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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/10444-0.txt b/10444-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae48d7f --- /dev/null +++ b/10444-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9272 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10444 *** + +THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS + +A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + +BY ROBERT LANSING + + +WITH ILLUSTRATIONS + + + + + + +CONTENTS + + I. REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + + II. MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE + + III. GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + IV. SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED + + V. THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER + + VI. THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN + + VII. SELF-DETERMINATION + + VIII. THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919 + + IX. A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT + + X. THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT + + XI. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION + + XII. REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + XIII. THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES + + XIV. DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED + + XV. THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE + + XVI. LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME + + XVII. SECRET DIPLOMACY + +XVIII. THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT + + XIX. THE BULLITT AFFAIR + + CONCLUSION + + +APPENDICES + + I. THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE + LEAGUE OF NATIONS, LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION + ON JANUARY 10, 1919 + + II. LEAGUE OF NATIONS PLAN OF LORD ROBERT CECIL + + III. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF + VERSAILLES + + IV. THE FOURTEEN POINTS + + V. PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF + FEBRUARY 11, 1918 + + VI. THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG + + +INDEX + + + + +ILLUSTRATIONS + +THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AT PARIS +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S COMMISSION AS A COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY +TO NEGOTIATE PEACE + +THE RUE ROYALE ON THE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT WILSON ON DECEMBER 14, 1918 +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AND STAFF +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +A MEETING AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY AFTER PRESIDENT WILSON'S +DEPARTURE FROM PARIS + +FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S "FULL POWERS" TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY OF +ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE + +THE DAILY CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION +Photograph by Isabey, Paris + + + + + + +CHRONOLOGY + +The Declaration of the Fourteen Points January 18, 1918 + + +Declaration of Four Additional Bases of Peace February 11, 1918 + +Departure of Colonel House for Paris to represent the + President on Supreme War Council October 17, 1918 + +Signature of Armistice, 5 A.M.; effective, 11 A.M. + November 11, 1918 + +Departure of President and American Commission + for France December 4, 1918 + +Arrival of President and American Commission in + Paris December 14, 1918 + +Meeting of Supreme War Council January 12, 1919 + +First Plenary Session of Peace Conference January 25, 1919 + +Plenary Session at which Report on the League of Nations + was Submitted February 14, 1919 + +Departure of President from Paris for United States + February 14, 1919 + +President lands at Boston February 24, 1919 + +Departure of President from New York for France March 5, 1919 + +President arrives in Paris March 14, 1919 + +Organization of Council of Four About March 24, 1919 + +President's public statement in regard to Fiume April 23, 1919 + +Adoption of Commission's Report on League of Nations + by the Conference April 28, 1919 + +The Shantung Settlement April 30, 1919 + +Delivery of the Peace Treaty to the German + Plenipotentiaries May 7, 1919 + +Signing of Treaty of Versailles June 28, 1919 + +Signing of Treaty of Assistance with France June 28, 1919 + +Departure of President for the United States June 28, 1919 + +Departure of Mr. Lansing from Paris for United + States July 12, 1919 + +Hearing of Mr. Lansing before Senate Committee on + Foreign Relations August 6, 1919 + +Conference of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations + with the President at the White House August 19, 1919 + +Hearing of Mr. Bullitt before Senate Committee on + Foreign Relations September 12, 1919 + +Return of President to Washington from tour + of West September 28, 1919 + +Resignation of Mr. Lansing as Secretary + of State February 13, 1920 + + + + + + +CHAPTER I + +REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + + +"While we were still in Paris, I felt, and have felt increasingly ever +since, that you accepted my guidance and direction on questions with +regard to which I had to instruct you only with increasing +reluctance.... + +"... I must say that it would relieve me of embarrassment, Mr. +Secretary, the embarrassment of feeling your reluctance and divergence +of judgment, if you would give your present office up and afford me an +opportunity to select some one whose mind would more willingly go along +with mine." + +These words are taken from the letter which President Wilson wrote to me +on February 11, 1920. On the following day I tendered my resignation as +Secretary of State by a letter, in which I said: + + "Ever since January, 1919, I have been conscious of the fact that you + no longer were disposed to welcome my advice in matters pertaining to + the negotiations in Paris, to our foreign service, or to + international affairs in general. Holding these views I would, if I + had consulted my personal inclination alone, have resigned as + Secretary of State and as a Commissioner to Negotiate Peace. I felt, + however, that such a step might have been misinterpreted both at home + and abroad, and that it was my duty to cause you no embarrassment in + carrying forward the great task in which you were then engaged." + +The President was right in his impression that, "while we were still in +Paris," I had accepted his guidance and direction with reluctance. It +was as correct as my statement that, as early as January, 1919, I was +conscious that he was no longer disposed to welcome my advice in matters +pertaining to the peace negotiations at Paris. + +There have been obvious reasons of propriety for my silence until now as +to the divergence of judgment, the differences of opinion and the +consequent breach in the relations between President Wilson and myself. +They have been the subject of speculation and inference which have left +uncertain the true record. The time has come when a frank account of our +differences can be given publicity without a charge being made of +disloyalty to the Administration in power. + +The President, in his letter of February 11, 1920, from which the +quotation is made, indicated my unwillingness to follow him in the +course which he adopted at Paris, but he does not specifically point out +the particular subjects as to which we were not in accord. It is +unsatisfactory, if not criticizable, to leave the American people in +doubt as to a disagreement between two of their official representatives +upon a matter of so grave importance to the country as the negotiation +of the Treaty of Versailles. They are entitled to know the truth in +order that they may pass judgment upon the merits of the differences +which existed. I am not willing that the present uncertainty as to the +facts should continue. Possibly some may think that I have remained +silent too long. If I have, it has been only from a sense of obligation +to an Administration of which I was so long a member. It has not been +through lack of desire to lay the record before the public. + +The statements which will be made in the succeeding pages will not be +entirely approved by some of my readers. In the circumstances it is far +too much to expect to escape criticism. The review of facts and the +comments upon them may be characterized in certain quarters as disloyal +to a superior and as violative of the seal of silence which is +considered generally to apply to the intercourse and communications +between the President and his official advisers. Under normal conditions +such a characterization would not be unjustified. But the present case +is different from the usual one in which a disagreement arises between a +President and a high official of his Administration. + +Mr. Wilson made our differences at Paris one of the chief grounds for +stating that he would be pleased to take advantage of my expressed +willingness to resign. The manifest imputation was that I had advised +him wrongly and that, after he had decided to adopt a course contrary to +my advice, I had continued to oppose his views and had with reluctance +obeyed his instructions. Certainly no American official is in honor +bound to remain silent under such an imputation which approaches a +charge of faithlessness and of a secret, if not open, avoidance of duty. +He has, in my judgment, the right to present the case to the American +people in order that they may decide whether the imputation was +justified by the facts, and whether his conduct was or was not in the +circumstances in accord with the best traditions of the public service +of the United States. + +A review of this sort becomes necessarily a personal narrative, which, +because of its intimate nature, is embarrassing to the writer, since he +must record his own acts, words, desires, and purposes, his own views as +to a course of action, and his own doubts, fears, and speculations as to +the future. If there were another method of treatment which would retain +the authoritative character of a personal statement, it would be a +satisfaction to adopt it. But I know of none. The true story can only be +told from the intimate and personal point of view. As I intend to tell +the true story I offer no further apology for its personal character. + +Before beginning a recital of the relations existing between President +Wilson and myself during the Paris Conference, I wish to state, and to +emphasize the statement, that I was never for a moment unmindful that +the Constitution of the United States confides to the President the +absolute right of conducting the foreign relations of the Republic, and +that it is the duty of a Commissioner to follow the President's +instructions in the negotiation of a treaty. Many Americans, some of +whom are national legislators and solicitous about the Constitution, +seem to have ignored or to have forgotten this delegation of exclusive +authority, with the result that they have condemned the President in +intemperate language for exercising this executive right. As to the +wisdom of the way in which Mr. Wilson exercised it in directing the +negotiations at Paris individual opinions may differ, but as to the +legality of his conduct there ought to be but one mind. From first to +last he acted entirely within his constitutional powers as President of +the United States. + +The duties of a diplomatic representative commissioned by the President +and given full powers to negotiate a treaty are, in addition to the +formal carrying out of his instructions, twofold, namely, to advise the +President during the negotiation of his views as to the wise course to +be adopted, and to prevent the President, in so far as possible, from +taking any step in the proceedings which may impair the rights of his +country or may be injurious to its interests. These duties, in my +opinion, are equally imperative whether the President directs the +negotiations through written instructions issuing from the White House +or conducts them in person. For an American plenipotentiary to remain +silent, and by his silence to give the impression that he approves a +course of action which he in fact believes to be wrong in principle or +contrary to good policy, constitutes a failure to perform his full duty +to the President and to the country. It is his duty to speak and to +speak frankly and plainly. + +With this conception of the obligations of a Commissioner to Negotiate +Peace, obligations which were the more compelling in my case because of +my official position as Secretary of State, I felt it incumbent upon me +to offer advice to the President whenever it seemed necessary to me to +consider the adoption of a line of action in regard to the negotiations, +and particularly so when the indications were that the President +purposed to reach a decision which seemed to me unwise or impolitic. +Though from the first I felt that my suggestions were received with +coldness and my criticisms with disfavor, because they did not conform +to the President's wishes and intentions, I persevered in my efforts to +induce him to abandon in some cases or to modify in others a course +which would in my judgment be a violation of principle or a mistake in +policy. It seemed to me that duty demanded this, and that, whatever the +consequences might be, I ought not to give tacit assent to that which I +believed wrong or even injudicious. + +The principal subjects, concerning which President Wilson and I were in +marked disagreement, were the following: His presence in Paris during +the peace negotiations and especially his presence there as a delegate +to the Peace Conference; the fundamental principles of the constitution +and functions of a League of Nations as proposed or advocated by him; +the form of the organic act, known as the "Covenant," its elaborate +character and its inclusion in the treaty restoring a state of peace; +the treaty of defensive alliance with France; the necessity for a +definite programme which the American Commissioners could follow in +carrying on the negotiations; the employment of private interviews and +confidential agreements in reaching settlements, a practice which gave +color to the charge of "secret diplomacy"; and, lastly, the admission of +the Japanese claims to possession of German treaty rights at Kiao-Chau +and in the Province of Shantung. + +Of these seven subjects of difference the most important were those +relating to the League of Nations and the Covenant, though our opposite +views as to Shantung were more generally known and more frequently the +subject of public comment. While chief consideration will be given to +the differences regarding the League and the Covenant, the record would +be incomplete if the other subjects were omitted. In fact nearly all of +these matters of difference are more or less interwoven and have a +collateral, if not a direct, bearing upon one another. They all +contributed in affecting the attitude of President Wilson toward the +advice that I felt it my duty to volunteer, an attitude which was +increasingly impatient of unsolicited criticism and suggestion and which +resulted at last in the correspondence of February, 1920, that ended +with the acceptance of my resignation as Secretary of State. + +The review of these subjects will be, so far as it is possible, treated +in chronological order, because, as the matters of difference increased +in number, they gave emphasis to the divergence of judgment which +existed between the President and myself. The effect was cumulative, and +tended not only to widen the breach, but to make less and less possible +a restoration of our former relations. It was my personal desire to +support the President's views concerning the negotiations at Paris, but, +when in order to do so it became necessary to deny a settled conviction +and to suppress a conception of the true principle or the wise policy to +be followed, I could not do it and feel that to give support under such +conditions accorded with true loyalty to the President of the +United States. + +It was in this spirit that my advice was given and my suggestions were +made, though in doing so I believed it justifiable to conform as far as +it was possible to the expressed views of Mr. Wilson, or to what seemed +to be his views, concerning less important matters and to concentrate on +those which seemed vital. I went in fact as far as I could in adopting +his views in the hope that my advice would be less unpalatable and +would, as a consequence, receive more sympathetic consideration. +Believing that I understood the President's temperament, success in an +attempt to change his views seemed to lie in moderation and in partial +approval of his purpose rather than in bluntly arguing that it was +wholly wrong and should be abandoned. This method of approach, which +seemed the expedient one at the time, weakened, in some instances at +least, the criticisms and objections which I made. It is very possible +that even in this diluted form my views were credited with wrong motives +by the President so that he suspected my purpose. It is to be hoped that +this was the true explanation of Mr. Wilson's attitude of mind, for the +alternative forces a conclusion as to the cause for his resentful +reception of honest differences of opinion, which no one, who admires +his many sterling qualities and great attainments, will +willingly accept. + +Whatever the cause of the President's attitude toward the opinions which +I expressed on the subjects concerning which our views were at +variance--and I prefer to assume that the cause was a misapprehension of +my reasons for giving them--the result was that he was disposed to give +them little weight. The impression made was that he was irritated by +opposition to his views, however moderately urged, and that he did not +like to have his judgment questioned even in a friendly way. It is, of +course, possible that this is not a true estimate of the President's +feelings. It may do him an injustice. But his manner of meeting +criticism and his disposition to ignore opposition can hardly be +interpreted in any other way. + +There is the alternative possibility that Mr. Wilson was convinced that, +after he had given a subject mature consideration and reached a +decision, his judgment was right or at least better than that of any +adviser. A conviction of this nature, if it existed, would naturally +have caused him to feel impatient with any one who attempted to +controvert his decisions and would tend to make him believe that +improper motives induced the opposition or criticism. This alternative, +which is based of necessity on a presumption as to the temperament of +Mr. Wilson that an unprejudiced and cautious student of personality +would hesitate to adopt, I mention only because there were many who +believed it to be the correct explanation of his attitude. In view of my +intimate relations with the President prior to the Paris Conference I +feel that in justice to him I should say that he did not, except on rare +occasions, resent criticism of a proposed course of action, and, while +he seemed in a measure changed after departing from the United States in +December, 1918, I do not think that the change was sufficient to justify +the presumption of self-assurance which it would be necessary to adopt +if the alternative possibility is considered to furnish the better +explanation. + +It is, however, natural, considering what occurred at Paris, to search +out the reason or reasons for the President's evident unwillingness to +listen to advice when he did not solicit it, and for his failure to take +all the American Commissioners into his confidence. But to attempt to +dissect the mentality and to analyze the intellectual processes of +Woodrow Wilson is not my purpose. It would only invite discussion and +controversy as to the truth of the premises and the accuracy of the +deductions reached. The facts will be presented and to an extent the +impressions made upon me at the time will be reviewed, but impressions +of that character which are not the result of comparison with subsequent +events and of mature deliberation are not always justified. They may +later prove to be partially or wholly wrong. They have the value, +nevertheless, of explaining in many cases why I did or did not do +certain things, and of disclosing the state of mind that in a measure +determined my conduct which without this recital of contemporaneous +impressions might mystify one familiar with what afterwards took place. +The notes, letters, and memoranda which are quoted in the succeeding +pages, as well as the opinions and beliefs held at the time (of which, +in accordance with a practice of years, I kept a record supplementing my +daily journal of events), should be weighed and measured by the +situation which existed when they were written and not alone in the +light of the complete review of the proceedings. In forming an opinion +as to my differences with the President it should be the reader's +endeavor to place himself in my position at the time and not judge them +solely by the results of the negotiations at Paris. It comes to this: +Was I justified then? Am I justified now? If those questions are +answered impartially and without prejudice, there is nothing further +that I would ask of the reader. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE + + +Early in October, 1918, it required no prophetic vision to perceive that +the World War would come to an end in the near future. Austria-Hungary, +acting with the full approval of the German Government, had made +overtures for peace, and Bulgaria, recognizing the futility of further +struggle, had signed an armistice which amounted to an unconditional +surrender. These events were soon followed by the collapse of Turkish +resistance and by the German proposals which resulted in the armistice +which went into effect on November 11, 1918. + +In view of the importance of the conditions of the armistice with +Germany and their relation to the terms of peace to be later negotiated, +the President considered it essential to have an American member added +to the Supreme War Council, which then consisted of M. Clemenceau, Mr. +Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando, the premiers of the three Allied +Powers. He selected Colonel Edward M. House for this important post and +named him a Special Commissioner to represent him personally. Colonel +House with a corps of secretaries and assistants sailed from New York on +October 17, _en route_ for Paris where the Supreme War Council was +in session. + +Three days before his departure the Colonel was in Washington and we had +two long conferences with the President regarding the correspondence +with Germany and with the Allies relating to a cessation of hostilities, +during which we discussed the position which the United States should +take as to the terms of the armistice and the bases of peace which +should be incorporated in the document. + +It was after one of these conferences that Colonel House informed me +that the President had decided to name him (the Colonel) and me as two +of the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference, and that the +President was considering attending the Conference and in person +directing the negotiations. This latter intention of Mr. Wilson +surprised and disturbed me, and I expressed the hope that the +President's mind was not made up, as I believed that if he gave more +consideration to the project he would abandon it, since it was manifest +that his influence over the negotiations would be much greater if he +remained in Washington and issued instructions to his representatives in +the Conference. Colonel House did not say that he agreed with my +judgment in this matter, though he did not openly disagree with it. +However, I drew the conclusion, though without actual knowledge, that he +approved of the President's purpose, and, possibly, had encouraged him +to become an actual participant in the preliminary conferences. + +The President's idea of attending the Peace Conference was not a new +one. Though I cannot recollect the source of my information, I know that +in December, 1916, when it will be remembered Mr. Wilson was endeavoring +to induce the belligerents to state their objects in the war and to +enter into a conference looking toward peace, he had an idea that he +might, as a friend of both parties, preside over such a conference and +exert his personal influence to bring the belligerents into agreement. A +service of this sort undoubtedly appealed to the President's +humanitarian instinct and to his earnest desire to end the devastating +war, while the novelty of the position in which he would be placed would +not have been displeasing to one who in his public career seemed to find +satisfaction in departing from the established paths marked out by +custom and usage. + +When, however, the attempt at mediation failed and when six weeks later, +on February 1, 1917, the German Government renewed indiscriminate +submarine warfare resulting in the severance of diplomatic relations +between the United States and Germany, President Wilson continued to +cherish the hope that he might yet assume the role of mediator. He even +went so far as to prepare a draft of the bases of peace, which he +purposed to submit to the belligerents if they could be induced to meet +in conference. I cannot conceive how he could have expected to bring +this about in view of the elation of the Allies at the dismissal of +Count von Bernstorff and the seeming certainty that the United States +would declare war against Germany if the latter persisted in her +ruthless sinking of American merchant vessels. But I know, in spite of +the logic of the situation, that he expected or at least hoped to +succeed in his mediatory programme and made ready to play his part in +the negotiation of a peace. + +From the time that Congress declared that a state of war existed between +the United States and the Imperial German Government up to the autumn of +1918, when the Central Alliance made overtures to end the war, the +President made no attempt so far as I am aware to enter upon peace +negotiations with the enemy nations. In fact he showed a disposition to +reject all peace proposals. He appears to have reached the conclusion +that the defeat of Germany and her allies was essential before permanent +peace could be restored. At all events, he took no steps to bring the +belligerents together until a military decision had been practically +reached. He did, however, on January 8,1918, lay down his famous +"Fourteen Points," which he supplemented with certain declarations in +"subsequent addresses," thus proclaiming his ideas as to the proper +bases of peace when the time should come to negotiate. + +Meanwhile, in anticipation of the final triumph of the armies of the +Allied and Associated Powers, the President, in the spring of 1917, +directed the organization, under the Department of State, of a body of +experts to collect data and prepare monographs, charts, and maps, +covering all historical, territorial, economic, and legal subjects which +would probably arise in the negotiation of a treaty of peace. This +Commission of Inquiry, as it was called, had its offices in New York and +was under Colonel House so far as the selection of its members was +concerned. The nominal head of the Commission was Dr. Mezes, President +of the College of the City of New York and a brother-in-law of Colonel +House, though the actual and efficient executive head was Dr. Isaiah +Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society. The plans of +organization, the outline of work, and the proposed expenditures for the +maintenance of the Commission were submitted to me as Secretary of +State. I examined them and, after several conferences with Dr. Mezes, +approved them and recommended to the President that he allot the funds +necessary to carry out the programme. + +In addition to the subjects which were dealt with by this excellent +corps of students and experts, whose work was of the highest order, the +creation of some sort of an international association to prevent wars in +the future received special attention from the President as it did from +Americans of prominence not connected with the Government. It caused +considerable discussion in the press and many schemes were proposed and +pamphlets written on the subject. To organize such an association became +a generally recognized object to be attained in the negotiation of the +peace which would end the World War; and there can be no doubt that the +President believed more and more in the vital necessity of forming an +effective organization of the nations to preserve peace in the future +and make another great war impossible. + +The idea of being present and taking an active part in formulating the +terms of peace had, in my opinion, never been abandoned by President +Wilson, although it had remained dormant while the result of the +conflict was uncertain. When, however, in early October, 1918, there +could no longer be any doubt that the end of the war was approaching, +the President appears to have revived the idea and to have decided, if +possible, to carry out the purpose which he had so long cherished. He +seemed to have failed to appreciate, or, if he did appreciate, to have +ignored the fact that the conditions were wholly different in October, +1918, from what they were in December, 1916. + +In December, 1916, the United States was a neutral nation, and the +President, in a spirit of mutual friendliness, which was real and not +assumed, was seeking to bring the warring powers together in conference +looking toward the negotiation of "a peace without victory." In the +event that he was able to persuade them to meet, his presence at the +conference as a pacificator and probably as the presiding officer would +not improbably have been in the interests of peace, because, as the +executive head of the greatest of the neutral nations of the world and +as the impartial friend of both parties, his personal influence would +presumably have been very great in preventing a rupture in the +negotiations and in inducing the parties to act in a spirit of +conciliation and compromise. + +In October, 1918, however, the United States was a belligerent. Its +national interests were involved; its armies were in conflict with the +Germans on the soil of France; its naval vessels were patrolling the +Atlantic; and the American people, bitterly hostile, were demanding +vengeance on the Governments and peoples of the Central Powers, +particularly those of Germany. President Wilson, it is true, had +endeavored with a measure of success to maintain the position of an +unbiased arbiter in the discussions leading up to the armistice of +November 11, and Germany undoubtedly looked to him as the one hope of +checking the spirit of revenge which animated the Allied Powers in view +of all that they had suffered at the hands of the Germans. It is +probable too that the Allies recognized that Mr. Wilson was entitled to +be satisfied as to the terms of peace since American man power and +American resources had turned the scale against Germany and made victory +a certainty. The President, in fact, dominated the situation. If he +remained in Washington and carried on the negotiations through his +Commissioners, he would in all probability retain his superior place and +be able to dictate such terms of peace as he considered just. But, if he +did as he purposed doing and attended the Peace Conference, he would +lose the unique position which he held and would have to submit to the +combined will of his foreign colleagues becoming a prey to intrigue and +to the impulses arising from their hatred for the vanquished nations. + +A practical view of the situation so clearly pointed to the unwisdom of +the President's personal participation in the peace negotiations that a +very probable explanation for his determination to be present at the +Conference is the assumption that the idea had become so firmly embedded +in his mind that nothing could dislodge it or divert him from his +purpose. How far the spectacular feature of a President crossing the +ocean to control in person the making of peace appealed to him I do not +know. It may have been the deciding factor. It may have had no effect at +all. How far the belief that a just peace could only be secured by the +exercise of his personal influence over the delegates I cannot say. How +far he doubted the ability of the men whom he proposed to name as +plenipotentiaries is wholly speculative. Whatever plausible reason may +be given, the true reason will probably never be known. + +Not appreciating, at the time that Colonel House informed me of the +President's plan to be present at the Conference, that the matter had +gone as far as it had, and feeling very strongly that it would be a +grave mistake for the President to take part in person in the +negotiations, I felt it to be my duty, as his official adviser in +foreign affairs and as one desirous to have him adopt a wise course, to +state plainly to him my views. It was with hesitation that I did this +because the consequence of the non-attendance of the President would be +to make me the head of the American Peace Commission at Paris. There was +the danger that my motive in opposing the President's attending the +Conference would be misconstrued and that I might be suspected of acting +from self-interest rather than from a sense of loyalty to my chief. +When, however, the armistice went into effect and the time arrived for +completing the personnel of the American Commission, I determined that I +ought not to remain silent. + +The day after the cessation of hostilities, that is, on November 12, I +made the following note: + + "I had a conference this noon with the President at the White House + in relation to the Peace Conference. I told him frankly that I + thought the plan for him to attend was unwise and would be a mistake. + I said that I felt embarrassed in speaking to him about it because it + would leave me at the head of the delegation, and I hoped that he + understood that I spoke only out of a sense of duty. I pointed out + that he held at present a dominant position in the world, which I was + afraid he would lose if he went into conference with the foreign + statesmen; that he could practically dictate the terms of peace if he + held aloof; that he would be criticized severely in this country for + leaving at a time when Congress particularly needed his guidance; and + that he would be greatly embarrassed in directing domestic affairs + from overseas." + +I also recorded as significant that the President listened to my remarks +without comment and turned the conversation into other channels. + +For a week after this interview I heard nothing from the President on +the subject, though the fact that no steps were taken to prepare written +instructions for the American Commissioners convinced me that he +intended to follow his original intention. My fears were confirmed. On +the evening of Monday, November 18, the President came to my residence +and told me that he had finally decided to go to the Peace Conference +and that he had given out to the press an announcement to that effect. +In view of the publicity given to his decision it would have been futile +to have attempted to dissuade him from his purpose. He knew my opinion +and that it was contrary to his. + +After the President departed I made a note of the interview, in which +among other things I wrote: + + "I am convinced that he is making one of the greatest mistakes of his + career and will imperil his reputation. I may be in error and hope + that I am, but I prophesy trouble in Paris and worse than trouble + here. I believe the President's place is here in America." + +Whether the decision of Mr. Wilson was wise and whether my prophecy was +unfulfilled, I leave to the judgment of others. His visit to Europe and +its consequences are facts of history. It should be understood that the +incident is not referred to here to justify my views or to prove that +the President was wrong in what he did. The reference is made solely +because it shows that at the very outset there was a decided divergence +of judgment between us in regard to the peace negotiations. + +While this difference of opinion apparently in no way affected our +cordial relations, I cannot but feel, in reviewing this period of our +intercourse, that my open opposition to his attending the Conference was +considered by the President to be an unwarranted meddling with his +personal affairs and was none of my business. It was, I believe, the +beginning of his loss of confidence in my judgment and advice, which +became increasingly marked during the Paris negotiations. At the time, +however, I did not realize that my honest opinion affected the President +in the way which I now believe that it did. It had always been my +practice as Secretary of State to speak to him with candor and to +disagree with him whenever I thought he was reaching a wrong decision in +regard to any matter pertaining to foreign affairs. There was a general +belief that Mr. Wilson was not open-minded and that he was quick to +resent any opposition however well founded. I had not found him so +during the years we had been associated. Except in a few instances he +listened with consideration to arguments and apparently endeavored to +value them correctly. If, however, the matter related even remotely to +his personal conduct he seemed unwilling to debate the question. My +conclusion is that he considered his going to the Peace Conference was +his affair solely and that he viewed my objections as a direct criticism +of him personally for thinking of going. He may, too, have felt that my +opposition arose from a selfish desire to become the head of the +American Commission. From that time forward any suggestion or advice +volunteered by me was seemingly viewed with suspicion. It was, however, +long after this incident that I began to feel that the President was +imputing to me improper motives and crediting me with disloyalty to him +personally, an attitude which was as unwarranted as it was unjust. + +The President having determined to go to Paris, it seemed almost useless +to urge him not to become a delegate in view of the fact that he had +named but four Commissioners, although it had been arranged that the +Great Powers should each have five delegates in the Conference. This +clearly indicated that the President was at least considering sitting as +the fifth member of the American group. At the same time it seemed that, +if he did not take his place in the Conference as a delegate, he might +retain in a measure his superior place of influence even though he was +in Paris. Four days after the Commission landed at Brest I had a long +conference with Colonel House on matters pertaining to the approaching +negotiations, during which he informed me that there was a determined +effort being made by the European statesmen to induce the President to +sit at the peace table and that he was afraid that the President was +disposed to accede to their wishes. This information indicated that, +while the President had come to Paris prepared to act as a delegate, he +had, after discussing the subject with the Colonel and possibly with +others, become doubtful as to the wisdom of doing so, but that through +the pressure of his foreign colleagues he was turning again to the +favorable view of personal participation which he had held before he +left the United States. + +In my conversation with Colonel House I told him my reasons for opposing +the President's taking an active part in the Conference and explained to +him the embarrassment that I felt in advising the President to adopt a +course which would make me the head of the American Commission. I am +sure that the Colonel fully agreed with me that it was impolitic for Mr. +Wilson to become a delegate, but whether he actively opposed the plan I +do not know, although I believe that he did. It was some days before the +President announced that he would become the head of the American +Commission. I believe that he did this with grave doubts in his own mind +as to the wisdom of his decision, and I do not think that any new +arguments were advanced during those days which materially affected +his judgment. + +This delay in reaching a final determination as to a course of action +was characteristic of Mr. Wilson. There is in his mentality a strange +mixture of positiveness and indecision which is almost paradoxical. It +is a peculiarity which it is hard to analyze and which has often been an +embarrassment in the conduct of public affairs. Suddenness rather than +promptness has always marked his decisions. Procrastination in +announcing a policy or a programme makes coöperation difficult and not +infrequently defeats the desired purpose. To put off a decision to the +last moment is a trait of Mr. Wilson's character which has caused much +anxiety to those who, dealing with matters of vital importance, realized +that delay was perilous if not disastrous. + +Of the consequences of the President's acting as one of his own +representatives to negotiate peace it is not my purpose to speak. The +events of the six months succeeding his decision to exercise in person +his constitutional right to conduct the foreign relations of the United +States are in a general way matters of common knowledge and furnish +sufficient data for the formulation of individual opinions without the +aid of argument or discussion. The important fact in connection with the +general topic being considered is the difference of opinion between the +President and myself as to the wisdom of his assuming the role of a +delegate. While I did not discuss the matter with him except at the +first when I opposed his attending the Peace Conference, I have little +doubt that Colonel House, if he urged the President to decline to sit as +a delegate, which I think may be presumed, or if he discussed it at all, +mentioned to him my opinion that such a step would be unwise. In any +event Mr. Wilson knew my views and that they were at variance with the +decision which he reached. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +It appears, from a general review of the situation prior and subsequent +to the assembling of the delegates to the Peace Conference, that +President Wilson's decision to go to Paris and to engage in person in +the negotiations was strongly influenced by his belief that it was the +only sure way of providing in the treaty of peace for the organization +of a League of Nations. While his presence in Paris was probably +affected to an extent by other considerations, as I have pointed out, it +is to be presumed that he was anxious to participate directly in the +drafting of the plan of organization of the League and to exert his +personal influence on the delegates in favor of its acceptance by +publicly addressing the Conference. This he could hardly have done +without becoming a delegate. It would seem, therefore, that the purpose +of creating a League of Nations and obtaining the incorporation of a +plan of organization in the treaty to be negotiated had much to do with +the President's presence at the peace table. + +From the time that the United States entered the war in April, 1917, Mr. +Wilson held firmly to the idea that the salvation of the world from +imperialism would not be lasting unless provision was made in the peace +treaty for an international agency strong enough to prevent a future +attack upon the rights and liberties of the nations which were at so +great a cost holding in check the German armies and preventing them from +carrying out their evil designs of conquest. The object sought by the +United States in the war would not, in the views of many, be achieved +unless the world was organized to resist future aggression. The +essential thing, as the President saw it, in order to "make the world +safe for democracy" was to give permanency to the peace which would be +negotiated at the conclusion of the war. A union of the nations for the +purpose of preventing wars of aggression and conquest seemed to him the +most practical, if not the only, way of accomplishing this supreme +object, and he urged it with earnestness and eloquence in his public +addresses relating to the bases of peace. + +There was much to be said in favor of the President's point of view. +Unquestionably the American people as a whole supported him in the +belief that there ought to be some international agreement, association, +or concord which would lessen the possibility of future wars. An +international organization to remove in a measure the immediate causes +of war, to provide means for the peaceable settlement of disputes +between nations, and to draw the governments into closer friendship +appealed to the general desire of the peoples of America and Europe. The +four years and more of horror and agony through which mankind had passed +must be made impossible of repetition, and there seemed no other way +than to form an international union devoted to the maintenance of peace +by composing, as far as possible, controversies which might ripen +into war. + +For many years prior to 1914 an organization devoted to the prevention +of international wars had been discussed by those who gave thought to +warfare of the nations and who realized in a measure the precarious +state of international peace. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and of 1907 +had been negotiated with that object, and it was only because of the +improper aspirations and hidden designs of certain powers, which were +represented at those great historic conferences, that the measures +adopted were not more expressive of the common desire of mankind and +more effective in securing the object sought. The Carnegie Endowment for +International Peace, the Ginn, now the World, Peace Foundation, and the +American Peace Society, and later the Society for the Judicial +Settlement of International Disputes, the League to Enforce Peace, and +many other organizations in America and in Europe were actively engaged +in considering ways and means to prevent war, to strengthen the bonds of +international good-will, and to insure the more general application of +the principles of justice to disputes between nations. + +The outbreak of the war and the dreadful waste and suffering which +followed impelled the societies and associations then organized to +redoubled effort and induced the formation of new organizations. People +everywhere began to realize that their objects were real and not merely +sentimental or academic, that they were seeking practical means to +remove the conditions which had made the Great War possible. Public +opinion became more and more pronounced as the subject was more widely +discussed in the journals and periodicals of the day and at public +meetings, the divergence of views being chiefly in regard to the means +to be employed by the proposed organization and not as to the creation +of the organization, the necessity for which appeared to be +generally conceded. + +With popular sentiment overwhelmingly in favor of some sort of world +union which would to an extent insure the nations against another +tragedy like the one which in November, 1918, had left the belligerents +wasted and exhausted and the whole world a prey to social and industrial +unrest, there was beyond question a demand that out of the great +international assembly at Paris there should come some common agency +devoted to the prevention of war. To ignore this all-prevalent sentiment +would have been to misrepresent the peoples of the civilized world and +would have aroused almost universal condemnation and protest. The +President was, therefore, entirely right in giving prominence to the +idea of an international union against war and in insisting that the +Peace Conference should make provision for the establishment of an +organization of the world with the prevention of future wars as its +central thought and purpose. + +The great bulk of the American people, at the time that the President +left the United States to attend the Peace Conference, undoubtedly +believed that some sort of organization of this nature was necessary, +and I am convinced that the same popular belief prevailed in all other +civilized countries. It is possible that this assertion may seem too +emphatic to some who have opposed the plan for a League of Nations, +which appears in the first articles of the Treaty of Versailles, but, if +these opponents of the plan will go back to the time of which I am +writing, and avoid the impressions made upon them by subsequent events, +they will find, I believe, that even their own views have materially +changed since December, 1918. It is true that concrete plans had then +been suggested, but so far as the public knew the President had not +adopted any of them or formulated one of his own. He had not then +disclosed the provisions of his "Covenant." + +The mass of the people were only concerned with the general idea. There +was no well-defined opposition to that idea. At least it was not vocal. +Even the defeat of the Democratic Party in the Congressional elections +of November, 1918, could not be interpreted to be a repudiation of the +formation of a world organization. That election, by which both Houses +of Congress became Republican, was a popular rebuke to Mr. Wilson for +the partisanship shown in his letter of October addressed to the +American people, in which he practically asserted that it was +unpatriotic to support the Republican candidates. The indignation and +resentment aroused by that injudicious and unwarranted attack upon the +loyalty of his political opponents lost to the Democratic Party the +Senate and largely reduced its