirements on which
+readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in
+order to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in order
+to maintain its vitality.
+
+One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction
+preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing
+conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military
+authorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy,
+since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon.
+Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty to
+perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit.
+
+It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to
+disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of
+the preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarily
+available. "No expenditure without security," runs the formula in which
+this policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security is
+fixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the duties
+which must be fulfilled--as Treitschke, our great historian and national
+politician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the great
+Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by
+sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically
+indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the
+nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that
+the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He
+can only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the Ministers
+for Commerce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to break
+down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the
+individual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to create
+favourable conditions for profitable business. A great impulse must
+thrill the whole productive and financial circles of the State, if the
+duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled.
+
+Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls for
+very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the
+entire social and political life of the people and on the financial
+policy of the State.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+
+
+THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR
+
+The social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defend
+itself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strength
+of the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors which
+determine the conditions of preparation for war.
+
+I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres
+of policy and progress which our history and our national character
+impose on us. My next task is to observe the possible military
+combinations which we must be prepared to face.
+
+In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can
+judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political
+intentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movements
+will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and
+this war will decide our future.
+
+It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our
+probable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessary
+basis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves the
+intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable
+efficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is
+determined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions
+clash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as to
+the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data
+available.
+
+If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups
+of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results:
+According to the recent communications of the French Finance Minister
+Klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan),
+the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910
+amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial
+Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to
+the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service
+auxiliaire "--that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in
+for service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to the
+information of the same Minister, including field army and reserves,
+consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. A reduction from
+this number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sources
+put down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army and
+reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000.
+
+To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1,700,000
+Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per
+cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made.
+
+If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will
+correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength
+of separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the
+2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to the
+infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a
+considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the
+transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers,
+70,000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical
+service, etc.), 90,000.
+
+No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per
+cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the
+birth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly,
+it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. Recourse already has been had to the
+expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of
+filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less
+efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves.
+
+Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the
+plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians
+and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with
+them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and
+trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited
+conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria.
+The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and
+conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops are
+in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops
+stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers
+against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are
+heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the
+Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the
+climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops.
+The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the
+march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value.
+There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with
+every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative
+proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native
+Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before
+Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the
+native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War,
+Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians.
+An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age
+available for military service. The Commission appointed for the purpose
+reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in
+the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined
+some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. They
+could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen
+the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in
+the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the
+formation of reserves.
+
+As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in her
+West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops
+available. As the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000,
+these figures may be considerably raised.
+
+Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalese
+sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912
+a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to
+Algeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black
+troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. There
+is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being
+transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient
+number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3,
+stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the
+Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France.
+Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a
+strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be
+available for a European war is still remote. But it cannot be
+questioned that they will be so some day.
+
+Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops in
+Europe contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but
+the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the
+territory termed "Morocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to
+come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale.
+The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in
+organizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the
+command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco.
+
+The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great addition
+to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the
+country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and France will
+certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in
+military matters.
+
+For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the
+reinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained from
+Algeria and Tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription is
+universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000
+men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have
+witnessed their exploits on the battlefields of Weissenburg and Woerth.
+At least one strong division of Turcos is already available.
+
+Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the military
+power of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are not
+published, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information is
+forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service,
+but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According to
+the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the
+Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of
+Cossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formed
+into 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe;
+3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry is
+divided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independent
+regiments.
+
+In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures
+42,000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strength
+of 20,000. Each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry
+divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive
+at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions,
+sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be added
+unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the
+war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000.
+
+This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. The
+Siberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would
+certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For the
+maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to
+leave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least one
+division at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. This
+would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men; so that
+we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army,
+1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of
+Cossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men,
+and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case
+of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men
+available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank
+for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed
+to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a
+certain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not known
+which of these formations would be really raised in event of
+mobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be
+put into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces which
+must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could
+easily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whether
+arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in
+sufficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empire
+like Russia in this respect.
+
+Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to
+England, the third member of the Triple Entente.
+
+The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into two
+divisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed by
+the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have
+at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of
+formation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns any
+European theatre of war.
+
+The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinet
+divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the
+native troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army,
+a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total
+of 300,000. It is now 270,000 strong, and is destined exclusively for
+home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very
+highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We
+have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army.
+This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which seven
+are with the colours and five in the reserve. The annual supply of
+recruits is 35,000. The regular reserve is now 136,000 strong. There is
+also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted
+for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the
+figure of 200,000.
+
+Of the regular English army, 134,000 men are stationed in England,
+74,500 in India (where, in combination with 159,000 native troops, they
+form the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39,000 in different
+stations--Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the other
+Colonies and Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt
+are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in
+the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong)
+one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in
+view of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of the
+English is precarious. The 11,000 troops now stationed in South Africa
+are to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. In
+event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there.
+
+For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account the
+regular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regular
+field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted
+brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and
+trains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form part
+of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. They consist of a
+very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for
+coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with
+some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home
+Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing
+its organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of this
+army can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150,000 men may
+be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troops
+compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the
+Colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutes
+the weak point in the British armament. England can employ her regular
+army in a Continental war so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies.
+This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war
+break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and
+especially in Egypt.
+
+Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente can
+put into the field, Germany can command an active army of 589,705 men
+(on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about
+25,500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a peace footing is
+361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. The combined war strength
+of the two States may be estimated as follows:
+
+In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and
+non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an
+average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of
+3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we
+have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment to
+it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French
+can match with about the same figures.
+
+The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,000. Liability to
+serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the
+Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a
+total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent.,
+911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained
+Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to
+911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a
+grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as
+Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe.
+
+In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available
+for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would
+be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available,
+partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion.
+However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never
+reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia
+present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the
+enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent
+generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the
+addition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would
+not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field.
+
+In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must
+be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are already
+reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple
+Alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the
+field against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France are
+available against Germany.
+
+[Footnote A: Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne."]
+
+The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000
+men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry,
+in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of
+Bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regiments
+in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are
+united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field
+artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193
+field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountain
+batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies.
+Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regiment
+and an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28,000 men.
+
+On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. Some 70,000
+men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. The
+militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might
+be mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9
+army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the
+Territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions.
+
+As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48
+officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500
+native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned
+officers and privates of Italian birth, and 3,800 natives.
+
+Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it is
+questionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value.
+It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence,
+while the protection of Tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim a
+powerful army if it is to be held against France.
+
+The Turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joined
+the coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents.
+
+The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275,000
+men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it:
+
+I. The Active Army (Nizam):
+
+  Infantry              133,000
+  Cavalry                26,000
+  Artillery              43,000
+  Pioneers                4,500
+  Special troops          7,500
+  Train formations        3,000
+  Mechanics               3,000
+
+A total, that is, of 220,000 men.
+
+2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. Within
+this limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns for
+short trainings.
+
+3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military employes, officials,
+and others, more than 30,000.
+
+The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. We
+need only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia,
+Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in a
+European theatre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be
+regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for
+local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior.
+To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplest
+process. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the
+Turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. Turkey thus is
+a very valuable ally to whichever party she joins.
+
+The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies into
+the field.
+
+Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons
+and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and
+home duties.
+
+Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing;
+this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The
+war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000
+rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4
+guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and
+228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (third
+line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the
+militia, an uncertain quantity.
+
+The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not
+known how they are distributed among the various branches of the
+service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including
+infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine
+guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and
+national militia, which latter is only available for home service and
+comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be
+400,000 strong.
+
+Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power
+in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to
+their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia
+cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of
+their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods.
+
+In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the
+permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. The
+infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent
+cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery
+14,000 men with 700 officers.
+
+For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000
+men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry,
+7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is
+therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part
+of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves
+and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000
+trained men available for service.
+
+Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chiefly
+concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into
+relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European
+States may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if
+they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a
+European war.
+
+Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under
+consideration, and then Belgium.
+
+Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men.
+The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive
+war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns
+and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a
+total of 141,000 men.
+
+The Landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36
+12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total
+strength of 69,000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000
+men.
+
+The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which
+varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally
+available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400
+garrison artillery, and I,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport
+troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000
+infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400
+artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of
+15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There
+is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active
+and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot
+artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers,
+including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder,
+Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Voelkerack and Haringvliet there are various
+outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present
+unimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications
+in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland).
+
+Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English
+landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. It
+would easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us.
+
+
+Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows:
+26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison
+artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service.
+
+On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising
+74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers
+and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry
+divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each
+of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1
+squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a
+garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde
+civique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as
+a very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are
+the fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast
+fortifications.
+
+Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great
+military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong
+fortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of
+strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This
+State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry,
+2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the
+strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. In war-time an army of 62,000
+men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically
+of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special
+arms.
+
+Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises units
+from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as
+well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which
+is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There
+are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students
+from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age.
+
+The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can,
+accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case
+of war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head.
+
+In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might in
+combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to
+Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men
+can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the
+Landwehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm.
+
+Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently
+stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active
+army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is
+so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could
+at most be put into the field.
+
+As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the
+accompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affords
+a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that,
+numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours.
+This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of
+really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four
+battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have
+ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned
+battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The
+comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable,
+that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be
+noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really
+have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be
+counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the
+number of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto known
+about the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respect
+of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important
+factor if allied with the English.
+
+         |Battle-   |Armoured |Armoured| Armoured |Protected |Number   |N S
+Nation.  |ships     |Coast    |Gunboats| Cruisers |Cruisers  |of       |u u
+         |above     |Defence  |and     |          |          |Torpedo  |m b
+         |5,000     |Vessels  |Armoured|          |          |Vessels  |b m
+         |Tons.     |from     |Ships   |          |          |         |e a
+         |          |3000 Tons|under   |          |          |         |r r
+         |          |to 5,000 |3,000   |          |          |         |  i
+         |          |Tons     |Tons    |          |          |         |  i
+         +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n
+         |No|Displ. |No|Displ.|No|Displ|No|Displ. |No|Displ. |    |From|f e
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |200+|80- |  s
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |Tons| 200|
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |Tons|
+---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+---
+GERMANY: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |25|332,410| 5|20,600| -| --- |10|114,590|33|122,130| 117|  70| 12
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building|12|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | 4|   --- | 7|   --- |  14| -- | --
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ENGLAND: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |50|793,260| -|  --- | -| --- |38|484,970|66|333,540| 223|  36| 53
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building|12|286,640| -|  --- | -| --- | 6|145,320|20|101,320|  51| -- | 19
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+FRANCE:  |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |22|314,930| -|  --- | -| --- |22|214,670|10| 50,780|  71| 191| 52
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4| 93,880| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  13| -- | 19
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ITALY:   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    | 8| 96,980| -|  --- | -| --- |10| 79,530| 4| 10,040|  53|  39|  7
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4| 84,000| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3| 10,200|  14|  28| 13
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+AUSTRIA- |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ HUNGARY |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |11|102,620| -|  --- | -| --- | 3| 18,870| 4| 10,590|  18|  66|  7
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 5| 94,500| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3|   --- |   6| -- | --
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+RUSSIA:  |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Baltic   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ Fleet   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Ready  | 4| 62,300| -|  --- | 1|1,760| 6| 64,950| 4| 27,270|  60|  19| 13
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 8|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |   1| -- |  1
+Black Sea|  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ Fleet   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Ready  | 6| 72,640| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 3| 13,620|  17|  10|  4
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 4|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  14| -- |  7
+Siberian |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+  Fleet  |--|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | 2|  9,180|  20|   7| 13
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+UNITED   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ STATES: |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |30|434,890| 4|13,120| -| --- |14|181,260|16| 65,270|  40|  28| 19
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 7|190,000| -|  --- | -| --- | -|   --- | -|   --- |  14| -- | 20
+         |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+JAPAN:   |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+Ready    |13|194,690| 2| 8,540| -| --- |13|139,830|12| 49,170|  59|  49| 12
+Voted or |  |       |  |      |  |     |  |       |  |       |    |    |
+ building| 3|   --- | -|  --- | -| --- | 4|107,120| 3| 15,000|   2| -- |  1
+---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+---
+
+Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leave
+a certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be stronger
+than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in
+event of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further assume
+that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-European
+stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together
+can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships
+alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by
+a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia
+joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition
+to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since
+the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships,
+and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our
+coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the
+other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of
+the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be
+superior to us.
+
+As regards _materiel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is
+distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our
+equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a
+superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless
+energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up
+some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these
+advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of
+an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English.
+
+Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under
+certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in
+this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente
+can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time.
+
+If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of
+the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany,
+we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in
+every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are
+very different.
+
+If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed
+she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member
+of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course,
+very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost
+equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization
+and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The
+French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united
+spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of
+the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too,
+has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to
+double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the
+French succeed in making a large African army available for a European
+theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with
+ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind,
+for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may
+safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if
+only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well
+that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of
+her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by
+the exercise of extraordinary efforts.
