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| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 04:35:02 -0700 |
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| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 04:35:02 -0700 |
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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/10713-0.txt b/10713-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ebff91a --- /dev/null +++ b/10713-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5200 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10713 *** + +THE BULLITT MISSION TO RUSSIA + +Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States +Senate of WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +MCMXIX + + + + + + +CONTENTS + + THE COMMITTEE MEETS + + MR. BULLITT'S OFFICIAL STATUS + + ORDERED TO RUSSIA + + COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA + + THE TROOPS AT ARCHANGEL + + SITUATION IN RUSSIA + + FRANCE BLOCKS PRINKIPOS CONFERENCE + + WHAT AMERICA WANTED + + THE BRITISH TERMS + + TEXT OF PROJECTED PEACE PROPOSAL BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED + GOVERNMENTS + + MR. BULLITT'S REPORT ON RUSSIA + ECONOMIC SITUATION + SOCIAL CONDITIONS + POLITICAL SITUATION + PEACE PROPOSALS + CONCLUSIONS + +APPENDIX TO REPORT + TRANSPORT + FOOD + MANAGEMENT + SOCIAL CONDITIONS + STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES + ARMY + LENIN'S PRESTIGE + CONCESSIONS + +BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE + +BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED + +PROPOSED DECLARATION OF ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS' POLICY AND OFFER OF + ARMISTICE + +NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA + +AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL + +BULLITT MEMORANDUM FOR AUCHINCLOSS + +REPLY OF PRESIDENT AND THREE PREMIERS TO NANSEN + +HOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL + +LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT + +MR. BULLITT RESIGNS + +REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + +REPORTS OF CAPT. W.W. PETTIT + +SOCIAL WORK IN PETROGRAD + +THE COMMITTEE ADJOURNS + + + + +UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, + +Washington, D.C., Friday, September 12, 1919. + + +The committee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, +at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 310, Senate Office Building, Senator Henry +Cabot Lodge presiding. + +Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), Brandegee, Fall, Knox, Harding, +and New. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt is to make a statement to the committee this +morning. I think I ought to say that Mr. Bullitt was summoned on the +23d of August, I believe, and he was in the woods at that time, out of +reach of telegraph or telephone or mail, and only received the summons +a few days ago. He came at once to Washington. That is the reason of +the delay in his hearing. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, will you take the stand and give your full +name, please, to the stenographer? + +Mr. BULLITT, William C. Bullitt. + +The CHAIRMAN. You are a native and a resident of Philadelphia, are you +not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I am, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the war, what were you engaged in? + +Mr. BULLITT. Before the war I was employed by the Philadelphia Public +Ledger. I had been a correspondent for them in various places, and I +had been a member of the editorial staff in Philadelphia for a time. + +The CHAIRMAN. You went abroad for them as a correspondent? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Before we went into the war? + +Mr. BULLITT. Before we went into the war I toured Germany, Austria, +Hungary, Belgium, Poland, and other places, studying conditions there, +for the purposes of the Public Ledger. + +The CHAIRMAN. After we entered the war, what did you do? You came +back? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; I came back. I was in the United States at that +time. + +The CHAIRMAN. At that time? + +Mr. BULLITT. And I was asked to enter the Department of State, to work +in the Division of Western European Affairs under Mr. Grew, in which +my special province was to follow the political situation of Germany +and Austria-Hungary, to prepare the confidential reports of the +department on Germany, Austria, and Hungary--the weekly reports--and +also such memoranda on conditions as the President and the Secretary +and others might call for. + +The CHAIRMAN. And then you went to Paris as a member of the staff, +after the armistice? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; I was an employee of the department at the time of +the armistice, and I was ordered to Paris as a member of the staff of +the commission. + +Senator KNOX. When did you first go to Paris, Mr. Bullitt? + +Mr. BULLITT. I sailed on the _George Washington_. I went over with the +original trip of the President. + +Senator KNOX. And you were there continuously how long? + +Mr. BULLITT. I remained in Paris until--I can give you the exact +date--I was ordered to go on a special mission to Berne about the +first week of February. I can give you the exact date, if it is of any +moment. + +Senator KNOX. No; it is not. + +Mr. BULLITT. I remained a week in Berne, then returned and remained in +Paris until I was ordered to go to Russia. + +I left for Russia on the 22d of February. I was in Paris during the +entire period until the 22d of February. Senator KNOX. You said you +went over on the original trip of the President. Just to get these +dates right, when did you reach Paris? + +Mr. BULLITT. I left New York on December 4 and, as I remember, we +reached Paris on December 13. + +Senator KNOX. And you were there, then, until you went to Berne in +February? + +Mr. BULLITT. In February, + +Senator KNOX. What was your personal relation to the peace conference +and its work? + + + + +MR. BULLITT'S OFFICIAL STATUS + + + +Mr. BULLITT. When I first arrived I was asked to take charge of a +confidential bulletin which was to be gotten out for the benefit of +the commissioners each morning. It was to be read by them. That lasted +a very short time, and as is usual with most things of the kind, we +discovered that the commissioners did not care to spend the time +reading it, and therefore it was decided to abolish this bulletin, and +that instead I should receive all the intelligence reports of military +intelligence, of the State Department, intelligence received through +all the special dispatches of the ambassadors, etc., in fact, all the +information that came in, and a section was created called the Current +Intelligence Section. I was called the Chief of the Division of +Current Intelligence Summaries. + +Senator KNOX. Then, as I understand, your function was to acquaint +yourself with everything that was going on in connection with the +conference, and disseminate the news to the different branches of the +peace conference and the different bureaus? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was to report only to the commissioners. + +Senator KNOX. Well, but the essential thing is, was it your duty to +get information? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was my duty to be in constant touch with everyone +who was in the American delegation, and present information to the +commissioners each morning. I had 20 minutes with each commissioner +each morning. + +Senator KNOX. So that you were practically a clearing house of +information for the members of the American mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. That is what I was supposed to be. + + * * * * * + + + + +ORDERED TO RUSSIA + + +Senator KNOX. What was your mission to Russia, and when did you go? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was ordered to go to Russia on the 18th of February. I +received the following order from Secretary Lansing [reading]: + + AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + + 18 February, 1919. + + MR. WILLIAM C. BULLITT, + American Commission to Negotiate Peace. + + SIR: You are hereby directed to proceed to Russia for the + purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, + therein, for the benefit of the American commissioners + plenipotentiary to negotiate peace, and all American + diplomatic and consular officials are hereby directed to + extend to you the proper courtesies and facilities to enable + you to fulfill the duties of your mission. + + I am, sir, your obedient servant, + + ROBERT LANSING, + Secretary of State of the United States of America. + [SEAL.] + +Senator KNOX. What is the date of that? + +Mr. BULLITT. February 18, 1919. I also received at the same time from +Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the secretary of the American commission, the +following [reading]: + + AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + + 18 February, 1919. + + + To whom it may concern: + + I hereby certify that Mr. William C. Bullitt has been + authorized by the American commissioners plenipotentiary to + negotiate peace to proceed to Russia, for the purpose of + studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for + the benefit of the commission, and I bespeak for him the + proper courtesies and facilities in enabling him to fulfill + the duties of his mission. + + J.C. GREW, + Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. + [SEAL.] + +Senator KNOX. You say you started in February. What time in February? + +Mr. BULLITT. I left on the 22d day of February. + +Senator KNOX. Did you know at that time, or have you ascertained +since, whether a secret mission had or not been dispatched from Paris, +that is, by the President himself; a man by the name of Buckler, who +went to Russia a few days before you did? + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. W.H. Buckler, Mr. Henry White's half brother. He was +an attaché of the American embassy in London. He was ordered from +there to go, about the 1st of January, to Stockholm, to confer with +Litvinov, who had been the Ambassador of the Soviet Government to +London--the British had allowed him to stay there without actually +recognizing his official status, and had dealt with him. + +Mr. Buckler there conferred with Litvinov, who made various +propositions and representations to him which Mr. Buckler at once +telegraphed back to Paris, and which were considered so important by +the President that the President read them in extenso to the council +of ten on the morning of January 21. I regret that I have no actual +copy of those proposals by Litvinov, or of Buckler's telegrams. At +that time there was a discussion taking place in regard to Russia +which had extended over a couple of weeks, a discussion of the utmost +interest, in the council of ten. I happen to have the minutes of the +council for January 16, when this Russian question was taken up, which +I shall be glad to read, if the Senators should be interested, and +also the minutes of the council of ten on January 21, at which meeting +the Prinkipos proposal was decided upon. The Buckler meeting with +Litvinov was what eventually swung the meeting in favor of Prinkipos, +the suggestion for which had been made by Mr. Lloyd George. No; that +is slightly incorrect. Mr. Lloyd George had suggested that +representatives of the various Russian governments and factions should +be brought to Paris. + + +COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA + +NOTES ON CONVERSATIONS HELD IN THE OFFICE OF M. PICHON AT THE QUAI +D'ORSAY, ON JANUARY 16, 1919--PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION REGARDING THE +SITUATION IN RUSSIA. + +Mr. Lloyd George commenced his statement setting forth the information +in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian +situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently +in L'Humanite. He stated that he wished to point out that there had +been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as +to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The +British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatever, a +recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that +Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British +proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war +within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop +reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an +account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way +to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates +to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government +entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference. + +Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which +had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as +follows: + + Firstly, the real facts are not known; + + Secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is + to adjudicate the question; and + + Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general + mis-government and starvation. It is not known who is + obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik + Government would collapse had not been realized. In fact, + there is one report that the Bolsheviki are stronger than + ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their + hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case + of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and + overthrows the Government. The Government is incapable of + overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are + becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the business of the Great + Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to + one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either + side. + +Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible +policies: + + 1. Military intervention. It is true there the Bolsheviki + movement is as dangerous to civilization as German + militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there + anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain + number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one + million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of + this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand + British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would + mutiny. The same applies to U.S. troops in Siberia; also to + Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing + Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even + admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one + can conceive or understand to bring about order by force. + + 2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik + Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized + what this would mean. From the information furnished him + Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory + there are 150,000,000 men, women, and children. There is now + starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health + cordon, it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact, + the people who would die are just the people that the Allies + desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of + the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our + friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane + people, those present could not consider. + + Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the + Bolsheviki? He had been told there were three men, Denekin, + Kolchak and Knox. In considering the chances of these people + to overthrow the Bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had + received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to + fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that + while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone + over to Kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse + of this would not take place. If the Allies counted on any + of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand. + He had heard a lot of talk about Denekin, but when he looked + on the map he found that Denekin was occupying a little + backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that + Denekin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the + map, there was a great solid block of territory between + Denekin and Kolchak. Moreover, from information received it + would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the + old régime around him, and would seem to be at heart a + monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding + this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very + democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for + the restoration of the old conditions in Russia. + + Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the + present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving. + + Institutions of Bolsheviki are institutions of old Czarist + régime. This is not what one would call creating a new + world. + + 3. The third alternative was contained in the British + proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to + appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the + Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to + render an account of their actions. + +Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used +that there were already here certain representatives of these +Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sazonov, who claims +to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact, Sazonov can +not speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan, +like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in +direct contact with the Government at Omsk. + +It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for +bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and +leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in +flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of +themselves. + +Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to +permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed +that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England +becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist +representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a +military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviki, that would +make England Bolshevist, and there would be a Soviet in London. For +his part, Mr. Lloyd George was not afraid of Bolshevism if the facts +are known in England and the United States. The same applied to +Germany. He was convinced that an educated democracy can be always +trusted to turn down Bolshevism. + +Under all circumstances, Mr. Lloyd George saw no better way out than +to follow the third alternative. Let the Great Powers impose their +conditions and summon these people to Paris to give an account of +themselves to the Great Powers, not to the Peace Conference. + +Mr. Pichon suggested that it might be well to ask M. Noulens, the +French Ambassador to Russia, who had just returned to France, to +appear before the meeting to-morrow morning, and give those present +his views on the Russian situation. + +President Wilson stated that he did not see how it was possible to +controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. He thought that there +was a force behind this discussion which was no doubt in his mind, but +which it might be desirable to bring out a little more definitely. He +did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere with the brutal +aspect of Bolshevism, if it were not for the fact of the domination of +large vested interests in the political and economic world. While it +might be true that this evil was in process of discussion and slow +reform, it must be admitted, that the general body of men have grown +impatient at the failure to bring about the necessary reform. He +stated that there were many men who represented large vested interests +in the United States who saw the necessity for these reforms and +desired something which should be worked out at the Peace Conference, +namely, the establishment of some machinery to provide for the +opportunity of the individuals greater than the world has ever known. +Capital and labor in the United States are not friends. Still they are +not enemies in the sense that they are thinking of resorting to +physical force to settle their differences. But they are distrustful, +each of the other. Society can not go on that plane. On the one hand, +there is a minority possessing capital and brains; on the other, a +majority consisting of the great bodies of workers who are essential +to the minority, but do not trust the minority, and feel that the +minority will never render them their rights. A way must be found to +put trust and cooperation between these two. + +President Wilson pointed out that the whole world was disturbed by +this question before the Bolskeviki came into power. Seeds need soil, +and the Bolsheviki seeds found the soil already prepared for them. + +President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that +the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to +enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviki was explained by the fact that +the troops were not at all sure that if they put down Bolshevism they +would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order. For +example, in making a speech recently, to a well-dressed audience in +New York City who were not to be expected to show such feeling, Mr. +Wilson had referred casually to Russia, stating that the United States +would do its utmost to aid her suppressed people. The audience +exhibited the greatest enthusiasm, and this had remained in the +President's mind as an index to where the sympathies of the New World +are. + +President Wilson believed that those present would be playing against +the principle of the free spirit of the world if they did not give +Russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom. He +concurred with Mr. Lloyd George's view and supported his +recommendations that the third line of procedure be adopted. + +President Wilson stated that he had also, like Mr. Lloyd George, +received a memorandum from his experts which agreed substantially with +the information which Mr. Lloyd George had received. There was one +point which he thought particularly worthy of notice, and that was the +report that the strength of the Bolshevik leaders lay in the argument +that if they were not supported by the people of Russia, there would +be foreign intervention, and the Bolsheviki were the only thing that +stood between the Russians and foreign military control. It might well +be that if the Bolsheviki were assured that they were safe from +foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement. + +President Wilson further stated that he understood that the danger of +destruction of all hope in the Baltic provinces was immediate, and +that it should be made very clear if the British proposal were +adopted, that the Bolsheviki would have to withdraw entirely from +Lithuania and Poland. If they would agree to this to refrain from +reprisals and outrages, he, for his part, would be prepared to receive +representatives from as many groups and centers of action, as chose to +come, and endeavor to assist them to reach a solution of their +problem. + +He thought that the British proposal contained the only suggestions +that lead anywhere. It might lead nowhere. But this could at least be +found out. + +M. Pichon referred again to the suggestion that Ambassador Noulens be +called before the meeting. + +Mr. Balfour suggested that it might be well to call the Dutch Consul, +lately in Petrograd, if it was the desire of those present to hear the +anti-Bolshevik side. + +Baron Sonnino suggested that M. Scavenius, Minister of Denmark, +recently in Russia, would be able to give interesting data on the +Russian situation. + +Those present seemed to think that it might be desirable to hear what +these gentlemen might have to say. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about a letter that Buckler wrote +to the President in relation to his mission? Have you ever seen a copy +of his report in the form of a letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have read a copy of his report, but I have not the +copy. The only reference I have to it that I find, in the short time I +have had to go over my papers since I came down from the woods, is in +a memorandum to Col. House in reference to the withdrawal of the +American troops from Archangel [reading]: + +Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these troops with +Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the Bolsheviki would agree to +an armistice on the Archangel front at any time; and, furthermore, +would pledge themselves not to injure in any way those Russians in and +about Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He, +furthermore, suggested that such Russians as did not care to trust +their lives to such a promise should be taken out with the troops. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about whether Litvinov communicated +directly with the President in reference to this Buckler mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. Litvinov had written a letter to the President, which has +since been widely published, on December 24. + +Senator KNOX. That is the letter I had in mind. I had seen some +references to that. Do you have a copy of that letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not know whether I have any copies of this +letter--that is, authentic. I think I have a newspaper copy some +place, but I have no actual copy of the letter. + +Senator KNOX. Can you tell us anything more about the discussion in +reference to the withdrawal of troops from Russia that took place at +that time--anything more than is indicated by your letter, there? + +Mr. BULLITT. There were very serious discussions, all the time. +Telegrams were being received frequently from the various commanders +at Archangel, the American and the British notably, in regard to +conditions, which they described as likely to be disastrous, and +discussions of real gravity were taking place all the time. The +subject was very much in the air. I have, I will say, very few +references to that particular condition. I have here this memorandum +which takes up some of these subjects. I do not know if the committee +would care to hear it. + +The CHAIRMAN. Yes. + +Senator KNOX. This is a memorandum that you sent to Col. House? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; Col. House. + +Senator KNOX. Please read it. + +Mr. BULLITT [reading]: + + JANUARY 30, 1919. + Memorandum for Col. House. + + Subject: Withdrawal of American troops from Archangel. + + DEAR COL. HOUSE: The 12,000 American, British, and French + troops at Archangel are no longer serving any useful + purpose. Only 3,000 Russians have rallied around this force. + It is the attacked, not the attacker, and serves merely to + create cynicism in regard to all our proposals and to + stimulate recruiting for the Red Army. + + Furthermore, the 4,000 Americans, 6,000 British, 2,000 + French, and 3,000 Russian troops in this region are in + considerable danger of destruction by the Bolsheviki. Gen. + Ironside has just appealed for reinforcements and the + British war office has directed the commanding general at + Murmansk to be prepared to dispatch a battalion of Infantry + to Archangel. + + Instead of transferring troops from Murmansk to Archangel, + it seems to me that we should at once transfer to Murmansk + and bring home the troops which are now at Archangel. Aside + from the needless suffering which these men are enduring, + aside from the demands of the public in the United States + and England for the return of these men, it seems to me that + the withdrawal of these troops would be of great value as a + proof that we have made the Prinkipos proposal in full good + faith. + + I have asked Gen. Churchill to obtain the most expert + opinion available on the practicability of moving the 12,000 + American, British, and French troops and such Russians as + may wish to accompany them from Archangel to Murmansk. The + appended memorandum and map which he has prepared show that + unless the ice in the White Sea suddenly becomes thicker it + is at present possible with the aid of six ice breakers + which are now at Archangel to move these troops by water to + Kem on the Murmansk Railroad, whence they may be carried by + train to Murmansk. + + Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these + troops with Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the + Bolsheviki would agree to an armistice on the Archangel + front at any time and, furthermore, would pledge themselves + not to injure in any way those Russians in and about + Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He + furthermore suggested that such Russians as did not care to + trust their lives to such a promise should be taken out with + the troops. + + The provisional government at Archangel has just notified us + that it will not accept the proposal for a conference at + Prinkipos. It seems dignified and honorable at this moment + to inform the Archangel government that since it can not + agree to the allied proposal, presented after the most + serious consideration, we shall decline to support it + further with arms, but will make provision for the safety of + all Russians who are unwilling to remain at Archangel. + + I have discussed this Archangel business at some length with + Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's secretary, who says that L.G. + intends to bring the British troops out on the 1st of May, + which he believes to be the first practicable moment. The + first practicable moment, however, seems to be now. + + The situation at Archangel is most serious for the soldiers + who are stationed there, but it is also serious for the + Governments which sent them out and seem to have abandoned + them. Unless they are saved by prompt action, we shall have + another Gallipoli. Very respectfully yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +I discussed these matters with each one of the commissioners each +morning. It was my duty to keep them au courant with anything that +struck me as important, which in the stress of the business of the +peace conference they were likely to overlook. + +Senator KNOX. This was a memorandum made in the line of your duty? + +Mr. BULLITT. This was a memorandum made as the result of the +conversations that I had had with all of the commissioners that +morning. + +This particular memorandum, in fact, was ordered by Col. House, and in +connection with it he asked me to have made a map showing the +feasibility of getting the troops out of Russia, by the military +experts of the conference, which map I have here. If you would be +interested in it in any way, I will append the memorandum made for +Gen. Churchill with regard to withdrawing the troops. + +Senator KNOX. I was going to ask you whether or not you had any +information as to the terms which the Allies were willing to accept +from Russia. + + + + +COUNCIL OF TEN FORMULATES A RUSSIAN POLICY + +Mr. BULLITT. I had, of course, seen the discussions of the conference +with regard to the entire Russian matter. The conference had decided, +after long consideration, that it was impossible to subdue or wipe out +the Soviet Government by force. The discussion of that is of a certain +interest, I believe, in connection with this general matter. There +are, in regard to the question you have just asked, minutes of the +council of ten, on January 21, 1919. + +Lloyd George had introduced the proposition that representatives of +the Soviet Government should be brought to Paris along with the +representatives of the other Russian governments [reading]: + + [McD. Secret. I.C. 114. Secretaries' notes of a conversation + held in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay on Tuesday, + January 21, 1919, at 15 hours.] + + PRESENT + + United States of America: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, + Mr. A.H. Frazier, Col. U.S. Grant, Mr. L. Harrison. + + British Empire: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, The Right + Hon. A.J. Balfour, Lieut. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, K.C.B., + Maj. A.M. Caccia, M.V.O., Mr. E. Phipps. + + France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, + Capt. A. Potier. + + Italy: Signor Orlando, H.E. Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, + Maj. A. Jones. + + Japan: Baron Makino, H.E.M. Matsui, M. Saburi. + + Interpreter, Prof. P.J. Mantoux. + + + SITUATION IN RUSSIA + + M. Clemenceau said they had met together to decide what + could be done in Russia under present circumstances. + + President Wilson said that in order to have something + definite to discuss, he wished to take advantage of a + suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd George and to propose a + modification of the British proposal. He wished to suggest + that the various organized groups in Russia should be asked + to send representatives, not to Paris, but to some other + place, such as Salonika, convenient of approach, there to + meet such representatives as might be appointed by the + Allies, in order to see if they could draw up a program upon + which agreement could be reached. + + Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the advantage of this + would be that they could be brought straight there from + Russia through the Black Sea without passing through other + countries. + + M. Sonnino said that some of the representatives of the + various Governments were already here in Paris, for example, + M. Sazonov. Why should these not be heard? + + President Wilson expressed the view that the various parties + should not be heard separately. It would be very desirable + to get all these representatives in one place, and still + better, all in one room, in order to obtain a close + comparison of views. + + Mr. Balfour said that a further objection to Mr. Sonnino's + plan was that if M. Sazonov was heard in Paris, it would be + difficult to refuse to hear the others in Paris also, and M. + Clemenceau objected strongly to having some of these + representatives in Paris. + + M. Sonnino explained that all the Russian parties had some + representatives here, except the Soviets, whom they did not + wish to hear. + + Mr. Lloyd George remarked that the Bolshevists were the very + people some of them wished to hear. + + M. Sonnino continuing said that they had heard M. Litovnov's + statements that morning. + +That was the statement that Litvinov had made to Buckler which the +President had read to the council of ten that morning. + +[Continuing reading.] + + The Allies were now fighting against the Bolshevists who + were their enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to + hear them with the others. + + Mr. Balfour remarked that the essence of President Wilson's + proposal was that the parties must all be heard at one and + the same time. + + Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that the acceptance of + M. Sonnino's proposals would amount to their hearing a + string of people, all of whom held the same opinion, and all + of whom would strike the same note. But they would not hear + the people who at the present moment were actually + controlling European Russia. In deference to M. Clemenceau's + views, they had put forward this new proposal. He thought it + would be quite safe to bring the Bolshevist representatives + to Salonika, or perhaps to Lemnos. + + It was absolutely necessary to endeavor to make peace. The + report read by President Wilson that morning went to show + that the Bolshevists were not convinced of the error of + their ways, but they apparently realised the folly of their + present methods. Therefore they were endeavouring to come to + terms. + + President Wilson asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of + the case. As M. Sonnino had implied, they were all repelled + by Bolshevism, and for that reason they had placed armed men + in opposition to them. One of the things that was clear in + the Russian situation was that by opposing Bolshevism with + arms, they were in reality serving the cause of Bolshevism. + The Allies were making it possible for the Bolsheviks to + argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were + endeavouring to exploit the country and to give the land + back to the landlords, and so bring about a re-action. If it + could be shown that this was not true, and that the Allies + were prepared to deal with the rulers of Russia, much of the + moral force of this argument would disappear. The allegation + that the Allies were against the people and wanted to + control their affairs provided the argument which enabled + them to raise armies. If, on the other hand, the Allies + could swallow their pride and the natural repulsion which + they felt for the Bolshevists and see the representatives of + all organized groups in one place, he thought it would bring + about a marked reaction against Bolshevism. + + M. Clemenceau said that, in principle, he did not favour + conversation with the Bolshevists; not because they were + criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level + by saying that they were worthy of entering into + conversation with us. The Bolshevist danger was very great + at the present moment. Bolshevism was spreading. It had + invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and that very + morning they received very bad news regarding its spread to + Budapesth and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger + was probably greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, + after spreading in Germany, were to traverse Austria and + Hungary and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a + very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against + Bolshevism. When listening to the document presented by + President Wilson that morning, he had been struck by the + cleverness with which the Bolshevists were attempting to lay + a trap for the Allies. When the Bolshevists first came into + power, a breach was made with the Capitalist Government on + questions of principle, but now they offered funds and + concessions as a basis for treating with them. He need not + say how valueless their promises were, but if they were + listened to, the Bolshevists would go back to their people + and say: "We offered them great principles of justice and + the Allies would have nothing to do with us. Now we offer + money, and they are ready to make peace." + + He admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. The great + misfortune was that the Allies were in need of a speedy + solution. After four years of war, and the losses and + sufferings they had incurred, their populations could stand + no more. Russia also was in need of immediate peace. But its + necessary evolution must take time. The signing of the world + Peace could not await Russia's final avatar. Had time been + available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually sound + men representing common-sense would come to the top. But + when would that be? He could make no forecast. Therefore + they must press for an early solution. + + To sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporize + and erect barriers to prevent Bolshevism from spreading. But + he was not alone, and in the presence of his colleagues he + felt compelled to make some concession, as it was essential + that there should not be even the appearance of disagreement + amongst them. The concession came easier after having heard + President Wilson's suggestions. He thought that they should + make a very clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable + peoples, emphatically stating that they did not wish in any + way to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and + especially that they had no intention of restoring Czardom. + The object of the Allies being to hasten the creation of a + strong Government, they proposed to call together + representatives of all parties to a Conference. He would beg + President Wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the + position of the Allies to the whole world, including the + Russians and the Germans. + + Mr. Lloyd George agreed and gave notice that he wished to + withdraw his own motion in favour of President Wilson's. + + Mr. Balfour said that he understood that all these people + were to be asked on an equality. On these terms he thought + the Bolshevists would refuse, and by their refusal, they + would put themselves in a very bad position. + + M. Sonnino said that he did not agree that the Bolshevists + would not come. He thought they would be the first to come, + because they would be eager to put themselves on an equality + with the others. He would remind his colleagues that, before + the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the Bolshevists + promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from + propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had + broken all their promises, their one idea being to spread + revolution in all other countries. His idea was to collect + together all the anti-Bolshevik parties and help them to + make a strong Government, provided they pledged themselves + not to serve the forces of re-action and especially not to + touch the land question, thereby depriving the Bolshevists + of their strongest argument. Should they take these pledges, + he would be prepared to help them. + + Mr. Lloyd George enquired how this help would be given. + + M. Sonnino replied that help would be given with soldiers to + a reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food, and money. + For instance, Poland asked for weapons and munitions; the + Ukraine asked for weapons. All the Allies wanted was to + establish a strong Government. The reason that no strong + Government at present existed was that no party could risk + taking the offensive against Bolshevism without the + assistance of the Allies. He would enquire how the parties + of order could possibly succeed without the help of the + Allies. President Wilson had said that they should put aside + all pride in the matter. He would point out that, for Italy + and probably for France also, as M. Clemenceau had stated, + it was in reality a question of self-defence. He thought + that even a partial recognition of the Bolshevists would + strengthen their position, and, speaking for himself, he + thought that Bolshevism was already a serious danger in his + country. + + Mr. Lloyd George said he wished to put one or two practical + questions to M. Sonnino. The British Empire now had some + 15,000 to 20,000 men in Russia. M. de Scavenius had + estimated that some 150,000 additional men would be + required, in order to keep the anti-Bolshevist Governments + from dissolution. And General Franchet d'Esperey also + insisted on the necessity of Allied assistance. Now Canada + had decided to withdraw her troops, because the Canadian + soldiers would not agree to stay and fight against the + Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the + other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the + British tried to send any more troops there, there would be + mutiny. + + M. Sonnino suggested that volunteers might be called for. + + Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that it would be + impossible to raise 150,000 men in that way. He asked, + however, what contributions America, Italy and France would + make towards the raising of this Army. + + President Wilson and M. Clemenceau each said none. + + M. Orlando agreed that Italy could make no further + contributions. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that the Bolshevists had an army of + 300,000 men who would, before long, be good soldiers, and to + fight them at least 400,000 Russian soldiers would be + required. Who would feed, equip and pay them? Would Italy, + or America, or France, do so? If they were unable to do + that, what would be the good of fighting Bolshevism? It + could not be crushed by speeches. He sincerely trusted that + they would accept President Wilson's proposal as it now + stood. + + M. Orlando agreed that the question was a very difficult one + for the reasons that had been fully given. He agreed that + Bolshevism constituted a grave danger to all Europe. To + prevent a contagious epidemic from spreading, the + sanitarians set up a _cordon Sanitaire_. If similar measures + could be taken against Bolshevism, in order to prevent its + spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant + vanquishing it. Italy was now passing through a period of + depression, due to war weariness. But Bolshevists could + never triumph there, unless they found a favourable medium, + such as might be produced either by a profound patriotic + disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of + the war, or by an economic crisis. Either might lead to + revolution, which was equivalent to Bolshevism. Therefore, + he would insist that all possible measures should be taken + to set up this cordon. Next, he suggested the consideration + of repressive measures. He thought two methods were + possible; either the use of physical force or the use of + moral force. He thought Mr. Lloyd George's objection to the + use of physical force unanswerable. The occupation of Russia + meant the employment of large numbers of troops for an + indefinite period of time. This meant an apparent + prolongation of the war. There remained the use of moral + force. He agreed with M. Clemenceau that no country could + continue in anarchy and that an end must eventually come; + but they could not wait; they could not proceed to make + peace and ignore Russia. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd George's + proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful + consideration by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, gave a + possible solution. It did not involve entering into + negotiations with the Bolsheviks; the proposal was merely an + attempt to bring together all the parties in Russia with a + view to finding a way out of the present difficulty. He was + prepared, therefore, to support it. + + President Wilson asked for the views of his Japanese + colleagues. + + Baron Makino said that after carefully considering the + various points of view put forward, he had no objections to + make regarding the conclusions reached. He thought that was + the best solution under the circumstances. He wished, + however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the + Representatives of the Allied powers if the Bolshevists + accepted the invitation to the meeting and there insisted + upon their principles. He thought they should under no + circumstances countenance Bolshevist ideas. The conditions + in Siberia East of the Baikal had greatly improved. The + objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to + that region had been attained. Bolshevism was no longer + aggressive, though it might still persist in a latent form. + In conclusion, he wished to support the proposal before the + meeting. + + President Wilson expressed the view that the emissaries of + the Allied Powers should not be authorised to adopt any + definite attitude towards Bolshevism. They should merely + report back to their Governments the conditions found. + + Mr. Lloyd George asked that that question be further + considered. He thought the emissaries of the Allied Powers + should be able to establish an agreement if they were able + to find a solution. For instance, if they succeeded in + reaching an agreement on the subject of the organization of + a Constituent Assembly, they should be authorised to accept + such a compromise without the delay of a reference to the + Governments. + + President Wilson suggested that the emissaries might be + furnished with a body of instructions. + + Mr. Balfour expressed the view that abstention from hostile + action against their neighbours should be made a condition + of their sending representatives to this meeting. + + President Wilson agreed. + + M. Clemenceau suggested that the manifesto to the Russian + parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They + should say to the Russians: "You are threatened by famine. + We are prompted by humanitarian feelings; we are making + peace; we do not want people to die. We are prepared to see + what can be done to remove the menace of starvation." He + thought the Russians would at once prick up their ears, and + be prepared to hear what the Allies had to say. They would + add that food cannot be sent unless peace and order were + re-established. It should, in fact, be made quite clear that + the representatives of all parties would merely be brought + together for purely humane reasons. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that in this connection he wished to + invite attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the + delegates of the British Dominions, namely, whether there + would be enough food and credit to go round should an + attempt be made to feed all Allied countries, and enemy + countries, and Russia also. The export of so much food would + inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in Allied + countries and so create discontent and Bolshevism. As + regards grain, Russia had always been an exporting country, + and there was evidence to show that plenty of food at + present existed in the Ukraine. + + President Wilson said that his information was that enough + food existed in Russia, but, either on account of its being + hoarded or on account of difficulties of transportation, it + could not be made available. + + (It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a + proclamation, for consideration at the next meeting, + inviting all organized parties in Russia to attend a Meeting + to be held at some selected place such as Salonika or + Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the + Allied and Associated Great Powers the means of restoring + order and peace in Russia. Participation in the Meeting + should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.) + + 2. _Peace Conference_.--M. Clemenceau considered it to be + most urgent that the delegates should be set to work. He + understood that President Wilson would be ready to put on + the table at the next full Conference, proposals relating to + the creation of a League of Nations. He was anxious to add a + second question, which could be studied immediately, namely, + reparation for damages. He thought the meeting should + consider how the work should be organized in order to give + effect to this suggestion. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that he agreed that these questions + should be studied forthwith. He would suggest that, in the + first place, the League of Nations should be considered, + and, that after the framing of the principles, an + International Committee of Experts be set to work out its + constitution in detail. The same remark applied also to the + question of indemnities and reparation. He thought that a + Committee should also be appointed as soon as possible to + consider International Labour Legislation. + + President Wilson observed that he had himself drawn up a + constitution of a League of Nations. He could not claim that + it was wholly his own creation. Its generation was as + follows:--He had received the Phillimore Report, which had + been amended by Colonel House and re-written by himself. He + had again revised it after having received General Smuts' + and Lord Robert Cecil's reports. It was therefore a compound + of these various suggestions. During the week he had seen M. + Bourgeois, with whom he found himself to be in substantial + accord on principles. A few days ago he had discussed his + draft with Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, and they + found themselves very near together. + + Mr. Balfour suggested that President Wilson's draft should + be submitted to the Committee as a basis for discussion. + + President Wilson further suggested that the question should + be referred as far as possible to the men who had been + studying it. + + Mr. Lloyd George expressed his complete agreement. He + thought they themselves should, in the first place, agree on + the fundamental principles and then refer the matter to the + Committee. When that Committee met they could take President + Wilson's proposals as the basis of discussion. + + (It was agreed that the question of appointing an + International Committee, consisting of two members from each + of the five Great Powers, to whom would be referred + President Wilson's draft, with certain basic principles to + guide them, should be considered at the next meeting.) + + 3. _Poland_.--M. Pichon called attention to the necessity + for replying to the demand addressed by M. Paderewski to + Colonel House, which had been read by President Wilson that + morning, and asked that Marshal Foch should be present. + + (It was agreed that this question should be discussed at the + next Meeting.) + + 4. _Disarmament_.--Mr. Balfour called attention to the + urgency of the question of disarmament, and said that he + would shortly propose that a Committee should be appointed + to consider this question. + + + + +VILLA MAJESTIC, Paris January 21st, 1919. + +This is the minute of January 21, and the Prinkipos memorandum was +written on January 22. + +The instructions to the President were as follows: + + It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a + proclamation for consideration at the next meeting, inviting + all organized parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be + held at some selected place such as Salonika or Lemnos, in + order to discuss with the representatives of the allied and + associated great powers the means of restoring order and + peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be + conditional on a cessation of hostilities. + + The President then wrote the Prinkipos proposition. + +Senator KNOX. Did you make a written report of your mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +Senator KNOX. Have you it here? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. I might read the report without the appendices. + +Senator KNOX. The chairman wants you to read it. + +The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether it is very long. The report he +made would be of some interest. You were the only official +representative sent? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; except Capt. Pettit, my assistant. The +circumstances of my sending will perhaps require further elucidation. +I not only was acquainted with the minutes of the discussions of the +council of ten, but in addition I had discussed the subject with each +of the commissioners each morning and I had talked with many British +representatives. After the Prinkipos proposal was made, the replies +began to come in from various factions, that they would refuse to +accept it for various reasons. The Soviet Government replied in a +slightly evasive form. They said, "We are ready to accept the terms of +the proposals, and we are ready to talk about stopping fighting." They +did not say, "We are ready to stop fighting on such and such a date." +It was not made specific. + +Senator KNOX. That was one of the conditions of the proposal? + + + + +FRANCE BLOCKS PRINKIPOS CONFERENCE + +Mr. BULLITT. It was. That is why I say they replied in an evasive +manner. The French--and particularly the French foreign office, even +more than Mr. Clemenceau--and you can observe it from that minute were +opposed to the idea, and we found that the French foreign office had +communicated to the Ukrainian Government and various other antisoviet +governments that if they were to refuse the proposal, they would +support them and continue to support them, and not allow the Allies, +if they could prevent it, or the allied Governments, to make peace +with the Russian Soviet Government. + +At all events, the time set for the Prinkipos proposal was February +15. At that time nobody had acted in a definite, uncompromising +matter. It therefore fell to the ground. + +There was a further discussion as to what should be done. The peace +conference was still of the opinion that it was impossible to hope to +conquer the Soviet Government by force of arms, because in the latter +part of that report, which I did not read to the committee, there was +expressed very forcibly the opinion of Mr. Lloyd George, that the +populations at home would not stand it. Therefore they desired to +follow up further the line of making peace. + +About that time I was working particularly closely on the Russian +affairs. I had had a number of discussions with everyone concerned in +it, and on the very day that Col. House and Mr. Lansing first asked me +to undertake this mission to Russia, I was dining at Mr. Lloyd +George's apartment to discuss Russian affairs with his secretaries, so +that I had a fair idea of the point of view of everyone in Paris. + +I further, before I went, received urgent instructions from Secretary +Lansing if possible to obtain the release of Consul Treadwell, who had +been our consul in Petrograd and had been transferred to Tashkent, and +had been detained by the local Soviet Government and had been kept +there several months. He was one of our Government officers they had +seized. Mr. Lansing ordered me to do everything I could to obtain his +release. + +I further, before I went, asked Col. House certain specific questions +in regard to what, exactly, the point of view of our Government was on +this subject, what we were ready to do, and I think it perhaps might +be important to detail a brief resume of this conversation. The idea +was this: Lloyd George had gone over to London on February 9, as I +remember, to try to adjust some labor troubles. He, however, still +insisted that the Prinkipos proposal must be renewed or some other +peace proposal must be made, and I arranged a meeting between him and +Col. House, which was to take place, I believe, on February 24, at +which time they were to prepare a renewal of the Prinkipos proposal, +and they were both prepared to insist that it be passed against any +opposition of the French. + +I arranged this meeting through Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's +confidential assistant. However, on the 19th day of the month, Mr. +Clemenceau was shot, and the next day Mr. Lloyd George telephoned over +from London to say that as long as Clemenceau was wounded and was ill, +he was boss of the roost, and that anything he desired to veto would +be immediately wiped out and therefore it was no use for him and Col. +House, as long as Clemenceau was ill, to attempt to renew the +Prinkipos proposal, as Clemenceau would simply have to hold up a +finger and the whole thing would drop to the ground. Therefore, it was +decided that I should go at once to Russia to attempt to obtain from +the Soviet Government an exact statement of the terms on which they +were ready to stop fighting. I was ordered if possible to obtain that +statement and have it back in Paris before the President returned to +Paris from the United States. The plan was to make a proposal to the +Soviet Government which would certainly be accepted. + +The CHAIRMAN. These orders came from the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. These orders came to me from Col. House. I also discussed +the matter with Mr. Lansing, and Mr. Lansing and Col. House gave me +the instructions which I had. + +Senator KNOX. You said a moment ago that you went to Col. House to get +a statement of the American position. + + + + +WHAT AMERICA WANTED + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; I asked Col. House these questions [reading]: + + 1. If the Bolsheviki are ready to stop the forward movement + of their troops on all fronts and to declare an armistice on + all fronts, would we be willing to do likewise? + + 2. Is the American Government prepared to insist that the + French, British, Italian, and Japanese Governments shall + accept such an armistice proposal? + + 3. If fighting is stopped on all fronts, is the Government + of the United States prepared to insist on the + reestablishment of economic relations with Russia, subject + only to the equitable distribution among all classes of the + population of supplies and food and essential commodities + which may be sent to Russia? + + In other words, a sort of Hoover Belgian distribution plan + so that the Bolsheviki could not use the food we sent in + there for propaganda purposes and to starve their enemies + and to feed their friends. + + The fourth question I asked him was as follows: + + 4. Is the United States Government, under these conditions, + prepared to press the Allies for a joint statement that all + Allied troops will be withdrawn from the soil of Russia as + soon as practicable, on condition that the Bolsheviki give + explicit assurances that there will be no retaliation + against persons who have cooperated with the allied forces? + + Col. House replied that we were prepared to. + + Further, I asked Col. House whether it was necessary to get + a flat and explicit assurance from the Soviet Government + that they would make full payment of all their debts before + we would make peace with them, and Col. House replied that + it was not; that no such statement was necessary, however, + that such a statement would be extremely desirable to have, + inasmuch as much of the French opposition to making peace + with the Soviet Government was on account of the money owed + by Russia to France. + + I further had an intimation of the British disposition + toward Russia. As I said before, I had discussed the matter + with Mr. Philip Kerr, and Sir Maurice Hankey and Col. House + asked me to inform Mr. Kerr of my mission before I went. It + was to be an entire secret from all except the British. The + British and American delegations worked in very close touch + throughout the conference, and there were practically no + secrets that the American delegation had that were not also + the property of the British delegation. + + + + +THE BRITISH TERMS + +I was asked to inform Mr. Kerr of this trip. I told him all about it, +and asked him if he could get Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George to give +me a general indication of their point of view on peace with Russia; +what they would be prepared to do in the matter. + +Mr. Kerr and I then talked and prepared what we thought might be the +basis of peace with Russia. + +I then received from Mr. Kerr, before I left, the following letter, +which is a personal letter, which I regret greatly to bring forward, +but which I feel is necessary in the interest of an understanding of +this matter. [Reading:] + + [Private and confidential.] + + BRITISH DELEGATION, + Paris, February 21, 1919. + + MY DEAR BULLITT: I inclose a note of the sort of conditions + upon which I personally think it would be possible for the + allied Governments to resume once more normal relations with + Soviet Russia. You will understand, of course, that these + have no official significance and merely represent + suggestions of my own opinion. + + Yours, sincerely, + + P.H. KERR. + +That was from Mr. Kerr, Lloyd George's confidential secretary. Mr. +Kerr had, however, told me that he had discussed the entire matter +with Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, and therefore I thought he had +a fair idea of what conditions the British were ready to accept. The +note inclosed reads as follows: + + 1. Hostilities to cease on all fronts. + + 2. All de facto governments to remain in full control of the + territories which they at present occupy. + + 3. Railways and ports necessary to transportation between + soviet Russia and the sea to be subject to the same + regulations as international railways and ports in the rest + of Europe. + + 4. Allied subjects to be given free right of entry and full + security to enable them to enter soviet Russia and go about + their business there provided they do not interfere in + politics. + + 5. Amnesty to all political prisoners on both sides: full + liberty to all Russians who have fought with the Allies. + + 6. Trade relations to be restored between soviet Russia and + the outside world under conditions which, while respecting + the sovereignty of soviet Russia insure that allied supplies + are made available on equal terms to all classes of the + Russian people. + + 7. All other questions connected with Russia's debt to the + Allies, etc., to be considered independently after peace has + been established. + + 8. All allied troops to be withdrawn from Russia as soon as + Russian armies above quota to be defined have been + demobilized and their surplus arms surrendered or destroyed. + +You will see the American and British positions were very close +together. + +Senator KNOX. With these statements from Col. House as to the American +position and from Mr. Kerr as to the British position, and with the +instructions which you had received, you proceeded to Russia, and, as +you said a moment ago, you made a written report? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. Do you want it read, or shall I state the +substance and then put it in the record? I think I can state it more +briefly if I read the first eight pages of it and then put the rest of +it in the record. + +The CHAIRMAN. Very well; do that. + +Mr. BULLITT. This report I made to the President and to the American +commissioners, by order of the President transmitted to me on my +return by Mr. Lansing. I should like to say, before I read this +report, that of course I was in Russia an extremely short time, and +this is merely the best observation that I could make supplemented by +the observation of Capt. Pettit of the Military Intelligence, who was +sent in as my assistant, and with other impressions that I got from +Mr. Lincoln Steffens and other observers who were there. + +Senator KNOX. How long were you in Russia? + +Mr. BULLITT. For only one week. I was instructed to go in and bring +back as quickly as possible a definite statement of exactly the terms +the Soviet Government was ready to accept. The idea in the minds of +the British and the American delegation were that if the Allies made +another proposal it should be a proposal which we would know in +advance would be accepted, so that there would be no chance of another +Prinkipos proposal miscarrying. + +I might perhaps read first, or show to you, the official text. This is +the official text of their proposition which they handed me in Moscow +on the 14th of March. Here is a curious thing--the Soviet foreign +office envelope. + + + + +TERMS WHICH RUSSIA OFFERED TO ACCEPT + +As I said, I was sent to obtain an exact statement of the terms that +the Soviet Government was ready to accept, and I received on the 14th +the following statement from Tchitcherin and Litvinov. + +Senator KNOX. Who were they? + +Mr. BULLITT. Tchitcherin was Peoples' Commisar for Foreign Affairs of +the Soviet Republic and Litvinov was the former Soviet Ambassador to +London, the man with whom Buckler had had his conversation, and who +was now practically assistant secretary for foreign affairs. + +I also had a conference with Lenin. The Soviet Government undertook to +accept this proposal provided it was made by the allied and associated +Governments not later than April 10, 1919. The proposal reads as +follows [reading]: + + + + +TEXT OF PROJECTED PEACE PROPOSAL BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED +GOVERNMENTS. + +The allied and associated Governments to propose that hostilities +shall cease on all fronts in the territory of the former Russian +Empire and Finland on ----[1] and that no new hostilities shall begin +after this date, pending a conference to be held at ----[2] on ----[3] + + [Footnote 1: The date of the armistice to be set at least a + week after the date when the allied and associated + Governments make this proposal.] + + [Footnote 2: The Soviet Government greatly prefers that the + conference should be held in a neutral country and also that + either a radio or a direct telegraph wire to Moscow should + be put at its disposal.] + + [Footnote 3: The conference to begin not later than a week + after the armistice takes effect and the Soviet Government + greatly prefers that the period between the date of the + armistice and the first meeting of the conference should be + only three days, if possible.] + +The duration of the armistice to be for two weeks, unless extended by +mutual consent, and all parties to the armistice to undertake not to +employ the period of the armistice to transfer troops and war material +to the territory of the former Russian Empire. + +The conference to discuss peace on the basis of the following +principles, which shall not be subject to revision by the conference. + + 1. All existing de facto governments which have been set up + on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to + remain in full control of the territories which they occupy + at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, except + in so far as the conference may agree upon the transfer of + territories; until the peoples inhabiting the territories + controlled by these de facto governments shall themselves + determine to change their Governments. The Russian Soviet + Government, the other soviet governments and all other + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire, the allied and associated + Governments, and the other Governments which are operating + against the soviet governments, including Finland, Poland, + Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, to + agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing de facto + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and the other Governments signatory to + this agreement. [Footnote 4: The allied and associated + Governments to undertake to see to it that the de facto + governments of Germany do not attempt to upset by force the + de facto governments of Russia. The de facto governments + which have been set up on the territory of the former + Russian Empire to undertake not to attempt to upset by force + the de facto governments of Germany.] + + 2. The economic blockade to be raised and trade relations + between Soviet Russia and the allied and associated + countries to be reestablished under conditions which will + ensure that supplies from the allied and associated + countries are made available on equal terms to all classes + of the Russian people. + + 3. The soviet governments of Russia to have the right of + unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports + which belonged to the former Russian Empire and to Finland + and are necessary for the disembarkation and transportation + of passengers and goods between their territories and the + sea; detailed arrangements for the carrying out of this + provision to be agreed upon at the conference. + + 4. The citizens of the soviet republics of Russia to have + the right of free entry into the allied and associated + countries as well as into all countries which have been + formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and + Finland; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and + full security, provided they do not interfere in the + domestic politics of those countries. [Footnote 5: It is + considered essential by the Soviet Government that the + allied and associated Governments should see to it that + Poland and all neutral countries extend the same rights as + the allied and associated countries.] + + Nationals of the allied and associated countries and of the + other countries above named to have the right of free entry + into the soviet republics of Russia; also the right of + sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they + do not interfere in the domestic politics of the soviet + republics. + + The allied and associated Governments and other governments + which have been set up on the territory of the former + Russian Empire and Finland to have the right to send + official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity + into the various Russian Soviet Republics. The soviet + governments of Russia to have the right to send official + representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into all + the allied and associated countries and into the nonsoviet + countries which have been formed on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland. + + 5. The soviet governments, the other Governments which have + been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire + and Finland, to give a general amnesty to all political + opponents, offenders, and prisoners. The allied and + associated governments to give a general amnesty to all + Russian political opponents, offenders, and prisoners, and + to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted + for giving help to Soviet Russia. All Russians who have + fought in, or otherwise aided the armies opposed to the + soviet governments, and those opposed to the other + Governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland to be included in this + amnesty. + + All prisoners of war of non-Russian powers detained in + Russia, likewise all nationals of those powers now in Russia + to be given full facilities for repatriation. The Russian + prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be, + likewise all Russian nationals, including the Russian + soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all + foreign armies to be given full facilities for repatriation. + + 6. Immediately after the signing of this agreement all + troops of the allied and associated Governments and other + non-Russian Governments to be withdrawn from Russia and + military assistance to cease to be given to antisoviet + Governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire. + + The soviet governments and the antisoviet governments which + have been set up on the territory of the former Russian + Empire and Finland to begin to reduce their armies + simultaneously, and at the same rate, to a peace footing + immediately after the signing of this agreement. The + conference to determine the most effective and just method + of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous + demobilization and also the withdrawal of the troops and the + cessation of military assistance to the antisoviet + governments. + + 7. The allied and associated Governments, taking cognizance + of the statement of the Soviet Government of Russia, in its + note of February 4, in regard to its foreign debts, propose + as an integral part of this agreement that the soviet + governments and the other governments which have been set up + on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland + shall recognize their responsibility for the financial + obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign States + parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such + States. Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts + to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the + present financial position of Russia. The Russian gold + seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan or taken from Germany + by the Allies to be regarded as partial payment of the + portion of the debt due from the soviet republics of Russia. + + The Soviet Government of Russia undertakes to accept the + foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April + 10, 1919. + +In regard to the second sentence in paragraph 5, in regard to "giving +help to Soviet Russia" I may say that I was told that that was not a +sine qua non but it was necessary in order to get the proposal through +the Russian executive committee, which it had to pass before it was +handed to me. I was also handed an additional sheet, which I refused +to take as a part of the formal document, containing the following: + + The Soviet Government is most anxious to have a semiofficial + guaranty from the American and British Governments that they + will do their utmost to see to it that France lives up to + the conditions of the armistice. + +The Soviet Government had a deep suspicion of the French Government. + +In reference to this matter, and in explanation of that proposal, I +sent a number of telegrams from Helsingfors. I feel that in a way it +is important, for an explanation of the matter, that those telegrams +should be made public, but, on the other hand, they were sent in a +confidential code of the Department of State, and I do not feel at +liberty to read them unless ordered to specifically by the committee. +I should not wish to take the responsibility for breaking a code which +is in current use by the department. + +Senator KNOX. I should think your scruples were well founded. I should +not read those telegrams. + +Mr. BULLITT. I can simply inform you briefly of the nature of them. + +Senator KNOX. You might give us the nature of them. To whom were they +sent? + +Mr. BULLITT. On reaching Petrograd I sent Capt. Pettit out to +Helsingfors after I had had a discussion with Tchitcherin and with +Litvinov with a telegram, in which I said I had reached Petrograd and +had perfected arrangements to cross the boundary at will, and to +communicate with the mission via the consul at Helsingfors; that the +journey had been easy, and that the reports of frightful conditions in +Petrograd had been ridiculously exaggerated. + +I described the discussions I had had with Tchitcherin and with +Litvinov, and said they had assured me that after going to Moscow and +after discussion with Lenin, I should be able to carry out a specific +statement of the position of the Soviet Government on all points. + +On reaching Helsingfors I sent a telegram to the mission at Paris +"Most secret, for the President, Secretary Lansing, and Col. House +only," in which I said that in handing me the statement which I have +just read, Tchitcherin and Litvinov had explained that the Executive +Council of the Soviet Government had formally considered and adopted +it, and that the Soviet Government considered itself absolutely bound +to accept the proposals made therein, provided they were made on or +before April 10, and under no conditions would they change their +minds. + +I also explained that I had found Lenin, Tchitcherin, and Litvinov +full of the sense of Russia's need for peace, and that I felt the +details of their statement might be modified without making it +unacceptable to them, and that in particular the clause under article +5 was not of vital importance. That, on the other hand, I felt that in +the main this statement represented the minimum terms that the Soviet +Government would accept. + +I explained that it was understood with regard to article 2 that the +allied and associated countries should have a right to send inspectors +into Soviet Russia and see to it that the disposition of supplies, if +the blockade was lifted, was entirely equitable, and I explained also +that it was fully understood that the phrase under article 4 on +"official representatives" did not include diplomatic representatives, +that the Soviet Government simply desired to have some agents who +might more or less look out for their people here. + +I explained further that in regard to footnote No. 2, the Soviet +Government hoped and preferred that the conference should be held in +Norway; that its preferences thereafter were, first, some point in +between Russia and Finland; second, a large ocean liner anchored off +Moon Island or the Aland Islands; and, fourth, Prinkipos. + +I also explained that Tchitcherin and all the other members of the +government with whom I had talked had said in the most positive and +unequivocal manner that the Soviet Government was determined to pay +its foreign debts, and I was convinced that there would be no dispute +on that point. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know how these telegrams were received in Paris, +whether favorably or unfavorably? + +Mr. BULLITT. I can only say, in regard to that, there are three other +very brief ones. One was on a subject which I might give you the gist +of before I go on with it. + +Senator KNOX. Go ahead, in your own way. + +Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent me a message of congratulation on receipt +of them, and by one of the curious quirks of the conference, a member +of the secretariat refused to send the message because of the way in +which it was signed, and Col. House was only able to give me a copy of +it when I reached Paris. I have a copy of it here. + +Senator HARDING. Would not this story be more interesting if we knew +which member of the conference objected? + +Mr. BULLITT. I believe the objection was on the technical point that +Col. House had signed "Ammission" instead of his name, but I really do +not know which member of the conference it was that made the +objection. + +I then sent another telegram, which is rather long, too long to +attempt to paraphrase, and I will ask that I may not put it in, +because the entire substance of it is contained in briefer form in my +formal report. This telegram itself is in code. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Are there any translations of those of your +telegrams that are in code? + +Mr. BULLITT. No; I have given you the substance of them as I have gone +along. + +As I said to you before, Secretary Lansing had instructed me if +possible to obtain the release of Mr. Treadwell, our consul at +Tashkent, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 miles from Moscow. In +Moscow I had spoken to Lenin and Tchitcherin and Litvinov in regard to +it, and finally they said they recognized that it was foolish to hold +him; that they had never really given much thought to the matter; that +he had been held by the local government at Tashkent, which was more +than 4,000 miles away; that raids were being made on the railroad +constantly, and they might have some difficulty in communicating. +However, they promised me that they would send a telegram at once +ordering his release, and that they would send him out either by +Persia or by Finland whichever way he preferred. I told them I was +sure he would prefer to go by way of Finland. Here is a copy of their +telegram ordering his release, which will not be of much use to you, I +fear, as it is in Russian. They carried out this promise to the +letter, releasing Treadwell at once, and Treadwell in due course of +time and in good health appeared on the frontier of Finland on the +27th of April. All that time was consumed in travel from Tashkent, +which is a long way under present conditions. + +Senator NEW. I saw Mr. Treadwell here some time ago. + +Mr. BULLITT. I then sent a telegram in regard to Mr. Pettit, the +officer of military intelligence, who was with me as my assistant, +saying I intended to send him back to Petrograd at once to keep in +touch with the situation so that we should have information +constantly. I will say in this connection that it was not an +extraordinary thing for the various Governments to have +representatives in Russia. The British Government had a man in there +at the same time that I was there. He was traveling as a Red Cross +representative, but in reality he was there for the Foreign Office, a +Maj. A.R. Parker, I believe. I am not certain of his name, but we can +verify it. + +I also sent a telegram from Helsingfors, "strictly personal to Col. +House," requesting him to show my fifth and sixth telegrams to Mr. +Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's secretary, so that Mr. Lloyd George +might be at once informed in regard to the situation, inasmuch as he +had known I was going, and inasmuch as the British had been so +courteous as to offer to send me across on a cruiser. When I got to +London and found that the torpedo boat on which I had expected to go +was escorting the President, Mr. Lloyd George's office in London +called up the Admiralty and asked them to give me a boat in which to +go across. Incidentally I was informed by Col. House, on my arrival in +Paris, that copies of my telegrams had been sent at once to Mr. Lloyd +George and Mr. Balfour. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I do not think we need to go into quite so +much detail. You have told us now with what instructions you went, +what the British attitude was, what the American attitude was, and +what the Soviet Government proposed. Now, let us have your report. + +Mr. BULLITT. All right, sir. This was my report-- + +Senator BRANDEGEE. What is the date of that, please? + +Mr. BULLITT. This copy does not bear the date on it. On the other hand +I can tell you within a day or two. The date unfortunately was left +off of this particular copy. It was made on or about the 27th or 28th +day of March, in the week before April 1. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. 1919? + +Mr. BULLITT. 1919. I unquestionably could obtain from Secretary +Lansing or the President or some one else the actual original of the +report. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I do not care about the precise date, but I want to +get it approximately. + +Mr. BULLITT. It was about the 1st day of April. + +Senator KNOX. To whom was the report made? + +Mr. BULLITT. The report was addressed to the President and the +American Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace. I was +ordered to make it. I had sent all these telegrams from Helsingfors, +and I felt personally that no report was necessary, but the President +desired a written report, and I made the report as follows: + + + + +MR. BULLITT'S REPORT ON RUSSIA + + + +ECONOMIC SITUATION + +Russia to-day is in a condition of acute economic distress. The +blockade by land and sea is the cause of this distress and lack of the +essentials of transportation is its gravest symptom. Only one-fourth +of the locomotives which ran on Russian lines before the war are now +available for use. Furthermore, Soviet Russia is cut off entirely from +all supplies of coal and gasoline. In consequence, transportation by +all steam and electric vehicles is greatly hampered; and +transportation by automobile and by the fleet of gasoline-using Volga +steamers and canal boats is impossible. (Appendix, p. 55.) + +As a result of these hindrances to transportation it is possible to +bring from the grain centers to Moscow only 25 carloads of food a day, +instead of the 100 carloads which are essential, and to Petrograd only +15 carloads, instead of the essential 50. In consequence, every man, +woman, and child in Moscow and Petrograd is suffering from slow +starvation. (Appendix, p. 56.) + +Mortality is particularly high among new-born children whose mothers +can not suckle them, among newly-delivered mothers, and among the +aged. The entire population, in addition, is exceptionally susceptible +to disease; and a slight illness is apt to result fatally because of +the total lack of medicines. Typhoid, typhus, and smallpox are +epidemic in both Petrograd and Moscow. + +Industry, except the production of munitions of war, is largely at a +standstill. Nearly all means of transport which are not employed in +carrying food are used to supply the army, and there is scarcely any +surplus transport to carry materials essential to normal industry. +Furthermore, the army has absorbed the best executive brains and +physical vigor of the nation. In addition, Soviet Russia is cut off +from most of its sources of iron and of cotton. Only the flax, hemp, +wood, and lumber industries have an adequate supply of raw material. + +On the other hand, such essentials of economic life as are available +are being utilized to the utmost by the Soviet Government. Such trains +as there are, run on time. The distribution of food is well +controlled. Many industrial experts of the old régime are again +managing their plants and sabotage by such managers has ceased. +Loafing by the workmen during work hours has been overcome. (Appendix, +p. 57.) + + + +SOCIAL CONDITIONS + +The destructive phase of the revolution is over and all the energy of +the Government is turned to constructive work. The terror has ceased. +All power of judgment has been taken away from the extraordinary +commission for suppression of the counter-revolution, which now merely +accuses suspected counter-revolutionaries, who are tried by the +regular, established, legal tribunals. Executions are extremely rare. +Good order has been established. The streets are safe. Shooting has +ceased. There are few robberies. Prostitution has disappeared from +sight. Family life has been unchanged by the revolution, the canard in +regard to "nationalization of women" notwithstanding. (Appendix, p. +58.) + +The theaters, opera, and ballet are performing as in peace. Thousands +of new schools have been opened in all parts of Russia and the Soviet +Government seems to have done more for the education of the Russian +people in a year and a half than czardom did in 50 years. (Appendix, +p. 59.) + + + +POLITICAL SITUATION + +The Soviet form of government is firmly established. Perhaps the most +striking fact in Russia today is the general support which is given +the government by the people in spite of their starvation. Indeed, the +people lay the blame for their distress wholly on the blockade and on +the governments which maintain it. The Soviet form of government seems +to have become to the Russian people the symbol of their revolution. +Unquestionably it is a form of government which lends itself to gross +abuse and tyranny but it meets the demand of the moment in Russia and +it has acquired so great a hold on the imagination of the common +people that the women are ready to starve and the young men to die for +it. + +The position of the communist party (formerly Bolsheviki) is also very +strong. Blockade and intervention have caused the chief opposition +parties, the right social revolutionaries and the menshiviki, to give +temporary support to the communists. These opposition parties have +both made formal statements against the blockade, intervention, and +the support of antisoviet governments by the allied and associated +governments. Their leaders, Volsky and Martov, are most vigorous in +their demands for the immediate raising of the blockade and peace. +(Appendix, p. 60.) + +Indeed, the only ponderable opposition to the communists to-day comes +from more radical parties--the left social revolutionaries and the +anarchists. These parties, in published statements, call the +communists, and particularly Lenin and Tchitcherin, "the paid +bourgeois gendarmes of the Entente." They attack the communists +because the communists have encouraged scientists, engineers, and +industrial experts of the bourgeois class to take important posts +under the Soviet Government at high pay. They rage against the +employment of bourgeois officers in the army and against the efforts +of the communists to obtain peace. They demand the immediate massacre +of all the bourgeoisie and an immediate declaration of war on all +nonrevolutionary governments. They argue that the Entente Governments +should be forced to intervene more deeply in Russia, asserting that +such action would surely provoke the proletariat of all European +countries to immediate revolution. + +Within the communist party itself there is a distinct division of +opinion in regard to foreign policy, but this disagreement has not +developed personal hostility or open breach in the ranks of the party. +Trotski, the generals, and many theorists believe the red army should +go forward everywhere until more vigorous intervention by the Entente +is provoked, which they, too, count upon to bring revolution in France +and England. Their attitude is not a little colored by pride in the +spirited young army. (Appendix, p. 62.) Lenin, Tchitcherin, and the +bulk of the communist party, on the other hand, insist that the +essential problem at present is to save the proletariat of Russia, in +particular, and the proletariat of Europe, in general, from +starvation, and assert that it will benefit the revolution but little +to conquer all Europe if the Government of the United States replies +by starving all Europe. They advocate, therefore, the conciliation of +the United States even at the cost of compromising with many of the +principles they hold most dear. And Lenin's prestige in Russia at +present is so overwhelming that the Trotski group is forced +reluctantly to follow him. (Appendix, p. 63.) + +Lenin, indeed, as a practical matter, stands well to the right in the +existing political life of Russia. He recognizes the undesirability, +from the Socialist viewpoint, of the compromises he feels compelled to +make; but he is ready to make the compromises. Among the more notable +concessions he has already made are: The abandonment of his plan to +nationalize the land and the adoption of the policy of dividing it +among the peasants, the establishment of savings banks paying 3 per +cent interest, the decision to pay all foreign debts, and the decision +to give concessions if that shall prove to be necessary to obtain +credit abroad. (Appendix, p. 64.) + +In a word, Lenin feels compelled to retreat from his theoretical +position all along the line. He is ready to meet the western +Governments half way. + + + +PEACE PROPOSALS + +Lenin seized upon the opportunity presented by my trip of +investigation to make a definite statement of the position of the +Soviet Government. He was opposed by Trotski and the generals, but +without much difficulty got the support of the majority of the +executive council, and the statement of the position of the Soviet +Government which was handed to me was finally adopted unanimously. + +My discussion of this proposal with the leaders of the Soviet +Government was so detailed that I feel sure of my ground in saying +that it does not represent the minimum terms of the Soviet Government, +and that I can point out in detail wherein it may be modified without +making it unacceptable to the Soviet Government. For example, the +clause under article 5--"and to their own nationals who have been or +may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia"--is certainly not +of vital importance. And the clause under article 4, in regard to +admission of citizens of the soviet republics of Russia into the +allied and associated countries, may certainly be changed in such a +way as to reserve all necessary rights to control such immigration to +the allied and associated countries, and to confine it to persons who +come on legitimate and necessary business, and to exclude definitely +all possibility of an influx of propagandists. + + + +CONCLUSIONS + +The following conclusions are respectfully submitted: + + 1. No government save a socialist government can be set up + in Russia to-day except by foreign bayonets, and any + governments so set up will fall the moment such support is + withdrawn. The Lenin wing of the communist party is to-day + as moderate as any socialist government which can control + Russia. + + 2. No real peace can be established in Europe or the world + until peace is made with the revolution. This proposal of + the Soviet Government presents an opportunity to make peace + with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis--perhaps + a unique opportunity. + + 3. If the blockade is lifted and supplies begin to be + delivered regularly to soviet Russia, a more powerful hold + over the Russian people will be established than that given + by the blockade itself--the hold given by fear that this + delivery of supplies may be stopped. Furthermore, the + parties which oppose the communists in principle but are + supporting them at present will be able to begin to fight + against them. + + 4. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that a + proposal following the general lines of the suggestion of + the Soviet Government should be made at the earliest + possible moment, such changes being made, particularly in + article 4 and article 5, as will make the proposal + acceptable to conservative opinion in the allied and + associated countries. + + Very respectfully submitted. + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + + * * * * * + + + + +APPENDIX TO REPORT + + + +TRANSPORT + +_Locomotives_.--Before the war Russia had 22,000 locomotives. +Destruction by war and ordinary wear and tear have reduced the number +of locomotives in good order to 5,500. Russia is entirely cut off from +supplies of spare parts and materials for repair, facilities for the +manufacture of which do not exist in Russia. And the Soviet Government +is able only with the greatest difficulty to keep in running order the +few locomotives at its disposal. + +_Coal_.--Soviet Russia is entirely cut off from supplies of coal. +Kolchak holds the Perm mining district, although Soviet troops are now +on the edge of it. Denikin still holds the larger part of the Donetz +coal district and has destroyed the mines in the portion of the +district which he has evacuated. As a result of this, locomotives, +electrical power plants, etc., must be fed with wood, which is +enormously expensive and laborious and comparatively ineffectual. + +_Gasoline_.--There is a total lack of gasoline, due to the British +occupation of Baku. The few automobiles in the cities which are kept +running for vital Government business are fed with substitute +mixtures, which causes them to break down with great frequency and to +miss continually. Almost the entire fleet on the great inland waterway +system of Russia was propelled by gasoline. As a result the Volga and +the canals, which are so vital a part of Russia's system of +transportation, are useless. + + + +FOOD + +Everyone is hungry in Moscow and Petrograd, including the people's +commissaries themselves. The daily ration of Lenin and the other +commissaries is the same as that of a soldier in the army or of a +workman at hard labor. In the hotel which is reserved for Government +officials the menu is the following: Breakfast--A quarter to half a +pound of black bread, which must last all day, and tea without sugar. +Dinner--A good soup, a small piece of fish, for which occasionally a +diminutive piece of meat is substituted, a vegetable, either a potato +or a bit of cabbage, more tea without sugar. Supper--What remains of +the morning ration of bread and more tea without sugar. + +Occasionally sugar, butter, and chickens slip through from the Ukraine +and are sold secretly at atrocious prices--butter, for example, at 140 +roubles a pound. Whenever the Government is able to get its hands on +any such "luxuries" it turns them over to the schools, where an +attempt is made to give every child a good dinner every day. + +The food situation has been slightly improved by the rejoining of +Ukraine to Great Russia, for food is relatively plentiful in the +south; but no great improvement in the situation is possible because +of the lack of transport. + + + +MANAGEMENT + +Such supplies as are available in Soviet Russia are being utilized +with considerable skill. For example, in spite of the necessity of +firing with wood, the Moscow-Petrograd express keeps up to its +schedule, and on both occasions when I made the trip it took but 13 +hours, compared to the 12 hours of prewar days. + +The food control works well, so that there is no abundance alongside +of famine. Powerful and weak alike endure about the same degree of +starvation. + +The Soviet Government has made great efforts to persuade industrial +managers and technical experts of the old régime to enter its service. +Many very prominent men have done so. And the Soviet Government pays +them as high as $45,000 a year for their services, although Lenin gets +but $1,800 a year. This very anomalous situation arises from the +principle that any believing communist must adhere to the scale of +wages established by the government, but if the government considers +it necessary to have the assistance of any anticommunist, it is +permitted to pay him as much as he demands. + +All meetings of workmen during work hours have been prohibited, with +the result that the loafing which was so fatal during the Kerensky +régime has been overcome and discipline has been restored in the +factories as in the army. + + + +SOCIAL CONDITIONS + +_Terror_.--The red terror is over. During the period of its power the +extraordinary commission for the suppression of the counter +revolution, which was the instrument of the terror, executed about +1,500 persons in Petrograd, 500 in Moscow, and 3,000 in the remainder +of the country--5,000 in all Russia. These figures agree with those +which were brought back from Russia by Maj. Wardwell, and inasmuch as +I have checked them from Soviet, anti-Soviet, and neutral sources I +believe them to be approximately correct. It is worthy of note in this +connection that in the white terror in southern Finland alone, +according to official figures, Gen. Mannerheim executed without trial +12,000 working men and women. + +_Order_.--One feels as safe in the streets of Petrograd and Moscow as +in the streets of Paris or New York. On the other hand, the streets of +these cities are dismal, because of the closing of retail shops whose +functions are now concentrated in a few large nationalized "department +stores." Petrograd, furthermore, has been deserted by half its +population; but Moscow teems with twice the number of inhabitants it +contained before the war. The only noticeable difference in the +theaters, opera, and ballet is that they are now run under the +direction of the department of education, which prefers classics and +sees to it that working men and women and children are given an +opportunity to attend the performances and that they are instructed +beforehand in the significance and beauties of the productions. + +_Morals_.--Prostitutes have disappeared from sight, the economic +reasons for their career having ceased to exist. Family life has been +absolutely unchanged by the revolution. I have never heard more +genuinely mirthful laughter than when I told Lenin, Tchitcherin, and +Litvinov that much of the world believed that women had been +"nationalized." This lie is so wildly fantastic that they will not +even take the trouble to deny it. Respect for womanhood was never +greater than in Russia to-day. Indeed, the day I reached Petrograd was +a holiday in honor of wives and mothers. + +_Education_.--The achievements of the department of education under +Lunacharsky have been very great. Not only have all the Russian +classics been reprinted in editions of three and five million copies +and sold at a low price to the people, but thousands of new schools +for men, women, and children have been opened in all parts of Russia. +Furthermore, workingmen's and soldiers' clubs have been organized in +many of the palaces of yesteryear, where the people are instructed by +means of moving pictures and lectures. In the art galleries one meets +classes of working men and women being instructed in the beauties of +the pictures. The children's schools have been entirely reorganized, +and an attempt is being made to give every child a good dinner at +school every day. Furthermore, very remarkable schools have been +opened for defective and over-nervous children. On the theory that +genius and insanity are closely allied, these children are taught from +the first to compose music, paint pictures, sculpt and write poetry, +and it is asserted that some very valuable results have been achieved, +not only in the way of productions but also in the way of restoring +the nervous systems of the children. + +_Morale_.--The belief of the convinced communists in their cause is +almost religious. Never in any religious service have I seen higher +emotional unity than prevailed at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet +in celebration of the foundation of the Third Socialist +Internationale. The remark of one young man to me when I questioned +him in regard to his starved appearance is characteristic. He replied +very simply: "I am ready to give another year of starvation to our +revolution." + + + + +STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES + +The following statement was made to me by Volsky, leader of the right +social revolutionaries, the largest opposition party: + +"Intervention of any kind will prolong the régime of the Bolsheviki by +compelling us, like all honorable Russians, to drop opposition and +rally round the Soviet Government in defense of the revolution. With +regard to help to individual groups or governments fighting against +soviet Russia, we see no difference between such intervention and the +sending of troops. If the allies come to an agreement with the Soviet +Government, sooner or later the peasant masses will make their will +felt and they are alike against the bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviki. + +"If by any chance Kolchak and Denikin were to win, they would have to +kill in tens of thousands where the Bolsheviki have had to kill in +hundreds and the result would be the complete ruin and collapse of +Russia into anarchy. Has not the Ukraine been enough to teach the +allies that occupation by non-Bolshevik troops merely turns into +Bolsheviki those of the population who were not Bolsheviki before? It +is clear to us that the Bolshiviki are really fighting against +bourgeois dictatorship, We are, therefore, prepared to help them in +every possible way. + +"Grandmother Ekaterina Constantinovna Breshkovskaya has no sort of +authority, either from the assembly of members of the all Russian +constituent assembly or from the party of social revolutionaries. Her +utterances in America, if she is preaching intervention, represent her +personal opinions which are categorically repudiated by the party of +social revolutionaries, which has decisively expressed itself against +the permissibility of intervention, direct or indirect." + +Volsky signed this latter statement: "V. Volsky, late president of the +assembly of members of the all Russian constituent assembly." + +Martov, leader of the Menshiviki, stated: "The Menshiviki are against +every form of intervention, direct or indirect, because by providing +the incentive to militarization it is bound to emphasize the least +desirable qualities of the revolution. Further, the needs of the army +overwhelm all efforts at meeting the needs of social and economic +reconstruction. Agreement with the Soviet Government would lessen the +tension of defense and would unmuzzle the opposition, who, while the +Soviet Government is attacked, are prepared to help in its defense, +while reserving until peace their efforts to alter the Bolshevik +régime. + +"The forces that would support intervention must be dominated by those +of extreme reaction because all but the reactionaries are prepared +temporarily to sink their differences with the Bolsheviki in order to +defend the revolution as a whole." + +Martov finally expressed himself as convinced that, given peace, life +itself and the needs of the country will bring about the changes he +desires. + + + + +ARMY + +The soviet army now numbers between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 troops of +the line. Nearly all these soldiers are young men between the ages of +17 and 27. The morale of regiments varies greatly. The convinced +communists, who compose the bulk of the army, fight with crusading +enthusiasm. Other regiments, composed of patriots but noncommunists, +are less spirited; other regiments composed of men who have entered +the army for the slightly higher bread ration are distinctly +untrustworthy. Great numbers of officers of the old army are occupying +important executive posts in the administration of the new army, but +are under control of convinced communist supervisors. Nearly all the +lower grade officers of the army are workmen who have displayed +courage in the ranks and have been trained in special officer schools. +Discipline has been restored and on the whole the spirit of the army +appears to be very high, particularly since its recent successes. The +soldiers no longer have the beaten dog-like look which distinguished +them under the Czar but carry themselves like freemen and curiously +like Americans. They are popular with the people. + +I witnessed a review of 15,000 troops in Petrograd. The men marched +well and their equipment of shoes, uniforms, rifles, and machine guns +and light artillery was excellent. On the other hand they have no big +guns, no aeroplanes, no gas shells, no liquid fire, nor indeed, any of +the more refined instruments of destruction. + +The testimony was universal that recruiting for the army is easiest in +the districts which having once lived under the soviet were over run +by anti-soviet forces and then reoccupied by the Red Army. + +Trotski is enormously proud of the army he has created, but it is +noteworthy that even he is ready to disband the army at once if peace +can be obtained in order that all the brains and energy it contains +may be turned to restoring the normal life of the country. + + + + +LENIN'S PRESTIGE + +The hold which Lenin has gained on the imagination of the Russian +people makes his position almost that of a dictator. There is already +a Lenin legend. He is regarded as almost a prophet. His picture, +usually accompanied by that of Karl Marx, hangs everywhere. In Russia +one never hears Lenin and Trotski spoken of in the same breath as is +usual in the western world. Lenin is regarded as in a class by +himself. Trotski is but one of the lower order of mortals. + +When I called on Lenin at the Kremlin I had to wait a few minutes +until a delegation of peasants left his room. They had heard in their +village that Comrade Lenin was hungry. And they had come hundreds of +miles carrying 800 poods of bread as the gift of the village to Lenin. +Just before them was another delegation of peasants to whom the report +had come that Comrade Lenin was working in an unheated room. They came +bearing a stove and enough firewood to heat it for three months. Lenin +is the only leader who receives such gifts. And he turns them into the +common fund. + +Face to face Lenin is a very striking man--straightforward and direct, +but also genial and with a large humor and serenity. + + + + +CONCESSIONS + +The Soviet Government recognizes very clearly the undesirability of +granting concessions to foreigners and is ready to do so only because +of necessity. The members of the Government realize that the lifting +of the blockade will be illusory unless the Soviet Government is able +to establish credits in foreign countries, particularly the United +States and England, so that goods may be bought in those countries. +For Russia to-day is in a position to export only a little gold, a +little platinum, a little hemp, flax, and wood. These exports will be +utterly inadequate to pay for the vast quantity of imports which +Russia needs. Russia must, therefore, obtain credit at any price. The +members of the Soviet Government realize fully that as a preliminary +step to the obtaining of credit the payment of foreign debts must be +resumed and, therefore, are ready to pay such debts. But even though +these debts are paid the members of the Soviet Government believe that +they will not be able to borrow money in foreign countries on any mere +promise to pay. They believe, therefore, that they will have to grant +concessions in Russia to foreigners in order to obtain immediate +credit. They desire to avoid this expedient if in any way it shall be +possible, but if absolutely necessary they are ready to adopt it in +order to begin the restoration of the normal life of the country. + +Senator KNOX. To whom did you hand that report? + +Mr. BULLITT. I handed copies of this personally to Secretary Lansing, +Col. House, Gen. Bliss and Mr. Henry White, and I handed a second +copy, for the President, to Mr. Lansing. Secretary Lansing wrote on +it, "Urgent and immediate"; put it in an envelope, and I took it up to +the President's house. + +Senator KNOX. At the same time that you handed in this report, did you +hand them the proposal of the Soviet Government? + +Mr. BULLITT. The proposal of the Soviet Government is appended to this +report. + +Senator KNOX. It is a part of the report? + +Mr. BULLITT. It is a part of the report which I have already read. +There comes first an appendix explaining the statements which I have +just read, and giving the evidence I have for them. + +Senator KNOX. Was there any formal meeting of the peace conference, or +of representatives of the great powers, to act upon this suggestion +and upon your report? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was acted upon in a very lengthy, long-drawn-out +manner. + +Immediately on my return I was first asked to appear before the +American Commission. First, the night I got back I had a couple of +hours with Col. House, in which I went over the whole matter. Col. +House was entirely and quite decidedly in favor of making peace, if +possible, on the basis of this proposal. + +The next morning I was called before the other Commissioners, and I +talked with Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. Henry White all the +morning and most of the afternoon. We had a long discussion, at the +end of which it was the sense of the commissioners' meeting that it +was highly desirable to attempt to bring about peace on that basis. + + + + +BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE + +The next morning I had breakfast with Mr. Lloyd George at his +apartment. Gen. Smuts and Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. Philip Kerr were +also present, and we discussed the matter at considerable length, I +brought Mr. Lloyd George the official text of the proposal, the same +official one, in that same envelop, which I have just shown to you. He +had previously read it, it having been telegraphed from Helsingfors. +As he had previously read it, he merely glanced over it and said, +"That is the same one I have already read," and he handed it to Gen. +Smuts, who was across the table, and said, "General, this is of the +utmost importance and interest, and you ought to read it right away." +Gen. Smuts read it immediately, and said he thought it should not be +allowed to lapse; that it was of the utmost importance. Mr. Lloyd +George, however, said that he did not know what he could do with +British public opinion. He had a copy of the Daily Mail in his hand, +and he said, "As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing +how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia?" The Daily Mail was +roaring and screaming about the whole Russian situation. Then Mr. +Lloyd George said, "Of course all the reports we get from people we +send in there are in this same general direction, but we have got to +send in somebody who is known to the whole world as a complete +conservative, in order to have the whole world believe that the report +he brings out is not simply the utterance of a radical." He then said, +"I wonder if we could get Lansdowne to go?" Then he immediately +corrected himself and said, "No; it would probably kill him." Then he +said, "I wish I could send Bob Cecil, but we have got to keep him for +the league of nations." And he said to Smuts, "It would be splendid if +you could go, but, of course, you have got the other job," which was +going down to Hungary. Afterwards he said he thought the most +desirable man to send was the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Robert +Cecil's brother; that he would be respectable enough and well known +enough so that when he came back and made the same report it would go +down with British public opinion. Mr. Lloyd George then urged me to +make public my report. He said it was absolutely necessary to have +publicity given to the actual conditions in Russia, which he +recognized were as presented. + +I saw Mr. Balfour that afternoon with Sir Eric Drummond, who at that +time was acting as his secretary. He is now secretary of the league of +nations. We discussed the entire matter. Sir William Wiseman told me +afterward that Mr. Balfour was thoroughly in favor of the proposition. + +Well, to cut the story short, first the President referred the matter +to Col. House. He left his decision on the matter with Col. House, as +was his usual course of procedure in most such matters. Mr. Lloyd +George also agreed in advance to leave the preparation of the proposal +to Col. House; that is, he said he would be disposed to go at least as +far as we would and would follow the lead of the President and Col. +House. Col. House thereupon asked me to prepare a reply to this +proposal, which I did. + +Col. House in the meantime had seen Mr. Orlando, and Mr. Orlando had +expressed himself as entirely in favor of making peace on this basis, +at least so Col. House informed me at the time. The French, I believe, +had not yet been approached formally on the matter. + +Senator KNOX. By the way, right here, you say Mr. Lloyd George advised +you to make your report public. Did you make it public? + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. Mr. Lloyd George desired me to make it public +for the enlightenment that he thought it might give to public opinion. + +Senator KNOX. But you did not do it? + + + + +BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED + +Mr. BULLITT. I attempted to. I prepared a statement for the press +based on my report, giving the facts, which I submitted to the +commission to be given out. No member of the commission was ready to +take the responsibility for publicity in the matter and it was +referred to the President. The President received it and decided that +he did not want it given out. He thought he would rather keep it +secret, and in spite of the urgings of the other commissioners he +continued to adhere to that point of view, and my report has never +been made public until this moment. + +Col. House asked me to prepare a declaration of policy, a statement +based on this proposal of the Soviet Government. It was to be an +ironclad declaration which we knew in advance would be accepted by the +Soviet Government if we made it, and he thought that the President and +Mr. Lloyd George would put it through. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you attend that meeting of the commission when +that report was considered by the American Commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. I first handed each member of the commission my report. I +had appeared before them and discussed my mission for an entire day. +They sat in the morning and in the afternoon. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I wondered whether you were present when the +President thought it would be better not to give it out, not to make +it public. + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir; I was not. Then upon order of Col. House, to +whom the matter had been referred, I prepared this declaration of +policy. I prepared it in conjunction with Mr. Whitney Shepherdson, who +was Col. House's assistant secretary, and also versed in international +law. I do not know that this is of any importance, aside from the fact +that it is almost the only direct proposition to accept their proposal +which was prepared. Col. House took this and held it under advisement +and discussed it, I believe, with the President and other persons. + +The CHAIRMAN. It had better be printed. + +The document referred to is as follows: + +A PROPOSED DECLARATION OF POLICY TO BE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE +ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS AND AN OFFER OF AN ARMISTICE + + +The representatives of the States assembled in conference at Paris +recently extended an invitation to the organized groups in Russia to +lay down their arms and to send delegates to Prince's Island. These +delegates were asked to "confer with the representatives of the +associated powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to +ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people and +bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which +Russia may work out her own purposes and happy cooperative relations +may be established between her people and the other peoples of the +world." The truce of arms was not declared, and the meeting did not +take place. + +The people of Russia are laboring to-day to establish the system of +government under which they shall live. Their task is one of +unparalleled difficulty, and should not be further complicated by the +existence of misapprehensions among the Russian people or throughout +the world. Therefore, the representatives of the associated powers, +now sitting in the conference of Paris, have determined to state +publicly what they had in mind to say through their delegates to +Prince's Island concerning the policies which govern their relations +with the Russian people. + +They wish to make it plain that they do not intend to interfere in any +way with the solution of the political, social, or economic problems +of Russia. They believe that the peace of the world will largely +depend upon a right settlement of these matters; but they equally +recognize that any right settlement must proceed from the Russian +people themselves, unembarrassed by influence or direction from +without. On the other hand, the associated powers desired to have it +clearly understood that they can have no dealings with any Russian +Government which shall invade the territory of its neighbors or seek +to impose its will upon other peoples by force. The full authority and +military power of the associated governments will stand in the way of +any such attempt. + +The task of creating a stable government demands all the great +strength of Russia, healed of the famine, misery, and disease which +attend and delay the reconstruction. The associated powers have +solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of +Europe. Their efforts, begun in Belgium and in northern France during +the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to +the Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads of +food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an +impartial hand. Industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point +where it was broken off by war. These measures of relief will be +continued until peace is signed and until nations are once more able +to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce. + +It is the earnest desire of the associated peoples similarly to +assuage the distress of millions of men and women in Russia and to +provide them with such physical conditions as will make life possible +and desirable. Relief can not be effectively rendered, however, except +by the employment of all available transportation facilities and the +active cooperation of those exercising authority within the country. + +These requisites can not be assured while Russia is still at war. + +The allied and associated governments, therefore, propose an agreement +between themselves and all governments now exercising political +authority within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including +Finland, together with Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, +Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, that hostilities against one another +shall cease on all fronts within these territories on April ---- at +noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of +this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind +whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long +as the armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice shall +be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent. The allied and +associated Governments propose that such of these Governments as are +willing to accept the terms of this armistice shall send not more than +three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts, +to ---- where they shall meet on April ---- with representatives of +the allied and associated Governments in conference to discuss peace, +upon the basis of the following principles: + + (1) All signatory Governments shall remain, as against each + other, in full control of the territories which they occupy + at the moment when the armistice becomes effective; subject + only to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the + conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these + territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change + their Government. + + (2) The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, and full + security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the + citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons + comply with the laws of the country to which they seek + admittance, and provided also that they do not interfere or + attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics + of that country. + + (3) The right to send official representatives enjoying full + liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several + signatories to each other. + + (4) A general amnesty shall be granted by the various + signatories to all political or military opponents, + offenders, and prisoners who are so regarded because of + their association or affiliation with another signatory, + provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of + the land. + + (5) Nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the + country of another shall be given all possible facilities + for repatriation. + + (6) The allied and associated Governments shall immediately + withdraw their armed forces and further military support + from the territory of the former Russian Empire, including + Finland, and the various Governments within that territory + shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces + according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be + agreed upon by the conference. + + (7) Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as + against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be + established, subject to a program of equitable distribution + of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be + agreed upon by the conference. + + (8) Provision shall be made by the conference for a mutual + exchange of transit and port privileges among the several + signatories. + + (9) The conference shall be competent to discuss and + determine any other matter which bears upon the problem of + establishing peace within the territory of the former + Russian Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment + of international relations among the signatories. + + NOTE.--If it is desirable to include a specific reference to + Russia's financial obligations, the following clause (8 bis) + would be acceptable to the Soviet Government at least: "The + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their + responsibility for the financial obligations of the former + Russian Empire to foreign States parties to this agreement + and to the nationals of such States. Detailed arrangements + for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by + the conference, regard being had to the present financial + situation of Russia." + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Was this brought to the attention of the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. The first night after I got in Col. House went to the +telephone and called up the President right away and told him that I +was in, and that he thought this was a matter of the utmost +importance, and that it would seem to be an opportunity to make peace +in a section of the world where there was no peace; in fact, where +there were 23 wars. The President said he would see me the next +evening down at Col. House's office, as I remember it. The next +evening, however, the President had a headache and he did not come. +The following afternoon Col. House said to me that he had seen the +President and the President had said he had a one-track mind and was +occupied with Germany at present, and he could not think about Russia, +and that he had left the Russian matter all to him, Col. House. +Therefore I continued to deal with Col. House directly on it inasmuch +as he was the delegate of the President, and Lloyd George, in the +matter. I used to see Col. House every day, indeed two or three times +a day, on the subject, urging him to obtain action before April 10, +which, as you will recall, was the date when this proposal was to +expire. + + + + +NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA + +Meanwhile Mr. Hoover and Mr. Auchincloss had the idea of approaching +peace with Russia by a feeding proposition, and they had approached +Mr. Fridjof Nansen, the Arctic explorer, and got him to write and send +the following letter to the President. You doubtless have seen his +letter to the President. + + PARIS, April 3, 1919. + + MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The present food situation in Russia, + where hundreds of thousands of people are dying monthly from + sheer starvation and disease, is one of the problems now + uppermost in all men's minds. As it appears that no solution + of this food and disease question has so far been reached in + any direction, I would like to make a suggestion from a + neutral point of view for the alleviation of this gigantic + misery on purely humanitarian grounds. + + It would appear to me possible to organize a purely + humanitarian commission for the provisioning of Russia, the + foodstuffs and medical supplies to be paid for, perhaps, to + some considerable extent by Russia itself, the justice of + distribution to be guaranteed by such a commission, the + membership of the commission to be comprised of Norwegian, + Swedish, and possibly Dutch, Danish, and Swiss + nationalities. It does not appear that the existing + authorities in Russia would refuse the intervention of such + a commission of wholly nonpolitical order, devoted solely to + the humanitarian purpose of saving life. If thus organized + upon the lines of the Belgian Relief Commission, it would + raise no question of political recognition or negotiations + between the Allies with the existing authorities in Russia. + + I recognize keenly the large political issues involved, and + I would be glad to know under what conditions you would + approve such an enterprise and whether such commission could + look for actual support in finance, shipping, and food and + medical supplies from the United States Government. + + I am addressing a similar note to Messrs. Orlando, + Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. Believe me, my dear Mr. + President, + + Yours, most respectfully, + + FRIDJOF NANSEN. + + His Excellency the PRESIDENT, + II Place des Etats-Unis, Paris. + +Senator KNOX, I think that was published in nearly all the papers. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. In it he proposed that a commission should be formed +at once for the feeding of Russia, because of the frightful conditions +of starvation and so on. Col. House decided that it would be an easier +way to peace if we could get there via the feeding plan, under the +guise of a purely humanitarian plan, if we could slide in that way +instead of by a direct, outright statement inviting these people to +sit down and make peace. Therefore he asked me to prepare a reply to +the Nansen letter, which I have here. + + PARIS, FRANCE, April 4, 1919. Suggested reply to Dr. + Nansen by the President of the United States and the + premiers of France, Great Britain, and Italy: + + DEAR MR. NANSEN: It is the earnest desire of the allied and + associated Governments, and of the peoples for whom they + speak, to assuage the distress of the millions of men, + women, and children who are suffering in Russia. The + associated powers have solemnly pledged their resources to + relieve the stricken regions of Europe. Their efforts, begun + in Belgium and in Northern France during the course of the + war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to the + Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads + of food are moved into the interior and there are + distributed with an impartial hand. Industry is awakened, + and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by + war. These measures of relief will be continued until + nations are once more able to provide for their needs + through the normal channels of commerce. + + The associated peoples desire and deem it their duty + similarly to assist in relieving the people of Russia from + the misery, famine, and disease which oppress them. In view + of the responsibilities which have already been undertaken + by the associated Governments they welcome the suggestion + that the neutral States should take the initiative in the + matter of Russian relief and, therefore, are prepared to + state in accordance with your request, the conditions under + which they will approve and assist a neutral commission for + the provisioning of Russia. + + The allied and associated Governments and all Governments + now exercising political authority within the territory of + the former Russian Empire, including Finland, together with + Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and + Afghanistan, shall agree that hostilities against one + another shall cease on all fronts within these territories + on April 20 at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be + begun during the period of this armistice, and that no + troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be + transferred to or within these territories so long as the + armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice + shall be for two weeks unless extended by mutual consent. + + The allied and associated Governments propose that such of + these Governments as are willing to accept the terms of this + armistice, shall send not more than three representatives + each, together with necessary technical experts, to + Christiania, where they shall meet on April 25 with + representatives of the allied and associated Governments in + conference to discuss peace 'and the provisioning of Russia, + upon the basis of the following principles: + + 1. All signatory Governments shall remain, as + against each other, in full control of the + territories which they occupy at the moment when + the armistice becomes effective, subject to such + rectifications as may be agreed upon by the + conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these + territories shall themselves voluntarily determine + to change their government. + + 2. The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, + and full security shall be accorded by the several + signatories to the citizens of each other; + provided, however, that such persons comply with + the laws of the country to which they seek + admittance, and provided also-that they do not + interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with + the domestic politics of that country. + + 3. The right to send official representatives + enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be + accorded by the several signatories to one + another. + + 4. A general amnesty shall be granted by the + various signatories to all political or military + opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so + treated because of their association or + affiliation with another signatory, provided that + they have not otherwise violated the laws of the + land. + + 5. Nationals of one signatory residing or detained + in the country of another shall be given all + possible facilities for repatriation. + + 6. The allied and associated Governments will + immediately withdraw their armed forces and + further military support from the territory of the + former Russian Empire, including Finland and the + various Governments within that territory shall + effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces + according to a scheme of demobilization and + control to be agreed upon by the conference. + + 7. Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory + as against another shall be lifted and trade + relations shall be established, subject to a + program of equitable distribution of supplies and + utilization of transport facilities to be agreed + upon by the conference in consultation with + representatives of those neutral States which are + prepared to assume the responsibility for the + provisioning of Russia. + + 8. Provision shall be made by the conference for a + mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among + the several signatories. + + 9. The Governments which have been set up on the + territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland + shall recognize their responsibility for the + financial obligations of the former Russian Empire + to foreign States parties to this agreement and to + the nationals of such States. Detailed + arrangements for discharging these obligations + shall be agreed upon by the conference, regard + being had to the present financial situation of + Russia. + + 10. The conference shall be competent to discuss and + determine any other matter which bears upon the + provisioning of Russia, the problem of establishing + peace within the territory of the former Russian + Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment of + international relations among the signatories. + +Mr. BULLITT. I also prepared at the orders of Col. House------ + +Senator KNOX. What attitude did you take toward the Nansen proposal? + +Mr. BULLITT. At first I opposed it. I was in favor of the original +plan. + +Senator KNOX. You were in favor of the original plan? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was in favor of direct, straightforward action in the +matter. However, I found that there was no use in kicking against the +pricks, that I was unable to persuade the commission that my point of +view was the correct one. Therefore at the request of Col. House I +wrote out a reply to Dr. Nansen, in which I embodied a peace proposal +so that it would have meant a peace conference via Nansen, which was +what was desired. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Was that letter delivered to Nansen? + +Mr. BULLITT. No. I gave this reply of mine to Col. House. Col. House +read it and said he would approve it, but that before he gave it to +the President and to Lloyd George as his solution of the way to deal +with this Russian matter, he wished it considered by his international +law experts, Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, and it was thereupon +turned over that afternoon to Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller. Does the +Senator desire this document? + +Senator KNOX. I do not regard it as material. It was not accepted? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was not accepted. What happened in regard to this was +that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, to correct its legal language, +produced a proposition which was entirely different, which left out +all possibility of the matter coming to a peace conference, and was +largely an offer to feed Russia provided Russia put all her railroads +in the hands of the allied and associated Governments. I have that as +well. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you object to having that put in the record, +Senator Knox? + +Senator KNOX. No. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I would like to have that put in. + +(The document referred to is here printed in full, as follows:) + + (AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL) + + Draft of proposed letter to be signed by President Wilson + and the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy + in reply to Mr. Nansen's letter: + + DEAR SIR: The situation of misery and suffering in Russia + which is described in your letter of April 3 is one which + appeals to the sympathies of all peoples of the world. + Regardless of political differences or shades of thought, + the knowledge that thousands and perhaps millions of men, + and above all of women and children lack the food and the + necessities which make life endurable is one which is + shocking to humanity. + + The Governments and the peoples whom we represent, without + thought of political, military or financial advantage, would + be glad to cooperate in any proposal which would relieve the + existing situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose, purely humanitarian in its + purpose, would offer a practical means of carrying out the + beneficent results which you have in view and could not + either in its conception or its operation be considered as + having in view any other aim than "the humanitarian purpose + of saving life." + + It is true that there are great difficulties to be overcome, + political difficulties owing to the existing situation in + Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the + existing de facto governments of Russia are all willing as + the Governments and peoples whom we represent to see succor + and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no + political difficulties will remain as obstacles thereto. + + There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and + transport which we have mentioned and also the problem of + distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can + ourselves safely hope to solve in connection with the advice + and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The + problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to + meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral + Governments. + + The difficulties of transport in Russia can in large degree + only be overcome in Russia itself. So far as possible, we + would endeavor to provide increased means of transportation; + but we would consider it essential in any such scheme of + relief that control of transportation in Russia, so far as + was necessary in the distribution of relief supplies, should + be placed wholly under such a commission as is described in + your letter and should to the necessary extent be freed from + any governmental or private control whatsoever. + + The real human element in the situation, even supposing all + these difficulties to be surmounted, is the problem of + distribution, the problem of seeing that the food reaches + the starving, the medicines the sick, the clothing the + naked. Subject to the supervision of such a commission, this + is a problem which should be solely under the control of the + people of Russia themselves so far as it is humanly possible + to put it under their control. It is not a question of class + or of race or of politics but a question of human beings in + need, and these human beings in each locality should be + given, as under the regime of the Belgian relief commission, + the fullest opportunity to advise the commission upon the + methods and the personnel by which their community is to be + relieved. Under no other circumstances could it be believed + that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian and not + political, and still more important, under no other + conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. + That such a course would involve cessation of hostilities by + Russian troops would of course mean a cessation of all + hostilities on the Russian fronts. Indeed, relief to Russia + which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be + futile, and would be impossible to consider. + + Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that + your plan could be successfully carried into effect and we + should be prepared to give it our full support. + +Senator KNOX. What I am anxious to get at is to find out what became +of your report. + +Senator FALL. I should like to know whether Col. House approved Mr. +Auchincloss's and Mr. Miller's report, or the report of the witness. + +Mr. BULLITT. I should like to have this clear, and if I can read just +this one page I shall be greatly obliged. On this proposition I wrote +the following memorandum to Mr. Auchincloss [reading]: + + APRIL 4, 1919. + + Memorandum for Mr. Auchincloss: + + DEAR GORDON: I have studied carefully the draft of the reply + to Dr. Nansen which you have prepared. In spirit and + substance your letter differs so radically from the reply + which I consider essential that I find it difficult to make + any constructive criticism. And I shall refrain from + criticizing your rhetoric. + + There are two proposals in your letter, however, which are + obviously unfair and will not, I am certain, be accepted by + the Soviet Government. + + 1. The life of Russia depends upon its railroads; + and your demand for control of transportation by + the commission can hardly be accepted by the + Soviet Government which knows that plots for the + destruction of railroad bridges were hatched in + the American consulate in Moscow. You are asking + the Soviet Government to put its head in the + lion's mouth. It will not accept. You must + moderate your phrases. + + 2. When you speak of the "cessation of hostilities + by Russian troops," you fail to speak of + hostilities by troops of the allied and associated + Governments, a number of whom, you may recall, + have invaded Russia. Furthermore, your phrase does + not cover Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Poles, etc. In + addition, you say absolutely nothing about the + withdrawal of the troops of the allied and + associated Governments from Russian territory. + And, most important, you fail to say that troops + and military supplies will cease to be sent into + the territory of the former Russian Empire. You + thereby go a long way toward proving Trotsky's + thesis: That any armistice will simply be used by + the Allies as a period in which to supply tanks, + aeroplanes, gas shells, liquid fire, etc., to the + various antisoviet governments. As it stands, your + armistice proposal is absolutely unfair, and I am + sure that it will not be accepted by the Soviet + Government. + + Very respectfully, yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +Senator NEW. Otherwise you had no fault to find with it? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. The morning after Col. House had told me he wished +to submit this proposition to his international law experts, I came as +usual to his office about 9.40, and Mr. Auchincloss was on his way to +the President with his proposal, the Auchincloss-Miller proposal, as +Col. House's proposal. But I got that stopped. I went in to Col. +House, and Col. House told Mr. Auchincloss not to take it up to the +President, and asked me if I could doctor up the reply of Mr. +Auchincloss and Mr. Miller to the Nansen letter so that it might +possibly be acceptable to the Soviet Government. I thereupon rewrote +the Auchincloss-Miller letter, but I was forced to stick very closely +to the text. I was told that I could cut things out if I wished to, +but to stick very closely to the text, which I did. I drew this +redraft of their letter, under protest at the whole business. My +redraft of their letter was finally the basis of the reply of the four +to Nansen. I have both these documents here, my reply--and the four +took that reply--and with the changes---- + +The CHAIRMAN. What four--the successors of the ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. The successors of the 10, sir, took the reply------ + +The CHAIRMAN. Who were the four at that moment? + +Mr. BULLITT. M. Orlando, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and the +President. This extremely mild proposition, which really had almost no +chance of life, was, you will see, in no sense a reply to these +proposals of the Soviet Government. This is my attempt to doctor up +the Auchincloss-Miller proposition. In spite of every effort I could +make to obtain definite action on it, the reply was made to me that +this reply to the Nansen proposal would be a sufficient reply to that +proposal of the Soviet Government. [Reading:] + + DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in + your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all + peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, + women, and children lack the food and the necessities, which + make life endurable. + + The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad + to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or + financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve + this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose would offer a practical means of + achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could + not, either in its conception or its operation, be + considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian + purpose of saving life." + +There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, +owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply +and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as +willing as the Governments and the peoples whom we represent to see +succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no +political obstacle will remain. There will remain, however, the +difficulties of supply and transport, which we have mentioned, and +also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of +supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice +and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of +transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the +assistance of your own and other neutral Governments. The problem of +transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the +people of Russia themselves, with the assistance, advice, and +supervision of your commission. + +Subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be +solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The +people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the +Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your +commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community +is to be relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed that +the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under +no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. + +That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within +the territory of the former Russian Empire is obvious. And the +cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete +suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all +sorts to and within these territories. Indeed, relief to Russia which +did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would +be impossible to consider. + +Under such conditions as we have outlined we believe that your plan +could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared +to give it our full support. + + + + + +REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON, PREMIERS CLEMENCEAU, LLOYD GEORGE, AND +ORLANDO, TO DR. NANSEN, APRIL 17, 1919 + + DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in + your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all + peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, + women, and children lack the food and the necessities which + make life endurable. + + The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad + to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or + financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve + this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose would offer a practical means of + achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could + not, either in its conception or its operation, be + considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian + purpose of saving life." + + There are great difficulties to be overcome, political + difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and + difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing + local governments of Russia are as willing as the + Governments and people whom we represent to see succor and + relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political + obstacle will remain. + + There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply, + finance, and transport which we have mentioned? and also the + problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of + supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with + the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you + propose. The problem of finance would seem to us to fall + upon the Russian authorities. The problem of transport of + supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance + of your own and other neutral governments whose interests + should be as great as our own and whose losses have been far + less. The problems of transport in Russia and of + distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia + themselves, with the assistance, advice, and supervision of + your commission. + + Subject to your supervision, the problem of distribution + should be solely under the control of the people of Russia + themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as + under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the + fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the + methods and the personnel by which their community is to be + relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed + that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not + political; under no other condition could it be certain that + the hungry would be fed. + + That such a course would involve cessation of all + hostilities within definitive lines in the territory of + Russia is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, + necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer + of troops and military material of all sorts to and within + Russian territory. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not + mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would + be impossible to consider. + + Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that + your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we + should be prepared to give it our full support. + + V.E. ORLANDO. + D. LLOYD GEORGE. + WOODROW WILSON. + G. CLEMENCEAU. + +Senator KNOX. I want the reply of Auchincloss to Nansen to go into the +record. + +The CHAIRMAN. Let all that correspondence be printed in the record. + +Senator KNOX. Dr. Nansen's proposition, and then the reply, + +(The letters referred to are inserted above.) + +Mr. BULLITT. The Nansen letter was written in Mr. Hoover's office. +Nansen made the proposition. I wrote the original of a reply to Dr. +Nansen, which I believe would have led to peace. Col. House indicated +his approval of it, but wished to have it considered from the +international legal standpoint, which was then done by Mr. Auchincloss +and Mr. Miller, who proposed a reply that had no resemblance to my +proposal. I then objected to that as it was on its way to the +President. It was not sent to the President, and I was ordered to try +to doctor it up. I attempted to doctor it up and produced a doctored +version which was finally made the basis of the reply, with the change +of two or three words which made it even worse and even more +indefinite, so that the Soviet Government could not possibly conceive +it as a genuine peace proposition. It left the whole thing in the air. + +Senator KNOX. We would like to have you see that these documents to +which you have just now referred are inserted in the record in the +sequence in which you have named them. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I shall be at the service of the committee in that +regard. + +Senator HARDING. Lest I missed something while I was out of the room I +am exceedingly curious to know why the Soviet proposal was not given +favorable consideration. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt has stated that. + + + + +KOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL + +Mr. BULLITT. The principal reason was entirely different. The fact was +that just at this moment, when this proposal was under consideration, +Kolchak made a 100-mile advance. There was a revolt of peasants in a +district of Russia which entirely cut off supplies from the Bolshevik +army operating against Kolchak. Kolchak made a 100-mile advance, and +immediately the entire press of Paris was roaring and screaming on the +subject, announcing that Kolchak would be in Moscow within two weeks; +and therefore everyone in Paris, including, I regret to say members of +the American commission, began to grow very lukewarm about peace in +Russia, because they thought Kolchak would arrive in Moscow and wipe +out the Soviet Government. + +Senator KNOX. And the proposal which you brought back from Russia, +that is the Soviet proposal, was abandoned and dropped, after this +last document to which you have just referred. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was. May I say this, that April 10 was the final +date when their proposition was open. I had attempted every day and +almost every night to obtain a reply to it. I finally requested the +commission to send the following telegram to Tchitcherin. + +I proposed to send this telegram to the American consul at Helsingfors +[reading]: + + APRIL 10, 1919. + AMERICAN CONSUL, Helsingfors: + + Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to + Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with + following message for Tchitcherin: + + "Action leading to food relief via neutrals likely within + week.--Bullitt." + + + + +AMMISSION. + +The commission considered that matter, and this is the official minute +of their meeting [reading]: + + AMERICAN MISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + [No. 211.] April 10, 1919. + + To: The Commissioners, for action. + Subject: Telegram to Tchitcherin. + + _Statement_.--Action by the council of four on the reply to + Mr. Nansen was prevented yesterday by French objection to a + minor clause in the President's letter. It is hoped that + agreement in this matter may be reached to-day or to-morrow, + but it is quite possible that agreement may not be reached + for several days. + + To-day, April 10, the pledge of the Soviet Government to + accept a proposal of the sort outlined in its statement of + March 14 expires. No indication has been given the Soviet + Government that its statement was ever placed before the + conference of Paris or that any change of policy in regard + to Russia is contemplated. In view of the importance which + the Soviet Government placed upon its statement, I fear that + this silence and the passing of April 10 will be interpreted + as a definite rejection of the peace effort of the Soviet + Government and that the Soviet Government will at once issue + belligerent political statements and orders for attacks on + all fronts, including Bessarabia and Archangel. It is + certain that if the soviet troops should enter Bessarabia or + should overcome the allied forces at Archangel, the + difficulty of putting through the policy which is likely to + be adopted within the next few days would be greatly + increased. I feel that if the appended telegram should be + sent at once to Tchitcherin, no large offensive movements by + the soviet armies would be undertaken for another week, and + no provocative political statements would be issued. + + I therefore respectfully suggest that the appended telegram + should be sent at once. + + Respectfully submitted. + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +APRIL 10, 1919. + +At the meeting of the commissioners this morning the above memorandum +was read in which Mr. Bullitt requested that a telegram be sent to the +American consul at Helsingfors, instructing the latter to send a +message through reliable sources to Tchitcherin respecting Mr. +Lansing's contemplated scheme for relief in Russia. After some +discussion the commissioners redrafted the telegram in question to +read as follows: + + "Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to + Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with + following message for Tchitcherin, sent on my personal + responsibility: 'Individuals of neutral States are + considering organization for feeding Russia. Will perhaps + decide something definite within a week.'--Bullitt." + + CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, + Assistant to Mr. White. + +I believe that telegram was dispatched. I do not know. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I want to ask you a question. You have told +us that you went to Russia with instructions from the Secretary of +State, Mr. Lansing, with a definition of the American policy by Mr. +House, with the approval of Lloyd George, who approved of your +mission, of the purposes for which you were being sent. Now, tell us +whether or not to your knowledge your report and the proposal of the +Soviet Government was ever formally taken up by the peace conference +and acted on? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was never formally laid before the peace conference, +which I believe met only six times during the course of the entire +proceedings of what is called the peace conference. + + + + +LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT + +Senator KNOX. Did not Mr. Lloyd George in a speech to Parliament +assert that he had never received the proposal with which you returned +from Russia? Have you a copy of his speech? + +Mr. BULLITT. About a week after I had handed to Mr. Lloyd George the +official proposal, with my own hands, in the presence of three other +persons, he made a speech before the British Parliament, and gave the +British people to understand that he knew nothing whatever about any +such proposition. It was a most egregious case of misleading the +public, perhaps the boldest that I have ever known in my life. On the +occasion of that statement of Mr. Lloyd George, I wrote the President. +I clipped his statement from a newspaper and sent it to the President, +and I asked the President to inform me whether the statement of Mr. +Lloyd George was true or untrue. He was unable to answer, inasmuch as +he would have had to reply on paper that Mr. Lloyd George had made an +untrue statement. So flagrant was this that various members of the +British mission called on me at the Crillon, a day or so later, and +apologized for the Prime Minister's action in the case. + +Senator KNOX. Have you a copy of Lloyd George's remarks in the +Parliament? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have a copy. + +Senator KNOX. Suppose you read it? + +Mr. BULLITT. It is as follows: + +Mr. CLYNES. Before the right honorable gentleman comes to the next +subject, can he make any statement on the approaches or +representations alleged to have been made to his Government by persons +acting on behalf of such government as there is in Central Russia? + +Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all except what have +appeared in the papers. + +Mr. CLYNES. I ask the question because it has been repeatedly alleged. + +Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all. Constantly there +are men coming and going to Russia of all nationalities, and they +always come back with their tales of Russia. But we have made no +approach of any sort. + +I have only heard reports of others having proposals which they assume +have come from authentic quarters, but these have never been put +before the peace conference by any member, and therefore we have not +considered them. + +I think I know what my right honorable friend refers to. There was +some suggestion that a young American had come back from Russia with a +communication. It is not for me to judge the value of this +communication, but if the President of the United States had attached +any value to it he would have brought it before the conference, and he +certainly did not. + +It was explained to me by the members of the British delegation who +called on me, that the reason for this deception was that although +when Lloyd George got back to London he intended to make a statement +very favorable to peace with Russia, he found that Lord Northcliffe, +acting through Mr. Wickham Steed, the editor of The Times, and Mr. +Winston Churchill, British secretary for war, had rigged the +conservative majority of the House of Commons against him, and that +they were ready to slay him then and there if he attempted to speak +what was his own opinion at the moment on Russian policies. + + + + +MR. BULLITT RESIGNS + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, you resigned your relations with the State +Department and the public service, did you not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +Senator KNOX. When? + +Mr. BULLITT. I resigned on May 17. + +Senator KNOX. For what reason? + +Mr. BULLITT. Well, I can explain that perhaps more briefly than in any +other way by reading my letter of resignation to the President, which +is brief. + +Senator KNOX. Very well, we would like to hear it. + +The CHAIRMAN. Before that letter is read, you did not see the +President and had no knowledge of his attitude in regard to your +report? + +Mr. BULLITT. None whatever, except as it was reported to me by Col. +House. Col. House, as I said before, reported to me that he thought in +the first place that the President favored the peace proposal; in the +second place, that the President could not turn his mind to it, +because he was too occupied with Germany, and finally--well, really, I +have no idea what was in the President's mind. + +Senator KNOX. There never was another effort to secure an audience +with the President for you after those first two that you say Col. +House made? + +Mr. BULLITT. No; not at all. Meetings with the President were always +arranged through Col. House. + +In my letter of resignation to the President, which was dated May 17, +1919, I said: + + MAY 17, 1919. + + MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have submitted to-day to the + Secretary of State my resignation as an assistant in the + Department of State, attaché to the American commission to + negotiate peace. I was one of the millions who trusted + confidently and implicitly in your leadership and believed + that you would take nothing less than "a permanent peace" + based upon "unselfish and unbiased justice." But our + Government has consented now to deliver the suffering + peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections, and + dismemberments--a new century of war. And I can convince + myself no longer that effective labor for "a new world + order" is possible as a servant of this Government. + + Russia, "the acid test of good will," for me as for you, has + not even been understood. Unjust decisions of the conference + in regard to Shantung, the Tyrol, Thrace, Hungary, East + Prussia, Danzig, the Saar Valley, and the abandonment of the + principle of the freedom of the seas make new international + conflicts certain. It is my conviction that the present + league of nations will be powerless-to prevent these wars, + and that the United States will be involved in them by the + obligations undertaken in the covenant of the league and in + the special understanding with France. Therefore the duty of + the Government of the United States to its own people and to + mankind is to refuse to sign or ratify this unjust treaty, + to refuse to guarantee its settlements by entering the + league of nations, to refuse to entangle the United States + further by the understanding with France. + + That you personally opposed most of the unjust settlements, + and that you accepted them only under great pressure, is + well known. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that if you + had made your fight in the open, instead of behind closed + doors, you would have carried with you the public opinion of + the world, which was yours; you would have been able to + resist the pressure and might have established the "new + international order based upon broad and universal + principles of right and justice" of which you used to speak. + I am sorry that you did not fight our fight to the finish + and that you had so little faith in the millions of men, + like myself, in every nation who had faith in you. + + Very sincerely, yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + To the honorable WOODROW WILSON, + President of the United States. + +Senator KNOX. Did you ever get a reply to that letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did not, sir. The only intimation I had in regard to it +was that Mr. Close, secretary of the President, with whom I was +lunching, said to me that the President had read my letter and had +said that he would not reply. In connection with that I wrote Col. +House a letter at the same time as follows: + + MAY 17, 1919. + + MY DEAR COL. HOUSE: Since you kindly lent me the text of the + proposed treaty of peace, I have tried to convince myself + that some good might come of it and that I ought to remain + in the service of the Department of State to labor for its + establishment. + + It is with sincere regret that I have come to the conviction + that no good ever will issue from a thing so evil and that + those who care about a permanent peace should oppose the + signature and ratification of it, and of the special + understanding with France. + + I have therefore submitted my resignation to the Secretary + of State and have written the appended note to the + President. I hope you will bring it to his attention; not + because he will care what I may think, but because I have + expressed the thoughts which are in the minds of many young + and old men in the commission--thoughts which the President + will have to reckon with when the world begins to reap the + crop of wars the seeds of which have here been sown. + + I feel sure that you will agree that I am right in acting on + my conviction and I hope that this action will in no way + affect the relationship between us which has always been so + delightful and stimulating to me. + + With my sincerest personal regards, I am, Very respectfully, + yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + To the honorable EDWARD M. HOUSE, + Hotel Crillon, Paris. + +Senator KNOX. Did you get a reply to that? + +Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent for me, and after that we had a +conversation. That was the only reply that I had. I had a conversation +with Col. House on the whole matter, and we thrashed it all out. + +Senator KNOX. Was anything said during this conversation which you +feel willing or disposed to tell us, which will be important? + +Mr. BULLITT. I made a record of the conversation. Inasmuch as the +conversations which I had with various members of the commission on +the occasion of my resignation touched on a number of important +issues, I kept a record of those conversations, that is, those I had +at the time when I resigned. They are the only conversations of which +I made records, and I made them simply because we did deal more or +less with the entire question of the peace treaty. On the other hand, +they are personal conversations, and I hesitate to repeat them, unless +the committee considers it particularly important. + +Senator KNOX. I would not press you on the personal conversations +which you had with Col. House after you resigned. I leave the matter +to your own judgment. I wondered whether there might have been +something which transpired which you would care to tell us; but I +withdraw that suggestion. I should like to ask you this one question: +I suppose your letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was merely formal? + +Mr. BULLITT. My letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was a formal +letter. + +Senator KNOX. You certainly got a reply to that. + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. I wrote a formal letter and I got a formal +reply, and the Secretary sent for me the same afternoon and explained +that he only sent me a formal reply because it was necessary, because +of the form in which I had put my resignation, and particularly +because I had appended to my note my letter to the President. We then +discussed various other matters in connection with the treaty. + +The CHAIRMAN. Are you through? + +Senator KNOX. Yes. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, you put into the record or read here, I +think, some extracts from the minutes of the Council of Ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at any of these meetings? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was not, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. The Council of Ten was the first body that was dealing +with the treaty generally, the important body? It was not a special +commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. It was the main body of the conference. + +The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was the main body, and was the one that +subsequently became the Council of Five, and then the Council of Four, +and I think at one time a Council of Three? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, there were records of these meetings, were +there not? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what disposition was made of those records? + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, there were a number of copies for each +delegation, and I presume that there must be a number of copies in +this country at the present time; perhaps not. + +The CHAIRMAN. You say each delegate had a copy? + +Mr. BULLITT. Each plenipotentiary had a copy, and the Secretary of the +American Commission had a copy, I believe, and the assistant +secretaries had copies; certainly one of the assistant secretaries, +Mr. Leland Harrison; and Mr. Grew had a copy. + +The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Lansing have copies while he served on the +Council of Ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; well, I am quite sure that he did. I am sure +that I have seen copies on the desk of the Secretary. + +The CHAIRMAN. Well, they were furnished regularly to every member of +the conference? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. + +The CHAIRMAN. We have found some difficulty in getting them; that is +the reason I asked. + +Senator KNOX. I am informed--perhaps Mr. Bullitt can tell us--that +there is a complete set of minutes in the hands of some individual in +this country. Do you know anything about that--perhaps Auchincloss & +Miller? + +Mr. BULLITT. I could not be certain in regard to the matter, but I +should certainly be under the impression that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. +Miller have copies of the minutes; perhaps not. Perhaps Mr. +Auchincloss has left his with Col. House. He would have Col. House's +copies. Perhaps they are in this country, perhaps not. But Mr. +Auchincloss and Mr. Miller perhaps have those minutes in their files. + +The CHAIRMAN. Undoubtedly there are a number, at least, of those +records in existence. + +Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. That must be the case. + +Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir. Also records of the meetings of the +American Commission. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know whether or not they are in the State +Department--any of these minutes or records in our State Department? + +Mr. BULLITT. I should presume that in the normal course of events they +would be certainly among Mr. Lansing's papers, which were very +carefully kept. He had an excellent secretariat. + +The CHAIRMAN. Did any member of our delegation, any member of the +council of 10, express to you any opinions about the general character +of this treaty? + +Mr. BULLITT. Well, Mr. Lansing, Col. House, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. White +had all expressed to me very vigorously their opinions on the subject. + +The CHAIRMAN. Were they enthusiastically in favor of it? + +Mr. BULLITT. I regret to say, not. + +As I say, the only documents of the sort that I have are the memoranda +of the discussions that I had after I resigned, when we thrashed over +the whole ground. + +The CHAIRMAN. Those memoranda of consultations that you had after you +resigned you prefer not to publish? I am not asking you to do so. + +Mr. BULLITT. I think it would be out of the way. + +The CHAIRMAN. I quite understand your position. I only wanted to +know--I thought it might be proper for you to say whether or not their +opinions which you heard them express were favorable to the series of +arrangements, I would call them, that were made for the consideration +of this treaty. + +Mr. BULLITT. It is no secret that Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. +Henry White objected very vigorously to the numerous provisions of the +treaty. + +The CHAIRMAN. It is known that they objected to Shantung. That, I +think, is public information. I do not know that it is public +information that they objected to anything else. + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not think that Secretary Lansing is at all +enthusiastic about the league of nations as it stands at present. I +have a note of a conversation with him on the subject, which, if I +may, I will just read, without going into the rest of that +conversation, because it bears directly on the issue involved. + +This was a conversation with the Secretary of State at 2.30 on May 19. +The Secretary sent for me. It was a long conversation, and Mr. Lansing +in the course of it said: + +Mr. Lansing then said that he personally would have strengthened +greatly the judicial clauses of the league of nations covenant, making +arbitration compulsory. He also said that he was absolutely opposed to +the United States taking a mandate in either Armenia or +Constantinople; that he thought that Constantinople should be placed +under a local government, the chief members of which were appointed by +an international committee. + +This is a matter, it seems to me, of some importance in regard to the +whole discussion, and therefore I feel at liberty to read it, as it is +not a personal matter. + +The CHAIRMAN. This is a note of the conversation made at the time? + +Mr. BULLITT. This is a note which I immediately dictated after the +conversation. [Reading:] + + Mr. Lansing then said that he, too, considered many parts of + the treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with + Shantung and the league of nations. He said: "I consider + that the league of nations at present is entirely useless. + The great powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the + world to suit themselves. England and France in particular + have gotten out of the treaty everything that they wanted, + and the league of nations can do nothing to alter any of the + unjust clauses of the treaty except by unanimous consent of + the members of the league, and the great powers will never + give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker + peoples." + +We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. +Mr. Lansing said: "I believe that if the Senate could only understand +what this treaty means, and if the American people could really +understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they +will ever understand what it lets them in for." He expressed the +opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really understand the treaty-- +[Laughter.] May I reread it? + +He expressed the opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really +understand the treaty, and that Mr. Lodge would; but that Mr. Lodge's +position would become purely political, and therefore ineffective. + +[Laughter.] + +The CHAIRMAN. I do not mind. + +Mr. BULLITT (reading): + +He thought, however, that Mr. Knox might instruct America in the real +meaning of it. + +[Laughter.] + +The CHAIRMAN. He has made some very valuable efforts in the direction. + +Mr. BULLITT. I beg to be excused from reading any +more of these conversations. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. We get the drift. + +[Laughter.] + +I want to ask one or two questions. + +The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read any of these minutes of the meetings +of the American commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. Of the American commission itself? + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Yes. + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. I have on one or two occasions glanced at them +but I never have read them carefully. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. They were accessible to you at the time, were they? + +Mr. BULLITT. They were, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated, if I recall your testimony correctly, +that when the proposition was made that the legislative bodies of the +contracting parties should have representation in the assembly, the +President objected to that? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President--if I may explain again--approved in +principle, but said that he did not see how the thing could be worked +out, and he felt that the assembly of delegates, or whatever it is +called in the present draft, gave sufficient representation to the +peoples of the various countries. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know what his objection was to the +legislative bodies of the contracting parties having representation on +the assembly? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President believed, I think--in fact, it was so +stated to me by Col. House, who discussed the matter with me--that it +would make too unwieldy a central organ for the league. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you understand why it would be any more unwieldy +if Congress should appoint the delegates than if the President should? + +Mr. BULLITT. It would necessitate a larger central body if +representation was to be given to the important political parties of +the various countries. It would have necessitated a body of, say, 10 +representatives from the United States--5 from the Republican party +and 5 from the; Democratic Party, in the assembly of the league, which +would become a large body. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. The idea was that the political parties of the +country should be represented? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, the political viewpoints should be represented so +that you would get some connection between the central assembly of the +league and the true opinion of the countries. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. When you went across to Paris on the _George +Washington_ with the President do you know whether he had with him at +that time any draft for a league of nations or any memorandum that he +showed to you of discussed with you? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President outlined to several of us one evening, or +rather one afternoon, the conception he had at the time of the league +of nations. I did not see any formal draft that he had, but the +President made a statement before the council of 10, in one of these +minutes from which I have been reading, stating that he had first--and +in fact I think I know it from other sources--that he had first +received the Phillimore report, that then it had been rewritten by +Col. House and that he had rewritten Col. House's report, and after he +had discussed his rewriting with Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts, he had +rewritten it again. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated substantially that the only part of the +league draft which was laid before the Peace Conference which the +President had his way about, was Article 10. Did you make some such +statement as that? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. The President stated to us that that was +practically what he had submitted to the Niagara conference here when +the ABC powers from South America were discussing the Mexican +question. He had then considered it as an article for American use on +this continent. + +Do you know what the attitude of Gen Smuts was as to article 10 as +proposed by the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not, sir. Again, full minutes of the discussions and +conclusions reached of all these meetings of the committee on the +league of nations were kept. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read the various other plans that were +proposed or suggested over there for a league of nations? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have read some of them, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did the others have anything similar to what is now +article 10 in the treaty pending in the Senate? + +Mr. BULLITT. I really can not say. I am sorry, but I have forgotten. I +should not care to testify on that. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know from what you heard while you were +there in your official capacity whether the other nations were anxious +to have article 10 in the covenant for the league? + +Mr. BULLITT. The French were not only anxious for it, but I believe +were anxious greatly to strengthen it. They desired immediately a +league army to be established, and I believe also to be stationed in +Alsace-Lorraine and along the Rhine, in addition to article 10. I can +not say for certain about the others. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, we had before us at one of our hearings a +representative of the Egyptian people. Do you know anything about +that, when it was done, or any discussions about it? I mean the +clauses that appear in regard to the British protectorate. + +Mr. BULLITT. You mean our agreement to recognize the British +protectorate in Egypt? + +The CHAIRMAN. It was recognized by this treaty in those clauses. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; but we gave a sort of assent before the treaty +formally came out, did we not? I recall the morning it was done. It +was handled by Sir William Wiseman, who was the confidential +representative that Lloyd George and Balfour had constantly with Col. +House and the President. He was a sort of extra confidential foreign +office. It was all done, if I recall his statement correctly, in the +course of one morning. The President was informed that the Egyptian +nationalists were using his 14 points as meaning that the President +thought that Egypt should have the right to control her own destinies, +and therefore have independence, and that they were using this to +foment revolution; that since the President had provoked this trouble +by the 14 points, they thought that he should allay it by the +statement that we would recognize the British protectorate, and as I +remember Sir William Wiseman's statement to me that morning, he said +that he had only brought up the matter that morning and that he had +got our recognition of the British protectorate before luncheon. + +The CHAIRMAN. The President made some public statement? + +Mr. BULLITT. I am not certain in regard to the further developments of +it. I recall that incident, that it was arranged through Sir William +Wiseman, and that it took only a few minutes. + +Senator KNOX. That was a good deal of time to devote to a little +country like Egypt. + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not know. You should know, sir, you have been +Secretary of State. + +Senator KNOX. We never chewed them up that fast. + +Senator NEW. Mr. Bullitt, what, if anything, was said with reference +to the Irish question, with which you are familiar? + +Mr. BULLITT. At the conference? I do not believe the Irish question +was ever brought up before the conference or discussed. There was +considerable said on the side, attempts to let down the Walsh mission +easily without antagonizing the Irish vote in this country. +[Laughter.] I think that is the only consideration that Ireland +received. + +Senator NEW. There was a cheerful willingness to do that, was there +not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I think so. + +The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further that anybody desires to ask +Mr. Bullitt? We are very much obliged to you indeed, Mr. Bullitt. + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, if I may just say--I do not know whether it +is a matter of first interest to the Senators or not--but on this trip +with me to Russia there was Capt. Pettit, and at the same time the +journalist, Lincoln Steffens, and I have documents which they prepared +and which might be of interest to the committee. + +The CHAIRMAN. If you will hand those to the stenographer, we will +print them with your testimony. + +Senator KNOX. What are your plans, Mr. Bullitt? What are you going to +do in this country now? + +Mr. BULLITT. I expect to return to Maine and fish for trout, where I +was when I was summoned by the committee. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did Mr. Steffens go to Russia with you? + +Mr. BULLITT. He did. + +The CHAIRMAN. He held no official position? + +Mr. BULLITT. No. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Who advised him to go? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Is he in the country now? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not believe so. I believe he is still in Europe. + + + + +REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + +(By order of the committee the report of Lincoln Steffens referred to +is here printed in full in the record, as follows:) + + REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + + APRIL 2, 1919. + + Politically, Russia has reached a state of equilibrium; + internally; for the present at least. + + I think the revolution there is ended; that it has run its + course. There will be changes. There may be advances; there + will surely be reactions, but these will be regular, I + think; political and economic, but parliamentary, A new + center of gravity seems to have been found. + + Certainly, the destructive phase of the revolution in Russia + is over. Constructive work has begun. + + We saw this everywhere. And we saw order, and though we + inquired for them, we heard of no disorders. Prohibition is + universal and absolute. Robberies have been reduced in + Petrograd below normal of large cities. Warned against + danger before we went in, we felt safe. Prostitution has + disappeared with its clientele, who have been driven out by + the "no-work-no-food law," enforced by the general want and + the labor-card system. Loafing on the job by workers and + sabotage by upper-class directors, managers, experts and + clerks have been overcome. Russia has settled down to work. + + The soviet form of government, which sprang up so + spontaneously all over Russia, is established. + + This is not a paper thing; not an invention. Never planned, + it has not yet been written into the forms of law. It is not + even uniform. It is full of faults and difficulties; clumsy, + and in its final development it is not democratic. The + present Russian Government is the most autocratic government + I have ever seen. Lenin, head of the Soviet Government, is + farther removed from the people than the Tsar was, or than + any actual ruler in Europe is. + + The people in a shop or an industry are a soviet. These + little informal Soviets elect a local soviet; which elects + delegates to the city or country (community) soviet; which + elects delegates to the government (State) soviet. The + government Soviets together elect delegates to the + All-Russian Soviet, which elects commissionaires (who + correspond to our Cabinet, or to a European minority). And + these commissionaires finally elect Lenin. He is thus five + or six removes from the people. To form an idea of his + stability, independence, and power, think of the process + that would have to be gone through with by the people to + remove him and elect a successor. A majority of all the + Soviets in all Russia would have to be changed in personnel + or opinion, recalled, or brought somehow to recognize and + represent the altered will of the people. + + No student of government likes the soviet as it has + developed. Lenin himself doesn't. He calls it a + dictatorship, and he opposed it at first. When I was in + Russia in the days of Milyoukov and Kerensky, Lenin and the + Bolsheviks were demanding the general election of the + constituent assembly. But the Soviets existed then; they had + the power, and I saw foreign ambassadors blunder, and the + world saw Milyoukov and Kerensky fall, partly because they + would not, or could not, comprehend the nature of the + soviet; as Lenin did finally, when, against his theory, he + joined in and expressed the popular repudiation of the + constituent assembly and went over to work with the soviet, + the actual power in Russia. The constituent assembly, + elected by the people, represented the upper class and the + old system. The soviet was the lower class. + + The soviet, at bottom, is a natural gathering of the working + people, of peasants, in their working and accustomed + groupings, instead of, as with us, by artificial + geographical sections. + + Labor unions and soldiers' messes made up the Soviets in the + cities; poorer peasants and soldiers at the village inn were + the first Soviets in the country; and in the beginning, two + years ago, these lower class delegates used to explain to me + that the "rich peasants" and the "rich people" had their own + meetings and meeting places. The popular intention then was + not to exclude the upper classes from the government, but + only from the Soviets, which were not yet the same. But the + Soviets, once in existence, absorbed in their own class + tasks and their own problems, which the upper class had + either not understood or solved, ignored--no; they simply + forgot the council of empire and the Duma. And so they + discovered (or, to be more exact, their leaders discovered) + that they had actually all the power. All that Lenin and the + other Socialist leaders had to do to carry through their + class-struggle theory was to recognize this fact of power + and teach the Soviets to continue to ignore the assemblies + and the institutions of the upper classes, which, with their + "governments," ministries, and local assemblies, fell, + powerless from neglect. + + The Soviet Government sprouted and grew out of the habits, + the psychology, and the condition of the Russian people. It + fitted them. They understand it. They find they can work it + and they like it. Every effort to put something else in its + place (including Lenin's) has failed. It will have to be + modified, I think, but not in essentials, and it can not be + utterly set aside. The Tsar himself, if he should come back, + would have to keep the Russian Soviet, and somehow rule over + and through it. + + The Communist Party (dubbed "Bolshevik") is in power now in + the Soviet Government. + + I think it will stay there a long time. What I have shown of + the machinery of change is one guaranty of communist + dominance. There are others. All opposition to the communist + government has practically ceased inside of Russia. + + There are three organized opposition parties: Mencheviks, + Social Revolutionary Right, and Social Revolutionary Left. + The anarchists are not organized. The Social Revolutionary + Left is a small group of very anarchistic leaders, who have + hardly any following. The Mencheviks and the Social + Revolutionaries Right are said to be strong, but there is no + way of measuring their strength, for a very significant + reason. + + These parties have stopped fighting. They are critical, but + they are not revolutionary. They also think the revolution + is over. They proposed, and they still propose eventually, + to challenge and oust the Communist Party by parliamentary + and political methods, not by force. But when intervention + came upon distracted Russia, and the people realized they + were fighting many enemies on many fronts, the two strong + opposing parties expressed their own and the public will to + stand by the party in power until the menace of foreign + invasion was beaten off. These parties announced this in + formal statements, uttered by their regular conventions; you + have confirmation of it in the memoranda written for you by + Martov and Volsky, and you will remember how one of them put + it to us personally: + + "There is a fight to be made against the + Bolsheviks, but so long as you foreigners are + making it, we Russians won't. When you quit and + leave us alone, we will take up our burden again, + and we shall deal with the Bolsheviks. And we will + finish them. But we will do it with our people, by + political methods, in the Soviets, and not by + force, not by war or by revolution, and not with + any outside foreign help." + + This is the nationalistic spirit, which we call patriotism, + and understand perfectly; it is much stronger in the new + than it was in the old, the Tsar's, Russia. But there is + another force back of this remarkable statement of a + remarkable state of mind. + + All Russia has turned to the labor of reconstruction; sees + the idea in the plans proposed for the future; and is + interested--imaginatively. + + Destruction was fun for a while and a satisfaction to a + suppressed, betrayed, to an almost destroyed people. + Violence was not in their character, however. The Russian + people, sober, are said to be a gentle people. One of their + poets speaks of them as "that gentle beast, the Russian + people," and I noticed and described in my reports of the + first revolution how patient, peaceable, and "safe" the mobs + of Petrograd were. The violence came later, with Bolshevism, + after the many attempts at counterrevolution, and with + vodka. The Bolshevik leaders regret and are ashamed of their + red terror. They do not excuse it. It was others, you + remember, who traced the worst of the Russian atrocities and + the terror itself to the adoption by the + counter-revolutionists of the method of assassination (of + Lenin and others), and most of all to the discovery by the + mobs of wine cellars and vodka stills. That the Russian + drunk and the Russian sober are two utterly different + animals, is well known to the Jews, to the Reactionaries, + and to the Russians themselves. And that is why this people + lately have not only obeyed; they have themselves ruthlessly + enforced the revolutionary prohibition decrees in every part + of Russia that we would inquire about and hear from. + + The destructive spirit, sated, exhausted, or suppressed, has + done its work. The leaders say so--the leaders of all + parties. + + There is a close relationship between the Russian people and + the new Russian leaders, in power and out. New men in + politics are commonly fresh, progressive, representative; + it's the later statesmen that damp the enthusiasm and sober + the idealism of legislators. In Russia all legislators, all, + are young or new. It is as if we should elect in the United + States a brand-new set of men to all offices, from the + lowest county to the highest Federal position, and as if the + election should occur in a great crisis, when all men are + full of hope and faith. The new leaders of the local Soviets + of Russia were, and they still are, of the people, really. + That is one reason why their autocratic dictatorship is + acceptable. They have felt, they shared the passion of the + mob to destroy, but they had something in mind to destroy. + + The soviet leaders used the revolution to destroy the system + of organized Russian life. + + While the mobs broke windows, smashed wine cellars, and + pillaged buildings to express their rage, their leaders + directed their efforts to the annihilation of the system + itself. They pulled down the Tsar and his officers; they + abolished the courts, which had been used to oppress them; + they closed shops, stopped business generally, and + especially all competitive and speculative business; and + they took over all the great industries, monopolies, + concessions, and natural resources. This was their purpose. + This is their religion. This is what the lower-class culture + has been slowly teaching the people of the world for 50 + years: that it is not some particular evil, but the whole + system of running business and railroads, shops, banks, and + exchanges, for speculation and profit that must be changed. + This is what causes poverty and riches, they teach, misery, + corruption, vice, and war. The people, the workers, or their + State, must own and run these things "for service." + + Not political democracy, as with us; economic democracy is + the idea; democracy in the shop, factory, business. + Bolshevism is a literal interpretation, the actual + application of this theory, policy, or program. And so, in + the destructive period of the Russian revolution, the + Bolshevik leaders led the people to destroy the old system, + root and branch, fruit and blossom, too. And apparently this + was done. The blocks we saw in Petrograd and Moscow of + retail shops nailed up were but one sign of it. When we + looked back of these dismal fronts and inquired more deeply + into the work of the revolution we were convinced that the + Russians have literally and completely done their job. And + it was this that shocked us. It is this that has startled + the world; not the atrocities of the revolution, but the + revolution itself. + + The organization of life as we know it in America, in the + rest of Europe, in the rest of the world, is wrecked and + abolished in Russia. + + The revolution didn't do it. The Tsar's Government had + rotted it. The war broke down the worn-out machinery of it; + the revolution has merely scrapped it finally. + + The effect is hunger, cold, misery, anguish, disease--death + to millions. But worse than these--I mean this--was the + confusion of mind among the well and the strong. We do not + realize, any of us--even those of us who have + imagination--how fixed our minds and habits are by the ways + of living that we know. So with the Russians. They + understood how to work and live under their old system; it + was not a pretty one; it was dark, crooked, and dangerous, + but they had groped around in it all their lives from + childhood up. They could find their way in it. And now they + can remember how it was, and they sigh for the old ways. The + rich emigres knew whom to see to bribe for a verdict, a + safe-conduct, or a concession; and the poor, in their + hunger, think now how it would be to go down to the market + and haggle, and bargain, from one booth to another, making + their daily purchases, reckoning up their defeats and + victories over the traders. And they did get food then. And + now--it is all gone. They have destroyed all this, and + having destroyed it they were lost, strangers in their own + land. + + This tragedy of transition was anticipated by the leaders of + the revolution, and the present needs were prepared for in + the plans laid for reconstruction. + + Lenin has imagination. He is an idealist, but he is a + scholar, too, and a very grim realist. Lenin was a + statistician by profession. He had long been trying to + foresee the future of society under socialism, and he had + marked down definitely the resources, the machinery, and the + institutions existing under the old order, which could be + used in the new. There was the old Russian communal land + system, passing, but standing in spots with its peasants + accustomed to it. That was to be revived; it is his solution + of the problem of the great estates. They are not to be + broken up, but worked by the peasants in common. Then there + was the great Russian Cooperative (trading) Society, with + its 11,000,000 families before the war; now with 17,000,000 + members. He kept that. There was a conflict; it was in + bourgeoise hands but it was an essential part of the + projected system of distribution, so Lenin compromised and + communist Russia has it. He had the railroads, telegraph, + telephone already; the workers seized the factories, the + local Soviets the mines; the All-Russian Soviet, the banks. + The new government set up shops--one in each + neighborhood--to dole out not for money, but on work + tickets, whatever food, fuel, and clothing this complete + government monopoly had to distribute. No bargaining, no + display, no advertising, and no speculation. Everything one + has earned by labor the right to buy at the cooperative and + soviet shops is at a fixed, low price, at the established + (too small.) profit--to the government or to the members of + the cooperative. + + Money is to be abolished gradually. It does not count much + now. Private capital has been confiscated, most of the rich + have left Russia, but there are still many people there who + have hidden away money or valuables, and live on them + without working. They can buy food and even luxuries, but + only illegally from peasants and speculators at the risk of + punishment and very high prices. They can buy, also, at the + government stores, at the low prices, but they can get only + their share there, and only on their class or work tickets. + The class arrangement, though transitory and temporary--the + aim is to have but one class--is the key to the idea of the + whole new system. + + There are three classes. The first can buy, for example, + 1-1/2 pounds of bread a day; the second, three-quarters of a + pound; the third, only one-quarter of a pound; no matter how + much money they may have. The first class includes soldiers, + workers in war, and other essential industries, actors, + teachers, writers, experts, and Government workers of all + sorts. The second class is of all other sorts of workers. + The third is of people who do not work--the leisure class. + Their allowance is, under present circumstances, not enough + to live on, but they are allowed to buy surreptitiously from + speculators on the theory that the principal of their + capital will soon be exhausted, and, since interest, rent, + and profits--all forms of unearned money--are abolished, + they will soon be forced to go to work. + + The shock of this, and the confusion due to the strange + details of it, were, and they still are, painful to many + minds, and not only to the rich. For a long time there was + widespread discontent with this new system. The peasants + rebelled, and the workers were suspicious. They blamed the + new system for the food shortage, the fuel shortage, the + lack of raw materials for the factories. But this also was + anticipated by that very remarkable mind and will--Lenin. He + used the State monopoly and control of the press, and the + old army of revolutionary propagandists to shift the blame + for the sufferings of Russia from the revolutionary + government to the war, the blockade, and the lack of + transportation. Also, he and his executive organization were + careful to see that, when the government did get hold of a + supply of anything, its arrival was heralded, and the next + day it appeared at the community shops, where everybody + (that worked) got his share at the low government price. The + two American prisoners we saw had noticed this, you + remember. "We don't get much to eat," they said, "but + neither do our guards or the other Russians. We all get the + same. And when they get more, we get our share." + + The fairness of the new system, as it works so far, has won + over to it the working class and the poorer peasants. The + well-to-do still complain, and very bitterly sometimes. + Their hoardings are broken into by the government and by the + poverty committees, and they are severely punished for + speculative trading. But even these classes are moved + somewhat by the treatment of children. They are in a class + by themselves: class A,--I. They get all the few + delicacies--milk, eggs, fruit, game, that come to the + government monopoly--at school, where they all are fed, + regardless of class. "Even the rich children," they told us, + "they have as much as the poor children." And the children, + like the workers, now see the operas, too, the plays, the + ballets, the art galleries--all with instructors. + + The Bolsheviks--all the Russian parties--regard the + communists' attitude toward children as the symbol of their + new civilization. + + "It is to be for the good of humanity, not business," one of + them, an American, said, "and the kids represent the future. + Our generation is to have only the labor, the joy, and the + misery of the struggle. We will get none of the material + benefits of the new system, and we will probably never all + understand and like it. But the children--it is for them and + their children that we are fighting, so we are giving them + the best of it from the start, and teaching them to take it + all naturally. They are getting the idea. They are to be our + new propagandists." + + The idea is that everybody is to work for the common good, + and so, as the children and the American prisoners note, + when they all produce more, they all get more. They are + starving now, but they are sharing their poverty. And they + really are sharing it. Lenin eats, like everybody else--only + one meal a day--soup, fish, bread, and tea. He has to save + out of that a bit for breakfast and another bit for supper. + The people, the peasants, send him more, but he puts it in + the common mess. So the heads of this government do not have + to imagine the privations of the people; they feel them. And + so the people and the government realize that, if ever + Russia becomes prosperous, all will share in the wealth, + exactly as they share in the poverty now. In a word, rich + Russia expects to become a rich Russian people. + + This, then, is the idea which has begun to catch the + imagination of the Russian people. This it is that is making + men and women work with a new interest, and a new incentive, + not to earn high wages and short hours, but to produce an + abundance for all. This is what is making a people, sick of + war, send their ablest and strongest men into the new, + high-spirited, hard-drilled army to defend, not their + borders, but their new working system of common living. + + And this is what is making Lenin and his sobered communist + government ask for peace. They think they have carried a + revolution through for once to the logical conclusion. All + other revolutions have stopped when they had revolved + through the political phase to political democracy. This one + has turned once more clear through the economic phase to + economic democracy, to self-government in the factory, shop, + and on the land, and has laid a foundation for universal + profit sharing, for the universal division of food, clothes, + and all goods, equally among all. And they think their + civilization is working on this foundation. They want time + to go on and build it higher and better. They want to spread + it all over the world, but only as it works, As they told us + when we reminded them that the world dreaded their + propaganda: + + "We are through with the old propaganda of + argument. All we ask now is to be allowed to prove + by the examples of things well done here in + Russia, that the new system is good. We are so + sure we shall make good, that we are willing to + stop saying so, to stop reasoning, stop the + haranguing, and all that old stuff. And especially + are we sick of the propaganda by the sword. We + want to stop fighting. We know that each country + must evolve its own revolution out of its own + conditions and in its own imagination. To force it + by war is not scientific, not democratic, not + socialistic. And we are fighting now only in + self-defense. We will stop fighting, if you will + let us stop. We will call back our troops, if you + will withdraw yours. We will demobilize. We need + the picked organizers and the skilled workers now + in the army for our shops, factories, and farms. + We would love to recall them to all this needed + work, and use their troop trains to distribute our + goods and our harvests, if only you will call off + your soldiers and your moral, financial, and + material support from our enemies, and the enemies + of our ideals. Let every country in dispute on our + borders self-determine its own form of government + and its own allegiance. + + "But you must not treat us as a conquered nation. + We are not conquered. We are prepared to join in a + revolutionary, civil war all over all of Europe + and the world, if this good thing has to be done + in this bad way of force. But we would prefer to + have our time and our energy to work to make sure + that our young, good thing is good. We have proved + that we can share misery, and sickness, and + poverty; it has helped us to have these things to + share, and we think we shall be able to share the + wealth of Russia as we gradually develop it. But + we are not sure of that; the world is not sure. + Let us Russians pay the price of the experiment; + do the hard, hard work of it; make the + sacrifice--then your people can follow us, slowly, + as they decide for themselves that what we have is + worth having." + + That is the message you bring back, Mr. Bullitt. It is your + duty to deliver it. It is mine to enforce it by my + conception of the situation as it stands in Russia and + Europe to-day. + + It seems to me that we are on the verge of war, a new war, a + terrible war--the long-predicted class war--all over Europe. + + The peace commission, busy with the settlement of the old + war, may not see the new one, or may not measure aright the + imminent danger of it. Germany is going over, Hungary has + gone, Austria is coming into the economic revolutionary + stage. The propaganda for it is old and strong in all + countries: Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Norway, + Sweden--you know. All men know this propaganda. But that is + in the rear. Look at the front. + + Russia is the center of it. Germany, Austria, Hungary are + the wings of the potential war front of--Bolshevism. + + And Russia, the center, has made a proposition to you for + peace, for a separate peace; made it officially; made it + after thought; made it proudly, not in fear, but in pitiful + sympathy with its suffering people and for the sake of a + vision of the future in which it verily believes. They are + practical men--those that made it. You met them. We talked + with them. We measured their power. They are all idealists, + but they are idealists sobered by the responsibility of + power. Sentiment has passed out of them into work--hard + work. They said they could give one year more of starvation + to the revolution, but they said it practically, and they + prefer to compromise and make peace. I believe that, if we + take their offer, there will be such an outcry of rage and + disappointment from the Left Socialists of Germany, Italy, + France, and the world, that Lenin and Trotsky will be + astonished. The Red Revolution--the class war--will be + broken, and evolution will have its chance once more in the + rest of Europe. And you and I know that the men we met in + Moscow see this thus, and that they believe the peace + conference will not, can not, see it, but will go on to make + war and so bring on the European revolution. + + But your duty, our duty, is to point out this opportunity, + and to vouch for the strength and the will and the character + of Lenin and the commissaires of Russia to make and keep the + compact they have outlined to you. Well, this is the + briefest way in which I can express my full faith: + + Kautsky has gone to Moscow. He has gone late; he has gone + after we were there. He will find, as we found, a careful, + thoughtful, deliberate group of men in power; in too much + power; unremovable and controlling a state of monopoly, + which is political, social, economic, financial; which + controls or directs all the activities, all the fears, all + the hopes, all the aspirations of a great people. Kautsky + will speak to revolutionary Russia for revolutionary + Germany, and for a revolutionary Europe. There will be an + appeal in that; there will be a strong appeal in that to the + revolutionary Russian commissaires. But, if I am any judge + of character, Lenin and his commissaires will stand by their + offer to us until Paris has answered, or until the time set + for the answer--April 10--shall have passed. Then, and not + until then, will Kautsky receive an answer to his appeal + for--whatever it is the Germans are asking. + + It is not enough that you have delivered your message and + made it a part of the record of the peace conference. I + think it is your duty to ask the fixed attention of your + chiefs upon it for a moment, and to get from them the + courtesy of a clear, direct reply to Russia before April 10. + + + + +REPORTS OF CAPT. W.W. PETTIT + +(The reports of Capt. Pettit are here printed in full, as follows:) + + REPORTS OF CAPT, W.W. PETTIT + + I left Petrograd on March 31. During the past three weeks I have + crossed the Finnish border six times and have been approximately + two weeks in Petrograd. I have met Tchitcherin, Litvinov, and + most of the important personages in the communist government of + Petrograd (including Bill Shatov, chief of police). + + Briefly, my opinion of the Russian situation is as follows: + In Petrograd I presume the present communist government has + a majority of the working-men behind it, but probably less + than half of the total population are members of the + communist party. However, my conclusions are based on + conversations with not only communists, but also many + opponents of the communist government, members of the + aristocracy, business men, and foreigners, and I am + persuaded that a large majority of the population of + Petrograd if given a choice between the present government + and the two alternatives, revolution or foreign + intervention, would without hesitation take the present + government. Foreign intervention would unite the population + in opposition and would tend to greatly emphasize the + present nationalist spirit. Revolution would result in + chaos. (There is nowhere a group of Russians in whom the + people I have talked with have confidence. Kolchak, Denikin, + Yudenvitch, Trepov, the despicable hordes of Russian + emigrees who haunt the Grand Hotel, Stockholm; the Socithans + House, Helsingfors; the offices of the peace commission in + Paris, and squabble among themselves as to how the Russian + situation shall be solved; all equally fail to find many + supporters in Petrograd.) Those with whom I have talked + recognize that revolution, did it succeed in developing a + strong government, would result in a white terror comparable + with that of Finland. In Finland our consul has a record of + 12,500 executions in some 50 districts, out of something + like 500 districts, by the White Guard. In Petrograd I have + been repeatedly assured that the total Red executions in + Petrograd and Moscow and other cities was at a maximum + 3,200. + + It may seem somewhat inconsistent for the Russian + bourgeoisie to oppose allied intervention and at the same + time fail to give whole-hearted support to the present + government. They justify this attitude on the grounds that + when the two great problems of food and peace are solved the + whole population can turn itself to assisting the present + régime in developing a stable efficient government. They + point to the numerous changes which have already been + introduced by the present communist government, to the + acknowledgment that mistakes have been made to the ease of + securing introduction of constructive ideas under the + present régime. All these facts have persuaded many of the + thinking people with whom I have talked to look to the + present government in possibly a somewhat modified form as + the salvation of Russia. + + At present the situation is bad. Russia is straining every + nerve to raise an army to oppose the encircling White + Guards. That the army is efficient is demonstrated by the + present location of Soviet forces who have contended with + the Russian White Guard supported by enormous sums of money, + munitions, and even soldiers from the Allies. Naturally, + transportation is inefficient; it was horrible in the last + year of the Czar's regime. Absolute separation from the rest + of the world, combined with the chaotic conditions which + Russia has passed through since the 1917 revolution, plus + the sabotage, which until recently was quite general among + the intelligent classes, including engineers, has resulted + in a decrease in rolling stock. The transportation of the + enormous army which has been raised limits the number of + cars which can be used for food. The cutting off of Siberia, + Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and until recently the + Ukraine, made it necessary to establish new lines of food + transportation. Consequently there has been great suffering + in Petrograd. Of the population of a million, 200,000 are + reported by the board of health to be ill, 100,000 seriously + ill in hospitals or at home, and another 100,000 with + swollen limbs still able to go to the food kitchens. + However, the reports of people dying in the streets are not + true. Whatever food exists is fairly well distributed and + there are food kitchens where anyone can get a fairly good + dinner for 3.50 rubles. + + For money one can still obtain many of the luxuries of life. + The children, some 50,000 of whom have been provided with + homes, are splendidly taken care of, and except for the + absence of milk have little to complain of. In the public + schools free lunches are given the children, and one sees in + the faces of the younger generation little of the suffering + which some of the older people have undergone and are + undergoing. Food conditions have improved recently, due to + the suspension of passenger traffic and the retaking of the + Ukraine, where food is plentiful. From 60 to 100 carloads of + food have arrived in Petrograd each day since February 18. + + Perhaps it is futile to add that my solution of the Russian + problem is some sort of recognition of the present + government, with the establishment of economic relations and + the sending of every possible assistance to the people. I + have been treated in a wonderful manner by the communist + representatives, though they know that I am no socialist and + though I have admitted to the leaders that my civilian + clothing is a disguise. They have the warmest affection for + America, believe in President Wilson, and are certain that + we are coming to their assistance, and, together with our + engineers, our food, our school-teachers, and our supplies, + they are going to develop in Russia a government which will + emphasize the rights of the common people as no other + government has. I am so convinced of the necessity for us + taking a step immediately to end the suffering of this + wonderful people that I should be willing to stake all I + have in converting ninety out of every hundred American + business men whom I could take to Petrograd for two weeks. + + It is needless for me to tell you that most of the stories + that have come from Russia regarding atrocities, horrors, + immorality, are manufactured in Viborg, Helsingfors, or + Stockholm. The horrible massacres planned for last November + were first learned of in Petrograd from the Helsingfors + papers. That anybody could even for a moment believe in the + nationalization of women seems impossible to anyone in + Petrograd. To-day Petrograd is an orderly city--probably the + only city of the world of its size without police. Bill + Shatov, chief of police, and I were at the opera the other + night to hear Chaliapine sing in Boris Gudonov. He excused + himself early because he said there had been a robbery the + previous night, in which a man had lost 5,000 rubles, that + this was the first robbery in several weeks, and that he had + an idea who had done it, and was going to get the men that + night. I feel personally that Petrograd is safer than Paris. + At night there are automobiles, sleighs, and people on the + streets at 12 o'clock to a much greater extent than was true + in Paris when I left five weeks ago. + + Most wonderful of all, the great crowd of prostitutes has + disappeared. I have seen not a disreputable woman since I + went to Petrograd, and foreigners who have been there for + the last three months report the same. The policy of the + present government has resulted in eliminating throughout + Russia, I am told, this horrible outgrowth of modern + civilization. + + Begging has decreased. I have asked to be taken to the + poorest parts of the city to see how the people in the slums + live, and both the communists and bourgeoisie have held up + their hands and said, "But you fail to understand there are + no such places." There is poverty, but it is scattered and + exists among those of the former poor or of the former rich + who have been unable to adapt themselves to the conditions + which require everyone to do something. + + Terrorism has ended. For months there have been no + executions, I am told, and certainly people go to the + theater and church and out on the streets as much as they + would in any city of the world. + +(Certain memoranda referred to in the hearing relating to the work of +Capt. Pettit in Russia are here printed in full as follows:) + + MEMORANDUM + + From: W.W. Pettit + To: Ammission, Paris. + + (Attention of Mr. Bullitt.) + + 1. _Mr. Pettit's recent movements_.--On March 18 I left + Helsingfors for Petrograd and remained there until March 28 + when I left for Helsingfors, at which place I received a + cable ordering me to report immediately to Paris. On the + 29th I left again for Petrograd to secure some baggage I had + left. On the 21st I left Petrograd for Helsingfors. On April + 1st I left Helsingfors for Stockholm and in Stockholm I find + a telegram asking me to wait until I receive further orders. + + 2. _Optimism of present government_.--On the night of the + 30th and the afternoon of the 31st I had several hours with + Schklovsky, Tchitcherin's personal representative in + Petrograd. He was disappointed to think I was to return to + Paris, but felt certain that inasmuch as the orders + recalling me had been sent before Mr. Bullitt's arrival, + there was every possibility of my being returned to + Petrograd. He was most optimistic about the future and felt + that the Allies must soon take some definite stand regarding + Russia, and that the result of the Paris negotiations would + almost surely be favorable to the Soviet Government. He said + that the present war conditions and the limited + transportation facilities, with the shortage of food + resulting therefrom, had handicapped his government + enormously, and that everyone hopes that soon the action of + the allied powers will permit the establishment of normal + relations in Russia. + + 3. _Radios in re Bullitt_.--He has received at least three + radio communications from the American press in which Mr. + Bullitt's activities have been mentioned and this has tended + to encourage him. The last cablegram stated that Mr. Bullitt + was preparing a statement regarding conditions in Russia + which the press anticipated would go far toward dispelling + ignorance and misinformation regarding conditions in Moscow + and Petrograd. + + 4. _Hungarian situation_.--The Hungarian situation has also + gone far toward encouraging the present Government. Hungary + has proposed a mutual offensive and defensive alliance with + Russia. The fact that the Soviet Government has been + instituted in Hungary without bloodshed up to the present, + and with little opposition on the part of the people, has + also encouraged Schklovsky. He stated that the action of the + Allies in sending troops against Hungary was to be regretted + because of the bloodshed which would probably result. + However, he thought in the long run that the Allies would + find it a suicidal policy to try to suppress the Hungarian + revolution by force. + + 5. _The Ukraine situation_.--The soviet troops have taken + almost the entire Ukraine and this with the food supplies + which it will provide have strengthened the Soviet + Government. A friend who has recently returned from Peltava, + Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, and other southern cities, states that + food is abundant and cheap. The Soviet Government believes + that the French and Greek troops are withdrawing from Odessa + and going to Sebastopol. They anticipate taking Odessa + within the next few days. + + 6. _Esthonian situation_.--At least twice within the last + two weeks Esthonia has sent word to the Soviet Government + that it desired peace. The following four points have been + emphasized by the Esthonians: (i) That peace must come + immediately; (2) that the offer must come from the Soviet + Government; (3) that a fair offer will be accepted by the + Esthonians immediately without consultation with France or + England, who are supporting them; (4) that free access to + Esthonian harbors and free use of Esthonian railroads will + be assured the Soviet Government. + + 7. _The Lithuanian situation_.--It is fairly well understood + that the Lithuanian Government that is fighting the + Bolsheviks is not going to allow itself to be made a tool by + the French and British Governments to invade Russian + territory. The Lithuanian Government is desirous of securing + possession of Lithuanian territory, but beyond that it is + understood it will not go. + + 8. _The Finnish situation_.--The Soviet Government is in + close touch with the Finnish situation and has little fear + of an invasion of Russia from that direction. The Finnish + Army is without question a third Red; probably a half Red; + possibly two-thirds Red. There is even reported to be a + tendency on a part of certain of the White Guards to oppose + intervention in Russia. One of the Finnish regiments in + Esthonia has returned to Finland, and it is supposed that it + will assist the proposed revolution of the Finns in East + Karelia against the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government + has sent a committee to Helsingfors to arrange economic + relations with Finland, and it is said that this committee + carries threats of reprisals on the part of the Soviet + Government against the Finns in Petrograd unless the treaty + is negotiated. It is said in Petrograd that some of the + Finns have already left Petrograd in anticipation that the + Finnish Government will not be permitted to make any + arrangement with the Soviet Government because of the + attitude of certain of the allied representatives in + Helsingfors. + + 9. _Improvement in food conditions_.--The suspension of passenger + traffic from March 18 to April 10 has resulted in the Government + bringing to Petrograd 60 to 100 cars of food each day, and one + sees large quantities of food being transported about the city. + At Easter time it is hoped to be able to give 3 pounds of white + bread to the population of Petrograd. There also seems to be a + larger supply of food for private purchase in the city. Mr. + Shiskin has recently been able to buy 3 geese, a sucking pig, 2 + splendid legs of veal, and roasts of beef at from 40 to 50 rubles + a pound, which, considering the value of the ruble, is much less + than it sounds. Shiskin has also been able recently to get eggs, + milk, honey, and butter, together with potatoes, carrots, and + cabbage. My bill for food for 11 days with Mr. Shiskin was about + 1,300 rubles. + + 10. _Order in Petrograd_.--About three weeks ago there were + several strikes in factories in Petrograd and Lenin came to + talk to the strikers. Apparently the matter was settled + satisfactorily and the workers were given the same bread + rations that the soldiers receive. At the Putilov works some + 400 men struck and part of them were dismissed. Both Shatov + and the director of factories said that there were no + executions, though the population the next morning reported + 80 workers shot and that afternoon the rumor had increased + the number to 400. There is practically no robbery in the + city. Shatov left the opera the other night early because he + told me the previous night a man had lost 5,000 rubles and + it was such an exceptional thing to have a robbery that he + was going out personally to investigate the matter, having + some idea as to who was responsible. + + 11. _Currency plans_.--Zorin tells me that the Soviet + Government has or had printed a new issue of currency which + it is proposed to exchange for the old currency within the + next three months. The details of the plan have not been + completed but he thinks that an exchange of ruble for ruble + will be made up to 3,000; an additional 2,000 will be placed + on deposit in the government bank. That beyond 5,000 only a + small percentage will be allowed to any one, and that a + limit of possibly 15,000 will be placed beyond which no + rubles will be exchanged. Then the plan is, after a certain + period to declare the old ruble valueless. Zorin feels that + as a result of this plan the new ruble will have some value + and that the present situation in the country in which the + farmer has so much paper that he refuses to sell any longer + for money, will be relieved. This exchange would be followed + later on by the issue of still other currency the entire + purpose being the more equal distribution of wealth and the + gradual approach to elimination of currency. + + 12. _Concessions_.--It is asserted that the northern railway + concession has been signed and Amundsen tells me that all + negotiations were accomplished without the payment of a + single cent of tea money, probably the first instance of the + absence of graft in such negotiations in the history of + Russia. He says that Trepov, through his agent Borisov, at + Moscow, was the greatest opponent of the Norwegian + interests. Trepov was formerly minister of ways and + communications and is reported to have been refused a + similar concession under the Czar's government. Amundsen + claims that Trepov has made every effort to secure this + concession from the Soviet Government. I am attaching a + statement regarding a concession which is supposed to have + been granted to the lumber interests. There are rumors that + other concessions have been granted. + + 13. _Y.M.C.A._--Recently the Y.M.C.A. secretary arrived in + Petrograd, claiming to have come without authorization from + his superiors. He has been staying at the embassy but + recently went to Moscow at the invitation of Tchitcherin. + Schklovsky tells me that the American has plans for the + establishment of the Y.M.C.A. in Russia which he wanted to + put before the Moscow government. Schklovsky doubted that it + would be feasible to organize in Russia at present a branch + of the International association unless some rather + fundamental modifications were made in their policy. + + 14. _Treadwell_.--I have twice asked Schklovsky to secure + information regarding Treadwell, and he assures me that he + has taken the matter up with Moscow, but that apparently + they have had no news from Tashkent as yet. He promised to + let me know as soon as anything was heard. + + 15. _Attitude toward United States_.--The degree of + confidence which the Russians and the soviet officials show + toward our Government is to me a matter of surprise, + considering our activities during the past 18 months. There + seems to be no question in the minds of the officials in + Petrograd whom I have met that we are going to give them an + opportunity to develop a more stable form of government, and + they apparently look upon President Wilson as one who is + going to decide the question on its merits without being + influenced by the enormous pressure of the Russian emigrés + and the French Government. Doubtless part of this attitude + is due to the favorable impression created by Mr. Bullitt, + but much of it must be the result of information which they + have secured from the press. At the present moment the + United States has the opportunity of demonstrating to the + Russian people its friendship and cementing the bonds which + already exist. Russia believes in us, and a little + assistance to Russia in its present crisis will result in + putting the United States in a position in Russia which can + never be overthrown by Germany or any other power. + + 16. _Social work_.--I have recently sent a cable from + Helsingfors regarding health and sanitary conditions in + Petrograd, a copy of which I am attaching. I have spent the + past two weeks visiting schools and the children's home in + Petrograd. There are 30,000 children for whom homes have + been provided in the past nine months, and preparations are + being made to house 10,000 more. Homes of emigrés are being + taken over and groups of 40 children placed in them under + the care of able instructors; where the children are old + enough they go to school during the daytime. A beautiful + home life has been developed. The children are well fed and + well clothed, and there is a minimum of sickness among them. + At the present time, when so much disease exists in + Petrograd, and when there is so much starvation, the healthy + appearance of these thousands of children, together with the + well-fed condition of children who are not in institutions, + but are receiving free meals in schools, is a demonstration + of the social spirit behind much of the activities of the + present government. I shall send later a more detailed + statement of some of the interesting things I have learned + about this phase of the activities of the new regime. + + 17. _Conclusion_.--In this rather hastily dictated + memorandum which Mr. Francis is going to take tonight to + Paris I have tried to point out some of the things that have + interested me in Petrograd. Naturally I have emphasized the + brighter side, for the vast amount of absolutely false news + manufactured in Helsingfors and Stockholm and sent out + through the world seems to me to necessitate the emphasizing + of some of the more hopeful features of the present + government. Naturally the character of the Russian people + has not changed to any great extent in 18 months, and there + is doubtless corruption, and there is certainly inefficiency + and ignorance and a hopeless failure to grasp the new + principles motivating the government on the part of many of + the people. A people subjected to the treatment which + Russians have had during the last 200 years can not in one + generation be expected to change very greatly, but + personally I feel the present government has made a vast + improvement on the government of the Czar as I knew it in + 1916-17. Without doubt the majority of the people in + Petrograd are opposed to allied intervention or revolution + and wish the present government to be given a fair chance to + work out the salvation of Russia. One of the most hopeful + symptoms of the present government is its willingness to + acknowledge mistakes when they are demonstrated and to adopt + new ideas which are worth while. Personally I am heart and + soul for some action on the part of the United States + Government which will show our sincere intention to permit + the Russian people to solve their own problems with what + assistance they may require from us. STOCKHOLM, April 4 + 1919. + + + + +SOCIAL WORK IN PETROGRAD + +The wife of Zinoviev, Madame Lelina, is in charge of the social +institutions in the city of Petrograd. This does not include the +public schools, which are under another organization. Madame Lelina is +a short-haired woman, probably Jewish, of about 45. She has an +enormous amount of energy, and is commonly supposed to be doing at +least two things at the same time. The morning I met her she was +carrying on two interviews and trying to arrange to have me shown some +of the social work she is directing. There seemed to be little system +about her efforts. Her office was rather disorderly, and her method of +work seemed very wasteful of time and effort, and very much like the +usual Russian way of doing things. Bill Shatov, formerly organizer of +the I.W.W., who is commissar of police for Petrograd and also +commissar for one of the northern armies, introduced me to Madame +Lelina, and accompanied me the first day on our visits. We were guided +by a young woman by the name of Bachrath, who is a university graduate +and lawyer, and since the legal profession has fallen into disrepute, +has turned her efforts toward social work. + +Under her guidance I spent three days visiting institutions. I saw a +boarding school for girls, a boarding home for younger children, an +institution for the feeble-minded, three of the new homes organized by +the Soviet Government, and two small hospitals for children. + +The institutions which Madame Lelina is directing are in two groups: +First, those which she has taken over from the old Czar regime, and +second, those which have been founded in the last 18 months. The new +government has been so handicapped by the difficulties of securing +food and other supplies, by the sabotage of many of the intelligent +classes, and by the necessity of directing every energy toward +carrying on hostilities against the bourgeoisie and the Allies, that +there has been little opportunity to remodel the institutions +inherited from the previous régime, therefore neither the strength nor +the weakness of these institutions is to any great extent due to the +present régime. Two of the institutions I visited were of this type, +one happened to be very good and the other very bad, and in neither +case did I feel that Lelina's organization was responsible. + +An aristocratic organization under the Czar maintained a boarding +school for girls. This has been taken over by the Soviet Government +with little change, and the 140 children in this institution are +enjoying all the opportunities which a directress trained in France +and Germany, with an exceptionally skillful corps of assistants, can +give them. + +I inquired regarding the changes which the Soviet Government had made +in the organization of this school. Some of the girls who were there +have been kept, but vacant places have been filled by Madame Lelina's +committee, and the institution has been required to take boys into the +day school, a plan which is carried out in most of the soviet social +and educational work. Much more freedom has been introduced in the +management of the institution, and the girls at table talk and walk +about, much as though they were in their own homes. The Soviet +Government requires that certain girls be permitted membership in the +teachers' committee, and the two communists accompanying me pointed to +this as a great accomplishment. Privately, the teachers informed me +they regarded it as of little significance, and apparently they were +entirely out of sympathy with the innovations that the new government +has made. Now all the girls are required to work in the kitchen, +dining room, or m cleaning their own dormitories, and certain girls +are assigned to the kitchen to over-see the use of supplies by the +cooks. However, the whole institution, from the uniforms of the girls +to the required form in which even hand towels have to be hung, +indicates the iron will of the directress. In one class we visited the +girls sat at desks and listened to a traditional pedagogue pour out +quantities of information on Pushkin's Boris Gudonov. Occasionally the +girls were called upon to react, which they did with sentences +apparently only partially memorized. The spirit of the institution is +behind that of our better institutions in America, and the spirit of +the classroom is quite mediaeval. + +The greatest objection which the teachers seem to have to soviet +activities is the question of sacred pictures and religious +observances. The chapel of the school has been closed, but in each +room from the corner still hangs the Ikon and at the heads of many of +the girls' beds there are still small pictures of the Virgin, much to +the disgust of the representatives of the Soviet Government, who in +many cases are Jewish, and in practically all cases have renounced any +religious connection. Recently the Soviet Party has announced the fact +that they as a party are not hostile to any religion, but intend to +remain neutral on the subject. The attitude of the commissars +apparently is that required religious observances should not be +permitted in public institutions, and doubtless some of the inspectors +have gone further than was necessary in prohibiting any symbol of the +religion which probably most of the children still nominally adhere +to. + +The second institution I visited, which had been taken over from the +old government, was an orphan asylum with some 600 children mostly +under 10. It was frightfully crowded, in many places rather dirty, +with frequently bad odors from unclean toilets. In one little room +some 20 small boys were sleeping and eating, and I found one child of +2 who was not able to walk and was eating in the bed in which he +slept. + +Ventilation was bad, linen not very clean, a general feeling of +repression present, slovenly employees, and, in general, an atmosphere +of inefficiency and failure to develop a home spirit which one still +finds in some of the worst institutions in America. The instructor who +showed me this home realized its horrors, and said that the Government +intended to move the children into more adequate quarters as soon as +conditions permitted. In summer the children are all taken to the +country. In this institution all the older children go out to public +schools and there have been no cases of smallpox or typhus in spite of +the epidemics the city has had this winter. Forty children were in the +hospital with minor complaints. About 10 per cent of the children are +usually ill. + +The school for feeble-minded occupies a large apartment house and the +children are divided into groups of 10 under the direction of two +teachers, each group developing home life in one of the large +apartments. There is emphasis on handwork. Printing presses, a +bookbinding establishment, and woodworking tools are provided. Music +and art appreciation are given much time, and some of the work done is +very beautiful. This school is largely the result of the efforts of +the Soviet Government. Careful records are kept of the children and +simple test material has been devised to develop in the more backward +children elementary reactions regarding size, shape, form, and color. +The greatest difficulty is the impossibility of securing trained +workers either for the shops or for the special pedagogical problems +of the school. However, an energetic corps of young men and young +women are employed, and they are conscious of the size of their +problem and are already thinking of the difficulties of sending their +students back into industrial life. In many of the activities of the +Soviet Government, as well as in these institutions taken over from +the old regime, I was dismayed at the inefficiency and ignorance of +many of the subordinates. After talking to the leaders and getting +some understanding of their ideals, an American expects to see these +carried over into practice. One is liable to forget that the Russian +people have not greatly changed, and that the same easy-going, +inefficient attitude of decades of the previous regime still exists. +No one knows this obstacle better than the members of the present +regime. They realize that the character of the Russian people is their +greatest obstacle, and change in the Russian conception of Government +service is a slow process. Far from being discouraged, they point to +their accomplishments with pride. + +During the last nine months Madame Lelina has taken 30,000 children +into Government homes and preparations are made to take 10,000 more +during the next three months. The three new institutions which I +visited are attractive suburban homes of wealthy emigrés. The +Government has taken these over and is putting groups of 40 children +in charge of specially selected and trained men and women. The older +children go out to school. For the younger children kindergarten +activities are provided and much time is spent out of doors. An +atmosphere of home life has been developed which is surprising +considering the short time the institutions have been organized and +the difficulties they have had to contend with. This plan, which I am +told is permanent, is a most encouraging feature of Madame Lelina's +work. + +Requests to have children placed in the Government institutions are +turned over to a special corps of investigators. In each house there +is what is known as a poor committee which must also approve the +requests and the local soviet is required to pass upon the commitment +of the child to an institution. The large number of children taken +over by the city is due to the number of orphans and half orphans +caused by the war and to the impossibility of many poor families +providing their children with food during the recent famine. In cases +where several children of a family are taken they are placed in the +same home. Frequent opportunities for relatives to visit the homes are +provided. The amount of sickness has been surprisingly low considering +the great amount of disease in Petrograd during the last few months. +In one group of 300 children there have been no deaths within the past +nine months, and among all the children there have been very few cases +of contagious diseases. + +The difficulties which Madame Lelina faces are numerous. First, Russia +has never had an adequate number of trained workers and many of those +who were trained have refused to cooperate with the present regime, +and, secondly, though the Soviet Government has adopted the policy of +turning over to the children's homes and the schools an adequate +supply of food, regardless of the suffering of the adult population, +still it has been impossible to get certain items of diet, as, for +instance, milk. It is true, however, that among these children one +sees few signs of undernourishment or famine, and in general +throughout the city the children seem much better nourished than the +adult population. + +I had planned to visit other institutions but was unable to do so. I +was told of a large palace which has been taken over as a home for +mothers. Here all women who so desire are sent after childbirth with +their children for a period of two months. + +The health department, which asserts that there are in addition to the +100,000 bedridden people in the city, another 100,000 who are ill +because of undernourishment though able to go to the food kitchens, +has been very successful in securing from the local soviets special +food supplies to be provided sick persons on doctors' orders. At each +food kitchen the board of health has a representative whose business +it is to give such special diet as may be possible to undernourished +individuals. + +(Thereupon, at 12.50 o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned subject to +the call of the chairman.) + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10713 *** diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2036fa0 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #10713 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10713) diff --git a/old/10713-8.txt b/old/10713-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3dda3b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10713-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5591 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Bullitt Mission to Russia, by William C. +Bullitt + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: The Bullitt Mission to Russia + +Author: William C. Bullitt + +Release Date: August 2, 2004 [eBook #10713] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BULLITT MISSION TO RUSSIA*** + + +E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Keith M. Eckrich, and the Project +Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + +THE BULLITT MISSION TO RUSSIA + +Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States +Senate of WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +MCMXIX + + + + + + +CONTENTS + + THE COMMITTEE MEETS + + MR. BULLITT'S OFFICIAL STATUS + + ORDERED TO RUSSIA + + COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA + + THE TROOPS AT ARCHANGEL + + SITUATION IN RUSSIA + + FRANCE BLOCKS PRINKIPOS CONFERENCE + + WHAT AMERICA WANTED + + THE BRITISH TERMS + + TEXT OF PROJECTED PEACE PROPOSAL BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED + GOVERNMENTS + + MR. BULLITT'S REPORT ON RUSSIA + ECONOMIC SITUATION + SOCIAL CONDITIONS + POLITICAL SITUATION + PEACE PROPOSALS + CONCLUSIONS + +APPENDIX TO REPORT + TRANSPORT + FOOD + MANAGEMENT + SOCIAL CONDITIONS + STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES + ARMY + LENIN'S PRESTIGE + CONCESSIONS + +BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE + +BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED + +PROPOSED DECLARATION OF ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS' POLICY AND OFFER OF + ARMISTICE + +NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA + +AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL + +BULLITT MEMORANDUM FOR AUCHINCLOSS + +REPLY OF PRESIDENT AND THREE PREMIERS TO NANSEN + +HOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL + +LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT + +MR. BULLITT RESIGNS + +REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + +REPORTS OF CAPT. W.W. PETTIT + +SOCIAL WORK IN PETROGRAD + +THE COMMITTEE ADJOURNS + + + + +UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, + +Washington, D.C., Friday, September 12, 1919. + + +The committee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, +at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 310, Senate Office Building, Senator Henry +Cabot Lodge presiding. + +Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), Brandegee, Fall, Knox, Harding, +and New. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt is to make a statement to the committee this +morning. I think I ought to say that Mr. Bullitt was summoned on the +23d of August, I believe, and he was in the woods at that time, out of +reach of telegraph or telephone or mail, and only received the summons +a few days ago. He came at once to Washington. That is the reason of +the delay in his hearing. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, will you take the stand and give your full +name, please, to the stenographer? + +Mr. BULLITT, William C. Bullitt. + +The CHAIRMAN. You are a native and a resident of Philadelphia, are you +not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I am, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the war, what were you engaged in? + +Mr. BULLITT. Before the war I was employed by the Philadelphia Public +Ledger. I had been a correspondent for them in various places, and I +had been a member of the editorial staff in Philadelphia for a time. + +The CHAIRMAN. You went abroad for them as a correspondent? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Before we went into the war? + +Mr. BULLITT. Before we went into the war I toured Germany, Austria, +Hungary, Belgium, Poland, and other places, studying conditions there, +for the purposes of the Public Ledger. + +The CHAIRMAN. After we entered the war, what did you do? You came +back? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; I came back. I was in the United States at that +time. + +The CHAIRMAN. At that time? + +Mr. BULLITT. And I was asked to enter the Department of State, to work +in the Division of Western European Affairs under Mr. Grew, in which +my special province was to follow the political situation of Germany +and Austria-Hungary, to prepare the confidential reports of the +department on Germany, Austria, and Hungary--the weekly reports--and +also such memoranda on conditions as the President and the Secretary +and others might call for. + +The CHAIRMAN. And then you went to Paris as a member of the staff, +after the armistice? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; I was an employee of the department at the time of +the armistice, and I was ordered to Paris as a member of the staff of +the commission. + +Senator KNOX. When did you first go to Paris, Mr. Bullitt? + +Mr. BULLITT. I sailed on the _George Washington_. I went over with the +original trip of the President. + +Senator KNOX. And you were there continuously how long? + +Mr. BULLITT. I remained in Paris until--I can give you the exact +date--I was ordered to go on a special mission to Berne about the +first week of February. I can give you the exact date, if it is of any +moment. + +Senator KNOX. No; it is not. + +Mr. BULLITT. I remained a week in Berne, then returned and remained in +Paris until I was ordered to go to Russia. + +I left for Russia on the 22d of February. I was in Paris during the +entire period until the 22d of February. Senator KNOX. You said you +went over on the original trip of the President. Just to get these +dates right, when did you reach Paris? + +Mr. BULLITT. I left New York on December 4 and, as I remember, we +reached Paris on December 13. + +Senator KNOX. And you were there, then, until you went to Berne in +February? + +Mr. BULLITT. In February, + +Senator KNOX. What was your personal relation to the peace conference +and its work? + + + + +MR. BULLITT'S OFFICIAL STATUS + + + +Mr. BULLITT. When I first arrived I was asked to take charge of a +confidential bulletin which was to be gotten out for the benefit of +the commissioners each morning. It was to be read by them. That lasted +a very short time, and as is usual with most things of the kind, we +discovered that the commissioners did not care to spend the time +reading it, and therefore it was decided to abolish this bulletin, and +that instead I should receive all the intelligence reports of military +intelligence, of the State Department, intelligence received through +all the special dispatches of the ambassadors, etc., in fact, all the +information that came in, and a section was created called the Current +Intelligence Section. I was called the Chief of the Division of +Current Intelligence Summaries. + +Senator KNOX. Then, as I understand, your function was to acquaint +yourself with everything that was going on in connection with the +conference, and disseminate the news to the different branches of the +peace conference and the different bureaus? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was to report only to the commissioners. + +Senator KNOX. Well, but the essential thing is, was it your duty to +get information? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was my duty to be in constant touch with everyone +who was in the American delegation, and present information to the +commissioners each morning. I had 20 minutes with each commissioner +each morning. + +Senator KNOX. So that you were practically a clearing house of +information for the members of the American mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. That is what I was supposed to be. + + * * * * * + + + + +ORDERED TO RUSSIA + + +Senator KNOX. What was your mission to Russia, and when did you go? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was ordered to go to Russia on the 18th of February. I +received the following order from Secretary Lansing [reading]: + + AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + + 18 February, 1919. + + MR. WILLIAM C. BULLITT, + American Commission to Negotiate Peace. + + SIR: You are hereby directed to proceed to Russia for the + purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, + therein, for the benefit of the American commissioners + plenipotentiary to negotiate peace, and all American + diplomatic and consular officials are hereby directed to + extend to you the proper courtesies and facilities to enable + you to fulfill the duties of your mission. + + I am, sir, your obedient servant, + + ROBERT LANSING, + Secretary of State of the United States of America. + [SEAL.] + +Senator KNOX. What is the date of that? + +Mr. BULLITT. February 18, 1919. I also received at the same time from +Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the secretary of the American commission, the +following [reading]: + + AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + + 18 February, 1919. + + + To whom it may concern: + + I hereby certify that Mr. William C. Bullitt has been + authorized by the American commissioners plenipotentiary to + negotiate peace to proceed to Russia, for the purpose of + studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for + the benefit of the commission, and I bespeak for him the + proper courtesies and facilities in enabling him to fulfill + the duties of his mission. + + J.C. GREW, + Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. + [SEAL.] + +Senator KNOX. You say you started in February. What time in February? + +Mr. BULLITT. I left on the 22d day of February. + +Senator KNOX. Did you know at that time, or have you ascertained +since, whether a secret mission had or not been dispatched from Paris, +that is, by the President himself; a man by the name of Buckler, who +went to Russia a few days before you did? + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. W.H. Buckler, Mr. Henry White's half brother. He was +an attaché of the American embassy in London. He was ordered from +there to go, about the 1st of January, to Stockholm, to confer with +Litvinov, who had been the Ambassador of the Soviet Government to +London--the British had allowed him to stay there without actually +recognizing his official status, and had dealt with him. + +Mr. Buckler there conferred with Litvinov, who made various +propositions and representations to him which Mr. Buckler at once +telegraphed back to Paris, and which were considered so important by +the President that the President read them in extenso to the council +of ten on the morning of January 21. I regret that I have no actual +copy of those proposals by Litvinov, or of Buckler's telegrams. At +that time there was a discussion taking place in regard to Russia +which had extended over a couple of weeks, a discussion of the utmost +interest, in the council of ten. I happen to have the minutes of the +council for January 16, when this Russian question was taken up, which +I shall be glad to read, if the Senators should be interested, and +also the minutes of the council of ten on January 21, at which meeting +the Prinkipos proposal was decided upon. The Buckler meeting with +Litvinov was what eventually swung the meeting in favor of Prinkipos, +the suggestion for which had been made by Mr. Lloyd George. No; that +is slightly incorrect. Mr. Lloyd George had suggested that +representatives of the various Russian governments and factions should +be brought to Paris. + + +COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA + +NOTES ON CONVERSATIONS HELD IN THE OFFICE OF M. PICHON AT THE QUAI +D'ORSAY, ON JANUARY 16, 1919--PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION REGARDING THE +SITUATION IN RUSSIA. + +Mr. Lloyd George commenced his statement setting forth the information +in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian +situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently +in L'Humanite. He stated that he wished to point out that there had +been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as +to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The +British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatever, a +recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that +Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British +proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war +within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop +reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an +account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way +to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates +to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government +entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference. + +Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which +had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as +follows: + + Firstly, the real facts are not known; + + Secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is + to adjudicate the question; and + + Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general + mis-government and starvation. It is not known who is + obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik + Government would collapse had not been realized. In fact, + there is one report that the Bolsheviki are stronger than + ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their + hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case + of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and + overthrows the Government. The Government is incapable of + overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are + becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the business of the Great + Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to + one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either + side. + +Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible +policies: + + 1. Military intervention. It is true there the Bolsheviki + movement is as dangerous to civilization as German + militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there + anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain + number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one + million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of + this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand + British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would + mutiny. The same applies to U.S. troops in Siberia; also to + Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing + Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even + admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one + can conceive or understand to bring about order by force. + + 2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik + Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized + what this would mean. From the information furnished him + Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory + there are 150,000,000 men, women, and children. There is now + starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health + cordon, it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact, + the people who would die are just the people that the Allies + desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of + the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our + friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane + people, those present could not consider. + + Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the + Bolsheviki? He had been told there were three men, Denekin, + Kolchak and Knox. In considering the chances of these people + to overthrow the Bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had + received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to + fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that + while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone + over to Kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse + of this would not take place. If the Allies counted on any + of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand. + He had heard a lot of talk about Denekin, but when he looked + on the map he found that Denekin was occupying a little + backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that + Denekin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the + map, there was a great solid block of territory between + Denekin and Kolchak. Moreover, from information received it + would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the + old régime around him, and would seem to be at heart a + monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding + this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very + democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for + the restoration of the old conditions in Russia. + + Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the + present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving. + + Institutions of Bolsheviki are institutions of old Czarist + régime. This is not what one would call creating a new + world. + + 3. The third alternative was contained in the British + proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to + appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the + Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to + render an account of their actions. + +Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used +that there were already here certain representatives of these +Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sazonov, who claims +to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact, Sazonov can +not speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan, +like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in +direct contact with the Government at Omsk. + +It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for +bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and +leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in +flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of +themselves. + +Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to +permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed +that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England +becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist +representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a +military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviki, that would +make England Bolshevist, and there would be a Soviet in London. For +his part, Mr. Lloyd George was not afraid of Bolshevism if the facts +are known in England and the United States. The same applied to +Germany. He was convinced that an educated democracy can be always +trusted to turn down Bolshevism. + +Under all circumstances, Mr. Lloyd George saw no better way out than +to follow the third alternative. Let the Great Powers impose their +conditions and summon these people to Paris to give an account of +themselves to the Great Powers, not to the Peace Conference. + +Mr. Pichon suggested that it might be well to ask M. Noulens, the +French Ambassador to Russia, who had just returned to France, to +appear before the meeting to-morrow morning, and give those present +his views on the Russian situation. + +President Wilson stated that he did not see how it was possible to +controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. He thought that there +was a force behind this discussion which was no doubt in his mind, but +which it might be desirable to bring out a little more definitely. He +did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere with the brutal +aspect of Bolshevism, if it were not for the fact of the domination of +large vested interests in the political and economic world. While it +might be true that this evil was in process of discussion and slow +reform, it must be admitted, that the general body of men have grown +impatient at the failure to bring about the necessary reform. He +stated that there were many men who represented large vested interests +in the United States who saw the necessity for these reforms and +desired something which should be worked out at the Peace Conference, +namely, the establishment of some machinery to provide for the +opportunity of the individuals greater than the world has ever known. +Capital and labor in the United States are not friends. Still they are +not enemies in the sense that they are thinking of resorting to +physical force to settle their differences. But they are distrustful, +each of the other. Society can not go on that plane. On the one hand, +there is a minority possessing capital and brains; on the other, a +majority consisting of the great bodies of workers who are essential +to the minority, but do not trust the minority, and feel that the +minority will never render them their rights. A way must be found to +put trust and cooperation between these two. + +President Wilson pointed out that the whole world was disturbed by +this question before the Bolskeviki came into power. Seeds need soil, +and the Bolsheviki seeds found the soil already prepared for them. + +President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that +the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to +enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviki was explained by the fact that +the troops were not at all sure that if they put down Bolshevism they +would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order. For +example, in making a speech recently, to a well-dressed audience in +New York City who were not to be expected to show such feeling, Mr. +Wilson had referred casually to Russia, stating that the United States +would do its utmost to aid her suppressed people. The audience +exhibited the greatest enthusiasm, and this had remained in the +President's mind as an index to where the sympathies of the New World +are. + +President Wilson believed that those present would be playing against +the principle of the free spirit of the world if they did not give +Russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom. He +concurred with Mr. Lloyd George's view and supported his +recommendations that the third line of procedure be adopted. + +President Wilson stated that he had also, like Mr. Lloyd George, +received a memorandum from his experts which agreed substantially with +the information which Mr. Lloyd George had received. There was one +point which he thought particularly worthy of notice, and that was the +report that the strength of the Bolshevik leaders lay in the argument +that if they were not supported by the people of Russia, there would +be foreign intervention, and the Bolsheviki were the only thing that +stood between the Russians and foreign military control. It might well +be that if the Bolsheviki were assured that they were safe from +foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement. + +President Wilson further stated that he understood that the danger of +destruction of all hope in the Baltic provinces was immediate, and +that it should be made very clear if the British proposal were +adopted, that the Bolsheviki would have to withdraw entirely from +Lithuania and Poland. If they would agree to this to refrain from +reprisals and outrages, he, for his part, would be prepared to receive +representatives from as many groups and centers of action, as chose to +come, and endeavor to assist them to reach a solution of their +problem. + +He thought that the British proposal contained the only suggestions +that lead anywhere. It might lead nowhere. But this could at least be +found out. + +M. Pichon referred again to the suggestion that Ambassador Noulens be +called before the meeting. + +Mr. Balfour suggested that it might be well to call the Dutch Consul, +lately in Petrograd, if it was the desire of those present to hear the +anti-Bolshevik side. + +Baron Sonnino suggested that M. Scavenius, Minister of Denmark, +recently in Russia, would be able to give interesting data on the +Russian situation. + +Those present seemed to think that it might be desirable to hear what +these gentlemen might have to say. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about a letter that Buckler wrote +to the President in relation to his mission? Have you ever seen a copy +of his report in the form of a letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have read a copy of his report, but I have not the +copy. The only reference I have to it that I find, in the short time I +have had to go over my papers since I came down from the woods, is in +a memorandum to Col. House in reference to the withdrawal of the +American troops from Archangel [reading]: + +Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these troops with +Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the Bolsheviki would agree to +an armistice on the Archangel front at any time; and, furthermore, +would pledge themselves not to injure in any way those Russians in and +about Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He, +furthermore, suggested that such Russians as did not care to trust +their lives to such a promise should be taken out with the troops. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about whether Litvinov communicated +directly with the President in reference to this Buckler mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. Litvinov had written a letter to the President, which has +since been widely published, on December 24. + +Senator KNOX. That is the letter I had in mind. I had seen some +references to that. Do you have a copy of that letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not know whether I have any copies of this +letter--that is, authentic. I think I have a newspaper copy some +place, but I have no actual copy of the letter. + +Senator KNOX. Can you tell us anything more about the discussion in +reference to the withdrawal of troops from Russia that took place at +that time--anything more than is indicated by your letter, there? + +Mr. BULLITT. There were very serious discussions, all the time. +Telegrams were being received frequently from the various commanders +at Archangel, the American and the British notably, in regard to +conditions, which they described as likely to be disastrous, and +discussions of real gravity were taking place all the time. The +subject was very much in the air. I have, I will say, very few +references to that particular condition. I have here this memorandum +which takes up some of these subjects. I do not know if the committee +would care to hear it. + +The CHAIRMAN. Yes. + +Senator KNOX. This is a memorandum that you sent to Col. House? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; Col. House. + +Senator KNOX. Please read it. + +Mr. BULLITT [reading]: + + JANUARY 30, 1919. + Memorandum for Col. House. + + Subject: Withdrawal of American troops from Archangel. + + DEAR COL. HOUSE: The 12,000 American, British, and French + troops at Archangel are no longer serving any useful + purpose. Only 3,000 Russians have rallied around this force. + It is the attacked, not the attacker, and serves merely to + create cynicism in regard to all our proposals and to + stimulate recruiting for the Red Army. + + Furthermore, the 4,000 Americans, 6,000 British, 2,000 + French, and 3,000 Russian troops in this region are in + considerable danger of destruction by the Bolsheviki. Gen. + Ironside has just appealed for reinforcements and the + British war office has directed the commanding general at + Murmansk to be prepared to dispatch a battalion of Infantry + to Archangel. + + Instead of transferring troops from Murmansk to Archangel, + it seems to me that we should at once transfer to Murmansk + and bring home the troops which are now at Archangel. Aside + from the needless suffering which these men are enduring, + aside from the demands of the public in the United States + and England for the return of these men, it seems to me that + the withdrawal of these troops would be of great value as a + proof that we have made the Prinkipos proposal in full good + faith. + + I have asked Gen. Churchill to obtain the most expert + opinion available on the practicability of moving the 12,000 + American, British, and French troops and such Russians as + may wish to accompany them from Archangel to Murmansk. The + appended memorandum and map which he has prepared show that + unless the ice in the White Sea suddenly becomes thicker it + is at present possible with the aid of six ice breakers + which are now at Archangel to move these troops by water to + Kem on the Murmansk Railroad, whence they may be carried by + train to Murmansk. + + Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these + troops with Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the + Bolsheviki would agree to an armistice on the Archangel + front at any time and, furthermore, would pledge themselves + not to injure in any way those Russians in and about + Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He + furthermore suggested that such Russians as did not care to + trust their lives to such a promise should be taken out with + the troops. + + The provisional government at Archangel has just notified us + that it will not accept the proposal for a conference at + Prinkipos. It seems dignified and honorable at this moment + to inform the Archangel government that since it can not + agree to the allied proposal, presented after the most + serious consideration, we shall decline to support it + further with arms, but will make provision for the safety of + all Russians who are unwilling to remain at Archangel. + + I have discussed this Archangel business at some length with + Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's secretary, who says that L.G. + intends to bring the British troops out on the 1st of May, + which he believes to be the first practicable moment. The + first practicable moment, however, seems to be now. + + The situation at Archangel is most serious for the soldiers + who are stationed there, but it is also serious for the + Governments which sent them out and seem to have abandoned + them. Unless they are saved by prompt action, we shall have + another Gallipoli. Very respectfully yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +I discussed these matters with each one of the commissioners each +morning. It was my duty to keep them au courant with anything that +struck me as important, which in the stress of the business of the +peace conference they were likely to overlook. + +Senator KNOX. This was a memorandum made in the line of your duty? + +Mr. BULLITT. This was a memorandum made as the result of the +conversations that I had had with all of the commissioners that +morning. + +This particular memorandum, in fact, was ordered by Col. House, and in +connection with it he asked me to have made a map showing the +feasibility of getting the troops out of Russia, by the military +experts of the conference, which map I have here. If you would be +interested in it in any way, I will append the memorandum made for +Gen. Churchill with regard to withdrawing the troops. + +Senator KNOX. I was going to ask you whether or not you had any +information as to the terms which the Allies were willing to accept +from Russia. + + + + +COUNCIL OF TEN FORMULATES A RUSSIAN POLICY + +Mr. BULLITT. I had, of course, seen the discussions of the conference +with regard to the entire Russian matter. The conference had decided, +after long consideration, that it was impossible to subdue or wipe out +the Soviet Government by force. The discussion of that is of a certain +interest, I believe, in connection with this general matter. There +are, in regard to the question you have just asked, minutes of the +council of ten, on January 21, 1919. + +Lloyd George had introduced the proposition that representatives of +the Soviet Government should be brought to Paris along with the +representatives of the other Russian governments [reading]: + + [McD. Secret. I.C. 114. Secretaries' notes of a conversation + held in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay on Tuesday, + January 21, 1919, at 15 hours.] + + PRESENT + + United States of America: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, + Mr. A.H. Frazier, Col. U.S. Grant, Mr. L. Harrison. + + British Empire: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, The Right + Hon. A.J. Balfour, Lieut. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, K.C.B., + Maj. A.M. Caccia, M.V.O., Mr. E. Phipps. + + France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, + Capt. A. Potier. + + Italy: Signor Orlando, H.E. Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, + Maj. A. Jones. + + Japan: Baron Makino, H.E.M. Matsui, M. Saburi. + + Interpreter, Prof. P.J. Mantoux. + + + SITUATION IN RUSSIA + + M. Clemenceau said they had met together to decide what + could be done in Russia under present circumstances. + + President Wilson said that in order to have something + definite to discuss, he wished to take advantage of a + suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd George and to propose a + modification of the British proposal. He wished to suggest + that the various organized groups in Russia should be asked + to send representatives, not to Paris, but to some other + place, such as Salonika, convenient of approach, there to + meet such representatives as might be appointed by the + Allies, in order to see if they could draw up a program upon + which agreement could be reached. + + Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the advantage of this + would be that they could be brought straight there from + Russia through the Black Sea without passing through other + countries. + + M. Sonnino said that some of the representatives of the + various Governments were already here in Paris, for example, + M. Sazonov. Why should these not be heard? + + President Wilson expressed the view that the various parties + should not be heard separately. It would be very desirable + to get all these representatives in one place, and still + better, all in one room, in order to obtain a close + comparison of views. + + Mr. Balfour said that a further objection to Mr. Sonnino's + plan was that if M. Sazonov was heard in Paris, it would be + difficult to refuse to hear the others in Paris also, and M. + Clemenceau objected strongly to having some of these + representatives in Paris. + + M. Sonnino explained that all the Russian parties had some + representatives here, except the Soviets, whom they did not + wish to hear. + + Mr. Lloyd George remarked that the Bolshevists were the very + people some of them wished to hear. + + M. Sonnino continuing said that they had heard M. Litovnov's + statements that morning. + +That was the statement that Litvinov had made to Buckler which the +President had read to the council of ten that morning. + +[Continuing reading.] + + The Allies were now fighting against the Bolshevists who + were their enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to + hear them with the others. + + Mr. Balfour remarked that the essence of President Wilson's + proposal was that the parties must all be heard at one and + the same time. + + Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that the acceptance of + M. Sonnino's proposals would amount to their hearing a + string of people, all of whom held the same opinion, and all + of whom would strike the same note. But they would not hear + the people who at the present moment were actually + controlling European Russia. In deference to M. Clemenceau's + views, they had put forward this new proposal. He thought it + would be quite safe to bring the Bolshevist representatives + to Salonika, or perhaps to Lemnos. + + It was absolutely necessary to endeavor to make peace. The + report read by President Wilson that morning went to show + that the Bolshevists were not convinced of the error of + their ways, but they apparently realised the folly of their + present methods. Therefore they were endeavouring to come to + terms. + + President Wilson asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of + the case. As M. Sonnino had implied, they were all repelled + by Bolshevism, and for that reason they had placed armed men + in opposition to them. One of the things that was clear in + the Russian situation was that by opposing Bolshevism with + arms, they were in reality serving the cause of Bolshevism. + The Allies were making it possible for the Bolsheviks to + argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were + endeavouring to exploit the country and to give the land + back to the landlords, and so bring about a re-action. If it + could be shown that this was not true, and that the Allies + were prepared to deal with the rulers of Russia, much of the + moral force of this argument would disappear. The allegation + that the Allies were against the people and wanted to + control their affairs provided the argument which enabled + them to raise armies. If, on the other hand, the Allies + could swallow their pride and the natural repulsion which + they felt for the Bolshevists and see the representatives of + all organized groups in one place, he thought it would bring + about a marked reaction against Bolshevism. + + M. Clemenceau said that, in principle, he did not favour + conversation with the Bolshevists; not because they were + criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level + by saying that they were worthy of entering into + conversation with us. The Bolshevist danger was very great + at the present moment. Bolshevism was spreading. It had + invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and that very + morning they received very bad news regarding its spread to + Budapesth and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger + was probably greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, + after spreading in Germany, were to traverse Austria and + Hungary and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a + very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against + Bolshevism. When listening to the document presented by + President Wilson that morning, he had been struck by the + cleverness with which the Bolshevists were attempting to lay + a trap for the Allies. When the Bolshevists first came into + power, a breach was made with the Capitalist Government on + questions of principle, but now they offered funds and + concessions as a basis for treating with them. He need not + say how valueless their promises were, but if they were + listened to, the Bolshevists would go back to their people + and say: "We offered them great principles of justice and + the Allies would have nothing to do with us. Now we offer + money, and they are ready to make peace." + + He admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. The great + misfortune was that the Allies were in need of a speedy + solution. After four years of war, and the losses and + sufferings they had incurred, their populations could stand + no more. Russia also was in need of immediate peace. But its + necessary evolution must take time. The signing of the world + Peace could not await Russia's final avatar. Had time been + available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually sound + men representing common-sense would come to the top. But + when would that be? He could make no forecast. Therefore + they must press for an early solution. + + To sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporize + and erect barriers to prevent Bolshevism from spreading. But + he was not alone, and in the presence of his colleagues he + felt compelled to make some concession, as it was essential + that there should not be even the appearance of disagreement + amongst them. The concession came easier after having heard + President Wilson's suggestions. He thought that they should + make a very clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable + peoples, emphatically stating that they did not wish in any + way to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and + especially that they had no intention of restoring Czardom. + The object of the Allies being to hasten the creation of a + strong Government, they proposed to call together + representatives of all parties to a Conference. He would beg + President Wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the + position of the Allies to the whole world, including the + Russians and the Germans. + + Mr. Lloyd George agreed and gave notice that he wished to + withdraw his own motion in favour of President Wilson's. + + Mr. Balfour said that he understood that all these people + were to be asked on an equality. On these terms he thought + the Bolshevists would refuse, and by their refusal, they + would put themselves in a very bad position. + + M. Sonnino said that he did not agree that the Bolshevists + would not come. He thought they would be the first to come, + because they would be eager to put themselves on an equality + with the others. He would remind his colleagues that, before + the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the Bolshevists + promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from + propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had + broken all their promises, their one idea being to spread + revolution in all other countries. His idea was to collect + together all the anti-Bolshevik parties and help them to + make a strong Government, provided they pledged themselves + not to serve the forces of re-action and especially not to + touch the land question, thereby depriving the Bolshevists + of their strongest argument. Should they take these pledges, + he would be prepared to help them. + + Mr. Lloyd George enquired how this help would be given. + + M. Sonnino replied that help would be given with soldiers to + a reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food, and money. + For instance, Poland asked for weapons and munitions; the + Ukraine asked for weapons. All the Allies wanted was to + establish a strong Government. The reason that no strong + Government at present existed was that no party could risk + taking the offensive against Bolshevism without the + assistance of the Allies. He would enquire how the parties + of order could possibly succeed without the help of the + Allies. President Wilson had said that they should put aside + all pride in the matter. He would point out that, for Italy + and probably for France also, as M. Clemenceau had stated, + it was in reality a question of self-defence. He thought + that even a partial recognition of the Bolshevists would + strengthen their position, and, speaking for himself, he + thought that Bolshevism was already a serious danger in his + country. + + Mr. Lloyd George said he wished to put one or two practical + questions to M. Sonnino. The British Empire now had some + 15,000 to 20,000 men in Russia. M. de Scavenius had + estimated that some 150,000 additional men would be + required, in order to keep the anti-Bolshevist Governments + from dissolution. And General Franchet d'Esperey also + insisted on the necessity of Allied assistance. Now Canada + had decided to withdraw her troops, because the Canadian + soldiers would not agree to stay and fight against the + Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the + other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the + British tried to send any more troops there, there would be + mutiny. + + M. Sonnino suggested that volunteers might be called for. + + Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that it would be + impossible to raise 150,000 men in that way. He asked, + however, what contributions America, Italy and France would + make towards the raising of this Army. + + President Wilson and M. Clemenceau each said none. + + M. Orlando agreed that Italy could make no further + contributions. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that the Bolshevists had an army of + 300,000 men who would, before long, be good soldiers, and to + fight them at least 400,000 Russian soldiers would be + required. Who would feed, equip and pay them? Would Italy, + or America, or France, do so? If they were unable to do + that, what would be the good of fighting Bolshevism? It + could not be crushed by speeches. He sincerely trusted that + they would accept President Wilson's proposal as it now + stood. + + M. Orlando agreed that the question was a very difficult one + for the reasons that had been fully given. He agreed that + Bolshevism constituted a grave danger to all Europe. To + prevent a contagious epidemic from spreading, the + sanitarians set up a _cordon Sanitaire_. If similar measures + could be taken against Bolshevism, in order to prevent its + spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant + vanquishing it. Italy was now passing through a period of + depression, due to war weariness. But Bolshevists could + never triumph there, unless they found a favourable medium, + such as might be produced either by a profound patriotic + disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of + the war, or by an economic crisis. Either might lead to + revolution, which was equivalent to Bolshevism. Therefore, + he would insist that all possible measures should be taken + to set up this cordon. Next, he suggested the consideration + of repressive measures. He thought two methods were + possible; either the use of physical force or the use of + moral force. He thought Mr. Lloyd George's objection to the + use of physical force unanswerable. The occupation of Russia + meant the employment of large numbers of troops for an + indefinite period of time. This meant an apparent + prolongation of the war. There remained the use of moral + force. He agreed with M. Clemenceau that no country could + continue in anarchy and that an end must eventually come; + but they could not wait; they could not proceed to make + peace and ignore Russia. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd George's + proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful + consideration by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, gave a + possible solution. It did not involve entering into + negotiations with the Bolsheviks; the proposal was merely an + attempt to bring together all the parties in Russia with a + view to finding a way out of the present difficulty. He was + prepared, therefore, to support it. + + President Wilson asked for the views of his Japanese + colleagues. + + Baron Makino said that after carefully considering the + various points of view put forward, he had no objections to + make regarding the conclusions reached. He thought that was + the best solution under the circumstances. He wished, + however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the + Representatives of the Allied powers if the Bolshevists + accepted the invitation to the meeting and there insisted + upon their principles. He thought they should under no + circumstances countenance Bolshevist ideas. The conditions + in Siberia East of the Baikal had greatly improved. The + objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to + that region had been attained. Bolshevism was no longer + aggressive, though it might still persist in a latent form. + In conclusion, he wished to support the proposal before the + meeting. + + President Wilson expressed the view that the emissaries of + the Allied Powers should not be authorised to adopt any + definite attitude towards Bolshevism. They should merely + report back to their Governments the conditions found. + + Mr. Lloyd George asked that that question be further + considered. He thought the emissaries of the Allied Powers + should be able to establish an agreement if they were able + to find a solution. For instance, if they succeeded in + reaching an agreement on the subject of the organization of + a Constituent Assembly, they should be authorised to accept + such a compromise without the delay of a reference to the + Governments. + + President Wilson suggested that the emissaries might be + furnished with a body of instructions. + + Mr. Balfour expressed the view that abstention from hostile + action against their neighbours should be made a condition + of their sending representatives to this meeting. + + President Wilson agreed. + + M. Clemenceau suggested that the manifesto to the Russian + parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They + should say to the Russians: "You are threatened by famine. + We are prompted by humanitarian feelings; we are making + peace; we do not want people to die. We are prepared to see + what can be done to remove the menace of starvation." He + thought the Russians would at once prick up their ears, and + be prepared to hear what the Allies had to say. They would + add that food cannot be sent unless peace and order were + re-established. It should, in fact, be made quite clear that + the representatives of all parties would merely be brought + together for purely humane reasons. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that in this connection he wished to + invite attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the + delegates of the British Dominions, namely, whether there + would be enough food and credit to go round should an + attempt be made to feed all Allied countries, and enemy + countries, and Russia also. The export of so much food would + inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in Allied + countries and so create discontent and Bolshevism. As + regards grain, Russia had always been an exporting country, + and there was evidence to show that plenty of food at + present existed in the Ukraine. + + President Wilson said that his information was that enough + food existed in Russia, but, either on account of its being + hoarded or on account of difficulties of transportation, it + could not be made available. + + (It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a + proclamation, for consideration at the next meeting, + inviting all organized parties in Russia to attend a Meeting + to be held at some selected place such as Salonika or + Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the + Allied and Associated Great Powers the means of restoring + order and peace in Russia. Participation in the Meeting + should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.) + + 2. _Peace Conference_.--M. Clemenceau considered it to be + most urgent that the delegates should be set to work. He + understood that President Wilson would be ready to put on + the table at the next full Conference, proposals relating to + the creation of a League of Nations. He was anxious to add a + second question, which could be studied immediately, namely, + reparation for damages. He thought the meeting should + consider how the work should be organized in order to give + effect to this suggestion. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that he agreed that these questions + should be studied forthwith. He would suggest that, in the + first place, the League of Nations should be considered, + and, that after the framing of the principles, an + International Committee of Experts be set to work out its + constitution in detail. The same remark applied also to the + question of indemnities and reparation. He thought that a + Committee should also be appointed as soon as possible to + consider International Labour Legislation. + + President Wilson observed that he had himself drawn up a + constitution of a League of Nations. He could not claim that + it was wholly his own creation. Its generation was as + follows:--He had received the Phillimore Report, which had + been amended by Colonel House and re-written by himself. He + had again revised it after having received General Smuts' + and Lord Robert Cecil's reports. It was therefore a compound + of these various suggestions. During the week he had seen M. + Bourgeois, with whom he found himself to be in substantial + accord on principles. A few days ago he had discussed his + draft with Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, and they + found themselves very near together. + + Mr. Balfour suggested that President Wilson's draft should + be submitted to the Committee as a basis for discussion. + + President Wilson further suggested that the question should + be referred as far as possible to the men who had been + studying it. + + Mr. Lloyd George expressed his complete agreement. He + thought they themselves should, in the first place, agree on + the fundamental principles and then refer the matter to the + Committee. When that Committee met they could take President + Wilson's proposals as the basis of discussion. + + (It was agreed that the question of appointing an + International Committee, consisting of two members from each + of the five Great Powers, to whom would be referred + President Wilson's draft, with certain basic principles to + guide them, should be considered at the next meeting.) + + 3. _Poland_.--M. Pichon called attention to the necessity + for replying to the demand addressed by M. Paderewski to + Colonel House, which had been read by President Wilson that + morning, and asked that Marshal Foch should be present. + + (It was agreed that this question should be discussed at the + next Meeting.) + + 4. _Disarmament_.--Mr. Balfour called attention to the + urgency of the question of disarmament, and said that he + would shortly propose that a Committee should be appointed + to consider this question. + + + + +VILLA MAJESTIC, Paris January 21st, 1919. + +This is the minute of January 21, and the Prinkipos memorandum was +written on January 22. + +The instructions to the President were as follows: + + It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a + proclamation for consideration at the next meeting, inviting + all organized parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be + held at some selected place such as Salonika or Lemnos, in + order to discuss with the representatives of the allied and + associated great powers the means of restoring order and + peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be + conditional on a cessation of hostilities. + + The President then wrote the Prinkipos proposition. + +Senator KNOX. Did you make a written report of your mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +Senator KNOX. Have you it here? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. I might read the report without the appendices. + +Senator KNOX. The chairman wants you to read it. + +The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether it is very long. The report he +made would be of some interest. You were the only official +representative sent? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; except Capt. Pettit, my assistant. The +circumstances of my sending will perhaps require further elucidation. +I not only was acquainted with the minutes of the discussions of the +council of ten, but in addition I had discussed the subject with each +of the commissioners each morning and I had talked with many British +representatives. After the Prinkipos proposal was made, the replies +began to come in from various factions, that they would refuse to +accept it for various reasons. The Soviet Government replied in a +slightly evasive form. They said, "We are ready to accept the terms of +the proposals, and we are ready to talk about stopping fighting." They +did not say, "We are ready to stop fighting on such and such a date." +It was not made specific. + +Senator KNOX. That was one of the conditions of the proposal? + + + + +FRANCE BLOCKS PRINKIPOS CONFERENCE + +Mr. BULLITT. It was. That is why I say they replied in an evasive +manner. The French--and particularly the French foreign office, even +more than Mr. Clemenceau--and you can observe it from that minute were +opposed to the idea, and we found that the French foreign office had +communicated to the Ukrainian Government and various other antisoviet +governments that if they were to refuse the proposal, they would +support them and continue to support them, and not allow the Allies, +if they could prevent it, or the allied Governments, to make peace +with the Russian Soviet Government. + +At all events, the time set for the Prinkipos proposal was February +15. At that time nobody had acted in a definite, uncompromising +matter. It therefore fell to the ground. + +There was a further discussion as to what should be done. The peace +conference was still of the opinion that it was impossible to hope to +conquer the Soviet Government by force of arms, because in the latter +part of that report, which I did not read to the committee, there was +expressed very forcibly the opinion of Mr. Lloyd George, that the +populations at home would not stand it. Therefore they desired to +follow up further the line of making peace. + +About that time I was working particularly closely on the Russian +affairs. I had had a number of discussions with everyone concerned in +it, and on the very day that Col. House and Mr. Lansing first asked me +to undertake this mission to Russia, I was dining at Mr. Lloyd +George's apartment to discuss Russian affairs with his secretaries, so +that I had a fair idea of the point of view of everyone in Paris. + +I further, before I went, received urgent instructions from Secretary +Lansing if possible to obtain the release of Consul Treadwell, who had +been our consul in Petrograd and had been transferred to Tashkent, and +had been detained by the local Soviet Government and had been kept +there several months. He was one of our Government officers they had +seized. Mr. Lansing ordered me to do everything I could to obtain his +release. + +I further, before I went, asked Col. House certain specific questions +in regard to what, exactly, the point of view of our Government was on +this subject, what we were ready to do, and I think it perhaps might +be important to detail a brief resume of this conversation. The idea +was this: Lloyd George had gone over to London on February 9, as I +remember, to try to adjust some labor troubles. He, however, still +insisted that the Prinkipos proposal must be renewed or some other +peace proposal must be made, and I arranged a meeting between him and +Col. House, which was to take place, I believe, on February 24, at +which time they were to prepare a renewal of the Prinkipos proposal, +and they were both prepared to insist that it be passed against any +opposition of the French. + +I arranged this meeting through Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's +confidential assistant. However, on the 19th day of the month, Mr. +Clemenceau was shot, and the next day Mr. Lloyd George telephoned over +from London to say that as long as Clemenceau was wounded and was ill, +he was boss of the roost, and that anything he desired to veto would +be immediately wiped out and therefore it was no use for him and Col. +House, as long as Clemenceau was ill, to attempt to renew the +Prinkipos proposal, as Clemenceau would simply have to hold up a +finger and the whole thing would drop to the ground. Therefore, it was +decided that I should go at once to Russia to attempt to obtain from +the Soviet Government an exact statement of the terms on which they +were ready to stop fighting. I was ordered if possible to obtain that +statement and have it back in Paris before the President returned to +Paris from the United States. The plan was to make a proposal to the +Soviet Government which would certainly be accepted. + +The CHAIRMAN. These orders came from the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. These orders came to me from Col. House. I also discussed +the matter with Mr. Lansing, and Mr. Lansing and Col. House gave me +the instructions which I had. + +Senator KNOX. You said a moment ago that you went to Col. House to get +a statement of the American position. + + + + +WHAT AMERICA WANTED + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; I asked Col. House these questions [reading]: + + 1. If the Bolsheviki are ready to stop the forward movement + of their troops on all fronts and to declare an armistice on + all fronts, would we be willing to do likewise? + + 2. Is the American Government prepared to insist that the + French, British, Italian, and Japanese Governments shall + accept such an armistice proposal? + + 3. If fighting is stopped on all fronts, is the Government + of the United States prepared to insist on the + reestablishment of economic relations with Russia, subject + only to the equitable distribution among all classes of the + population of supplies and food and essential commodities + which may be sent to Russia? + + In other words, a sort of Hoover Belgian distribution plan + so that the Bolsheviki could not use the food we sent in + there for propaganda purposes and to starve their enemies + and to feed their friends. + + The fourth question I asked him was as follows: + + 4. Is the United States Government, under these conditions, + prepared to press the Allies for a joint statement that all + Allied troops will be withdrawn from the soil of Russia as + soon as practicable, on condition that the Bolsheviki give + explicit assurances that there will be no retaliation + against persons who have cooperated with the allied forces? + + Col. House replied that we were prepared to. + + Further, I asked Col. House whether it was necessary to get + a flat and explicit assurance from the Soviet Government + that they would make full payment of all their debts before + we would make peace with them, and Col. House replied that + it was not; that no such statement was necessary, however, + that such a statement would be extremely desirable to have, + inasmuch as much of the French opposition to making peace + with the Soviet Government was on account of the money owed + by Russia to France. + + I further had an intimation of the British disposition + toward Russia. As I said before, I had discussed the matter + with Mr. Philip Kerr, and Sir Maurice Hankey and Col. House + asked me to inform Mr. Kerr of my mission before I went. It + was to be an entire secret from all except the British. The + British and American delegations worked in very close touch + throughout the conference, and there were practically no + secrets that the American delegation had that were not also + the property of the British delegation. + + + + +THE BRITISH TERMS + +I was asked to inform Mr. Kerr of this trip. I told him all about it, +and asked him if he could get Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George to give +me a general indication of their point of view on peace with Russia; +what they would be prepared to do in the matter. + +Mr. Kerr and I then talked and prepared what we thought might be the +basis of peace with Russia. + +I then received from Mr. Kerr, before I left, the following letter, +which is a personal letter, which I regret greatly to bring forward, +but which I feel is necessary in the interest of an understanding of +this matter. [Reading:] + + [Private and confidential.] + + BRITISH DELEGATION, + Paris, February 21, 1919. + + MY DEAR BULLITT: I inclose a note of the sort of conditions + upon which I personally think it would be possible for the + allied Governments to resume once more normal relations with + Soviet Russia. You will understand, of course, that these + have no official significance and merely represent + suggestions of my own opinion. + + Yours, sincerely, + + P.H. KERR. + +That was from Mr. Kerr, Lloyd George's confidential secretary. Mr. +Kerr had, however, told me that he had discussed the entire matter +with Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, and therefore I thought he had +a fair idea of what conditions the British were ready to accept. The +note inclosed reads as follows: + + 1. Hostilities to cease on all fronts. + + 2. All de facto governments to remain in full control of the + territories which they at present occupy. + + 3. Railways and ports necessary to transportation between + soviet Russia and the sea to be subject to the same + regulations as international railways and ports in the rest + of Europe. + + 4. Allied subjects to be given free right of entry and full + security to enable them to enter soviet Russia and go about + their business there provided they do not interfere in + politics. + + 5. Amnesty to all political prisoners on both sides: full + liberty to all Russians who have fought with the Allies. + + 6. Trade relations to be restored between soviet Russia and + the outside world under conditions which, while respecting + the sovereignty of soviet Russia insure that allied supplies + are made available on equal terms to all classes of the + Russian people. + + 7. All other questions connected with Russia's debt to the + Allies, etc., to be considered independently after peace has + been established. + + 8. All allied troops to be withdrawn from Russia as soon as + Russian armies above quota to be defined have been + demobilized and their surplus arms surrendered or destroyed. + +You will see the American and British positions were very close +together. + +Senator KNOX. With these statements from Col. House as to the American +position and from Mr. Kerr as to the British position, and with the +instructions which you had received, you proceeded to Russia, and, as +you said a moment ago, you made a written report? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. Do you want it read, or shall I state the +substance and then put it in the record? I think I can state it more +briefly if I read the first eight pages of it and then put the rest of +it in the record. + +The CHAIRMAN. Very well; do that. + +Mr. BULLITT. This report I made to the President and to the American +commissioners, by order of the President transmitted to me on my +return by Mr. Lansing. I should like to say, before I read this +report, that of course I was in Russia an extremely short time, and +this is merely the best observation that I could make supplemented by +the observation of Capt. Pettit of the Military Intelligence, who was +sent in as my assistant, and with other impressions that I got from +Mr. Lincoln Steffens and other observers who were there. + +Senator KNOX. How long were you in Russia? + +Mr. BULLITT. For only one week. I was instructed to go in and bring +back as quickly as possible a definite statement of exactly the terms +the Soviet Government was ready to accept. The idea in the minds of +the British and the American delegation were that if the Allies made +another proposal it should be a proposal which we would know in +advance would be accepted, so that there would be no chance of another +Prinkipos proposal miscarrying. + +I might perhaps read first, or show to you, the official text. This is +the official text of their proposition which they handed me in Moscow +on the 14th of March. Here is a curious thing--the Soviet foreign +office envelope. + + + + +TERMS WHICH RUSSIA OFFERED TO ACCEPT + +As I said, I was sent to obtain an exact statement of the terms that +the Soviet Government was ready to accept, and I received on the 14th +the following statement from Tchitcherin and Litvinov. + +Senator KNOX. Who were they? + +Mr. BULLITT. Tchitcherin was Peoples' Commisar for Foreign Affairs of +the Soviet Republic and Litvinov was the former Soviet Ambassador to +London, the man with whom Buckler had had his conversation, and who +was now practically assistant secretary for foreign affairs. + +I also had a conference with Lenin. The Soviet Government undertook to +accept this proposal provided it was made by the allied and associated +Governments not later than April 10, 1919. The proposal reads as +follows [reading]: + + + + +TEXT OF PROJECTED PEACE PROPOSAL BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED +GOVERNMENTS. + +The allied and associated Governments to propose that hostilities +shall cease on all fronts in the territory of the former Russian +Empire and Finland on ----[1] and that no new hostilities shall begin +after this date, pending a conference to be held at ----[2] on ----[3] + + [Footnote 1: The date of the armistice to be set at least a + week after the date when the allied and associated + Governments make this proposal.] + + [Footnote 2: The Soviet Government greatly prefers that the + conference should be held in a neutral country and also that + either a radio or a direct telegraph wire to Moscow should + be put at its disposal.] + + [Footnote 3: The conference to begin not later than a week + after the armistice takes effect and the Soviet Government + greatly prefers that the period between the date of the + armistice and the first meeting of the conference should be + only three days, if possible.] + +The duration of the armistice to be for two weeks, unless extended by +mutual consent, and all parties to the armistice to undertake not to +employ the period of the armistice to transfer troops and war material +to the territory of the former Russian Empire. + +The conference to discuss peace on the basis of the following +principles, which shall not be subject to revision by the conference. + + 1. All existing de facto governments which have been set up + on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to + remain in full control of the territories which they occupy + at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, except + in so far as the conference may agree upon the transfer of + territories; until the peoples inhabiting the territories + controlled by these de facto governments shall themselves + determine to change their Governments. The Russian Soviet + Government, the other soviet governments and all other + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire, the allied and associated + Governments, and the other Governments which are operating + against the soviet governments, including Finland, Poland, + Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, to + agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing de facto + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and the other Governments signatory to + this agreement. [Footnote 4: The allied and associated + Governments to undertake to see to it that the de facto + governments of Germany do not attempt to upset by force the + de facto governments of Russia. The de facto governments + which have been set up on the territory of the former + Russian Empire to undertake not to attempt to upset by force + the de facto governments of Germany.] + + 2. The economic blockade to be raised and trade relations + between Soviet Russia and the allied and associated + countries to be reestablished under conditions which will + ensure that supplies from the allied and associated + countries are made available on equal terms to all classes + of the Russian people. + + 3. The soviet governments of Russia to have the right of + unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports + which belonged to the former Russian Empire and to Finland + and are necessary for the disembarkation and transportation + of passengers and goods between their territories and the + sea; detailed arrangements for the carrying out of this + provision to be agreed upon at the conference. + + 4. The citizens of the soviet republics of Russia to have + the right of free entry into the allied and associated + countries as well as into all countries which have been + formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and + Finland; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and + full security, provided they do not interfere in the + domestic politics of those countries. [Footnote 5: It is + considered essential by the Soviet Government that the + allied and associated Governments should see to it that + Poland and all neutral countries extend the same rights as + the allied and associated countries.] + + Nationals of the allied and associated countries and of the + other countries above named to have the right of free entry + into the soviet republics of Russia; also the right of + sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they + do not interfere in the domestic politics of the soviet + republics. + + The allied and associated Governments and other governments + which have been set up on the territory of the former + Russian Empire and Finland to have the right to send + official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity + into the various Russian Soviet Republics. The soviet + governments of Russia to have the right to send official + representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into all + the allied and associated countries and into the nonsoviet + countries which have been formed on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland. + + 5. The soviet governments, the other Governments which have + been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire + and Finland, to give a general amnesty to all political + opponents, offenders, and prisoners. The allied and + associated governments to give a general amnesty to all + Russian political opponents, offenders, and prisoners, and + to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted + for giving help to Soviet Russia. All Russians who have + fought in, or otherwise aided the armies opposed to the + soviet governments, and those opposed to the other + Governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland to be included in this + amnesty. + + All prisoners of war of non-Russian powers detained in + Russia, likewise all nationals of those powers now in Russia + to be given full facilities for repatriation. The Russian + prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be, + likewise all Russian nationals, including the Russian + soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all + foreign armies to be given full facilities for repatriation. + + 6. Immediately after the signing of this agreement all + troops of the allied and associated Governments and other + non-Russian Governments to be withdrawn from Russia and + military assistance to cease to be given to antisoviet + Governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire. + + The soviet governments and the antisoviet governments which + have been set up on the territory of the former Russian + Empire and Finland to begin to reduce their armies + simultaneously, and at the same rate, to a peace footing + immediately after the signing of this agreement. The + conference to determine the most effective and just method + of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous + demobilization and also the withdrawal of the troops and the + cessation of military assistance to the antisoviet + governments. + + 7. The allied and associated Governments, taking cognizance + of the statement of the Soviet Government of Russia, in its + note of February 4, in regard to its foreign debts, propose + as an integral part of this agreement that the soviet + governments and the other governments which have been set up + on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland + shall recognize their responsibility for the financial + obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign States + parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such + States. Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts + to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the + present financial position of Russia. The Russian gold + seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan or taken from Germany + by the Allies to be regarded as partial payment of the + portion of the debt due from the soviet republics of Russia. + + The Soviet Government of Russia undertakes to accept the + foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April + 10, 1919. + +In regard to the second sentence in paragraph 5, in regard to "giving +help to Soviet Russia" I may say that I was told that that was not a +sine qua non but it was necessary in order to get the proposal through +the Russian executive committee, which it had to pass before it was +handed to me. I was also handed an additional sheet, which I refused +to take as a part of the formal document, containing the following: + + The Soviet Government is most anxious to have a semiofficial + guaranty from the American and British Governments that they + will do their utmost to see to it that France lives up to + the conditions of the armistice. + +The Soviet Government had a deep suspicion of the French Government. + +In reference to this matter, and in explanation of that proposal, I +sent a number of telegrams from Helsingfors. I feel that in a way it +is important, for an explanation of the matter, that those telegrams +should be made public, but, on the other hand, they were sent in a +confidential code of the Department of State, and I do not feel at +liberty to read them unless ordered to specifically by the committee. +I should not wish to take the responsibility for breaking a code which +is in current use by the department. + +Senator KNOX. I should think your scruples were well founded. I should +not read those telegrams. + +Mr. BULLITT. I can simply inform you briefly of the nature of them. + +Senator KNOX. You might give us the nature of them. To whom were they +sent? + +Mr. BULLITT. On reaching Petrograd I sent Capt. Pettit out to +Helsingfors after I had had a discussion with Tchitcherin and with +Litvinov with a telegram, in which I said I had reached Petrograd and +had perfected arrangements to cross the boundary at will, and to +communicate with the mission via the consul at Helsingfors; that the +journey had been easy, and that the reports of frightful conditions in +Petrograd had been ridiculously exaggerated. + +I described the discussions I had had with Tchitcherin and with +Litvinov, and said they had assured me that after going to Moscow and +after discussion with Lenin, I should be able to carry out a specific +statement of the position of the Soviet Government on all points. + +On reaching Helsingfors I sent a telegram to the mission at Paris +"Most secret, for the President, Secretary Lansing, and Col. House +only," in which I said that in handing me the statement which I have +just read, Tchitcherin and Litvinov had explained that the Executive +Council of the Soviet Government had formally considered and adopted +it, and that the Soviet Government considered itself absolutely bound +to accept the proposals made therein, provided they were made on or +before April 10, and under no conditions would they change their +minds. + +I also explained that I had found Lenin, Tchitcherin, and Litvinov +full of the sense of Russia's need for peace, and that I felt the +details of their statement might be modified without making it +unacceptable to them, and that in particular the clause under article +5 was not of vital importance. That, on the other hand, I felt that in +the main this statement represented the minimum terms that the Soviet +Government would accept. + +I explained that it was understood with regard to article 2 that the +allied and associated countries should have a right to send inspectors +into Soviet Russia and see to it that the disposition of supplies, if +the blockade was lifted, was entirely equitable, and I explained also +that it was fully understood that the phrase under article 4 on +"official representatives" did not include diplomatic representatives, +that the Soviet Government simply desired to have some agents who +might more or less look out for their people here. + +I explained further that in regard to footnote No. 2, the Soviet +Government hoped and preferred that the conference should be held in +Norway; that its preferences thereafter were, first, some point in +between Russia and Finland; second, a large ocean liner anchored off +Moon Island or the Aland Islands; and, fourth, Prinkipos. + +I also explained that Tchitcherin and all the other members of the +government with whom I had talked had said in the most positive and +unequivocal manner that the Soviet Government was determined to pay +its foreign debts, and I was convinced that there would be no dispute +on that point. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know how these telegrams were received in Paris, +whether favorably or unfavorably? + +Mr. BULLITT. I can only say, in regard to that, there are three other +very brief ones. One was on a subject which I might give you the gist +of before I go on with it. + +Senator KNOX. Go ahead, in your own way. + +Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent me a message of congratulation on receipt +of them, and by one of the curious quirks of the conference, a member +of the secretariat refused to send the message because of the way in +which it was signed, and Col. House was only able to give me a copy of +it when I reached Paris. I have a copy of it here. + +Senator HARDING. Would not this story be more interesting if we knew +which member of the conference objected? + +Mr. BULLITT. I believe the objection was on the technical point that +Col. House had signed "Ammission" instead of his name, but I really do +not know which member of the conference it was that made the +objection. + +I then sent another telegram, which is rather long, too long to +attempt to paraphrase, and I will ask that I may not put it in, +because the entire substance of it is contained in briefer form in my +formal report. This telegram itself is in code. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Are there any translations of those of your +telegrams that are in code? + +Mr. BULLITT. No; I have given you the substance of them as I have gone +along. + +As I said to you before, Secretary Lansing had instructed me if +possible to obtain the release of Mr. Treadwell, our consul at +Tashkent, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 miles from Moscow. In +Moscow I had spoken to Lenin and Tchitcherin and Litvinov in regard to +it, and finally they said they recognized that it was foolish to hold +him; that they had never really given much thought to the matter; that +he had been held by the local government at Tashkent, which was more +than 4,000 miles away; that raids were being made on the railroad +constantly, and they might have some difficulty in communicating. +However, they promised me that they would send a telegram at once +ordering his release, and that they would send him out either by +Persia or by Finland whichever way he preferred. I told them I was +sure he would prefer to go by way of Finland. Here is a copy of their +telegram ordering his release, which will not be of much use to you, I +fear, as it is in Russian. They carried out this promise to the +letter, releasing Treadwell at once, and Treadwell in due course of +time and in good health appeared on the frontier of Finland on the +27th of April. All that time was consumed in travel from Tashkent, +which is a long way under present conditions. + +Senator NEW. I saw Mr. Treadwell here some time ago. + +Mr. BULLITT. I then sent a telegram in regard to Mr. Pettit, the +officer of military intelligence, who was with me as my assistant, +saying I intended to send him back to Petrograd at once to keep in +touch with the situation so that we should have information +constantly. I will say in this connection that it was not an +extraordinary thing for the various Governments to have +representatives in Russia. The British Government had a man in there +at the same time that I was there. He was traveling as a Red Cross +representative, but in reality he was there for the Foreign Office, a +Maj. A.R. Parker, I believe. I am not certain of his name, but we can +verify it. + +I also sent a telegram from Helsingfors, "strictly personal to Col. +House," requesting him to show my fifth and sixth telegrams to Mr. +Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's secretary, so that Mr. Lloyd George +might be at once informed in regard to the situation, inasmuch as he +had known I was going, and inasmuch as the British had been so +courteous as to offer to send me across on a cruiser. When I got to +London and found that the torpedo boat on which I had expected to go +was escorting the President, Mr. Lloyd George's office in London +called up the Admiralty and asked them to give me a boat in which to +go across. Incidentally I was informed by Col. House, on my arrival in +Paris, that copies of my telegrams had been sent at once to Mr. Lloyd +George and Mr. Balfour. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I do not think we need to go into quite so +much detail. You have told us now with what instructions you went, +what the British attitude was, what the American attitude was, and +what the Soviet Government proposed. Now, let us have your report. + +Mr. BULLITT. All right, sir. This was my report-- + +Senator BRANDEGEE. What is the date of that, please? + +Mr. BULLITT. This copy does not bear the date on it. On the other hand +I can tell you within a day or two. The date unfortunately was left +off of this particular copy. It was made on or about the 27th or 28th +day of March, in the week before April 1. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. 1919? + +Mr. BULLITT. 1919. I unquestionably could obtain from Secretary +Lansing or the President or some one else the actual original of the +report. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I do not care about the precise date, but I want to +get it approximately. + +Mr. BULLITT. It was about the 1st day of April. + +Senator KNOX. To whom was the report made? + +Mr. BULLITT. The report was addressed to the President and the +American Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace. I was +ordered to make it. I had sent all these telegrams from Helsingfors, +and I felt personally that no report was necessary, but the President +desired a written report, and I made the report as follows: + + + + +MR. BULLITT'S REPORT ON RUSSIA + + + +ECONOMIC SITUATION + +Russia to-day is in a condition of acute economic distress. The +blockade by land and sea is the cause of this distress and lack of the +essentials of transportation is its gravest symptom. Only one-fourth +of the locomotives which ran on Russian lines before the war are now +available for use. Furthermore, Soviet Russia is cut off entirely from +all supplies of coal and gasoline. In consequence, transportation by +all steam and electric vehicles is greatly hampered; and +transportation by automobile and by the fleet of gasoline-using Volga +steamers and canal boats is impossible. (Appendix, p. 55.) + +As a result of these hindrances to transportation it is possible to +bring from the grain centers to Moscow only 25 carloads of food a day, +instead of the 100 carloads which are essential, and to Petrograd only +15 carloads, instead of the essential 50. In consequence, every man, +woman, and child in Moscow and Petrograd is suffering from slow +starvation. (Appendix, p. 56.) + +Mortality is particularly high among new-born children whose mothers +can not suckle them, among newly-delivered mothers, and among the +aged. The entire population, in addition, is exceptionally susceptible +to disease; and a slight illness is apt to result fatally because of +the total lack of medicines. Typhoid, typhus, and smallpox are +epidemic in both Petrograd and Moscow. + +Industry, except the production of munitions of war, is largely at a +standstill. Nearly all means of transport which are not employed in +carrying food are used to supply the army, and there is scarcely any +surplus transport to carry materials essential to normal industry. +Furthermore, the army has absorbed the best executive brains and +physical vigor of the nation. In addition, Soviet Russia is cut off +from most of its sources of iron and of cotton. Only the flax, hemp, +wood, and lumber industries have an adequate supply of raw material. + +On the other hand, such essentials of economic life as are available +are being utilized to the utmost by the Soviet Government. Such trains +as there are, run on time. The distribution of food is well +controlled. Many industrial experts of the old régime are again +managing their plants and sabotage by such managers has ceased. +Loafing by the workmen during work hours has been overcome. (Appendix, +p. 57.) + + + +SOCIAL CONDITIONS + +The destructive phase of the revolution is over and all the energy of +the Government is turned to constructive work. The terror has ceased. +All power of judgment has been taken away from the extraordinary +commission for suppression of the counter-revolution, which now merely +accuses suspected counter-revolutionaries, who are tried by the +regular, established, legal tribunals. Executions are extremely rare. +Good order has been established. The streets are safe. Shooting has +ceased. There are few robberies. Prostitution has disappeared from +sight. Family life has been unchanged by the revolution, the canard in +regard to "nationalization of women" notwithstanding. (Appendix, p. +58.) + +The theaters, opera, and ballet are performing as in peace. Thousands +of new schools have been opened in all parts of Russia and the Soviet +Government seems to have done more for the education of the Russian +people in a year and a half than czardom did in 50 years. (Appendix, +p. 59.) + + + +POLITICAL SITUATION + +The Soviet form of government is firmly established. Perhaps the most +striking fact in Russia today is the general support which is given +the government by the people in spite of their starvation. Indeed, the +people lay the blame for their distress wholly on the blockade and on +the governments which maintain it. The Soviet form of government seems +to have become to the Russian people the symbol of their revolution. +Unquestionably it is a form of government which lends itself to gross +abuse and tyranny but it meets the demand of the moment in Russia and +it has acquired so great a hold on the imagination of the common +people that the women are ready to starve and the young men to die for +it. + +The position of the communist party (formerly Bolsheviki) is also very +strong. Blockade and intervention have caused the chief opposition +parties, the right social revolutionaries and the menshiviki, to give +temporary support to the communists. These opposition parties have +both made formal statements against the blockade, intervention, and +the support of antisoviet governments by the allied and associated +governments. Their leaders, Volsky and Martov, are most vigorous in +their demands for the immediate raising of the blockade and peace. +(Appendix, p. 60.) + +Indeed, the only ponderable opposition to the communists to-day comes +from more radical parties--the left social revolutionaries and the +anarchists. These parties, in published statements, call the +communists, and particularly Lenin and Tchitcherin, "the paid +bourgeois gendarmes of the Entente." They attack the communists +because the communists have encouraged scientists, engineers, and +industrial experts of the bourgeois class to take important posts +under the Soviet Government at high pay. They rage against the +employment of bourgeois officers in the army and against the efforts +of the communists to obtain peace. They demand the immediate massacre +of all the bourgeoisie and an immediate declaration of war on all +nonrevolutionary governments. They argue that the Entente Governments +should be forced to intervene more deeply in Russia, asserting that +such action would surely provoke the proletariat of all European +countries to immediate revolution. + +Within the communist party itself there is a distinct division of +opinion in regard to foreign policy, but this disagreement has not +developed personal hostility or open breach in the ranks of the party. +Trotski, the generals, and many theorists believe the red army should +go forward everywhere until more vigorous intervention by the Entente +is provoked, which they, too, count upon to bring revolution in France +and England. Their attitude is not a little colored by pride in the +spirited young army. (Appendix, p. 62.) Lenin, Tchitcherin, and the +bulk of the communist party, on the other hand, insist that the +essential problem at present is to save the proletariat of Russia, in +particular, and the proletariat of Europe, in general, from +starvation, and assert that it will benefit the revolution but little +to conquer all Europe if the Government of the United States replies +by starving all Europe. They advocate, therefore, the conciliation of +the United States even at the cost of compromising with many of the +principles they hold most dear. And Lenin's prestige in Russia at +present is so overwhelming that the Trotski group is forced +reluctantly to follow him. (Appendix, p. 63.) + +Lenin, indeed, as a practical matter, stands well to the right in the +existing political life of Russia. He recognizes the undesirability, +from the Socialist viewpoint, of the compromises he feels compelled to +make; but he is ready to make the compromises. Among the more notable +concessions he has already made are: The abandonment of his plan to +nationalize the land and the adoption of the policy of dividing it +among the peasants, the establishment of savings banks paying 3 per +cent interest, the decision to pay all foreign debts, and the decision +to give concessions if that shall prove to be necessary to obtain +credit abroad. (Appendix, p. 64.) + +In a word, Lenin feels compelled to retreat from his theoretical +position all along the line. He is ready to meet the western +Governments half way. + + + +PEACE PROPOSALS + +Lenin seized upon the opportunity presented by my trip of +investigation to make a definite statement of the position of the +Soviet Government. He was opposed by Trotski and the generals, but +without much difficulty got the support of the majority of the +executive council, and the statement of the position of the Soviet +Government which was handed to me was finally adopted unanimously. + +My discussion of this proposal with the leaders of the Soviet +Government was so detailed that I feel sure of my ground in saying +that it does not represent the minimum terms of the Soviet Government, +and that I can point out in detail wherein it may be modified without +making it unacceptable to the Soviet Government. For example, the +clause under article 5--"and to their own nationals who have been or +may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia"--is certainly not +of vital importance. And the clause under article 4, in regard to +admission of citizens of the soviet republics of Russia into the +allied and associated countries, may certainly be changed in such a +way as to reserve all necessary rights to control such immigration to +the allied and associated countries, and to confine it to persons who +come on legitimate and necessary business, and to exclude definitely +all possibility of an influx of propagandists. + + + +CONCLUSIONS + +The following conclusions are respectfully submitted: + + 1. No government save a socialist government can be set up + in Russia to-day except by foreign bayonets, and any + governments so set up will fall the moment such support is + withdrawn. The Lenin wing of the communist party is to-day + as moderate as any socialist government which can control + Russia. + + 2. No real peace can be established in Europe or the world + until peace is made with the revolution. This proposal of + the Soviet Government presents an opportunity to make peace + with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis--perhaps + a unique opportunity. + + 3. If the blockade is lifted and supplies begin to be + delivered regularly to soviet Russia, a more powerful hold + over the Russian people will be established than that given + by the blockade itself--the hold given by fear that this + delivery of supplies may be stopped. Furthermore, the + parties which oppose the communists in principle but are + supporting them at present will be able to begin to fight + against them. + + 4. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that a + proposal following the general lines of the suggestion of + the Soviet Government should be made at the earliest + possible moment, such changes being made, particularly in + article 4 and article 5, as will make the proposal + acceptable to conservative opinion in the allied and + associated countries. + + Very respectfully submitted. + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + + * * * * * + + + + +APPENDIX TO REPORT + + + +TRANSPORT + +_Locomotives_.--Before the war Russia had 22,000 locomotives. +Destruction by war and ordinary wear and tear have reduced the number +of locomotives in good order to 5,500. Russia is entirely cut off from +supplies of spare parts and materials for repair, facilities for the +manufacture of which do not exist in Russia. And the Soviet Government +is able only with the greatest difficulty to keep in running order the +few locomotives at its disposal. + +_Coal_.--Soviet Russia is entirely cut off from supplies of coal. +Kolchak holds the Perm mining district, although Soviet troops are now +on the edge of it. Denikin still holds the larger part of the Donetz +coal district and has destroyed the mines in the portion of the +district which he has evacuated. As a result of this, locomotives, +electrical power plants, etc., must be fed with wood, which is +enormously expensive and laborious and comparatively ineffectual. + +_Gasoline_.--There is a total lack of gasoline, due to the British +occupation of Baku. The few automobiles in the cities which are kept +running for vital Government business are fed with substitute +mixtures, which causes them to break down with great frequency and to +miss continually. Almost the entire fleet on the great inland waterway +system of Russia was propelled by gasoline. As a result the Volga and +the canals, which are so vital a part of Russia's system of +transportation, are useless. + + + +FOOD + +Everyone is hungry in Moscow and Petrograd, including the people's +commissaries themselves. The daily ration of Lenin and the other +commissaries is the same as that of a soldier in the army or of a +workman at hard labor. In the hotel which is reserved for Government +officials the menu is the following: Breakfast--A quarter to half a +pound of black bread, which must last all day, and tea without sugar. +Dinner--A good soup, a small piece of fish, for which occasionally a +diminutive piece of meat is substituted, a vegetable, either a potato +or a bit of cabbage, more tea without sugar. Supper--What remains of +the morning ration of bread and more tea without sugar. + +Occasionally sugar, butter, and chickens slip through from the Ukraine +and are sold secretly at atrocious prices--butter, for example, at 140 +roubles a pound. Whenever the Government is able to get its hands on +any such "luxuries" it turns them over to the schools, where an +attempt is made to give every child a good dinner every day. + +The food situation has been slightly improved by the rejoining of +Ukraine to Great Russia, for food is relatively plentiful in the +south; but no great improvement in the situation is possible because +of the lack of transport. + + + +MANAGEMENT + +Such supplies as are available in Soviet Russia are being utilized +with considerable skill. For example, in spite of the necessity of +firing with wood, the Moscow-Petrograd express keeps up to its +schedule, and on both occasions when I made the trip it took but 13 +hours, compared to the 12 hours of prewar days. + +The food control works well, so that there is no abundance alongside +of famine. Powerful and weak alike endure about the same degree of +starvation. + +The Soviet Government has made great efforts to persuade industrial +managers and technical experts of the old régime to enter its service. +Many very prominent men have done so. And the Soviet Government pays +them as high as $45,000 a year for their services, although Lenin gets +but $1,800 a year. This very anomalous situation arises from the +principle that any believing communist must adhere to the scale of +wages established by the government, but if the government considers +it necessary to have the assistance of any anticommunist, it is +permitted to pay him as much as he demands. + +All meetings of workmen during work hours have been prohibited, with +the result that the loafing which was so fatal during the Kerensky +régime has been overcome and discipline has been restored in the +factories as in the army. + + + +SOCIAL CONDITIONS + +_Terror_.--The red terror is over. During the period of its power the +extraordinary commission for the suppression of the counter +revolution, which was the instrument of the terror, executed about +1,500 persons in Petrograd, 500 in Moscow, and 3,000 in the remainder +of the country--5,000 in all Russia. These figures agree with those +which were brought back from Russia by Maj. Wardwell, and inasmuch as +I have checked them from Soviet, anti-Soviet, and neutral sources I +believe them to be approximately correct. It is worthy of note in this +connection that in the white terror in southern Finland alone, +according to official figures, Gen. Mannerheim executed without trial +12,000 working men and women. + +_Order_.--One feels as safe in the streets of Petrograd and Moscow as +in the streets of Paris or New York. On the other hand, the streets of +these cities are dismal, because of the closing of retail shops whose +functions are now concentrated in a few large nationalized "department +stores." Petrograd, furthermore, has been deserted by half its +population; but Moscow teems with twice the number of inhabitants it +contained before the war. The only noticeable difference in the +theaters, opera, and ballet is that they are now run under the +direction of the department of education, which prefers classics and +sees to it that working men and women and children are given an +opportunity to attend the performances and that they are instructed +beforehand in the significance and beauties of the productions. + +_Morals_.--Prostitutes have disappeared from sight, the economic +reasons for their career having ceased to exist. Family life has been +absolutely unchanged by the revolution. I have never heard more +genuinely mirthful laughter than when I told Lenin, Tchitcherin, and +Litvinov that much of the world believed that women had been +"nationalized." This lie is so wildly fantastic that they will not +even take the trouble to deny it. Respect for womanhood was never +greater than in Russia to-day. Indeed, the day I reached Petrograd was +a holiday in honor of wives and mothers. + +_Education_.--The achievements of the department of education under +Lunacharsky have been very great. Not only have all the Russian +classics been reprinted in editions of three and five million copies +and sold at a low price to the people, but thousands of new schools +for men, women, and children have been opened in all parts of Russia. +Furthermore, workingmen's and soldiers' clubs have been organized in +many of the palaces of yesteryear, where the people are instructed by +means of moving pictures and lectures. In the art galleries one meets +classes of working men and women being instructed in the beauties of +the pictures. The children's schools have been entirely reorganized, +and an attempt is being made to give every child a good dinner at +school every day. Furthermore, very remarkable schools have been +opened for defective and over-nervous children. On the theory that +genius and insanity are closely allied, these children are taught from +the first to compose music, paint pictures, sculpt and write poetry, +and it is asserted that some very valuable results have been achieved, +not only in the way of productions but also in the way of restoring +the nervous systems of the children. + +_Morale_.--The belief of the convinced communists in their cause is +almost religious. Never in any religious service have I seen higher +emotional unity than prevailed at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet +in celebration of the foundation of the Third Socialist +Internationale. The remark of one young man to me when I questioned +him in regard to his starved appearance is characteristic. He replied +very simply: "I am ready to give another year of starvation to our +revolution." + + + + +STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES + +The following statement was made to me by Volsky, leader of the right +social revolutionaries, the largest opposition party: + +"Intervention of any kind will prolong the régime of the Bolsheviki by +compelling us, like all honorable Russians, to drop opposition and +rally round the Soviet Government in defense of the revolution. With +regard to help to individual groups or governments fighting against +soviet Russia, we see no difference between such intervention and the +sending of troops. If the allies come to an agreement with the Soviet +Government, sooner or later the peasant masses will make their will +felt and they are alike against the bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviki. + +"If by any chance Kolchak and Denikin were to win, they would have to +kill in tens of thousands where the Bolsheviki have had to kill in +hundreds and the result would be the complete ruin and collapse of +Russia into anarchy. Has not the Ukraine been enough to teach the +allies that occupation by non-Bolshevik troops merely turns into +Bolsheviki those of the population who were not Bolsheviki before? It +is clear to us that the Bolshiviki are really fighting against +bourgeois dictatorship, We are, therefore, prepared to help them in +every possible way. + +"Grandmother Ekaterina Constantinovna Breshkovskaya has no sort of +authority, either from the assembly of members of the all Russian +constituent assembly or from the party of social revolutionaries. Her +utterances in America, if she is preaching intervention, represent her +personal opinions which are categorically repudiated by the party of +social revolutionaries, which has decisively expressed itself against +the permissibility of intervention, direct or indirect." + +Volsky signed this latter statement: "V. Volsky, late president of the +assembly of members of the all Russian constituent assembly." + +Martov, leader of the Menshiviki, stated: "The Menshiviki are against +every form of intervention, direct or indirect, because by providing +the incentive to militarization it is bound to emphasize the least +desirable qualities of the revolution. Further, the needs of the army +overwhelm all efforts at meeting the needs of social and economic +reconstruction. Agreement with the Soviet Government would lessen the +tension of defense and would unmuzzle the opposition, who, while the +Soviet Government is attacked, are prepared to help in its defense, +while reserving until peace their efforts to alter the Bolshevik +régime. + +"The forces that would support intervention must be dominated by those +of extreme reaction because all but the reactionaries are prepared +temporarily to sink their differences with the Bolsheviki in order to +defend the revolution as a whole." + +Martov finally expressed himself as convinced that, given peace, life +itself and the needs of the country will bring about the changes he +desires. + + + + +ARMY + +The soviet army now numbers between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 troops of +the line. Nearly all these soldiers are young men between the ages of +17 and 27. The morale of regiments varies greatly. The convinced +communists, who compose the bulk of the army, fight with crusading +enthusiasm. Other regiments, composed of patriots but noncommunists, +are less spirited; other regiments composed of men who have entered +the army for the slightly higher bread ration are distinctly +untrustworthy. Great numbers of officers of the old army are occupying +important executive posts in the administration of the new army, but +are under control of convinced communist supervisors. Nearly all the +lower grade officers of the army are workmen who have displayed +courage in the ranks and have been trained in special officer schools. +Discipline has been restored and on the whole the spirit of the army +appears to be very high, particularly since its recent successes. The +soldiers no longer have the beaten dog-like look which distinguished +them under the Czar but carry themselves like freemen and curiously +like Americans. They are popular with the people. + +I witnessed a review of 15,000 troops in Petrograd. The men marched +well and their equipment of shoes, uniforms, rifles, and machine guns +and light artillery was excellent. On the other hand they have no big +guns, no aeroplanes, no gas shells, no liquid fire, nor indeed, any of +the more refined instruments of destruction. + +The testimony was universal that recruiting for the army is easiest in +the districts which having once lived under the soviet were over run +by anti-soviet forces and then reoccupied by the Red Army. + +Trotski is enormously proud of the army he has created, but it is +noteworthy that even he is ready to disband the army at once if peace +can be obtained in order that all the brains and energy it contains +may be turned to restoring the normal life of the country. + + + + +LENIN'S PRESTIGE + +The hold which Lenin has gained on the imagination of the Russian +people makes his position almost that of a dictator. There is already +a Lenin legend. He is regarded as almost a prophet. His picture, +usually accompanied by that of Karl Marx, hangs everywhere. In Russia +one never hears Lenin and Trotski spoken of in the same breath as is +usual in the western world. Lenin is regarded as in a class by +himself. Trotski is but one of the lower order of mortals. + +When I called on Lenin at the Kremlin I had to wait a few minutes +until a delegation of peasants left his room. They had heard in their +village that Comrade Lenin was hungry. And they had come hundreds of +miles carrying 800 poods of bread as the gift of the village to Lenin. +Just before them was another delegation of peasants to whom the report +had come that Comrade Lenin was working in an unheated room. They came +bearing a stove and enough firewood to heat it for three months. Lenin +is the only leader who receives such gifts. And he turns them into the +common fund. + +Face to face Lenin is a very striking man--straightforward and direct, +but also genial and with a large humor and serenity. + + + + +CONCESSIONS + +The Soviet Government recognizes very clearly the undesirability of +granting concessions to foreigners and is ready to do so only because +of necessity. The members of the Government realize that the lifting +of the blockade will be illusory unless the Soviet Government is able +to establish credits in foreign countries, particularly the United +States and England, so that goods may be bought in those countries. +For Russia to-day is in a position to export only a little gold, a +little platinum, a little hemp, flax, and wood. These exports will be +utterly inadequate to pay for the vast quantity of imports which +Russia needs. Russia must, therefore, obtain credit at any price. The +members of the Soviet Government realize fully that as a preliminary +step to the obtaining of credit the payment of foreign debts must be +resumed and, therefore, are ready to pay such debts. But even though +these debts are paid the members of the Soviet Government believe that +they will not be able to borrow money in foreign countries on any mere +promise to pay. They believe, therefore, that they will have to grant +concessions in Russia to foreigners in order to obtain immediate +credit. They desire to avoid this expedient if in any way it shall be +possible, but if absolutely necessary they are ready to adopt it in +order to begin the restoration of the normal life of the country. + +Senator KNOX. To whom did you hand that report? + +Mr. BULLITT. I handed copies of this personally to Secretary Lansing, +Col. House, Gen. Bliss and Mr. Henry White, and I handed a second +copy, for the President, to Mr. Lansing. Secretary Lansing wrote on +it, "Urgent and immediate"; put it in an envelope, and I took it up to +the President's house. + +Senator KNOX. At the same time that you handed in this report, did you +hand them the proposal of the Soviet Government? + +Mr. BULLITT. The proposal of the Soviet Government is appended to this +report. + +Senator KNOX. It is a part of the report? + +Mr. BULLITT. It is a part of the report which I have already read. +There comes first an appendix explaining the statements which I have +just read, and giving the evidence I have for them. + +Senator KNOX. Was there any formal meeting of the peace conference, or +of representatives of the great powers, to act upon this suggestion +and upon your report? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was acted upon in a very lengthy, long-drawn-out +manner. + +Immediately on my return I was first asked to appear before the +American Commission. First, the night I got back I had a couple of +hours with Col. House, in which I went over the whole matter. Col. +House was entirely and quite decidedly in favor of making peace, if +possible, on the basis of this proposal. + +The next morning I was called before the other Commissioners, and I +talked with Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. Henry White all the +morning and most of the afternoon. We had a long discussion, at the +end of which it was the sense of the commissioners' meeting that it +was highly desirable to attempt to bring about peace on that basis. + + + + +BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE + +The next morning I had breakfast with Mr. Lloyd George at his +apartment. Gen. Smuts and Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. Philip Kerr were +also present, and we discussed the matter at considerable length, I +brought Mr. Lloyd George the official text of the proposal, the same +official one, in that same envelop, which I have just shown to you. He +had previously read it, it having been telegraphed from Helsingfors. +As he had previously read it, he merely glanced over it and said, +"That is the same one I have already read," and he handed it to Gen. +Smuts, who was across the table, and said, "General, this is of the +utmost importance and interest, and you ought to read it right away." +Gen. Smuts read it immediately, and said he thought it should not be +allowed to lapse; that it was of the utmost importance. Mr. Lloyd +George, however, said that he did not know what he could do with +British public opinion. He had a copy of the Daily Mail in his hand, +and he said, "As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing +how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia?" The Daily Mail was +roaring and screaming about the whole Russian situation. Then Mr. +Lloyd George said, "Of course all the reports we get from people we +send in there are in this same general direction, but we have got to +send in somebody who is known to the whole world as a complete +conservative, in order to have the whole world believe that the report +he brings out is not simply the utterance of a radical." He then said, +"I wonder if we could get Lansdowne to go?" Then he immediately +corrected himself and said, "No; it would probably kill him." Then he +said, "I wish I could send Bob Cecil, but we have got to keep him for +the league of nations." And he said to Smuts, "It would be splendid if +you could go, but, of course, you have got the other job," which was +going down to Hungary. Afterwards he said he thought the most +desirable man to send was the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Robert +Cecil's brother; that he would be respectable enough and well known +enough so that when he came back and made the same report it would go +down with British public opinion. Mr. Lloyd George then urged me to +make public my report. He said it was absolutely necessary to have +publicity given to the actual conditions in Russia, which he +recognized were as presented. + +I saw Mr. Balfour that afternoon with Sir Eric Drummond, who at that +time was acting as his secretary. He is now secretary of the league of +nations. We discussed the entire matter. Sir William Wiseman told me +afterward that Mr. Balfour was thoroughly in favor of the proposition. + +Well, to cut the story short, first the President referred the matter +to Col. House. He left his decision on the matter with Col. House, as +was his usual course of procedure in most such matters. Mr. Lloyd +George also agreed in advance to leave the preparation of the proposal +to Col. House; that is, he said he would be disposed to go at least as +far as we would and would follow the lead of the President and Col. +House. Col. House thereupon asked me to prepare a reply to this +proposal, which I did. + +Col. House in the meantime had seen Mr. Orlando, and Mr. Orlando had +expressed himself as entirely in favor of making peace on this basis, +at least so Col. House informed me at the time. The French, I believe, +had not yet been approached formally on the matter. + +Senator KNOX. By the way, right here, you say Mr. Lloyd George advised +you to make your report public. Did you make it public? + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. Mr. Lloyd George desired me to make it public +for the enlightenment that he thought it might give to public opinion. + +Senator KNOX. But you did not do it? + + + + +BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED + +Mr. BULLITT. I attempted to. I prepared a statement for the press +based on my report, giving the facts, which I submitted to the +commission to be given out. No member of the commission was ready to +take the responsibility for publicity in the matter and it was +referred to the President. The President received it and decided that +he did not want it given out. He thought he would rather keep it +secret, and in spite of the urgings of the other commissioners he +continued to adhere to that point of view, and my report has never +been made public until this moment. + +Col. House asked me to prepare a declaration of policy, a statement +based on this proposal of the Soviet Government. It was to be an +ironclad declaration which we knew in advance would be accepted by the +Soviet Government if we made it, and he thought that the President and +Mr. Lloyd George would put it through. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you attend that meeting of the commission when +that report was considered by the American Commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. I first handed each member of the commission my report. I +had appeared before them and discussed my mission for an entire day. +They sat in the morning and in the afternoon. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I wondered whether you were present when the +President thought it would be better not to give it out, not to make +it public. + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir; I was not. Then upon order of Col. House, to +whom the matter had been referred, I prepared this declaration of +policy. I prepared it in conjunction with Mr. Whitney Shepherdson, who +was Col. House's assistant secretary, and also versed in international +law. I do not know that this is of any importance, aside from the fact +that it is almost the only direct proposition to accept their proposal +which was prepared. Col. House took this and held it under advisement +and discussed it, I believe, with the President and other persons. + +The CHAIRMAN. It had better be printed. + +The document referred to is as follows: + +A PROPOSED DECLARATION OF POLICY TO BE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE +ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS AND AN OFFER OF AN ARMISTICE + + +The representatives of the States assembled in conference at Paris +recently extended an invitation to the organized groups in Russia to +lay down their arms and to send delegates to Prince's Island. These +delegates were asked to "confer with the representatives of the +associated powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to +ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people and +bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which +Russia may work out her own purposes and happy cooperative relations +may be established between her people and the other peoples of the +world." The truce of arms was not declared, and the meeting did not +take place. + +The people of Russia are laboring to-day to establish the system of +government under which they shall live. Their task is one of +unparalleled difficulty, and should not be further complicated by the +existence of misapprehensions among the Russian people or throughout +the world. Therefore, the representatives of the associated powers, +now sitting in the conference of Paris, have determined to state +publicly what they had in mind to say through their delegates to +Prince's Island concerning the policies which govern their relations +with the Russian people. + +They wish to make it plain that they do not intend to interfere in any +way with the solution of the political, social, or economic problems +of Russia. They believe that the peace of the world will largely +depend upon a right settlement of these matters; but they equally +recognize that any right settlement must proceed from the Russian +people themselves, unembarrassed by influence or direction from +without. On the other hand, the associated powers desired to have it +clearly understood that they can have no dealings with any Russian +Government which shall invade the territory of its neighbors or seek +to impose its will upon other peoples by force. The full authority and +military power of the associated governments will stand in the way of +any such attempt. + +The task of creating a stable government demands all the great +strength of Russia, healed of the famine, misery, and disease which +attend and delay the reconstruction. The associated powers have +solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of +Europe. Their efforts, begun in Belgium and in northern France during +the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to +the Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads of +food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an +impartial hand. Industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point +where it was broken off by war. These measures of relief will be +continued until peace is signed and until nations are once more able +to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce. + +It is the earnest desire of the associated peoples similarly to +assuage the distress of millions of men and women in Russia and to +provide them with such physical conditions as will make life possible +and desirable. Relief can not be effectively rendered, however, except +by the employment of all available transportation facilities and the +active cooperation of those exercising authority within the country. + +These requisites can not be assured while Russia is still at war. + +The allied and associated governments, therefore, propose an agreement +between themselves and all governments now exercising political +authority within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including +Finland, together with Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, +Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, that hostilities against one another +shall cease on all fronts within these territories on April ---- at +noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of +this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind +whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long +as the armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice shall +be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent. The allied and +associated Governments propose that such of these Governments as are +willing to accept the terms of this armistice shall send not more than +three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts, +to ---- where they shall meet on April ---- with representatives of +the allied and associated Governments in conference to discuss peace, +upon the basis of the following principles: + + (1) All signatory Governments shall remain, as against each + other, in full control of the territories which they occupy + at the moment when the armistice becomes effective; subject + only to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the + conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these + territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change + their Government. + + (2) The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, and full + security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the + citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons + comply with the laws of the country to which they seek + admittance, and provided also that they do not interfere or + attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics + of that country. + + (3) The right to send official representatives enjoying full + liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several + signatories to each other. + + (4) A general amnesty shall be granted by the various + signatories to all political or military opponents, + offenders, and prisoners who are so regarded because of + their association or affiliation with another signatory, + provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of + the land. + + (5) Nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the + country of another shall be given all possible facilities + for repatriation. + + (6) The allied and associated Governments shall immediately + withdraw their armed forces and further military support + from the territory of the former Russian Empire, including + Finland, and the various Governments within that territory + shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces + according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be + agreed upon by the conference. + + (7) Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as + against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be + established, subject to a program of equitable distribution + of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be + agreed upon by the conference. + + (8) Provision shall be made by the conference for a mutual + exchange of transit and port privileges among the several + signatories. + + (9) The conference shall be competent to discuss and + determine any other matter which bears upon the problem of + establishing peace within the territory of the former + Russian Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment + of international relations among the signatories. + + NOTE.