membership in the House of +Representatives if it did not in fact deprive the party of control of +that body. The result, however, did not mean that the President's ideas +as to the terms of peace were repudiated, but that his practical +assertion, that refusal to accept his policies was unpatriotic, was +repudiated by the American people. + +It is very apparent to one, who without prejudice reviews the state of +public sentiment in December, 1918, that the trouble, which later +developed as to a League of Nations, did not lie in the necessity of +convincing the peoples of the world, their governments, and their +delegates to the Paris Conference that it was desirable to organize the +world to prevent future wars, but in deciding upon the form and +functions of the organization to be created. As to these details, which +of course affected the character, the powers, and the duties of the +organization, there had been for years a wide divergence of opinion. +Some advocated the use of international force to prevent a nation from +warring against another. Some favored coercion by means of general +ostracism and non-intercourse. Some believed that the application of +legal justice through the medium of international tribunals and +commissions was the only practical method of settling disputes which +might become causes of war. And some emphasized the importance of a +mutual agreement to postpone actual hostilities until there could be an +investigation as to the merits of a controversy. There were thus two +general classes of powers proposed which were in the one case political +and in the other juridical. The cleavage of opinion was along these +lines, although it possibly was not recognized by the general public. It +was not only shown in the proposed powers, but also in the proposed form +of the organization, the one centering on a politico-diplomatic body, +and the other on an international judiciary. Naturally the details of +any plan proposed would become the subject of discussion and the +advisability of adopting the provisions would arouse controversy and +dispute. Thus unanimity in approving a world organization did not mean +that opinions might not differ radically in working out the fundamental +principles of its form and functions, to say nothing of the detailed +plan based on these principles. + +In May, 1916, President Wilson accepted an invitation to address the +first annual meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, which was to be +held in Washington. After preparing his address he went over it and +erased all reference to the use of physical force in preventing wars. I +mention this as indicative of the state of uncertainty in which he was +in the spring of 1916 as to the functions and powers of the +international organization to maintain peace which he then advocated. By +January, 1917, he had become convinced that the use of force was the +practical method of checking aggressions. This conversion was probably +due to the fact that he had in his own mind worked out, as one of the +essential bases of peace, to which he was then giving much thought, a +mutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence, +which had been the chief article of a proposed Pan-American Treaty +prepared early in 1915 and to which he referred in his address before +the League to Enforce Peace. He appears to have reached the conclusion +that a guaranty of this sort would be of little value unless supported +by the threatened, and, if necessary, the actual, employment of force. +The President was entirely logical in this attitude. A guaranty against +physical aggression would be practically worthless if it did not rest on +an agreement to protect with physical force. An undertaking to protect +carried with it the idea of using effectual measures to insure +protection. They were inseparable; and the President, having adopted an +affirmative guaranty against aggression as a cardinal provision--perhaps +I should say _the_ cardinal provision--of the anticipated peace treaty, +could not avoid becoming the advocate of the use of force in making good +the guaranty. + +During the year 1918 the general idea of the formation of an +international organization to prevent war was increasingly discussed in +the press of the United States and Europe and engaged the thought of the +Governments of the Powers at war with the German Empire. On January 8 of +that year President Wilson in an address to Congress proclaimed his +"Fourteen Points," the adoption of which he considered necessary to a +just and stable peace. The last of these "Points" explicitly states the +basis of the proposed international organization and the fundamental +reason for its formation. It is as follows: + + "XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific + covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political + independence and territorial integrity to great and small + states alike." + +This declaration may be considered in view of subsequent developments to +be a sufficiently clear announcement of the President's theory as to the +plan of organization which ought to be adopted, but at the time the +exact character of the "mutual guarantees" was not disclosed and aroused +little comment. I do not believe that Congress, much less the public at +large, understood the purpose that the President had in mind. +Undoubtedly, too, a sense of loyalty to the Chief Executive, while the +war was in progress, and the desire to avoid giving comfort of any sort +to the enemy, prevented a critical discussion of the announced bases of +peace, some of which were at the time academic, premature, and liable to +modification if conditions changed. + +In March Lord Phillimore and his colleagues made their preliminary +report to the British Government on "a League of Nations" and this was +followed in July by their final report, copies of which reached the +President soon after they were made. The time had arrived for putting +into concrete form the general ideas that the President held, and +Colonel House, whom some believed to be the real author of Mr. Wilson's +conception of a world union, prepared, I am informed, the draft of a +scheme of organization. This draft was either sent or handed to the +President and discussed with him. To what extent it was amended or +revised by Mr. Wilson I do not know, but in a modified form it became +the typewritten draft of the Covenant which he took with him to Paris, +where it underwent several changes. In it was the guaranty of 1915, +1916, 1917, and 1918, which, from the form in which it appeared, +logically required the use of force to give it effect. + +Previous to the departure of the American Commission for Paris, on +December 4, 1918, the President did not consult me as to his plan for a +League of Nations. He did not show me a copy of the plan or even mention +that one had been put into writing. I think that there were two reasons +for his not doing so, although I was the official adviser whom he should +naturally consult on such matters. + +The first reason, I believe, was due to the following facts. In our +conversations prior to 1918 I had uniformly opposed the idea of the +employment of international force to compel a nation to respect the +rights of other nations and had repeatedly urged judicial settlement as +the practical way of composing international controversies, though I did +not favor the use of force to compel such settlement. + +To show my opposition to an international agreement providing for the +use of force and to show that President Wilson knew of this opposition +and the reasons for it, I quote a letter which I wrote to him in May, +1916, that is, two years and a half before the end of the war: + + "_May 25, 1916_ + + "My DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "I had hoped to see you to-morrow at Cabinet meeting, but to-day the + Doctor refused to allow me to leave the house this week. I intended + when I saw you to say something about the purposes of the League to + Enforce Peace, which is to meet here, and at the banquet of which I + understand you are to speak on Saturday night. I would have preferred + to talk the matter over with you, but as that is impossible I have + taken the liberty to write you this letter, although in doing so I am + violating the directions of the Doctor. + + "While I have not had time or opportunity to study carefully the + objects of the proposed League to Enforce Peace, I understand the + fundamental ideas are these, which are to be embodied in a general + treaty of the nations: _First_, an agreement to submit all + differences which fail of diplomatic adjustment to arbitration or a + board of conciliation; and, _second_, in case a government fails to + comply with this provision, an agreement that the other parties will + unite in compelling it to do so by an exercise of force. + + "With the first agreement I am in accord to an extent, but I cannot + see how it is practicable to apply it in case of a continuing + invasion of fundamental national or individual rights unless some + authoritative international body has the power to impose and enforce + an order in the nature of an injunction, which will prevent the + aggressor from further action until arbitration has settled the + rights of the parties. How this can be done in a practical way I have + not attempted to work out, but the problem is not easy, especially + the part which relates to the enforcement of the order. + + "It is, however, the second agreement in regard to the imposition of + international arbitration by force, which seems to me the most + difficult, especially when viewed from the standpoint of its effects + on our national sovereignty and national interests. It is needless to + go into the manifest questions arising when the _modus operandi_ of + the agreement is considered. Such questions as: Who may demand + international intervention? What body will decide whether the demand + should be complied with? How will the international forces be + constituted? Who will take charge of the military and naval + operations? Who will pay the expenses of the war (for war it + will be)? + + "Perplexing as these questions appear to me, I am more concerned with + the direct effect on this country. I do not believe that it is wise + to limit our independence of action, a sovereign right, to the will + of other powers beyond this hemisphere. In any representative + international body clothed with authority to require of the nations + to employ their armies and navies to coerce one of their number, we + would be in the minority. I do not believe that we should put + ourselves in the position of being compelled to send our armed forces + to Europe or Asia or, in the alternative, of repudiating our treaty + obligation. Neither our sovereignty nor our interests would accord + with such a proposition, and I am convinced that popular opinion as + well as the Senate would reject a treaty framed along such lines. + + "It is possible that the difficulty might be obviated by the + establishment of geographical zones, and leaving to the groups of + nations thus formed the enforcement of the peaceful settlement of + disputes. But if that is done why should all the world participate? + We have adopted a much modified form of this idea in the proposed + Pan-American Treaty by the 'guaranty' article. But I would not like + to see its stipulations extended to the European powers so that they, + with our full agreement, would have the right to cross the ocean and + stop quarrels between two American Republics. Such authority would be + a serious menace to the Monroe Doctrine and a greater menace to the + Pan-American Doctrine. + + "It appears to me that, if the first idea of the League can be worked + out in a practical way and an international body constituted to + determine when steps should be taken to enforce compliance, the use + of force might be avoided by outlawing the offending nation. No + nation to-day can live unto itself. The industrial and commercial + activities of the world are too closely interwoven for a nation + isolated from the other nations to thrive and prosper. A tremendous + economic pressure could be imposed on the outlawed nation by all + other nations denying it intercourse of every nature, even + communication, in a word make that nation a pariah, and so to remain + until it was willing to perform its obligations. + + "I am not at all sure that this means is entirely feasible. I see + many difficulties which would have to be met under certain + conditions. But I do think that it is more practical in operation and + less objectionable from the standpoint of national rights and + interests than the one proposed by the League. It does not appear to + me that the use of physical force is in any way practical or + advisable. + + "I presume that you are far more familiar than I am with the details + of the plans of the League and that it may be presumptuous on my part + to write you as I have. I nevertheless felt it my duty to frankly + give you my views on the subject and I have done so. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "_The White House_" + +The President, thus early advised of my unqualified opposition to any +plan which was similar in principle to the one advocated by the League +to Enforce Peace, naturally concluded that I would look with disfavor on +an international guaranty which by implication, if not by declaration, +compelled the use of force to give it effect. Doubtless he felt that I +would not be disposed to aid in perfecting a plan which had as its +central idea a guaranty of that nature. Disliking opposition to a plan +or policy which he had originated or made his own by adoption, he +preferred to consult those who without debate accepted his judgment and +were in sympathy with his ideas. Undoubtedly the President by refraining +from asking my advice spared himself from listening to arguments against +the guaranty and the use of force which struck at the very root of his +plan, for I should, if I had been asked, have stated my views with +entire frankness. + +The other reason for not consulting me, as I now realize, but did not at +the time, was that I belonged to the legal profession. It is a fact, +which Mr. Wilson has taken no trouble to conceal, that he does not value +the advice of lawyers except on strictly legal questions, and that he +considers their objections and criticisms on other subjects to be too +often based on mere technicalities and their judgments to be warped by +an undue regard for precedent. This prejudice against the legal +profession in general was exhibited on more than one occasion during our +sojourn at Paris. Looking back over my years of intercourse with the +President I can now see that he chafed under the restraints imposed by +usage and even by enacted laws if they interfered with his acting in a +way which seemed to him right or justified by conditions. I do not say +that he was lawless. He was not that, but he conformed grudgingly and +with manifest displeasure to legal limitations. It was a thankless task +to question a proposed course of action on the ground of illegality, +because he appeared to be irritated by such an obstacle to his will and +to transfer his irritation against the law to the one who raised it as +an objection. I think that he was especially resentful toward any one +who volunteered criticism based on a legal provision, precept, or +precedent, apparently assuming that the critic opposed his purpose on +the merits and in order to defeat it interposed needless legal +objections. It is unnecessary to comment on the prejudice which such an +attitude of mind made evident. + +After the President's exceptionally strong address at the Metropolitan +Opera House in New York on September 27, 1918, I realized the great +importance which he gave to the creation of a League of Nations and in +view of this I devoted time and study to the subject, giving particular +attention to the British and French suggestions, both of which +emphasized judicial settlement. Knowing that the President had been in +consultation with Colonel House on the various phases of the peace to be +negotiated as well as on the terms of the armistice, I asked the latter +what he knew about the former's scheme for a League of Nations. + +The Colonel discreetly avoided disclosing the details of the plan, but +from our conversation I gained an idea of the general principles of the +proposed organization and the way in which the President intended to +apply them. + +After the Colonel and his party had sailed for France and in expectation +of being consulted on the subject by President Wilson, I put my thoughts +on the League of Nations into writing. In a note, which is dated October +27, 1918, appears the following: + + "From the little I know of the President's plan I am sure that it is + impracticable. There is in it too much altruistic cooperation. No + account is taken of national selfishness and the mutual suspicions + which control international relations. It may be noble thinking, but + it is not true thinking. + + "What I fear is that a lot of dreamers and theorists will be selected + to work out an organization instead of men whose experience and + common sense will tell them not to attempt anything which will not + work. The scheme ought to be simple and practical. If the federation, + or whatever it may be called, is given too much power or if its + machinery is complex, my belief is that it will be unable to function + or else will be defied. I can see lots of trouble ahead unless + impractical enthusiasts and fanatics are suppressed. This is a time + when sober thought, caution, and common sense should control." + +On November 22, 1918, after I had been formally designated as a Peace +Commissioner, I made another note for the purpose of crystallizing my +own thought on the subject of a League of Nations. Although President +Wilson had not then consulted me in any way regarding his plan of +organization, I felt sure that he would, and I wished to be prepared to +give him my opinion concerning the fundamentals of the plan which might +be proposed on behalf of the United States. I saw, or thought that I +saw, a disposition to adopt physical might as the basis of the +organization, because the guaranty, which the President had announced in +Point XIV and evidently purposed to advocate, seemed to require the use +of force in the event that it became necessary to make it good. + +From the note of November 22 I quote the following: + + "The legal principle [of the equality of nations], whatever its basis + in fact, must be preserved, otherwise force rather than law, the + power to act rather than the right to act, becomes the fundamental + principle of organization, just as it has been in all previous + Congresses and Concerts of the European Powers. + + "It appears to me that a positive guaranty of territorial integrity + and political independence by the nations would have to rest upon an + open recognition of dominant coercive power in the articles of + agreement, the power being commercial and economic as well as + physical. The wisdom of entering into such a guaranty is questionable + and should be carefully considered before being adopted. + + "In order to avoid the recognition of force as a basis and the + question of dominant force with the unavoidable classification of + nations into 'big' and 'little,' 'strong' and 'weak,' the desired + result of a guaranty might be attained by entering into a mutual + undertaking _not_ to impair the territorial integrity or to violate + the political sovereignty of any state. The breach of this + undertaking would be a breach of the treaty and would sever the + relations of the offending nation with all other signatories." + +I have given these two extracts from my notes in order to show the views +that I held, at the time the American Commission was about to depart +from the United States, in regard to the character of the guaranty which +the President intended to make the central feature of the League of +Nations. In the carrying out of his scheme and in creating an +organization to give effect to the guaranty I believed that I saw as an +unavoidable consequence an exaltation of force and an overlordship of +the strong nations. Under such conditions it would be impossible to +preserve within the organization the equality of nations, a precept of +international law which was the universally recognized basis of +intercourse between nations in time of peace. This I considered most +unwise and a return to the old order, from which every one hoped that +the victory over the Central Empires had freed the world. + +The views expressed in the notes quoted formed the basis for my +subsequent course of action as an American Commissioner at Paris in +relation to the League of Nations. Convinced from previous experience +that to oppose every form of guaranty by the nations assembled at Paris +would be futile in view of the President's apparent determination to +compel the adoption of that principle, I endeavored to find a form of +guaranty that would be less objectionable than the one which the +President had in mind. The commitment of the United States to any +guaranty seemed to me at least questionable, though to prevent it seemed +impossible in the circumstances. It did not seem politic to try to +persuade the President to abandon the idea altogether. I was certain +that that could not be done. If he could be induced to modify his plan +so as to avoid a direct undertaking to protect other nations from +aggression, the result would be all that could be expected. I was +guided, therefore, chiefly by expediency rather than by principle in +presenting my views to the President and in openly approving the idea of +a guaranty. + +The only opportunity that I had to learn more of the President's plan +for a League before arriving in Paris was an hour's interview with him +on the U.S.S. George Washington some days after we sailed from New York. +He showed me nothing in writing, but explained in a general way his +views as to the form, purpose, and powers of a League. From this +conversation I gathered that my fears as to the proposed organization +were justified and that it was to be based on the principle of +diplomatic adjustment rather than that of judicial settlement and that +political expediency tinctured with morality was to be the standard of +determination of an international controversy rather than strict +legal justice. + +In view of the President's apparent fixity of purpose it seemed unwise +to criticize the plan until I could deliver to him a substitute in +writing for the mutual guaranty which he evidently considered to be the +chief feature of the plan. I did not attempt to debate the subject with +him believing it better to submit my ideas in concrete form, as I had +learned from experience that Mr. Wilson preferred to have matters for +his decision presented in writing rather than by word of mouth. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED + + +The President, Mr. Henry White, and I arrived in Paris on Saturday, +December 14, 1918, where Colonel House and General Bliss awaited us. The +days following our arrival were given over to public functions in honor +of the President and to official exchanges of calls and interviews with +the delegates of other countries who were gathering for the Peace +Conference. On the 23d, when the pressure of formal and social +engagements had in a measure lessened, I decided to present to the +President my views as to the mutual guaranty which he intended to +propose, fearing that, if there were further delay, he would become +absolutely committed to the affirmative form. I, therefore, on that day +sent him the following letter, which was marked "Secret and Urgent": + + "_Hotel de Crillon December 23, 1918_ + + "MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "The plan of guaranty proposed for the League of Nations, which has + been the subject of discussion, will find considerable objection from + other Governments because, even when the principle is agreed to, + there will be a wide divergence of views as to the terms of the + obligation. This difference of opinion will be seized upon by those, + who are openly or secretly opposed to the League, to create + controversy and discord. + + "In addition to this there will be opposition in Congress to assuming + obligations to take affirmative action along either military or + economic lines. On constitutional grounds, on its effect on the + Monroe Doctrine, on jealousy as to Congressional powers, etc., there + will be severe criticism which will materially weaken our position + with other nations, and may, in view of senatorial hostility, defeat + a treaty as to the League of Nations or at least render it impotent. + + "With these thoughts in mind and with an opposition known to exist + among certain European statesmen and already manifest in Washington, + I take the liberty of laying before you a tentative draft of articles + of guaranty which I do not believe can be successfully opposed either + at home or abroad." + +I would interrupt the reader at this point to suggest that it might be +well to peruse the enclosures, which will be found in the succeeding +pages, in order to have a better understanding of the comments which +follow. To continue: + + "I do not see how any nation can refuse to subscribe to them. I do + not see how any question of constitutionality can be raised, as they + are based essentially on powers which are confided to the Executive. + They in no way raise a question as to the Monroe Doctrine. At the + same time I believe that the result would be as efficacious as if + there was an undertaking to take positive action against an offending + nation, which is the present cause of controversy. + + "I am so earnestly in favor of the guaranty, which is the heart of + the League of Nations, that I have endeavored to find a way to + accomplish this and to remove the objections raised which seem to me + to-day to jeopardize the whole plan. + + "I shall be glad, if you desire it, to confer with you in regard to + the enclosed paper or to receive your opinion as to the suggestions + made. In any event it is my hope that you will give the paper + consideration. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "28 _Rue de Monceau_" + +It should be borne in mind in reading this letter that I had reached the +conclusion that modification rather than abandonment of the guaranty was +all that I could hope to accomplish, and that, as a matter of +expediency, it seemed wise to indicate a sympathetic attitude toward the +idea. For that reason I expressed myself as favorable to the guaranty +and termed it "the heart of the League of Nations," a phrase which the +President by his subsequent use of it considered to be a proper +characterization. + +The memoranda contained in the paper enclosed in the letter were as +follows: + +_The Constitutional Power to provide Coercion in a Treaty_ + + "_December_ 20, 1918 + + "In the institution of a League of Nations we must bear in mind the + limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States upon the + Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government in defining + their respective powers. + + "The Constitution confers upon Congress the right to declare war. + This right, I do not believe, can be delegated and it certainly + cannot be taken away by treaty. The question arises, therefore, as to + how far a provision in an agreement as to a League of Nations, which + imposes on the United States the obligation to employ its military or + naval forces in enforcing the terms of the agreement, would be + constitutional. + + "It would seem that the utilization of forces, whether independently + or in conjunction with other nations, would in fact by being an act + of war create a state of war, which constitutionally can only be done + by a declaration of Congress. To contract by treaty to create a state + of war upon certain contingencies arising would be equally tainted + with unconstitutionality and would be null and inoperative. + + "I do not think, therefore, that, even if it were advisable, any + treaty can provide for the independent or joint use of the military + or naval forces of the United States to compel compliance with a + treaty or to make good a guaranty made in a treaty. + + "The other method of international coercion is non-intercourse, + especially commercial non-intercourse. Would a treaty provision to + employ this method be constitutional? + + "As to this my mind is less clear. The Constitution in delegating + powers to Congress includes the regulation of commerce. Does + non-intercourse fall within the idea of regulation? Could an embargo + be imposed without an act of Congress? My impression is that it could + not be done without legislation and that a treaty provision agreeing + in a certain event to impose an embargo against another nation + would be void. + + "Even if Congress was willing to delegate to the Executive for a + certain purpose its powers as to making war and regulating commerce, + I do not think that it could constitutionally do so. It is only in + the event of war that powers conferred by the Constitution on + Congress can be delegated and then only for war purposes. As a state + of war would not exist at the time action was required, I do not + believe that it could be done, and any provision contracting to take + measures of this nature would be contrary to the Constitution and as + a consequence void. + + "But, assuming that Congress possessed the power of delegation, I am + convinced that it would not only refuse to do so, but would resent + such a suggestion because of the fact that both Houses have been and + are extremely jealous of their rights and authority. + + "Viewed from the standpoints of legality and expediency it would seem + necessary to find some other method than coercion in enforcing an + international guaranty, or else to find some substitute for a + guaranty which would be valueless without affirmative action to + support it. + + "I believe that such a substitute can be found." + +The foregoing memorandum was intended as an introduction to the negative +guaranty or "self-denying covenant" which I desired to lay before the +President as a substitute for the one upon which he intended to build +the League of Nations. The memorandum was suggestive merely, but in view +of the necessity for a speedy decision there was no time to prepare an +exhaustive legal opinion. Furthermore, I felt that the President, whose +hours were at that time crowded with numerous personal conferences and +public functions, would find little opportunity to peruse a long and +closely reasoned argument on the subject. + +The most important portion of the document was that entitled "_Suggested +Draft of Articles for Discussion_. December 20, 1918." It reads +as follows: + + "The parties to this convention, for the purpose of maintaining + international peace and preventing future wars between one another, + hereby constitute themselves into a League of Nations and solemnly + undertake jointly and severally to fulfill the obligations imposed + upon them in the following articles: + + "A + + "Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and + guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or + impair the political independence of any other power signatory or + adherent to this convention except when authorized so to do by a + decree of the arbitral tribunal hereinafter referred to or by a + three-fourths vote of the International Council of the League of + Nations created by this convention. + + "B + + "In the event that any power signatory or adherent hereto shall fail + to observe the covenant and guaranty set forth in the preceding + article, such breach of covenant and guaranty shall _ipso facto_ + operate as an abrogation of this convention in so far as it applies + to the offending power and furthermore as an abrogation of all + treaties, conventions, and agreements heretofore or hereafter entered + into between the offending power and all other powers signatory and + adherent to this convention. + + "C + + "A breach of the covenant and guaranty declared in Article A shall + constitute an act unfriendly to all other powers signatory and + adherent hereto, and they shall forthwith sever all diplomatic, + consular, and official relations with the offending power, and shall, + through the International Council, hereinafter provided for, exchange + views as to the measures necessary to restore the power, whose + sovereignty has been invaded, to the rights and liberties which it + possessed prior to such invasion and to prevent further + violation thereof. + + "D + + "Any interference with a vessel on the high seas or with aircraft + proceeding over the high seas, which interference is not + affirmatively sanctioned by the law of nations shall be, for the + purposes of this convention, considered an impairment of political + independence." + +In considering the foregoing series of articles constituting a guaranty +against one's own acts, instead of a guaranty against the acts of +another, it must be remembered that, at the time of their preparation, I +had not seen a draft of the President's proposed guaranty, though from +conversations with Colonel House and from my study of Point XIV of "The +Fourteen Points," I knew that it was affirmative rather than negative in +form and would require positive action to be effective in the event that +the menace of superior force was insufficient to prevent +aggressive acts. + +As far as I am able to judge from subsequently acquired knowledge, +President Wilson at the time he received my letter of December 23 had a +typewritten draft of the document which after certain amendments he +later laid before the American Commissioners and which he had printed +with a few verbal changes under the title of "The Covenant." In order to +understand the two forms of guaranty which he had for consideration +after he received my letter, I quote the article relating to it, which +appears in the first printed draft of the Covenant. + + III + + "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political + independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between + them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the + future become necessary by reasons of changes in present racial + conditions and aspirations or present social and political + relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and + also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three + fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest + interest of the people concerned, may be effected if agreeable to + those peoples; and that territorial changes may involve material + compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the + principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to + every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." + +It seems needless to comment upon the involved language and the +uncertainty of meaning of this article wherein it provided for +"territorial readjustments" of which there appeared to be two classes, +one dependent on "self-determination," the other on the judgment of the +Body of Delegates of the League. In view of the possible reasons which +might be advanced for changes in territory and allegiance, justification +for an appeal to the guarantors was by no means certain. If this article +had been before me when the letter of December 23 was written, I might +have gone much further in opposition to the President's plan for +stabilizing peace in the world on the ground that a guaranty so +conditioned would cause rather than prevent international discord. + +Though without knowledge of the exact terms of the President's proposed +guaranty, I did not feel for the reason stated that I could delay longer +in submitting my views to the President. There was not time to work out +a complete and well-digested plan for a League, but I had prepared in +the rough several articles for discussion which related to the +organization, and which might be incorporated in the organic agreement +which I then assumed would be a separate document from the treaty +restoring peace. While unwilling to lay these articles before the +President until they were more carefully drafted, I enclosed in my +letter the following as indicative of the character of the organization +which it seemed to me would form a simple and practical agency common to +all nations: + + "_Suggestions as to an International Council For Discussion_ + + "_December_ 21, 1918 + + "An International Council of the League of Nations is hereby + constituted, which shall be the channel for communication between the + members of the League, and the agent for common action. + + "The International Council shall consist of the diplomatic + representative of each party signatory or adherent to this + convention at ----. + + "Meetings of the International Council shall be held at ----, or in + the event that the subject to be considered involves the interests of + ---- or its nationals, then at such other place outside the territory + of a power whose interests are involved as the Supervisory Committee + of the Council shall designate. + + "The officer charged with the conduct of the foreign affairs of the + power where a meeting is held shall be the presiding officer thereof. + + "At the first meeting of the International Council a Supervisory + Committee shall be chosen by a majority vote of the members present, + which shall consist of five members and shall remain in office for + two years or until their successors are elected. + + "The Supervisory Committee shall name a Secretariat which shall have + charge of the archives of the Council and receive all communications + addressed to the Council or Committee and send all communications + issued by the Council or Committee. + + "The Supervisory Committee may draft such rules of procedure as it + deems necessary for conducting business coming before the Council or + before the Committee. + + "The Supervisory Committee may call a meeting of the Council at its + discretion and must call a meeting at the request of any member of + the Council provided the request contains a written statement of the + subject to be discussed. + + "The archives of the Council shall be open at any time to any member + of the Council, who may make and retain copies thereof. + + "All expenses of the Supervisory Committee and Secretariat shall be + borne equally by all powers signatory or adherent to this + convention." + +As indicated by the caption, this document was intended merely "for +discussion" of the principal features of the organization. It should be +noted that the basic principle is the equality of nations. No special +privileges are granted to the major powers in the conduct of the +organization. The rights and obligations of one member of the League are +no more and no less than those of every other member. It is based on +international democracy and denies international aristocracy. + +Equality in the exercise of sovereign rights in times of peace, an +equality which is imposed by the very nature of sovereignty, seemed to +me fundamental to a world organization affecting in any way a nation's +independence of action or its exercise of supreme authority over its +external or domestic affairs. In my judgment any departure from that +principle would be a serious error fraught with danger to the general +peace of the world and to the recognized law of nations, since it could +mean nothing less than the primacy of the Great Powers and the +acknowledgment that because they possessed the physical might they had a +right to control the affairs of the world in times of peace as well as +in times of war. For the United States to admit that such primacy ought +to be formed would be bad enough, but to suggest it indirectly by +proposing an international organization based on that idea would be +far worse. + +On January 22, 1917, the President in an address to the Senate had made +the following declaration: + + "The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to + last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must + neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations or + small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right + must be based upon the common strength, not the individual strength, + of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of + territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other + sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate + development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects + anything more than an equality of rights." + +In view of this sound declaration of principle it seemed hardly possible +that the President, after careful consideration of the consequences of +his plan of a guaranty requiring force to make it practical, would not +perceive the fundamental error of creating a primacy of the +Great Powers. + +It was in order to prevent, if possible, the United States from becoming +sponsor for an undemocratic principle that I determined to lay my +partial plan of organization before the President at the earliest moment +that I believed it would receive consideration. + +To my letter of December 23 with its enclosed memoranda I never received +a reply or even an acknowledgment. It is true that the day following its +delivery the President went to Chaumont to spend Christmas at the +headquarters of General Pershing and that almost immediately thereafter +he visited London and two or three days after his return to Paris he set +out for Rome. It is possible that Mr. Wilson in the midst of these +crowded days had no time to digest or even to read my letter and its +enclosed memoranda. It is possible that he was unable or unwilling to +form an opinion as to their merits without time for meditation. I do not +wish to be unjustly critical or to blame the President for a neglect +which was the result of circumstance rather than of intention. + +At the time I assumed that his failure to mention my letter in any way +was because his visits to royalty exacted from him so much of his time +that there was no opportunity to give the matter consideration. While +some doubt was thrown on this assumption by the fact that the President +held an hour's conference with the American Commissioners on January 1, +just before departing for Italy, during which he discussed the favorable +attitude of Mr. Lloyd George toward his (the President's) ideas as to a +League of Nations, but never made any reference to my proposed +substitute for the guaranty, I was still disposed to believe that there +was a reasonable explanation for his silence and that upon his return +from Rome he would discuss it. + +Having this expectation I continued the preparation of tentative +provisions to be included in the charter of a League of Nations in the +event one was negotiated, and which would in any event constitute a +guide for the preparation of declarations to be included in the Treaty +of Peace in case the negotiation as to a League was postponed until +after peace had been restored. As has been said, it was my hope that +there would be a separate convention organizing the League, but I was +not as sanguine of this as many who believed this course would +be followed. + +It later developed that the President never had any other purpose than +to include the detailed plan of organization in the peace treaty, +whether the treaty was preliminary or definitive. When he departed for +Italy he had not declared this purpose to the Commissioners, but from +some source, which I failed to note at the time and cannot now +recollect, I gained the impression that he intended to pursue this +policy, for on December 29 I wrote in my book of notes: + + "It is evident that the President is determined to incorporate in the + peace treaty an elaborate scheme for the League of Nations which will + excite all sorts of opposition at home and abroad and invite much + discussion. + + "The articles relating to the League ought to be few and brief. They + will not be. They will be many and long. If we wait till they are + accepted, it will be four or five months before peace is signed, and + I fear to say how much longer it will take to have it ratified. + + "It is perhaps foolish to prophesy, but I will take the chance. Two + months from now we will still be haggling over the League of Nations + and an exasperated world will be cursing us for not having made + peace. I hope that I am a false prophet, but I fear my prophecy will + come true. We are riding a hobby, and riding to a fall." + +By the time the President returned from his triumphal journey to Rome I +had completed the articles upon which I had been working; at least they +were in form for discussion. At a conference at the Hôtel Crillon +between President Wilson and the American Commissioners on January 7, I +handed to him the draft articles saying that they were supplemental to +my letter of December 23. He took them without comment and without +making any reference to my unanswered letter. + +The first two articles of the "International Agreement," as I termed the +document, were identical in language with the memoranda dealing with a +mutual covenant and with an international council which I had enclosed +in my letter of December 23. It is needless, therefore, to repeat +them here. + +Article III of the so-called "Agreement" was entitled "Peaceful +Settlements of International Disputes," and read as follows: + + "_Clause_ 1 + + "In the event that there is a controversy between two or more members + of the League of Nations which fails of settlement through diplomatic + channels, one of the following means of settlement shall be employed: + + "1. The parties to the controversy shall constitute a joint + commission to investigate and report jointly or severally to their + Governments the facts and make recommendations as to settlement. + After such report a further effort shall be made to reach a + diplomatic settlement of the controversy. + + "2. The parties shall by agreement arrange for the submission of the + controversy to arbitration mutually agreed upon, or to the Arbitral + Tribunal hereinafter referred to. + + "3. Any party may, unless the second means of settlement is mutually + adopted, submit the controversy to the Supervisory Committee of the + International Council; and the Committee shall forthwith (a) name and + direct a special commission to investigate and report upon the + subject; (b) name and direct a commission to mediate between the + parties to the controversy; or (c) direct the parties to submit the + controversy to the Arbitral Tribunal for judicial settlement, it + being understood that the direction to arbitrate may be made at any + time in the event that investigation and mediation fail to result in + a settlement of the controversy. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "No party to a controversy shall assume any authority or perform any + acts based upon disputed rights without authorization of the + Supervisory Committee, such authorization being limited in all cases + to the pendency of the controversy and its final settlement and being + in no way prejudicial to the rights of the parties. An authorization + thus granted by the Supervisory Committee may be modified or + superseded by mutual agreement of the parties, by order of an + arbitrator or arbitrators selected by the parties, or by order of the + Arbitral Tribunal if the controversy is submitted to it. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "The foregoing clause shall not apply to cases in which the + constituted authorities of a power are unable or fail to give + protection to the lives and property of nationals of another power. + In the event that it becomes necessary for a power to use its + military or naval forces to safeguard the lives or property of its + nationals within the territorial jurisdiction of another power, the + facts and reasons for such action shall be forthwith reported to the + Supervisory Committee, which shall determine the course of action to + be adopted in order to protect the rights of all parties, and shall + notify the same to the governments involved which shall comply with + such notification. In the event that a government fails to comply + therewith it shall be deemed to have violated the covenant and + guaranty hereinbefore set forth." + +The other articles follow: + + "ARTICLE IV + + "_Revision of Arbitral Tribunal and Codification of International + Law_ + + "_Clause 1_ + + "The International Council, within one year after its organization, + shall notify to the powers signatory and adherent to this convention + and shall invite all other powers to send delegates to an + international conference at such place and time as the Council may + determine and not later than six months after issuance of such + notification and invitation. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "The International Conference shall consider the revision of the + constitution and procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal and provisions + for the amicable settlement of international disputes established by + the I Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907, and shall formulate codes + embodying the principles of international law applicable in time of + peace and the rules of warfare on land and sea and in the air. The + revision and codification when completed shall be embodied in a + treaty or treaties. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "The International Council shall prepare and submit with the + notification and invitation above provided a preliminary programme of + the International Conference, which shall be subject to modification + or amendment by the Conference. + + "_Clause 4_ + + "Until the treaty of revision of the constitution and procedure of + the Arbitral Tribunal becomes operative, the provisions of the I + Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907 shall continue in force, and all + references herein to the 'Arbitral Tribunal' shall be understood to + be the Tribunal constituted under the I Treaty, but upon the treaty + of revision coming into force the references shall be construed as + applying to the Arbitral Tribunal therein constituted. + + "ARTICLE V + + "_Publication of Treaties and Agreements_ + + "_Clause 1_ + + "Each power, signatory or adherent to this convention, severally + agrees with all other parties hereto that it will not exchange the + ratification of any treaty or convention hereinafter entered into by + it with any other power until thirty days after the full text of such + treaty or convention has been published in the public press of the + parties thereto and a copy has been filed with the Secretariat of the + League of Nations. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "No international agreement, to which a power signatory or adherent + to this convention, is a party, shall become operative or be put in + force until published and filed as aforesaid. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "All treaties, conventions and agreements, to which a power, + signatory or adherent to this convention, is a party, and which are + in force or to come into force and which have not been heretofore + published, shall within six months after the signature of this + convention be published and filed as aforesaid or abrogated or + denounced. + + "ARTICLE VI + + "_Equality of Commercial Privileges_ + + "The powers, signatory and adherent to this convention agree jointly + and severally not to discriminate against or in favor of any power in + the matter of commerce or trade or of industrial privileges; and they + further agree that all treaties, conventions and agreements now in + force or to come into force or hereinafter negotiated shall be + considered as subject to the 'most favored nation' doctrine, whether + they contain or do not contain a clause to that effect. It is + specifically declared that it is the purpose of this article not to + limit any power in imposing upon commerce and trade such restrictions + and burdens as it may deem proper but to make such impositions apply + equally and impartially to all other powers, their nationals + and ships. + + "This article shall not apply, however, to any case, in which a power + has committed an unfriendly act against the members of the League of + Nations as defined in Article I and in which commercial and trade + relations are denied or restricted by agreements between the members + as a measure of restoration or protection of the rights of a power + injured by such unfriendly act." + +These proposed articles, which were intended for discussion before +drafting the provisions constituting a League of Nations and which did +not purport to be a completed document, are given in full because there +seems no simpler method of showing the differences between the President +and me as to the form, functions, and authority of an international +organization. They should be compared with the draft of the "Covenant" +which the President had when these proposed articles were handed to him; +the text of the President's draft appears in the Appendix (page 281). +Comparison will disclose the irreconcilable differences between the +two projects. + +Of these differences the most vital was in the character of the +international guaranty of territorial and political sovereignty. That +difference has already been discussed. The second in importance was the +practical repudiation by the President of the doctrine of the equality +of nations, which, as has been shown, was an unavoidable consequence of +an affirmative guaranty which he had declared to be absolutely essential +to an effective world union. The repudiation, though by indirection, was +none the less evident in the recognition in the President's plan of the +primacy of the Great Powers through giving to them a permanent majority +on the "Executive Council" which body substantially controlled the +activities of the League. A third marked difference was in Mr. Wilson's +exaltation of the executive power of the League and the subordination of +the administration of legal justice to that power, and in my advocacy of +an independent international judiciary, whose decisions would be final +and whose place in the organization of the nations would be superior, +since I considered a judicial tribunal the most practical agency for +removing causes of war. + +The difference as to international courts and the importance of applied +legal justice requires further consideration in order to understand the +divergence of views which existed as to the fundamental idea of +organization of the League. + +President Wilson in his Covenant, as at first submitted to the American +Commissioners, made no provision for the establishment of a World Court +of Justice, and no reference of any sort was made to The Hague Tribunal +of Arbitration. It is not, in my opinion, a misstatement to say that the +President intentionally omitted judicial means of composing +international disputes preferring to leave settlements of that sort to +arrangement between the parties or else to the Body of Delegates or the +Executive Council, both of which bodies being essentially diplomatic or +political in their composition would lack the judicial point of view, +since their members would presumably be influenced by their respective +national interests and by political considerations rather than by a +desire and purpose to do impartial justice by applying legal principles. + +It is true that in Article V of the first draft of the Covenant +(Appendix) there is an agreement to submit to arbitration +certain classes of controversies and a method of selecting arbitrators +is provided--a method, by the way, which the actual experience of a +century has shown to be the least satisfactory in administering legal +justice, since it almost inevitably leads to a compromise which impairs +the just rights of one of the parties. But, to my mind, a provision, far +more objectionable than the antiquated and unsatisfactory method of +arbitration provided, was that which made an arbitral award reviewable +on appeal to the Body of Delegates of the League, which could set aside +the award even if the arbitrators had rendered a unanimous decision and +compel a rehearing before other arbitrators. International arbitration +as a method of applying the principles of justice to disputes between +nations would, in the first instance at least, have become a farce if +this provision had been adopted. As an award based on compromise is +seldom, if ever, satisfactory to both parties, the right of appeal would +in substantially every case have been invoked and the award would have +been reviewed by the Body of Delegates, who would practically render a +final decision since the new arbitrators would presumably adopt it. The +effect of this provision as to appeals was, therefore, to supplant +judicial settlements by political compromises and diplomatic +adjustments, in which the national interests of the judges, many of whom +would be untrained in juridical procedure, would be decided, if not +deciding, factors. Manifestly the expediency of the moment would be far +more potent in the decisions reached than the principles and precepts of +international law. + +I shall not express here my opinion as to the reasons which I believe +impelled the President to insert in the Covenant these extraordinary +provisions which deprived arbitral courts of that independence of the +executive authority which has been in modern times considered essential +to the impartial administration of justice. But, when one considers how +jealously and effectively the Constitution of the United States and the +constitutions of the various States of the Union guard the judiciary +from executive and legislative interference, the proposal in the +President's plan for a League of Nations to abandon that great principle +in the settlement of international disputes of a justiciable nature +causes speculation as to Mr. Wilson's real opinion of the American +political system which emphasizes the separation and independence of the +three coordinate branches of government. + +That a provision found its way into the draft of the Covenant, which the +President, on February 3, 1919, laid before the Commission on the League +of Nations, declaring for the creation by the League of a permanent +court of international justice, was not due, I feel sure, to any +spontaneous thought on the part of President Wilson. + +My own views as to the relative value of the settlement of an +international controversy, which is by its nature justiciable, by a body +of diplomats and of the settlement by a body of trained jurists were +fully set forth in an address which I delivered before the American Bar +Association at its annual meeting at Boston on September 5,1919. + +An extract from that address will show the radical difference between +the President's views and mine. + + "While abstract justice cannot [under present conditions] be depended + upon as a firm basis on which to constitute an international concord + for the preservation of peace and good relations between nations, + legal justice offers a common ground where the nations can meet to + settle their controversies. No nation can refuse in the face of the + opinion of the world to declare its unwillingness to recognize the + legal rights of other nations or to submit to the judgment of an + impartial tribunal a dispute involving the determination of such + rights. The moment, however, that we go beyond the clearly defined + field of legal justice we enter the field of diplomacy where national + interests and ambitions are to-day the controlling factors of + national action. Concession and compromise are the chief agents of + diplomatic settlement instead of the impartial application of legal + justice which is essential to a judicial settlement. Furthermore, the + two modes of settlement differ in that a judicial settlement rests + upon the precept that all nations, whether great or small, are equal, + but in the sphere of diplomacy the inequality of nations is not only + recognized, but unquestionably influences the adjustment of + international differences. Any change in the relative power of + nations, a change which is continually taking place, makes more or + less temporary diplomatic settlements, but in no way affects a + judicial settlement. + + "However, then, international society may be organized for the future + and whatever machinery may be set up to minimize the possibilities of + war, I believe that the agency which may be counted upon to function + with certainty is that which develops and applies legal justice." + +Every other agency, regardless of its form, will be found, when +analyzed, to be diplomatic in character and subject to those impulses +and purposes which generally affect diplomatic negotiations. With a full +appreciation of the advantage to be gained for the world at large +through the common consideration of a vexatious international question +by a body representing all nations, we ought not to lose sight of the +fact that such consideration and the action resulting from it are +essentially diplomatic in nature. It is, in brief, the transference of a +dispute in a particular case from the capitals of the disputants to the +place where the delegates of the nations assemble to deliberate together +on matters which affect their common interests. It does not--and this we +should understand--remove the question from the processes of diplomacy +or prevent the influences which enter into diplomacy from affecting its +consideration. Nor does it to an appreciable extent change the actual +inequality which exists among nations in the matter of power and +influence. + + "On the other hand, justice applied through the agency of an + impartial tribunal clothed with an international jurisdiction + eliminates the diplomatic methods of compromise and concession and + recognizes that before the law all nations are equal and equally + entitled to the exercise of their rights as sovereign and independent + states. In a word, international democracy exists in the sphere of + legal justice and, up to the present time, in no other relation + between nations. + + "Let us, then, with as little delay as possible establish an + international tribunal or tribunals of justice with The Hague Court + as a foundation; let us provide an easier, a cheaper, and better + procedure than now exists; and let us draft a simple and concise body + of legal principles to be applied to the questions to be adjudicated. + When that has been accomplished--and it ought not to be a difficult + task if the delegates of the Governments charged with it are chosen + for their experience and learning in the field of jurisprudence--we + shall, in my judgment, have done more to prevent international wars + through removing their causes than can be done by any other means + that has been devised or suggested." + +The views, which I thus publicly expressed at Boston in September, 1919, +while the President was upon his tour of the country in favor of the +Covenant of the League of Nations, were the same as those that I held at +Paris in December, 1918, before I had seen the President's first draft +of a Covenant, as the following will indicate. + +On December 17, 1918, three days after arriving in Paris, I had, as has +been stated, a long conference with Colonel House on the Peace +Conference and the subjects to come before it. I urged him in the course +of our conversation "to persuade the President to make the nucleus of +his proposed League of Nations an international court pointing out that +it was the simplest and best way of organizing the world for peace, and +that, if in addition the general principles of international law were +codified and the right of inquiry confided to the court, everything +practical would have been done to prevent wars in the future" (quoted +from a memorandum of the conversation made at the time). I also urged +upon the Colonel that The Hague Tribunal be made the basis of the +judicial organization, but that it be expanded and improved to meet the +new conditions. I shall have something further to say on this subject. + +Reverting now to the draft of articles which I had in form on January 5, +1919, it must be borne in mind that I then had no reason to think that +the President would omit from his plan an independent judicial agency +for the administration of legal justice, although I did realize that he +gave first place to the mutual guaranty and intended to build a League +on that as a nucleus. It did not seem probable that an American, a +student of the political institutions of the United States and familiar +with their operation, would fail to incorporate in any scheme for world +organization a judicial system which would be free from the control and +even from the influence of the political and diplomatic branch of the +organization. The benefit, if not the necessity, of such a division of +authority seemed so patent that the omission of a provision to that +effect in the original draft of the Covenant condemned it to one who +believed in the principles of government which found expression in +American institutions. Fortunately the defect was in a measure cured +before the Commission on the League of Nations formally met to discuss +the subject, though not before the Covenant had been laid before the +American Commissioners. + +The articles of a proposed convention for the creation of an +international organization were not intended, as I have said, to form a +complete convention. They were suggestive only of the principal features +of a plan which could, if the President desired, arouse discussion as to +the right theory and the fundamental principles of the international +organization which there seemed little doubt would be declared by the +Paris Conference. + +Among the suggested articles there was none covering the subject of +disarmament, because the problem was highly technical requiring the +consideration of military and naval experts. Nor was there any reference +to the mandatory system because there had not been, to my knowledge, any +mention of it at that time in connection with the President's plan, +though General Smuts had given it prominence in his proposed scheme. + +During the preparation of these suggestive articles I made a brief +memorandum on the features, which seemed to me salient, of any +international agreement to prevent wars in the future, and which in my +opinion ought to be in mind when drafting such an agreement. The first +three paragraphs of the memorandum follow: + + "There are three doctrines which should be incorporated in the Treaty + of Peace if wars are to be avoided and equal justice is to prevail in + international affairs. + + "These three doctrines may be popularly termed 'Hands Off,' the 'Open + Door,' and 'Publicity.' + + "The first pertains to national possessions and national rights; the + second to international commerce and economic conditions; and the + third, to international agreements." + +An examination of the articles which I prepared shows that these +doctrines are developed in them, although at the time I was uncertain +whether they ought to appear in the convention creating the League or in +the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, which I believed, in common with the +prevailing belief, would be negotiated. My impression was that they +should appear in the Peace Treaty and possibly be repeated in the League +Treaty, if the two were kept distinct. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER + + +While I was engaged in the preparation of these articles for discussion, +which were based primarily on the equality of nations and avoided a +mutual guaranty or other undertaking necessitating a departure from that +principle, M. Clemenceau delivered an important address in the Chamber +of Deputies at its session on December 30, 1918. In this address the +French Premier declared himself in favor of maintaining the doctrine of +"the balance of power" and of supporting it by a concert of the Great +Powers. During his remarks he made the following significant assertion, +"This system of alliances, which I do not renounce, will be my guiding +thought at the Conference, if your confidence sends me to it, so that +there will be no separation in peace of the four powers which have +battled side by side." + +M. Clemenceau's words caused a decided sensation among the delegates +already in Paris and excited much comment in the press. The public +interest was intensified by the fact that President Wilson had but a day +or two before, in an address at Manchester, England, denounced the +doctrine of "the balance of power" as belonging to the old international +order which had been repudiated because it had produced the conditions +that resulted in the Great War. + +A week after the delivery of M. Clemenceau's address I discussed his +declarations at some length with Colonel House, and he agreed with me +that the doctrine was entirely contrary to the public opinion of the +world and that every effort should be made to prevent its revival and to +end the "system of alliances" which M. Clemenceau desired to continue. + +During this conversation I pointed out that the form of affirmative +guaranty, which the President then had in mind, would unavoidably impose +the burden of enforcing it upon the Great Powers, and that they, having +that responsibility, would demand the right to decide at what time and +in what manner the guaranty should be enforced. This seemed to me to be +only a different application of the principle expressed in the doctrine +of "the balance of power" and to amount to a practical continuance of +the alliances formed for prosecution of the war. I said that, in my +judgment, if the President's guaranty was made the central idea of the +League of Nations, it would play directly into the hands of M. +Clemenceau because it could mean nothing other than the primacy of the +great military and naval powers; that I could not understand how the +President was able to harmonize his plan of a positive guaranty with his +utterances at Manchester; and that, if he clung to his plan, he would +have to accept the Clemenceau doctrine, which would to all intents +transform the Conference into a second Congress of Vienna and result in +a reversion to the old undesirable order, and its continuance in the +League of Nations. + +It was my hope that Colonel House, to whom I had shown the letter and +memoranda which I had sent to the President, would be so impressed with +the inconsistency of favoring the affirmative guaranty and of opposing +the doctrine of "the balance of power," that he would exert his +influence with the President to persuade him to find a substitute for +the guaranty which Mr. Wilson then favored. It seemed politic to +approach the President in this way in view of the fact that he had never +acknowledged my letter or manifested any inclination to discuss the +subject with me. + +This hope was increased when the Colonel came to me on the evening of +the same day that we had the conversation related above and told me that +he was "entirely converted" to my plan for a negative guaranty and for +the organization of a League. + +At this second interview Colonel House gave me a typewritten copy of the +President's plan and asked me to examine it and to suggest a way to +amend it so that it would harmonize with my views. This was the first +time that I had seen the President's complete plan for a League. My +previous knowledge had been gained orally and was general and more or +less vague in character except as to the guaranty of which I had an +accurate idea through the President's "Bases of Peace" of 1917, and +Point XIV of his address of January 8, 1918. At the time that the +typewritten plan was handed to me another copy had already been given to +the printer of the Commission. It was evident, therefore, that the +President was satisfied with the document. It contained the theory and +fundamental principles which he advocated for world organization. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN + + +I immediately began an examination and analysis of the President's plan +for a League, having in mind Colonel House's suggestion that I consider +a way to modify it so that it would harmonize with my views. The more I +studied the document, the less I liked it. A cursory reading of the +plan, which is printed in the Appendix (page 281), will disclose the +looseness of the language and the doubtful interpretation of many of the +provisions. It showed an inexpertness in drafting and a fault in +expression which were chargeable to lack of appreciation of the need of +exactness or else to haste in preparation. This fault in the paper, +which was very apparent, could, however, be cured and was by no means a +fatal defect. As a matter of fact, the faults of expression were to a +certain extent removed by subsequent revisions, though some of the +vagueness and ambiguity of the first draft persisted and appeared in the +final text of the Covenant. + +The more serious defects of the plan were in the principles on which it +was based and in their application under the provisions of the articles +proposed. The contemplated use of force in making good the guaranty of +sovereign rights and the establishment of a primacy of the Great Powers +were provided for in language which was sufficiently explicit to admit +of no denial. In my opinion these provisions were entirely out of +harmony with American ideals, policies, and traditions. Furthermore, the +clauses in regard to arbitration and appeals from arbitral awards, to +which reference has been made, the lack of any provision for the +establishment of a permanent international judiciary, and the +introduction of the mandatory system were strong reasons to reject the +President's plan. + +It should be borne in mind that, at the time that this document was +placed in my hands, the plan of General Smuts for a League of Nations +had, as I have said, been printed in the press and in pamphlet form and +had been given wide publicity. In the Smuts plan, which gave first place +to the system of mandates, appeared the declaration that the League of +Nations was to acquire the mandated territories as "the heir of the +Empires." This clever and attractive phrase caught the fancy of the +President, as was evident from his frequent repetition and approval of +it in discussing mandates under the League. Just as General Smuts had +adopted the President's "self-determination," Mr. Wilson seized upon the +Smuts idea with avidity and incorporated it in his plan. It +unquestionably had a decided influence upon his conception of the right +way to dispose of the colonial possessions of Germany and of the proper +relation of the newly created European states to the League of Nations. +As an example of the way in which President Wilson understood and +applied General Smuts's phrase to the new states, I quote the following +from the "Supplementary Agreements" forming part of the first printed +draft of the President's Covenant, but which I believe were added to the +typewritten draft after the President had examined the plan of the South +African statesman: + + "As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, + directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations + _inter se_ of all new independent states arising or created out of + the Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating + and composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance + of settled order and the general peace." + +There is a natural temptation to a student of international agreements +to analyze critically the composition and language of this provision, +but to do so would in no way advance the consideration of the subject +under discussion and would probably be interpreted as a criticism of the +President's skill in accurately expressing his thoughts, a criticism +which it is not my purpose to make. + +Mr. Wilson's draft also contained a system of mandates over territories +in a form which was, to say the least, rudimentary if not inadequate. By +the proposed system the League of Nations, as "the residuary trustee," +was to take sovereignty over "the peoples and territories" of the +defeated Empires and to issue a mandate to some power or powers to +exercise such sovereignty. A "residuary trustee" was a novelty in +international relations sufficient to arouse conjecture as to its +meaning, but giving to the League the character of an independent state +with the capacity of possessing sovereignty and the power to exercise +sovereign rights through a designated agent was even more extraordinary. +This departure from the long accepted idea of the essentials of +statehood seemed to me an inexpedient and to a degree a dangerous +adventure. The only plausible excuse for the proposal seemed to be a +lack of knowledge as to the nature of sovereignty and as to the +attributes inherent in the very conception of a state. The character of +a mandate, a mandatory, and the authority issuing the mandate presented +many legal perplexities which certainly required very careful study +before the experiment was tried. Until the system was fully worked out +and the problems of practical operation were solved, it seemed to me +unwise to suggest it and still more unwise to adopt it. While the +general idea of mandates issuing from the proposed international +organization was presumably acceptable to the President from the first, +his support was doubtless confirmed by the fact that it followed the +groove which had been made in his mind by the Smuts phrase "the heir of +the Empires." + +In any event it seemed to me the course of wise statesmanship to +postpone the advocacy of mandates, based on the assumption that the +League of Nations could become the possessor of sovereignty, until the +practical application of the theory could be thoroughly considered from +the standpoint of international law as well as from the standpoint of +policy. The experiment was too revolutionary to be tried without +hesitation and without consideration of the effect on established +principles and usage. At an appropriate place this subject will be more +fully discussed. + +As to the organization and functions of the League of Nations planned by +Mr. Wilson there was little that appealed to one who was opposed to the +employment of force in compelling the observance of international +obligations and to the establishment of an international oligarchy of +the Great Powers to direct and control world affairs. The basic +principle of the plan was that the strong should, as a matter of right +recognized by treaty, possess a dominant voice in international +councils. Obviously the principle of the equality of nations was ignored +or abandoned. In the face of the repeated declarations of the Government +of the United States in favor of the equality of independent states as +to their rights in times of peace, this appeared to be a reversal of +policy which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain in a +satisfactory way. Personally I could not subscribe to this principle +which was so destructive of the American theory of the proper relations +between nations. + +It was manifest, when I read the President's plan, that there was no +possible way to harmonize my ideas with it. They were fundamentally +different. There was no common basis on which to build. To attempt to +bring the two theories into accord would have been futile. I, therefore, +told Colonel House that it was useless to try to bring into accord the +two plans, since they were founded on contradictory principles and that +the only course of procedure open to me was to present my views to the +President in written form, hoping that he would give them consideration, +although fearing that his mind was made up, since he had ordered his +plan to be printed. + +In the afternoon of the same day (January 7), on which I informed the +Colonel of the impossibility of harmonizing and uniting the two plans, +President Wilson held a conference with the American Commissioners +during which he declared that he considered the affirmative guaranty +absolutely necessary to the preservation of future peace and the only +effective means of preventing war. Before this declaration could be +discussed M. Clemenceau was announced and the conference came to an end. +While the President did not refer in any way to the "self-denying +covenant" which I had proposed as a substitute, it seemed to me that he +intended it to be understood that the substitute was rejected, and that +he had made the declaration with that end in view. This was the nearest +approach to an answer to my letter of December 23 that I ever received. +Indirect as it was the implication was obvious. + +Although the settled purpose of the President to insist on his form of +mutual guaranty was discouraging and his declaration seemed to be +intended to close debate on the subject, I felt that no effort should be +spared to persuade him to change his views or at least to leave open an +avenue for further consideration. Impelled by this motive I gave to the +President the articles which I had drafted and asked him if he would be +good enough to read them and consider the principles on which they were +based. The President with his usual courtesy of manner smilingly +received them. Whether or not he ever read them I cannot state +positively because he never mentioned them to me or, to my knowledge, to +any one else. I believe, however, that he did read them and realized +that they were wholly opposed to the theory which he had evolved, +because from that time forward he seemed to assume that I was hostile to +his plan for a League of Nations. I drew this conclusion from the fact +that he neither asked my advice as to any provision of the Covenant nor +discussed the subject with me personally. In many little ways he showed +that he preferred to have me direct my activities as a Commissioner into +other channels and to keep away from the subject of a League. The +conviction that my counsel was unwelcome to Mr. Wilson was, of course, +not formed at the time that he received the articles drafted by me. It +only developed after some time had elapsed, during which incidents took +place that aroused a suspicion which finally became a conviction. +Possibly I was over-sensitive as to the President's treatment of my +communications to him. Possibly he considered my advice of no value, +and, therefore, unworthy of discussion. But, in view of his letter of +February 11, 1920, it must be admitted that he recognized that I was +reluctant in accepting certain of his views at Paris, a recognition +which arose from my declared opposition to them. Except in the case of +the Shantung settlement, there was none concerning which our judgments +were so at variance as they were concerning the League of Nations. I +cannot believe, therefore, that I was wrong in my conclusion as to +his attitude. + +On the two days succeeding the one when I handed the President my draft +of articles I had long conferences with Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel +House. Previous to these conferences, or at least previous to the second +one, I examined Lord Robert's plan for a League. His plan was based on +the proposition that the Supreme War Council, consisting of the Heads of +States and the Secretaries and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Five +Great Powers, should be perpetuated as a permanent international body +which should meet once a year and discuss subjects of common interest. +That is, he proposed the formation of a Quintuple Alliance which would +constitute itself primate over all nations and the arbiter in world +affairs, a scheme of organization very similar to the one proposed by +General Smuts. + +Lord Robert made no attempt to disguise the purpose of his plan. It was +intended to place in the hands of the Five Powers the control of +international relations and the direction in large measure of the +foreign policies of all nations. It was based on the power to compel +obedience, on the right of the powerful to rule. Its chief merit was its +honest declaration of purpose, however wrong that purpose might appear +to those who denied that the possession of superior might conferred +special rights upon the possessor. It seemed to provide for a rebirth of +the Congress of Vienna which should be clothed in the modern garb of +democracy. It could only be interpreted as a rejection of the principle +of the equality of nations. Its adoption would mean that the destiny of +the world would be in the hands of a powerful international oligarchy +possessed of dictatorial powers. + +There was nothing idealistic in the plan of Lord Robert Cecil, although +he was reputed to be an idealist favoring a new international order. An +examination of his plan (Appendix) shows it to be a substantial revival +of the old and discredited ideas of a century ago. There could be no +doubt that a plan of this sort, materialistic and selfish as it was, +would win the approval and cordial support of M. Clemenceau, since it +fitted in with his public advocacy of the doctrine of "the balance of +power." Presumably the Italian delegates would not be opposed to a +scheme which gave Italy so influential a voice in international affairs, +while the Japanese, not averse to this recognition of their national +power and importance, would unquestionably favor an alliance of this +nature. I think that it is fair to assume that all of the Five Great +Powers would have readily accepted the Cecil plan--all except the +United States. + +This plan, however, did not meet with the approval of President Wilson, +and his open opposition to it became an obstacle which prevented its +consideration in the form in which it was proposed. It is a matter of +speculation what reasons appealed to the President and caused him to +oppose the plan, although the principle of primacy found application in +a different and less radical form in his own plan of organization. +Possibly he felt that the British statesman's proposal too frankly +declared the coalition and oligarchy of the Five Powers, and that there +should be at least the appearance of cooperation on the part of the +lesser nations. Of course, in view of the perpetual majority of the Five +Powers on the Executive Council, as provided in the President's plan, +the primacy of the Five was weakened little if at all by the minority +membership of the small nations. The rule of unanimity gave to each +nation a veto power, but no one believed that one of the lesser states +represented on the Council would dare to exercise it if the Great Powers +were unanimous in support of a proposition. In theory unanimity was a +just and satisfactory rule; in practice it would amount to nothing. The +President may also have considered the council proposed by Lord Robert +to be inexpedient in view of the political organization of the United +States. The American Government had no actual premier except the +President, and it seemed out of the question for him to attend an annual +meeting of the proposed council. It would result in the President +sending a personal representative who would unavoidably be in a +subordinate position when sitting with the European premiers. I think +this latter reason was a very valid one, but that the first one, which +seemed to appeal especially to the President, had little real merit. + +In addition to his objection to the Cecil plan of administration, +another was doubtless of even greater weight to Mr. Wilson and that was +the entire omission in the Cecil proposal of the mutual guaranty of +political independence and territorial integrity. The method of +preventing wars which was proposed by Lord Robert was for the nations to +enter into a covenant to submit disputes to international investigation +and to obtain a report before engaging in hostilities and also a +covenant not to make war on a disputant nation which accepted a report +which had been unanimously adopted. He further proposed that the members +of the League should undertake to regard themselves as _ipso facto_ at +war with a member violating these covenants and "to take, jointly and +severally, appropriate military, economic, and other measures against +the recalcitrant State," thus following closely the idea of the League +to Enforce Peace. + +Manifestly this last provision in the Cecil plan was open to the same +constitutional objections as those which could be raised against the +President's mutual guaranty. My impression is that Mr. Wilson's +opposition to the provision was not based on the ground that it was in +contravention of the Constitution of the United States, but rather on +the ground that it did not go far enough in stabilizing the terms of +peace which were to be negotiated. The President was seeking permanency +by insuring, through the threat or pressure of international force, a +condition of changelessness in boundaries and sovereign rights, subject, +nevertheless, to territorial changes based either on the principle of +"self-determination" or on a three-fourths vote of the Body of +Delegates. He, nevertheless, discussed the subject with Lord Robert +Cecil prior to laying his draft of a Covenant before the American +Commissioners, as is evident by comparing it with the Cecil plan, for +certain phrases are almost identical in language in the two documents. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +SELF-DETERMINATION + + +The mutual guaranty which was advocated by President Wilson appears as +Article III of his original draft of a Covenant. It reads as follows: + + "ARTICLE III + + "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political + independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between + them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the + future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial + conditions and aspirations or present social and political + relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and + also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three + fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest + interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to + those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve + material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without + reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in + importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." + +In the revised draft, which he laid before the Commission +on the League of Nations at its first session Article III +became Article 7. It is as follows: + + "ARTICLE 7 + + "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as + against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing + political independence of all States members of the League." + +The guaranty was finally incorporated in the Treaty of Peace as Article +10. It reads: + + "ARTICLE 10 + + "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as + against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing + political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any + such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression + the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation + shall be fulfilled." + +In the revision of the original draft the modifying clause providing for +future territorial readjustments was omitted. It does not appear in +Article 7 of the draft which was presented to the Commission on the +League of Nations and which formed the basis of its deliberations. In +addition to this modification the words "unite in guaranteeing" in +Article III became "undertake to respect and preserve" in Article 7. +These changes are only important in that they indicate a disposition to +revise the article to meet the wishes, and to remove to an extent the +objections, of some of the foreign delegates who had prepared plans for +a League or at least had definite ideas as to the purposes and functions +of an international organization. + +It was generally believed that the elimination of the modifying clause +from the President's original form of guaranty was chiefly due to the +opposition of the statesmen who represented the British Empire in +contradistinction to those who represented the self-governing British +Dominions. It was also believed that this opposition was caused by an +unwillingness on their part to recognize or to apply as a right the +principle of "self-determination" in arranging possible future changes +of sovereignty over territories. + +I do not know the arguments which were used to induce the President to +abandon this phrase and to strike it from his article of guaranty. I +personally doubt whether the objection to the words "self-determination" +was urged upon him. Whatever reasons were advanced by his foreign +colleagues, they were successful in freeing the Covenant from the +phrase. It is to be regretted that the influence, which was sufficient +to induce the President to eliminate from his proposed guaranty the +clause containing a formal acceptance of the principle of +"self-determination," was not exerted or else was not potent enough to +obtain from him an open disavowal of the principle as a right standard +for the determination of sovereign authority. Without such a disavowal +the phrase remained as one of the general bases upon which a just peace +should be negotiated. It remained a precept of the international creed +which Mr. Wilson proclaimed while the war was still in progress, for he +had declared, in an address delivered on February 11, 1918, before a +joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives, that +"self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle +of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." + +"Self-determination" is as right in theory as the more famous phrase +"the consent of the governed," which has for three centuries been +repeatedly declared to be sound by political philosophers and has been +generally accepted as just by civilized peoples, but which has been for +three centuries commonly ignored by statesmen because the right could +not be practically applied without imperiling national safety, always +the paramount consideration in international and national affairs. The +two phrases mean substantially the same thing and have to an extent been +used interchangeably by those who advocate the principle as a standard +of right. "Self-determination" was not a new thought. It was a +restatement of the old one. + +Under the present political organization of the world, based as it is on +the idea of nationality, the new phrase is as unsusceptible of universal +application as the old one was found to be. Fixity of national +boundaries and of national allegiance, and political stability would +disappear if this principle was uniformly applied. Impelled by new +social conditions, by economic interests, by racial prejudices, and by +the various forces which affect society, change and uncertainty would +result from an attempt to follow the principle in every case to which it +is possible to apply it. + +Among my notes I find one of December 20, 1918--that is, one week after +the American Commission landed in France--in which I recorded my +thoughts concerning certain phrases or epigrams of the President, which +he had declared to be bases of peace, and which I considered to contain +the seeds of future trouble. In regard to the asserted right of +"self-determination" I wrote: + + "When the President talks of 'self-determination' what unit has he in + mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? + Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this + principle is dangerous to peace and stability." + +Ten days later (December 30) the frequent repetition of the phrase in +the press and by members of certain groups and unofficial delegations, +who were in Paris seeking to obtain hearings before the Conference, +caused me to write the following: + + "The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right + of 'self-determination,' the more convinced I am of the danger of + putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be + the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create + trouble in many lands. + + "What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, + and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, + disorder, and rebellion? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and + Palestine and possibly of Morocco and Tripoli rely on it? How can it + be harmonized with Zionism, to which the President is practically + committed? + + "The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which + can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In + the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an + idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check + those who attempt to put the principle in force. What a calamity that + the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!" + +Since the foregoing notes were written the impracticability of the +universal or even of the general application of the principle has been +fully demonstrated. Mr. Wilson resurrected "the consent of the governed" +regardless of the fact that history denied its value as a practical +guide in modern political relations. He proclaimed it in the phrase +"self-determination," declaring it to be an "imperative principle of +action." He made it one of the bases of peace. And yet, in the +negotiations at Paris and in the formulation of the foreign policy of +the United States, he has by his acts denied the existence of the right +other than as the expression of a moral precept, as something to be +desired, but generally unattainable in the lives of nations. In the +actual conduct of affairs, in the practical and concrete relations +between individuals and governments, it doubtless exercises and should +exercise a measure of influence, but it is not a controlling influence. + +In the Treaty of Versailles with Germany the readjustment of the German +boundaries, by which the sovereignty over millions of persons of German +blood was transferred to the new states of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, +and the practical cession to the Empire of Japan of the port of +Kiao-Chau and control over the economic life of the Province of Shantung +are striking examples of the abandonment of the principle. + +In the Treaty of Saint-Germain the Austrian Tyrol was ceded to the +Kingdom of Italy against the known will of substantially the entire +population of that region. + +In both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Saint-Germain Austria +was denied the right to form a political union with Germany, and when an +article of the German Constitution of August, 1919, contemplating a +"reunion" of "German Austria" with the German Empire was objected to by +the Supreme Council, then in session at Paris, as in contradiction of +the terms of the Treaty with Germany, a protocol was signed on September +22, 1919, by plenipotentiaries of Germany and the five Principal Allied +and Associated Powers, declaring the article in the Constitution null +and void. There could hardly be a more open repudiation of the alleged +right of "self-determination" than this refusal to permit Austria to +unite with Germany however unanimous the wish of the Austrian people for +such union. + +But Mr. Wilson even further discredited the phrase by adopting a policy +toward Russia which ignored the principle. The peoples of Esthonia, +Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan have by blood, +language, and racial traits elements of difference which give to each of +them in more or less degree the character of a distinct nationality. +These peoples all possess aspirations to become independent states, and +yet, throughout the negotiations at Paris and since that time, the +Government of the United States has repeatedly refused to recognize the +right of the inhabitants of these territories to determine for +themselves the sovereignty under which they shall live. It has, on the +contrary, declared in favor of a "Great Russia" comprising the vast +territory of the old Empire except the province which belonged to the +dismembered Kingdom of Poland and the lands included within the present +boundaries of the Republic of Finland. + +I do not mention the policy of President Wilson as to an undivided +Russia by way of criticism because I believe the policy was and has +continued to be the right one. The reference to it is made for the +sole purpose of pointing out another example of Mr. Wilson's frequent +departure without explanation from his declared standard for the +determination of political authority and allegiance. I think +that it must be conceded that he has by his acts proved that +"self-determination" _is_ "a mere phrase" which ought to be discarded +as misleading because it cannot be practically applied. + +It may be pointed out as a matter of special interest to the student of +American history that, if the right of "self-determination" were sound +in principle and uniformly applicable in establishing political +allegiance and territorial sovereignty, the endeavor of the Southern +States to secede from the American Union in 1861 would have been wholly +justifiable; and, conversely, the Northern States, in forcibly +preventing secession and compelling the inhabitants of the States +composing the Confederacy to remain under the authority of the Federal +Government, would have perpetrated a great and indefensible wrong +against the people of the South by depriving them of a right to which +they were by nature entitled. This is the logic of the application of +the principle of "self-determination" to the political rights at issue +in the American Civil War. + +I do not believe that there are many Americans of the present generation +who would support the proposition that the South was inherently right +and the North was inherently wrong in that great conflict. There were, +at the time when the sections were arrayed in arms against each other, +and there may still be, differences of opinion as to the _legal_ right +of secession under the Constitution of the United States, but the +inherent right of a people of a State to throw off at will their +allegiance to the Federal Union and resume complete sovereignty over the +territory of the State was never urged as a conclusive argument. It was +the legal right and not the natural right which was emphasized as +justifying those who took up arms in order to disrupt the Union. But if +an American citizen denies that the principle of "self-determination" +can be rightfully applied to the affairs of his own country, how can he +consistently maintain that it is a right inseparable from a true +conception of political liberty and therefore universally applicable, +just in principle, and wise from the practical point of view? + +Of course, those who subscribe to "self-determination" and advocate it +as a great truth fundamental to every political society organized to +protect and promote civil liberty, do not claim it for races, peoples, +or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive them of the +capacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations. As to +peoples or communities, however, who do possess the intelligence to make +a rational choice of political allegiance, no exception is made, so far +as words go, to the undeviating application of the principle. It is the +affirmation of an unqualified right. It is one of those declarations of +principle which sounds true, which in the abstract may be true, and +which appeals strongly to man's innate sense of moral right and to his +conception of natural justice, but which, when the attempt is made to +apply it in every case, becomes a source of political instability and +domestic disorder and not infrequently a cause of rebellion. + +In the settlement of territorial rights and of the sovereignty to be +exercised over particular regions there are several factors which +require consideration. International boundaries may be drawn along +ethnic, economic, geographic, historic, or strategic lines. One or all +of these elements may influence the decision, but whatever argument may +be urged in favor of any one of these factors, the chief object in the +determination of the sovereignty to be exercised within a certain +territory is national safety. National safety is as dominant in the life +of a nation as self-preservation is in the life of an individual. It is +even more so, as nations do not respond to the impulse of +self-sacrifice. With national safety as the primary object to be +attained in territorial settlements, the factors of the problem assume +generally, though not always, the following order of importance: the +strategic, to which is closely allied the geographic and historic; the +economic, affecting the commercial and industrial life of a nation; and +lastly the ethnic, including in the terms such conditions as +consanguinity, common language, and similar social and religious +institutions. + +The national safety and the economic welfare of the United States were +at stake in the War of Secession, although the attempt to secede +resulted from institutional rather than ethnic causes. The same was true +when in the Papineau Rebellion of 1837 the French inhabitants of the +Province of Lower Canada attempted for ethnic reasons to free themselves +from British sovereignty. Had the right of "self-determination" in the +latter case been recognized as "imperative" by Great Britain, the +national life and economic growth of Canada would have been strangled +because the lines of communication and the commercial routes to the +Atlantic seaboard would have been across an alien state. The future of +Canada, with its vast undeveloped resources, its very life as a British +colony, depended upon denying the right of "self-determination." It was +denied and the French inhabitants of Quebec were forced against their +will to accept British sovereignty. + +Experience has already demonstrated the unwisdom of having given +currency to the phrase "self-determination." As the expression of an +actual right, the application of which is universal and invariable, the +phrase has been repudiated or at least violated by many of the terms of +the treaties which brought to an end the World War. Since the time that +the principle was proclaimed, it has been the excuse for turbulent +political elements in various lands to resist established governmental +authority; it has induced the use of force in an endeavor to wrest the +sovereignty over a territory or over a community from those who have +long possessed and justly exercised it. It has formed the basis for +territorial claims by avaricious nations. And it has introduced into +domestic as well as international affairs a new spirit of disorder. It +is an evil thing to permit the principle of "self-determination" to +continue to have the apparent sanction of the nations when it has been +in fact thoroughly discredited and will always be cast aside whenever it +comes in conflict with national safety, with historic political rights, +or with national economic interests affecting the prosperity of +a nation. + +This discussion of the right of "self-determination," which was one of +the bases of peace which President Wilson declared in the winter of +1918, and which was included in the modifying clause of his guaranty as +originally drafted, is introduced for the purpose of showing the +reluctance which I felt in accepting his guidance in the adoption of a +principle so menacing to peace and so impossible of practical +application. As a matter of fact I never discussed the subject with Mr. +Wilson as I purposed doing, because a situation arose on January 10, +1919, which discouraged me from volunteering to him advice on matters +which did not directly pertain to legal questions and to the +international administration of legal justice. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919 + + +It is with extreme reluctance, as the reader will understand, that I +make any reference to the conference which the President held with the +American Commissioners at the Hotel Crillon on January 10, because of +the personal nature of what occurred. It would be far more agreeable to +omit an account of this unpleasant episode. But without referring to it +I cannot satisfactorily explain the sudden decision I then reached to +take no further part in the preparation or revision of the text of the +Covenant of the League of Nations. Without explanation my subsequent +conduct would be, and not without reason, open to the charge of neglect +of duty and possibly of disloyalty. I do not feel called upon to rest +under that suspicion, or to remain silent when a brief statement of what +occurred at that conference will disclose the reason for the cessation +of my efforts to effect changes in the plan of world organization which +the President had prepared. In the circumstances there can be no +impropriety in disclosing the truth as to the cause for a course of +action when the course of action itself must be set forth to complete +the record and to explain an ignorance of the subsequent negotiations +regarding the League of Nations, an ignorance which has been the subject +of public comment. Certainly no one who participated in the conference +can object to the truth being known unless for personal reasons he +prefers that a false impression should go forth. After careful +consideration I can see no public reason for withholding the facts. At +this meeting, to which I refer, the President took up the provisions of +his original draft of a Covenant, which was at the time in typewritten +form, and indicated the features which he considered fundamental to the +proper organization of a League of Nations. I pointed out certain +provisions which appeared to me objectionable in principle or at least +of doubtful policy. Mr. Wilson, however, clearly indicated--at least so +I interpreted his words and manner--that he was not disposed to receive +these criticisms in good part and was unwilling to discuss them. He also +said with great candor and emphasis that he did not intend to have +lawyers drafting the treaty of peace. Although this declaration was +called forth by the statement that the legal advisers of the American +Commission had been, at my request, preparing an outline of a treaty, a +"skeleton treaty" in fact, the President's sweeping disapproval of +members of the legal profession participating in the treaty-making +seemed to be, and I believe was, intended to be notice to me that my +counsel was unwelcome. Being the only lawyer on the delegation I +naturally took this remark to myself, and I know that other American +Commissioners held the same view of its purpose. If my belief was +unjustified, I can only regret that I did not persevere in my criticisms +and suggestions, but I could not do so believing as I then did that a +lawyer's advice on any question not wholly legal in nature was +unacceptable to the President, a belief which, up to the present time, I +have had no reason to change. + +It should be understood that this account of the conference of January +10 is given by way of explanation of my conduct subsequent to it and not +in any spirit of complaint or condemnation of Mr. Wilson's attitude. He +had a right to his own opinion of the worth of a lawyer's advice and a +right to act in accordance with that opinion. If there was any injustice +done, it was in his asking a lawyer to become a Peace Commissioner, +thereby giving the impression that he desired his counsel and advice as +to the negotiations in general, when in fact he did not. But, +disregarding the personal element, I consider that he was justified in +his course, as the entire constitutional responsibility for the +negotiation of a treaty was on his shoulders and he was, in the +performance of his duty, entitled to seek advice from those only in +whose judgment he had confidence. + +In spite of this frank avowal of prejudice by the President there was no +outward change in the personal and official relations between him and +myself. The breach, however, regardless of appearances, was too wide and +too deep to be healed. While subsequent events bridged it temporarily, +it remained until my association with President Wilson came to an end in +February, 1920. I never forgot his words and always felt that in his +mind my opinions, even when he sought them, were tainted with legalism. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT + + +As it seemed advisable, in view of the incident of January 10, to have +nothing to do with the drafting of the Covenant unless the entire theory +was changed, the fact that there prevailed at that time a general belief +that a preliminary treaty of peace would be negotiated in the near +future invited an effort to delay the consideration of a complete and +detailed charter of the League of Nations until the definitive treaty or +a separate treaty dealing with the League alone was considered. As delay +would furnish time to study and discuss the subject and prevent hasty +acceptance of an undesirable or defective plan, it seemed to me that the +advisable course to take was to limit reference to the organization in +the preliminary treaty to general principles. + +The method that I had in mind in carrying out this policy was to secure +the adoption, by the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace, of a +resolution embodying a series of declarations as to the creation, the +nature, and the purposes of a League of Nations, which declarations +could be included in the preliminary treaty of peace accompanied by an +article providing for the negotiation of a detailed plan based on these +declarations at the time of the negotiation of the definitive treaty or +else by an article providing for the summoning of a world congress, in +which all nations, neutrals as well as belligerents, would be +represented and have a voice in the drafting of a convention +establishing a League of Nations in accordance with the general +principles declared in the preliminary treaty. Personally I preferred a +separate treaty, but doubted the possibility of obtaining the assent of +the Conference to that plan because some of the delegates showed a +feeling of resentment toward certain neutral nations on account of their +attitude during the war, while the inclusion of the four powers which +had formed the Central Alliance seemed almost out of the question. + +In addition to the advantage to be gained by postponing the +determination of the details of the organization until the theory, the +form, the purposes and the powers of the proposed League could be +thoroughly considered, it would make possible the speedy restoration of +a state of peace. There can be no doubt that peace at the earliest +possible moment was the supreme need of the world. The political and +social chaos in the Central Empires, due to the overthrow of their +strong autocratic governments and the prevailing want, suffering, and +despair, in which the war had left their peoples, offered a fertile +field for the pernicious doctrines of Bolshevism to take root and +thrive. A proletarian revolution seemed imminent. The Spartacists in +Germany, the Radical Socialists in Austria, and the Communists in +Hungary were the best organized and most vigorous of the political +groups in those countries and were conducting an active and seemingly +successful propaganda among the starving and hopeless masses, while the +Russian duumvirs, Lenine and Trotsky, were with funds and emissaries +aiding these movements against established authority and social order. +Eastern Europe seemed to be a volcano on the very point of eruption. +Unless something was speedily done to check the peril, it threatened to +spread to other countries and even to engulf the very foundations of +modern civilization. + +A restoration of commercial relations and of normal industrial +conditions through the medium of a treaty of peace appeared to offer the +only practical means of resisting these movements and of saving Europe +from the horrors of a proletarian despotism which had brought the +Russian people to so low a state. This was the common judgment of those +who at that time watched with increasing impatience the slow progress of +the negotiations at Paris and with apprehension the political turmoil in +the defeated and distracted empires of Central Europe. + +An immediate restoration of peace was, as I then saw it, of vital +importance to the world as it was the universal demand of all mankind. +To delay it for the purpose of completing the organization of a League +of Nations or for any other purpose than the formulation of terms +essential to peace seemed to me to be taking a risk as to the future +wholly unwarranted by the relative importance of the subjects. There is +no question, in the light of subsequent events, that the peoples of the +Central Empires possessed a greater power of resistance to the +temptations of lawlessness and disorder than was presumed in the winter +of 1918-19. And yet it was a critical time. Anything might have +happened. It would have taken very little to turn the scale. What +occurred later cannot excuse the delay in making peace. It was not wise +statesmanship and foresight that saved the world from a great +catastrophe but the fortunate circumstance that a people habituated to +obedience were not led astray by the enemies of the existing order. + +Of the importance of negotiating a peace without waiting to complete a +detailed plan for a League of Nations I was firmly convinced in those +early days at Paris, and I know that the President's judgment as to this +was contrary to mine. He considered--at least his course can only be so +interpreted--that the organization of a League in all its details was +the principal task to be accomplished by the Conference, a task that he +felt must be completed before other matters were settled. The conclusion +is that the necessity of an immediate peace seemed to him subordinate to +the necessity of erecting an international agency to preserve the peace +when it was restored. In fact one may infer that the President was +disposed to employ the general longing for peace as a means of exerting +pressure on the delegates in Paris and on their Governments to accept +his plan for a League. It is generally believed that objections to +certain provisions of the Covenant were not advanced or, if advanced, +were not urged because the discussion of objections would mean delay in +negotiating the peace. + +Mr. Wilson gave most of his time and thought prior to his departure for +the United States in February, 1919, to the revision of the plan of +organization which he had prepared and to the conversion of the more +influential members of the Conference to its support. While other +questions vital to a preliminary peace treaty were brought up in the +Council of Ten, he showed a disposition to keep them open and to avoid +their settlement until the Covenant had been reported to the Conference. +In this I could not conscientiously follow him. I felt that the policy +was wholly wrong since it delayed the peace. + +Though recognizing the President's views as to the relative importance +of organizing a League and of restoring peace without delay, and +suspecting that he purposed to use the impatience and fear of the +delegates to break down objections to his plan of organization, I still +hoped that the critical state of affairs in Europe might induce him to +adopt another course. With that hope I began the preparation of a +resolution to be laid before the Conference, which, if adopted, would +appear in the preliminary treaty in the form of declarations which would +constitute the bases of a future negotiation regarding a League +of Nations. + +At a conference on January 20 between the President and the American +Commissioners, all being present except Colonel House, I asked the +President if he did not think that, in view of the shortness of time +before he would be compelled to return to Washington on account of the +approaching adjournment of Congress, it would be well to prepare a +resolution of this sort and to have it adopted in order that it might +clear the way for the determination of other matters which should be +included in a preliminary treaty. From the point of view of policy I +advanced the argument that a series of declarations would draw the fire +of the opponents and critics of the League and would give opportunity +for an expression of American public opinion which would make possible +the final drafting of the charter of a League in a way to win the +approval of the great mass of the American people and in all probability +insure approval of the Covenant by the Senate of the United States. + +In reviewing what took place at this conference I realize now, as I did +not then, that it was impolitic for me to have presented an argument +based on the assumption that changes in the President's plan might be +necessary, as he might interpret my words to be another effort to revise +the theory of his plan. At the time, however, I was so entirely +convinced of the expediency of this course, from the President's own +point of view as well as from the point of view of those who gave first +place to restoring peace, that I believed he would see the advantage to +be gained and would adopt the course suggested. I found that I was +mistaken. Mr. Wilson without discussing the subject said that he did not +think that a resolution of that sort was either necessary or advisable. + +While this definite rejection of the proposal seemed to close the door +to further effort in that direction, I decided to make another attempt +before abandoning the plan. The next afternoon (January 21) at a meeting +of the Council of Ten, the discussion developed in a way that gave me an +excuse to present the proposal informally to the Council. The advantages +to be gained by adopting the suggested action apparently appealed to the +members, and their general approval of it impressed the President, for +he asked me in an undertone if I had prepared the resolution. I replied +that I had been working upon it, but had ceased when he said to me the +day before that he did not think it necessary or advisable, adding that +I would complete the draft if he wished me to do so. He said that he +would be obliged to me if I would prepare one. + +Encouraged by the support received in the Council and by the seeming +willingness of the President to give the proposal consideration, I +proceeded at once to draft a resolution. + +The task was not an easy one because it would have been useless to +insert in the document any declaration which seemed to be contradictory +of the President's theory of an affirmative guaranty or which was not +sufficiently broad to be interpreted in other terms in the event that +American public opinion was decidedly opposed to his theory, as I felt +that it would be. It was also desirable, from my point of view, that the +resolution should contain a declaration in favor of the equality of +nations or one which would prevent the establishment of an oligarchy of +the Great Powers, and another declaration which would give proper place +to the administration of legal justice in international disputes. + +The handicaps and difficulties under which I labored are manifest, and +the resolution as drafted indicates them in that it does not express as +clearly and unequivocally as it would otherwise do the principles which +formed the bases of the articles which I handed to the President on +January 7 and which have already been quoted _in extenso_. + +The text of the resolution, which was completed on the 22d, reads as +follows: + + "_Resolved_ that the Conference makes the following declaration: + + "That the preservation of international peace is the standing policy + of civilization and to that end a league of nations should be + organized to prevent international wars; + + "That it is a fundamental principle of peace that all nations are + equally entitled to the undisturbed possession of their respective + territories, to the full exercise of their respective sovereignties, + and to the use of the high seas as the common property of all + peoples; and + + "That it is the duty of all nations to engage by mutual covenants-- + + "(1) To safeguard from invasion the sovereign rights of one another; + + "(2) To submit to arbitration all justiciable