+
+It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military
+power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself
+desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably
+not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her
+own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured
+the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too
+high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has
+all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war,
+and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must
+expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple
+Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have
+struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination
+with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would
+attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland,
+and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the
+fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the
+considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and
+threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of
+the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without
+difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would
+enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would
+enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine,
+after investing Metz and Diedenhofen.
+
+[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.]
+
+England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must
+reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of
+an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only
+serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign.
+English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not
+coincident with those of France.
+
+The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea
+commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any
+further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy
+our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the
+supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium
+between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in
+order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never
+impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the
+private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her
+plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political
+position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war
+against us.
+
+If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on
+this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the
+first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by
+the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely
+compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might
+consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied
+by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in
+India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European
+war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might
+interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was
+important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall
+any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case
+of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea
+will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm
+resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial
+centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will
+throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of
+her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English
+policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other
+hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only
+so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval
+bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this
+because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's
+battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation
+will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a
+definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It is
+very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively
+acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South
+Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and
+stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the
+offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the
+generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale,
+held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not,
+according to available information, show the English army in a
+favourable light so far as strategical ability went.
+
+If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's
+probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian
+standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than
+a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the
+Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to
+join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of
+communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of
+power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is
+as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory
+over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople,
+but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia
+in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation
+for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could
+be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire.
+
+Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an
+offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite
+different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war.
+Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against
+complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not
+shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for
+political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such
+a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion
+in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast
+Empire the social and also political education, especially among the
+peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy
+seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have
+acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools
+have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind
+anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their
+interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote
+their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the
+Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of
+a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive
+war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an
+extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people
+showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be
+involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never
+bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary
+elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every
+weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in
+internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the
+community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the
+moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out
+their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of
+arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we
+have already mentioned.
+
+Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole
+power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a
+certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by
+defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater
+exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks,
+nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's
+political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another
+sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her
+losses on another frontier.
+
+Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia
+will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars
+against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented
+the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign
+revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and
+battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all
+probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats
+favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against
+Russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coute_.
+
+If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole
+position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in
+the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile
+forces which would cripple the conduct of the war.
+
+So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese
+War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle
+showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest
+losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian
+army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but
+essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of
+the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong;
+indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every
+grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above
+mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian
+generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and
+that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must
+therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack.
+
+When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we
+cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military
+difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel
+successfully the attack of our opponents.
+
+In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our
+country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no
+opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the
+government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our
+western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north
+through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is
+there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper
+bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned
+through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country
+offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves
+resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their
+army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in
+their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten.
+
+The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and
+the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a
+prey to our enemies.
+
+The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a
+strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland.
+England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire
+oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east
+alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are
+encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides.
+This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so
+presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our
+opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan.
+
+If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact
+that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in
+carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia
+have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will
+sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of
+any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an
+extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by
+the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not
+merely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is a
+cause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound
+to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase
+of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct
+of Italy at the conference of Algeciras sufficiently demonstrated. It
+even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always
+reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a
+defensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France and
+England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how
+difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with
+France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we
+think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which
+is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt
+whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were
+allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests
+are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the
+same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria.
+Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate
+State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements,
+patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to
+the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of
+such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that
+might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration.
+
+We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of
+standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the
+Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the
+struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own
+resolution for victory.
+
+Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our
+political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can
+only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and
+by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect
+continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their
+interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest,
+since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and
+obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable,
+then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own
+resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of
+desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would
+destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize
+the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would
+shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus
+check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for
+which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war
+will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind.
+This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power
+or downfall!" will be our rallying cry.
+
+Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident
+intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the
+end, come what may.
+
+We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted
+campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our
+enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to
+defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last
+is won.
+
+It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numerical
+equality with our opponents. On the contrary, we must strive to call up
+the entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the great
+decision which impends. We must try also to gain a certain superiority
+over our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold some
+winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. We
+must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only by
+continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our
+preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future
+makes on us. A nation of 65,000,000 which stakes _all_ her forces on
+winning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot be
+conquered. But it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblance
+of power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content with
+half-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only be
+attained by the exertion and development of all her powers.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+
+
+THE NEXT NAVAL WAR
+
+In the next European land war we shall probably face our foes with
+Austria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the day
+against any opposing forces. In a naval war we shall be thrown on our
+own resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against the
+superior forces which will certainly press us hard.
+
+There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for,
+although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack
+would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking
+our political power. It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack
+_us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France. The English have,
+besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should
+always be held before our eyes. They talk so much of a possible German
+attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question
+is from the opposite point of view. Again, the preparations which they
+are making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly have
+contemplated an attack on Germany. These preparations are like a
+strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves
+no doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbour of Rosyth is
+admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can mean
+nothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especially
+strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the
+Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These are
+measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand
+an inquiry into the military position thus created.
+
+The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since
+1902. Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it
+is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time.
+This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the
+circumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusively
+directed against Germany.
+
+We must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us to
+believe--reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, and
+shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. It will be
+so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the
+offensive against the English fleet. But we must contemplate the
+possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning
+the freedom of the seas, if England attacks us. We shall now discuss
+this possibility. On this matter I am expressing my personal views only,
+which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest
+exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed
+antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. I shall not
+betray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any. But I
+consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand
+what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met.
+
+In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong
+enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question
+remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure
+protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to
+become its master?
+
+The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack,
+instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the
+war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English
+fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its
+superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective
+blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that
+such an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does not
+seem to me to promise any great success.
+
+The English have secured themselves against such attacks by
+comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seems
+dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall
+urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings.
+Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than
+formerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English
+merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under such
+circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign
+service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's
+warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of
+these ships will certainly be a difficult task.
+
+The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and
+energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes
+which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will
+usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the
+few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing
+our vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken against
+neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable
+results can be expected from a war against England's trade. On the
+contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at
+her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must be
+ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England's
+custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests
+are at stake.
+
+Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire
+with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by
+the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to
+English vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they
+can be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has
+no knowledge of their existence.
+
+It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation
+from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications
+will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way
+would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral
+Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the
+great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be
+discovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remain
+suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of
+trade.
+
+It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such
+communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect
+of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to block
+these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the
+States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether
+they would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity,
+or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography
+dictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with England
+and a Continental war with their German neighbours--two possibilities,
+each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay much
+attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was
+at issue is hardly credible.
+
+The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot be
+foreseen. It would probably depend on the general political position and
+the attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest. The
+policy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor. One
+can easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch are
+seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on
+their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea
+side. They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which
+obviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sided
+with our enemies.
+
+I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities
+which might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to a
+sympathetic understanding by the war. I will only point out how
+widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the
+Continental war and on the political relations generally. The attitude
+of Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the
+Baltic must mainly depend on her. It is vital to us that these
+communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this.
+The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly important
+for the conduct of the war. Free commerce with Sweden is essential for
+us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish
+iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted.
+
+It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the
+interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by
+diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. We
+cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands.
+
+Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus
+raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer
+greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us
+assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only
+trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--a
+condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and
+should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any
+case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on
+which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and
+also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial
+products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They
+must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the
+Government must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry of
+Commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in
+collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which
+our commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort of
+commercial mobilization.
+
+These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us
+in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a
+defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our
+coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack.
+
+Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade
+closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish
+straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she
+can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the
+Continent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotland
+and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea
+commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping.
+
+A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of
+the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a
+blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base
+and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since all
+the English naval ports are considerably farther than this from our
+coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously
+increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich has
+recently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. It is considered
+the best harbourage on the English coast, and is hardly 300 nautical
+miles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities of
+fortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distance
+from the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes of
+blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless
+count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutch
+coast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means.
+Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as
+Heligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all
+attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. This
+task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by
+night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on
+board.
+
+Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy,
+if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the
+offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain
+an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive
+operations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts
+must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We must
+endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly
+with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the
+blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as
+possible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces,
+for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there
+is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the
+enemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end.
+And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold
+attack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionally
+favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the
+fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy
+losses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring,
+to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place
+or another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and
+the battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behind
+the farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold the
+high seas in full strength. The forces of the defending party, however,
+lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight.
+
+Such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party.
+We may therefore fairly assume that the English would decide in favour
+of the second kind. At all events, the harbour constructions, partly
+building, partly projected, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were chosen with
+an eye to this line of blockade. It would entail in the north the
+barring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasible
+from the military aspect. Only a small force is required to seal up the
+Channel, as the navigation route is very narrow. In addition to all
+this, the great English naval depots--Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, and
+Plymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediately
+behind it. Besides, every advance against this line from the north is
+flanked by Sheerness and Harwich, so that a retreat to the German coast
+might be barred. The conditions for the northern line of blockade will
+be no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. The
+blockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour of
+Rosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the Orkney
+Isles. Every attacking fleet from the German north coast will be
+unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cut
+off from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to the
+English superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading
+fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the
+Baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here we
+should have a tolerably secure retreat. This accentuates once more the
+supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage
+through the Sound and the Great Belt. The command of these straits will
+not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the
+sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading
+fleet.
+
+In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade
+offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are
+well worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, it
+prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed
+by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the
+blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or
+three divisions.
+
+As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let
+herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests
+of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory
+arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As
+regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous
+conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily
+divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the
+superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea.
+Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending
+party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction
+with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be
+deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are
+the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be
+employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled.
+
+This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But
+it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the
+close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet
+more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in
+far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the
+threatened flank of our attacking fleet.
+
+After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a
+mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision
+of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event
+of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt
+to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They
+could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our
+naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and
+Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these
+places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea.
+
+It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate
+against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford
+extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by
+protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the
+communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack
+will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast
+fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely
+defensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon
+the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the
+fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should
+inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength
+between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must
+be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast
+fortifications hold out.
+
+No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a
+defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows.
+Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments
+for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative
+movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures
+for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers.
+The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we
+shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy
+"scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleet
+must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the
+enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by
+attacking them directly.
+
+If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they
+would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English
+force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus
+contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing
+forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected
+to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be
+dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a
+balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in
+mind.
+
+So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for,
+starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines would
+be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully
+than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they
+would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant English
+coast.
+
+Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and
+nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the
+boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in
+hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the
+science of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is the
+only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we
+may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea.
+
+In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to
+be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a
+World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England.
+
+This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of
+Germany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the
+common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win
+recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This was
+the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under
+Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her
+history; and the great Republic of the United States of North America
+strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right
+of nations for which every people craves." [A]
+
+[Footnote A: Schiemann.]
+
+In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this
+vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us
+in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which,
+in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy,
+has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the
+unscrupulous suppression of her rivals.
+
+If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English and
+takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage
+than a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold our
+allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her
+forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the
+two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea,
+since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean
+interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful
+issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then
+despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak,
+on land--i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be
+compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet
+to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to
+the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an
+absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports and
+destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife with
+France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the
+French position as a Great Power. If France, with her falling
+birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her
+place in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanent
+political subservience. Those are the stakes.
+
+The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated.
+That is the less dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present
+still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French.
+We could operate against it on the inner line--i.e., we could use the
+opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the
+Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we could attack the Russian ships in vastly
+superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the
+North Sea. For these operations it is of the first importance that the
+Danish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell into
+the hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would be
+almost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the
+passive protection of our coast batteries.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+
+
+THE CRUCIAL QUESTION
+
+I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some
+detail, because I thought that our general political and military
+position can only be properly estimated by considering the various
+phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities
+and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on
+our coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction be
+decided in which our preparations for war ought to move.
+
+The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war
+with England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall
+need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from
+a hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on an
+ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If an
+Anglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatened
+our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by
+sea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armies
+advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined
+fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be
+rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land.
+
+We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on
+land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all
+circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the
+Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before
+we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy
+based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in
+Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her
+triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own
+country.
+
+But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by
+the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing
+with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land
+army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting
+the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally
+necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every
+attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled.
+
+At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the
+conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk
+of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay
+the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample
+scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put
+aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost
+energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole
+future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the
+broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the
+individual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere is
+critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as
+a World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the Triple
+Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey,
+threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which
+destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing
+ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, if
+we wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we are
+Germans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out our
+preparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to our
+national duty.
+
+I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated
+merely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in the
+cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer
+the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the
+future. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to
+desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour
+something of what we have lost in the last years.
+
+Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on
+the continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problem
+of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great
+numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainly
+exist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance,
+whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to
+Irredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondary
+importance.
+
+The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make
+the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate
+the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make
+universal service an existing fact.
+
+The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a
+splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has
+in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and
+has brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification.
+Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed
+in a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mighty
+political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our
+greatness was founded.