--If it is desirable to include a specific reference to + Russia's financial obligations, the following clause (8 bis) + would be acceptable to the Soviet Government at least: "The + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their + responsibility for the financial obligations of the former + Russian Empire to foreign States parties to this agreement + and to the nationals of such States. Detailed arrangements + for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by + the conference, regard being had to the present financial + situation of Russia." + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Was this brought to the attention of the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. The first night after I got in Col. House went to the +telephone and called up the President right away and told him that I +was in, and that he thought this was a matter of the utmost +importance, and that it would seem to be an opportunity to make peace +in a section of the world where there was no peace; in fact, where +there were 23 wars. The President said he would see me the next +evening down at Col. House's office, as I remember it. The next +evening, however, the President had a headache and he did not come. +The following afternoon Col. House said to me that he had seen the +President and the President had said he had a one-track mind and was +occupied with Germany at present, and he could not think about Russia, +and that he had left the Russian matter all to him, Col. House. +Therefore I continued to deal with Col. House directly on it inasmuch +as he was the delegate of the President, and Lloyd George, in the +matter. I used to see Col. House every day, indeed two or three times +a day, on the subject, urging him to obtain action before April 10, +which, as you will recall, was the date when this proposal was to +expire. + + + + +NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA + +Meanwhile Mr. Hoover and Mr. Auchincloss had the idea of approaching +peace with Russia by a feeding proposition, and they had approached +Mr. Fridjof Nansen, the Arctic explorer, and got him to write and send +the following letter to the President. You doubtless have seen his +letter to the President. + + PARIS, April 3, 1919. + + MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The present food situation in Russia, + where hundreds of thousands of people are dying monthly from + sheer starvation and disease, is one of the problems now + uppermost in all men's minds. As it appears that no solution + of this food and disease question has so far been reached in + any direction, I would like to make a suggestion from a + neutral point of view for the alleviation of this gigantic + misery on purely humanitarian grounds. + + It would appear to me possible to organize a purely + humanitarian commission for the provisioning of Russia, the + foodstuffs and medical supplies to be paid for, perhaps, to + some considerable extent by Russia itself, the justice of + distribution to be guaranteed by such a commission, the + membership of the commission to be comprised of Norwegian, + Swedish, and possibly Dutch, Danish, and Swiss + nationalities. It does not appear that the existing + authorities in Russia would refuse the intervention of such + a commission of wholly nonpolitical order, devoted solely to + the humanitarian purpose of saving life. If thus organized + upon the lines of the Belgian Relief Commission, it would + raise no question of political recognition or negotiations + between the Allies with the existing authorities in Russia. + + I recognize keenly the large political issues involved, and + I would be glad to know under what conditions you would + approve such an enterprise and whether such commission could + look for actual support in finance, shipping, and food and + medical supplies from the United States Government. + + I am addressing a similar note to Messrs. Orlando, + Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. Believe me, my dear Mr. + President, + + Yours, most respectfully, + + FRIDJOF NANSEN. + + His Excellency the PRESIDENT, + II Place des Etats-Unis, Paris. + +Senator KNOX, I think that was published in nearly all the papers. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. In it he proposed that a commission should be formed +at once for the feeding of Russia, because of the frightful conditions +of starvation and so on. Col. House decided that it would be an easier +way to peace if we could get there via the feeding plan, under the +guise of a purely humanitarian plan, if we could slide in that way +instead of by a direct, outright statement inviting these people to +sit down and make peace. Therefore he asked me to prepare a reply to +the Nansen letter, which I have here. + + PARIS, FRANCE, April 4, 1919. Suggested reply to Dr. + Nansen by the President of the United States and the + premiers of France, Great Britain, and Italy: + + DEAR MR. NANSEN: It is the earnest desire of the allied and + associated Governments, and of the peoples for whom they + speak, to assuage the distress of the millions of men, + women, and children who are suffering in Russia. The + associated powers have solemnly pledged their resources to + relieve the stricken regions of Europe. Their efforts, begun + in Belgium and in Northern France during the course of the + war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to the + Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads + of food are moved into the interior and there are + distributed with an impartial hand. Industry is awakened, + and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by + war. These measures of relief will be continued until + nations are once more able to provide for their needs + through the normal channels of commerce. + + The associated peoples desire and deem it their duty + similarly to assist in relieving the people of Russia from + the misery, famine, and disease which oppress them. In view + of the responsibilities which have already been undertaken + by the associated Governments they welcome the suggestion + that the neutral States should take the initiative in the + matter of Russian relief and, therefore, are prepared to + state in accordance with your request, the conditions under + which they will approve and assist a neutral commission for + the provisioning of Russia. + + The allied and associated Governments and all Governments + now exercising political authority within the territory of + the former Russian Empire, including Finland, together with + Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and + Afghanistan, shall agree that hostilities against one + another shall cease on all fronts within these territories + on April 20 at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be + begun during the period of this armistice, and that no + troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be + transferred to or within these territories so long as the + armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice + shall be for two weeks unless extended by mutual consent. + + The allied and associated Governments propose that such of + these Governments as are willing to accept the terms of this + armistice, shall send not more than three representatives + each, together with necessary technical experts, to + Christiania, where they shall meet on April 25 with + representatives of the allied and associated Governments in + conference to discuss peace 'and the provisioning of Russia, + upon the basis of the following principles: + + 1. All signatory Governments shall remain, as + against each other, in full control of the + territories which they occupy at the moment when + the armistice becomes effective, subject to such + rectifications as may be agreed upon by the + conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these + territories shall themselves voluntarily determine + to change their government. + + 2. The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, + and full security shall be accorded by the several + signatories to the citizens of each other; + provided, however, that such persons comply with + the laws of the country to which they seek + admittance, and provided also-that they do not + interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with + the domestic politics of that country. + + 3. The right to send official representatives + enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be + accorded by the several signatories to one + another. + + 4. A general amnesty shall be granted by the + various signatories to all political or military + opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so + treated because of their association or + affiliation with another signatory, provided that + they have not otherwise violated the laws of the + land. + + 5. Nationals of one signatory residing or detained + in the country of another shall be given all + possible facilities for repatriation. + + 6. The allied and associated Governments will + immediately withdraw their armed forces and + further military support from the territory of the + former Russian Empire, including Finland and the + various Governments within that territory shall + effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces + according to a scheme of demobilization and + control to be agreed upon by the conference. + + 7. Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory + as against another shall be lifted and trade + relations shall be established, subject to a + program of equitable distribution of supplies and + utilization of transport facilities to be agreed + upon by the conference in consultation with + representatives of those neutral States which are + prepared to assume the responsibility for the + provisioning of Russia. + + 8. Provision shall be made by the conference for a + mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among + the several signatories. + + 9. The Governments which have been set up on the + territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland + shall recognize their responsibility for the + financial obligations of the former Russian Empire + to foreign States parties to this agreement and to + the nationals of such States. Detailed + arrangements for discharging these obligations + shall be agreed upon by the conference, regard + being had to the present financial situation of + Russia. + + 10. The conference shall be competent to discuss and + determine any other matter which bears upon the + provisioning of Russia, the problem of establishing + peace within the territory of the former Russian + Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment of + international relations among the signatories. + +Mr. BULLITT. I also prepared at the orders of Col. House------ + +Senator KNOX. What attitude did you take toward the Nansen proposal? + +Mr. BULLITT. At first I opposed it. I was in favor of the original +plan. + +Senator KNOX. You were in favor of the original plan? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was in favor of direct, straightforward action in the +matter. However, I found that there was no use in kicking against the +pricks, that I was unable to persuade the commission that my point of +view was the correct one. Therefore at the request of Col. House I +wrote out a reply to Dr. Nansen, in which I embodied a peace proposal +so that it would have meant a peace conference via Nansen, which was +what was desired. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Was that letter delivered to Nansen? + +Mr. BULLITT. No. I gave this reply of mine to Col. House. Col. House +read it and said he would approve it, but that before he gave it to +the President and to Lloyd George as his solution of the way to deal +with this Russian matter, he wished it considered by his international +law experts, Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, and it was thereupon +turned over that afternoon to Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller. Does the +Senator desire this document? + +Senator KNOX. I do not regard it as material. It was not accepted? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was not accepted. What happened in regard to this was +that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, to correct its legal language, +produced a proposition which was entirely different, which left out +all possibility of the matter coming to a peace conference, and was +largely an offer to feed Russia provided Russia put all her railroads +in the hands of the allied and associated Governments. I have that as +well. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you object to having that put in the record, +Senator Knox? + +Senator KNOX. No. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I would like to have that put in. + +(The document referred to is here printed in full, as follows:) + + (AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL) + + Draft of proposed letter to be signed by President Wilson + and the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy + in reply to Mr. Nansen's letter: + + DEAR SIR: The situation of misery and suffering in Russia + which is described in your letter of April 3 is one which + appeals to the sympathies of all peoples of the world. + Regardless of political differences or shades of thought, + the knowledge that thousands and perhaps millions of men, + and above all of women and children lack the food and the + necessities which make life endurable is one which is + shocking to humanity. + + The Governments and the peoples whom we represent, without + thought of political, military or financial advantage, would + be glad to cooperate in any proposal which would relieve the + existing situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose, purely humanitarian in its + purpose, would offer a practical means of carrying out the + beneficent results which you have in view and could not + either in its conception or its operation be considered as + having in view any other aim than "the humanitarian purpose + of saving life." + + It is true that there are great difficulties to be overcome, + political difficulties owing to the existing situation in + Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the + existing de facto governments of Russia are all willing as + the Governments and peoples whom we represent to see succor + and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no + political difficulties will remain as obstacles thereto. + + There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and + transport which we have mentioned and also the problem of + distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can + ourselves safely hope to solve in connection with the advice + and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The + problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to + meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral + Governments. + + The difficulties of transport in Russia can in large degree + only be overcome in Russia itself. So far as possible, we + would endeavor to provide increased means of transportation; + but we would consider it essential in any such scheme of + relief that control of transportation in Russia, so far as + was necessary in the distribution of relief supplies, should + be placed wholly under such a commission as is described in + your letter and should to the necessary extent be freed from + any governmental or private control whatsoever. + + The real human element in the situation, even supposing all + these difficulties to be surmounted, is the problem of + distribution, the problem of seeing that the food reaches + the starving, the medicines the sick, the clothing the + naked. Subject to the supervision of such a commission, this + is a problem which should be solely under the control of the + people of Russia themselves so far as it is humanly possible + to put it under their control. It is not a question of class + or of race or of politics but a question of human beings in + need, and these human beings in each locality should be + given, as under the regime of the Belgian relief commission, + the fullest opportunity to advise the commission upon the + methods and the personnel by which their community is to be + relieved. Under no other circumstances could it be believed + that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian and not + political, and still more important, under no other + conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. + That such a course would involve cessation of hostilities by + Russian troops would of course mean a cessation of all + hostilities on the Russian fronts. Indeed, relief to Russia + which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be + futile, and would be impossible to consider. + + Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that + your plan could be successfully carried into effect and we + should be prepared to give it our full support. + +Senator KNOX. What I am anxious to get at is to find out what became +of your report. + +Senator FALL. I should like to know whether Col. House approved Mr. +Auchincloss's and Mr. Miller's report, or the report of the witness. + +Mr. BULLITT. I should like to have this clear, and if I can read just +this one page I shall be greatly obliged. On this proposition I wrote +the following memorandum to Mr. Auchincloss [reading]: + + APRIL 4, 1919. + + Memorandum for Mr. Auchincloss: + + DEAR GORDON: I have studied carefully the draft of the reply + to Dr. Nansen which you have prepared. In spirit and + substance your letter differs so radically from the reply + which I consider essential that I find it difficult to make + any constructive criticism. And I shall refrain from + criticizing your rhetoric. + + There are two proposals in your letter, however, which are + obviously unfair and will not, I am certain, be accepted by + the Soviet Government. + + 1. The life of Russia depends upon its railroads; + and your demand for control of transportation by + the commission can hardly be accepted by the + Soviet Government which knows that plots for the + destruction of railroad bridges were hatched in + the American consulate in Moscow. You are asking + the Soviet Government to put its head in the + lion's mouth. It will not accept. You must + moderate your phrases. + + 2. When you speak of the "cessation of hostilities + by Russian troops," you fail to speak of + hostilities by troops of the allied and associated + Governments, a number of whom, you may recall, + have invaded Russia. Furthermore, your phrase does + not cover Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Poles, etc. In + addition, you say absolutely nothing about the + withdrawal of the troops of the allied and + associated Governments from Russian territory. + And, most important, you fail to say that troops + and military supplies will cease to be sent into + the territory of the former Russian Empire. You + thereby go a long way toward proving Trotsky's + thesis: That any armistice will simply be used by + the Allies as a period in which to supply tanks, + aeroplanes, gas shells, liquid fire, etc., to the + various antisoviet governments. As it stands, your + armistice proposal is absolutely unfair, and I am + sure that it will not be accepted by the Soviet + Government. + + Very respectfully, yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +Senator NEW. Otherwise you had no fault to find with it? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. The morning after Col. House had told me he wished +to submit this proposition to his international law experts, I came as +usual to his office about 9.40, and Mr. Auchincloss was on his way to +the President with his proposal, the Auchincloss-Miller proposal, as +Col. House's proposal. But I got that stopped. I went in to Col. +House, and Col. House told Mr. Auchincloss not to take it up to the +President, and asked me if I could doctor up the reply of Mr. +Auchincloss and Mr. Miller to the Nansen letter so that it might +possibly be acceptable to the Soviet Government. I thereupon rewrote +the Auchincloss-Miller letter, but I was forced to stick very closely +to the text. I was told that I could cut things out if I wished to, +but to stick very closely to the text, which I did. I drew this +redraft of their letter, under protest at the whole business. My +redraft of their letter was finally the basis of the reply of the four +to Nansen. I have both these documents here, my reply--and the four +took that reply--and with the changes---- + +The CHAIRMAN. What four--the successors of the ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. The successors of the 10, sir, took the reply------ + +The CHAIRMAN. Who were the four at that moment? + +Mr. BULLITT. M. Orlando, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and the +President. This extremely mild proposition, which really had almost no +chance of life, was, you will see, in no sense a reply to these +proposals of the Soviet Government. This is my attempt to doctor up +the Auchincloss-Miller proposition. In spite of every effort I could +make to obtain definite action on it, the reply was made to me that +this reply to the Nansen proposal would be a sufficient reply to that +proposal of the Soviet Government. [Reading:] + + DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in + your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all + peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, + women, and children lack the food and the necessities, which + make life endurable. + + The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad + to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or + financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve + this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose would offer a practical means of + achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could + not, either in its conception or its operation, be + considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian + purpose of saving life." + +There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, +owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply +and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as +willing as the Governments and the peoples whom we represent to see +succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no +political obstacle will remain. There will remain, however, the +difficulties of supply and transport, which we have mentioned, and +also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of +supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice +and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of +transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the +assistance of your own and other neutral Governments. The problem of +transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the +people of Russia themselves, with the assistance, advice, and +supervision of your commission. + +Subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be +solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The +people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the +Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your +commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community +is to be relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed that +the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under +no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. + +That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within +the territory of the former Russian Empire is obvious. And the +cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete +suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all +sorts to and within these territories. Indeed, relief to Russia which +did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would +be impossible to consider. + +Under such conditions as we have outlined we believe that your plan +could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared +to give it our full support. + + + + + +REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON, PREMIERS CLEMENCEAU, LLOYD GEORGE, AND +ORLANDO, TO DR. NANSEN, APRIL 17, 1919 + + DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in + your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all + peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, + women, and children lack the food and the necessities which + make life endurable. + + The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad + to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or + financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve + this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose would offer a practical means of + achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could + not, either in its conception or its operation, be + considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian + purpose of saving life." + + There are great difficulties to be overcome, political + difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and + difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing + local governments of Russia are as willing as the + Governments and people whom we represent to see succor and + relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political + obstacle will remain. + + There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply, + finance, and transport which we have mentioned? and also the + problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of + supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with + the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you + propose. The problem of finance would seem to us to fall + upon the Russian authorities. The problem of transport of + supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance + of your own and other neutral governments whose interests + should be as great as our own and whose losses have been far + less. The problems of transport in Russia and of + distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia + themselves, with the assistance, advice, and supervision of + your commission. + + Subject to your supervision, the problem of distribution + should be solely under the control of the people of Russia + themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as + under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the + fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the + methods and the personnel by which their community is to be + relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed + that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not + political; under no other condition could it be certain that + the hungry would be fed. + + That such a course would involve cessation of all + hostilities within definitive lines in the territory of + Russia is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, + necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer + of troops and military material of all sorts to and within + Russian territory. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not + mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would + be impossible to consider. + + Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that + your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we + should be prepared to give it our full support. + + V.E. ORLANDO. + D. LLOYD GEORGE. + WOODROW WILSON. + G. CLEMENCEAU. + +Senator KNOX. I want the reply of Auchincloss to Nansen to go into the +record. + +The CHAIRMAN. Let all that correspondence be printed in the record. + +Senator KNOX. Dr. Nansen's proposition, and then the reply, + +(The letters referred to are inserted above.) + +Mr. BULLITT. The Nansen letter was written in Mr. Hoover's office. +Nansen made the proposition. I wrote the original of a reply to Dr. +Nansen, which I believe would have led to peace. Col. House indicated +his approval of it, but wished to have it considered from the +international legal standpoint, which was then done by Mr. Auchincloss +and Mr. Miller, who proposed a reply that had no resemblance to my +proposal. I then objected to that as it was on its way to the +President. It was not sent to the President, and I was ordered to try +to doctor it up. I attempted to doctor it up and produced a doctored +version which was finally made the basis of the reply, with the change +of two or three words which made it even worse and even more +indefinite, so that the Soviet Government could not possibly conceive +it as a genuine peace proposition. It left the whole thing in the air. + +Senator KNOX. We would like to have you see that these documents to +which you have just now referred are inserted in the record in the +sequence in which you have named them. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I shall be at the service of the committee in that +regard. + +Senator HARDING. Lest I missed something while I was out of the room I +am exceedingly curious to know why the Soviet proposal was not given +favorable consideration. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt has stated that. + + + + +KOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL + +Mr. BULLITT. The principal reason was entirely different. The fact was +that just at this moment, when this proposal was under consideration, +Kolchak made a 100-mile advance. There was a revolt of peasants in a +district of Russia which entirely cut off supplies from the Bolshevik +army operating against Kolchak. Kolchak made a 100-mile advance, and +immediately the entire press of Paris was roaring and screaming on the +subject, announcing that Kolchak would be in Moscow within two weeks; +and therefore everyone in Paris, including, I regret to say members of +the American commission, began to grow very lukewarm about peace in +Russia, because they thought Kolchak would arrive in Moscow and wipe +out the Soviet Government. + +Senator KNOX. And the proposal which you brought back from Russia, +that is the Soviet proposal, was abandoned and dropped, after this +last document to which you have just referred. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was. May I say this, that April 10 was the final +date when their proposition was open. I had attempted every day and +almost every night to obtain a reply to it. I finally requested the +commission to send the following telegram to Tchitcherin. + +I proposed to send this telegram to the American consul at Helsingfors +[reading]: + + APRIL 10, 1919. + AMERICAN CONSUL, Helsingfors: + + Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to + Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with + following message for Tchitcherin: + + "Action leading to food relief via neutrals likely within + week.--Bullitt." + + + + +AMMISSION. + +The commission considered that matter, and this is the official minute +of their meeting [reading]: + + AMERICAN MISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + [No. 211.] April 10, 1919. + + To: The Commissioners, for action. + Subject: Telegram to Tchitcherin. + + _Statement_.--Action by the council of four on the reply to + Mr. Nansen was prevented yesterday by French objection to a + minor clause in the President's letter. It is hoped that + agreement in this matter may be reached to-day or to-morrow, + but it is quite possible that agreement may not be reached + for several days. + + To-day, April 10, the pledge of the Soviet Government to + accept a proposal of the sort outlined in its statement of + March 14 expires. No indication has been given the Soviet + Government that its statement was ever placed before the + conference of Paris or that any change of policy in regard + to Russia is contemplated. In view of the importance which + the Soviet Government placed upon its statement, I fear that + this silence and the passing of April 10 will be interpreted + as a definite rejection of the peace effort of the Soviet + Government and that the Soviet Government will at once issue + belligerent political statements and orders for attacks on + all fronts, including Bessarabia and Archangel. It is + certain that if the soviet troops should enter Bessarabia or + should overcome the allied forces at Archangel, the + difficulty of putting through the policy which is likely to + be adopted within the next few days would be greatly + increased. I feel that if the appended telegram should be + sent at once to Tchitcherin, no large offensive movements by + the soviet armies would be undertaken for another week, and + no provocative political statements would be issued. + + I therefore respectfully suggest that the appended telegram + should be sent at once. + + Respectfully submitted. + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +APRIL 10, 1919. + +At the meeting of the commissioners this morning the above memorandum +was read in which Mr. Bullitt requested that a telegram be sent to the +American consul at Helsingfors, instructing the latter to send a +message through reliable sources to Tchitcherin respecting Mr. +Lansing's contemplated scheme for relief in Russia. After some +discussion the commissioners redrafted the telegram in question to +read as follows: + + "Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to + Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with + following message for Tchitcherin, sent on my personal + responsibility: 'Individuals of neutral States are + considering organization for feeding Russia. Will perhaps + decide something definite within a week.'--Bullitt." + + CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, + Assistant to Mr. White. + +I believe that telegram was dispatched. I do not know. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I want to ask you a question. You have told +us that you went to Russia with instructions from the Secretary of +State, Mr. Lansing, with a definition of the American policy by Mr. +House, with the approval of Lloyd George, who approved of your +mission, of the purposes for which you were being sent. Now, tell us +whether or not to your knowledge your report and the proposal of the +Soviet Government was ever formally taken up by the peace conference +and acted on? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was never formally laid before the peace conference, +which I believe met only six times during the course of the entire +proceedings of what is called the peace conference. + + + + +LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT + +Senator KNOX. Did not Mr. Lloyd George in a speech to Parliament +assert that he had never received the proposal with which you returned +from Russia? Have you a copy of his speech? + +Mr. BULLITT. About a week after I had handed to Mr. Lloyd George the +official proposal, with my own hands, in the presence of three other +persons, he made a speech before the British Parliament, and gave the +British people to understand that he knew nothing whatever about any +such proposition. It was a most egregious case of misleading the +public, perhaps the boldest that I have ever known in my life. On the +occasion of that statement of Mr. Lloyd George, I wrote the President. +I clipped his statement from a newspaper and sent it to the President, +and I asked the President to inform me whether the statement of Mr. +Lloyd George was true or untrue. He was unable to answer, inasmuch as +he would have had to reply on paper that Mr. Lloyd George had made an +untrue statement. So flagrant was this that various members of the +British mission called on me at the Crillon, a day or so later, and +apologized for the Prime Minister's action in the case. + +Senator KNOX. Have you a copy of Lloyd George's remarks in the +Parliament? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have a copy. + +Senator KNOX. Suppose you read it? + +Mr. BULLITT. It is as follows: + +Mr. CLYNES. Before the right honorable gentleman comes to the next +subject, can he make any statement on the approaches or +representations alleged to have been made to his Government by persons +acting on behalf of such government as there is in Central Russia? + +Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all except what have +appeared in the papers. + +Mr. CLYNES. I ask the question because it has been repeatedly alleged. + +Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all. Constantly there +are men coming and going to Russia of all nationalities, and they +always come back with their tales of Russia. But we have made no +approach of any sort. + +I have only heard reports of others having proposals which they assume +have come from authentic quarters, but these have never been put +before the peace conference by any member, and therefore we have not +considered them. + +I think I know what my right honorable friend refers to. There was +some suggestion that a young American had come back from Russia with a +communication. It is not for me to judge the value of this +communication, but if the President of the United States had attached +any value to it he would have brought it before the conference, and he +certainly did not. + +It was explained to me by the members of the British delegation who +called on me, that the reason for this deception was that although +when Lloyd George got back to London he intended to make a statement +very favorable to peace with Russia, he found that Lord Northcliffe, +acting through Mr. Wickham Steed, the editor of The Times, and Mr. +Winston Churchill, British secretary for war, had rigged the +conservative majority of the House of Commons against him, and that +they were ready to slay him then and there if he attempted to speak +what was his own opinion at the moment on Russian policies. + + + + +MR. BULLITT RESIGNS + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, you resigned your relations with the State +Department and the public service, did you not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +Senator KNOX. When? + +Mr. BULLITT. I resigned on May 17. + +Senator KNOX. For what reason? + +Mr. BULLITT. Well, I can explain that perhaps more briefly than in any +other way by reading my letter of resignation to the President, which +is brief. + +Senator KNOX. Very well, we would like to hear it. + +The CHAIRMAN. Before that letter is read, you did not see the +President and had no knowledge of his attitude in regard to your +report? + +Mr. BULLITT. None whatever, except as it was reported to me by Col. +House. Col. House, as I said before, reported to me that he thought in +the first place that the President favored the peace proposal; in the +second place, that the President could not turn his mind to it, +because he was too occupied with Germany, and finally--well, really, I +have no idea what was in the President's mind. + +Senator KNOX. There never was another effort to secure an audience +with the President for you after those first two that you say Col. +House made? + +Mr. BULLITT. No; not at all. Meetings with the President were always +arranged through Col. House. + +In my letter of resignation to the President, which was dated May 17, +1919, I said: + + MAY 17, 1919. + + MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have submitted to-day to the + Secretary of State my resignation as an assistant in the + Department of State, attaché to the American commission to + negotiate peace. I was one of the millions who trusted + confidently and implicitly in your leadership and believed + that you would take nothing less than "a permanent peace" + based upon "unselfish and unbiased justice." But our + Government has consented now to deliver the suffering + peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections, and + dismemberments--a new century of war. And I can convince + myself no longer that effective labor for "a new world + order" is possible as a servant of this Government. + + Russia, "the acid test of good will," for me as for you, has + not even been understood. Unjust decisions of the conference + in regard to Shantung, the Tyrol, Thrace, Hungary, East + Prussia, Danzig, the Saar Valley, and the abandonment of the + principle of the freedom of the seas make new international + conflicts certain. It is my conviction that the present + league of nations will be powerless-to prevent these wars, + and that the United States will be involved in them by the + obligations undertaken in the covenant of the league and in + the special understanding with France. Therefore the duty of + the Government of the United States to its own people and to + mankind is to refuse to sign or ratify this unjust treaty, + to refuse to guarantee its settlements by entering the + league of nations, to refuse to entangle the United States + further by the understanding with France. + + That you personally opposed most of the unjust settlements, + and that you accepted them only under great pressure, is + well known. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that if you + had made your fight in the open, instead of behind closed + doors, you would have carried with you the public opinion of + the world, which was yours; you would have been able to + resist the pressure and might have established the "new + international order based upon broad and universal + principles of right and justice" of which you used to speak. + I am sorry that you did not fight our fight to the finish + and that you had so little faith in the millions of men, + like myself, in every nation who had faith in you. + + Very sincerely, yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + To the honorable WOODROW WILSON, + President of the United States. + +Senator KNOX. Did you ever get a reply to that letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did not, sir. The only intimation I had in regard to it +was that Mr. Close, secretary of the President, with whom I was +lunching, said to me that the President had read my letter and had +said that he would not reply. In connection with that I wrote Col. +House a letter at the same time as follows: + + MAY 17, 1919. + + MY DEAR COL. HOUSE: Since you kindly lent me the text of the + proposed treaty of peace, I have tried to convince myself + that some good might come of it and that I ought to remain + in the service of the Department of State to labor for its + establishment. + + It is with sincere regret that I have come to the conviction + that no good ever will issue from a thing so evil and that + those who care about a permanent peace should oppose the + signature and ratification of it, and of the special + understanding with France. + + I have therefore submitted my resignation to the Secretary + of State and have written the appended note to the + President. I hope you will bring it to his attention; not + because he will care what I may think, but because I have + expressed the thoughts which are in the minds of many young + and old men in the commission--thoughts which the President + will have to reckon with when the world begins to reap the + crop of wars the seeds of which have here been sown. + + I feel sure that you will agree that I am right in acting on + my conviction and I hope that this action will in no way + affect the relationship between us which has always been so + delightful and stimulating to me. + + With my sincerest personal regards, I am, Very respectfully, + yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + To the honorable EDWARD M. HOUSE, + Hotel Crillon, Paris. + +Senator KNOX. Did you get a reply to that? + +Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent for me, and after that we had a +conversation. That was the only reply that I had. I had a conversation +with Col. House on the whole matter, and we thrashed it all out. + +Senator KNOX. Was anything said during this conversation which you +feel willing or disposed to tell us, which will be important? + +Mr. BULLITT. I made a record of the conversation. Inasmuch as the +conversations which I had with various members of the commission on +the occasion of my resignation touched on a number of important +issues, I kept a record of those conversations, that is, those I had +at the time when I resigned. They are the only conversations of which +I made records, and I made them simply because we did deal more or +less with the entire question of the peace treaty. On the other hand, +they are personal conversations, and I hesitate to repeat them, unless +the committee considers it particularly important. + +Senator KNOX. I would not press you on the personal conversations +which you had with Col. House after you resigned. I leave the matter +to your own judgment. I wondered whether there might have been +something which transpired which you would care to tell us; but I +withdraw that suggestion. I should like to ask you this one question: +I suppose your letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was merely formal? + +Mr. BULLITT. My letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was a formal +letter. + +Senator KNOX. You certainly got a reply to that. + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. I wrote a formal letter and I got a formal +reply, and the Secretary sent for me the same afternoon and explained +that he only sent me a formal reply because it was necessary, because +of the form in which I had put my resignation, and particularly +because I had appended to my note my letter to the President. We then +discussed various other matters in connection with the treaty. + +The CHAIRMAN. Are you through? + +Senator KNOX. Yes. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, you put into the record or read here, I +think, some extracts from the minutes of the Council of Ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at any of these meetings? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was not, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. The Council of Ten was the first body that was dealing +with the treaty generally, the important body? It was not a special +commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. It was the main body of the conference. + +The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was the main body, and was the one that +subsequently became the Council of Five, and then the Council of Four, +and I think at one time a Council of Three? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, there were records of these meetings, were +there not? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what disposition was made of those records? + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, there were a number of copies for each +delegation, and I presume that there must be a number of copies in +this country at the present time; perhaps not. + +The CHAIRMAN. You say each delegate had a copy? + +Mr. BULLITT. Each plenipotentiary had a copy, and the Secretary of the +American Commission had a copy, I believe, and the assistant +secretaries had copies; certainly one of the assistant secretaries, +Mr. Leland Harrison; and Mr. Grew had a copy. + +The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Lansing have copies while he served on the +Council of Ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; well, I am quite sure that he did. I am sure +that I have seen copies on the desk of the Secretary. + +The CHAIRMAN. Well, they were furnished regularly to every member of +the conference? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. + +The CHAIRMAN. We have found some difficulty in getting them; that is +the reason I asked. + +Senator KNOX. I am informed--perhaps Mr. Bullitt can tell us--that +there is a complete set of minutes in the hands of some individual in +this country. Do you know anything about that--perhaps Auchincloss & +Miller? + +Mr. BULLITT. I could not be certain in regard to the matter, but I +should certainly be under the impression that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. +Miller have copies of the minutes; perhaps not. Perhaps Mr. +Auchincloss has left his with Col. House. He would have Col. House's +copies. Perhaps they are in this country, perhaps not. But Mr. +Auchincloss and Mr. Miller perhaps have those minutes in their files. + +The CHAIRMAN. Undoubtedly there are a number, at least, of those +records in existence. + +Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. That must be the case. + +Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir. Also records of the meetings of the +American Commission. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know whether or not they are in the State +Department--any of these minutes or records in our State Department? + +Mr. BULLITT. I should presume that in the normal course of events they +would be certainly among Mr. Lansing's papers, which were very +carefully kept. He had an excellent secretariat. + +The CHAIRMAN. Did any member of our delegation, any member of the +council of 10, express to you any opinions about the general character +of this treaty? + +Mr. BULLITT. Well, Mr. Lansing, Col. House, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. White +had all expressed to me very vigorously their opinions on the subject. + +The CHAIRMAN. Were they enthusiastically in favor of it? + +Mr. BULLITT. I regret to say, not. + +As I say, the only documents of the sort that I have are the memoranda +of the discussions that I had after I resigned, when we thrashed over +the whole ground. + +The CHAIRMAN. Those memoranda of consultations that you had after you +resigned you prefer not to publish? I am not asking you to do so. + +Mr. BULLITT. I think it would be out of the way. + +The CHAIRMAN. I quite understand your position. I only wanted to +know--I thought it might be proper for you to say whether or not their +opinions which you heard them express were favorable to the series of +arrangements, I would call them, that were made for the consideration +of this treaty. + +Mr. BULLITT. It is no secret that Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. +Henry White objected very vigorously to the numerous provisions of the +treaty. + +The CHAIRMAN. It is known that they objected to Shantung. That, I +think, is public information. I do not know that it is public +information that they objected to anything else. + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not think that Secretary Lansing is at all +enthusiastic about the league of nations as it stands at present. I +have a note of a conversation with him on the subject, which, if I +may, I will just read, without going into the rest of that +conversation, because it bears directly on the issue involved. + +This was a conversation with the Secretary of State at 2.30 on May 19. +The Secretary sent for me. It was a long conversation, and Mr. Lansing +in the course of it said: + +Mr. Lansing then said that he personally would have strengthened +greatly the judicial clauses of the league of nations covenant, making +arbitration compulsory. He also said that he was absolutely opposed to +the United States taking a mandate in either Armenia or +Constantinople; that he thought that Constantinople should be placed +under a local government, the chief members of which were appointed by +an international committee. + +This is a matter, it seems to me, of some importance in regard to the +whole discussion, and therefore I feel at liberty to read it, as it is +not a personal matter. + +The CHAIRMAN. This is a note of the conversation made at the time? + +Mr. BULLITT. This is a note which I immediately dictated after the +conversation. [Reading:] + + Mr. Lansing then said that he, too, considered many parts of + the treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with + Shantung and the league of nations. He said: "I consider + that the league of nations at present is entirely useless. + The great powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the + world to suit themselves. England and France in particular + have gotten out of the treaty everything that they wanted, + and the league of nations can do nothing to alter any of the + unjust clauses of the treaty except by unanimous consent of + the members of the league, and the great powers will never + give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker + peoples." + +We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. +Mr. Lansing said: "I believe that if the Senate could only understand +what this treaty means, and if the American people could really +understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they +will ever understand what it lets them in for." He expressed the +opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really understand the treaty-- +[Laughter.] May I reread it? + +He expressed the opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really +understand the treaty, and that Mr. Lodge would; but that Mr. Lodge's +position would become purely political, and therefore ineffective. + +[Laughter.] + +The CHAIRMAN. I do not mind. + +Mr. BULLITT (reading): + +He thought, however, that Mr. Knox might instruct America in the real +meaning of it. + +[Laughter.] + +The CHAIRMAN. He has made some very valuable efforts in the direction. + +Mr. BULLITT. I beg to be excused from reading any +more of these conversations. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. We get the drift. + +[Laughter.] + +I want to ask one or two questions. + +The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read any of these minutes of the meetings +of the American commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. Of the American commission itself? + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Yes. + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. I have on one or two occasions glanced at them +but I never have read them carefully. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. They were accessible to you at the time, were they? + +Mr. BULLITT. They were, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated, if I recall your testimony correctly, +that when the proposition was made that the legislative bodies of the +contracting parties should have representation in the assembly, the +President objected to that? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President--if I may explain again--approved in +principle, but said that he did not see how the thing could be worked +out, and he felt that the assembly of delegates, or whatever it is +called in the present draft, gave sufficient representation to the +peoples of the various countries. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know what his objection was to the +legislative bodies of the contracting parties having representation on +the assembly? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President believed, I think--in fact, it was so +stated to me by Col. House, who discussed the matter with me--that it +would make too unwieldy a central organ for the league. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you understand why it would be any more unwieldy +if Congress should appoint the delegates than if the President should? + +Mr. BULLITT. It would necessitate a larger central body if +representation was to be given to the important political parties of +the various countries. It would have necessitated a body of, say, 10 +representatives from the United States--5 from the Republican party +and 5 from the; Democratic Party, in the assembly of the league, which +would become a large body. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. The idea was that the political parties of the +country should be represented? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, the political viewpoints should be represented so +that you would get some connection between the central assembly of the +league and the true opinion of the countries. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. When you went across to Paris on the _George +Washington_ with the President do you know whether he had with him at +that time any draft for a league of nations or any memorandum that he +showed to you of discussed with you? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President outlined to several of us one evening, or +rather one afternoon, the conception he had at the time of the league +of nations. I did not see any formal draft that he had, but the +President made a statement before the council of 10, in one of these +minutes from which I have been reading, stating that he had first--and +in fact I think I know it from other sources--that he had first +received the Phillimore report, that then it had been rewritten by +Col. House and that he had rewritten Col. House's report, and after he +had discussed his rewriting with Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts, he had +rewritten it again. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated substantially that the only part of the +league draft which was laid before the Peace Conference which the +President had his way about, was Article 10. Did you make some such +statement as that? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. The President stated to us that that was +practically what he had submitted to the Niagara conference here when +the ABC powers from South America were discussing the Mexican +question. He had then considered it as an article for American use on +this continent. + +Do you know what the attitude of Gen Smuts was as to article 10 as +proposed by the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not, sir. Again, full minutes of the discussions and +conclusions reached of all these meetings of the committee on the +league of nations were kept. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read the various other plans that were +proposed or suggested over there for a league of nations? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have read some of them, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did the others have anything similar to what is now +article 10 in the treaty pending in the Senate? + +Mr. BULLITT. I really can not say. I am sorry, but I have forgotten. I +should not care to testify on that. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know from what you heard while you were +there in your official capacity whether the other nations were anxious +to have article 10 in the covenant for the league? + +Mr. BULLITT. The French were not only anxious for it, but I believe +were anxious greatly to strengthen it. They desired immediately a +league army to be established, and I believe also to be stationed in +Alsace-Lorraine and along the Rhine, in addition to article 10. I can +not say for certain about the others. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, we had before us at one of our hearings a +representative of the Egyptian people. Do you know anything about +that, when it was done, or any discussions about it? I mean the +clauses that appear in regard to the British protectorate. + +Mr. BULLITT. You mean our agreement to recognize the British +protectorate in Egypt? + +The CHAIRMAN. It was recognized by this treaty in those clauses. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; but we gave a sort of assent before the treaty +formally came out, did we not? I recall the morning it was done. It +was handled by Sir William Wiseman, who was the confidential +representative that Lloyd George and Balfour had constantly with Col. +House and the President. He was a sort of extra confidential foreign +office. It was all done, if I recall his statement correctly, in the +course of one morning. The President was informed that the Egyptian +nationalists were using his 14 points as meaning that the President +thought that Egypt should have the right to control her own destinies, +and therefore have independence, and that they were using this to +foment revolution; that since the President had provoked this trouble +by the 14 points, they thought that he should allay it by the +statement that we would recognize the British protectorate, and as I +remember Sir William Wiseman's statement to me that morning, he said +that he had only brought up the matter that morning and that he had +got our recognition of the British protectorate before luncheon. + +The CHAIRMAN. The President made some public statement? + +Mr. BULLITT. I am not certain in regard to the further developments of +it. I recall that incident, that it was arranged through Sir William +Wiseman, and that it took only a few minutes. + +Senator KNOX. That was a good deal of time to devote to a little +country like Egypt. + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not know. You should know, sir, you have been +Secretary of State. + +Senator KNOX. We never chewed them up that fast. + +Senator NEW. Mr. Bullitt, what, if anything, was said with reference +to the Irish question, with which you are familiar? + +Mr. BULLITT. At the conference? I do not believe the Irish question +was ever brought up before the conference or discussed. There was +considerable said on the side, attempts to let down the Walsh mission +easily without antagonizing the Irish vote in this country. +[Laughter.] I think that is the only consideration that Ireland +received. + +Senator NEW. There was a cheerful willingness to do that, was there +not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I think so. + +The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further that anybody desires to ask +Mr. Bullitt? We are very much obliged to you indeed, Mr. Bullitt. + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, if I may just say--I do not know whether it +is a matter of first interest to the Senators or not--but on this trip +with me to Russia there was Capt. Pettit, and at the same time the +journalist, Lincoln Steffens, and I have documents which they prepared +and which might be of interest to the committee. + +The CHAIRMAN. If you will hand those to the stenographer, we will +print them with your testimony. + +Senator KNOX. What are your plans, Mr. Bullitt? What are you going to +do in this country now? + +Mr. BULLITT. I expect to return to Maine and fish for trout, where I +was when I was summoned by the committee. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did Mr. Steffens go to Russia with you? + +Mr. BULLITT. He did. + +The CHAIRMAN. He held no official position? + +Mr. BULLITT. No. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Who advised him to go? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Is he in the country now? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not believe so. I believe he is still in Europe. + + + + +REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + +(By order of the committee the report of Lincoln Steffens referred to +is here printed in full in the record, as follows:) + + REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + + APRIL 2, 1919. + + Politically, Russia has reached a state of equilibrium; + internally; for the present at least. + + I think the revolution there is ended; that it has run its + course. There will be changes. There may be advances; there + will surely be reactions, but these will be regular, I + think; political and economic, but parliamentary, A new + center of gravity seems to have been found. + + Certainly, the destructive phase of the revolution in Russia + is over. Constructive work has begun. + + We saw this everywhere. And we saw order, and though we + inquired for them, we heard of no disorders. Prohibition is + universal and absolute. Robberies have been reduced in + Petrograd below normal of large cities. Warned against + danger before we went in, we felt safe. Prostitution has + disappeared with its clientele, who have been driven out by + the "no-work-no-food law," enforced by the general want and + the labor-card system. Loafing on the job by workers and + sabotage by upper-class directors, managers, experts and + clerks have been overcome. Russia has settled down to work. + + The soviet form of government, which sprang up so + spontaneously all over Russia, is established. + + This is not a paper thing; not an invention. Never planned, + it has not yet been written into the forms of law. It is not + even uniform. It is full of faults and difficulties; clumsy, + and in its final development it is not democratic. The + present Russian Government is the most autocratic government + I have ever seen. Lenin, head of the Soviet Government, is + farther removed from the people than the Tsar was, or than + any actual ruler in Europe is. + + The people in a shop or an industry are a soviet. These + little informal Soviets elect a local soviet; which elects + delegates to the city or country (community) soviet; which + elects delegates to the government (State) soviet. The + government Soviets together elect delegates to the + All-Russian Soviet, which elects commissionaires (who + correspond to our Cabinet, or to a European minority). And + these commissionaires finally elect Lenin. He is thus five + or six removes from the people. To form an idea of his + stability, independence, and power, think of the process + that would have to be gone through with by the people to + remove him and elect a successor. A majority of all the + Soviets in all Russia would have to be changed in personnel + or opinion, recalled, or brought somehow to recognize and + represent the altered will of the people. + + No student of government likes the soviet as it has + developed. Lenin himself doesn't. He calls it a + dictatorship, and he opposed it at first. When I was in + Russia in the days of Milyoukov and Kerensky, Lenin and the + Bolsheviks were demanding the general election of the + constituent assembly. But the Soviets existed then; they had + the power, and I saw foreign ambassadors blunder, and the + world saw Milyoukov and Kerensky fall, partly because they + would not, or could not, comprehend the nature of the + soviet; as Lenin did finally, when, against his theory, he + joined in and expressed the popular repudiation of the + constituent assembly and went over to work with the soviet, + the actual power in Russia. The constituent assembly, + elected by the people, represented the upper class and the + old system. The soviet was the lower class. + + The soviet, at bottom, is a natural gathering of the working + people, of peasants, in their working and accustomed + groupings, instead of, as with us, by artificial + geographical sections. + + Labor unions and soldiers' messes made up the Soviets in the + cities; poorer peasants and soldiers at the village inn were + the first Soviets in the country; and in the beginning, two + years ago, these lower class delegates used to explain to me + that the "rich peasants" and the "rich people" had their own + meetings and meeting places. The popular intention then was + not to exclude the upper classes from the government, but + only from the Soviets, which were not yet the same. But the + Soviets, once in existence, absorbed in their own class + tasks and their own problems, which the upper class had + either not understood or solved, ignored--no; they simply + forgot the council of empire and the Duma. And so they + discovered (or, to be more exact, their leaders discovered) + that they had actually all the power. All that Lenin and the + other Socialist leaders had to do to carry through their + class-struggle theory was to recognize this fact of power + and teach the Soviets to continue to ignore the assemblies + and the institutions of the upper classes, which, with their + "governments," ministries, and local assemblies, fell, + powerless from neglect. + + The Soviet Government sprouted and grew out of the habits, + the psychology, and the condition of the Russian people. It + fitted them. They understand it. They find they can work it + and they like it. Every effort to put something else in its + place (including Lenin's) has failed. It will have to be + modified, I think, but not in essentials, and it can not be + utterly set aside. The Tsar himself, if he should come back, + would have to keep the Russian Soviet, and somehow rule over + and through it. + + The Communist Party (dubbed "Bolshevik") is in power now in + the Soviet Government. + + I think it will stay there a long time. What I have shown of + the machinery of change is one guaranty of communist + dominance. There are others. All opposition to the communist + government has practically ceased inside of Russia. + + There are three organized opposition parties: Mencheviks, + Social Revolutionary Right, and Social Revolutionary Left. + The anarchists are not organized. The Social Revolutionary + Left is a small group of very anarchistic leaders, who have + hardly any following. The Mencheviks and the Social + Revolutionaries Right are said to be strong, but there is no + way of measuring their strength, for a very significant + reason. + + These parties have stopped fighting. They are critical, but + they are not revolutionary. They also think the revolution + is over. They proposed, and they still propose eventually, + to challenge and oust the Communist Party by parliamentary + and political methods, not by force. But when intervention + came upon distracted Russia, and the people realized they + were fighting many enemies on many fronts, the two strong + opposing parties expressed their own and the public will to + stand by the party in power until the menace of foreign + invasion was beaten off. These parties announced this in + formal statements, uttered by their regular conventions; you + have confirmation of it in the memoranda written for you by + Martov and Volsky, and you will remember how one of them put + it to us personally: + + "There is a fight to be made against the + Bolsheviks, but so long as you foreigners are + making it, we Russians won't. When you quit and + leave us alone, we will take up our burden again, + and we shall deal with the Bolsheviks. And we will + finish them. But we will do it with our people, by + political methods, in the Soviets, and not by + force, not by war or by revolution, and not with + any outside foreign help." + + This is the nationalistic spirit, which we call patriotism, + and understand perfectly; it is much stronger in the new + than it was in the old, the Tsar's, Russia. But there is + another force back of this remarkable statement of a + remarkable state of mind. + + All Russia has turned to the labor of reconstruction; sees + the idea in the plans proposed for the future; and is + interested--imaginatively. + + Destruction was fun for a while and a satisfaction to a + suppressed, betrayed, to an almost destroyed people. + Violence was not in their character, however. The Russian + people, sober, are said to be a gentle people. One of their + poets speaks of them as "that gentle beast, the Russian + people," and I noticed and described in my reports of the + first revolution how patient, peaceable, and "safe" the mobs + of Petrograd were. The violence came later, with Bolshevism, + after the many attempts at counterrevolution, and with + vodka. The Bolshevik leaders regret and are ashamed of their + red terror. They do not excuse it. It was others, you + remember, who traced the worst of the Russian atrocities and + the terror itself to the adoption by the + counter-revolutionists of the method of assassination (of + Lenin and others), and most of all to the discovery by the + mobs of wine cellars and vodka stills. That the Russian + drunk and the Russian sober are two utterly different + animals, is well known to the Jews, to the Reactionaries, + and to the Russians themselves. And that is why this people + lately have not only obeyed; they have themselves ruthlessly + enforced the revolutionary prohibition decrees in every part + of Russia that we would inquire about and hear from. + + The destructive spirit, sated, exhausted, or suppressed, has + done its work. The leaders say so--the leaders of all + parties. + + There is a close relationship between the Russian people and + the new Russian leaders, in power and out. New men in + politics are commonly fresh, progressive, representative; + it's the later statesmen that damp the enthusiasm and sober + the idealism of legislators. In Russia all legislators, all, + are young or new. It is as if we should elect in the United + States a brand-new set of men to all offices, from the + lowest county to the highest Federal position, and as if the + election should occur in a great crisis, when all men are + full of hope and faith. The new leaders of the local Soviets + of Russia were, and they still are, of the people, really. + That is one reason why their autocratic dictatorship is + acceptable. They have felt, they shared the passion of the + mob to destroy, but they had something in mind to destroy. + + The soviet leaders used the revolution to destroy the system + of organized Russian life. + + While the mobs broke windows, smashed wine cellars, and + pillaged buildings to express their rage, their leaders + directed their efforts to the annihilation of the system + itself. They pulled down the Tsar and his officers; they + abolished the courts, which had been used to oppress them; + they closed shops, stopped business generally, and + especially all competitive and speculative business; and + they took over all the great industries, monopolies, + concessions, and natural resources. This was their purpose. + This is their religion. This is what the lower-class culture + has been slowly teaching the people of the world for 50 + years: that it is not some particular evil, but the whole + system of running business and railroads, shops, banks, and + exchanges, for speculation and profit that must be changed. + This is what causes poverty and riches, they teach, misery, + corruption, vice, and war. The people, the workers, or their + State, must own and run these things "for service." + + Not political democracy, as with us; economic democracy is + the idea; democracy in the shop, factory, business. + Bolshevism is a literal interpretation, the actual + application of this theory, policy, or program. And so, in + the destructive period of the Russian revolution, the + Bolshevik leaders led the people to destroy the old system, + root and branch, fruit and blossom, too. And apparently this + was done. The blocks we saw in Petrograd and Moscow of + retail shops nailed up were but one sign of it. When we + looked back of these dismal fronts and inquired more deeply + into the work of the revolution we were convinced that the + Russians have literally and completely done their job. And + it was this that shocked us. It is this that has startled + the world; not the atrocities of the revolution, but the + revolution itself. + + The organization of life as we know it in America, in the + rest of Europe, in the rest of the world, is wrecked and + abolished in Russia. + + The revolution didn't do it. The Tsar's Government had + rotted it. The war broke down the worn-out machinery of it; + the revolution has merely scrapped it finally. + + The effect is hunger, cold, misery, anguish, disease--death + to millions. But worse than these--I mean this--was the + confusion of mind among the well and the strong. We do not + realize, any of us--even those of us who have + imagination--how fixed our minds and habits are by the ways + of living that we know. So with the Russians. They + understood how to work and live under their old system; it + was not a pretty one; it was dark, crooked, and dangerous, + but they had groped around in it all their lives from + childhood up. They could find their way in it. And now they + can remember how it was, and they sigh for the old ways. The + rich emigres knew whom to see to bribe for a verdict, a + safe-conduct, or a concession; and the poor, in their + hunger, think now how it would be to go down to the market + and haggle, and bargain, from one booth to another, making + their daily purchases, reckoning up their defeats and + victories over the traders. And they did get food then. And + now--it is all gone. They have destroyed all this, and + having destroyed it they were lost, strangers in their own + land. + + This tragedy of transition was anticipated by the leaders of + the revolution, and the present needs were prepared for in + the plans laid for reconstruction. + + Lenin has imagination. He is an idealist, but he is a + scholar, too, and a very grim realist. Lenin was a + statistician by profession. He had long been trying to + foresee the future of society under socialism, and he had + marked down definitely the resources, the machinery, and the + institutions existing under the old order, which could be + used in the new. There was the old Russian communal land + system, passing, but standing in spots with its peasants + accustomed to it. That was to be revived; it is his solution + of the problem of the great estates. They are not to be + broken up, but worked by the peasants in common. Then there + was the great Russian Cooperative (trading) Society, with + its 11,000,000 families before the war; now with 17,000,000 + members. He kept that. There was a conflict; it was in + bourgeoise hands but it was an essential part of the + projected system of distribution, so Lenin compromised and + communist Russia has it. He had the railroads, telegraph, + telephone already; the workers seized the factories, the + local Soviets the mines; the All-Russian Soviet, the banks. + The new government set up shops--one in each + neighborhood--to dole out not for money, but on work + tickets, whatever food, fuel, and clothing this complete + government monopoly had to distribute. No bargaining, no + display, no advertising, and no speculation. Everything one + has earned by labor the right to buy at the cooperative and + soviet shops is at a fixed, low price, at the established + (too small.) profit--to the government or to the members of + the cooperative. + + Money is to be abolished gradually. It does not count much + now. Private capital has been confiscated, most of the rich + have left Russia, but there are still many people there who + have hidden away money or valuables, and live on them + without working. They can buy food and even luxuries, but + only illegally from peasants and speculators at the risk of + punishment and very high prices. They can buy, also, at the + government stores, at the low prices, but they can get only + their share there, and only on their class or work tickets. + The class arrangement, though transitory and temporary--the + aim is to have but one class--is the key to the idea of the + whole new system. + + There are three classes. The first can buy, for example, + 1-1/2 pounds of bread a day; the second, three-quarters of a + pound; the third, only one-quarter of a pound; no matter how + much money they may have. The first class includes soldiers, + workers in war, and other essential industries, actors, + teachers, writers, experts, and Government workers of all + sorts. The second class is of all other sorts of workers. + The third is of people who do not work--the leisure class. + Their allowance is, under present circumstances, not enough + to live on, but they are allowed to buy surreptitiously from + speculators on the theory that the principal of their + capital will soon be exhausted, and, since interest, rent, + and profits--all forms of unearned money--are abolished, + they will soon be forced to go to work. + + The shock of this, and the confusion due to the strange + details of it, were, and they still are, painful to many + minds, and not only to the rich. For a long time there was + widespread discontent with this new system. The peasants + rebelled, and the workers were suspicious. They blamed the + new system for the food shortage, the fuel shortage, the + lack of raw materials for the factories. But this also was + anticipated by that very remarkable mind and will--Lenin. He + used the State monopoly and control of the press, and the + old army of revolutionary propagandists to shift the blame + for the sufferings of Russia from the revolutionary + government to the war, the blockade, and the lack of + transportation. Also, he and his executive organization were + careful to see that, when the government did get hold of a + supply of anything, its arrival was heralded, and the next + day it appeared at the community shops, where everybody + (that worked) got his share at the low government price. The + two American prisoners we saw had noticed this, you + remember. "We don't get much to eat," they said, "but + neither do our guards or the other Russians. We all get the + same. And when they get more, we get our share." + + The fairness of the new system, as it works so far, has won + over to it the working class and the poorer peasants. The + well-to-do still complain, and very bitterly sometimes. + Their hoardings are broken into by the government and by the + poverty committees, and they are severely punished for + speculative trading. But even these classes are moved + somewhat by the treatment of children. They are in a class + by themselves: class A,--I. They get all the few + delicacies--milk, eggs, fruit, game, that come to the + government monopoly--at school, where they all are fed, + regardless of class. "Even the rich children," they told us, + "they have as much as the poor children." And the children, + like the workers, now see the operas, too, the plays, the + ballets, the art galleries--all with instructors. + + The Bolsheviks--all the Russian parties--regard the + communists' attitude toward children as the symbol of their + new civilization. + + "It is to be for the good of humanity, not business," one of + them, an American, said, "and the kids represent the future. + Our generation is to have only the labor, the joy, and the + misery of the struggle. We will get none of the material + benefits of the new system, and we will probably never all + understand and like it. But the children--it is for them and + their children that we are fighting, so we are giving them + the best of it from the start, and teaching them to take it + all naturally. They are getting the idea. They are to be our + new propagandists." + + The idea is that everybody is to work for the common good, + and so, as the children and the American prisoners note, + when they all produce more, they all get more. They are + starving now, but they are sharing their poverty. And they + really are sharing it. Lenin eats, like everybody else--only + one meal a day--soup, fish, bread, and tea. He has to save + out of that a bit for breakfast and another bit for supper. + The people, the peasants, send him more, but he puts it in + the common mess. So the heads of this government do not have + to imagine the privations of the people; they feel them. And + so the people and the government realize that, if ever + Russia becomes prosperous, all will share in the wealth, + exactly as they share in the poverty now. In a word, rich + Russia expects to become a rich Russian people. + + This, then, is the idea which has begun to catch the + imagination of the Russian people. This it is that is making + men and women work with a new interest, and a new incentive, + not to earn high wages and short hours, but to produce an + abundance for all. This is what is making a people, sick of + war, send their ablest and strongest men into the new, + high-spirited, hard-drilled army to defend, not their + borders, but their new working system of common living. + + And this is what is making Lenin and his sobered communist + government ask for peace. They think they have carried a + revolution through for once to the logical conclusion. All + other revolutions have stopped when they had revolved + through the political phase to political democracy. This one + has turned once more clear through the economic phase to + economic democracy, to self-government in the factory, shop, + and on the land, and has laid a foundation for universal + profit sharing, for the universal division of food, clothes, + and all goods, equally among all. And they think their + civilization is working on this foundation. They want time + to go on and build it higher and better. They want to spread + it all over the world, but only as it works, As they told us + when we reminded them that the world dreaded their + propaganda: + + "We are through with the old propaganda of + argument. All we ask now is to be allowed to prove + by the examples of things well done here in + Russia, that the new system is good. We are so + sure we shall make good, that we are willing to + stop saying so, to stop reasoning, stop the + haranguing, and all that old stuff. And especially + are we sick of the propaganda by the sword. We + want to stop fighting. We know that each country + must evolve its own revolution out of its own + conditions and in its own imagination. To force it + by war is not scientific, not democratic, not + socialistic. And we are fighting now only in + self-defense. We will stop fighting, if you will + let us stop. We will call back our troops, if you + will withdraw yours. We will demobilize. We need + the picked organizers and the skilled workers now + in the army for our shops, factories, and farms. + We would love to recall them to all this needed + work, and use their troop trains to distribute our + goods and our harvests, if only you will call off + your soldiers and your moral, financial, and + material support from our enemies, and the enemies + of our ideals. Let every country in dispute on our + borders self-determine its own form of government + and its own allegiance. + + "But you must not treat us as a conquered nation. + We are not conquered. We are prepared to join in a + revolutionary, civil war all over all of Europe + and the world, if this good thing has to be done + in this bad way of force. But we would prefer to + have our time and our energy to work to make sure + that our young, good thing is good. We have proved + that we can share misery, and sickness, and + poverty; it has helped us to have these things to + share, and we think we shall be able to share the + wealth of Russia as we gradually develop it. But + we are not sure of that; the world is not sure. + Let us Russians pay the price of the experiment; + do the hard, hard work of it; make the + sacrifice--then your people can follow us, slowly, + as they decide for themselves that what we have is + worth having." + + That is the message you bring back, Mr. Bullitt. It is your + duty to deliver it. It is mine to enforce it by my + conception of the situation as it stands in Russia and + Europe to-day. + + It seems to me that we are on the verge of war, a new war, a + terrible war--the long-predicted class war--all over Europe. + + The peace commission, busy with the settlement of the old + war, may not see the new one, or may not measure aright the + imminent danger of it. Germany is going over, Hungary has + gone, Austria is coming into the economic revolutionary + stage. The propaganda for it is old and strong in all + countries: Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Norway, + Sweden--you know. All men know this propaganda. But that is + in the rear. Look at the front. + + Russia is the center of it. Germany, Austria, Hungary are + the wings of the potential war front of--Bolshevism. + + And Russia, the center, has made a proposition to you for + peace, for a separate peace; made it officially; made it + after thought; made it proudly, not in fear, but in pitiful + sympathy with its suffering people and for the sake of a + vision of the future in which it verily believes. They are + practical men--those that made it. You met them. We talked + with them. We measured their power. They are all idealists, + but they are idealists sobered by the responsibility of + power. Sentiment has passed out of them into work--hard + work. They said they could give one year more of starvation + to the revolution, but they said it practically, and they + prefer to compromise and make peace. I believe that, if we + take their offer, there will be such an outcry of rage and + disappointment from the Left Socialists of Germany, Italy, + France, and the world, that Lenin and Trotsky will be + astonished. The Red Revolution--the class war--will be + broken, and evolution will have its chance once more in the + rest of Europe. And you and I know that the men we met in + Moscow see this thus, and that they believe the peace + conference will not, can not, see it, but will go on to make + war and so bring on the European revolution. + + But your duty, our duty, is to point out this opportunity, + and to vouch for the strength and the will and the character + of Lenin and the commissaires of Russia to make and keep the + compact they have outlined to you. Well, this is the + briefest way in which I can express my full faith: + + Kautsky has gone to Moscow. He has gone late; he has gone + after we were there. He will find, as we found, a careful, + thoughtful, deliberate group of men in power; in too much + power; unremovable and controlling a state of monopoly, + which is political, social, economic, financial; which + controls or directs all the activities, all the fears, all + the hopes, all the aspirations of a great people. Kautsky + will speak to revolutionary Russia for revolutionary + Germany, and for a revolutionary Europe. There will be an + appeal in that; there will be a strong appeal in that to the + revolutionary Russian commissaires. But, if I am any judge + of character, Lenin and his commissaires will stand by their + offer to us until Paris has answered, or until the time set + for the answer--April 10--shall have passed. Then, and not + until then, will Kautsky receive an answer to his appeal + for--whatever it is the Germans are asking. + + It is not enough that you have delivered your message and + made it a part of the record of the peace conference. I + think it is your duty to ask the fixed attention of your + chiefs upon it for a moment, and to get from them the + courtesy of a clear, direct reply to Russia before April 10. + + + + +REPORTS OF CAPT. W.W. PETTIT + +(The reports of Capt. Pettit are here printed in full, as follows:) + + REPORTS OF CAPT, W.W. PETTIT + + I left Petrograd on March 31. During the past three weeks I have + crossed the Finnish border six times and have been approximately + two weeks in Petrograd. I have met Tchitcherin, Litvinov, and + most of the important personages in the communist government of + Petrograd (including Bill Shatov, chief of police). + + Briefly, my opinion of the Russian situation is as follows: + In Petrograd I presume the present communist government has + a majority of the working-men behind it, but probably less + than half of the total population are members of the + communist party. However, my conclusions are based on + conversations with not only communists, but also many + opponents of the communist government, members of the + aristocracy, business men, and foreigners, and I am + persuaded that a large majority of the population of + Petrograd if given a choice between the present government + and the two alternatives, revolution or foreign + intervention, would without hesitation take the present + government. Foreign intervention would unite the population + in opposition and would tend to greatly emphasize the + present nationalist spirit. Revolution would result in + chaos. (There is nowhere a group of Russians in whom the + people I have talked with have confidence. Kolchak, Denikin, + Yudenvitch, Trepov, the despicable hordes of Russian + emigrees who haunt the Grand Hotel, Stockholm; the Socithans + House, Helsingfors; the offices of the peace commission in + Paris, and squabble among themselves as to how the Russian + situation shall be solved; all equally fail to find many + supporters in Petrograd.) Those with whom I have talked + recognize that revolution, did it succeed in developing a + strong government, would result in a white terror comparable + with that of Finland. In Finland our consul has a record of + 12,500 executions in some 50 districts, out of something + like 500 districts, by the White Guard. In Petrograd I have + been repeatedly assured that the total Red executions in + Petrograd and Moscow and other cities was at a maximum + 3,200. + + It may seem somewhat inconsistent for the Russian + bourgeoisie to oppose allied intervention and at the same + time fail to give whole-hearted support to the present + government. They justify this attitude on the grounds that + when the two great problems of food and peace are solved the + whole population can turn itself to assisting the present + régime in developing a stable efficient government. They + point to the numerous changes which have already been + introduced by the present communist government, to the + acknowledgment that mistakes have been made to the ease of + securing introduction of constructive ideas under the + present régime. All these facts have persuaded many of the + thinking people with whom I have talked to look to the + present government in possibly a somewhat modified form as + the salvation of Russia. + + At present the situation is bad. Russia is straining every + nerve to raise an army to oppose the encircling White + Guards. That the army is efficient is demonstrated by the + present location of Soviet forces who have contended with + the Russian White Guard supported by enormous sums of money, + munitions, and even soldiers from the Allies. Naturally, + transportation is inefficient; it was horrible in the last + year of the Czar's regime. Absolute separation from the rest + of the world, combined with the chaotic conditions which + Russia has passed through since the 1917 revolution, plus + the sabotage, which until recently was quite general among + the intelligent classes, including engineers, has resulted + in a decrease in rolling stock. The transportation of the + enormous army which has been raised limits the number of + cars which can be used for food. The cutting off of Siberia, + Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and until recently the + Ukraine, made it necessary to establish new lines of food + transportation. Consequently there has been great suffering + in Petrograd. Of the population of a million, 200,000 are + reported by the board of health to be ill, 100,000 seriously + ill in hospitals or at home, and another 100,000 with + swollen limbs still able to go to the food kitchens. + However, the reports of people dying in the streets are not + true. Whatever food exists is fairly well distributed and + there are food kitchens where anyone can get a fairly good + dinner for 3.50 rubles. + + For money one can still obtain many of the luxuries of life. + The children, some 50,000 of whom have been provided with + homes, are splendidly taken care of, and except for the + absence of milk have little to complain of. In the public + schools free lunches are given the children, and one sees in + the faces of the younger generation little of the suffering + which some of the older people have undergone and are + undergoing. Food conditions have improved recently, due to + the suspension of passenger traffic and the retaking of the + Ukraine, where food is plentiful. From 60 to 100 carloads of + food have arrived in Petrograd each day since February 18. + + Perhaps it is futile to add that my solution of the Russian + problem is some sort of recognition of the present + government, with the establishment of economic relations and + the sending of every possible assistance to the people. I + have been treated in a wonderful manner by the communist + representatives, though they know that I am no socialist and + though I have admitted to the leaders that my civilian + clothing is a disguise. They have the warmest affection for + America, believe in President Wilson, and are certain that + we are coming to their assistance, and, together with our + engineers, our food, our school-teachers, and our supplies, + they are going to develop in Russia a government which will + emphasize the rights of the common people as no other + government has. I am so convinced of the necessity for us + taking a step immediately to end the suffering of this + wonderful people that I should be willing to stake all I + have in converting ninety out of every hundred American + business men whom I could take to Petrograd for two weeks. + + It is needless for me to tell you that most of the stories + that have come from Russia regarding atrocities, horrors, + immorality, are manufactured in Viborg, Helsingfors, or + Stockholm. The horrible massacres planned for last November + were first learned of in Petrograd from the Helsingfors + papers. That anybody could even for a moment believe in the + nationalization of women seems impossible to anyone in + Petrograd. To-day Petrograd is an orderly city--probably the + only city of the world of its size without police. Bill + Shatov, chief of police, and I were at the opera the other + night to hear Chaliapine sing in Boris Gudonov. He excused + himself early because he said there had been a robbery the + previous night, in which a man had lost 5,000 rubles, that + this was the first robbery in several weeks, and that he had + an idea who had done it, and was going to get the men that + night. I feel personally that Petrograd is safer than Paris. + At night there are automobiles, sleighs, and people on the + streets at 12 o'clock to a much greater extent than was true + in Paris when I left five weeks ago. + + Most wonderful of all, the great crowd of prostitutes has + disappeared. I have seen not a disreputable woman since I + went to Petrograd, and foreigners who have been there for + the last three months report the same. The policy of the + present government has resulted in eliminating throughout + Russia, I am told, this horrible outgrowth of modern + civilization. + + Begging has decreased. I have asked to be taken to the + poorest parts of the city to see how the people in the slums + live, and both the communists and bourgeoisie have held up + their hands and said, "But you fail to understand there are + no such places." There is poverty, but it is scattered and + exists among those of the former poor or of the former rich + who have been unable to adapt themselves to the conditions + which require everyone to do something. + + Terrorism has ended. For months there have been no + executions, I am told, and certainly people go to the + theater and church and out on the streets as much as they + would in any city of the world. + +(Certain memoranda referred to in the hearing relating to the work of +Capt. Pettit in Russia are here printed in full as follows:) + + MEMORANDUM + + From: W.W. Pettit + To: Ammission, Paris. + + (Attention of Mr. Bullitt.) + + 1. _Mr. Pettit's recent movements_.