+
+France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in
+Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000.
+Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. But since
+the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very
+various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are
+also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to
+the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself
+successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the
+inner line, even though England took part in the war.
+
+Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of
+universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued
+to carry it out effectively. The country where universal service exists
+is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only
+kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the
+able-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little use
+has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army.
+
+In this direction some reorganization is required which will
+energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army,
+such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand,
+we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers.
+
+Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not
+shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make
+up our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by
+150,000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not be
+forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could
+not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased army
+only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and
+Landwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recur
+to the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the new
+Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wish
+to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even
+if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that
+we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the
+superior forces of our opponents.
+
+We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we
+must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These
+means can only be found in the spiritual domain.
+
+History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have
+only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been
+equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party
+exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases
+it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment,
+greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able
+strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Rome
+conquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great with
+inferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent history
+shows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over a
+crushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a great
+commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear.
+Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the
+hostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisive
+factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory
+or defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and
+keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a
+real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which
+would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should we
+then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy
+which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be
+possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a
+considerable numerical superiority.
+
+[Footnote A: _Cf_. v. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.]
+
+The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery
+with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships,
+and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable
+opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast
+with the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certain
+spiritual servility and inferiority.
+
+Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which
+the ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is to
+prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to
+apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of
+superiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the material
+advantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushed
+by their weight of numbers.
+
+We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by
+uninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight the
+probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new
+paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. New
+goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches
+us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress,
+in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritual
+capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be
+sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action,
+are the soil in which great successes ripen.
+
+It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the
+nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas
+which will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughly
+ventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege"
+("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results of
+my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration
+of the essential questions of the future.
+
+In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extent
+unprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness
+will exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means of
+communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. These
+three momentous factors will mark the war of the future.
+
+"Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain
+elements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they can
+be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical
+efficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the country
+during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are
+therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower
+and less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they require
+for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into
+effective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible to
+morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may
+prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run
+short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority
+over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions.
+
+The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer
+range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting
+claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner than
+formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far
+wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. The
+soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which
+he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all
+circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing
+which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious
+movement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances.
+Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short,
+while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands
+made on them have become considerably greater.
+
+Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and
+feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main
+roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign,
+aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their
+use, and the commanders counted upon them.
+
+The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great
+superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and
+tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists.
+
+The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy,
+and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than
+they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior
+force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective
+troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile
+army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it
+before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the
+field.
+
+Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly
+shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary
+conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare.
+
+In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength
+which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action.
+Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack
+to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a
+superior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which is
+the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place
+which is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked party
+can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the
+intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold
+out promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attacking
+General strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his
+troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature
+guarantees.
+
+This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancing
+armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it
+will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take
+proper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, the
+prospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable,
+especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at
+his disposal.
+
+Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility
+of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all
+the more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is
+impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and
+completely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisive
+direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of
+the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and
+its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations.
+If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior
+numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his
+numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory
+over the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law,
+Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and striking
+strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in
+mere numbers.
+
+No further proof is required that the superiority of the attack
+increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and
+to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of
+concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the
+enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very
+appreciable.
+
+We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the
+superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it
+is incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise the
+tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and
+especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements
+and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to
+act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the
+manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be
+superior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has
+objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks
+by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It
+must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since
+a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods.
+
+This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which I
+have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face
+the future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raise
+the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else
+must give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all our
+measures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, and
+thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too
+easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of
+a collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions would
+have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying
+principle.
+
+The requirements which I have described as the most essential are
+somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a
+resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age.
+
+The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, the
+smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not
+merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as
+such. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will be
+suffocated by their own fat," said General v. Brandenstein, the great
+organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of
+the French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the
+whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure
+the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his
+own movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the course
+of military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tactical
+efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it
+certainly will prove in the wars of the future.
+
+A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of
+public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have
+conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential
+contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained,
+and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It would
+be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is
+recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached
+on them.
+
+This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is
+attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military
+service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less,
+and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had
+to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a
+good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_,
+which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no
+means helped by the very brief training which these units at best
+receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity
+for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy
+strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be
+indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the
+field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain
+the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass
+would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to
+some degree the task of making good the losses.
+
+A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops.
+Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are
+already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full
+strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on
+mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according
+to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much
+inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which
+were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this,
+notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new
+French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere
+of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their
+duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered
+territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact,
+they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the
+field army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and
+mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By acting
+at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually
+become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of
+offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset
+of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied
+with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be.
+
+Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such
+troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive
+operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated
+as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some
+are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical
+conception.
+
+For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars
+only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks
+for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if
+necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and
+more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical
+striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater
+numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the
+decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever
+before.
+
+The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are
+placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this
+principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that
+he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong
+advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and
+therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his
+army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be
+employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as
+much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the
+numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the
+actual war.
+
+It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to
+render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a
+mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their
+_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to
+them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of
+efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered.
+
+Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An
+increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more
+than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is
+supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the
+establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient
+will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality,
+not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If we
+wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening
+the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of
+professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This step
+is the more necessary because the present available cadres are
+insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide
+for their thorough training.
+
+The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with
+an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. We
+shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the
+efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be
+improved by organization, equipment, and training.
+
+I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the
+questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of
+military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt
+original action--I mean the importance of personality.
+
+From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of
+his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune,
+and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a given
+general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left
+to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in
+the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the
+face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other
+age, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics has
+abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left
+to himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In the
+strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of
+that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before
+from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in the
+artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly
+emphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations have
+increased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far less
+able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the
+field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates.
+These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations.
+
+When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his
+ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the
+reserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment
+to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot
+be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Even
+the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now
+wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have
+to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing
+touch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on the
+commander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy,
+deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from
+him. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All this
+puts a heavy strain on personality.
+
+It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of
+self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct
+advantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to
+attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And this
+object can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in the
+sphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can be
+improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the
+conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in
+which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and
+more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp.
+Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune
+are produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkward
+and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same
+process is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mental
+development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the
+personality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsman
+Bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of
+leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. General
+Chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute
+determination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks of
+the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and
+thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is it
+essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in
+high command. In a long military life ideas all too early grow
+stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought
+and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of such
+development cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of the
+army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a
+one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of
+actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akin
+to this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en
+masse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatest
+value. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual
+independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and
+solving new problems by original methods.
+
+It has often been said that one man is as good as another; that
+personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is
+erroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real
+struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is
+enough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility and
+danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a
+chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross.
+
+That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the
+important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is the
+only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to
+break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and
+success. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. that for the
+highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time
+of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men
+around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition
+those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of
+need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. This
+is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and
+distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action,
+appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of
+the stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved:
+
+  "Folk and thrall and victor can
+  Witness bear in every zone:
+  Fortune's greatest gift to man
+  Is personality alone."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+
+
+ARMY ORGANIZATION
+
+I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it
+is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with
+this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. I
+shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in
+my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we
+wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions
+which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It will
+be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially
+noteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come into
+opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further
+from my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based on
+theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely
+presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and
+of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political
+disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is,
+in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something
+already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent
+historical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to the
+future, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-defined
+lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most
+important that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall not
+look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future.
+
+The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I have
+already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the
+greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position
+to carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore,
+fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, as
+already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the
+arming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops,
+and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly
+have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of
+their peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter how
+essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary
+cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches
+so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in
+war-time.
+
+The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the
+non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of
+the troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline,
+decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the
+troops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number of
+permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in
+proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the
+demands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officers
+and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred
+to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern
+tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his
+influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing
+_personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to the
+infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a
+sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the more
+important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers
+and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on
+the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and
+non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is a
+question of training, and does not come into the present discussion.
+
+The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a
+sense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospects
+which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect
+the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to
+keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary
+advantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, the
+financial question is all-important. The career of the officer offers
+to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and
+self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the
+service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as
+they now are. The infantry officer especially must have a better
+position. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur
+greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer
+has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most
+strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It would
+be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than
+the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm
+more attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for
+which there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be well
+supplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must be
+counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service.
+By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the
+chief arm.
+
+If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition
+and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the
+troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in
+action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on
+conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical
+proportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally the
+cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the
+proportion which artillery must bear to infantry.
+
+With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent
+replace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weapons
+of defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourable
+conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful
+attack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder that
+impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, this
+auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and
+employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into
+large units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching
+columns.
+
+The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance.
+
+Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooth
+their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly.
+This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry
+must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting
+instruments in the whole army.
+
+If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the
+result. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to
+modern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greater
+superiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of front
+in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close
+tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire.
+This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the
+conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as
+before. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in
+a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The
+troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en echelon _than in the
+last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate
+the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be
+settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the
+experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will
+most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in
+the domain of military science.
+
+If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an
+infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of
+artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern
+artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must
+advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the
+artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path
+between these two extremes.
+
+If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or,
+better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the
+guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially
+adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the
+conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is
+reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we
+must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into
+account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If
+we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper
+strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such
+infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position
+taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that
+section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions,
+requires greater numbers and depth than before.
+
+In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of
+the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian
+campaign.
+
+Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period
+extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not
+rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original
+strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans
+on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so
+decisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would have
+shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the
+contest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the former
+case the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery,
+under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak
+infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under
+the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was
+too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched
+enemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of
+infantry were needed at Woerth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite of
+the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker
+enemy of equal class.
+
+Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English in
+artillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state of
+things was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery was
+extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russian
+field guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, the
+Japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also,
+because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite
+superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillery
+was scattered along the whole of their broad front.
+
+The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the
+arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these
+units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be
+appropriately determined.
+
+The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or
+superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly
+mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and
+corps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucial
+test. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpected
+concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the
+superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way.
+If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine
+against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies
+a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it is
+assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and
+that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so
+slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then
+equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese were
+tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they
+were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive
+directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical
+superiority of the Russian army as a whole.
+
+If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the
+artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy
+within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a
+considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful.
+In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded
+the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the
+artillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the
+separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of
+the army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excess
+in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is
+restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then
+artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to
+victory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forces
+for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces
+along the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often be
+weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage
+may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a
+position. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering
+concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. This
+victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere.
+
+The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater
+marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of
+the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the
+columns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossal
+armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly
+live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from
+the rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies;
+but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be
+maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go
+to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead.
+Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct
+communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught
+animals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons of
+provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily,
+must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of
+food. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a
+certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport
+waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to
+the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the
+night's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained
+if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient
+quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry
+with them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid
+down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusually
+lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the
+troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thus
+the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly
+dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A careful
+calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to
+average 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from an
+army--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25
+kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps on
+the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle
+troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps.
+
+This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily
+affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and
+rations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyed
+railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of
+columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared
+by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time
+the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the
+troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption
+continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In order
+to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any
+crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample
+stock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of the
+necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must be
+taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of
+tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done by
+special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the
+organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a
+distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by
+forced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increase
+the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It is
+further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very
+long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other
+provisions compressed into the smallest space.
+
+An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps,
+and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army
+with its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it the
+troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is far
+more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any
+other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the
+decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent.
+
+However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained
+if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed
+from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out.
+Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within
+these limits.
+
+Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army
+corresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened by
+a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it
+will considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, the
+necessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantry
+is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to
+deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack
+and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to
+strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the
+artillery.
+
+In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division
+is very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as to
+permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of
+reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units.
+This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional
+organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet
+appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the
+existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been
+drawn up by competent officers.
+
+The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two
+infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The
+formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix
+the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his
+own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a
+reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of
+some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity
+for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a
+wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this
+procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible,
+even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the
+brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken
+by the enemy and the course of the battle.
+
+Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its
+application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of
+cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution
+which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that
+the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of
+two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry
+these duties out.
+
+This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts
+the most generally accepted military principles.
+
+The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as
+is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate
+divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal
+of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the
+subdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack
+must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best
+formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops
+to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result
+there.
+
+A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by
+the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action
+two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of
+course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not
+always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely
+the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ
+them as their particular character demands.
+
+The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and
+divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding
+formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately
+according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the
+undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders
+of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the
+commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of
+enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for
+himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one
+division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to
+withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one
+division only, the same division must always be subjected to this
+reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether
+this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least
+worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not
+be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each
+division.
+
+The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous
+question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the
+whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement
+would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a
+position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They
+can also, however, be combined under the command of the
+General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first
+arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the
+great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is
+dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left
+but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the
+indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are
+inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers
+is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is
+planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that
+the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line
+by a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach
+single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army
+corps temporarily.
+
+There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally
+used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the
+spot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into the
+advance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's field
+artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in
+such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers.
+It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this
+problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long
+unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their
+effectiveness doubtful.
+
+No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased
+their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort
+to every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, be
+overestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite _sui generis_.
+The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions
+strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line
+in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns.
+It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective
+12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I
+can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty
+was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. The
+Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their
+howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but
+break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs,
+the question of concentration seems to me very important for us.
+
+Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the
+heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus best
+serve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which he
+wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain
+that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the
+army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries will
+be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General.
+There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the
+deciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knows
+that.
+
+I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the
+heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batteries
+which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed
+under the orders of the corps commanders _(Truppenfuehrer)_ if they are
+to become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artillery
+of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot
+artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres.
+It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does
+not feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinction
+between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical.
+
+This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the
+heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the
+Commander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and
+manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the
+present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy
+artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. This
+disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned
+permanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being united
+in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, they
+would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely
+the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies.
+
+The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more
+effective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies not
+merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but
+the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the
+advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We were
+taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway
+communications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vital
+importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the
+discharge of these necessary functions.
+
+Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was
+organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations,
+but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system
+can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them.
+
+The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by
+the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and
+so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train
+adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years'
+service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building,
+fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on
+fortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer's
+duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for
+the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the
+actual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training
+for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation.
+
+Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the late
+Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable
+service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. This
+follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--a
+rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training
+for their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and develop
+more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better
+proportion to its value.
+
+In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are
+directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical
+efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly
+serve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of the
+enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening
+movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy
+unawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. I
+refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet.
+
+The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry out
+reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must
+operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the
+regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility.
+
+Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the
+war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned
+them in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen if
+we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize
+that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and
+that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited
+efficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous,
+because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little
+from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal.
+There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and
+1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is
+misleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it
+crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on
+the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly
+antiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independent
+movements. What they then did must not be compared with what will be
+required from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces were
+really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived
+notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their
+employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of
+their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa,
+notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must be
+studied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that an
+increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course,
+only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped
+with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate
+independently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the
+fulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, when
+the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting
+force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. This
+is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's
+communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand,
+the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive
+than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if
+cavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry is
+undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of
+the enemy.
+
+Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists,
+another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful
+service. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in
+war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have
+repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted.
+
+The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of the
+divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time
+being. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in
+a high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that
+the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on
+modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over
+the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue.
+
+I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are
+attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that
+the division with its three parts would have the control of three
+batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each
+brigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. once
+made, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalry
+usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing
+momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with
+the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously,
+therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the
+artillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when
+it is important to make a decisive attack.
+
+The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed
+by the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yet
+exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of
+military science will play in future wars.[A] It is therefore necessary
+to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special
+weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration
+from the technical side.
+
+[Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators in
+Tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were no
+opponents in the air.]
+
+The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of
+handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting
+strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of
+the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking
+successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers.
+
+The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading
+idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once
+thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since
+tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the
+technical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne in
+mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our
+opponents.
+
+If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the
+necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed
+changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve
+the efficiency of our army.
+
+The whole organization must be such that the column length of the army
+corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the
+supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots.
+
+In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as
+being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition
+must be observed.
+
+The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially
+strengthened.
+
+The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to
+concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up
+the units.
+
+The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so
+organized as to insure their efficiency in war.
+
+The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so
+elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the
+troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained.
+
+The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making
+it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy.
+
+Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every
+nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to
+take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in
+the decisive field war.
+
+The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present
+organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be
+carried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which,
+without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to
+make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition.
+The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit
+political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so
+strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when
+all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. They
+comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen,
+although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often
+surpassed all expectations.
+
+But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is
+necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to
+achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to
+public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake
+there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as
+unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the
+principles of a sound military organization.
+
+The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in
+various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject,
+and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive
+consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration.
+
+One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of
+three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous
+intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in
+every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the
+extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jaeger
+battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the
+hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried
+out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the
+drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within
+the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing
+the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being
+thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more
+ways.
+
+The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only
+be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the
+enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to
+each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present.
+But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that
+new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be
+taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this
+means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the
+artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited,
+without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the
+quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle
+should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. All
+that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat
+waggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when a
+battle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troops
+and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than
+the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of
+ammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will be
+inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the
+fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can
+only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be
+reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, the
+required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought
+forward by stages in good time.
+
+A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division
+had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light field
+howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that
+they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the
+formations of the division. The strength of the artillery must be
+regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the
+entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavy
+field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the
+orders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as
+"army" artillery.
+
+It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached
+from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent
+in war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with the
+infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres
+with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional
+cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. On
+the other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the _Truppenfuehrer_
+are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders;
+but this objection does not seem very pertinent.
+
+Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the
+arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging
+to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under
+the commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would be
+withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments
+strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended for
+divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six
+squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. If
+the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only
+be able to receive two squadrons.
+
+In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry
+would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it;
+but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army
+cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult
+task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one
+to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame for
+such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who
+did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. The
+whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. If
+it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the
+arm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There are
+various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry
+can be guaranteed.
+
+The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached
+to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in
+co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make
+appropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restricted
+to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which
+require to be surmounted.
+
+The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the
+organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. In
+military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual
+factors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that my
+opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect
+of affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main
+leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by
+question of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part of
+that general combination of things which only really comes into view in
+actual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must be
+rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced.
+Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means
+of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient
+account of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made such
+progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much
+importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort,
+the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which
+they employ.
+
+A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are
+essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out;
+under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer
+of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way
+or that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from
+a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the
+importance of the separate co-operating factors.
+
+
+
+  "For he who grasps the problem as a whole
+  Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul"
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+
+
+TRAINING AND EDUCATION
+
+Our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the German
+army into the most effective tool of German policy, and into a school of
+health and strength for our nation. We must also try to get ahead of our
+rivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do full
+justice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all our
+efforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units and
+strengthening their loyal German feelings.
+
+Diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at the
+present day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, for
+there are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. If we
+wish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training must
+break with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the war
+of the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops as
+well as on the officers.
+
+It is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the use
+of modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily from
+the introduction of these means of war. But if we survey the sphere of
+training as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us as
+peculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands which
+will be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" to
+an extent hitherto unknown.
+
+The necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantry
+and artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle;
+in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategical
+duties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in the
+case of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vast
+extent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and the
+difficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving direct
+orders. Wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare,
+we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldier
+in the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of the
+enemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles huge
+hosts. In battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity of
+action can only be attained at the present time by independent
+co-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme.
+
+The employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of moving
+and feeding the troops. It is one thing to lead 100,000 or perhaps
+200,000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate them
+for a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800,000 men on a scene of war
+stripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have been
+destroyed by modern explosives. In the first case the military empiric
+may be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively a
+scientifically educated General and a staff who have also studied and
+mastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. The problems of
+the future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able to
+operate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision.
+
+The necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universally
+recognized. To be sure, the old traditions die slowly. Here and there an
+undeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method of
+education, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised more
+than is justified by its value. The cavalry is not yet completely
+awakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises on
+the parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, oblivious
+of the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they were
+still the old arm which Napoleon or Frederick the Great commanded. Even
+the artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions;
+technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom of
+operations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still in
+vogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of fire
+with a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. Even in
+theory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. Many
+conservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. Obsolete ideas
+have not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations and
+ordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on the
+whole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility and
+self-reliance must be encouraged. In this respect the army is on the
+right road, and if it continues on it and continually resists the
+temptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for the
+sake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually the
+highest results will be attained, provided that competent military
+criticism has been equally encouraged.
+
+In this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficient
+attention has been given to the fact that the main features of war have
+completely changed. Although in the next war men will have to be handled
+by millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted on
+lines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modern
+conditions. Our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. Most of
+the practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades and
+divisions--i.e., in formations which could never occur in the great
+decisive campaigns of the future. From time to time--financial grounds
+unfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre is
+held, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of
+"masses." Sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled for
+combined training under veteran Generals, who soon afterwards leave the
+service, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience which
+they may have gained.
+
+It cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres are
+extraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troops
+themselves', but they are not a direct training for the command of
+armies in modern warfare. Even the so-called "Imperial Manoeuvres" only
+correspond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war,
+since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, and
+seldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc., the troops which would
+be essential in real warfare. A glance at the Imperial Manoeuvres of
+1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never have
+been carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed under
+the conditions of war. It is an absolute necessity that our officers
+should learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are the
+rule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. In
+theory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken into
+account; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theory
+are posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and the
+divisions. That they would in reality all have to circulate with a
+pendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that the
+magazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent farther
+back, that the position of the field bakeries is of extreme
+importance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome,
+and so are very seldom considered.
+
+In great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected in
+Russia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariat
+arrangements are rarely worked out in detail; I should almost doubt
+whether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazine
+feeding" has ever been entertained. Even smaller opportunities of being
+acquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinary
+manoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoretical
+lines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding a
+large army and to master the subject efficiently.
+
+The friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be brought
+home to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such things
+cannot be learnt from books.
+
+These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations,
+but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an
+army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is
+obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. When, in 1870,
+some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the
+advance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not
+masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war
+and the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operations
+to succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army. All
+these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our General
+Staff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no means
+the common property of the army.
+
+On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres
+must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered
+conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. The
+troops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency,
+and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for
+carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two
+pivots. But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the
+great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. The paths
+we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal.
+
+All methods of training and education must be in accordance with these
+views.
+
+I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and
+cavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question at
+length in special treatises.[A] In the case of the artillery alone, some
+remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm
+seem necessary.
+
+[Footnote A: v. Bernhardi: "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie," 1910
+"Unsere Kavallerie im naechsten Krieg," 1899; "Reiterdienst," 1910.]
+
+The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partly
+expressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: all
+preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one
+side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or
+infantry at the decisive point. This principle is universally
+acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice.
+The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their
+tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical
+requirements subservient to this idea. The ever-recurring tendency to
+fight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. On the
+defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking
+artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most
+dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its
+chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible,
+from masked positions. The principle of keeping the artillery divisions
+close together on the battlefield and combining the fire in one
+direction, must not be carried to an extreme. The artillery certainly
+must be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see that
+there is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but in
+particular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this idea
+will be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than by
+explaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leaving
+to them the duty of carrying it out. Accordingly, it is important that
+the personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognized
+more fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action is
+indispensable. The great extent of the battlefields and the natural
+endeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack will
+often force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behind
+the other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against the
+tactically most important objective. This result is hard to attain by a
+centralization of command, and is best realized by the independent
+action of tactically trained subordinates.
+
+This is not the place to enter into technical details, and I will only
+mention some points which appear especially important.
+
+The Bz shell _(Granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and its
+use should not form part of the training. It requires, in order to
+attain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming as
+is very seldom possible in actual warfare.
+
+No very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. It seems
+to be retained in France and to have shown satisfactory results with us;
+but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of the
+shooting-range directly to serious warfare. No doubt its use, if
+successful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especially
+in the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. In any case,
+practice with Az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance.
+
+The Az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of an
+offensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations.
+
+Care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements and
+complications of strategy and devices. Only the simplest methods can be
+successfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten.
+
+The important point in the general training of the artillery is that
+text-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should be
+relegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics should
+be given a more prominent position. In this way only can the artillery
+do really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must not
+be neglected in the reports. That would mean rejecting the good and the
+evil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenient
+must be distinctly opposed.
+
+Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres
+of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large
+expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. They must, in my
+opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their
+possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks.
+They lead to pronounced tactics of position _(Stellungstaktik)_ which
+are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual
+war--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a
+definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in
+search of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt on
+these manoeuvres. They could be made more instructive if the tactical
+limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these
+manoeuvres--viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive
+arm--cannot be thus remedied. The usual result is that favourable
+artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to
+under some tactical pretence.
+
+After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may
+be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of the
+various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them
+into line with modern conditions. If, however, the troops are to be
+educated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new ground
+must be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubted
+superiority over our opponents can be attained. Considerable
+difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to
+amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties
+are not, in my opinion, insurmountable.
+
+There are two chief points: first, the practice of marching and
+operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with
+well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a
+reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more
+thorough education of the chief commanders.
+
+As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know,
+has never yet been attempted. But if we consider, firstly, how valuable
+more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of
+the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we
+shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for
+the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage
+over our supposed antagonist.
+
+The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally
+also be carried out in smaller formation. It is, moreover, very
+important to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--in
+long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in
+the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such
+movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them.
+
+Training marches with full military stores, etc., in columns of 20 to 25
+kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond to
+the daily needs of real warfare. Should it not be possible to assemble
+two army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march can
+be obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitable
+intervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed.