--On March 18 I left + Helsingfors for Petrograd and remained there until March 28 + when I left for Helsingfors, at which place I received a + cable ordering me to report immediately to Paris. On the + 29th I left again for Petrograd to secure some baggage I had + left. On the 21st I left Petrograd for Helsingfors. On April + 1st I left Helsingfors for Stockholm and in Stockholm I find + a telegram asking me to wait until I receive further orders. + + 2. _Optimism of present government_.--On the night of the + 30th and the afternoon of the 31st I had several hours with + Schklovsky, Tchitcherin's personal representative in + Petrograd. He was disappointed to think I was to return to + Paris, but felt certain that inasmuch as the orders + recalling me had been sent before Mr. Bullitt's arrival, + there was every possibility of my being returned to + Petrograd. He was most optimistic about the future and felt + that the Allies must soon take some definite stand regarding + Russia, and that the result of the Paris negotiations would + almost surely be favorable to the Soviet Government. He said + that the present war conditions and the limited + transportation facilities, with the shortage of food + resulting therefrom, had handicapped his government + enormously, and that everyone hopes that soon the action of + the allied powers will permit the establishment of normal + relations in Russia. + + 3. _Radios in re Bullitt_.--He has received at least three + radio communications from the American press in which Mr. + Bullitt's activities have been mentioned and this has tended + to encourage him. The last cablegram stated that Mr. Bullitt + was preparing a statement regarding conditions in Russia + which the press anticipated would go far toward dispelling + ignorance and misinformation regarding conditions in Moscow + and Petrograd. + + 4. _Hungarian situation_.--The Hungarian situation has also + gone far toward encouraging the present Government. Hungary + has proposed a mutual offensive and defensive alliance with + Russia. The fact that the Soviet Government has been + instituted in Hungary without bloodshed up to the present, + and with little opposition on the part of the people, has + also encouraged Schklovsky. He stated that the action of the + Allies in sending troops against Hungary was to be regretted + because of the bloodshed which would probably result. + However, he thought in the long run that the Allies would + find it a suicidal policy to try to suppress the Hungarian + revolution by force. + + 5. _The Ukraine situation_.--The soviet troops have taken + almost the entire Ukraine and this with the food supplies + which it will provide have strengthened the Soviet + Government. A friend who has recently returned from Peltava, + Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, and other southern cities, states that + food is abundant and cheap. The Soviet Government believes + that the French and Greek troops are withdrawing from Odessa + and going to Sebastopol. They anticipate taking Odessa + within the next few days. + + 6. _Esthonian situation_.--At least twice within the last + two weeks Esthonia has sent word to the Soviet Government + that it desired peace. The following four points have been + emphasized by the Esthonians: (i) That peace must come + immediately; (2) that the offer must come from the Soviet + Government; (3) that a fair offer will be accepted by the + Esthonians immediately without consultation with France or + England, who are supporting them; (4) that free access to + Esthonian harbors and free use of Esthonian railroads will + be assured the Soviet Government. + + 7. _The Lithuanian situation_.--It is fairly well understood + that the Lithuanian Government that is fighting the + Bolsheviks is not going to allow itself to be made a tool by + the French and British Governments to invade Russian + territory. The Lithuanian Government is desirous of securing + possession of Lithuanian territory, but beyond that it is + understood it will not go. + + 8. _The Finnish situation_.--The Soviet Government is in + close touch with the Finnish situation and has little fear + of an invasion of Russia from that direction. The Finnish + Army is without question a third Red; probably a half Red; + possibly two-thirds Red. There is even reported to be a + tendency on a part of certain of the White Guards to oppose + intervention in Russia. One of the Finnish regiments in + Esthonia has returned to Finland, and it is supposed that it + will assist the proposed revolution of the Finns in East + Karelia against the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government + has sent a committee to Helsingfors to arrange economic + relations with Finland, and it is said that this committee + carries threats of reprisals on the part of the Soviet + Government against the Finns in Petrograd unless the treaty + is negotiated. It is said in Petrograd that some of the + Finns have already left Petrograd in anticipation that the + Finnish Government will not be permitted to make any + arrangement with the Soviet Government because of the + attitude of certain of the allied representatives in + Helsingfors. + + 9. _Improvement in food conditions_.--The suspension of passenger + traffic from March 18 to April 10 has resulted in the Government + bringing to Petrograd 60 to 100 cars of food each day, and one + sees large quantities of food being transported about the city. + At Easter time it is hoped to be able to give 3 pounds of white + bread to the population of Petrograd. There also seems to be a + larger supply of food for private purchase in the city. Mr. + Shiskin has recently been able to buy 3 geese, a sucking pig, 2 + splendid legs of veal, and roasts of beef at from 40 to 50 rubles + a pound, which, considering the value of the ruble, is much less + than it sounds. Shiskin has also been able recently to get eggs, + milk, honey, and butter, together with potatoes, carrots, and + cabbage. My bill for food for 11 days with Mr. Shiskin was about + 1,300 rubles. + + 10. _Order in Petrograd_.--About three weeks ago there were + several strikes in factories in Petrograd and Lenin came to + talk to the strikers. Apparently the matter was settled + satisfactorily and the workers were given the same bread + rations that the soldiers receive. At the Putilov works some + 400 men struck and part of them were dismissed. Both Shatov + and the director of factories said that there were no + executions, though the population the next morning reported + 80 workers shot and that afternoon the rumor had increased + the number to 400. There is practically no robbery in the + city. Shatov left the opera the other night early because he + told me the previous night a man had lost 5,000 rubles and + it was such an exceptional thing to have a robbery that he + was going out personally to investigate the matter, having + some idea as to who was responsible. + + 11. _Currency plans_.--Zorin tells me that the Soviet + Government has or had printed a new issue of currency which + it is proposed to exchange for the old currency within the + next three months. The details of the plan have not been + completed but he thinks that an exchange of ruble for ruble + will be made up to 3,000; an additional 2,000 will be placed + on deposit in the government bank. That beyond 5,000 only a + small percentage will be allowed to any one, and that a + limit of possibly 15,000 will be placed beyond which no + rubles will be exchanged. Then the plan is, after a certain + period to declare the old ruble valueless. Zorin feels that + as a result of this plan the new ruble will have some value + and that the present situation in the country in which the + farmer has so much paper that he refuses to sell any longer + for money, will be relieved. This exchange would be followed + later on by the issue of still other currency the entire + purpose being the more equal distribution of wealth and the + gradual approach to elimination of currency. + + 12. _Concessions_.--It is asserted that the northern railway + concession has been signed and Amundsen tells me that all + negotiations were accomplished without the payment of a + single cent of tea money, probably the first instance of the + absence of graft in such negotiations in the history of + Russia. He says that Trepov, through his agent Borisov, at + Moscow, was the greatest opponent of the Norwegian + interests. Trepov was formerly minister of ways and + communications and is reported to have been refused a + similar concession under the Czar's government. Amundsen + claims that Trepov has made every effort to secure this + concession from the Soviet Government. I am attaching a + statement regarding a concession which is supposed to have + been granted to the lumber interests. There are rumors that + other concessions have been granted. + + 13. _Y.M.C.A._--Recently the Y.M.C.A. secretary arrived in + Petrograd, claiming to have come without authorization from + his superiors. He has been staying at the embassy but + recently went to Moscow at the invitation of Tchitcherin. + Schklovsky tells me that the American has plans for the + establishment of the Y.M.C.A. in Russia which he wanted to + put before the Moscow government. Schklovsky doubted that it + would be feasible to organize in Russia at present a branch + of the International association unless some rather + fundamental modifications were made in their policy. + + 14. _Treadwell_.--I have twice asked Schklovsky to secure + information regarding Treadwell, and he assures me that he + has taken the matter up with Moscow, but that apparently + they have had no news from Tashkent as yet. He promised to + let me know as soon as anything was heard. + + 15. _Attitude toward United States_.--The degree of + confidence which the Russians and the soviet officials show + toward our Government is to me a matter of surprise, + considering our activities during the past 18 months. There + seems to be no question in the minds of the officials in + Petrograd whom I have met that we are going to give them an + opportunity to develop a more stable form of government, and + they apparently look upon President Wilson as one who is + going to decide the question on its merits without being + influenced by the enormous pressure of the Russian emigrés + and the French Government. Doubtless part of this attitude + is due to the favorable impression created by Mr. Bullitt, + but much of it must be the result of information which they + have secured from the press. At the present moment the + United States has the opportunity of demonstrating to the + Russian people its friendship and cementing the bonds which + already exist. Russia believes in us, and a little + assistance to Russia in its present crisis will result in + putting the United States in a position in Russia which can + never be overthrown by Germany or any other power. + + 16. _Social work_.--I have recently sent a cable from + Helsingfors regarding health and sanitary conditions in + Petrograd, a copy of which I am attaching. I have spent the + past two weeks visiting schools and the children's home in + Petrograd. There are 30,000 children for whom homes have + been provided in the past nine months, and preparations are + being made to house 10,000 more. Homes of emigrés are being + taken over and groups of 40 children placed in them under + the care of able instructors; where the children are old + enough they go to school during the daytime. A beautiful + home life has been developed. The children are well fed and + well clothed, and there is a minimum of sickness among them. + At the present time, when so much disease exists in + Petrograd, and when there is so much starvation, the healthy + appearance of these thousands of children, together with the + well-fed condition of children who are not in institutions, + but are receiving free meals in schools, is a demonstration + of the social spirit behind much of the activities of the + present government. I shall send later a more detailed + statement of some of the interesting things I have learned + about this phase of the activities of the new regime. + + 17. _Conclusion_.--In this rather hastily dictated + memorandum which Mr. Francis is going to take tonight to + Paris I have tried to point out some of the things that have + interested me in Petrograd. Naturally I have emphasized the + brighter side, for the vast amount of absolutely false news + manufactured in Helsingfors and Stockholm and sent out + through the world seems to me to necessitate the emphasizing + of some of the more hopeful features of the present + government. Naturally the character of the Russian people + has not changed to any great extent in 18 months, and there + is doubtless corruption, and there is certainly inefficiency + and ignorance and a hopeless failure to grasp the new + principles motivating the government on the part of many of + the people. A people subjected to the treatment which + Russians have had during the last 200 years can not in one + generation be expected to change very greatly, but + personally I feel the present government has made a vast + improvement on the government of the Czar as I knew it in + 1916-17. Without doubt the majority of the people in + Petrograd are opposed to allied intervention or revolution + and wish the present government to be given a fair chance to + work out the salvation of Russia. One of the most hopeful + symptoms of the present government is its willingness to + acknowledge mistakes when they are demonstrated and to adopt + new ideas which are worth while. Personally I am heart and + soul for some action on the part of the United States + Government which will show our sincere intention to permit + the Russian people to solve their own problems with what + assistance they may require from us. STOCKHOLM, April 4 + 1919. + + + + +SOCIAL WORK IN PETROGRAD + +The wife of Zinoviev, Madame Lelina, is in charge of the social +institutions in the city of Petrograd. This does not include the +public schools, which are under another organization. Madame Lelina is +a short-haired woman, probably Jewish, of about 45. She has an +enormous amount of energy, and is commonly supposed to be doing at +least two things at the same time. The morning I met her she was +carrying on two interviews and trying to arrange to have me shown some +of the social work she is directing. There seemed to be little system +about her efforts. Her office was rather disorderly, and her method of +work seemed very wasteful of time and effort, and very much like the +usual Russian way of doing things. Bill Shatov, formerly organizer of +the I.W.W., who is commissar of police for Petrograd and also +commissar for one of the northern armies, introduced me to Madame +Lelina, and accompanied me the first day on our visits. We were guided +by a young woman by the name of Bachrath, who is a university graduate +and lawyer, and since the legal profession has fallen into disrepute, +has turned her efforts toward social work. + +Under her guidance I spent three days visiting institutions. I saw a +boarding school for girls, a boarding home for younger children, an +institution for the feeble-minded, three of the new homes organized by +the Soviet Government, and two small hospitals for children. + +The institutions which Madame Lelina is directing are in two groups: +First, those which she has taken over from the old Czar regime, and +second, those which have been founded in the last 18 months. The new +government has been so handicapped by the difficulties of securing +food and other supplies, by the sabotage of many of the intelligent +classes, and by the necessity of directing every energy toward +carrying on hostilities against the bourgeoisie and the Allies, that +there has been little opportunity to remodel the institutions +inherited from the previous régime, therefore neither the strength nor +the weakness of these institutions is to any great extent due to the +present régime. Two of the institutions I visited were of this type, +one happened to be very good and the other very bad, and in neither +case did I feel that Lelina's organization was responsible. + +An aristocratic organization under the Czar maintained a boarding +school for girls. This has been taken over by the Soviet Government +with little change, and the 140 children in this institution are +enjoying all the opportunities which a directress trained in France +and Germany, with an exceptionally skillful corps of assistants, can +give them. + +I inquired regarding the changes which the Soviet Government had made +in the organization of this school. Some of the girls who were there +have been kept, but vacant places have been filled by Madame Lelina's +committee, and the institution has been required to take boys into the +day school, a plan which is carried out in most of the soviet social +and educational work. Much more freedom has been introduced in the +management of the institution, and the girls at table talk and walk +about, much as though they were in their own homes. The Soviet +Government requires that certain girls be permitted membership in the +teachers' committee, and the two communists accompanying me pointed to +this as a great accomplishment. Privately, the teachers informed me +they regarded it as of little significance, and apparently they were +entirely out of sympathy with the innovations that the new government +has made. Now all the girls are required to work in the kitchen, +dining room, or m cleaning their own dormitories, and certain girls +are assigned to the kitchen to over-see the use of supplies by the +cooks. However, the whole institution, from the uniforms of the girls +to the required form in which even hand towels have to be hung, +indicates the iron will of the directress. In one class we visited the +girls sat at desks and listened to a traditional pedagogue pour out +quantities of information on Pushkin's Boris Gudonov. Occasionally the +girls were called upon to react, which they did with sentences +apparently only partially memorized. The spirit of the institution is +behind that of our better institutions in America, and the spirit of +the classroom is quite mediaeval. + +The greatest objection which the teachers seem to have to soviet +activities is the question of sacred pictures and religious +observances. The chapel of the school has been closed, but in each +room from the corner still hangs the Ikon and at the heads of many of +the girls' beds there are still small pictures of the Virgin, much to +the disgust of the representatives of the Soviet Government, who in +many cases are Jewish, and in practically all cases have renounced any +religious connection. Recently the Soviet Party has announced the fact +that they as a party are not hostile to any religion, but intend to +remain neutral on the subject. The attitude of the commissars +apparently is that required religious observances should not be +permitted in public institutions, and doubtless some of the inspectors +have gone further than was necessary in prohibiting any symbol of the +religion which probably most of the children still nominally adhere +to. + +The second institution I visited, which had been taken over from the +old government, was an orphan asylum with some 600 children mostly +under 10. It was frightfully crowded, in many places rather dirty, +with frequently bad odors from unclean toilets. In one little room +some 20 small boys were sleeping and eating, and I found one child of +2 who was not able to walk and was eating in the bed in which he +slept. + +Ventilation was bad, linen not very clean, a general feeling of +repression present, slovenly employees, and, in general, an atmosphere +of inefficiency and failure to develop a home spirit which one still +finds in some of the worst institutions in America. The instructor who +showed me this home realized its horrors, and said that the Government +intended to move the children into more adequate quarters as soon as +conditions permitted. In summer the children are all taken to the +country. In this institution all the older children go out to public +schools and there have been no cases of smallpox or typhus in spite of +the epidemics the city has had this winter. Forty children were in the +hospital with minor complaints. About 10 per cent of the children are +usually ill. + +The school for feeble-minded occupies a large apartment house and the +children are divided into groups of 10 under the direction of two +teachers, each group developing home life in one of the large +apartments. There is emphasis on handwork. Printing presses, a +bookbinding establishment, and woodworking tools are provided. Music +and art appreciation are given much time, and some of the work done is +very beautiful. This school is largely the result of the efforts of +the Soviet Government. Careful records are kept of the children and +simple test material has been devised to develop in the more backward +children elementary reactions regarding size, shape, form, and color. +The greatest difficulty is the impossibility of securing trained +workers either for the shops or for the special pedagogical problems +of the school. However, an energetic corps of young men and young +women are employed, and they are conscious of the size of their +problem and are already thinking of the difficulties of sending their +students back into industrial life. In many of the activities of the +Soviet Government, as well as in these institutions taken over from +the old regime, I was dismayed at the inefficiency and ignorance of +many of the subordinates. After talking to the leaders and getting +some understanding of their ideals, an American expects to see these +carried over into practice. One is liable to forget that the Russian +people have not greatly changed, and that the same easy-going, +inefficient attitude of decades of the previous regime still exists. +No one knows this obstacle better than the members of the present +regime. They realize that the character of the Russian people is their +greatest obstacle, and change in the Russian conception of Government +service is a slow process. Far from being discouraged, they point to +their accomplishments with pride. + +During the last nine months Madame Lelina has taken 30,000 children +into Government homes and preparations are made to take 10,000 more +during the next three months. The three new institutions which I +visited are attractive suburban homes of wealthy emigrés. The +Government has taken these over and is putting groups of 40 children +in charge of specially selected and trained men and women. The older +children go out to school. For the younger children kindergarten +activities are provided and much time is spent out of doors. An +atmosphere of home life has been developed which is surprising +considering the short time the institutions have been organized and +the difficulties they have had to contend with. This plan, which I am +told is permanent, is a most encouraging feature of Madame Lelina's +work. + +Requests to have children placed in the Government institutions are +turned over to a special corps of investigators. In each house there +is what is known as a poor committee which must also approve the +requests and the local soviet is required to pass upon the commitment +of the child to an institution. The large number of children taken +over by the city is due to the number of orphans and half orphans +caused by the war and to the impossibility of many poor families +providing their children with food during the recent famine. In cases +where several children of a family are taken they are placed in the +same home. Frequent opportunities for relatives to visit the homes are +provided. The amount of sickness has been surprisingly low considering +the great amount of disease in Petrograd during the last few months. +In one group of 300 children there have been no deaths within the past +nine months, and among all the children there have been very few cases +of contagious diseases. + +The difficulties which Madame Lelina faces are numerous. First, Russia +has never had an adequate number of trained workers and many of those +who were trained have refused to cooperate with the present regime, +and, secondly, though the Soviet Government has adopted the policy of +turning over to the children's homes and the schools an adequate +supply of food, regardless of the suffering of the adult population, +still it has been impossible to get certain items of diet, as, for +instance, milk. It is true, however, that among these children one +sees few signs of undernourishment or famine, and in general +throughout the city the children seem much better nourished than the +adult population. + +I had planned to visit other institutions but was unable to do so. I +was told of a large palace which has been taken over as a home for +mothers. Here all women who so desire are sent after childbirth with +their children for a period of two months. + +The health department, which asserts that there are in addition to the +100,000 bedridden people in the city, another 100,000 who are ill +because of undernourishment though able to go to the food kitchens, +has been very successful in securing from the local soviets special +food supplies to be provided sick persons on doctors' orders. At each +food kitchen the board of health has a representative whose business +it is to give such special diet as may be possible to undernourished +individuals. + +(Thereupon, at 12.50 o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned subject to +the call of the chairman.) + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BULLITT MISSION TO RUSSIA*** + + +******* This file should be named 10713-8.txt or 10713-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/7/1/10713 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + https://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + diff --git a/old/10713-8.zip b/old/10713-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..c98b545 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10713-8.zip diff --git a/old/10713.txt b/old/10713.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2071a10 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10713.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5591 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Bullitt Mission to Russia, by William C. +Bullitt + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: The Bullitt Mission to Russia + +Author: William C. Bullitt + +Release Date: August 2, 2004 [eBook #10713] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BULLITT MISSION TO RUSSIA*** + + +E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Keith M. Eckrich, and the Project +Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + +THE BULLITT MISSION TO RUSSIA + +Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States +Senate of WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +MCMXIX + + + + + + +CONTENTS + + THE COMMITTEE MEETS + + MR. BULLITT'S OFFICIAL STATUS + + ORDERED TO RUSSIA + + COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA + + THE TROOPS AT ARCHANGEL + + SITUATION IN RUSSIA + + FRANCE BLOCKS PRINKIPOS CONFERENCE + + WHAT AMERICA WANTED + + THE BRITISH TERMS + + TEXT OF PROJECTED PEACE PROPOSAL BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED + GOVERNMENTS + + MR. BULLITT'S REPORT ON RUSSIA + ECONOMIC SITUATION + SOCIAL CONDITIONS + POLITICAL SITUATION + PEACE PROPOSALS + CONCLUSIONS + +APPENDIX TO REPORT + TRANSPORT + FOOD + MANAGEMENT + SOCIAL CONDITIONS + STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES + ARMY + LENIN'S PRESTIGE + CONCESSIONS + +BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE + +BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED + +PROPOSED DECLARATION OF ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS' POLICY AND OFFER OF + ARMISTICE + +NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA + +AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL + +BULLITT MEMORANDUM FOR AUCHINCLOSS + +REPLY OF PRESIDENT AND THREE PREMIERS TO NANSEN + +HOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL + +LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT + +MR. BULLITT RESIGNS + +REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + +REPORTS OF CAPT. W.W. PETTIT + +SOCIAL WORK IN PETROGRAD + +THE COMMITTEE ADJOURNS + + + + +UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, + +Washington, D.C., Friday, September 12, 1919. + + +The committee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, +at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 310, Senate Office Building, Senator Henry +Cabot Lodge presiding. + +Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), Brandegee, Fall, Knox, Harding, +and New. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt is to make a statement to the committee this +morning. I think I ought to say that Mr. Bullitt was summoned on the +23d of August, I believe, and he was in the woods at that time, out of +reach of telegraph or telephone or mail, and only received the summons +a few days ago. He came at once to Washington. That is the reason of +the delay in his hearing. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, will you take the stand and give your full +name, please, to the stenographer? + +Mr. BULLITT, William C. Bullitt. + +The CHAIRMAN. You are a native and a resident of Philadelphia, are you +not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I am, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the war, what were you engaged in? + +Mr. BULLITT. Before the war I was employed by the Philadelphia Public +Ledger. I had been a correspondent for them in various places, and I +had been a member of the editorial staff in Philadelphia for a time. + +The CHAIRMAN. You went abroad for them as a correspondent? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Before we went into the war? + +Mr. BULLITT. Before we went into the war I toured Germany, Austria, +Hungary, Belgium, Poland, and other places, studying conditions there, +for the purposes of the Public Ledger. + +The CHAIRMAN. After we entered the war, what did you do? You came +back? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; I came back. I was in the United States at that +time. + +The CHAIRMAN. At that time? + +Mr. BULLITT. And I was asked to enter the Department of State, to work +in the Division of Western European Affairs under Mr. Grew, in which +my special province was to follow the political situation of Germany +and Austria-Hungary, to prepare the confidential reports of the +department on Germany, Austria, and Hungary--the weekly reports--and +also such memoranda on conditions as the President and the Secretary +and others might call for. + +The CHAIRMAN. And then you went to Paris as a member of the staff, +after the armistice? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; I was an employee of the department at the time of +the armistice, and I was ordered to Paris as a member of the staff of +the commission. + +Senator KNOX. When did you first go to Paris, Mr. Bullitt? + +Mr. BULLITT. I sailed on the _George Washington_. I went over with the +original trip of the President. + +Senator KNOX. And you were there continuously how long? + +Mr. BULLITT. I remained in Paris until--I can give you the exact +date--I was ordered to go on a special mission to Berne about the +first week of February. I can give you the exact date, if it is of any +moment. + +Senator KNOX. No; it is not. + +Mr. BULLITT. I remained a week in Berne, then returned and remained in +Paris until I was ordered to go to Russia. + +I left for Russia on the 22d of February. I was in Paris during the +entire period until the 22d of February. Senator KNOX. You said you +went over on the original trip of the President. Just to get these +dates right, when did you reach Paris? + +Mr. BULLITT. I left New York on December 4 and, as I remember, we +reached Paris on December 13. + +Senator KNOX. And you were there, then, until you went to Berne in +February? + +Mr. BULLITT. In February, + +Senator KNOX. What was your personal relation to the peace conference +and its work? + + + + +MR. BULLITT'S OFFICIAL STATUS + + + +Mr. BULLITT. When I first arrived I was asked to take charge of a +confidential bulletin which was to be gotten out for the benefit of +the commissioners each morning. It was to be read by them. That lasted +a very short time, and as is usual with most things of the kind, we +discovered that the commissioners did not care to spend the time +reading it, and therefore it was decided to abolish this bulletin, and +that instead I should receive all the intelligence reports of military +intelligence, of the State Department, intelligence received through +all the special dispatches of the ambassadors, etc., in fact, all the +information that came in, and a section was created called the Current +Intelligence Section. I was called the Chief of the Division of +Current Intelligence Summaries. + +Senator KNOX. Then, as I understand, your function was to acquaint +yourself with everything that was going on in connection with the +conference, and disseminate the news to the different branches of the +peace conference and the different bureaus? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was to report only to the commissioners. + +Senator KNOX. Well, but the essential thing is, was it your duty to +get information? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was my duty to be in constant touch with everyone +who was in the American delegation, and present information to the +commissioners each morning. I had 20 minutes with each commissioner +each morning. + +Senator KNOX. So that you were practically a clearing house of +information for the members of the American mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. That is what I was supposed to be. + + * * * * * + + + + +ORDERED TO RUSSIA + + +Senator KNOX. What was your mission to Russia, and when did you go? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was ordered to go to Russia on the 18th of February. I +received the following order from Secretary Lansing [reading]: + + AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + + 18 February, 1919. + + MR. WILLIAM C. BULLITT, + American Commission to Negotiate Peace. + + SIR: You are hereby directed to proceed to Russia for the + purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, + therein, for the benefit of the American commissioners + plenipotentiary to negotiate peace, and all American + diplomatic and consular officials are hereby directed to + extend to you the proper courtesies and facilities to enable + you to fulfill the duties of your mission. + + I am, sir, your obedient servant, + + ROBERT LANSING, + Secretary of State of the United States of America. + [SEAL.] + +Senator KNOX. What is the date of that? + +Mr. BULLITT. February 18, 1919. I also received at the same time from +Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the secretary of the American commission, the +following [reading]: + + AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + + 18 February, 1919. + + + To whom it may concern: + + I hereby certify that Mr. William C. Bullitt has been + authorized by the American commissioners plenipotentiary to + negotiate peace to proceed to Russia, for the purpose of + studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for + the benefit of the commission, and I bespeak for him the + proper courtesies and facilities in enabling him to fulfill + the duties of his mission. + + J.C. GREW, + Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. + [SEAL.] + +Senator KNOX. You say you started in February. What time in February? + +Mr. BULLITT. I left on the 22d day of February. + +Senator KNOX. Did you know at that time, or have you ascertained +since, whether a secret mission had or not been dispatched from Paris, +that is, by the President himself; a man by the name of Buckler, who +went to Russia a few days before you did? + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. W.H. Buckler, Mr. Henry White's half brother. He was +an attache of the American embassy in London. He was ordered from +there to go, about the 1st of January, to Stockholm, to confer with +Litvinov, who had been the Ambassador of the Soviet Government to +London--the British had allowed him to stay there without actually +recognizing his official status, and had dealt with him. + +Mr. Buckler there conferred with Litvinov, who made various +propositions and representations to him which Mr. Buckler at once +telegraphed back to Paris, and which were considered so important by +the President that the President read them in extenso to the council +of ten on the morning of January 21. I regret that I have no actual +copy of those proposals by Litvinov, or of Buckler's telegrams. At +that time there was a discussion taking place in regard to Russia +which had extended over a couple of weeks, a discussion of the utmost +interest, in the council of ten. I happen to have the minutes of the +council for January 16, when this Russian question was taken up, which +I shall be glad to read, if the Senators should be interested, and +also the minutes of the council of ten on January 21, at which meeting +the Prinkipos proposal was decided upon. The Buckler meeting with +Litvinov was what eventually swung the meeting in favor of Prinkipos, +the suggestion for which had been made by Mr. Lloyd George. No; that +is slightly incorrect. Mr. Lloyd George had suggested that +representatives of the various Russian governments and factions should +be brought to Paris. + + +COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA + +NOTES ON CONVERSATIONS HELD IN THE OFFICE OF M. PICHON AT THE QUAI +D'ORSAY, ON JANUARY 16, 1919--PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION REGARDING THE +SITUATION IN RUSSIA. + +Mr. Lloyd George commenced his statement setting forth the information +in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian +situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently +in L'Humanite. He stated that he wished to point out that there had +been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as +to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The +British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatever, a +recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that +Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British +proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war +within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop +reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an +account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way +to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates +to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government +entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference. + +Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which +had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as +follows: + + Firstly, the real facts are not known; + + Secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is + to adjudicate the question; and + + Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general + mis-government and starvation. It is not known who is + obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik + Government would collapse had not been realized. In fact, + there is one report that the Bolsheviki are stronger than + ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their + hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case + of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and + overthrows the Government. The Government is incapable of + overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are + becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the business of the Great + Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to + one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either + side. + +Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible +policies: + + 1. Military intervention. It is true there the Bolsheviki + movement is as dangerous to civilization as German + militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there + anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain + number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one + million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of + this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand + British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would + mutiny. The same applies to U.S. troops in Siberia; also to + Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing + Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even + admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one + can conceive or understand to bring about order by force. + + 2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik + Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized + what this would mean. From the information furnished him + Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory + there are 150,000,000 men, women, and children. There is now + starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health + cordon, it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact, + the people who would die are just the people that the Allies + desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of + the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our + friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane + people, those present could not consider. + + Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the + Bolsheviki? He had been told there were three men, Denekin, + Kolchak and Knox. In considering the chances of these people + to overthrow the Bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had + received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to + fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that + while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone + over to Kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse + of this would not take place. If the Allies counted on any + of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand. + He had heard a lot of talk about Denekin, but when he looked + on the map he found that Denekin was occupying a little + backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that + Denekin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the + map, there was a great solid block of territory between + Denekin and Kolchak. Moreover, from information received it + would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the + old regime around him, and would seem to be at heart a + monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding + this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very + democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for + the restoration of the old conditions in Russia. + + Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the + present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving. + + Institutions of Bolsheviki are institutions of old Czarist + regime. This is not what one would call creating a new + world. + + 3. The third alternative was contained in the British + proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to + appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the + Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to + render an account of their actions. + +Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used +that there were already here certain representatives of these +Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sazonov, who claims +to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact, Sazonov can +not speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan, +like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in +direct contact with the Government at Omsk. + +It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for +bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and +leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in +flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of +themselves. + +Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to +permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed +that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England +becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist +representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a +military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviki, that would +make England Bolshevist, and there would be a Soviet in London. For +his part, Mr. Lloyd George was not afraid of Bolshevism if the facts +are known in England and the United States. The same applied to +Germany. He was convinced that an educated democracy can be always +trusted to turn down Bolshevism. + +Under all circumstances, Mr. Lloyd George saw no better way out than +to follow the third alternative. Let the Great Powers impose their +conditions and summon these people to Paris to give an account of +themselves to the Great Powers, not to the Peace Conference. + +Mr. Pichon suggested that it might be well to ask M. Noulens, the +French Ambassador to Russia, who had just returned to France, to +appear before the meeting to-morrow morning, and give those present +his views on the Russian situation. + +President Wilson stated that he did not see how it was possible to +controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. He thought that there +was a force behind this discussion which was no doubt in his mind, but +which it might be desirable to bring out a little more definitely. He +did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere with the brutal +aspect of Bolshevism, if it were not for the fact of the domination of +large vested interests in the political and economic world. While it +might be true that this evil was in process of discussion and slow +reform, it must be admitted, that the general body of men have grown +impatient at the failure to bring about the necessary reform. He +stated that there were many men who represented large vested interests +in the United States who saw the necessity for these reforms and +desired something which should be worked out at the Peace Conference, +namely, the establishment of some machinery to provide for the +opportunity of the individuals greater than the world has ever known. +Capital and labor in the United States are not friends. Still they are +not enemies in the sense that they are thinking of resorting to +physical force to settle their differences. But they are distrustful, +each of the other. Society can not go on that plane. On the one hand, +there is a minority possessing capital and brains; on the other, a +majority consisting of the great bodies of workers who are essential +to the minority, but do not trust the minority, and feel that the +minority will never render them their rights. A way must be found to +put trust and cooperation between these two. + +President Wilson pointed out that the whole world was disturbed by +this question before the Bolskeviki came into power. Seeds need soil, +and the Bolsheviki seeds found the soil already prepared for them. + +President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that +the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to +enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviki was explained by the fact that +the troops were not at all sure that if they put down Bolshevism they +would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order. For +example, in making a speech recently, to a well-dressed audience in +New York City who were not to be expected to show such feeling, Mr. +Wilson had referred casually to Russia, stating that the United States +would do its utmost to aid her suppressed people. The audience +exhibited the greatest enthusiasm, and this had remained in the +President's mind as an index to where the sympathies of the New World +are. + +President Wilson believed that those present would be playing against +the principle of the free spirit of the world if they did not give +Russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom. He +concurred with Mr. Lloyd George's view and supported his +recommendations that the third line of procedure be adopted. + +President Wilson stated that he had also, like Mr. Lloyd George, +received a memorandum from his experts which agreed substantially with +the information which Mr. Lloyd George had received. There was one +point which he thought particularly worthy of notice, and that was the +report that the strength of the Bolshevik leaders lay in the argument +that if they were not supported by the people of Russia, there would +be foreign intervention, and the Bolsheviki were the only thing that +stood between the Russians and foreign military control. It might well +be that if the Bolsheviki were assured that they were safe from +foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement. + +President Wilson further stated that he understood that the danger of +destruction of all hope in the Baltic provinces was immediate, and +that it should be made very clear if the British proposal were +adopted, that the Bolsheviki would have to withdraw entirely from +Lithuania and Poland. If they would agree to this to refrain from +reprisals and outrages, he, for his part, would be prepared to receive +representatives from as many groups and centers of action, as chose to +come, and endeavor to assist them to reach a solution of their +problem. + +He thought that the British proposal contained the only suggestions +that lead anywhere. It might lead nowhere. But this could at least be +found out. + +M. Pichon referred again to the suggestion that Ambassador Noulens be +called before the meeting. + +Mr. Balfour suggested that it might be well to call the Dutch Consul, +lately in Petrograd, if it was the desire of those present to hear the +anti-Bolshevik side. + +Baron Sonnino suggested that M. Scavenius, Minister of Denmark, +recently in Russia, would be able to give interesting data on the +Russian situation. + +Those present seemed to think that it might be desirable to hear what +these gentlemen might have to say. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about a letter that Buckler wrote +to the President in relation to his mission? Have you ever seen a copy +of his report in the form of a letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have read a copy of his report, but I have not the +copy. The only reference I have to it that I find, in the short time I +have had to go over my papers since I came down from the woods, is in +a memorandum to Col. House in reference to the withdrawal of the +American troops from Archangel [reading]: + +Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these troops with +Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the Bolsheviki would agree to +an armistice on the Archangel front at any time; and, furthermore, +would pledge themselves not to injure in any way those Russians in and +about Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He, +furthermore, suggested that such Russians as did not care to trust +their lives to such a promise should be taken out with the troops. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about whether Litvinov communicated +directly with the President in reference to this Buckler mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. Litvinov had written a letter to the President, which has +since been widely published, on December 24. + +Senator KNOX. That is the letter I had in mind. I had seen some +references to that. Do you have a copy of that letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not know whether I have any copies of this +letter--that is, authentic. I think I have a newspaper copy some +place, but I have no actual copy of the letter. + +Senator KNOX. Can you tell us anything more about the discussion in +reference to the withdrawal of troops from Russia that took place at +that time--anything more than is indicated by your letter, there? + +Mr. BULLITT. There were very serious discussions, all the time. +Telegrams were being received frequently from the various commanders +at Archangel, the American and the British notably, in regard to +conditions, which they described as likely to be disastrous, and +discussions of real gravity were taking place all the time. The +subject was very much in the air. I have, I will say, very few +references to that particular condition. I have here this memorandum +which takes up some of these subjects. I do not know if the committee +would care to hear it. + +The CHAIRMAN. Yes. + +Senator KNOX. This is a memorandum that you sent to Col. House? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; Col. House. + +Senator KNOX. Please read it. + +Mr. BULLITT [reading]: + + JANUARY 30, 1919. + Memorandum for Col. House. + + Subject: Withdrawal of American troops from Archangel. + + DEAR COL. HOUSE: The 12,000 American, British, and French + troops at Archangel are no longer serving any useful + purpose. Only 3,000 Russians have rallied around this force. + It is the attacked, not the attacker, and serves merely to + create cynicism in regard to all our proposals and to + stimulate recruiting for the Red Army. + + Furthermore, the 4,000 Americans, 6,000 British, 2,000 + French, and 3,000 Russian troops in this region are in + considerable danger of destruction by the Bolsheviki. Gen. + Ironside has just appealed for reinforcements and the + British war office has directed the commanding general at + Murmansk to be prepared to dispatch a battalion of Infantry + to Archangel. + + Instead of transferring troops from Murmansk to Archangel, + it seems to me that we should at once transfer to Murmansk + and bring home the troops which are now at Archangel. Aside + from the needless suffering which these men are enduring, + aside from the demands of the public in the United States + and England for the return of these men, it seems to me that + the withdrawal of these troops would be of great value as a + proof that we have made the Prinkipos proposal in full good + faith. + + I have asked Gen. Churchill to obtain the most expert + opinion available on the practicability of moving the 12,000 + American, British, and French troops and such Russians as + may wish to accompany them from Archangel to Murmansk. The + appended memorandum and map which he has prepared show that + unless the ice in the White Sea suddenly becomes thicker it + is at present possible with the aid of six ice breakers + which are now at Archangel to move these troops by water to + Kem on the Murmansk Railroad, whence they may be carried by + train to Murmansk. + + Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these + troops with Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the + Bolsheviki would agree to an armistice on the Archangel + front at any time and, furthermore, would pledge themselves + not to injure in any way those Russians in and about + Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He + furthermore suggested that such Russians as did not care to + trust their lives to such a promise should be taken out with + the troops. + + The provisional government at Archangel has just notified us + that it will not accept the proposal for a conference at + Prinkipos. It seems dignified and honorable at this moment + to inform the Archangel government that since it can not + agree to the allied proposal, presented after the most + serious consideration, we shall decline to support it + further with arms, but will make provision for the safety of + all Russians who are unwilling to remain at Archangel. + + I have discussed this Archangel business at some length with + Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's secretary, who says that L.G. + intends to bring the British troops out on the 1st of May, + which he believes to be the first practicable moment. The + first practicable moment, however, seems to be now. + + The situation at Archangel is most serious for the soldiers + who are stationed there, but it is also serious for the + Governments which sent them out and seem to have abandoned + them. Unless they are saved by prompt action, we shall have + another Gallipoli. Very respectfully yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +I discussed these matters with each one of the commissioners each +morning. It was my duty to keep them au courant with anything that +struck me as important, which in the stress of the business of the +peace conference they were likely to overlook. + +Senator KNOX. This was a memorandum made in the line of your duty? + +Mr. BULLITT. This was a memorandum made as the result of the +conversations that I had had with all of the commissioners that +morning. + +This particular memorandum, in fact, was ordered by Col. House, and in +connection with it he asked me to have made a map showing the +feasibility of getting the troops out of Russia, by the military +experts of the conference, which map I have here. If you would be +interested in it in any way, I will append the memorandum made for +Gen. Churchill with regard to withdrawing the troops. + +Senator KNOX. I was going to ask you whether or not you had any +information as to the terms which the Allies were willing to accept +from Russia. + + + + +COUNCIL OF TEN FORMULATES A RUSSIAN POLICY + +Mr. BULLITT. I had, of course, seen the discussions of the conference +with regard to the entire Russian matter. The conference had decided, +after long consideration, that it was impossible to subdue or wipe out +the Soviet Government by force. The discussion of that is of a certain +interest, I believe, in connection with this general matter. There +are, in regard to the question you have just asked, minutes of the +council of ten, on January 21, 1919. + +Lloyd George had introduced the proposition that representatives of +the Soviet Government should be brought to Paris along with the +representatives of the other Russian governments [reading]: + + [McD. Secret. I.C. 114. Secretaries' notes of a conversation + held in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay on Tuesday, + January 21, 1919, at 15 hours.] + + PRESENT + + United States of America: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, + Mr. A.H. Frazier, Col. U.S. Grant, Mr. L. Harrison. + + British Empire: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, The Right + Hon. A.J. Balfour, Lieut. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, K.C.B., + Maj. A.M. Caccia, M.V.O., Mr. E. Phipps. + + France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, + Capt. A. Potier. + + Italy: Signor Orlando, H.E. Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, + Maj. A. Jones. + + Japan: Baron Makino, H.E.M. Matsui, M. Saburi. + + Interpreter, Prof. P.J. Mantoux. + + + SITUATION IN RUSSIA + + M. Clemenceau said they had met together to decide what + could be done in Russia under present circumstances. + + President Wilson said that in order to have something + definite to discuss, he wished to take advantage of a + suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd George and to propose a + modification of the British proposal. He wished to suggest + that the various organized groups in Russia should be asked + to send representatives, not to Paris, but to some other + place, such as Salonika, convenient of approach, there to + meet such representatives as might be appointed by the + Allies, in order to see if they could draw up a program upon + which agreement could be reached. + + Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the advantage of this + would be that they could be brought straight there from + Russia through the Black Sea without passing through other + countries. + + M. Sonnino said that some of the representatives of the + various Governments were already here in Paris, for example, + M. Sazonov. Why should these not be heard? + + President Wilson expressed the view that the various parties + should not be heard separately. It would be very desirable + to get all these representatives in one place, and still + better, all in one room, in order to obtain a close + comparison of views. + + Mr. Balfour said that a further objection to Mr. Sonnino's + plan was that if M. Sazonov was heard in Paris, it would be + difficult to refuse to hear the others in Paris also, and M. + Clemenceau objected strongly to having some of these + representatives in Paris. + + M. Sonnino explained that all the Russian parties had some + representatives here, except the Soviets, whom they did not + wish to hear. + + Mr. Lloyd George remarked that the Bolshevists were the very + people some of them wished to hear. + + M. Sonnino continuing said that they had heard M. Litovnov's + statements that morning. + +That was the statement that Litvinov had made to Buckler which the +President had read to the council of ten that morning. + +[Continuing reading.] + + The Allies were now fighting against the Bolshevists who + were their enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to + hear them with the others. + + Mr. Balfour remarked that the essence of President Wilson's + proposal was that the parties must all be heard at one and + the same time. + + Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that the acceptance of + M. Sonnino's proposals would amount to their hearing a + string of people, all of whom held the same opinion, and all + of whom would strike the same note. But they would not hear + the people who at the present moment were actually + controlling European Russia. In deference to M. Clemenceau's + views, they had put forward this new proposal. He thought it + would be quite safe to bring the Bolshevist representatives + to Salonika, or perhaps to Lemnos. + + It was absolutely necessary to endeavor to make peace. The + report read by President Wilson that morning went to show + that the Bolshevists were not convinced of the error of + their ways, but they apparently realised the folly of their + present methods. Therefore they were endeavouring to come to + terms. + + President Wilson asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of + the case. As M. Sonnino had implied, they were all repelled + by Bolshevism, and for that reason they had placed armed men + in opposition to them. One of the things that was clear in + the Russian situation was that by opposing Bolshevism with + arms, they were in reality serving the cause of Bolshevism. + The Allies were making it possible for the Bolsheviks to + argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were + endeavouring to exploit the country and to give the land + back to the landlords, and so bring about a re-action. If it + could be shown that this was not true, and that the Allies + were prepared to deal with the rulers of Russia, much of the + moral force of this argument would disappear. The allegation + that the Allies were against the people and wanted to + control their affairs provided the argument which enabled + them to raise armies. If, on the other hand, the Allies + could swallow their pride and the natural repulsion which + they felt for the Bolshevists and see the representatives of + all organized groups in one place, he thought it would bring + about a marked reaction against Bolshevism. + + M. Clemenceau said that, in principle, he did not favour + conversation with the Bolshevists; not because they were + criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level + by saying that they were worthy of entering into + conversation with us. The Bolshevist danger was very great + at the present moment. Bolshevism was spreading. It had + invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and that very + morning they received very bad news regarding its spread to + Budapesth and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger + was probably greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, + after spreading in Germany, were to traverse Austria and + Hungary and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a + very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against + Bolshevism. When listening to the document presented by + President Wilson that morning, he had been struck by the + cleverness with which the Bolshevists were attempting to lay + a trap for the Allies. When the Bolshevists first came into + power, a breach was made with the Capitalist Government on + questions of principle, but now they offered funds and + concessions as a basis for treating with them. He need not + say how valueless their promises were, but if they were + listened to, the Bolshevists would go back to their people + and say: "We offered them great principles of justice and + the Allies would have nothing to do with us. Now we offer + money, and they are ready to make peace." + + He admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. The great + misfortune was that the Allies were in need of a speedy + solution. After four years of war, and the losses and + sufferings they had incurred, their populations could stand + no more. Russia also was in need of immediate peace. But its + necessary evolution must take time. The signing of the world + Peace could not await Russia's final avatar. Had time been + available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually sound + men representing common-sense would come to the top. But + when would that be? He could make no forecast. Therefore + they must press for an early solution. + + To sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporize + and erect barriers to prevent Bolshevism from spreading. But + he was not alone, and in the presence of his colleagues he + felt compelled to make some concession, as it was essential + that there should not be even the appearance of disagreement + amongst them. The concession came easier after having heard + President Wilson's suggestions. He thought that they should + make a very clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable + peoples, emphatically stating that they did not wish in any + way to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and + especially that they had no intention of restoring Czardom. + The object of the Allies being to hasten the creation of a + strong Government, they proposed to call together + representatives of all parties to a Conference. He would beg + President Wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the + position of the Allies to the whole world, including the + Russians and the Germans. + + Mr. Lloyd George agreed and gave notice that he wished to + withdraw his own motion in favour of President Wilson's. + + Mr. Balfour said that he understood that all these people + were to be asked on an equality. On these terms he thought + the Bolshevists would refuse, and by their refusal, they + would put themselves in a very bad position. + + M. Sonnino said that he did not agree that the Bolshevists + would not come. He thought they would be the first to come, + because they would be eager to put themselves on an equality + with the others. He would remind his colleagues that, before + the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the Bolshevists + promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from + propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had + broken all their promises, their one idea being to spread + revolution in all other countries. His idea was to collect + together all the anti-Bolshevik parties and help them to + make a strong Government, provided they pledged themselves + not to serve the forces of re-action and especially not to + touch the land question, thereby depriving the Bolshevists + of their strongest argument. Should they take these pledges, + he would be prepared to help them. + + Mr. Lloyd George enquired how this help would be given. + + M. Sonnino replied that help would be given with soldiers to + a reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food, and money. + For instance, Poland asked for weapons and munitions; the + Ukraine asked for weapons. All the Allies wanted was to + establish a strong Government. The reason that no strong + Government at present existed was that no party could risk + taking the offensive against Bolshevism without the + assistance of the Allies. He would enquire how the parties + of order could possibly succeed without the help of the + Allies. President Wilson had said that they should put aside + all pride in the matter. He would point out that, for Italy + and probably for France also, as M. Clemenceau had stated, + it was in reality a question of self-defence. He thought + that even a partial recognition of the Bolshevists would + strengthen their position, and, speaking for himself, he + thought that Bolshevism was already a serious danger in his + country. + + Mr. Lloyd George said he wished to put one or two practical + questions to M. Sonnino. The British Empire now had some + 15,000 to 20,000 men in Russia. M. de Scavenius had + estimated that some 150,000 additional men would be + required, in order to keep the anti-Bolshevist Governments + from dissolution. And General Franchet d'Esperey also + insisted on the necessity of Allied assistance. Now Canada + had decided to withdraw her troops, because the Canadian + soldiers would not agree to stay and fight against the + Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the + other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the + British tried to send any more troops there, there would be + mutiny. + + M. Sonnino suggested that volunteers might be called for. + + Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that it would be + impossible to raise 150,000 men in that way. He asked, + however, what contributions America, Italy and France would + make towards the raising of this Army. + + President Wilson and M. Clemenceau each said none. + + M. Orlando agreed that Italy could make no further + contributions. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that the Bolshevists had an army of + 300,000 men who would, before long, be good soldiers, and to + fight them at least 400,000 Russian soldiers would be + required. Who would feed, equip and pay them? Would Italy, + or America, or France, do so? If they were unable to do + that, what would be the good of fighting Bolshevism? It + could not be crushed by speeches. He sincerely trusted that + they would accept President Wilson's proposal as it now + stood. + + M. Orlando agreed that the question was a very difficult one + for the reasons that had been fully given. He agreed that + Bolshevism constituted a grave danger to all Europe. To + prevent a contagious epidemic from spreading, the + sanitarians set up a _cordon Sanitaire_. If similar measures + could be taken against Bolshevism, in order to prevent its + spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant + vanquishing it. Italy was now passing through a period of + depression, due to war weariness. But Bolshevists could + never triumph there, unless they found a favourable medium, + such as might be produced either by a profound patriotic + disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of + the war, or by an economic crisis. Either might lead to + revolution, which was equivalent to Bolshevism. Therefore, + he would insist that all possible measures should be taken + to set up this cordon. Next, he suggested the consideration + of repressive measures. He thought two methods were + possible; either the use of physical force or the use of + moral force. He thought Mr. Lloyd George's objection to the + use of physical force unanswerable. The occupation of Russia + meant the employment of large numbers of troops for an + indefinite period of time. This meant an apparent + prolongation of the war. There remained the use of moral + force. He agreed with M. Clemenceau that no country could + continue in anarchy and that an end must eventually come; + but they could not wait; they could not proceed to make + peace and ignore Russia. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd George's + proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful + consideration by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, gave a + possible solution. It did not involve entering into + negotiations with the Bolsheviks; the proposal was merely an + attempt to bring together all the parties in Russia with a + view to finding a way out of the present difficulty. He was + prepared, therefore, to support it. + + President Wilson asked for the views of his Japanese + colleagues. + + Baron Makino said that after carefully considering the + various points of view put forward, he had no objections to + make regarding the conclusions reached. He thought that was + the best solution under the circumstances. He wished, + however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the + Representatives of the Allied powers if the Bolshevists + accepted the invitation to the meeting and there insisted + upon their principles. He thought they should under no + circumstances countenance Bolshevist ideas. The conditions + in Siberia East of the Baikal had greatly improved. The + objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to + that region had been attained. Bolshevism was no longer + aggressive, though it might still persist in a latent form. + In conclusion, he wished to support the proposal before the + meeting. + + President Wilson expressed the view that the emissaries of + the Allied Powers should not be authorised to adopt any + definite attitude towards Bolshevism. They should merely + report back to their Governments the conditions found. + + Mr. Lloyd George asked that that question be further + considered. He thought the emissaries of the Allied Powers + should be able to establish an agreement if they were able + to find a solution. For instance, if they succeeded in + reaching an agreement on the subject of the organization of + a Constituent Assembly, they should be authorised to accept + such a compromise without the delay of a reference to the + Governments. + + President Wilson suggested that the emissaries might be + furnished with a body of instructions. + + Mr. Balfour expressed the view that abstention from hostile + action against their neighbours should be made a condition + of their sending representatives to this meeting. + + President Wilson agreed. + + M. Clemenceau suggested that the manifesto to the Russian + parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They + should say to the Russians: "You are threatened by famine. + We are prompted by humanitarian feelings; we are making + peace; we do not want people to die. We are prepared to see + what can be done to remove the menace of starvation." He + thought the Russians would at once prick up their ears, and + be prepared to hear what the Allies had to say. They would + add that food cannot be sent unless peace and order were + re-established. It should, in fact, be made quite clear that + the representatives of all parties would merely be brought + together for purely humane reasons. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that in this connection he wished to + invite attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the + delegates of the British Dominions, namely, whether there + would be enough food and credit to go round should an + attempt be made to feed all Allied countries, and enemy + countries, and Russia also. The export of so much food would + inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in Allied + countries and so create discontent and Bolshevism. As + regards grain, Russia had always been an exporting country, + and there was evidence to show that plenty of food at + present existed in the Ukraine. + + President Wilson said that his information was that enough + food existed in Russia, but, either on account of its being + hoarded or on account of difficulties of transportation, it + could not be made available. + + (It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a + proclamation, for consideration at the next meeting, + inviting all organized parties in Russia to attend a Meeting + to be held at some selected place such as Salonika or + Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the + Allied and Associated Great Powers the means of restoring + order and peace in Russia. Participation in the Meeting + should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.) + + 2. _Peace Conference_.--M. Clemenceau considered it to be + most urgent that the delegates should be set to work. He + understood that President Wilson would be ready to put on + the table at the next full Conference, proposals relating to + the creation of a League of Nations. He was anxious to add a + second question, which could be studied immediately, namely, + reparation for damages. He thought the meeting should + consider how the work should be organized in order to give + effect to this suggestion. + + Mr. Lloyd George said that he agreed that these questions + should be studied forthwith. He would suggest that, in the + first place, the League of Nations should be considered, + and, that after the framing of the principles, an + International Committee of Experts be set to work out its + constitution in detail. The same remark applied also to the + question of indemnities and reparation. He thought that a + Committee should also be appointed as soon as possible to + consider International Labour Legislation. + + President Wilson observed that he had himself drawn up a + constitution of a League of Nations. He could not claim that + it was wholly his own creation. Its generation was as + follows:--He had received the Phillimore Report, which had + been amended by Colonel House and re-written by himself. He + had again revised it after having received General Smuts' + and Lord Robert Cecil's reports. It was therefore a compound + of these various suggestions. During the week he had seen M. + Bourgeois, with whom he found himself to be in substantial + accord on principles. A few days ago he had discussed his + draft with Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, and they + found themselves very near together. + + Mr. Balfour suggested that President Wilson's draft should + be submitted to the Committee as a basis for discussion. + + President Wilson further suggested that the question should + be referred as far as possible to the men who had been + studying it. + + Mr. Lloyd George expressed his complete agreement. He + thought they themselves should, in the first place, agree on + the fundamental principles and then refer the matter to the + Committee. When that Committee met they could take President + Wilson's proposals as the basis of discussion. + + (It was agreed that the question of appointing an + International Committee, consisting of two members from each + of the five Great Powers, to whom would be referred + President Wilson's draft, with certain basic principles to + guide them, should be considered at the next meeting.) + + 3. _Poland_.--M. Pichon called attention to the necessity + for replying to the demand addressed by M. Paderewski to + Colonel House, which had been read by President Wilson that + morning, and asked that Marshal Foch should be present. + + (It was agreed that this question should be discussed at the + next Meeting.) + + 4. _Disarmament_.--Mr. Balfour called attention to the + urgency of the question of disarmament, and said that he + would shortly propose that a Committee should be appointed + to consider this question. + + + + +VILLA MAJESTIC, Paris January 21st, 1919. + +This is the minute of January 21, and the Prinkipos memorandum was +written on January 22. + +The instructions to the President were as follows: + + It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a + proclamation for consideration at the next meeting, inviting + all organized parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be + held at some selected place such as Salonika or Lemnos, in + order to discuss with the representatives of the allied and + associated great powers the means of restoring order and + peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be + conditional on a cessation of hostilities. + + The President then wrote the Prinkipos proposition. + +Senator KNOX. Did you make a written report of your mission? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +Senator KNOX. Have you it here? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. I might read the report without the appendices. + +Senator KNOX. The chairman wants you to read it. + +The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether it is very long. The report he +made would be of some interest. You were the only official +representative sent? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; except Capt. Pettit, my assistant. The +circumstances of my sending will perhaps require further elucidation. +I not only was acquainted with the minutes of the discussions of the +council of ten, but in addition I had discussed the subject with each +of the commissioners each morning and I had talked with many British +representatives. After the Prinkipos proposal was made, the replies +began to come in from various factions, that they would refuse to +accept it for various reasons. The Soviet Government replied in a +slightly evasive form. They said, "We are ready to accept the terms of +the proposals, and we are ready to talk about stopping fighting." They +did not say, "We are ready to stop fighting on such and such a date." +It was not made specific. + +Senator KNOX. That was one of the conditions of the proposal? + + + + +FRANCE BLOCKS PRINKIPOS CONFERENCE + +Mr. BULLITT. It was. That is why I say they replied in an evasive +manner. The French--and particularly the French foreign office, even +more than Mr. Clemenceau--and you can observe it from that minute were +opposed to the idea, and we found that the French foreign office had +communicated to the Ukrainian Government and various other antisoviet +governments that if they were to refuse the proposal, they would +support them and continue to support them, and not allow the Allies, +if they could prevent it, or the allied Governments, to make peace +with the Russian Soviet Government. + +At all events, the time set for the Prinkipos proposal was February +15. At that time nobody had acted in a definite, uncompromising +matter. It therefore fell to the ground. + +There was a further discussion as to what should be done. The peace +conference was still of the opinion that it was impossible to hope to +conquer the Soviet Government by force of arms, because in the latter +part of that report, which I did not read to the committee, there was +expressed very forcibly the opinion of Mr. Lloyd George, that the +populations at home would not stand it. Therefore they desired to +follow up further the line of making peace. + +About that time I was working particularly closely on the Russian +affairs. I had had a number of discussions with everyone concerned in +it, and on the very day that Col. House and Mr. Lansing first asked me +to undertake this mission to Russia, I was dining at Mr. Lloyd +George's apartment to discuss Russian affairs with his secretaries, so +that I had a fair idea of the point of view of everyone in Paris. + +I further, before I went, received urgent instructions from Secretary +Lansing if possible to obtain the release of Consul Treadwell, who had +been our consul in Petrograd and had been transferred to Tashkent, and +had been detained by the local Soviet Government and had been kept +there several months. He was one of our Government officers they had +seized. Mr. Lansing ordered me to do everything I could to obtain his +release. + +I further, before I went, asked Col. House certain specific questions +in regard to what, exactly, the point of view of our Government was on +this subject, what we were ready to do, and I think it perhaps might +be important to detail a brief resume of this conversation. The idea +was this: Lloyd George had gone over to London on February 9, as I +remember, to try to adjust some labor troubles. He, however, still +insisted that the Prinkipos proposal must be renewed or some other +peace proposal must be made, and I arranged a meeting between him and +Col. House, which was to take place, I believe, on February 24, at +which time they were to prepare a renewal of the Prinkipos proposal, +and they were both prepared to insist that it be passed against any +opposition of the French. + +I arranged this meeting through Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's +confidential assistant. However, on the 19th day of the month, Mr. +Clemenceau was shot, and the next day Mr. Lloyd George telephoned over +from London to say that as long as Clemenceau was wounded and was ill, +he was boss of the roost, and that anything he desired to veto would +be immediately wiped out and therefore it was no use for him and Col. +House, as long as Clemenceau was ill, to attempt to renew the +Prinkipos proposal, as Clemenceau would simply have to hold up a +finger and the whole thing would drop to the ground. Therefore, it was +decided that I should go at once to Russia to attempt to obtain from +the Soviet Government an exact statement of the terms on which they +were ready to stop fighting. I was ordered if possible to obtain that +statement and have it back in Paris before the President returned to +Paris from the United States. The plan was to make a proposal to the +Soviet Government which would certainly be accepted. + +The CHAIRMAN. These orders came from the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. These orders came to me from Col. House. I also discussed +the matter with Mr. Lansing, and Mr. Lansing and Col. House gave me +the instructions which I had. + +Senator KNOX. You said a moment ago that you went to Col. House to get +a statement of the American position. + + + + +WHAT AMERICA WANTED + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; I asked Col. House these questions [reading]: + + 1. If the Bolsheviki are ready to stop the forward movement + of their troops on all fronts and to declare an armistice on + all fronts, would we be willing to do likewise? + + 2. Is the American Government prepared to insist that the + French, British, Italian, and Japanese Governments shall + accept such an armistice proposal? + + 3. If fighting is stopped on all fronts, is the Government + of the United States prepared to insist on the + reestablishment of economic relations with Russia, subject + only to the equitable distribution among all classes of the + population of supplies and food and essential commodities + which may be sent to Russia? + + In other words, a sort of Hoover Belgian distribution plan + so that the Bolsheviki could not use the food we sent in + there for propaganda purposes and to starve their enemies + and to feed their friends. + + The fourth question I asked him was as follows: + + 4. Is the United States Government, under these conditions, + prepared to press the Allies for a joint statement that all + Allied troops will be withdrawn from the soil of Russia as + soon as practicable, on condition that the Bolsheviki give + explicit assurances that there will be no retaliation + against persons who have cooperated with the allied forces? + + Col. House replied that we were prepared to. + + Further, I asked Col. House whether it was necessary to get + a flat and explicit assurance from the Soviet Government + that they would make full payment of all their debts before + we would make peace with them, and Col. House replied that + it was not; that no such statement was necessary, however, + that such a statement would be extremely desirable to have, + inasmuch as much of the French opposition to making peace + with the Soviet Government was on account of the money owed + by Russia to France. + + I further had an intimation of the British disposition + toward Russia. As I said before, I had discussed the matter + with Mr. Philip Kerr, and Sir Maurice Hankey and Col. House + asked me to inform Mr. Kerr of my mission before I went. It + was to be an entire secret from all except the British. The + British and American delegations worked in very close touch + throughout the conference, and there were practically no + secrets that the American delegation had that were not also + the property of the British delegation. + + + + +THE BRITISH TERMS + +I was asked to inform Mr. Kerr of this trip. I told him all about it, +and asked him if he could get Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George to give +me a general indication of their point of view on peace with Russia; +what they would be prepared to do in the matter. + +Mr. Kerr and I then talked and prepared what we thought might be the +basis of peace with Russia. + +I then received from Mr. Kerr, before I left, the following letter, +which is a personal letter, which I regret greatly to bring forward, +but which I feel is necessary in the interest of an understanding of +this matter. [Reading:] + + [Private and confidential.] + + BRITISH DELEGATION, + Paris, February 21, 1919. + + MY DEAR BULLITT: I inclose a note of the sort of conditions + upon which I personally think it would be possible for the + allied Governments to resume once more normal relations with + Soviet Russia. You will understand, of course, that these + have no official significance and merely represent + suggestions of my own opinion. + + Yours, sincerely, + + P.H. KERR. + +That was from Mr. Kerr, Lloyd George's confidential secretary. Mr. +Kerr had, however, told me that he had discussed the entire matter +with Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, and therefore I thought he had +a fair idea of what conditions the British were ready to accept. The +note inclosed reads as follows: + + 1. Hostilities to cease on all fronts. + + 2. All de facto governments to remain in full control of the + territories which they at present occupy. + + 3. Railways and ports necessary to transportation between + soviet Russia and the sea to be subject to the same + regulations as international railways and ports in the rest + of Europe. + + 4. Allied subjects to be given free right of entry and full + security to enable them to enter soviet Russia and go about + their business there provided they do not interfere in + politics. + + 5. Amnesty to all political prisoners on both sides: full + liberty to all Russians who have fought with the Allies. + + 6. Trade relations to be restored between soviet Russia and + the outside world under conditions which, while respecting + the sovereignty of soviet Russia insure that allied supplies + are made available on equal terms to all classes of the + Russian people. + + 7. All other questions connected with Russia's debt to the + Allies, etc., to be considered independently after peace has + been established. + + 8. All allied troops to be withdrawn from Russia as soon as + Russian armies above quota to be defined have been + demobilized and their surplus arms surrendered or destroyed. + +You will see the American and British positions were very close +together. + +Senator KNOX. With these statements from Col. House as to the American +position and from Mr. Kerr as to the British position, and with the +instructions which you had received, you proceeded to Russia, and, as +you said a moment ago, you made a written report? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. Do you want it read, or shall I state the +substance and then put it in the record? I think I can state it more +briefly if I read the first eight pages of it and then put the rest of +it in the record. + +The CHAIRMAN. Very well; do that. + +Mr. BULLITT. This report I made to the President and to the American +commissioners, by order of the President transmitted to me on my +return by Mr. Lansing. I should like to say, before I read this +report, that of course I was in Russia an extremely short time, and +this is merely the best observation that I could make supplemented by +the observation of Capt. Pettit of the Military Intelligence, who was +sent in as my assistant, and with other impressions that I got from +Mr. Lincoln Steffens and other observers who were there. + +Senator KNOX. How long were you in Russia? + +Mr. BULLITT. For only one week. I was instructed to go in and bring +back as quickly as possible a definite statement of exactly the terms +the Soviet Government was ready to accept. The idea in the minds of +the British and the American delegation were that if the Allies made +another proposal it should be a proposal which we would know in +advance would be accepted, so that there would be no chance of another +Prinkipos proposal miscarrying. + +I might perhaps read first, or show to you, the official text. This is +the official text of their proposition which they handed me in Moscow +on the 14th of March. Here is a curious thing--the Soviet foreign +office envelope. + + + + +TERMS WHICH RUSSIA OFFERED TO ACCEPT + +As I said, I was sent to obtain an exact statement of the terms that +the Soviet Government was ready to accept, and I received on the 14th +the following statement from Tchitcherin and Litvinov. + +Senator KNOX. Who were they? + +Mr. BULLITT. Tchitcherin was Peoples' Commisar for Foreign Affairs of +the Soviet Republic and Litvinov was the former Soviet Ambassador to +London, the man with whom Buckler had had his conversation, and who +was now practically assistant secretary for foreign affairs. + +I also had a conference with Lenin. The Soviet Government undertook to +accept this proposal provided it was made by the allied and associated +Governments not later than April 10, 1919. The proposal reads as +follows [reading]: + + + + +TEXT OF PROJECTED PEACE PROPOSAL BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED +GOVERNMENTS. + +The allied and associated Governments to propose that hostilities +shall cease on all fronts in the territory of the former Russian +Empire and Finland on ----[1] and that no new hostilities shall begin +after this date, pending a conference to be held at ----[2] on ----[3] + + [Footnote 1: The date of the armistice to be set at least a + week after the date when the allied and associated + Governments make this proposal.] + + [Footnote 2: The Soviet Government greatly prefers that the + conference should be held in a neutral country and also that + either a radio or a direct telegraph wire to Moscow should + be put at its disposal.] + + [Footnote 3: The conference to begin not later than a week + after the armistice takes effect and the Soviet Government + greatly prefers that the period between the date of the + armistice and the first meeting of the conference should be + only three days, if possible.] + +The duration of the armistice to be for two weeks, unless extended by +mutual consent, and all parties to the armistice to undertake not to +employ the period of the armistice to transfer troops and war material +to the territory of the former Russian Empire. + +The conference to discuss peace on the basis of the following +principles, which shall not be subject to revision by the conference. + + 1. All existing de facto governments which have been set up + on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to + remain in full control of the territories which they occupy + at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, except + in so far as the conference may agree upon the transfer of + territories; until the peoples inhabiting the territories + controlled by these de facto governments shall themselves + determine to change their Governments. The Russian Soviet + Government, the other soviet governments and all other + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire, the allied and associated + Governments, and the other Governments which are operating + against the soviet governments, including Finland, Poland, + Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, to + agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing de facto + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and the other Governments signatory to + this agreement. [Footnote 4: The allied and associated + Governments to undertake to see to it that the de facto + governments of Germany do not attempt to upset by force the + de facto governments of Russia. The de facto governments + which have been set up on the territory of the former + Russian Empire to undertake not to attempt to upset by force + the de facto governments of Germany.] + + 2. The economic blockade to be raised and trade relations + between Soviet Russia and the allied and associated + countries to be reestablished under conditions which will + ensure that supplies from the allied and associated + countries are made available on equal terms to all classes + of the Russian people. + + 3. The soviet governments of Russia to have the right of + unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports + which belonged to the former Russian Empire and to Finland + and are necessary for the disembarkation and transportation + of passengers and goods between their territories and the + sea; detailed arrangements for the carrying out of this + provision to be agreed upon at the conference. + + 4. The citizens of the soviet republics of Russia to have + the right of free entry into the allied and associated + countries as well as into all countries which have been + formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and + Finland; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and + full security, provided they do not interfere in the + domestic politics of those countries. [Footnote 5: It is + considered essential by the Soviet Government that the + allied and associated Governments should see to it that + Poland and all neutral countries extend the same rights as + the allied and associated countries.] + + Nationals of the allied and associated countries and of the + other countries above named to have the right of free entry + into the soviet republics of Russia; also the right of + sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they + do not interfere in the domestic politics of the soviet + republics. + + The allied and associated Governments and other governments + which have been set up on the territory of the former + Russian Empire and Finland to have the right to send + official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity + into the various Russian Soviet Republics. The soviet + governments of Russia to have the right to send official + representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into all + the allied and associated countries and into the nonsoviet + countries which have been formed on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland. + + 5. The soviet governments, the other Governments which have + been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire + and Finland, to give a general amnesty to all political + opponents, offenders, and prisoners. The allied and + associated governments to give a general amnesty to all + Russian political opponents, offenders, and prisoners, and + to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted + for giving help to Soviet Russia. All Russians who have + fought in, or otherwise aided the armies opposed to the + soviet governments, and those opposed to the other + Governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland to be included in this + amnesty. + + All prisoners of war of non-Russian powers detained in + Russia, likewise all nationals of those powers now in Russia + to be given full facilities for repatriation. The Russian + prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be, + likewise all Russian nationals, including the Russian + soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all + foreign armies to be given full facilities for repatriation. + + 6. Immediately after the signing of this agreement all + troops of the allied and associated Governments and other + non-Russian Governments to be withdrawn from Russia and + military assistance to cease to be given to antisoviet + Governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire. + + The soviet governments and the antisoviet governments which + have been set up on the territory of the former Russian + Empire and Finland to begin to reduce their armies + simultaneously, and at the same rate, to a peace footing + immediately after the signing of this agreement. The + conference to determine the most effective and just method + of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous + demobilization and also the withdrawal of the troops and the + cessation of military assistance to the antisoviet + governments. + + 7. The allied and associated Governments, taking cognizance + of the statement of the Soviet Government of Russia, in its + note of February 4, in regard to its foreign debts, propose + as an integral part of this agreement that the soviet + governments and the other governments which have been set up + on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland + shall recognize their responsibility for the financial + obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign States + parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such + States. Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts + to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the + present financial position of Russia. The Russian gold + seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan or taken from Germany + by the Allies to be regarded as partial payment of the + portion of the debt due from the soviet republics of Russia. + + The Soviet Government of Russia undertakes to accept the + foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April + 10, 1919. + +In regard to the second sentence in paragraph 5, in regard to "giving +help to Soviet Russia" I may say that I was told that that was not a +sine qua non but it was necessary in order to get the proposal through +the Russian executive committee, which it had to pass before it was +handed to me. I was also handed an additional sheet, which I refused +to take as a part of the formal document, containing the following: + + The Soviet Government is most anxious to have a semiofficial + guaranty from the American and British Governments that they + will do their utmost to see to it that France lives up to + the conditions of the armistice. + +The Soviet Government had a deep suspicion of the French Government. + +In reference to this matter, and in explanation of that proposal, I +sent a number of telegrams from Helsingfors. I feel that in a way it +is important, for an explanation of the matter, that those telegrams +should be made public, but, on the other hand, they were sent in a +confidential code of the Department of State, and I do not feel at +liberty to read them unless ordered to specifically by the committee. +I should not wish to take the responsibility for breaking a code which +is in current use by the department. + +Senator KNOX. I should think your scruples were well founded. I should +not read those telegrams. + +Mr. BULLITT. I can simply inform you briefly of the nature of them. + +Senator KNOX. You might give us the nature of them. To whom were they +sent? + +Mr. BULLITT. On reaching Petrograd I sent Capt. Pettit out to +Helsingfors after I had had a discussion with Tchitcherin and with +Litvinov with a telegram, in which I said I had reached Petrograd and +had perfected arrangements to cross the boundary at will, and to +communicate with the mission via the consul at Helsingfors; that the +journey had been easy, and that the reports of frightful conditions in +Petrograd had been ridiculously exaggerated. + +I described the discussions I had had with Tchitcherin and with +Litvinov, and said they had assured me that after going to Moscow and +after discussion with Lenin, I should be able to carry out a specific +statement of the position of the Soviet Government on all points. + +On reaching Helsingfors I sent a telegram to the mission at Paris +"Most secret, for the President, Secretary Lansing, and Col. House +only," in which I said that in handing me the statement which I have +just read, Tchitcherin and Litvinov had explained that the Executive +Council of the Soviet Government had formally considered and adopted +it, and that the Soviet Government considered itself absolutely bound +to accept the proposals made therein, provided they were made on or +before April 10, and under no conditions would they change their +minds. + +I also explained that I had found Lenin, Tchitcherin, and Litvinov +full of the sense of Russia's need for peace, and that I felt the +details of their statement might be modified without making it +unacceptable to them, and that in particular the clause under article +5 was not of vital importance. That, on the other hand, I felt that in +the main this statement represented the minimum terms that the Soviet +Government would accept. + +I explained that it was understood with regard to article 2 that the +allied and associated countries should have a right to send inspectors +into Soviet Russia and see to it that the disposition of supplies, if +the blockade was lifted, was entirely equitable, and I explained also +that it was fully understood that the phrase under article 4 on +"official representatives" did not include diplomatic representatives, +that the Soviet Government simply desired to have some agents who +might more or less look out for their people here. + +I explained further that in regard to footnote No. 2, the Soviet +Government hoped and preferred that the conference should be held in +Norway; that its preferences thereafter were, first, some point in +between Russia and Finland; second, a large ocean liner anchored off +Moon Island or the Aland Islands; and, fourth, Prinkipos. + +I also explained that Tchitcherin and all the other members of the +government with whom I had talked had said in the most positive and +unequivocal manner that the Soviet Government was determined to pay +its foreign debts, and I was convinced that there would be no dispute +on that point. + +Senator KNOX. Do you know how these telegrams were received in Paris, +whether favorably or unfavorably? + +Mr. BULLITT. I can only say, in regard to that, there are three other +very brief ones. One was on a subject which I might give you the gist +of before I go on with it. + +Senator KNOX. Go ahead, in your own way. + +Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent me a message of congratulation on receipt +of them, and by one of the curious quirks of the conference, a member +of the secretariat refused to send the message because of the way in +which it was signed, and Col. House was only able to give me a copy of +it when I reached Paris. I have a copy of it here. + +Senator HARDING. Would not this story be more interesting if we knew +which member of the conference objected? + +Mr. BULLITT. I believe the objection was on the technical point that +Col. House had signed "Ammission" instead of his name, but I really do +not know which member of the conference it was that made the +objection. + +I then sent another telegram, which is rather long, too long to +attempt to paraphrase, and I will ask that I may not put it in, +because the entire substance of it is contained in briefer form in my +formal report. This telegram itself is in code. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Are there any translations of those of your +telegrams that are in code? + +Mr. BULLITT. No; I have given you the substance of them as I have gone +along. + +As I said to you before, Secretary Lansing had instructed me if +possible to obtain the release of Mr. Treadwell, our consul at +Tashkent, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 miles from Moscow. In +Moscow I had spoken to Lenin and Tchitcherin and Litvinov in regard to +it, and finally they said they recognized that it was foolish to hold +him; that they had never really given much thought to the matter; that +he had been held by the local government at Tashkent, which was more +than 4,000 miles away; that raids were being made on the railroad +constantly, and they might have some difficulty in communicating. +However, they promised me that they would send a telegram at once +ordering his release, and that they would send him out either by +Persia or by Finland whichever way he preferred. I told them I was +sure he would prefer to go by way of Finland. Here is a copy of their +telegram ordering his release, which will not be of much use to you, I +fear, as it is in Russian. They carried out this promise to the +letter, releasing Treadwell at once, and Treadwell in due course of +time and in good health appeared on the frontier of Finland on the +27th of April. All that time was consumed in travel from Tashkent, +which is a long way under present conditions. + +Senator NEW. I saw Mr. Treadwell here some time ago. + +Mr. BULLITT. I then sent a telegram in regard to Mr. Pettit, the +officer of military intelligence, who was with me as my assistant, +saying I intended to send him back to Petrograd at once to keep in +touch with the situation so that we should have information +constantly. I will say in this connection that it was not an +extraordinary thing for the various Governments to have +representatives in Russia. The British Government had a man in there +at the same time that I was there. He was traveling as a Red Cross +representative, but in reality he was there for the Foreign Office, a +Maj. A.R. Parker, I believe. I am not certain of his name, but we can +verify it. + +I also sent a telegram from Helsingfors, "strictly personal to Col. +House," requesting him to show my fifth and sixth telegrams to Mr. +Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's secretary, so that Mr. Lloyd George +might be at once informed in regard to the situation, inasmuch as he +had known I was going, and inasmuch as the British had been so +courteous as to offer to send me across on a cruiser. When I got to +London and found that the torpedo boat on which I had expected to go +was escorting the President, Mr. Lloyd George's office in London +called up the Admiralty and asked them to give me a boat in which to +go across. Incidentally I was informed by Col. House, on my arrival in +Paris, that copies of my telegrams had been sent at once to Mr. Lloyd +George and Mr. Balfour. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I do not think we need to go into quite so +much detail. You have told us now with what instructions you went, +what the British attitude was, what the American attitude was, and +what the Soviet Government proposed. Now, let us have your report. + +Mr. BULLITT. All right, sir. This was my report-- + +Senator BRANDEGEE. What is the date of that, please? + +Mr. BULLITT. This copy does not bear the date on it. On the other hand +I can tell you within a day or two. The date unfortunately was left +off of this particular copy. It was made on or about the 27th or 28th +day of March, in the week before April 1. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. 1919? + +Mr. BULLITT. 1919. I unquestionably could obtain from Secretary +Lansing or the President or some one else the actual original of the +report. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I do not care about the precise date, but I want to +get it approximately. + +Mr. BULLITT. It was about the 1st day of April. + +Senator KNOX. To whom was the report made? + +Mr. BULLITT. The report was addressed to the President and the +American Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace. I was +ordered to make it. I had sent all these telegrams from Helsingfors, +and I felt personally that no report was necessary, but the President +desired a written report, and I made the report as follows: + + + + +MR. BULLITT'S REPORT ON RUSSIA + + + +ECONOMIC SITUATION + +Russia to-day is in a condition of acute economic distress. The +blockade by land and sea is the cause of this distress and lack of the +essentials of transportation is its gravest symptom. Only one-fourth +of the locomotives which ran on Russian lines before the war are now +available for use. Furthermore, Soviet Russia is cut off entirely from +all supplies of coal and gasoline. In consequence, transportation by +all steam and electric vehicles is greatly hampered; and +transportation by automobile and by the fleet of gasoline-using Volga +steamers and canal boats is impossible. (Appendix, p. 55.) + +As a result of these hindrances to transportation it is possible to +bring from the grain centers to Moscow only 25 carloads of food a day, +instead of the 100 carloads which are essential, and to Petrograd only +15 carloads, instead of the essential 50. In consequence, every man, +woman, and child in Moscow and Petrograd is suffering from slow +starvation. (Appendix, p. 56.) + +Mortality is particularly high among new-born children whose mothers +can not suckle them, among newly-delivered mothers, and among the +aged. The entire population, in addition, is exceptionally susceptible +to disease; and a slight illness is apt to result fatally because of +the total lack of medicines. Typhoid, typhus, and smallpox are +epidemic in both Petrograd and Moscow. + +Industry, except the production of munitions of war, is largely at a +standstill. Nearly all means of transport which are not employed in +carrying food are used to supply the army, and there is scarcely any +surplus transport to carry materials essential to normal industry. +Furthermore, the army has absorbed the best executive brains and +physical vigor of the nation. In addition, Soviet Russia is cut off +from most of its sources of iron and of cotton. Only the flax, hemp, +wood, and lumber industries have an adequate supply of raw material. + +On the other hand, such essentials of economic life as are available +are being utilized to the utmost by the Soviet Government. Such trains +as there are, run on time. The distribution of food is well +controlled. Many industrial experts of the old regime are again +managing their plants and sabotage by such managers has ceased. +Loafing by the workmen during work hours has been overcome. (Appendix, +p. 57.) + + + +SOCIAL CONDITIONS + +The destructive phase of the revolution is over and all the energy of +the Government is turned to constructive work. The terror has ceased. +All power of judgment has been taken away from the extraordinary +commission for suppression of the counter-revolution, which now merely +accuses suspected counter-revolutionaries, who are tried by the +regular, established, legal tribunals. Executions are extremely rare. +Good order has been established. The streets are safe. Shooting has +ceased. There are few robberies. Prostitution has disappeared from +sight. Family life has been unchanged by the revolution, the canard in +regard to "nationalization of women" notwithstanding. (Appendix, p. +58.) + +The theaters, opera, and ballet are performing as in peace. Thousands +of new schools have been opened in all parts of Russia and the Soviet +Government seems to have done more for the education of the Russian +people in a year and a half than czardom did in 50 years. (Appendix, +p. 59.) + + + +POLITICAL SITUATION + +The Soviet form of government is firmly established. Perhaps the most +striking fact in Russia today is the general support which is given +the government by the people in spite of their starvation. Indeed, the +people lay the blame for their distress wholly on the blockade and on +the governments which maintain it. The Soviet form of government seems +to have become to the Russian people the symbol of their revolution. +Unquestionably it is a form of government which lends itself to gross +abuse and tyranny but it meets the demand of the moment in Russia and +it has acquired so great a hold on the imagination of the common +people that the women are ready to starve and the young men to die for +it. + +The position of the communist party (formerly Bolsheviki) is also very +strong. Blockade and intervention have caused the chief opposition +parties, the right social revolutionaries and the menshiviki, to give +temporary support to the communists. These opposition parties have +both made formal statements against the blockade, intervention, and +the support of antisoviet governments by the allied and associated +governments. Their leaders, Volsky and Martov, are most vigorous in +their demands for the immediate raising of the blockade and peace. +(Appendix, p. 60.) + +Indeed, the only ponderable opposition to the communists to-day comes +from more radical parties--the left social revolutionaries and the +anarchists. These parties, in published statements, call the +communists, and particularly Lenin and Tchitcherin, "the paid +bourgeois gendarmes of the Entente." They attack the communists +because the communists have encouraged scientists, engineers, and +industrial experts of the bourgeois class to take important posts +under the Soviet Government at high pay. They rage against the +employment of bourgeois officers in the army and against the efforts +of the communists to obtain peace. They demand the immediate massacre +of all the bourgeoisie and an immediate declaration of war on all +nonrevolutionary governments. They argue that the Entente Governments +should be forced to intervene more deeply in Russia, asserting that +such action would surely provoke the proletariat of all European +countries to immediate revolution. + +Within the communist party itself there is a distinct division of +opinion in regard to foreign policy, but this disagreement has not +developed personal hostility or open breach in the ranks of the party. +Trotski, the generals, and many theorists believe the red army should +go forward everywhere until more vigorous intervention by the Entente +is provoked, which they, too, count upon to bring revolution in France +and England. Their attitude is not a little colored by pride in the +spirited young army. (Appendix, p. 62.) Lenin, Tchitcherin, and the +bulk of the communist party, on the other hand, insist that the +essential problem at present is to save the proletariat of Russia, in +particular, and the proletariat of Europe, in general, from +starvation, and assert that it will benefit the revolution but little +to conquer all Europe if the Government of the United States replies +by starving all Europe. They advocate, therefore, the conciliation of +the United States even at the cost of compromising with many of the +principles they hold most dear. And Lenin's prestige in Russia at +present is so overwhelming that the Trotski group is forced +reluctantly to follow him. (Appendix, p. 63.) + +Lenin, indeed, as a practical matter, stands well to the right in the +existing political life of Russia. He recognizes the undesirability, +from the Socialist viewpoint, of the compromises he feels compelled to +make; but he is ready to make the compromises. Among the more notable +concessions he has already made are: The abandonment of his plan to +nationalize the land and the adoption of the policy of dividing it +among the peasants, the establishment of savings banks paying 3 per +cent interest, the decision to pay all foreign debts, and the decision +to give concessions if that shall prove to be necessary to obtain +credit abroad. (Appendix, p. 64.) + +In a word, Lenin feels compelled to retreat from his theoretical +position all along the line. He is ready to meet the western +Governments half way. + + + +PEACE PROPOSALS + +Lenin seized upon the opportunity presented by my trip of +investigation to make a definite statement of the position of the +Soviet Government. He was opposed by Trotski and the generals, but +without much difficulty got the support of the majority of the +executive council, and the statement of the position of the Soviet +Government which was handed to me was finally adopted unanimously. + +My discussion of this proposal with the leaders of the Soviet +Government was so detailed that I feel sure of my ground in saying +that it does not represent the minimum terms of the Soviet Government, +and that I can point out in detail wherein it may be modified without +making it unacceptable to the Soviet Government. For example, the +clause under article 5--"and to their own nationals who have been or +may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia"--is certainly not +of vital importance. And the clause under article 4, in regard to +admission of citizens of the soviet republics of Russia into the +allied and associated countries, may certainly be changed in such a +way as to reserve all necessary rights to control such immigration to +the allied and associated countries, and to confine it to persons who +come on legitimate and necessary business, and to exclude definitely +all possibility of an influx of propagandists. + + + +CONCLUSIONS + +The following conclusions are respectfully submitted: + + 1. No government save a socialist government can be set up + in Russia to-day except by foreign bayonets, and any + governments so set up will fall the moment such support is + withdrawn. The Lenin wing of the communist party is to-day + as moderate as any socialist government which can control + Russia. + + 2. No real peace can be established in Europe or the world + until peace is made with the revolution. This proposal of + the Soviet Government presents an opportunity to make peace + with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis--perhaps + a unique opportunity. + + 3. If the blockade is lifted and supplies begin to be + delivered regularly to soviet Russia, a more powerful hold + over the Russian people will be established than that given + by the blockade itself--the hold given by fear that this + delivery of supplies may be stopped. Furthermore, the + parties which oppose the communists in principle but are + supporting them at present will be able to begin to fight + against them. + + 4. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that a + proposal following the general lines of the suggestion of + the Soviet Government should be made at the earliest + possible moment, such changes being made, particularly in + article 4 and article 5, as will make the proposal + acceptable to conservative opinion in the allied and + associated countries. + + Very respectfully submitted. + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + + * * * * * + + + + +APPENDIX TO REPORT + + + +TRANSPORT + +_Locomotives_.--Before the war Russia had 22,000 locomotives. +Destruction by war and ordinary wear and tear have reduced the number +of locomotives in good order to 5,500. Russia is entirely cut off from +supplies of spare parts and materials for repair, facilities for the +manufacture of which do not exist in Russia. And the Soviet Government +is able only with the greatest difficulty to keep in running order the +few locomotives at its disposal. + +_Coal_.--Soviet Russia is entirely cut off from supplies of coal. +Kolchak holds the Perm mining district, although Soviet troops are now +on the edge of it. Denikin still holds the larger part of the Donetz +coal district and has destroyed the mines in the portion of the +district which he has evacuated. As a result of this, locomotives, +electrical power plants, etc., must be fed with wood, which is +enormously expensive and laborious and comparatively ineffectual. + +_Gasoline_.--There is a total lack of gasoline, due to the British +occupation of Baku. The few automobiles in the cities which are kept +running for vital Government business are fed with substitute +mixtures, which causes them to break down with great frequency and to +miss continually. Almost the entire fleet on the great inland waterway +system of Russia was propelled by gasoline. As a result the Volga and +the canals, which are so vital a part of Russia's system of +transportation, are useless. + + + +FOOD + +Everyone is hungry in Moscow and Petrograd, including the people's +commissaries themselves. The daily ration of Lenin and the other +commissaries is the same as that of a soldier in the army or of a +workman at hard labor. In the hotel which is reserved for Government +officials the menu is the following: Breakfast--A quarter to half a +pound of black bread, which must last all day, and tea without sugar. +Dinner--A good soup, a small piece of fish, for which occasionally a +diminutive piece of meat is substituted, a vegetable, either a potato +or a bit of cabbage, more tea without sugar. Supper--What remains of +the morning ration of bread and more tea without sugar. + +Occasionally sugar, butter, and chickens slip through from the Ukraine +and are sold secretly at atrocious prices--butter, for example, at 140 +roubles a pound. Whenever the Government is able to get its hands on +any such "luxuries" it turns them over to the schools, where an +attempt is made to give every child a good dinner every day. + +The food situation has been slightly improved by the rejoining of +Ukraine to Great Russia, for food is relatively plentiful in the +south; but no great improvement in the situation is possible because +of the lack of transport. + + + +MANAGEMENT + +Such supplies as are available in Soviet Russia are being utilized +with considerable skill. For example, in spite of the necessity of +firing with wood, the Moscow-Petrograd express keeps up to its +schedule, and on both occasions when I made the trip it took but 13 +hours, compared to the 12 hours of prewar days. + +The food control works well, so that there is no abundance alongside +of famine. Powerful and weak alike endure about the same degree of +starvation. + +The Soviet Government has made great efforts to persuade industrial +managers and technical experts of the old regime to enter its service. +Many very prominent men have done so. And the Soviet Government pays +them as high as $45,000 a year for their services, although Lenin gets +but $1,800 a year. This very anomalous situation arises from the +principle that any believing communist must adhere to the scale of +wages established by the government, but if the government considers +it necessary to have the assistance of any anticommunist, it is +permitted to pay him as much as he demands. + +All meetings of workmen during work hours have been prohibited, with +the result that the loafing which was so fatal during the Kerensky +regime has been overcome and discipline has been restored in the +factories as in the army. + + + +SOCIAL CONDITIONS + +_Terror_.--The red terror is over. During the period of its power the +extraordinary commission for the suppression of the counter +revolution, which was the instrument of the terror, executed about +1,500 persons in Petrograd, 500 in Moscow, and 3,000 in the remainder +of the country--5,000 in all Russia. These figures agree with those +which were brought back from Russia by Maj. Wardwell, and inasmuch as +I have checked them from Soviet, anti-Soviet, and neutral sources I +believe them to be approximately correct. It is worthy of note in this +connection that in the white terror in southern Finland alone, +according to official figures, Gen. Mannerheim executed without trial +12,000 working men and women. + +_Order_.--One feels as safe in the streets of Petrograd and Moscow as +in the streets of Paris or New York. On the other hand, the streets of +these cities are dismal, because of the closing of retail shops whose +functions are now concentrated in a few large nationalized "department +stores." Petrograd, furthermore, has been deserted by half its +population; but Moscow teems with twice the number of inhabitants it +contained before the war. The only noticeable difference in the +theaters, opera, and ballet is that they are now run under the +direction of the department of education, which prefers classics and +sees to it that working men and women and children are given an +opportunity to attend the performances and that they are instructed +beforehand in the significance and beauties of the productions. + +_Morals_.--Prostitutes have disappeared from sight, the economic +reasons for their career having ceased to exist. Family life has been +absolutely unchanged by the revolution. I have never heard more +genuinely mirthful laughter than when I told Lenin, Tchitcherin, and +Litvinov that much of the world believed that women had been +"nationalized." This lie is so wildly fantastic that they will not +even take the trouble to deny it. Respect for womanhood was never +greater than in Russia to-day. Indeed, the day I reached Petrograd was +a holiday in honor of wives and mothers. + +_Education_.--The achievements of the department of education under +Lunacharsky have been very great. Not only have all the Russian +classics been reprinted in editions of three and five million copies +and sold at a low price to the people, but thousands of new schools +for men, women, and children have been opened in all parts of Russia. +Furthermore, workingmen's and soldiers' clubs have been organized in +many of the palaces of yesteryear, where the people are instructed by +means of moving pictures and lectures. In the art galleries one meets +classes of working men and women being instructed in the beauties of +the pictures. The children's schools have been entirely reorganized, +and an attempt is being made to give every child a good dinner at +school every day. Furthermore, very remarkable schools have been +opened for defective and over-nervous children. On the theory that +genius and insanity are closely allied, these children are taught from +the first to compose music, paint pictures, sculpt and write poetry, +and it is asserted that some very valuable results have been achieved, +not only in the way of productions but also in the way of restoring +the nervous systems of the children. + +_Morale_.--The belief of the convinced communists in their cause is +almost religious. Never in any religious service have I seen higher +emotional unity than prevailed at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet +in celebration of the foundation of the Third Socialist +Internationale. The remark of one young man to me when I questioned +him in regard to his starved appearance is characteristic. He replied +very simply: "I am ready to give another year of starvation to our +revolution." + + + + +STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES + +The following statement was made to me by Volsky, leader of the right +social revolutionaries, the largest opposition party: + +"Intervention of any kind will prolong the regime of the Bolsheviki by +compelling us, like all honorable Russians, to drop opposition and +rally round the Soviet Government in defense of the revolution. With +regard to help to individual groups or governments fighting against +soviet Russia, we see no difference between such intervention and the +sending of troops. If the allies come to an agreement with the Soviet +Government, sooner or later the peasant masses will make their will +felt and they are alike against the bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviki. + +"If by any chance Kolchak and Denikin were to win, they would have to +kill in tens of thousands where the Bolsheviki have had to kill in +hundreds and the result would be the complete ruin and collapse of +Russia into anarchy. Has not the Ukraine been enough to teach the +allies that occupation by non-Bolshevik troops merely turns into +Bolsheviki those of the population who were not Bolsheviki before? It +is clear to us that the Bolshiviki are really fighting against +bourgeois dictatorship, We are, therefore, prepared to help them in +every possible way. + +"Grandmother Ekaterina Constantinovna Breshkovskaya has no sort of +authority, either from the assembly of members of the all Russian +constituent assembly or from the party of social revolutionaries. Her +utterances in America, if she is preaching intervention, represent her +personal opinions which are categorically repudiated by the party of +social revolutionaries, which has decisively expressed itself against +the permissibility of intervention, direct or indirect." + +Volsky signed this latter statement: "V. Volsky, late president of the +assembly of members of the all Russian constituent assembly." + +Martov, leader of the Menshiviki, stated: "The Menshiviki are against +every form of intervention, direct or indirect, because by providing +the incentive to militarization it is bound to emphasize the least +desirable qualities of the revolution. Further, the needs of the army +overwhelm all efforts at meeting the needs of social and economic +reconstruction. Agreement with the Soviet Government would lessen the +tension of defense and would unmuzzle the opposition, who, while the +Soviet Government is attacked, are prepared to help in its defense, +while reserving until peace their efforts to alter the Bolshevik +regime. + +"The forces that would support intervention must be dominated by those +of extreme reaction because all but the reactionaries are prepared +temporarily to sink their differences with the Bolsheviki in order to +defend the revolution as a whole." + +Martov finally expressed himself as convinced that, given peace, life +itself and the needs of the country will bring about the changes he +desires. + + + + +ARMY + +The soviet army now numbers between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 troops of +the line. Nearly all these soldiers are young men between the ages of +17 and 27. The morale of regiments varies greatly. The convinced +communists, who compose the bulk of the army, fight with crusading +enthusiasm. Other regiments, composed of patriots but noncommunists, +are less spirited; other regiments composed of men who have entered +the army for the slightly higher bread ration are distinctly +untrustworthy. Great numbers of officers of the old army are occupying +important executive posts in the administration of the new army, but +are under control of convinced communist supervisors. Nearly all the +lower grade officers of the army are workmen who have displayed +courage in the ranks and have been trained in special officer schools. +Discipline has been restored and on the whole the spirit of the army +appears to be very high, particularly since its recent successes. The +soldiers no longer have the beaten dog-like look which distinguished +them under the Czar but carry themselves like freemen and curiously +like Americans. They are popular with the people. + +I witnessed a review of 15,000 troops in Petrograd. The men marched +well and their equipment of shoes, uniforms, rifles, and machine guns +and light artillery was excellent. On the other hand they have no big +guns, no aeroplanes, no gas shells, no liquid fire, nor indeed, any of +the more refined instruments of destruction. + +The testimony was universal that recruiting for the army is easiest in +the districts which having once lived under the soviet were over run +by anti-soviet forces and then reoccupied by the Red Army. + +Trotski is enormously proud of the army he has created, but it is +noteworthy that even he is ready to disband the army at once if peace +can be obtained in order that all the brains and energy it contains +may be turned to restoring the normal life of the country. + + + + +LENIN'S PRESTIGE + +The hold which Lenin has gained on the imagination of the Russian +people makes his position almost that of a dictator. There is already +a Lenin legend. He is regarded as almost a prophet. His picture, +usually accompanied by that of Karl Marx, hangs everywhere. In Russia +one never hears Lenin and Trotski spoken of in the same breath as is +usual in the western world. Lenin is regarded as in a class by +himself. Trotski is but one of the lower order of mortals. + +When I called on Lenin at the Kremlin I had to wait a few minutes +until a delegation of peasants left his room. They had heard in their +village that Comrade Lenin was hungry. And they had come hundreds of +miles carrying 800 poods of bread as the gift of the village to Lenin. +Just before them was another delegation of peasants to whom the report +had come that Comrade Lenin was working in an unheated room. They came +bearing a stove and enough firewood to heat it for three months. Lenin +is the only leader who receives such gifts. And he turns them into the +common fund. + +Face to face Lenin is a very striking man--straightforward and direct, +but also genial and with a large humor and serenity. + + + + +CONCESSIONS + +The Soviet Government recognizes very clearly the undesirability of +granting concessions to foreigners and is ready to do so only because +of necessity. The members of the Government realize that the lifting +of the blockade will be illusory unless the Soviet Government is able +to establish credits in foreign countries, particularly the United +States and England, so that goods may be bought in those countries. +For Russia to-day is in a position to export only a little gold, a +little platinum, a little hemp, flax, and wood. These exports will be +utterly inadequate to pay for the vast quantity of imports which +Russia needs. Russia must, therefore, obtain credit at any price. The +members of the Soviet Government realize fully that as a preliminary +step to the obtaining of credit the payment of foreign debts must be +resumed and, therefore, are ready to pay such debts. But even though +these debts are paid the members of the Soviet Government believe that +they will not be able to borrow money in foreign countries on any mere +promise to pay. They believe, therefore, that they will have to grant +concessions in Russia to foreigners in order to obtain immediate +credit. They desire to avoid this expedient if in any way it shall be +possible, but if absolutely necessary they are ready to adopt it in +order to begin the restoration of the normal life of the country. + +Senator KNOX. To whom did you hand that report? + +Mr. BULLITT. I handed copies of this personally to Secretary Lansing, +Col. House, Gen. Bliss and Mr. Henry White, and I handed a second +copy, for the President, to Mr. Lansing. Secretary Lansing wrote on +it, "Urgent and immediate"; put it in an envelope, and I took it up to +the President's house. + +Senator KNOX. At the same time that you handed in this report, did you +hand them the proposal of the Soviet Government? + +Mr. BULLITT. The proposal of the Soviet Government is appended to this +report. + +Senator KNOX. It is a part of the report? + +Mr. BULLITT. It is a part of the report which I have already read. +There comes first an appendix explaining the statements which I have +just read, and giving the evidence I have for them. + +Senator KNOX. Was there any formal meeting of the peace conference, or +of representatives of the great powers, to act upon this suggestion +and upon your report? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was acted upon in a very lengthy, long-drawn-out +manner. + +Immediately on my return I was first asked to appear before the +American Commission. First, the night I got back I had a couple of +hours with Col. House, in which I went over the whole matter. Col. +House was entirely and quite decidedly in favor of making peace, if +possible, on the basis of this proposal. + +The next morning I was called before the other Commissioners, and I +talked with Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. Henry White all the +morning and most of the afternoon. We had a long discussion, at the +end of which it was the sense of the commissioners' meeting that it +was highly desirable to attempt to bring about peace on that basis. + + + + +BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE + +The next morning I had breakfast with Mr. Lloyd George at his +apartment. Gen. Smuts and Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. Philip Kerr were +also present, and we discussed the matter at considerable length, I +brought Mr. Lloyd George the official text of the proposal, the same +official one, in that same envelop, which I have just shown to you. He +had previously read it, it having been telegraphed from Helsingfors. +As he had previously read it, he merely glanced over it and said, +"That is the same one I have already read," and he handed it to Gen. +Smuts, who was across the table, and said, "General, this is of the +utmost importance and interest, and you ought to read it right away." +Gen. Smuts read it immediately, and said he thought it should not be +allowed to lapse; that it was of the utmost importance. Mr. Lloyd +George, however, said that he did not know what he could do with +British public opinion. He had a copy of the Daily Mail in his hand, +and he said, "As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing +how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia?" The Daily Mail was +roaring and screaming about the whole Russian situation. Then Mr. +Lloyd George said, "Of course all the reports we get from people we +send in there are in this same general direction, but we have got to +send in somebody who is known to the whole world as a complete +conservative, in order to have the whole world believe that the report +he brings out is not simply the utterance of a radical." He then said, +"I wonder if we could get Lansdowne to go?" Then he immediately +corrected himself and said, "No; it would probably kill him." Then he +said, "I wish I could send Bob Cecil, but we have got to keep him for +the league of nations." And he said to Smuts, "It would be splendid if +you could go, but, of course, you have got the other job," which was +going down to Hungary. Afterwards he said he thought the most +desirable man to send was the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Robert +Cecil's brother; that he would be respectable enough and well known +enough so that when he came back and made the same report it would go +down with British public opinion. Mr. Lloyd George then urged me to +make public my report. He said it was absolutely necessary to have +publicity given to the actual conditions in Russia, which he +recognized were as presented. + +I saw Mr. Balfour that afternoon with Sir Eric Drummond, who at that +time was acting as his secretary. He is now secretary of the league of +nations. We discussed the entire matter. Sir William Wiseman told me +afterward that Mr. Balfour was thoroughly in favor of the proposition. + +Well, to cut the story short, first the President referred the matter +to Col. House. He left his decision on the matter with Col. House, as +was his usual course of procedure in most such matters. Mr. Lloyd +George also agreed in advance to leave the preparation of the proposal +to Col. House; that is, he said he would be disposed to go at least as +far as we would and would follow the lead of the President and Col. +House. Col. House thereupon asked me to prepare a reply to this +proposal, which I did. + +Col. House in the meantime had seen Mr. Orlando, and Mr. Orlando had +expressed himself as entirely in favor of making peace on this basis, +at least so Col. House informed me at the time. The French, I believe, +had not yet been approached formally on the matter. + +Senator KNOX. By the way, right here, you say Mr. Lloyd George advised +you to make your report public. Did you make it public? + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. Mr. Lloyd George desired me to make it public +for the enlightenment that he thought it might give to public opinion. + +Senator KNOX. But you did not do it? + + + + +BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED + +Mr. BULLITT. I attempted to. I prepared a statement for the press +based on my report, giving the facts, which I submitted to the +commission to be given out. No member of the commission was ready to +take the responsibility for publicity in the matter and it was +referred to the President. The President received it and decided that +he did not want it given out. He thought he would rather keep it +secret, and in spite of the urgings of the other commissioners he +continued to adhere to that point of view, and my report has never +been made public until this moment. + +Col. House asked me to prepare a declaration of policy, a statement +based on this proposal of the Soviet Government. It was to be an +ironclad declaration which we knew in advance would be accepted by the +Soviet Government if we made it, and he thought that the President and +Mr. Lloyd George would put it through. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you attend that meeting of the commission when +that report was considered by the American Commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. I first handed each member of the commission my report. I +had appeared before them and discussed my mission for an entire day. +They sat in the morning and in the afternoon. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I wondered whether you were present when the +President thought it would be better not to give it out, not to make +it public. + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir; I was not. Then upon order of Col. House, to +whom the matter had been referred, I prepared this declaration of +policy. I prepared it in conjunction with Mr. Whitney Shepherdson, who +was Col. House's assistant secretary, and also versed in international +law. I do not know that this is of any importance, aside from the fact +that it is almost the only direct proposition to accept their proposal +which was prepared. Col. House took this and held it under advisement +and discussed it, I believe, with the President and other persons. + +The CHAIRMAN. It had better be printed. + +The document referred to is as follows: + +A PROPOSED DECLARATION OF POLICY TO BE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE +ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS AND AN OFFER OF AN ARMISTICE + + +The representatives of the States assembled in conference at Paris +recently extended an invitation to the organized groups in Russia to +lay down their arms and to send delegates to Prince's Island. These +delegates were asked to "confer with the representatives of the +associated powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to +ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people and +bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which +Russia may work out her own purposes and happy cooperative relations +may be established between her people and the other peoples of the +world." The truce of arms was not declared, and the meeting did not +take place. + +The people of Russia are laboring to-day to establish the system of +government under which they shall live. Their task is one of +unparalleled difficulty, and should not be further complicated by the +existence of misapprehensions among the Russian people or throughout +the world. Therefore, the representatives of the associated powers, +now sitting in the conference of Paris, have determined to state +publicly what they had in mind to say through their delegates to +Prince's Island concerning the policies which govern their relations +with the Russian people. + +They wish to make it plain that they do not intend to interfere in any +way with the solution of the political, social, or economic problems +of Russia. They believe that the peace of the world will largely +depend upon a right settlement of these matters; but they equally +recognize that any right settlement must proceed from the Russian +people themselves, unembarrassed by influence or direction from +without. On the other hand, the associated powers desired to have it +clearly understood that they can have no dealings with any Russian +Government which shall invade the territory of its neighbors or seek +to impose its will upon other peoples by force. The full authority and +military power of the associated governments will stand in the way of +any such attempt. + +The task of creating a stable government demands all the great +strength of Russia, healed of the famine, misery, and disease which +attend and delay the reconstruction. The associated powers have +solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of +Europe. Their efforts, begun in Belgium and in northern France during +the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to +the Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads of +food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an +impartial hand. Industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point +where it was broken off by war. These measures of relief will be +continued until peace is signed and until nations are once more able +to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce. + +It is the earnest desire of the associated peoples similarly to +assuage the distress of millions of men and women in Russia and to +provide them with such physical conditions as will make life possible +and desirable. Relief can not be effectively rendered, however, except +by the employment of all available transportation facilities and the +active cooperation of those exercising authority within the country. + +These requisites can not be assured while Russia is still at war. + +The allied and associated governments, therefore, propose an agreement +between themselves and all governments now exercising political +authority within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including +Finland, together with Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, +Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, that hostilities against one another +shall cease on all fronts within these territories on April ---- at +noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of +this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind +whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long +as the armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice shall +be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent. The allied and +associated Governments propose that such of these Governments as are +willing to accept the terms of this armistice shall send not more than +three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts, +to ---- where they shall meet on April ---- with representatives of +the allied and associated Governments in conference to discuss peace, +upon the basis of the following principles: + + (1) All signatory Governments shall remain, as against each + other, in full control of the territories which they occupy + at the moment when the armistice becomes effective; subject + only to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the + conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these + territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change + their Government. + + (2) The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, and full + security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the + citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons + comply with the laws of the country to which they seek + admittance, and provided also that they do not interfere or + attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics + of that country. + + (3) The right to send official representatives enjoying full + liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several + signatories to each other. + + (4) A general amnesty shall be granted by the various + signatories to all political or military opponents, + offenders, and prisoners who are so regarded because of + their association or affiliation with another signatory, + provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of + the land. + + (5) Nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the + country of another shall be given all possible facilities + for repatriation. + + (6) The allied and associated Governments shall immediately + withdraw their armed forces and further military support + from the territory of the former Russian Empire, including + Finland, and the various Governments within that territory + shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces + according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be + agreed upon by the conference. + + (7) Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as + against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be + established, subject to a program of equitable distribution + of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be + agreed upon by the conference. + + (8) Provision shall be made by the conference for a mutual + exchange of transit and port privileges among the several + signatories. + + (9) The conference shall be competent to discuss and + determine any other matter which bears upon the problem of + establishing peace within the territory of the former + Russian Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment + of international relations among the signatories. + + NOTE.--If it is desirable to include a specific reference to + Russia's financial obligations, the following clause (8 bis) + would be acceptable to the Soviet Government at least: "The + governments which have been set up on the territory of the + former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their + responsibility for the financial obligations of the former + Russian Empire to foreign States parties to this agreement + and to the nationals of such States. Detailed arrangements + for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by + the conference, regard being had to the present financial + situation of Russia." + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Was this brought to the attention of the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. The first night after I got in Col. House went to the +telephone and called up the President right away and told him that I +was in, and that he thought this was a matter of the utmost +importance, and that it would seem to be an opportunity to make peace +in a section of the world where there was no peace; in fact, where +there were 23 wars. The President said he would see me the next +evening down at Col. House's office, as I remember it. The next +evening, however, the President had a headache and he did not come. +The following afternoon Col. House said to me that he had seen the +President and the President had said he had a one-track mind and was +occupied with Germany at present, and he could not think about Russia, +and that he had left the Russian matter all to him, Col. House. +Therefore I continued to deal with Col. House directly on it inasmuch +as he was the delegate of the President, and Lloyd George, in the +matter. I used to see Col. House every day, indeed two or three times +a day, on the subject, urging him to obtain action before April 10, +which, as you will recall, was the date when this proposal was to +expire. + + + + +NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA + +Meanwhile Mr. Hoover and Mr. Auchincloss had the idea of approaching +peace with Russia by a feeding proposition, and they had approached +Mr. Fridjof Nansen, the Arctic explorer, and got him to write and send +the following letter to the President. You doubtless have seen his +letter to the President. + + PARIS, April 3, 1919. + + MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The present food situation in Russia, + where hundreds of thousands of people are dying monthly from + sheer starvation and disease, is one of the problems now + uppermost in all men's minds. As it appears that no solution + of this food and disease question has so far been reached in + any direction, I would like to make a suggestion from a + neutral point of view for the alleviation of this gigantic + misery on purely humanitarian grounds. + + It would appear to me possible to organize a purely + humanitarian commission for the provisioning of Russia, the + foodstuffs and medical supplies to be paid for, perhaps, to + some considerable extent by Russia itself, the justice of + distribution to be guaranteed by such a commission, the + membership of the commission to be comprised of Norwegian, + Swedish, and possibly Dutch, Danish, and Swiss + nationalities. It does not appear that the existing + authorities in Russia would refuse the intervention of such + a commission of wholly nonpolitical order, devoted solely to + the humanitarian purpose of saving life. If thus organized + upon the lines of the Belgian Relief Commission, it would + raise no question of political recognition or negotiations + between the Allies with the existing authorities in Russia. + + I recognize keenly the large political issues involved, and + I would be glad to know under what conditions you would + approve such an enterprise and whether such commission could + look for actual support in finance, shipping, and food and + medical supplies from the United States Government. + + I am addressing a similar note to Messrs. Orlando, + Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. Believe me, my dear Mr. + President, + + Yours, most respectfully, + + FRIDJOF NANSEN. + + His Excellency the PRESIDENT, + II Place des Etats-Unis, Paris. + +Senator KNOX, I think that was published in nearly all the papers. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. In it he proposed that a commission should be formed +at once for the feeding of Russia, because of the frightful conditions +of starvation and so on. Col. House decided that it would be an easier +way to peace if we could get there via the feeding plan, under the +guise of a purely humanitarian plan, if we could slide in that way +instead of by a direct, outright statement inviting these people to +sit down and make peace. Therefore he asked me to prepare a reply to +the Nansen letter, which I have here. + + PARIS, FRANCE, April 4, 1919. Suggested reply to Dr. + Nansen by the President of the United States and the + premiers of France, Great Britain, and Italy: + + DEAR MR. NANSEN: It is the earnest desire of the allied and + associated Governments, and of the peoples for whom they + speak, to assuage the distress of the millions of men, + women, and children who are suffering in Russia. The + associated powers have solemnly pledged their resources to + relieve the stricken regions of Europe. Their efforts, begun + in Belgium and in Northern France during the course of the + war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to the + Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads + of food are moved into the interior and there are + distributed with an impartial hand. Industry is awakened, + and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by + war. These measures of relief will be continued until + nations are once more able to provide for their needs + through the normal channels of commerce. + + The associated peoples desire and deem it their duty + similarly to assist in relieving the people of Russia from + the misery, famine, and disease which oppress them. In view + of the responsibilities which have already been undertaken + by the associated Governments they welcome the suggestion + that the neutral States should take the initiative in the + matter of Russian relief and, therefore, are prepared to + state in accordance with your request, the conditions under + which they will approve and assist a neutral commission for + the provisioning of Russia. + + The allied and associated Governments and all Governments + now exercising political authority within the territory of + the former Russian Empire, including Finland, together with + Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and + Afghanistan, shall agree that hostilities against one + another shall cease on all fronts within these territories + on April 20 at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be + begun during the period of this armistice, and that no + troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be + transferred to or within these territories so long as the + armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice + shall be for two weeks unless extended by mutual consent. + + The allied and associated Governments propose that such of + these Governments as are willing to accept the terms of this + armistice, shall send not more than three representatives + each, together with necessary technical experts, to + Christiania, where they shall meet on April 25 with + representatives of the allied and associated Governments in + conference to discuss peace 'and the provisioning of Russia, + upon the basis of the following principles: + + 1. All signatory Governments shall remain, as + against each other, in full control of the + territories which they occupy at the moment when + the armistice becomes effective, subject to such + rectifications as may be agreed upon by the + conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these + territories shall themselves voluntarily determine + to change their government. + + 2. The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, + and full security shall be accorded by the several + signatories to the citizens of each other; + provided, however, that such persons comply with + the laws of the country to which they seek + admittance, and provided also-that they do not + interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with + the domestic politics of that country. + + 3. The right to send official representatives + enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be + accorded by the several signatories to one + another. + + 4. A general amnesty shall be granted by the + various signatories to all political or military + opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so + treated because of their association or + affiliation with another signatory, provided that + they have not otherwise violated the laws of the + land. + + 5. Nationals of one signatory residing or detained + in the country of another shall be given all + possible facilities for repatriation. + + 6. The allied and associated Governments will + immediately withdraw their armed forces and + further military support from the territory of the + former Russian Empire, including Finland and the + various Governments within that territory shall + effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces + according to a scheme of demobilization and + control to be agreed upon by the conference. + + 7. Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory + as against another shall be lifted and trade + relations shall be established, subject to a + program of equitable distribution of supplies and + utilization of transport facilities to be agreed + upon by the conference in consultation with + representatives of those neutral States which are + prepared to assume the responsibility for the + provisioning of Russia. + + 8. Provision shall be made by the conference for a + mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among + the several signatories. + + 9. The Governments which have been set up on the + territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland + shall recognize their responsibility for the + financial obligations of the former Russian Empire + to foreign States parties to this agreement and to + the nationals of such States. Detailed + arrangements for discharging these obligations + shall be agreed upon by the conference, regard + being had to the present financial situation of + Russia. + + 10. The conference shall be competent to discuss and + determine any other matter which bears upon the + provisioning of Russia, the problem of establishing + peace within the territory of the former Russian + Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment of + international relations among the signatories. + +Mr. BULLITT. I also prepared at the orders of Col. House------ + +Senator KNOX. What attitude did you take toward the Nansen proposal? + +Mr. BULLITT. At first I opposed it. I was in favor of the original +plan. + +Senator KNOX. You were in favor of the original plan? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was in favor of direct, straightforward action in the +matter. However, I found that there was no use in kicking against the +pricks, that I was unable to persuade the commission that my point of +view was the correct one. Therefore at the request of Col. House I +wrote out a reply to Dr. Nansen, in which I embodied a peace proposal +so that it would have meant a peace conference via Nansen, which was +what was desired. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Was that letter delivered to Nansen? + +Mr. BULLITT. No. I gave this reply of mine to Col. House. Col. House +read it and said he would approve it, but that before he gave it to +the President and to Lloyd George as his solution of the way to deal +with this Russian matter, he wished it considered by his international +law experts, Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, and it was thereupon +turned over that afternoon to Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller. Does the +Senator desire this document? + +Senator KNOX. I do not regard it as material. It was not accepted? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was not accepted. What happened in regard to this was +that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, to correct its legal language, +produced a proposition which was entirely different, which left out +all possibility of the matter coming to a peace conference, and was +largely an offer to feed Russia provided Russia put all her railroads +in the hands of the allied and associated Governments. I have that as +well. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you object to having that put in the record, +Senator Knox? + +Senator KNOX. No. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. I would like to have that put in. + +(The document referred to is here printed in full, as follows:) + + (AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL) + + Draft of proposed letter to be signed by President Wilson + and the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy + in reply to Mr. Nansen's letter: + + DEAR SIR: The situation of misery and suffering in Russia + which is described in your letter of April 3 is one which + appeals to the sympathies of all peoples of the world. + Regardless of political differences or shades of thought, + the knowledge that thousands and perhaps millions of men, + and above all of women and children lack the food and the + necessities which make life endurable is one which is + shocking to humanity. + + The Governments and the peoples whom we represent, without + thought of political, military or financial advantage, would + be glad to cooperate in any proposal which would relieve the + existing situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose, purely humanitarian in its + purpose, would offer a practical means of carrying out the + beneficent results which you have in view and could not + either in its conception or its operation be considered as + having in view any other aim than "the humanitarian purpose + of saving life." + + It is true that there are great difficulties to be overcome, + political difficulties owing to the existing situation in + Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the + existing de facto governments of Russia are all willing as + the Governments and peoples whom we represent to see succor + and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no + political difficulties will remain as obstacles thereto. + + There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and + transport which we have mentioned and also the problem of + distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can + ourselves safely hope to solve in connection with the advice + and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The + problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to + meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral + Governments. + + The difficulties of transport in Russia can in large degree + only be overcome in Russia itself. So far as possible, we + would endeavor to provide increased means of transportation; + but we would consider it essential in any such scheme of + relief that control of transportation in Russia, so far as + was necessary in the distribution of relief supplies, should + be placed wholly under such a commission as is described in + your letter and should to the necessary extent be freed from + any governmental or private control whatsoever. + + The real human element in the situation, even supposing all + these difficulties to be surmounted, is the problem of + distribution, the problem of seeing that the food reaches + the starving, the medicines the sick, the clothing the + naked. Subject to the supervision of such a commission, this + is a problem which should be solely under the control of the + people of Russia themselves so far as it is humanly possible + to put it under their control. It is not a question of class + or of race or of politics but a question of human beings in + need, and these human beings in each locality should be + given, as under the regime of the Belgian relief commission, + the fullest opportunity to advise the commission upon the + methods and the personnel by which their community is to be + relieved. Under no other circumstances could it be believed + that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian and not + political, and still more important, under no other + conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. + That such a course would involve cessation of hostilities by + Russian troops would of course mean a cessation of all + hostilities on the Russian fronts. Indeed, relief to Russia + which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be + futile, and would be impossible to consider. + + Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that + your plan could be successfully carried into effect and we + should be prepared to give it our full support. + +Senator KNOX. What I am anxious to get at is to find out what became +of your report. + +Senator FALL. I should like to know whether Col. House approved Mr. +Auchincloss's and Mr. Miller's report, or the report of the witness. + +Mr. BULLITT. I should like to have this clear, and if I can read just +this one page I shall be greatly obliged. On this proposition I wrote +the following memorandum to Mr. Auchincloss [reading]: + + APRIL 4, 1919. + + Memorandum for Mr. Auchincloss: + + DEAR GORDON: I have studied carefully the draft of the reply + to Dr. Nansen which you have prepared. In spirit and + substance your letter differs so radically from the reply + which I consider essential that I find it difficult to make + any constructive criticism. And I shall refrain from + criticizing your rhetoric. + + There are two proposals in your letter, however, which are + obviously unfair and will not, I am certain, be accepted by + the Soviet Government. + + 1. The life of Russia depends upon its railroads; + and your demand for control of transportation by + the commission can hardly be accepted by the + Soviet Government which knows that plots for the + destruction of railroad bridges were hatched in + the American consulate in Moscow. You are asking + the Soviet Government to put its head in the + lion's mouth. It will not accept. You must + moderate your phrases. + + 2. When you speak of the "cessation of hostilities + by Russian troops," you fail to speak of + hostilities by troops of the allied and associated + Governments, a number of whom, you may recall, + have invaded Russia. Furthermore, your phrase does + not cover Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Poles, etc. In + addition, you say absolutely nothing about the + withdrawal of the troops of the allied and + associated Governments from Russian territory. + And, most important, you fail to say that troops + and military supplies will cease to be sent into + the territory of the former Russian Empire. You + thereby go a long way toward proving Trotsky's + thesis: That any armistice will simply be used by + the Allies as a period in which to supply tanks, + aeroplanes, gas shells, liquid fire, etc., to the + various antisoviet governments. As it stands, your + armistice proposal is absolutely unfair, and I am + sure that it will not be accepted by the Soviet + Government. + + Very respectfully, yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +Senator NEW. Otherwise you had no fault to find with it? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. The morning after Col. House had told me he wished +to submit this proposition to his international law experts, I came as +usual to his office about 9.40, and Mr. Auchincloss was on his way to +the President with his proposal, the Auchincloss-Miller proposal, as +Col. House's proposal. But I got that stopped. I went in to Col. +House, and Col. House told Mr. Auchincloss not to take it up to the +President, and asked me if I could doctor up the reply of Mr. +Auchincloss and Mr. Miller to the Nansen letter so that it might +possibly be acceptable to the Soviet Government. I thereupon rewrote +the Auchincloss-Miller letter, but I was forced to stick very closely +to the text. I was told that I could cut things out if I wished to, +but to stick very closely to the text, which I did. I drew this +redraft of their letter, under protest at the whole business. My +redraft of their letter was finally the basis of the reply of the four +to Nansen. I have both these documents here, my reply--and the four +took that reply--and with the changes---- + +The CHAIRMAN. What four--the successors of the ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. The successors of the 10, sir, took the reply------ + +The CHAIRMAN. Who were the four at that moment? + +Mr. BULLITT. M. Orlando, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and the +President. This extremely mild proposition, which really had almost no +chance of life, was, you will see, in no sense a reply to these +proposals of the Soviet Government. This is my attempt to doctor up +the Auchincloss-Miller proposition. In spite of every effort I could +make to obtain definite action on it, the reply was made to me that +this reply to the Nansen proposal would be a sufficient reply to that +proposal of the Soviet Government. [Reading:] + + DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in + your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all + peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, + women, and children lack the food and the necessities, which + make life endurable. + + The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad + to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or + financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve + this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose would offer a practical means of + achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could + not, either in its conception or its operation, be + considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian + purpose of saving life." + +There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, +owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply +and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as +willing as the Governments and the peoples whom we represent to see +succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no +political obstacle will remain. There will remain, however, the +difficulties of supply and transport, which we have mentioned, and +also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of +supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice +and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of +transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the +assistance of your own and other neutral Governments. The problem of +transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the +people of Russia themselves, with the assistance, advice, and +supervision of your commission. + +Subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be +solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The +people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the +Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your +commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community +is to be relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed that +the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under +no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. + +That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within +the territory of the former Russian Empire is obvious. And the +cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete +suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all +sorts to and within these territories. Indeed, relief to Russia which +did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would +be impossible to consider. + +Under such conditions as we have outlined we believe that your plan +could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared +to give it our full support. + + + + + +REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON, PREMIERS CLEMENCEAU, LLOYD GEORGE, AND +ORLANDO, TO DR. NANSEN, APRIL 17, 1919 + + DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in + your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all + peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, + women, and children lack the food and the necessities which + make life endurable. + + The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad + to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or + financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve + this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a + commission as you propose would offer a practical means of + achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could + not, either in its conception or its operation, be + considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian + purpose of saving life." + + There are great difficulties to be overcome, political + difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and + difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing + local governments of Russia are as willing as the + Governments and people whom we represent to see succor and + relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political + obstacle will remain. + + There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply, + finance, and transport which we have mentioned? and also the + problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of + supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with + the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you + propose. The problem of finance would seem to us to fall + upon the Russian authorities. The problem of transport of + supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance + of your own and other neutral governments whose interests + should be as great as our own and whose losses have been far + less. The problems of transport in Russia and of + distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia + themselves, with the assistance, advice, and supervision of + your commission. + + Subject to your supervision, the problem of distribution + should be solely under the control of the people of Russia + themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as + under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the + fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the + methods and the personnel by which their community is to be + relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed + that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not + political; under no other condition could it be certain that + the hungry would be fed. + + That such a course would involve cessation of all + hostilities within definitive lines in the territory of + Russia is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, + necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer + of troops and military material of all sorts to and within + Russian territory. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not + mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would + be impossible to consider. + + Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that + your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we + should be prepared to give it our full support. + + V.E. ORLANDO. + D. LLOYD GEORGE. + WOODROW WILSON. + G. CLEMENCEAU. + +Senator KNOX. I want the reply of Auchincloss to Nansen to go into the +record. + +The CHAIRMAN. Let all that correspondence be printed in the record. + +Senator KNOX. Dr. Nansen's proposition, and then the reply, + +(The letters referred to are inserted above.) + +Mr. BULLITT. The Nansen letter was written in Mr. Hoover's office. +Nansen made the proposition. I wrote the original of a reply to Dr. +Nansen, which I believe would have led to peace. Col. House indicated +his approval of it, but wished to have it considered from the +international legal standpoint, which was then done by Mr. Auchincloss +and Mr. Miller, who proposed a reply that had no resemblance to my +proposal. I then objected to that as it was on its way to the +President. It was not sent to the President, and I was ordered to try +to doctor it up. I attempted to doctor it up and produced a doctored +version which was finally made the basis of the reply, with the change +of two or three words which made it even worse and even more +indefinite, so that the Soviet Government could not possibly conceive +it as a genuine peace proposition. It left the whole thing in the air. + +Senator KNOX. We would like to have you see that these documents to +which you have just now referred are inserted in the record in the +sequence in which you have named them. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I shall be at the service of the committee in that +regard. + +Senator HARDING. Lest I missed something while I was out of the room I +am exceedingly curious to know why the Soviet proposal was not given +favorable consideration. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt has stated that. + + + + +KOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL + +Mr. BULLITT. The principal reason was entirely different. The fact was +that just at this moment, when this proposal was under consideration, +Kolchak made a 100-mile advance. There was a revolt of peasants in a +district of Russia which entirely cut off supplies from the Bolshevik +army operating against Kolchak. Kolchak made a 100-mile advance, and +immediately the entire press of Paris was roaring and screaming on the +subject, announcing that Kolchak would be in Moscow within two weeks; +and therefore everyone in Paris, including, I regret to say members of +the American commission, began to grow very lukewarm about peace in +Russia, because they thought Kolchak would arrive in Moscow and wipe +out the Soviet Government. + +Senator KNOX. And the proposal which you brought back from Russia, +that is the Soviet proposal, was abandoned and dropped, after this +last document to which you have just referred. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was. May I say this, that April 10 was the final +date when their proposition was open. I had attempted every day and +almost every night to obtain a reply to it. I finally requested the +commission to send the following telegram to Tchitcherin. + +I proposed to send this telegram to the American consul at Helsingfors +[reading]: + + APRIL 10, 1919. + AMERICAN CONSUL, Helsingfors: + + Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to + Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with + following message for Tchitcherin: + + "Action leading to food relief via neutrals likely within + week.--Bullitt." + + + + +AMMISSION. + +The commission considered that matter, and this is the official minute +of their meeting [reading]: + + AMERICAN MISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, + [No. 211.] April 10, 1919. + + To: The Commissioners, for action. + Subject: Telegram to Tchitcherin. + + _Statement_.--Action by the council of four on the reply to + Mr. Nansen was prevented yesterday by French objection to a + minor clause in the President's letter. It is hoped that + agreement in this matter may be reached to-day or to-morrow, + but it is quite possible that agreement may not be reached + for several days. + + To-day, April 10, the pledge of the Soviet Government to + accept a proposal of the sort outlined in its statement of + March 14 expires. No indication has been given the Soviet + Government that its statement was ever placed before the + conference of Paris or that any change of policy in regard + to Russia is contemplated. In view of the importance which + the Soviet Government placed upon its statement, I fear that + this silence and the passing of April 10 will be interpreted + as a definite rejection of the peace effort of the Soviet + Government and that the Soviet Government will at once issue + belligerent political statements and orders for attacks on + all fronts, including Bessarabia and Archangel. It is + certain that if the soviet troops should enter Bessarabia or + should overcome the allied forces at Archangel, the + difficulty of putting through the policy which is likely to + be adopted within the next few days would be greatly + increased. I feel that if the appended telegram should be + sent at once to Tchitcherin, no large offensive movements by + the soviet armies would be undertaken for another week, and + no provocative political statements would be issued. + + I therefore respectfully suggest that the appended telegram + should be sent at once. + + Respectfully submitted. + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + +APRIL 10, 1919. + +At the meeting of the commissioners this morning the above memorandum +was read in which Mr. Bullitt requested that a telegram be sent to the +American consul at Helsingfors, instructing the latter to send a +message through reliable sources to Tchitcherin respecting Mr. +Lansing's contemplated scheme for relief in Russia. After some +discussion the commissioners redrafted the telegram in question to +read as follows: + + "Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to + Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with + following message for Tchitcherin, sent on my personal + responsibility: 'Individuals of neutral States are + considering organization for feeding Russia. Will perhaps + decide something definite within a week.'--Bullitt." + + CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, + Assistant to Mr. White. + +I believe that telegram was dispatched. I do not know. + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I want to ask you a question. You have told +us that you went to Russia with instructions from the Secretary of +State, Mr. Lansing, with a definition of the American policy by Mr. +House, with the approval of Lloyd George, who approved of your +mission, of the purposes for which you were being sent. Now, tell us +whether or not to your knowledge your report and the proposal of the +Soviet Government was ever formally taken up by the peace conference +and acted on? + +Mr. BULLITT. It was never formally laid before the peace conference, +which I believe met only six times during the course of the entire +proceedings of what is called the peace conference. + + + + +LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT + +Senator KNOX. Did not Mr. Lloyd George in a speech to Parliament +assert that he had never received the proposal with which you returned +from Russia? Have you a copy of his speech? + +Mr. BULLITT. About a week after I had handed to Mr. Lloyd George the +official proposal, with my own hands, in the presence of three other +persons, he made a speech before the British Parliament, and gave the +British people to understand that he knew nothing whatever about any +such proposition. It was a most egregious case of misleading the +public, perhaps the boldest that I have ever known in my life. On the +occasion of that statement of Mr. Lloyd George, I wrote the President. +I clipped his statement from a newspaper and sent it to the President, +and I asked the President to inform me whether the statement of Mr. +Lloyd George was true or untrue. He was unable to answer, inasmuch as +he would have had to reply on paper that Mr. Lloyd George had made an +untrue statement. So flagrant was this that various members of the +British mission called on me at the Crillon, a day or so later, and +apologized for the Prime Minister's action in the case. + +Senator KNOX. Have you a copy of Lloyd George's remarks in the +Parliament? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have a copy. + +Senator KNOX. Suppose you read it? + +Mr. BULLITT. It is as follows: + +Mr. CLYNES. Before the right honorable gentleman comes to the next +subject, can he make any statement on the approaches or +representations alleged to have been made to his Government by persons +acting on behalf of such government as there is in Central Russia? + +Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all except what have +appeared in the papers. + +Mr. CLYNES. I ask the question because it has been repeatedly alleged. + +Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all. Constantly there +are men coming and going to Russia of all nationalities, and they +always come back with their tales of Russia. But we have made no +approach of any sort. + +I have only heard reports of others having proposals which they assume +have come from authentic quarters, but these have never been put +before the peace conference by any member, and therefore we have not +considered them. + +I think I know what my right honorable friend refers to. There was +some suggestion that a young American had come back from Russia with a +communication. It is not for me to judge the value of this +communication, but if the President of the United States had attached +any value to it he would have brought it before the conference, and he +certainly did not. + +It was explained to me by the members of the British delegation who +called on me, that the reason for this deception was that although +when Lloyd George got back to London he intended to make a statement +very favorable to peace with Russia, he found that Lord Northcliffe, +acting through Mr. Wickham Steed, the editor of The Times, and Mr. +Winston Churchill, British secretary for war, had rigged the +conservative majority of the House of Commons against him, and that +they were ready to slay him then and there if he attempted to speak +what was his own opinion at the moment on Russian policies. + + + + +MR. BULLITT RESIGNS + +Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, you resigned your relations with the State +Department and the public service, did you not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. + +Senator KNOX. When? + +Mr. BULLITT. I resigned on May 17. + +Senator KNOX. For what reason? + +Mr. BULLITT. Well, I can explain that perhaps more briefly than in any +other way by reading my letter of resignation to the President, which +is brief. + +Senator KNOX. Very well, we would like to hear it. + +The CHAIRMAN. Before that letter is read, you did not see the +President and had no knowledge of his attitude in regard to your +report? + +Mr. BULLITT. None whatever, except as it was reported to me by Col. +House. Col. House, as I said before, reported to me that he thought in +the first place that the President favored the peace proposal; in the +second place, that the President could not turn his mind to it, +because he was too occupied with Germany, and finally--well, really, I +have no idea what was in the President's mind. + +Senator KNOX. There never was another effort to secure an audience +with the President for you after those first two that you say Col. +House made? + +Mr. BULLITT. No; not at all. Meetings with the President were always +arranged through Col. House. + +In my letter of resignation to the President, which was dated May 17, +1919, I said: + + MAY 17, 1919. + + MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have submitted to-day to the + Secretary of State my resignation as an assistant in the + Department of State, attache to the American commission to + negotiate peace. I was one of the millions who trusted + confidently and implicitly in your leadership and believed + that you would take nothing less than "a permanent peace" + based upon "unselfish and unbiased justice." But our + Government has consented now to deliver the suffering + peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections, and + dismemberments--a new century of war. And I can convince + myself no longer that effective labor for "a new world + order" is possible as a servant of this Government. + + Russia, "the acid test of good will," for me as for you, has + not even been understood. Unjust decisions of the conference + in regard to Shantung, the Tyrol, Thrace, Hungary, East + Prussia, Danzig, the Saar Valley, and the abandonment of the + principle of the freedom of the seas make new international + conflicts certain. It is my conviction that the present + league of nations will be powerless-to prevent these wars, + and that the United States will be involved in them by the + obligations undertaken in the covenant of the league and in + the special understanding with France. Therefore the duty of + the Government of the United States to its own people and to + mankind is to refuse to sign or ratify this unjust treaty, + to refuse to guarantee its settlements by entering the + league of nations, to refuse to entangle the United States + further by the understanding with France. + + That you personally opposed most of the unjust settlements, + and that you accepted them only under great pressure, is + well known. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that if you + had made your fight in the open, instead of behind closed + doors, you would have carried with you the public opinion of + the world, which was yours; you would have been able to + resist the pressure and might have established the "new + international order based upon broad and universal + principles of right and justice" of which you used to speak. + I am sorry that you did not fight our fight to the finish + and that you had so little faith in the millions of men, + like myself, in every nation who had faith in you. + + Very sincerely, yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + To the honorable WOODROW WILSON, + President of the United States. + +Senator KNOX. Did you ever get a reply to that letter? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did not, sir. The only intimation I had in regard to it +was that Mr. Close, secretary of the President, with whom I was +lunching, said to me that the President had read my letter and had +said that he would not reply. In connection with that I wrote Col. +House a letter at the same time as follows: + + MAY 17, 1919. + + MY DEAR COL. HOUSE: Since you kindly lent me the text of the + proposed treaty of peace, I have tried to convince myself + that some good might come of it and that I ought to remain + in the service of the Department of State to labor for its + establishment. + + It is with sincere regret that I have come to the conviction + that no good ever will issue from a thing so evil and that + those who care about a permanent peace should oppose the + signature and ratification of it, and of the special + understanding with France. + + I have therefore submitted my resignation to the Secretary + of State and have written the appended note to the + President. I hope you will bring it to his attention; not + because he will care what I may think, but because I have + expressed the thoughts which are in the minds of many young + and old men in the commission--thoughts which the President + will have to reckon with when the world begins to reap the + crop of wars the seeds of which have here been sown. + + I feel sure that you will agree that I am right in acting on + my conviction and I hope that this action will in no way + affect the relationship between us which has always been so + delightful and stimulating to me. + + With my sincerest personal regards, I am, Very respectfully, + yours, + + WILLIAM C. BULLITT. + + To the honorable EDWARD M. HOUSE, + Hotel Crillon, Paris. + +Senator KNOX. Did you get a reply to that? + +Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent for me, and after that we had a +conversation. That was the only reply that I had. I had a conversation +with Col. House on the whole matter, and we thrashed it all out. + +Senator KNOX. Was anything said during this conversation which you +feel willing or disposed to tell us, which will be important? + +Mr. BULLITT. I made a record of the conversation. Inasmuch as the +conversations which I had with various members of the commission on +the occasion of my resignation touched on a number of important +issues, I kept a record of those conversations, that is, those I had +at the time when I resigned. They are the only conversations of which +I made records, and I made them simply because we did deal more or +less with the entire question of the peace treaty. On the other hand, +they are personal conversations, and I hesitate to repeat them, unless +the committee considers it particularly important. + +Senator KNOX. I would not press you on the personal conversations +which you had with Col. House after you resigned. I leave the matter +to your own judgment. I wondered whether there might have been +something which transpired which you would care to tell us; but I +withdraw that suggestion. I should like to ask you this one question: +I suppose your letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was merely formal? + +Mr. BULLITT. My letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was a formal +letter. + +Senator KNOX. You certainly got a reply to that. + +Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. I wrote a formal letter and I got a formal +reply, and the Secretary sent for me the same afternoon and explained +that he only sent me a formal reply because it was necessary, because +of the form in which I had put my resignation, and particularly +because I had appended to my note my letter to the President. We then +discussed various other matters in connection with the treaty. + +The CHAIRMAN. Are you through? + +Senator KNOX. Yes. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, you put into the record or read here, I +think, some extracts from the minutes of the Council of Ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at any of these meetings? + +Mr. BULLITT. I was not, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. The Council of Ten was the first body that was dealing +with the treaty generally, the important body? It was not a special +commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. It was the main body of the conference. + +The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was the main body, and was the one that +subsequently became the Council of Five, and then the Council of Four, +and I think at one time a Council of Three? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, there were records of these meetings, were +there not? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what disposition was made of those records? + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, there were a number of copies for each +delegation, and I presume that there must be a number of copies in +this country at the present time; perhaps not. + +The CHAIRMAN. You say each delegate had a copy? + +Mr. BULLITT. Each plenipotentiary had a copy, and the Secretary of the +American Commission had a copy, I believe, and the assistant +secretaries had copies; certainly one of the assistant secretaries, +Mr. Leland Harrison; and Mr. Grew had a copy. + +The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Lansing have copies while he served on the +Council of Ten? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; well, I am quite sure that he did. I am sure +that I have seen copies on the desk of the Secretary. + +The CHAIRMAN. Well, they were furnished regularly to every member of +the conference? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes. + +The CHAIRMAN. We have found some difficulty in getting them; that is +the reason I asked. + +Senator KNOX. I am informed--perhaps Mr. Bullitt can tell us--that +there is a complete set of minutes in the hands of some individual in +this country. Do you know anything about that--perhaps Auchincloss & +Miller? + +Mr. BULLITT. I could not be certain in regard to the matter, but I +should certainly be under the impression that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. +Miller have copies of the minutes; perhaps not. Perhaps Mr. +Auchincloss has left his with Col. House. He would have Col. House's +copies. Perhaps they are in this country, perhaps not. But Mr. +Auchincloss and Mr. Miller perhaps have those minutes in their files. + +The CHAIRMAN. Undoubtedly there are a number, at least, of those +records in existence. + +Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir. + +The CHAIRMAN. That must be the case. + +Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir. Also records of the meetings of the +American Commission. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know whether or not they are in the State +Department--any of these minutes or records in our State Department? + +Mr. BULLITT. I should presume that in the normal course of events they +would be certainly among Mr. Lansing's papers, which were very +carefully kept. He had an excellent secretariat. + +The CHAIRMAN. Did any member of our delegation, any member of the +council of 10, express to you any opinions about the general character +of this treaty? + +Mr. BULLITT. Well, Mr. Lansing, Col. House, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. White +had all expressed to me very vigorously their opinions on the subject. + +The CHAIRMAN. Were they enthusiastically in favor of it? + +Mr. BULLITT. I regret to say, not. + +As I say, the only documents of the sort that I have are the memoranda +of the discussions that I had after I resigned, when we thrashed over +the whole ground. + +The CHAIRMAN. Those memoranda of consultations that you had after you +resigned you prefer not to publish? I am not asking you to do so. + +Mr. BULLITT. I think it would be out of the way. + +The CHAIRMAN. I quite understand your position. I only wanted to +know--I thought it might be proper for you to say whether or not their +opinions which you heard them express were favorable to the series of +arrangements, I would call them, that were made for the consideration +of this treaty. + +Mr. BULLITT. It is no secret that Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. +Henry White objected very vigorously to the numerous provisions of the +treaty. + +The CHAIRMAN. It is known that they objected to Shantung. That, I +think, is public information. I do not know that it is public +information that they objected to anything else. + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not think that Secretary Lansing is at all +enthusiastic about the league of nations as it stands at present. I +have a note of a conversation with him on the subject, which, if I +may, I will just read, without going into the rest of that +conversation, because it bears directly on the issue involved. + +This was a conversation with the Secretary of State at 2.30 on May 19. +The Secretary sent for me. It was a long conversation, and Mr. Lansing +in the course of it said: + +Mr. Lansing then said that he personally would have strengthened +greatly the judicial clauses of the league of nations covenant, making +arbitration compulsory. He also said that he was absolutely opposed to +the United States taking a mandate in either Armenia or +Constantinople; that he thought that Constantinople should be placed +under a local government, the chief members of which were appointed by +an international committee. + +This is a matter, it seems to me, of some importance in regard to the +whole discussion, and therefore I feel at liberty to read it, as it is +not a personal matter. + +The CHAIRMAN. This is a note of the conversation made at the time? + +Mr. BULLITT. This is a note which I immediately dictated after the +conversation. [Reading:] + + Mr. Lansing then said that he, too, considered many parts of + the treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with + Shantung and the league of nations. He said: "I consider + that the league of nations at present is entirely useless. + The great powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the + world to suit themselves. England and France in particular + have gotten out of the treaty everything that they wanted, + and the league of nations can do nothing to alter any of the + unjust clauses of the treaty except by unanimous consent of + the members of the league, and the great powers will never + give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker + peoples." + +We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. +Mr. Lansing said: "I believe that if the Senate could only understand +what this treaty means, and if the American people could really +understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they +will ever understand what it lets them in for." He expressed the +opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really understand the treaty-- +[Laughter.] May I reread it? + +He expressed the opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really +understand the treaty, and that Mr. Lodge would; but that Mr. Lodge's +position would become purely political, and therefore ineffective. + +[Laughter.] + +The CHAIRMAN. I do not mind. + +Mr. BULLITT (reading): + +He thought, however, that Mr. Knox might instruct America in the real +meaning of it. + +[Laughter.] + +The CHAIRMAN. He has made some very valuable efforts in the direction. + +Mr. BULLITT. I beg to be excused from reading any +more of these conversations. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. We get the drift. + +[Laughter.] + +I want to ask one or two questions. + +The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read any of these minutes of the meetings +of the American commission? + +Mr. BULLITT. Of the American commission itself? + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Yes. + +Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. I have on one or two occasions glanced at them +but I never have read them carefully. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. They were accessible to you at the time, were they? + +Mr. BULLITT. They were, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated, if I recall your testimony correctly, +that when the proposition was made that the legislative bodies of the +contracting parties should have representation in the assembly, the +President objected to that? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President--if I may explain again--approved in +principle, but said that he did not see how the thing could be worked +out, and he felt that the assembly of delegates, or whatever it is +called in the present draft, gave sufficient representation to the +peoples of the various countries. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know what his objection was to the +legislative bodies of the contracting parties having representation on +the assembly? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President believed, I think--in fact, it was so +stated to me by Col. House, who discussed the matter with me--that it +would make too unwieldy a central organ for the league. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you understand why it would be any more unwieldy +if Congress should appoint the delegates than if the President should? + +Mr. BULLITT. It would necessitate a larger central body if +representation was to be given to the important political parties of +the various countries. It would have necessitated a body of, say, 10 +representatives from the United States--5 from the Republican party +and 5 from the; Democratic Party, in the assembly of the league, which +would become a large body. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. The idea was that the political parties of the +country should be represented? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, the political viewpoints should be represented so +that you would get some connection between the central assembly of the +league and the true opinion of the countries. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. When you went across to Paris on the _George +Washington_ with the President do you know whether he had with him at +that time any draft for a league of nations or any memorandum that he +showed to you of discussed with you? + +Mr. BULLITT. The President outlined to several of us one evening, or +rather one afternoon, the conception he had at the time of the league +of nations. I did not see any formal draft that he had, but the +President made a statement before the council of 10, in one of these +minutes from which I have been reading, stating that he had first--and +in fact I think I know it from other sources--that he had first +received the Phillimore report, that then it had been rewritten by +Col. House and that he had rewritten Col. House's report, and after he +had discussed his rewriting with Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts, he had +rewritten it again. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated substantially that the only part of the +league draft which was laid before the Peace Conference which the +President had his way about, was Article 10. Did you make some such +statement as that? + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. The President stated to us that that was +practically what he had submitted to the Niagara conference here when +the ABC powers from South America were discussing the Mexican +question. He had then considered it as an article for American use on +this continent. + +Do you know what the attitude of Gen Smuts was as to article 10 as +proposed by the President? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not, sir. Again, full minutes of the discussions and +conclusions reached of all these meetings of the committee on the +league of nations were kept. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read the various other plans that were +proposed or suggested over there for a league of nations? + +Mr. BULLITT. I have read some of them, sir. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did the others have anything similar to what is now +article 10 in the treaty pending in the Senate? + +Mr. BULLITT. I really can not say. I am sorry, but I have forgotten. I +should not care to testify on that. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know from what you heard while you were +there in your official capacity whether the other nations were anxious +to have article 10 in the covenant for the league? + +Mr. BULLITT. The French were not only anxious for it, but I believe +were anxious greatly to strengthen it. They desired immediately a +league army to be established, and I believe also to be stationed in +Alsace-Lorraine and along the Rhine, in addition to article 10. I can +not say for certain about the others. + +The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, we had before us at one of our hearings a +representative of the Egyptian people. Do you know anything about +that, when it was done, or any discussions about it? I mean the +clauses that appear in regard to the British protectorate. + +Mr. BULLITT. You mean our agreement to recognize the British +protectorate in Egypt? + +The CHAIRMAN. It was recognized by this treaty in those clauses. + +Mr. BULLITT. Yes; but we gave a sort of assent before the treaty +formally came out, did we not? I recall the morning it was done. It +was handled by Sir William Wiseman, who was the confidential +representative that Lloyd George and Balfour had constantly with Col. +House and the President. He was a sort of extra confidential foreign +office. It was all done, if I recall his statement correctly, in the +course of one morning. The President was informed that the Egyptian +nationalists were using his 14 points as meaning that the President +thought that Egypt should have the right to control her own destinies, +and therefore have independence, and that they were using this to +foment revolution; that since the President had provoked this trouble +by the 14 points, they thought that he should allay it by the +statement that we would recognize the British protectorate, and as I +remember Sir William Wiseman's statement to me that morning, he said +that he had only brought up the matter that morning and that he had +got our recognition of the British protectorate before luncheon. + +The CHAIRMAN. The President made some public statement? + +Mr. BULLITT. I am not certain in regard to the further developments of +it. I recall that incident, that it was arranged through Sir William +Wiseman, and that it took only a few minutes. + +Senator KNOX. That was a good deal of time to devote to a little +country like Egypt. + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not know. You should know, sir, you have been +Secretary of State. + +Senator KNOX. We never chewed them up that fast. + +Senator NEW. Mr. Bullitt, what, if anything, was said with reference +to the Irish question, with which you are familiar? + +Mr. BULLITT. At the conference? I do not believe the Irish question +was ever brought up before the conference or discussed. There was +considerable said on the side, attempts to let down the Walsh mission +easily without antagonizing the Irish vote in this country. +[Laughter.] I think that is the only consideration that Ireland +received. + +Senator NEW. There was a cheerful willingness to do that, was there +not? + +Mr. BULLITT. I think so. + +The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further that anybody desires to ask +Mr. Bullitt? We are very much obliged to you indeed, Mr. Bullitt. + +Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, if I may just say--I do not know whether it +is a matter of first interest to the Senators or not--but on this trip +with me to Russia there was Capt. Pettit, and at the same time the +journalist, Lincoln Steffens, and I have documents which they prepared +and which might be of interest to the committee. + +The CHAIRMAN. If you will hand those to the stenographer, we will +print them with your testimony. + +Senator KNOX. What are your plans, Mr. Bullitt? What are you going to +do in this country now? + +Mr. BULLITT. I expect to return to Maine and fish for trout, where I +was when I was summoned by the committee. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Did Mr. Steffens go to Russia with you? + +Mr. BULLITT. He did. + +The CHAIRMAN. He held no official position? + +Mr. BULLITT. No. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Who advised him to go? + +Mr. BULLITT. I did. + +Senator BRANDEGEE. Is he in the country now? + +Mr. BULLITT. I do not believe so. I believe he is still in Europe. + + + + +REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + +(By order of the committee the report of Lincoln Steffens referred to +is here printed in full in the record, as follows:) + + REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS + + APRIL 2, 1919. + + Politically, Russia has reached a state of equilibrium; + internally; for the present at least. + + I think the revolution there is ended; that it has run its + course. There will be changes. There may be advances; there + will surely be reactions, but these will be regular, I + think; political and economic, but parliamentary, A new + center of gravity seems to have been found. + + Certainly, the destructive phase of the revolution in Russia + is over. Constructive work has begun. + + We saw this everywhere. And we saw order, and though we + inquired for them, we heard of no disorders. Prohibition is + universal and absolute. Robberies have been reduced in + Petrograd below normal of large cities. Warned against + danger before we went in, we felt safe. Prostitution has + disappeared with its clientele, who have been driven out by + the "no-work-no-food law," enforced by the general want and + the labor-card system. Loafing on the job by workers and + sabotage by upper-class directors, managers, experts and + clerks have been overcome. Russia has settled down to work. + + The soviet form of government, which sprang up so + spontaneously all over Russia, is established. + + This is not a paper thing; not an invention. Never planned, + it has not yet been written into the forms of law. It is not + even uniform. It is full of faults and difficulties; clumsy, + and in its final development it is not democratic. The + present Russian Government is the most autocratic government + I have ever seen. Lenin, head of the Soviet Government, is + farther removed from the people than the Tsar was, or than + any actual ruler in Europe is. + + The people in a shop or an industry are a soviet. These + little informal Soviets elect a local soviet; which elects + delegates to the city or country (community) soviet; which + elects delegates to the government (State) soviet. The + government Soviets together elect delegates to the + All-Russian Soviet, which elects commissionaires (who + correspond to our Cabinet, or to a European minority). And + these commissionaires finally elect Lenin. He is thus five + or six removes from the people. To form an idea of his + stability, independence, and power, think of the process + that would have to be gone through with by the people to + remove him and elect a successor. A majority of all the + Soviets in all Russia would have to be changed in personnel + or opinion, recalled, or brought somehow to recognize and + represent the altered will of the people. + + No student of government likes the soviet as it has + developed. Lenin himself doesn't. He calls it a + dictatorship, and he opposed it at first. When I was in + Russia in the days of Milyoukov and Kerensky, Lenin and the + Bolsheviks were demanding the general election of the + constituent assembly. But the Soviets existed then; they had + the power, and I saw foreign ambassadors blunder, and the + world saw Milyoukov and Kerensky fall, partly because they + would not, or could not, comprehend the nature of the + soviet; as Lenin did finally, when, against his theory, he + joined in and expressed the popular repudiation of the + constituent assembly and went over to work with the soviet, + the actual power in Russia. The constituent assembly, + elected by the people, represented the upper class and the + old system. The soviet was the lower class. + + The soviet, at bottom, is a natural gathering of the working + people, of peasants, in their working and accustomed + groupings, instead of, as with us, by artificial + geographical sections. + + Labor unions and soldiers' messes made up the Soviets in the + cities; poorer peasants and soldiers at the village inn were + the first Soviets in the country; and in the beginning, two + years ago, these lower class delegates used to explain to me + that the "rich peasants" and the "rich people" had their own + meetings and meeting places. The popular intention then was + not to exclude the upper classes from the government, but + only from the Soviets, which were not yet the same. But the + Soviets, once in existence, absorbed in their own class + tasks and their own problems, which the upper class had + either not understood or solved, ignored--no; they simply + forgot the council of empire and the Duma. And so they + discovered (or, to be more exact, their leaders discovered) + that they had actually all the power. All that Lenin and the + other Socialist leaders had to do to carry through their + class-struggle theory was to recognize this fact of power + and teach the Soviets to continue to ignore the assemblies + and the institutions of the upper classes, which, with their + "governments," ministries, and local assemblies, fell, + powerless from neglect. + + The Soviet Government sprouted and grew out of the habits, + the psychology, and the condition of the Russian people. It + fitted them. They understand it. They find they can work it + and they like it. Every effort to put something else in its + place (including Lenin's) has failed. It will have to be + modified, I think, but not in essentials, and it can not be + utterly set aside. The Tsar himself, if he should come back, + would have to keep the Russian Soviet, and somehow rule over + and through it. + + The Communist Party (dubbed "Bolshevik") is in power now in + the Soviet Government. + + I think it will stay there a long time. What I have shown of + the machinery of change is one guaranty of communist + dominance. There are others. All opposition to the communist + government has practically ceased inside of Russia. + + There are three organized opposition parties: Mencheviks, + Social Revolutionary Right, and Social Revolutionary Left. + The anarchists are not organized. The Social Revolutionary + Left is a small group of very anarchistic leaders, who have + hardly any following. The Mencheviks and the Social + Revolutionaries Right are said to be strong, but there is no + way of measuring their strength, for a very significant + reason. + + These parties have stopped fighting. They are critical, but + they are not revolutionary. They also think the revolution + is over. They proposed, and they still propose eventually, + to challenge and oust the Communist Party by parliamentary + and political methods, not by force. But when intervention + came upon distracted Russia, and the people realized they + were fighting many enemies on many fronts, the two strong + opposing parties expressed their own and the public will to + stand by the party in power until the menace of foreign + invasion was beaten off. These parties announced this in + formal statements, uttered by their regular conventions; you + have confirmation of it in the memoranda written for you by + Martov and Volsky, and you will remember how one of them put + it to us personally: + + "There is a fight to be made against the + Bolsheviks, but so long as you foreigners are + making it, we Russians won't. When you quit and + leave us alone, we will take up our burden again, + and we shall deal with the Bolsheviks. And we will + finish them. But we will do it with our people, by + political methods, in the Soviets, and not by + force, not by war or by revolution, and not with + any outside foreign help." + + This is the nationalistic spirit, which we call patriotism, + and understand perfectly; it is much stronger in the new + than it was in the old, the Tsar's, Russia. But there is + another force back of this remarkable statement of a + remarkable state of mind. + + All Russia has turned to the labor of reconstruction; sees + the idea in the plans proposed for the future; and is + interested--imaginatively. + + Destruction was fun for a while and a satisfaction to a + suppressed, betrayed, to an almost destroyed people. + Violence was not in their character, however. The Russian + people, sober, are said to be a gentle people. One of their + poets speaks of them as "that gentle beast, the Russian + people," and I noticed and described in my reports of the + first revolution how patient, peaceable, and "safe" the mobs + of Petrograd were. The violence came later, with Bolshevism, + after the many attempts at counterrevolution, and with + vodka. The Bolshevik leaders regret and are ashamed of their + red terror. They do not excuse it. It was others, you + remember, who traced the worst of the Russian atrocities and + the terror itself to the adoption by the + counter-revolutionists of the method of assassination (of + Lenin and others), and most of all to the discovery by the + mobs of wine cellars and vodka stills. That the Russian + drunk and the Russian sober are two utterly different + animals, is well known to the Jews, to the Reactionaries, + and to the Russians themselves. And that is why this people + lately have not only obeyed; they have themselves ruthlessly + enforced the revolutionary prohibition decrees in every part + of Russia that we would inquire about and hear from. + + The destructive spirit, sated, exhausted, or suppressed, has + done its work. The leaders say so--the leaders of all + parties. + + There is a close relationship between the Russian people and + the new Russian leaders, in power and out. New men in + politics are commonly fresh, progressive, representative; + it's the later statesmen that damp the enthusiasm and sober + the idealism of legislators. In Russia all legislators, all, + are young or new. It is as if we should elect in the United + States a brand-new set of men to all offices, from the + lowest county to the highest Federal position, and as if the + election should occur in a great crisis, when all men are + full of hope and faith. The new leaders of the local Soviets + of Russia were, and they still are, of the people, really. + That is one reason why their autocratic dictatorship is + acceptable. They have felt, they shared the passion of the + mob to destroy, but they had something in mind to destroy. + + The soviet leaders used the revolution to destroy the system + of organized Russian life. + + While the mobs broke windows, smashed wine cellars, and + pillaged buildings to express their rage, their leaders + directed their efforts to the annihilation of the system + itself. They pulled down the Tsar and his officers; they + abolished the courts, which had been used to oppress them; + they closed shops, stopped business generally, and + especially all competitive and speculative business; and + they took over all the great industries, monopolies, + concessions, and natural resources. This was their purpose. + This is their religion. This is what the lower-class culture + has been slowly teaching the people of the world for 50 + years: that it is not some particular evil, but the whole + system of running business and railroads, shops, banks, and + exchanges, for speculation and profit that must be changed. + This is what causes poverty and riches, they teach, misery, + corruption, vice, and war. The people, the workers, or their + State, must own and run these things "for service." + + Not political democracy, as with us; economic democracy is + the idea; democracy in the shop, factory, business. + Bolshevism is a literal interpretation, the actual + application of this theory, policy, or program. And so, in + the destructive period of the Russian revolution, the + Bolshevik leaders led the people to destroy the old system, + root and branch, fruit and blossom, too. And apparently this + was done. The blocks we saw in Petrograd and Moscow of + retail shops nailed up were but one sign of it. When we + looked back of these dismal fronts and inquired more deeply + into the work of the revolution we were convinced that the + Russians have literally and completely done their job. And + it was this that shocked us. It is this that has startled + the world; not the atrocities of the revolution, but the + revolution itself. + + The organization of life as we know it in America, in the + rest of Europe, in the rest of the world, is wrecked and + abolished in Russia. + + The revolution didn't do it. The Tsar's Government had + rotted it. The war broke down the worn-out machinery of it; + the revolution has merely scrapped it finally. + + The effect is hunger, cold, misery, anguish, disease--death + to millions. But worse than these--I mean this--was the + confusion of mind among the well and the strong. We do not + realize, any of us--even those of us who have + imagination--how fixed our minds and habits are by the ways + of living that we know. So with the Russians. They + understood how to work and live under their old system; it + was not a pretty one; it was dark, crooked, and dangerous, + but they had groped around in it all their lives from + childhood up. They could find their way in it. And now they + can remember how it was, and they sigh for the old ways. The + rich emigres knew whom to see to bribe for a verdict, a + safe-conduct, or a concession; and the poor, in their + hunger, think now how it would be to go down to the market + and haggle, and bargain, from one booth to another, making + their daily purchases, reckoning up their defeats and + victories over the traders. And they did get food then. And + now--it is all gone. They have destroyed all this, and + having destroyed it they were lost, strangers in their own + land. + + This tragedy of transition was anticipated by the leaders of + the revolution, and the present needs were prepared for in + the plans laid for reconstruction. + + Lenin has imagination. He is an idealist, but he is a + scholar, too, and a very grim realist. Lenin was a + statistician by profession. He had long been trying to + foresee the future of society under socialism, and he had + marked down definitely the resources, the machinery, and the + institutions existing under the old order, which could be + used in the new. There was the old Russian communal land + system, passing, but standing in spots with its peasants + accustomed to it. That was to be revived; it is his solution + of the problem of the great estates. They are not to be + broken up, but worked by the peasants in common. Then there + was the great Russian Cooperative (trading) Society, with + its 11,000,000 families before the war; now with 17,000,000 + members. He kept that. There was a conflict; it was in + bourgeoise hands but it was an essential part of the + projected system of distribution, so Lenin compromised and + communist Russia has it. He had the railroads, telegraph, + telephone already; the workers seized the factories, the + local Soviets the mines; the All-Russian Soviet, the banks. + The new government set up shops--one in each + neighborhood--to dole out not for money, but on work + tickets, whatever food, fuel, and clothing this complete + government monopoly had to distribute. No bargaining, no + display, no advertising, and no speculation. Everything one + has earned by labor the right to buy at the cooperative and + soviet shops is at a fixed, low price, at the established + (too small.) profit--to the government or to the members of + the cooperative. + + Money is to be abolished gradually. It does not count much + now. Private capital has been confiscated, most of the rich + have left Russia, but there are still many people there who + have hidden away money or valuables, and live on them + without working. They can buy food and even luxuries, but + only illegally from peasants and speculators at the risk of + punishment and very high prices. They can buy, also, at the + government stores, at the low prices, but they can get only + their share there, and only on their class or work tickets. + The class arrangement, though transitory and temporary--the + aim is to have but one class--is the key to the idea of the + whole new system. + + There are three classes. The first can buy, for example, + 1-1/2 pounds of bread a day; the second, three-quarters of a + pound; the third, only one-quarter of a pound; no matter how + much money they may have. The first class includes soldiers, + workers in war, and other essential industries, actors, + teachers, writers, experts, and Government workers of all + sorts. The second class is of all other sorts of workers. + The third is of people who do not work--the leisure class. + Their allowance is, under present circumstances, not enough + to live on, but they are allowed to buy surreptitiously from + speculators on the theory that the principal of their + capital will soon be exhausted, and, since interest, rent, + and profits--all forms of unearned money--are abolished, + they will soon be forced to go to work. + + The shock of this, and the confusion due to the strange + details of it, were, and they still are, painful to many + minds, and not only to the rich. For a long time there was + widespread discontent with this new system. The peasants + rebelled, and the workers were suspicious. They blamed the + new system for the food shortage, the fuel shortage, the + lack of raw materials for the factories. But this also was + anticipated by that very remarkable mind and will--Lenin. He + used the State monopoly and control of the press, and the + old army of revolutionary propagandists to shift the blame + for the sufferings of Russia from the revolutionary + government to the war, the blockade, and the lack of + transportation. Also, he and his executive organization were + careful to see that, when the government did get hold of a + supply of anything, its arrival was heralded, and the next + day it appeared at the community shops, where everybody + (that worked) got his share at the low government price. The + two American prisoners we saw had noticed this, you + remember. "We don't get much to eat," they said, "but + neither do our guards or the other Russians. We all get the + same. And when they get more, we get our share." + + The fairness of the new system, as it works so far, has won + over to it the working class and the poorer peasants. The + well-to-do still complain, and very bitterly sometimes. + Their hoardings are broken into by the government and by the + poverty committees, and they are severely punished for + speculative trading. But even these classes are moved + somewhat by the treatment of children. They are in a class + by themselves: class A,--I. They get all the few + delicacies--milk, eggs, fruit, game, that come to the + government monopoly--at school, where they all are fed, + regardless of class. "Even the rich children," they told us, + "they have as much as the poor children." And the children, + like the workers, now see the operas, too, the plays, the + ballets, the art galleries--all with instructors. + + The Bolsheviks--all the Russian parties--regard the + communists' attitude toward children as the symbol of their + new civilization. + + "It is to be for the good of humanity, not business," one of + them, an American, said, "and the kids represent the future. + Our generation is to have only the labor, the joy, and the + misery of the struggle. We will get none of the material + benefits of the new system, and we will probably never all + understand and like it. But the children--it is for them and + their children that we are fighting, so we are giving them + the best of it from the start, and teaching them to take it + all naturally. They are getting the idea. They are to be our + new propagandists." + + The idea is that everybody is to work for the common good, + and so, as the children and the American prisoners note, + when they all produce more, they all get more. They are + starving now, but they are sharing their poverty. And they + really are sharing it. Lenin eats, like everybody else--only + one meal a day--soup, fish, bread, and tea. He has to save + out of that a bit for breakfast and another bit for supper. + The people, the peasants, send him more, but he puts it in + the common mess. So the heads of this government do not have + to imagine the privations of the people; they feel them. And + so the people and the government realize that, if ever + Russia becomes prosperous, all will share in the wealth, + exactly as they share in the poverty now. In a word, rich + Russia expects to become a rich Russian people. + + This, then, is the idea which has begun to catch the + imagination of the Russian people. This it is that is making + men and women work with a new interest, and a new incentive, + not to earn high wages and short hours, but to produce an + abundance for all. This is what is making a people, sick of + war, send their ablest and strongest men into the new, + high-spirited, hard-drilled army to defend, not their + borders, but their new working system of common living. + + And this is what is making Lenin and his sobered communist + government ask for peace. They think they have carried a + revolution through for once to the logical conclusion. All + other revolutions have stopped when they had revolved + through the political phase to political democracy. This one + has turned once more clear through the economic phase to + economic democracy, to self-government in the factory, shop, + and on the land, and has laid a foundation for universal + profit sharing, for the universal division of food, clothes, + and all goods, equally among all. And they think their + civilization is working on this foundation. They want time + to go on and build it higher and better. They want to spread + it all over the world, but only as it works, As they told us + when we reminded them that the world dreaded their + propaganda: + + "We are through with the old propaganda of + argument. All we ask now is to be allowed to prove + by the examples of things well done here in + Russia, that the new system is good. We are so + sure we shall make good, that we are willing to + stop saying so, to stop reasoning, stop the + haranguing, and all that old stuff. And especially + are we sick of the propaganda by the sword. We + want to stop fighting. We know that each country + must evolve its own revolution out of its own + conditions and in its own imagination. To force it + by war is not scientific, not democratic, not + socialistic. And we are fighting now only in + self-defense. We will stop fighting, if you will + let us stop. We will call back our troops, if you + will withdraw yours. We will demobilize. We need + the picked organizers and the skilled workers now + in the army for our shops, factories, and farms. + We would love to recall them to all this needed + work, and use their troop trains to distribute our + goods and our harvests, if only you will call off + your soldiers and your moral, financial, and + material support from our enemies, and the enemies + of our ideals. Let every country in dispute on our + borders self-determine its own form of government + and its own allegiance. + + "But you must not treat us as a conquered nation. + We are not conquered. We are prepared to join in a + revolutionary, civil war all over all of Europe + and the world, if this good thing has to be done + in this bad way of force. But we would prefer to + have our time and our energy to work to make sure + that our young, good thing is good. We have proved + that we can share misery, and sickness, and + poverty; it has helped us to have these things to + share, and we think we shall be able to share the + wealth of Russia as we gradually develop it. But + we are not sure of that; the world is not sure. + Let us Russians pay the price of the experiment; + do the hard, hard work of it; make the + sacrifice--then your people can follow us, slowly, + as they decide for themselves that what we have is + worth having." + + That is the message you bring back, Mr. Bullitt. It is your + duty to deliver it. It is mine to enforce it by my + conception of the situation as it stands in Russia and + Europe to-day. + + It seems to me that we are on the verge of war, a new war, a + terrible war--the long-predicted class war--all over Europe. + + The peace commission, busy with the settlement of the old + war, may not see the new one, or may not measure aright the + imminent danger of it. Germany is going over, Hungary has + gone, Austria is coming into the economic revolutionary + stage. The propaganda for it is old and strong in all + countries: Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Norway, + Sweden--you know. All men know this propaganda. But that is + in the rear. Look at the front. + + Russia is the center of it. Germany, Austria, Hungary are + the wings of the potential war front of--Bolshevism. + + And Russia, the center, has made a proposition to you for + peace, for a separate peace; made it officially; made it + after thought; made it proudly, not in fear, but in pitiful + sympathy with its suffering people and for the sake of a + vision of the future in which it verily believes. They are + practical men--those that made it. You met them. We talked + with them. We measured their power. They are all idealists, + but they are idealists sobered by the responsibility of + power. Sentiment has passed out of them into work--hard + work. They said they could give one year more of starvation + to the revolution, but they said it practically, and they + prefer to compromise and make peace. I believe that, if we + take their offer, there will be such an outcry of rage and + disappointment from the Left Socialists of Germany, Italy, + France, and the world, that Lenin and Trotsky will be + astonished. The Red Revolution--the class war--will be + broken, and evolution will have its chance once more in the + rest of Europe. And you and I know that the men we met in + Moscow see this thus, and that they believe the peace + conference will not, can not, see it, but will go on to make + war and so bring on the European revolution. + + But your duty, our duty, is to point out this opportunity, + and to vouch for the strength and the will and the character + of Lenin and the commissaires of Russia to make and keep the + compact they have outlined to you. Well, this is the + briefest way in which I can express my full faith: + + Kautsky has gone to Moscow. He has gone late; he has gone + after we were there. He will find, as we found, a careful, + thoughtful, deliberate group of men in power; in too much + power; unremovable and controlling a state of monopoly, + which is political, social, economic, financial; which + controls or directs all the activities, all the fears, all + the hopes, all the aspirations of a great people. Kautsky + will speak to revolutionary Russia for revolutionary + Germany, and for a revolutionary Europe. There will be an + appeal in that; there will be a strong appeal in that to the + revolutionary Russian commissaires. But, if I am any judge + of character, Lenin and his commissaires will stand by their + offer to us until Paris has answered, or until the time set + for the answer--April 10--shall have passed. Then, and not + until then, will Kautsky receive an answer to his appeal + for--whatever it is the Germans are asking. + + It is not enough that you have delivered your message and + made it a part of the record of the peace conference. I + think it is your duty to ask the fixed attention of your + chiefs upon it for a moment, and to get from them the + courtesy of a clear, direct reply to Russia before April 10. + + + + +REPORTS OF CAPT. W.W. PETTIT + +(The reports of Capt. Pettit are here printed in full, as follows:) + + REPORTS OF CAPT, W.W. PETTIT + + I left Petrograd on March 31. During the past three weeks I have + crossed the Finnish border six times and have been approximately + two weeks in Petrograd. I have met Tchitcherin, Litvinov, and + most of the important personages in the communist government of + Petrograd (including Bill Shatov, chief of police). + + Briefly, my opinion of the Russian situation is as follows: + In Petrograd I presume the present communist government has + a majority of the working-men behind it, but probably less + than half of the total population are members of the + communist party. However, my conclusions are based on + conversations with not only communists, but also many + opponents of the communist government, members of the + aristocracy, business men, and foreigners, and I am + persuaded that a large majority of the population of + Petrograd if given a choice between the present government + and the two alternatives, revolution or foreign + intervention, would without hesitation take the present + government. Foreign intervention would unite the population + in opposition and would tend to greatly emphasize the + present nationalist spirit. Revolution would result in + chaos. (There is nowhere a group of Russians in whom the + people I have talked with have confidence. Kolchak, Denikin, + Yudenvitch, Trepov, the despicable hordes of Russian + emigrees who haunt the Grand Hotel, Stockholm; the Socithans + House, Helsingfors; the offices of the peace commission in + Paris, and squabble among themselves as to how the Russian + situation shall be solved; all equally fail to find many + supporters in Petrograd.) Those with whom I have talked + recognize that revolution, did it succeed in developing a + strong government, would result in a white terror comparable + with that of Finland. In Finland our consul has a record of + 12,500 executions in some 50 districts, out of something + like 500 districts, by the White Guard. In Petrograd I have + been repeatedly assured that the total Red executions in + Petrograd and Moscow and other cities was at a maximum + 3,200. + + It may seem somewhat inconsistent for the Russian + bourgeoisie to oppose allied intervention and at the same + time fail to give whole-hearted support to the present + government. They justify this attitude on the grounds that + when the two great problems of food and peace are solved the + whole population can turn itself to assisting the present + regime in developing a stable efficient government. They + point to the numerous changes which have already been + introduced by the present communist government, to the + acknowledgment that mistakes have been made to the ease of + securing introduction of constructive ideas under the + present regime. All these facts have persuaded many of the + thinking people with whom I have talked to look to the + present government in possibly a somewhat modified form as + the salvation of Russia. + + At present the situation is bad. Russia is straining every + nerve to raise an army to oppose the encircling White + Guards. That the army is efficient is demonstrated by the + present location of Soviet forces who have contended with + the Russian White Guard supported by enormous sums of money, + munitions, and even soldiers from the Allies. Naturally, + transportation is inefficient; it was horrible in the last + year of the Czar's regime. Absolute separation from the rest + of the world, combined with the chaotic conditions which + Russia has passed through since the 1917 revolution, plus + the sabotage, which until recently was quite general among + the intelligent classes, including engineers, has resulted + in a decrease in rolling stock. The transportation of the + enormous army which has been raised limits the number of + cars which can be used for food. The cutting off of Siberia, + Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and until recently the + Ukraine, made it necessary to establish new lines of food + transportation. Consequently there has been great suffering + in Petrograd. Of the population of a million, 200,000 are + reported by the board of health to be ill, 100,000 seriously + ill in hospitals or at home, and another 100,000 with + swollen limbs still able to go to the food kitchens. + However, the reports of people dying in the streets are not + true. Whatever food exists is fairly well distributed and + there are food kitchens where anyone can get a fairly good + dinner for 3.50 rubles. + + For money one can still obtain many of the luxuries of life. + The children, some 50,000 of whom have been provided with + homes, are splendidly taken care of, and except for the + absence of milk have little to complain of. In the public + schools free lunches are given the children, and one sees in + the faces of the younger generation little of the suffering + which some of the older people have undergone and are + undergoing. Food conditions have improved recently, due to + the suspension of passenger traffic and the retaking of the + Ukraine, where food is plentiful. From 60 to 100 carloads of + food have arrived in Petrograd each day since February 18. + + Perhaps it is futile to add that my solution of the Russian + problem is some sort of recognition of the present + government, with the establishment of economic relations and + the sending of every possible assistance to the people. I + have been treated in a wonderful manner by the communist + representatives, though they know that I am no socialist and + though I have admitted to the leaders that my civilian + clothing is a disguise. They have the warmest affection for + America, believe in President Wilson, and are certain that + we are coming to their assistance, and, together with our + engineers, our food, our school-teachers, and our supplies, + they are going to develop in Russia a government which will + emphasize the rights of the common people as no other + government has. I am so convinced of the necessity for us + taking a step immediately to end the suffering of this + wonderful people that I should be willing to stake all I + have in converting ninety out of every hundred American + business men whom I could take to Petrograd for two weeks. + + It is needless for me to tell you that most of the stories + that have come from Russia regarding atrocities, horrors, + immorality, are manufactured in Viborg, Helsingfors, or + Stockholm. The horrible massacres planned for last November + were first learned of in Petrograd from the Helsingfors + papers. That anybody could even for a moment believe in the + nationalization of women seems impossible to anyone in + Petrograd. To-day Petrograd is an orderly city--probably the + only city of the world of its size without police. Bill + Shatov, chief of police, and I were at the opera the other + night to hear Chaliapine sing in Boris Gudonov. He excused + himself early because he said there had been a robbery the + previous night, in which a man had lost 5,000 rubles, that + this was the first robbery in several weeks, and that he had + an idea who had done it, and was going to get the men that + night. I feel personally that Petrograd is safer than Paris. + At night there are automobiles, sleighs, and people on the + streets at 12 o'clock to a much greater extent than was true + in Paris when I left five weeks ago. + + Most wonderful of all, the great crowd of prostitutes has + disappeared. I have seen not a disreputable woman since I + went to Petrograd, and foreigners who have been there for + the last three months report the same. The policy of the + present government has resulted in eliminating throughout + Russia, I am told, this horrible outgrowth of modern + civilization. + + Begging has decreased. I have asked to be taken to the + poorest parts of the city to see how the people in the slums + live, and both the communists and bourgeoisie have held up + their hands and said, "But you fail to understand there are + no such places." There is poverty, but it is scattered and + exists among those of the former poor or of the former rich + who have been unable to adapt themselves to the conditions + which require everyone to do something. + + Terrorism has ended. For months there have been no + executions, I am told, and certainly people go to the + theater and church and out on the streets as much as they + would in any city of the world. + +(Certain memoranda referred to in the hearing relating to the work of +Capt. Pettit in Russia are here printed in full as follows:) + + MEMORANDUM + + From: W.W. Pettit + To: Ammission, Paris. + + (Attention of Mr. Bullitt.) + + 1. _Mr. Pettit's recent movements_.--On March 18 I left + Helsingfors for Petrograd and remained there until March 28 + when I left for Helsingfors, at which place I received a + cable ordering me to report immediately to Paris. On the + 29th I left again for Petrograd to secure some baggage I had + left. On the 21st I left Petrograd for Helsingfors. On April + 1st I left Helsingfors for Stockholm and in Stockholm I find + a telegram asking me to wait until I receive further orders. + + 2. _Optimism of present government_.--On the night of the + 30th and the afternoon of the 31st I had several hours with + Schklovsky, Tchitcherin's personal representative in + Petrograd. He was disappointed to think I was to return to + Paris, but felt certain that inasmuch as the orders + recalling me had been sent before Mr. Bullitt's arrival, + there was every possibility of my being returned to + Petrograd. He was most optimistic about the future and felt + that the Allies must soon take some definite stand regarding + Russia, and that the result of the Paris negotiations would + almost surely be favorable to the Soviet Government. He said + that the present war conditions and the limited + transportation facilities, with the shortage of food + resulting therefrom, had handicapped his government + enormously, and that everyone hopes that soon the action of + the allied powers will permit the establishment of normal + relations in Russia. + + 3. _Radios in re Bullitt_.--He has received at least three + radio communications from the American press in which Mr. + Bullitt's activities have been mentioned and this has tended + to encourage him. The last cablegram stated that Mr. Bullitt + was preparing a statement regarding conditions in Russia + which the press anticipated would go far toward dispelling + ignorance and misinformation regarding conditions in Moscow + and Petrograd. + + 4. _Hungarian situation_.--The Hungarian situation has also + gone far toward encouraging the present Government. Hungary + has proposed a mutual offensive and defensive alliance with + Russia. The fact that the Soviet Government has been + instituted in Hungary without bloodshed up to the present, + and with little opposition on the part of the people, has + also encouraged Schklovsky. He stated that the action of the + Allies in sending troops against Hungary was to be regretted + because of the bloodshed which would probably result. + However, he thought in the long run that the Allies would + find it a suicidal policy to try to suppress the Hungarian + revolution by force. + + 5. _The Ukraine situation_.--The soviet troops have taken + almost the entire Ukraine and this with the food supplies + which it will provide have strengthened the Soviet + Government. A friend who has recently returned from Peltava, + Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, and other southern cities, states that + food is abundant and cheap. The Soviet Government believes + that the French and Greek troops are withdrawing from Odessa + and going to Sebastopol. They anticipate taking Odessa + within the next few days. + + 6. _Esthonian situation_.--At least twice within the last + two weeks Esthonia has sent word to the Soviet Government + that it desired peace. The following four points have been + emphasized by the Esthonians: (i) That peace must come + immediately; (2) that the offer must come from the Soviet + Government; (3) that a fair offer will be accepted by the + Esthonians immediately without consultation with France or + England, who are supporting them; (4) that free access to + Esthonian harbors and free use of Esthonian railroads will + be assured the Soviet Government. + + 7. _The Lithuanian situation_.--It is fairly well understood + that the Lithuanian Government that is fighting the + Bolsheviks is not going to allow itself to be made a tool by + the French and British Governments to invade Russian + territory. The Lithuanian Government is desirous of securing + possession of Lithuanian territory, but beyond that it is + understood it will not go. + + 8. _The Finnish situation_.--The Soviet Government is in + close touch with the Finnish situation and has little fear + of an invasion of Russia from that direction. The Finnish + Army is without question a third Red; probably a half Red; + possibly two-thirds Red. There is even reported to be a + tendency on a part of certain of the White Guards to oppose + intervention in Russia. One of the Finnish regiments in + Esthonia has returned to Finland, and it is supposed that it + will assist the proposed revolution of the Finns in East + Karelia against the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government + has sent a committee to Helsingfors to arrange economic + relations with Finland, and it is said that this committee + carries threats of reprisals on the part of the Soviet + Government against the Finns in Petrograd unless the treaty + is negotiated. It is said in Petrograd that some of the + Finns have already left Petrograd in anticipation that the + Finnish Government will not be permitted to make any + arrangement with the Soviet Government because of the + attitude of certain of the allied representatives in + Helsingfors. + + 9. _Improvement in food conditions_.--The suspension of passenger + traffic from March 18 to April 10 has resulted in the Government + bringing to Petrograd 60 to 100 cars of food each day, and one + sees large quantities of food being transported about the city. + At Easter time it is hoped to be able to give 3 pounds of white + bread to the population of Petrograd. There also seems to be a + larger supply of food for private purchase in the city. Mr. + Shiskin has recently been able to buy 3 geese, a sucking pig, 2 + splendid legs of veal, and roasts of beef at from 40 to 50 rubles + a pound, which, considering the value of the ruble, is much less + than it sounds. Shiskin has also been able recently to get eggs, + milk, honey, and butter, together with potatoes, carrots, and + cabbage. My bill for food for 11 days with Mr. Shiskin was about + 1,300 rubles. + + 10. _Order in Petrograd_.--About three weeks ago there were + several strikes in factories in Petrograd and Lenin came to + talk to the strikers. Apparently the matter was settled + satisfactorily and the workers were given the same bread + rations that the soldiers receive. At the Putilov works some + 400 men struck and part of them were dismissed. Both Shatov + and the director of factories said that there were no + executions, though the population the next morning reported + 80 workers shot and that afternoon the rumor had increased + the number to 400. There is practically no robbery in the + city. Shatov left the opera the other night early because he + told me the previous night a man had lost 5,000 rubles and + it was such an exceptional thing to have a robbery that he + was going out personally to investigate the matter, having + some idea as to who was responsible. + + 11. _Currency plans_.--Zorin tells me that the Soviet + Government has or had printed a new issue of currency which + it is proposed to exchange for the old currency within the + next three months. The details of the plan have not been + completed but he thinks that an exchange of ruble for ruble + will be made up to 3,000; an additional 2,000 will be placed + on deposit in the government bank. That beyond 5,000 only a + small percentage will be allowed to any one, and that a + limit of possibly 15,000 will be placed beyond which no + rubles will be exchanged. Then the plan is, after a certain + period to declare the old ruble valueless. Zorin feels that + as a result of this plan the new ruble will have some value + and that the present situation in the country in which the + farmer has so much paper that he refuses to sell any longer + for money, will be relieved. This exchange would be followed + later on by the issue of still other currency the entire + purpose being the more equal distribution of wealth and the + gradual approach to elimination of currency. + + 12. _Concessions_.--It is asserted that the northern railway + concession has been signed and Amundsen tells me that all + negotiations were accomplished without the payment of a + single cent of tea money, probably the first instance of the + absence of graft in such negotiations in the history of + Russia. He says that Trepov, through his agent Borisov, at + Moscow, was the greatest opponent of the Norwegian + interests. Trepov was formerly minister of ways and + communications and is reported to have been refused a + similar concession under the Czar's government. Amundsen + claims that Trepov has made every effort to secure this + concession from the Soviet Government. I am attaching a + statement regarding a concession which is supposed to have + been granted to the lumber interests. There are rumors that + other concessions have been granted. + + 13. _Y.M.C.A._--Recently the Y.M.C.A. secretary arrived in + Petrograd, claiming to have come without authorization from + his superiors. He has been staying at the embassy but + recently went to Moscow at the invitation of Tchitcherin. + Schklovsky tells me that the American has plans for the + establishment of the Y.M.C.A. in Russia which he wanted to + put before the Moscow government. Schklovsky doubted that it + would be feasible to organize in Russia at present a branch + of the International association unless some rather + fundamental modifications were made in their policy. + + 14. _Treadwell_.--I have twice asked Schklovsky to secure + information regarding Treadwell, and he assures me that he + has taken the matter up with Moscow, but that apparently + they have had no news from Tashkent as yet. He promised to + let me know as soon as anything was heard. + + 15. _Attitude toward United States_.--The degree of + confidence which the Russians and the soviet officials show + toward our Government is to me a matter of surprise, + considering our activities during the past 18 months. There + seems to be no question in the minds of the officials in + Petrograd whom I have met that we are going to give them an + opportunity to develop a more stable form of government, and + they apparently look upon President Wilson as one who is + going to decide the question on its merits without being + influenced by the enormous pressure of the Russian emigres + and the French Government. Doubtless part of this attitude + is due to the favorable impression created by Mr. Bullitt, + but much of it must be the result of information which they + have secured from the press. At the present moment the + United States has the opportunity of demonstrating to the + Russian people its friendship and cementing the bonds which + already exist. Russia believes in us, and a little + assistance to Russia in its present crisis will result in + putting the United States in a position in Russia which can + never be overthrown by Germany or any other power. + + 16. _Social work_.--I have recently sent a cable from + Helsingfors regarding health and sanitary conditions in + Petrograd, a copy of which I am attaching. I have spent the + past two weeks visiting schools and the children's home in + Petrograd. There are 30,000 children for whom homes have + been provided in the past nine months, and preparations are + being made to house 10,000 more. Homes of emigres are being + taken over and groups of 40 children placed in them under + the care of able instructors; where the children are old + enough they go to school during the daytime. A beautiful + home life has been developed. The children are well fed and + well clothed, and there is a minimum of sickness among them. + At the present time, when so much disease exists in + Petrograd, and when there is so much starvation, the healthy + appearance of these thousands of children, together with the + well-fed condition of children who are not in institutions, + but are receiving free meals in schools, is a demonstration + of the social spirit behind much of the activities of the + present government. I shall send later a more detailed + statement of some of the interesting things I have learned + about this phase of the activities of the new regime. + + 17. _Conclusion_.--In this rather hastily dictated + memorandum which Mr. Francis is going to take tonight to + Paris I have tried to point out some of the things that have + interested me in Petrograd. Naturally I have emphasized the + brighter side, for the vast amount of absolutely false news + manufactured in Helsingfors and Stockholm and sent out + through the world seems to me to necessitate the emphasizing + of some of the more hopeful features of the present + government. Naturally the character of the Russian people + has not changed to any great extent in 18 months, and there + is doubtless corruption, and there is certainly inefficiency + and ignorance and a hopeless failure to grasp the new + principles motivating the government on the part of many of + the people. A people subjected to the treatment which + Russians have had during the last 200 years can not in one + generation be expected to change very greatly, but + personally I feel the present government has made a vast + improvement on the government of the Czar as I knew it in + 1916-17. Without doubt the majority of the people in + Petrograd are opposed to allied intervention or revolution + and wish the present government to be given a fair chance to + work out the salvation of Russia. One of the most hopeful + symptoms of the present government is its willingness to + acknowledge mistakes when they are demonstrated and to adopt + new ideas which are worth while. Personally I am heart and + soul for some action on the part of the United States + Government which will show our sincere intention to permit + the Russian people to solve their own problems with what + assistance they may require from us. STOCKHOLM, April 4 + 1919. + + + + +SOCIAL WORK IN PETROGRAD + +The wife of Zinoviev, Madame Lelina, is in charge of the social +institutions in the city of Petrograd. This does not include the +public schools, which are under another organization. Madame Lelina is +a short-haired woman, probably Jewish, of about 45. She has an +enormous amount of energy, and is commonly supposed to be doing at +least two things at the same time. The morning I met her she was +carrying on two interviews and trying to arrange to have me shown some +of the social work she is directing. There seemed to be little system +about her efforts. Her office was rather disorderly, and her method of +work seemed very wasteful of time and effort, and very much like the +usual Russian way of doing things. Bill Shatov, formerly organizer of +the I.W.W., who is commissar of police for Petrograd and also +commissar for one of the northern armies, introduced me to Madame +Lelina, and accompanied me the first day on our visits. We were guided +by a young woman by the name of Bachrath, who is a university graduate +and lawyer, and since the legal profession has fallen into disrepute, +has turned her efforts toward social work. + +Under her guidance I spent three days visiting institutions. I saw a +boarding school for girls, a boarding home for younger children, an +institution for the feeble-minded, three of the new homes organized by +the Soviet Government, and two small hospitals for children. + +The institutions which Madame Lelina is directing are in two groups: +First, those which she has taken over from the old Czar regime, and +second, those which have been founded in the last 18 months. The new +government has been so handicapped by the difficulties of securing +food and other supplies, by the sabotage of many of the intelligent +classes, and by the necessity of directing every energy toward +carrying on hostilities against the bourgeoisie and the Allies, that +there has been little opportunity to remodel the institutions +inherited from the previous regime, therefore neither the strength nor +the weakness of these institutions is to any great extent due to the +present regime. Two of the institutions I visited were of this type, +one happened to be very good and the other very bad, and in neither +case did I feel that Lelina's organization was responsible. + +An aristocratic organization under the Czar maintained a boarding +school for girls. This has been taken over by the Soviet Government +with little change, and the 140 children in this institution are +enjoying all the opportunities which a directress trained in France +and Germany, with an exceptionally skillful corps of assistants, can +give them. + +I inquired regarding the changes which the Soviet Government had made +in the organization of this school. Some of the girls who were there +have been kept, but vacant places have been filled by Madame Lelina's +committee, and the institution has been required to take boys into the +day school, a plan which is carried out in most of the soviet social +and educational work. Much more freedom has been introduced in the +management of the institution, and the girls at table talk and walk +about, much as though they were in their own homes. The Soviet +Government requires that certain girls be permitted membership in the +teachers' committee, and the two communists accompanying me pointed to +this as a great accomplishment. Privately, the teachers informed me +they regarded it as of little significance, and apparently they were +entirely out of sympathy with the innovations that the new government +has made. Now all the girls are required to work in the kitchen, +dining room, or m cleaning their own dormitories, and certain girls +are assigned to the kitchen to over-see the use of supplies by the +cooks. However, the whole institution, from the uniforms of the girls +to the required form in which even hand towels have to be hung, +indicates the iron will of the directress. In one class we visited the +girls sat at desks and listened to a traditional pedagogue pour out +quantities of information on Pushkin's Boris Gudonov. Occasionally the +girls were called upon to react, which they did with sentences +apparently only partially memorized. The spirit of the institution is +behind that of our better institutions in America, and the spirit of +the classroom is quite mediaeval. + +The greatest objection which the teachers seem to have to soviet +activities is the question of sacred pictures and religious +observances. The chapel of the school has been closed, but in each +room from the corner still hangs the Ikon and at the heads of many of +the girls' beds there are still small pictures of the Virgin, much to +the disgust of the representatives of the Soviet Government, who in +many cases are Jewish, and in practically all cases have renounced any +religious connection. Recently the Soviet Party has announced the fact +that they as a party are not hostile to any religion, but intend to +remain neutral on the subject. The attitude of the commissars +apparently is that required religious observances should not be +permitted in public institutions, and doubtless some of the inspectors +have gone further than was necessary in prohibiting any symbol of the +religion which probably most of the children still nominally adhere +to. + +The second institution I visited, which had been taken over from the +old government, was an orphan asylum with some 600 children mostly +under 10. It was frightfully crowded, in many places rather dirty, +with frequently bad odors from unclean toilets. In one little room +some 20 small boys were sleeping and eating, and I found one child of +2 who was not able to walk and was eating in the bed in which he +slept. + +Ventilation was bad, linen not very clean, a general feeling of +repression present, slovenly employees, and, in general, an atmosphere +of inefficiency and failure to develop a home spirit which one still +finds in some of the worst institutions in America. The instructor who +showed me this home realized its horrors, and said that the Government +intended to move the children into more adequate quarters as soon as +conditions permitted. In summer the children are all taken to the +country. In this institution all the older children go out to public +schools and there have been no cases of smallpox or typhus in spite of +the epidemics the city has had this winter. Forty children were in the +hospital with minor complaints. About 10 per cent of the children are +usually ill. + +The school for feeble-minded occupies a large apartment house and the +children are divided into groups of 10 under the direction of two +teachers, each group developing home life in one of the large +apartments. There is emphasis on handwork. Printing presses, a +bookbinding establishment, and woodworking tools are provided. Music +and art appreciation are given much time, and some of the work done is +very beautiful. This school is largely the result of the efforts of +the Soviet Government. Careful records are kept of the children and +simple test material has been devised to develop in the more backward +children elementary reactions regarding size, shape, form, and color. +The greatest difficulty is the impossibility of securing trained +workers either for the shops or for the special pedagogical problems +of the school. However, an energetic corps of young men and young +women are employed, and they are conscious of the size of their +problem and are already thinking of the difficulties of sending their +students back into industrial life. In many of the activities of the +Soviet Government, as well as in these institutions taken over from +the old regime, I was dismayed at the inefficiency and ignorance of +many of the subordinates. After talking to the leaders and getting +some understanding of their ideals, an American expects to see these +carried over into practice. One is liable to forget that the Russian +people have not greatly changed, and that the same easy-going, +inefficient attitude of decades of the previous regime still exists. +No one knows this obstacle better than the members of the present +regime. They realize that the character of the Russian people is their +greatest obstacle, and change in the Russian conception of Government +service is a slow process. Far from being discouraged, they point to +their accomplishments with pride. + +During the last nine months Madame Lelina has taken 30,000 children +into Government homes and preparations are made to take 10,000 more +during the next three months. The three new institutions which I +visited are attractive suburban homes of wealthy emigres. The +Government has taken these over and is putting groups of 40 children +in charge of specially selected and trained men and women. The older +children go out to school. For the younger children kindergarten +activities are provided and much time is spent out of doors. An +atmosphere of home life has been developed which is surprising +considering the short time the institutions have been organized and +the difficulties they have had to contend with. This plan, which I am +told is permanent, is a most encouraging feature of Madame Lelina's +work. + +Requests to have children placed in the Government institutions are +turned over to a special corps of investigators. In each house there +is what is known as a poor committee which must also approve the +requests and the local soviet is required to pass upon the commitment +of the child to an institution. The large number of children taken +over by the city is due to the number of orphans and half orphans +caused by the war and to the impossibility of many poor families +providing their children with food during the recent famine. In cases +where several children of a family are taken they are placed in the +same home. Frequent opportunities for relatives to visit the homes are +provided. The amount of sickness has been surprisingly low considering +the great amount of disease in Petrograd during the last few months. +In one group of 300 children there have been no deaths within the past +nine months, and among all the children there have been very few cases +of contagious diseases. + +The difficulties which Madame Lelina faces are numerous. First, Russia +has never had an adequate number of trained workers and many of those +who were trained have refused to cooperate with the present regime, +and, secondly, though the Soviet Government has adopted the policy of +turning over to the children's homes and the schools an adequate +supply of food, regardless of the suffering of the adult population, +still it has been impossible to get certain items of diet, as, for +instance, milk. It is true, however, that among these children one +sees few signs of undernourishment or famine, and in general +throughout the city the children seem much better nourished than the +adult population. + +I had planned to visit other institutions but was unable to do so. I +was told of a large palace which has been taken over as a home for +mothers. Here all women who so desire are sent after childbirth with +their children for a period of two months. + +The health department, which asserts that there are in addition to the +100,000 bedridden people in the city, another 100,000 who are ill +because of undernourishment though able to go to the food kitchens, +has been very successful in securing from the local soviets special +food supplies to be provided sick persons on doctors' orders. At each +food kitchen the board of health has a representative whose business +it is to give such special diet as may be possible to undernourished +individuals. + +(Thereupon, at 12.50 o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned subject to +the call of the chairman.) + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BULLITT MISSION TO RUSSIA*** + + +******* This file should be named 10713.txt or 10713.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/7/1/10713 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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