+This does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare,
+but it is useful as a makeshift. The waggons for the troops would have
+to be hired, as On manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to save
+expense. The supplies could be brought on army transport trains, which
+would represent the pioneer convoys _(Verpflegungsstaffel)_, and would
+regulate their pace accordingly.
+
+Marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with food
+supplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be of
+considerable value provided that care is taken to execute the march in
+the shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed by
+bringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is only
+properly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continued
+for several days. It is naturally not enough to undertake these
+manoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if they
+are intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army.
+Finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns,
+sometimes in army formation. The flank marches of separate columns will,
+of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice in
+feeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march on
+the side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence brought
+up to the troops at the close of the march. Flank marches in army
+formation will have some value, even apart from any training in the
+commissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marching
+columns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. But
+this exercise will have its full value only when the regulation
+commissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with them
+and furnish the supplies.
+
+I also consider that operative movements in army formation extending
+over several days are desirable. Practice must be given in moving
+backwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flank
+movements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rear
+being blocked when necessary. Then only can all the difficulties which
+occur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen where
+the lever must be applied in order to remove them. In this way alone can
+the higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting such
+operations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of a
+hostile attack. An army so disciplined would, I imagine, acquire a
+pronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experiments
+in such operations in actual war. The major strategic movements on both
+sides in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that.
+
+I recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost a
+great deal of money and could never all be carried out systematically
+one after the other. I wished, however, to ventilate the subject,
+firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study the
+points of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do;
+secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carry
+out in practice one or other of them--at the Imperial Manoeuvres, for
+example, or on some other occasion. How much could be saved in money
+alone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentioned
+country manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? From reasons of economy
+all the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employed
+on such manoeuvres. It would be useful, however, if, in addition to one
+detachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the other
+groups were present and were moved along at the proper distance from
+each other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from the
+kitchen waggon. It would thus be possible to get a sort of presentation
+of the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuable
+experience. It is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange such
+manoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and many
+obstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out,
+and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions;
+but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not be
+wholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matters
+which are really essential. They would, at any rate, be far more
+valuable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced by
+exercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings in
+the country, which are of no real utility, or than many other military
+institutions which are only remotely connected with the object of
+training under active service conditions. All that does not directly
+promote this object must be erased from our system of education at a
+time when the highest values are at stake.
+
+Even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often be
+carried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because it
+is not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of the
+troops.
+
+It must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so that
+eventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becoming
+practically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troops
+may become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but since
+such practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they must
+also be worked out beforehand theoretically. It is not at all sufficient
+that the officers on the General Staff and the Intendants have a mastery
+of these subjects. The rank and file must be well up in them; but
+especially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--that
+is to say, the transport officers of the standing army and those
+officers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as column
+commanders.
+
+The practical service in the transport battalions and the duties
+performed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who are
+assigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object.
+They learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of the
+system as a whole. It would therefore be advisable that all these
+officers should go through a special preliminary course for this
+service, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would be
+explained to them by the officers of the General Staff and the higher
+transport service officers, and they would then learn by practical
+examples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the most
+varied positions with precise regard to distances and time. This would
+be far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainings
+in driving, etc., on which so much time is wasted. The technical
+driver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is not
+easy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to be
+able, when occasion arises, to act independently.
+
+While, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must be
+thoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of a
+scientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples out
+of military history, the importance of these matters can be explained,
+is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. I have shown
+elsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically in
+the arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operative
+capabilities of the army depend on this system. Its nature, however,
+cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspiration
+when mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must be
+gained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of the
+importance which this service has attained under modern conditions is
+that officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully without
+having made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter.
+
+The transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinary
+importance in the general system of modern warfare. It should be
+appreciated accordingly. Every active transport service officer ought,
+after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the senior
+officers on the furlough establishment intended for transport service
+ought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. If
+these educational courses were held in the autumn in the training camps
+of the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimable
+advantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay.
+
+The results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, when
+the superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do not
+make demands contrary to the nature of the case, and therefore
+impossible to be met. They should therefore be obliged to undergo a
+thorough education in the practical duties of the General Staff, and not
+merely in leading troops in action.
+
+This reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how,
+generally, the training of the superior officers for the great war
+should be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with a
+view to the training. The essential contradiction between our obsolete
+method of training and the completely altered demands of a new era
+appears here with peculiar distinctness.
+
+A large part of our superior commanders pass through the General Staff,
+while part have attended at least the military academy; but when these
+men reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has long
+become out of date. The continuation school is missing. It can be
+replaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficient
+time for this, and often a lack of interest. The daily duties of
+training troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs great
+determination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his own
+scientific education. The result is, that comparatively few of our
+superior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less an
+independently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the great
+scale. This would cost dearly in real war. Experience shows that it is
+not enough that the officers of the General Staff attached to the leader
+are competent to fill up this gap. The leader, if he cannot himself
+grasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believes
+he is directing and is himself being directed. This is a far from
+healthy condition. Our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned,
+only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and from
+the tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. The
+minor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most important
+feature in present-day warfare--i.e., the sudden concentration of
+larger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from space
+considerations, of timely counter-movements on the other. The minor
+manoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. The commanders learn
+to form decisions and to give orders, and these are two important
+matters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grand
+scale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditions
+of warfare.
+
+Brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merely
+encourage wrong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is,
+fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds.
+Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders.
+The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in
+them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those
+of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger
+scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the
+operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled
+to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. The
+great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for
+only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the
+collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual
+warfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weighty
+consideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought before
+their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern
+warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations.
+
+The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of
+small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly
+strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important
+military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this
+direction. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they
+conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all our
+resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a
+modern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a
+rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of
+the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too
+small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional
+manoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this change
+could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: a
+great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system
+if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and
+execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word.
+
+It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training
+on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to
+educate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres can
+only show their full value if the officers of every rank who take part
+in them have already had a competent training in theory.
+
+To encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thus
+one of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. These
+must not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of the
+troops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves and
+their subordinates for leadership in the great war. Strategic war games
+on a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by the
+commanding Generals, and in the army-inspections by the Inspectors, seem
+to me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. All
+superior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiency
+in superior commands. The threads of all this training will meet in the
+hands of the Chief of the General Army Staff as the strategically
+responsible authority.
+
+It seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance to
+decide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not for
+their posts. The circumstances that a man is an energetic commander of
+a division, or as General in command maintains discipline in his army
+corps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader of
+an army. Military history supplies many instances of this.
+
+No proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfare
+the reconnoitring and screening units require special training. The
+possibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degree
+dependent on their activity. I have for years pointed out the absolute
+necessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for their
+profession, and I can only repeat the demand that our cavalry
+riding-schools should be organized also as places of scientific
+education. I will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulk
+of the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisional
+cavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. These exercises do not
+correspond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrong
+notions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command finds
+out who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalry
+division on manoeuvres.
+
+The centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing of
+operations and on the skilful transition from strategical independence
+to combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry lies
+in these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-grounds
+than systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. The perpetual
+subject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement between
+two divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. Any
+unprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to this
+result, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may be
+regarded as a serious preparation for war.
+
+It is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, always
+acts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annually
+extensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definite
+effect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which
+_always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself,
+but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is only
+rarely necessary in war. This clearly demonstrates the unsystematic and
+antiquated methods of all our training.
+
+Practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on a
+large scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry.
+Co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soon
+as aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as an
+integral factor of army organization. The airship division and the
+cavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command,
+especially for screening purposes, which are all-important.
+
+The methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully to
+modern requirements have been pointed out by General v. Beseler. This
+arm need only be developed further in the direction which this
+distinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of the
+next war.
+
+In the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the support
+of the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in the
+construction of similar positions. Tactical requirements must, however,
+be insisted upon in this connection. The whole training must be guided
+by considerations of tactics. This is the main point. As regards sieges,
+especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since the
+object is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take the
+fortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery.
+
+The duties of the Army Service Corps[B] are clear. They must, on the one
+hand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especially
+for the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to give
+every kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they must
+look after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. The
+rapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedy
+repair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on military
+railways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are the
+duties for which these troops must be trained. A thorough knowledge and
+mastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensable
+qualifications in their case also. They can only meet their many-sided
+and all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methods
+and system of army movements on every scale. It is highly important,
+therefore, that the officers of the Army Service Corps should be
+thoroughly trained in military science.
+
+[Footnote B: _Verkehrstruppen_.]
+
+Thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectual
+development of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of the
+close connection of the multifarious duties of war. This appreciation is
+requisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of the
+service; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to some
+degree the non-commissioned officers also. It will bear good fruit in
+the training of the men. The higher the stage on which the teacher
+stands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the more
+complete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly and
+successfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, and
+the more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respect
+which are the firmest foundations of discipline. All the means employed
+to improve the education of our establishment of officers in the science
+of war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient service
+on every other field of practical activity. Intellectual exercise gives
+tone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war and
+its requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education and
+bent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in their
+reciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. The
+effort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers'
+corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards,
+and must find its expression in a school of military education of a
+higher class than exists at present.
+
+A military academy as such was contemplated by Scharnhorst. To-day it
+assumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the General
+Staff. Instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of its
+former importance. The instruction in military history was entirely
+divested of its scientific character by the method of application
+employed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. In this way the
+meaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day,
+so far as I know, the lectures on military history primarily serve
+purposes of directly professional education. I cannot say how far the
+language teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. At any rate, it
+culminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues a
+directly practical end. This development was in a certain sense
+necessary. A quite specifically professional education of the officers
+of the General Staff is essential under present conditions. I will not
+decide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and truly
+academical character of the institution. In any case, we need in the
+army of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for the
+independent study of military science from the higher standpoint, and
+provides at the same time a comprehensive general education. I believe
+that the military academy could be developed into such an institution,
+without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of the
+officers for service on the General Staff. By the side of the military
+sciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures on
+general scientific subjects might be organized, to which admission
+should be free. In similar lectures the great military problems might be
+discussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearers
+might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to
+politics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, the
+importance of free personality under the pressure of necessary
+phenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as into
+the duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint.
+
+Limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are now
+arranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, and
+the institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture,
+intended not only to educate officers of the General Staff, but to train
+men who are competent to discharge the highest military and civic
+duties--this is what is required for the highest military educational
+institution of the German army.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+
+
+PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR
+
+"Germany's future lies on the sea." A proud saying, which contains a
+great truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished future
+and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy
+and act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they are
+supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at least
+that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest
+opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his
+position as a World Power.
+
+Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on
+a world policy if our political and military superiority on the
+continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yet
+reached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now take
+steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our
+pretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the
+full security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts and
+repel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economic
+necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needs
+be--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and
+this, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness of
+Germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea
+trade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be
+always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Our
+efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of
+hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish
+to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined
+ultimately to support this world policy.
+
+Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first
+ventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving for
+limited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. was destined
+to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's
+history, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activity
+must be set down as fruitless.
+
+We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most varied
+considerations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was first
+drawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906,
+and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, of
+course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. The
+needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard
+for the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on the
+claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations.
+At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the
+coasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguard
+this commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon
+shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for
+Germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the
+Government, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party was
+content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this
+object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by
+artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places.
+
+This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convinced
+of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high
+seas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the
+aggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it was
+thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called
+_Ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact
+that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies,
+and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank.
+This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a
+fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the
+costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a
+large number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fighting
+capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed
+torpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on a
+fallacy--that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an
+extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing
+population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political
+and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and
+on its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded
+with actual needs.
+
+The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most
+inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already
+stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the
+midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our
+strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly
+effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard
+for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our
+commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only
+object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an
+instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and
+supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such
+limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A
+few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in
+war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible,
+destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is
+obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the
+defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on
+permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed
+that sufficiently.
+
+The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at
+sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded
+commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies.
+
+It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for
+defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our
+political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed
+according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive,
+when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success;
+on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained
+in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the
+Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We
+must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise
+which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale.
+
+The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be
+calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that
+we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are
+weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger,
+unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all
+circumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our
+strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing
+reasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance
+of victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflicting
+such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests
+to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own
+position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses.
+
+This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that
+the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the
+necessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probably
+that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of
+victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle
+for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase
+their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even
+beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates.
+
+We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for
+many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. We
+may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast
+fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend
+ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown
+in the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out and
+exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against
+all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast;
+our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually
+inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to
+challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the lines
+that our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as a
+base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the
+offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break
+harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for
+this class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with
+a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by
+the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alone
+cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break
+through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able
+to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purpose
+permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow
+mines to be placed.
+
+I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the
+North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these
+requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be
+to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our
+naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade,
+although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further
+development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the
+background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only
+action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success
+presupposes the existence of some such fortress.
+
+But the question must be looked at from another aspect.
+
+The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the
+unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is
+determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power.
+Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from
+claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless,
+the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked
+menacing utterances from various English statesmen.
+
+If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military
+preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates
+attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the
+English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase
+the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly
+intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken;
+the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the German
+coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and
+to isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as
+a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite
+impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and
+protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly
+well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt
+would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German
+naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes
+for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an
+English attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able
+to postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned that
+the recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we must
+make up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext or
+other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very
+favourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage.
+Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon
+upon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war.
+
+Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our
+coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical
+principles. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in
+order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our
+fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would be
+justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by
+loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the
+greatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, of
+existence.
+
+Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or
+definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole
+nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who
+live on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows the
+absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with
+our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the
+decisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot,
+perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not
+check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to
+replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case.
+
+The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance,
+in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the
+Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military
+requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain
+secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of
+Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more
+possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in
+the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our
+battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot
+give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is
+feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal
+might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success
+depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous
+unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict
+heavy losses upon him.
+
+As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the
+completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and
+the usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in its
+present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. There
+can be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of the
+Kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbach
+class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be
+considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in a
+worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of the
+Hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the
+Prince class (_Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich_) fulfil their purpose
+neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Even
+the armoured cruisers _Fuerst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau,_ and
+_Scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements.
+If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the
+time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these
+totally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--by
+new and thoroughly effective ships.
+
+Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon
+will admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever so
+strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and
+all financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships,
+which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities.
+That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the line
+have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisers
+are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. But
+superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible
+readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made
+to do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possess
+a certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the English
+heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and
+to equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerful
+artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the
+more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way
+that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or
+straight ahead.
+
+Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part
+in strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet,
+therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority of
+England--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because,
+so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of
+superiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high
+standard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence of
+construction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep this
+position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to
+the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying
+to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must also
+devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these
+vessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing this
+branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every
+direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with
+increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with
+these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on
+the enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would be
+extraordinarily advantageous to us.
+
+Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the
+development of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to make
+airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they
+could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes,
+they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet would
+then, as already explained in Chapter VIII., be able to report
+successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the
+battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the
+approach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able to
+prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus
+facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse or
+frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If our
+airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side,
+could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English
+coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when
+fighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly be
+doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to
+perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over
+the English would contribute largely to equalize the difference in
+strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war.
+It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field
+because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can
+compete for the palm of victory on equal terms.
+
+Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be
+carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be
+especially effective in a struggle against England, as that country
+needs imports more than any other. Consequently great results would
+follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing
+his navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have been
+discussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative to
+organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended
+for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity
+unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. The
+auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the
+open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice,
+when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so.
+
+A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must
+be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace.
+History tells us what to expect from the English on this head.
+
+In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 to
+September 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houses
+were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were
+killed. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of
+England is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and
+in the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence shows
+distinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of the
+seas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11
+and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarly
+bombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under the
+hypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the
+foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well
+not to forget them.
+
+The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also
+Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships,
+suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians.
+
+Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as
+was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain
+conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal
+violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the
+above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course
+of action politically justifiable.
+
+A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first
+place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful
+inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the
+tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability
+of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation
+of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack
+becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are
+granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack
+in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable
+carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be
+formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken
+of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties
+concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of
+States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such
+cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it,
+as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limit
+the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the
+very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would
+have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most
+extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in
+1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful
+from the standpoint of political morality.
+
+These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we
+must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without
+warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right.
+Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such
+eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the
+reservists.
+
+Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to
+secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all
+circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready
+for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension.
+The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole
+_materiel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for
+instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the
+mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in
+force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple
+precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to
+the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as
+is done in England.
+
+When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are
+required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the
+navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the
+resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since
+the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the
+expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic
+preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the
+self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet
+must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast
+defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our
+requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be
+provisionally dropped.
+
+In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should
+limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary,
+devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest
+stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in
+case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition
+that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act
+contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on
+us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform
+tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we
+have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships.
+
+I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is to
+be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases
+quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general
+situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in
+the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war.
+My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid
+foundation without which any successful action against the superior
+forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail
+to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible.
+
+It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry
+out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever
+may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though
+this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for
+the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on
+strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a
+successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain
+a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we
+must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers.
+
+Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and
+German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we
+must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the
+coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the
+pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be
+met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion.
+
+The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness
+for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the
+first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the
+long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define
+and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free
+hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing
+more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious
+mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France
+was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was
+favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has,
+indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace
+and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this
+difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between
+resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against
+numerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles the
+supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her
+assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and
+thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North
+America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed,
+threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequences
+of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her
+former American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is
+far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas
+than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. It
+is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty,
+and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we
+might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have
+wished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866
+nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would
+fall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman is
+shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake
+what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best
+course. Just Fate decides the issue.
+
+The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that
+we started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we have
+made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the
+Brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of
+decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters
+concerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to develop
+systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties
+which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we
+have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it.
+
+This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never let
+the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views
+which must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good time
+those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even
+though they make heavy financial calls on our resources.
+
+This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our
+naval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for
+lost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty
+devotedly.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+
+
+THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION
+
+The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which
+we can only assert our place among the Great Powers and secure the
+conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of
+treasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. We shall be
+compelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, special
+measures which will enable us to be more or less a match for our
+enemies--I mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of the
+army. We must always bear in mind in the present that we have to provide
+for the future.
+
+Apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget to
+develop the elements on which not only our military strength, but also
+the political power of the State ultimately rest. We must maintain the
+physical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done if
+we aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widest
+sense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions and
+demands of existence.
+
+While it is the duty of the State to guide her citizens to the highest
+moral and mental development, on the other hand the elements of
+strength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the State.
+Only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can the
+State achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interested
+in promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. Her duty and
+her justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from the
+fulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highest
+sense true to it.
+
+It is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely military
+standpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development of
+our growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. For while
+the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction,
+the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment in
+very great numbers possible. Thus the full consummation of military
+training cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equipped
+physically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentiments
+worthy of the honourable profession of arms.
+
+We have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raise
+the culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best of
+our power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independent
+individual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence on
+the men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limited
+if it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligent
+material. This fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims which
+modern war will make on the individual fighter. In order to meet these
+demands fully, the people must be properly educated.
+
+Each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure of
+independent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. In
+the open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed duty
+has been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources;
+he may often have to take over the command of his own section if the
+losses among his superiors are heavy. The artilleryman will have to work
+his gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains have
+fallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders are
+often left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and the
+sapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himself
+unexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource left
+beyond his own professional knowledge and determination.
+
+But not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility of
+the individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique will
+probably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. This change
+is due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greater
+efficiency of the firearms. All movements in large masses are more
+exacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments,
+since they are never carried out so smoothly. The shelter and food of
+great masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth of
+the marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to the
+difficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregular
+hours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. The increased range of
+modern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combination
+with the larger fronts, necessitates wide detours whenever the troops
+attempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on the
+battlefield.
+
+In the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the army
+has been enormously increased. The State, however, has done little to
+prepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies are
+making themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a very
+detrimental influence on their education. I specially refer to the
+ever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patriotic
+feeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the population
+into the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development.
+This result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. At the
+present day, out of all the German-born military units, over 6.14 per
+cent. come from the large towns, 7.37 per cent, from the medium-sized
+towns, 22.34 per cent. from the small or country towns, and 64.15 per
+cent. from the rural districts; while the distribution of the population
+between town and country is quite different. According to the census of
+1905, the rural population amounted to 42.5 per cent., the small or
+country towns to 25.5 per cent., the medium-sized towns to 12.9 per
+cent., and the large towns to 19.1 per cent. of the entire number of
+inhabitants. The proportion has probably changed since that year still
+more unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns have
+increased in population. These figures clearly show the physical
+deterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to our
+national life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellect
+and compact unity of the nation. The rural population forms part and
+parcel of the army. A thousand bonds unite the troops and the families
+of their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone who
+studies the inner life of our army is aware of this. The interest felt
+in the soldier's life is intense. It is the same spirit, transmitted
+from one to another. The relation of the army to the population of the
+great cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of their
+sons into the army is quite different. A certain opposition exists
+between the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who,
+from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation.
+Similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened,
+and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutely
+hostile to the service.
+
+It is in the direct interests of the State to raise the physical health
+of the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order to
+enable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effect
+of military training more extensively to bear on the town population,
+and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. Nothing
+promotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of military
+service.
+
+So far as I can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself which
+exercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing to
+its monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditions
+of life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. Apart from many
+forms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health,
+the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housing
+conditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. This
+latter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the rural
+districts, and, in combination with the other influences of the great
+city, produces far more harmful results.
+
+It is therefore the unmistakable duty of the State, first, to fight
+alcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing all
+kinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sell
+them; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all efforts
+to improve the housing conditions of the working population, and to
+withdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life of
+amusements. In Munich, Bavarian officers have recently made a
+praiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men past
+the age of attendance at school with health-producing military
+exercises. The young men's clubs which Field-Marshal v.d. Goltz is
+trying to establish aim at similar objects. Such undertakings ought to
+be vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by the
+State, from purely physical as well as social considerations. The
+gymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has an
+undoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deserves
+every encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others,
+the system of universal service should have been made an effective
+reality. It is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect of
+military service on the physical development of the recruits. The
+authorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed to
+make the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers than
+hitherto.
+
+On the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against two
+tendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hours
+for factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sport
+with an exaggerated value for the national health. As already pointed
+out, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendant
+on working together in large numbers that are prejudicial.
+
+The wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderate
+degree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work are
+present, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a complete
+miscomprehension of the real value of work. It is in itself the greatest
+blessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it no
+longer as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning a
+livelihood and paying for amusements. Strenuous labour alone produces
+men and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to win
+their living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have often
+achieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality.
+
+So long as the Dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict with
+the sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against the
+Spanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now,
+when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead a
+politically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars,
+their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take a
+part in the struggle of the civilized nations. In Germany that stock
+which was destined to bring back our country from degradation to
+historical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the Rhine
+or the Danube, but on the sterile sands of the March.
+
+We must preserve the stern, industrious, old-Prussian feeling, and carry
+the rest of Germany with us to Kant's conception of life; we must
+continuously steel our strength by great political and economic
+endeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained,
+or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only we
+shall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in the
+world.
+
+Where Nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growing
+wealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life of
+pleasure rather than of work, society and the State must vie in taking
+care that work does not become play, or play work. It is work, regarded
+as a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. Sport, which is spreading
+more and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation,
+not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. We must never
+forget this. Hard, laborious work has made Germany great; in England, on
+the contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health of
+the nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place of
+serious work it has greatly injured the English nation. The English
+nation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard of
+labour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the English
+trades unions--and of the security of its military position, has more
+and more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and it
+may well be asked whether, under these conditions, England will show
+herself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself in
+the future. If, further, the political rivalry with the great and
+ambitious republic in America be removed by an Arbitration Treaty, this
+circumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads to
+progress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which develop
+physique.
+
+The physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless it
+comes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while,
+if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations,
+the result must be injurious in the long-run.
+
+We must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physically
+healthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and the
+whole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour to
+promote their spiritual development in every way. The means for doing so
+is the school. Military education under the present-day conditions,
+which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aims
+satisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, and
+an improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material.
+
+The national school is not sufficient for this requirement. The general
+regulations which settle the national school system in Prussia date from
+the year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account of
+the modern development which has been so rapid of late years. It is only
+natural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and the
+essentials of military education. Present-day military education
+requires complete individualization and a conscious development of manly
+feeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching in
+classes, and there is no distinction between the sexes. This is directly
+prescribed by the rules.
+
+In the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of the
+superiors by specially detached officers and selected experienced
+non-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quite
+small sections; while each one receives individual attention from the
+non-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superior
+officers. In a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teach
+as many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers as
+many as 120 children are divided into two classes. A separation of the
+sexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. As a rule,
+therefore, the instruction is given in common. It is certain that, under
+such conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual is
+possible. All that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanically
+and inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch of
+knowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boys
+and girls, still less of individuals.
+
+Such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a military
+education. The principles which regulate the teaching in the two places
+are quite different. That is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction.
+
+The military education aims at training the moral personality to
+independent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patriotic
+feelings among the men. Instruction in a sense of duty and in our
+national history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professional
+teaching. Great attention is given to educate each individual in logical
+reasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts.
+
+In the national school these views are completely relegated to the
+background--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but as
+the practical result of the conditions. The chief stress in such a
+school is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting some
+facility in reading, writing, and ciphering. The so-called _Realign_
+(history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite into
+the background. Only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly are
+devoted to all the _Realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in the
+lower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hours
+are assigned to religious instruction in every standard. There is no
+idea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. Not a word in the
+General Regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this;
+and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods of
+religious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for the
+development of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. As for
+influencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars to
+any extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts it
+altogether out of the question.
+
+While the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instruction
+is thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given,
+especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. Beginning with
+the lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years),
+stories not only from the New Testament, but also from the Old Testament
+are drummed into the heads of the scholars. Similarly every Saturday the
+portions of Scripture appointed for the next Sunday are read out and
+explained to all the children. Instruction in the Catechism begins also
+in the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children must
+learn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. It is a
+significant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid
+"the memorizing of the General Confession and other parts of the
+liturgical service," as "also the learning by heart of the Pericopes."
+On the other hand, the institution of Public Worship is to be explained
+to the children. This illustrates the spirit in which this instruction
+has to be imparted according to the regulations.
+
+It is really amazing to read these regulations. The object of
+Evangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to the
+comprehension of the Holy Scriptures and to the creed of the
+congregation," in order that they "may be enabled to read the Scriptures
+independently and to take an active part both in the life and the
+religious worship of the congregation." Requirements are laid down which
+entirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to the
+comprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, and
+presuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. Not a word,
+however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, that
+is, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought into
+prominence. The teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impress
+religious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course of
+instruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formal
+religiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if not
+deliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moral
+influence. A real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of such
+instruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their Confirmation
+to have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so they
+remain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to the
+religious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. Nor
+does the instruction for Confirmation do much to alter that, for it is
+usually conceived in the same spirit.
+
+All other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to the
+young minds some high ideals--more especially our own country's
+history--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort of
+instruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is of
+inestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. It is the
+more regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed by
+the regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, is
+totally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some real
+service to the country. It is quite refreshing to read in the new
+regulations for middle schools of February 10,1910, that by religious
+instruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should be
+awakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aim
+at exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of the
+fatherland."
+
+The method of religious instruction which is adopted in the national
+school is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. Religious instruction
+can only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectual
+growth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. To make
+it the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in the
+national schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to be
+directed at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mystical
+intuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has a
+confusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. Even the
+missionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate his
+pupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart to
+them subtle religious ideas. Yet every Saturday the appointed passages
+of Scripture (the Pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children.
+
+Religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. Up
+to that point the teacher should be content, from the religious
+standpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with the
+simplest ideas of the Deity, but in other respects to endeavour to
+awaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasp
+loftier conceptions. The national school stands in total contradiction
+to this intellectual development. This is in conformity to regulations,
+for the same children who read the Bible independently are only to be
+led to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are daily
+around them." In the course of eight years they learn a smattering of
+reading, writing, and ciphering.[A] It is significant of the knowledge
+of our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-three
+recruits of one company to whom the question was put who Bismarck was,
+not a single one could answer. That the scholars acquire even a general
+idea of their duties to the country and the State is quite out of the
+question. It is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of the
+children by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught in
+common. One thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those of
+girls; and, although I consider it important that patriotic feelings
+should be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmit
+them to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a different
+way from the boys. When the instruction is common to both, the treatment
+of the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. It is
+quite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in the
+religious field when so little has been achieved in every other field.
+
+This pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal that
+Frederick the Great set up. He declared that the duty of the State was
+"to educate the young generation to independent thinking and
+self-devoted love of country."
+
+[Footnote A: Recently a boy was discharged from a well-known national
+school as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualified
+to the office of a Head Forester. He showed that he could not copy
+correctly, to say nothing of writing by himself.]
+
+Our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reform
+if it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education,
+but for life generally. It sends children out into the world with
+undeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elements
+of knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, but
+easy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. As a
+matter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the national
+schoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instruction
+as a recruit.
+
+It is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform.
+I will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important from
+the standpoint of a citizen and a soldier.
+
+First and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. The number
+of teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholars
+diminished. It is worth while considering in this connection the
+feasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years.
+Then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the object
+of developing the children's minds, and formal religious instruction
+should only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. Finally,
+the _Realien,_ especially the history of our own country, should claim
+more attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in every
+way; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religion
+should be more prominent than the formal contents. The training of the
+national school teacher must be placed on a new basis. At present it
+absolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of the
+school itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds and
+feelings of their pupils. It must be reckoned a distinct disadvantage
+for the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age of
+fourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which the
+reasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselves
+and on any chance influences. In the interval between school life and
+military service the young people not only forget all that they learnt,
+perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkingly
+adopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from a
+lack of counteracting ideals.
+
+A compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity of
+the age. It is also urgently required from the military standpoint. Such
+a school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to prevent
+the scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him for
+a special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism and
+sense of citizenship. To do this, it is necessary to explain to him the
+relation of the State to the individual, and to explain, by reference to
+our national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion to
+the State. The duties of the individual to the State should be placed in
+the foreground. This instruction must be inspired by the spirit which
+animated Schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of Prussia, and
+culminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in the
+strength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the great
+whole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employed
+for higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishes
+in feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in the
+love for the fatherland and for the State, which is a haven for every
+faith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose.
+
+Only if national education works in this sense will it train up men to
+fill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school of
+arms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which great
+deeds spring. What can be effected by the spirit of a nation we have
+learnt from the history of the War of Liberation, that never-failing
+source of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centre
+of history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools.
+
+We can study it also by an example from most recent history, in the
+Russo-Japanese War. "The education of the whole Japanese people,
+beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic and
+warlike spirit. That education, combined with the rapidly acquired
+successes in culture and warfare, aroused in the Japanese a marvellous
+confidence in their own strength. They served with pride in the ranks of
+the army, and dreamed of heroic deeds.... All the thoughts of the
+nation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course of
+several years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of a
+powerful army and a strong fleet."[B] This was the spirit that led the
+Japanese to victory. "The day when the young Japanese enlisted was
+observed as a festival in his family."[B]
+
+In Russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that
+"Patriotism was an obsolete notion," "war was a crime and an
+anachronism," that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was the
+greatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourable
+trade."[B] Thus the Russian army marched to battle without any
+enthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of the
+great racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity." Already eaten
+up by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, without
+energy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspired
+leaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent.
+
+[Footnote B: "The Work of the Russian General Staff," from the Russian by
+Freiheu v. Tettau.]
+
+I have examined these conditions closely because I attach great
+importance to the national school and the continuation school as a means
+to the military education of our people. I am convinced that only the
+army of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything really
+great. I understand, of course, that the school alone, however high its
+efficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, in
+view of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every means
+if we wish to accomplish something great. The direct influence of school
+ends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at first
+make itself felt very gradually. Later generations will reap the fruits
+of its sowing. Its efficiency must be aided by other influences which
+will not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughout
+their lives. Now, there are two means available which can work upon
+public opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation;
+one is the Press, the other is a policy of action. If the Government
+wishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to secure
+a narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further its
+great political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong and
+national Press, through which it must present its views and aims
+vigorously and openly. The Government will never be able to count upon a
+well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or
+necessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is being
+systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy
+preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the
+same note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as the
+object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military
+spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an
+imperial policy.
+
+It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war
+as an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with the
+duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country.
+
+A parliamentary Government, which always represents merely a temporary
+majority, may leave the party Press to defend and back its views; but a
+Government like the German, which traces its justification to the fact
+that it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. Its point of view
+does not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course,
+conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. It
+must therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as on
+particular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims as
+widely understood as possible. I regard it, therefore, as one of the
+most important duties of a Government like ours to use the Press freely
+and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. I do not mean that a few
+large political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be well
+supplied with news, but that the views of the Government should find
+comprehensive expression in the local Press. It would be an advantage,
+in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certain
+announcements of the Government, in order that the reader might not have
+such a one-sided account of public affairs as the party Press supplies.
+It would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, as
+justifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health.
+Epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old Europe more dangerous and
+damaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the State to
+preserve the moral healthiness of the nation.
+
+More important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the Press is
+the _propaganda of action._ Nothing controls the spirit of the multitude
+so effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceived
+in a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. Such education by a powerful
+policy is an absolute necessity for the German people. This nation
+possesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritual
+energy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairy
+laid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. In addition to
+this, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national and
+religious unity of the nation created in the system of small States and
+in confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency to
+particularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nation
+was no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. Yet the heart
+of this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even though
+such aims can only be attended by danger. We must not be misled in this
+respect by the Press, which often represents a most one-sided,
+self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or even
+Anti-German lines rather than national. The soul of our nation is not
+reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on the
+necessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and
+comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness.
+
+On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the
+Powers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance,
+every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the
+people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their
+forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again and
+again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this
+yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the
+clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with
+him.
+
+He is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors of
+national psychology; Bismarck possessed this art, and used k with a
+master-hand. True, he found ready to hand one idea which was common to
+all--the sincere wish for German unification and the German Empire; but
+the German nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which lead
+to the realization of this idea. Only under compulsion and after a hard
+struggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation was
+fired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to which
+the great statesman was so surely leading it. Success was the foundation
+on which Bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the German Empire. Even
+in the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of the
+people by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of all
+opposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them serve
+his own great aims. He, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, and
+the motto _Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him;
+but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and of
+world-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that no
+statesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands the
+soul of his people.
+
+This knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with the
+Great Elector, Frederick the Incomparable, Scharnhorst and Bluecher; for
+even that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of a
+political idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground at
+the Congress of Vienna.
+
+The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things
+recognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influence
+over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by
+continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its
+interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions.
+Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to
+great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high
+aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to
+prepare their minds to it:
+
+  "The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims."
+
+We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed on
+the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous
+duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the
+whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of
+warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for
+the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices.
+
+We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization
+to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only
+fulfil it by the sword.
+
+
+Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most
+effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military
+duty? Such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for the
+strength and honour of the German people.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+
+
+FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that
+the political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitude
+of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the
+preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself.
+
+But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and
+moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military
+authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still
+further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of
+the State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must be
+made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the
+national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the
+tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further,
+as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of
+mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure
+under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the
+material and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations for
+war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made
+to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as
+possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come.
+If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in
+whom confidence can be reposed should war break out.
+
+
+I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the
+commercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere of
+commercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which the
+desired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Government
+and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regards
+finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may
+go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national
+household in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, on
+the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money
+required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions.
+
+The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financial
+economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the
+current incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, the
+indebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive
+and military capabilities.
+
+As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a great
+civilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never be
+brought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure for
+necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military
+forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general
+progress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion
+to the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly based
+on war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our
+forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the
+effeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is only
+one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one
+vice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of all
+culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the
+individual for itself.[A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepest
+gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an
+epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of
+the last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in
+Prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large
+sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the
+Government.
+
+Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of
+demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations
+contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to
+the great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day look
+contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut
+their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties
+imposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial
+pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in
+our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity
+and energy."[B]
+
+[Footnote A: Treitschke.]
+
+[Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte."]
+
+Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but is
+bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens,
+since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important,
+however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national
+property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities.
+
+This property is to a certain extent determined by the natural
+productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. But
+these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour
+of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced.
+Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and secure
+labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour
+conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by
+concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate
+German trade by vigorous political representation of German interests
+abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits
+from international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural production
+by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable
+protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on
+foreign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fishery
+would add to this.[D]
+
+[Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by international
+commerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling.]
+
+[Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from
+foreign countries.]
+
+From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase
+permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the
+annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be
+met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Home
+production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95
+per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, the
+production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two
+double-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered
+that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two
+million tons.
+
+A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national
+prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own
+colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense
+quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually
+independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to
+transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by
+effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less
+we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards,
+[E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the
+State will improve.
+
+[Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons
+of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of
+copper, etc.]
+
+If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of national
+productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the
+reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial
+position. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a
+two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays.
+The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very
+easily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it is
+a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to
+improve the financial position. The experiences of history leave no
+doubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of a
+nation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once is
+shaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the State
+creditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holds
+out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its
+creditors far better security than a weaker military power. If our
+credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened
+political position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our army
+and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible
+liquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first to
+improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to
+keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go.
+
+The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task.
+
+It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits of
+possible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and
+1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from
+20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same
+proportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there is
+a huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the German
+Empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per
+head of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the same
+basis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germany
+only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and
+navy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the
+individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in Germany and France, the
+outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our most
+probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their
+armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger
+politically.
+
+Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase
+of wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades and
+industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a
+setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again.
+
+The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the
+Empire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports has
+increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the
+year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14
+1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of the
+imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the
+exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... The value of the import of
+raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in
+1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of
+such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The import
+of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a
+value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of
+manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of the
+import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3
+milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food
+remained at about the same figure.
+
+The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in
+Germany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amounted
+in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2
+million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The
+quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in
+1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35
+million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from
+6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119
+million marks.... From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany
+has increased by 127 per cent.; in England only by about 59 per cent.
+The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172
+per cent.; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin.]
+
+Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financial
+position of the Empire has considerably improved since the Imperial
+Finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may very
+soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent.
+
+It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth
+of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive
+capitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked
+extent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of national
+wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number of
+taxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6,000 to 100,000
+marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent.,
+from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per
+cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. In these classes,
+therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater
+proportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100,000
+to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on
+an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in
+the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. In the class of 500,000
+marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per
+cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in
+the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually,
+it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. This means
+per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an
+increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an
+increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks
+and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year.
+
+We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and
+annually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister has
+estimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three
+years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliards
+yearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give some
+instances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory at
+Essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent.,
+the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the
+annual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from
+1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown by
+the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has
+reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and
+poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement
+in prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of a
+healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment
+are considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants
+left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's
+unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in
+the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 per
+cent. (in France it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of
+workmen's unions were unemployed.
+
+Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national
+debt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empire
+in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the
+national debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in--
+
+                                         Marks
+Prussia                                  9,421,770,800
+Bavaria                                  2,165,942,900
+Saxony                                     893,042,600
+Wuertemberg                                 606,042,800
+Baden                                      557,859,000
+Hesse                                      428,664,400
+Alsace-Lorraine                            31,758,100
+Hamburg                                    684,891,200
+Luebeck                                     666,888,400
+Bremen                                     263,431,400
+
+Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains,
+forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railways
+reached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in--
+
+                                       Marks,
+Prussia (Hesse)                        9,888
+Bavaria                                1,694
+Saxony                                 1,035
+Wuertemburg                               685
+Baden                                    727
+Alsace-Lorraine                          724
+
+--a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15,062 milliard
+marks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of
+1911 for Prussia alone 11,050 milliards. Nevertheless, the national
+debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously
+because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and
+presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in
+debt.
+
+The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10,000
+inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the
+whole Empire to some 5,000 million marks. This means that interest
+yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many
+communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions,
+are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or
+even 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributed
+according to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middle
+class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources of
+wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative
+income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on
+the Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into
+property. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to pay
+for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the
+protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization,
+so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the
+opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on
+the altar of patriotism.
+
+The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown how
+party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was
+not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his
+neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial
+sacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be
+made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But a
+considerable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if we
+wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of
+our country without a blow.
+
+Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedy
+introduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), in
+order to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue would
+oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would
+furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to
+diminish our burden of debt.
+
+If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters,
+depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they
+could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their
+favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in as
+heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based
+on official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place to
+examine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high a
+figure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large
+under any circumstances.
+
+Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that
+is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the
+nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first
+instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to
+paying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a
+private gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to be
+recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable
+to fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceeds
+principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing
+the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely
+important. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility
+that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other
+important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on
+land and sea.
+
+There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be
+urged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It is
+argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth,
+that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course
+of time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that the
+independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the
+ideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement that
+relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will,
+is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According to
+our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his
+fortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which he
+bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to
+any other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his natural
+heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he
+wishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he is
+interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things,
+that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession is
+based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual
+than his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait.
+The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in
+which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are
+alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of
+this sort."[F]
+
+[Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910.]
+
+Both objections are unconvincing.
+
+So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to
+liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met
+otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directly
+beneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay less
+taxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in
+the hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right of
+succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the
+State be prevented in other ways. The science of finance could
+unquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme to
+its extreme logical conclusion.
+
+The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true sense
+of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a
+will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. If
+such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of
+certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof
+in life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probably
+the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties
+would actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law,"
+which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and
+is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual
+than the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is the
+root from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and the
+defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that in
+the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and
+that the significance of the State for the individual, no less than for
+the family, should be thoroughly understood.
+
+These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty
+enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperial
+right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help
+and the whole future of Germany is at stake.
+
+If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally
+large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a
+law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our
+sorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be good
+prospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Government
+does not disguise the true state of the political position.
+
+Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We see
+that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against
+the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and
+are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts are
+also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as
+to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which
+England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world
+policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if
+she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has
+built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has
+secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious
+careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this
+English policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guided
+exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means
+of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill.
+
+There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements
+have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit
+reservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic
+stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting
+party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really
+benefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed.
+Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on which
+those of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes on
+the honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when
+concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so
+as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arise
+which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The
+country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical
+sense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his life
+long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever
+induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[A]
+
+The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or
+alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if
+he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an
+arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is,
+as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States,
+from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the
+happiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in the
+east will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank on
+the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria and
+outflank any Russian attack on Galicia.
+
+Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will
+never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a
+permanent political system.
+
+"There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as
+effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal
+interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the
+other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." These
+are the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher
+_pace_ Bismarck.
+
+We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but
+must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable
+attitude of the other States by reference to their own interests.
+Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to the
+diplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself,
+seeks nothing but his own advantage." It will prove waste labour to
+attempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions or
+an attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, the
+weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale.
+
+When Napoleon III. planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect an
+alliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually in
+Paris to conclude the military negotiations.[B] These probably were
+going on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand.
+Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussian
+flag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman less
+biassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austria
+nor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war
+under unfavourable conditions.
+
+[Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attache
+in Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, and
+pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of
+Prussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was better
+informed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the
+conditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by Archduke
+Albert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor had
+made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military
+calculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the former
+Minister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)]
+
+France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests,
+unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did not
+satisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomatic
+arrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests in
+Morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her
+interest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that country
+for herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will not
+allow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerce
+and German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the French
+standpoint she is right.
+
+The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own
+interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different
+Great Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt,
+however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political
+grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible
+only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State with
+which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its
+opponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to
+further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone
+and of being left isolated in the hour of danger.
+
+A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking
+chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keep
+this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances
+and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above
+all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take
+bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility
+of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under
+favourable conditions. "The great art of policy," writes Frederick the
+Great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to
+one's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage from
+favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." Even in
+his Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered
+all his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but
+boldness alone can acquire." "I give you a problem to solve," he said to
+his councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. was announced.
+"When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?"
+
+Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct
+summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate
+estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the
+interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and
+daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws
+of political and military success.
+
+The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blinded
+by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able
+to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success.
+"The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim
+which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which
+shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more
+despised than by the great Prussian King," so H. v. Treitschke tells us.
+"Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with
+remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the
+political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss
+the golden opportunity.
+
+It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize
+that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist
+policy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets up
+personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real
+current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures,
+as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia.
+
+A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these
+great duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are based
+on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the
+possibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers the
+result to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageous
+circumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe
+to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led.
+
+In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan
+had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as
+military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and
+assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her
+policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at
+the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment
+of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She
+had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance
+with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to
+place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover,
+compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of
+the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against
+Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations
+required by the political position had been made, although the conflict
+had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous
+retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no
+doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made
+resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the
+campaign by the offensive.
+
+England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and
+consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to
+her aims or suited to give weight to political demands.
+
+Two points stand out clearly from this consideration.
+
+First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and
+political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war
+are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong
+enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing
+which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be
+developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The
+obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace
+as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister
+and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the
+all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain
+influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs,
+and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military
+situation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister who
+conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is
+in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of
+the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he
+must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by
+war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has
+of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the
+realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the
+opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of
+compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a
+permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of
+recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one,
+but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to
+end in political and moral defeat.
+
+The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and
+hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and
+shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always
+creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory,
+tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy,
+which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts
+favourably on the military situation.
+
+In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can
+only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution
+join hands.
+
+If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next
+war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion:
+the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the
+necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions
+are to be created for the inevitably threatening war.
+
+So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two
+fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war
+from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was
+comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various
+strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small
+compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the
+other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive
+action on both sides. To-day the situation is different.
+
+We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expect
+not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of
+English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch
+neutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England may
+land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war
+with us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a
+position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather
+be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and
+south-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is also
+increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of
+the European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menaced
+in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet.
+
+All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur
+simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations
+they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the
+military aspect. The military situation thus created is very
+unfavourable.
+
+If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the
+army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the
+situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the
+stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure,
+and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must
+count. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one
+also. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have
+to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be
+directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and
+all necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops of
+the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected
+along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when
+occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the same
+principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in
+readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport
+arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many
+different lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements for
+unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the
+most various political prospects. We should in any case be forced to
+adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present
+conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent
+an invasion by one or other of our enemies.
+
+No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good
+prospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led against
+a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. A
+military investigation of the situation shows that a plan
+of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents,
+under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and
+has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind.
+
+The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy
+which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to
+overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. On
+this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of
+Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Of
+course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an
+unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which
+the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If we
+attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help,
+and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy
+to fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the
+cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be
+reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral.
+
+This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring
+about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor
+England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as
+we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by
+diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows.
+
+If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate
+an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her
+interests or those of England, that both these States would feel
+themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are
+offered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentively
+studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on
+this point.
+
+In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we
+should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of
+circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to
+struggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to state
+clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own
+interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Such
+political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid
+foundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and
+realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great
+results.
+
+It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and
+measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a
+favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous
+to Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. This
+requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic
+position which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said:
+Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must
+keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as
+time goes on.
+
+Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire
+settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons
+emigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and England
+to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the
+Mediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. The
+effort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured the
+Italian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in the
+least the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to the
+Triple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. The
+importance of these considerations will continue to be felt.
+
+Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, and
+Russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of
+present-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in
+England and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the
+Central European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder
+of abandoning her in Morocco.
+
+There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; in
+Central Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clash
+in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and China
+is forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to some
+degree ties her hands.
+
+All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if it
+is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than
+recent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy can
+count on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on an
+army whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficiently
+valued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. We
+have amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops,
+the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst
+them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are
+soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world,
+provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The German
+nation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height of
+its great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in
+its soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this
+people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a
+worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on
+in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will
+achieve a truly magnificent result.
+
+In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces,
+and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger,
+our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future;
+but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless it
+wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the
+brave words of Goethe:
+
+  "Bid defiance to every power!
+  Ever valiant, never cower!
+  To the brave soldier open flies
+  The golden gate of Paradise."
+
+
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-German
+convention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; the
+Turko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensions
+which point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and,
+lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real
+offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France and
+England. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently
+between the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has been
+foreseen and provided for.
+
+I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first
+occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the
+Anglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks.
+
+The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed,
+have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a
+collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this
+object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed
+that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was
+determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the
+attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered
+correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain
+was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for
+war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance
+on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this
+crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the
+concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable
+moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait
+until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and
+Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the
+other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it
+can actively support the Rhine army.
+
+This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government,
+but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined,
+that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes.
+
+
+It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as
+regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our
+manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of
+territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not
+inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in
+obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the
+possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can
+never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were
+compelled to abandon.
+
+I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial
+concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed
+force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo
+region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of
+November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their
+present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from
+this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no
+doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession
+for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish
+_enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has
+at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case
+of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese.
+
+It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial
+arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for
+a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be
+assumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has
+carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a
+moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because
+she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a
+desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea,
+in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v.
+Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not,
+therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to
+revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect,
+the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France.
+
+The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first an
+actual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by the
+expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn
+from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position.
+But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not
+merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but
+primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its
+entirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement
+means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly
+surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the
+sovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent
+infraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we had
+weighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty such
+action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the
+notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such
+explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front.
+
+An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islam
+have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, of
+course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey have
+suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in
+the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance
+for us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco convention
+precipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundly
+the solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which France
+obtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realize
+the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the
+Mediterranean.
+
+The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep
+rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the
+mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large
+sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in
+spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily
+supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this
+weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the
+Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better
+has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great
+disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical
+times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire
+must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to
+ride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war
+removes all further doubt on this point.
+
+The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the
+view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the
+various chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by a
+firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder
+any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have
+done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance,
+and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no
+doubt on this point.[A]
+
+[Footnote A: Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.]
+
+The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all
+pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead
+in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive
+intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would
+support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the
+limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with
+England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered
+by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new
+acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new
+colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and
+that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form
+objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear
+commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once
+more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates.
+
+In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count
+on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a
+_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at
+most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may
+fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.
+
+If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in
+the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world
+generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more
+face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the
+world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any
+case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide
+that the hour of attack has come.
+
+We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike
+preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down.
+All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to
+represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the
+people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to
+military and political success, without carrying still further the
+disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and
+frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between
+Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will
+prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy
+which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers
+threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs
+and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any
+conventional scruples distract it from this object.
+
+Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged
+basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of
+sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation
+calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it
+to the happy goal.
+
+The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever.
+England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her
+interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles
+question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of
+her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great
+Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and
+difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has
+considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before
+it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will
+probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in
+sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted
+German policy can utilize in order to influence the general political
+situation in the interests of our Fatherland.
+
+If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of
+Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the
+future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with
+confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to
+fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz
+Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God:
+
+  "From the height of the starry sky
+  May thy ringing sword flash bright;
+  Let every craven cry
+  Be silenced by thy might!"
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Germany and the Next War
+by Friedrich von Bernhardi
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