disputes which fail of + settlement by diplomatic arrangement; + + "(3) To submit to investigation by the league of nations all + non-justiciable disputes which fail of settlement by diplomatic + arrangement; and + + "(4) To abide by the award of an arbitral tribunal and to respect a + report of the league of nations after investigation; + + "That the nations should agree upon-- + + "(1) A plan for general reduction of armaments on land and sea; + + "(2) A plan for the restriction of enforced military service and the + governmental regulation and control of the manufacture and sale of + munitions of war; + + "(3) Full publicity of all treaties and international agreements; + + "(4) The equal application to all other nations of commercial and + trade regulations and restrictions imposed by any nation; and + + "(5) The proper regulation and control of new states pending complete + independence and sovereignty." + +This draft of a resolution was discussed with the other American +Commissioners, and after some changes of a more or less minor character +which it seemed advisable to make because of the appointment of a +Commission on the League of Nations at a plenary session of the +Conference on January 25, of which Commission President Wilson and +Colonel House were the American members, I sent the draft to the +President on the 31st, four days before the Commission held its first +meeting in Colonel House's office at the Hotel Crillon. + +As the Sixty-Fifth Congress would come to an end on March 4, and as the +interpretation which had been placed on certain provisions of the +Federal Constitution required the presence of the Chief Executive in +Washington during the last days of a session in order that he might pass +upon legislation enacted in the days immediately preceding adjournment, +Mr. Wilson had determined that he could not remain in Paris after +February 14. At the time that I sent him the proposed resolution there +remained, therefore, but two weeks for the Commission on the League of +Nations to organize, to deliberate, and to submit its report to the +Conference, provided its report was made prior to the President's +departure for the United States. It did not seem to me conceivable that +the work of the Commission could be properly completed in so short a +time if the President's Covenant became the basis of its deliberations. +This opinion was shared by many others who appreciated the difficulties +and intricacies of the subject and who felt that a hasty and undigested +report would be unwise and endanger the whole plan of a world +organization. + +In view of this situation, which seemed to be a strong argument for +delay in drafting the plan of international organization, I wrote a +letter to the President, at the time I sent him the proposed resolution, +saying that in my opinion no plan could be prepared with sufficient care +to warrant its submission to the Conference on the Preliminaries of +Peace before he left Paris and that unless a plan was reported he would +be in the position of returning empty-handed to the United States. I +urged him in the circumstances to secure the adoption of a resolution by +the delegates similar in nature, if not in language, to the draft which +was enclosed, thereby avoiding a state of affairs which would be very +disheartening to the advocates of a League of Nations and cause general +discontent among all peoples who impatiently expected evidence that the +restoration of peace was not far distant. + +It would be presumptuous on my part to speculate on the President's +feelings when he received and read my letter and the proposed +resolution. It was never answered or acknowledged, and he did not act +upon the suggestion or discuss acting upon it, to my knowledge, with any +of his colleagues. On the contrary, he summoned the Commission on the +League of Nations to meet on February 3, eleven days before the date +fixed for his departure for the United States, and laid before that body +his revised draft of a Covenant which formed the groundwork for the +Commission's report presented to the Conference on February 14. + +The question naturally arises--Why did the President ask me to complete +and send to him the resolution embodying a series of declarations if he +did not intend to make it a subject of consideration and discussion? It +is a pertinent question, but the true answer remains with Mr. Wilson +himself. Possibly he concluded that the only way to obtain his plan for +a League was to insist upon its practical acceptance before peace was +negotiated, and that, unless he took advantage of the universal demand +for peace by making the acceptance of the Covenant a condition +precedent, he would be unable to obtain its adoption. While I believe +this is a correct supposition, it is not responsive to the question as +to the reason why he wished me to deliver to him a draft resolution. In +fact it suggests another question--What, from the President's point of +view, was to be gained by having the resolution in his hands? + +I think the answer is not difficult to find when one remembers that Mr. +Wilson had disapproved a resolution of that sort and that the Council of +Ten had seemed disposed to approve it. There was no surer way to prevent +me from bringing the subject again before the Council than by having the +proposed resolution before him for action. Having submitted it to him I +was bound, on account of our official relationship, to await his +decision before taking any further steps. In a word, his request for a +draft practically closed my mouth and tied my hands. If he sought to +check my activities with the members of the Council in favor of the +proposed course of action, he could have taken no more effectual way +than the one which he did take. It was undoubtedly an effective means of +"pigeonholing" a resolution, the further discussion of which might +interfere with his plan to force through a report upon the Covenant +before the middle of February. + +This opinion as to the motive which impelled the President to pursue the +course that he did in regard to a resolution was not the one held by me +at the time. It was formed only after subsequent events threw new light +on the subject. The delay perplexed me at the time, but the reason for +it was not evident. I continued to hope, even after the Commission on +the League of Nations had assembled and had begun its deliberations, +that the policy of a resolution would be adopted. But, as the days went +by and the President made no mention of the proposal, I realized that he +did not intend to discuss it, and the conviction was forced upon me that +he had never intended to have it discussed. It was a disappointing +result and one which impressed me with the belief that Mr. Wilson was +prejudiced against any suggestion that I might make, if it in any way +differed with his own ideas even though it found favor with others. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT + + +During the three weeks preceding the meeting of the Commission on the +League the work of revising the President's original draft of the +Covenant had been in progress, the President and Colonel House holding +frequent interviews with the more influential delegates, particularly +the British and French statesmen who had been charged with the duty of +studying the subject. While I cannot speak from personal knowledge, I +learned that the suggested changes in terms and language were put into +form by members of the Colonel's office staff. In addition to +modifications which were made to meet the wishes of the foreign +statesmen, especially the British, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, the +son-in-law and secretary of Colonel House, and Mr. David Hunter Miller, +Auchincloss's law partner and one of the accredited legal advisers of +the American Commission, prepared an elaborate memorandum on the +President's draft of a Covenant which contained comments and also +suggested changes in the text. On account of the intimate relations +existing between Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss and Colonel House it +seems reasonable to assume that their comments and suggestions were +approved by, if they did not to an extent originate with, the Colonel. +The memorandum was first made public by Mr. William C. Bullitt during +his hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in +September, 1919 (Senate Doc. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, pages 1177 +_et seq._). + +The most important amendment to the Covenant suggested by these advisers +was, in my judgment, the one relating to Article III of the draft, which +became Article 10 in the Treaty. After a long criticism of the +President's proposed guaranty, in which it is declared that "such an +agreement would destroy the Monroe Doctrine," and that "any guaranty of +independence and integrity means war by the guarantor if a breach of the +independence or integrity of the guaranteed State is attempted and +persisted in," the memorandum proposed that the following be +substituted: + + "Each Contracting Power severally covenants and guarantees that it + will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political + independence of any other Contracting Power." + +This proposed substitute should be compared with the language of the +"self-denying covenant" that I sent to the President on December 23, +1918, the pertinent portion of which is repeated here for the purpose of +such comparison: + + "Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and + guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or + impair the political sovereignty of any other power signatory or + adherent to this convention, ..." + +The practical adoption of the language of my proposed substitute in the +memorandum furnishes conclusive proof that Colonel House was "entirely +converted" to my form of a guaranty as he had frankly assured me that he +was on the evening of January 6. I am convinced also that Mr. Henry +White and General Bliss held the same views on the subject. It is +obvious that President Wilson was the only one of the American +representatives at Paris who favored the affirmative guaranty, but, as +he possessed the constitutional authority to determine independently the +policy of the United States, his form of a guaranty was written into the +revised draft of a Covenant submitted to the Commission on the League of +Nations and with comparatively little change was finally adopted in the +Treaty of Peace with Germany. + +The memorandum prepared by Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss was apparently +in the President's hands before the revised draft was completed, for +certain changes in the original draft were in accord with the +suggestions made in their memorandum. His failure to modify the guaranty +may be considered another rejection of the "self-denying covenant" and a +final decision to insist on the affirmative form of guaranty in spite of +the unanimous opposition of his American colleagues. + +In view of what later occurred a very definite conclusion may be reached +concerning the President's rejection of the proposed substitute for his +guaranty. Article 10 was from the first the storm center of opposition +to the report of the Commission on the League of Nations and the chief +cause for refusal of consent to the ratification of the Treaty of +Versailles by the Senate of the United States. The vulnerable nature of +the provision, which had been so plainly pointed out to the President +before the Covenant was submitted to the Commission, invited attack. If +he had listened to the advice of his colleagues, in fact if he had +listened to any American who expressed an opinion on the subject, the +Treaty would probably have obtained the speedy approval of the Senate. +There would have been opposition from those inimical to the United +States entering any international organization, but it would have been +insufficient to prevent ratification of the Treaty. + +As it was, the President's unalterable determination to have his form of +guaranty in the Covenant, in which he was successful, and his firm +refusal to modify it in any substantial way resulted in strengthening +the opponents to the League to such an extent that they were able to +prevent the Treaty from obtaining the necessary consent of two thirds of +the Senators. + +The sincerity of Mr. Wilson's belief in the absolute necessity of the +guaranty, which he proposed, to the preservation of international peace +cannot be doubted. While his advisers were practically unanimous in the +opinion that policy, as well as principle, demanded a change in the +guaranty, he clung tenaciously to the affirmative form. The result was +that which was feared and predicted by his colleagues. The President, +and the President alone, must bear the responsibility for the result. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION + + +On the day that the Commission on the League of Nations held its first +meeting and before I had reason to suspect that Mr. Wilson intended to +ignore the letter which I had sent him with the suggested resolution +enclosed, I determined to appeal to him in behalf of international +arbitration. I decided to do this on the assumption that, even if the +plan for a resolution was approved, the Commission would continue its +sessions in preparation for the subsequent negotiation of an agreement +of some sort providing for world organization. The provision as to +arbitration in the President's original draft of a Covenant was so wrong +from my point of view and showed such a lack of knowledge of the +practical side of the subject that I was impelled to make an effort to +induce him to change the provision. Except for the fact that the matter +was wholly legal in character and invited an opinion based on technical +knowledge, I would have remained silent in accordance with my feeling +that it would be inadvisable for me to have anything to do with drafting +the Covenant. I felt, however, that the constitution and procedure of +international courts were subjects which did not affect the general +theory of organization and concerning which my views might influence the +President and be of aid to him in the formulation of the judicial +feature of any plan adopted. + +With this object in view I wrote to him the following letter: + + "_Hôtel Crillon, Paris + + "February_ 3, 1919 + + "My Dear Mr. President: + + "I am deeply interested, as you know, in the constitution and + procedure of international courts of arbitration, and having + participated in five proceedings of this sort I feel that I can speak + with a measure of authority. + + "In the first place let me say that a tribunal, on which + representatives of the litigants sit as judges, has not proved + satisfactory even though the majority of the tribunal are nationals + of other countries. However well prepared from experience on the + bench to render strict justice, the litigants' arbitrators act in + fact as advocates. As a consequence the neutral arbitrators are + decidedly hampered in giving full and free expression to their views, + and there is not that frank exchange of opinion which should + characterize the conference of judges. It has generally resulted in a + compromise, in which the nation in the wrong gains a measure of + benefit and the nation in the right is deprived of a part of the + remedy to which it is entitled. In fact an arbitration award is more + of a political and diplomatic arrangement than it is a judicial + determination. I believe that this undesirable result can be in large + measure avoided by eliminating arbitrators of the litigant nations. + It is only in the case of monetary claims that these observations do + not apply. + + "Another difficulty has been the method of procedure before + international tribunals. This does not apply to monetary claims, but + to disputes arising out of boundaries, interpretation of treaties, + national rights, etc. The present method of an exchange of cases and + of counter-cases is more diplomatic than judicial, since it does not + put the parties in the relation of complainant and defendant. This + relation can in every case be established, if not by mutual + agreement, then by some agency of the League of Nations charged with + that duty. Until this reform of procedure takes place there will be + no definition of issues, and arbitration will continue to be the long + and elaborate proceeding it has been in the past. + + "There is another practical obstacle to international arbitration as + now conducted which ought to be considered, and that is the cost. + This obstacle does not affect wealthy nations, but it does prevent + small and poor nations from resorting to it as a means of settling + disputes. Just how this can be remedied I am not prepared to say, + although possibly the international support of all arbitral tribunals + might be provided. At any rate, I feel that something should be done + to relieve the great expense which now prevents many of the smaller + nations from resorting to arbitration. + + "I would suggest, therefore, that the Peace Treaty contain a + provision directing the League of Nations to hold a conference or to + summon a conference to take up this whole matter and draft an + international treaty dealing with the constitution of arbitral + tribunals and radically revising the procedure. + + "On account of the difficulties of the subject, which do not appear + on the surface, but which experience has shown to be very real, I + feel that it would be impracticable to provide in the Peace Treaty + too definitely the method of constituting arbitral tribunals. It will + require considerable thought and discussion to make arbitration + available to the poor as well as the rich, to make an award a + judicial settlement rather than a diplomatic compromise, and to + supersede the cumbersome and prolonged procedure with its duplication + of documents and maps by a simple method which will settle the issues + and materially shorten the proceedings which now unavoidably drag + along for months, if not for years. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "28 _Rue de Monceau_" + +At the time that I sent this letter to Mr. Wilson I had not seen the +revised draft of the Covenant which he laid before the Commission on the +League of Nations. The probability is that, if I had seen it, the letter +would not have been written, for in the revision of the original draft +the objectionable Article V, relating to arbitration and appeals from +arbitral awards, was omitted. In place of it there were substituted two +articles, 11 and 12, the first being an agreement to arbitrate under +certain conditions and the other providing that "the Executive Council +will formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of +International Justice, and this Court will be competent to hear and +determine any matter which the parties recognize as suitable for +submission to it for arbitration." + +Unadvised as to this change, which promised a careful consideration of +the method of applying legal principles of justice to international +disputes, I did not feel that I could let pass without challenge the +unsatisfactory provisions of the President's original draft. Knowing the +contempt which Mr. Wilson felt for The Hague Tribunal and his general +suspicion of the justice of decisions which it might render, it seemed +to me inexpedient to suggest that it should form the basis of a newly +constituted judiciary, a suggestion which I should have made had I been +dealing with any one other than President Wilson. In view of the +intensity of the President's prejudices and of the uselessness of +attempting to remove them, my letter was intended to induce him to +postpone a determination of the subject until the problems which it +presented could be thoroughly studied and a judicial system developed by +an international body of representatives more expert in juridical +matters than the Commission on the League of Nations, the American +members of which were incompetent by training, knowledge, and practical +experience to consider the subject. + +No acknowledgment, either written or oral, was ever made of my letter of +February 3. Possibly President Wilson considered it unnecessary to do so +in view of the provision in his revised Covenant postponing discussion +of the subject. At the time, however, I naturally assumed that my +voluntary advice was unwelcome to him. His silence as to my +communications, which seemed to be intended to discourage a continuance +of them, gave the impression that he considered an uninvited opinion on +any subject connected with the League of Nations an unwarranted +interference with a phase of the negotiations which he looked upon as +his own special province, and that comment or suggestion, which did not +conform wholly to his views, was interpreted into opposition and +possibly into criticism of him personally. + +This judgment of the President's mental attitude, which was formed at +the time, may have been too harsh. It is possible that the shortness of +time in which to complete the drafting of the report of the Commission +on the League of Nations, upon which he had set his heart, caused him to +be impatient of any criticism or suggestion which tended to interrupt +his work or that of the Commission. It may have been that pressure for +time prevented him from answering letters of the character of the one of +February 3. Whatever the real reason was, the fact remains that the +letter went unnoticed and the impression was made that it was futile to +attempt to divert the President from the single purpose which he had in +mind. His fidelity to his own convictions and his unswerving +determination to attain what he sought are characteristics of Mr. Wilson +which are sources of weakness as well as of strength. Through them +success has generally crowned his efforts, success which in some +instances has been more disastrous than failure would have been. + +By what means the change of Article V of the original draft of the +Covenant took place, I cannot say. In the memorandum of Messrs. Miller +and Auchincloss no suggestion of a Court of International Justice +appears, which seems to indicate that the provision in the revised draft +did not originate with them or with Colonel House. In fact on more than +one occasion I had mentioned arbitration to the Colonel and found his +views on the subject extremely vague, though I concluded that he had +almost as poor an opinion of The Hague Tribunal as did the President. +The probability is that the change was suggested to Mr. Wilson by one of +the foreign statesmen in a personal interview during January and that +upon sounding others he found that they were practically unanimous in +favor of a Permanent Court of Justice. As a matter of policy it seemed +wise to forestall amendment by providing for its future establishment. +If this is the true explanation, Article 12 was not of American origin, +though it appears in the President's revised draft. + +To be entirely frank in stating my views in regard to Mr. Wilson's +attitude toward international arbitration and its importance in a plan +of world organization, I have always been and still am skeptical of the +sincerity of the apparent willingness of the President to accept the +change which was inserted in his revised draft. It is difficult to avoid +the belief that Article V of the original draft indicated his true +opinion of the application of legal principles to controversies between +nations. That article, by depriving an arbitral award of finality and +conferring the power of review on a political body with authority to +order a rehearing, shows that the President believed that more complete +justice would be rendered if the precepts and rules of international law +were in a measure subordinated to political expediency and if the judges +were not permitted to view the questions solely from the standpoint of +legal justice. There is nothing that occurred, to my knowledge, between +the printing of the original draft of the Covenant and the printing of +the revised draft, which indicated a change of opinion by the President. +It may be that this is a misinterpretation of Mr. Wilson's attitude, and +that the change toward international arbitration was due to conviction +rather than to expediency; but my belief is that expediency was the +sole cause. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +The Commission on the League of Nations, over which President Wilson +presided, held ten meetings between February 3 and February 14, on which +latter day it submitted a report at a plenary session of the Conference +on the Preliminaries of Peace. The report was presented by the President +in an address of exceptional excellence which made a deep impression on +his hearers. His dignity of manner, his earnestness, and his logical +presentation of the subject, clothed as it was in well-chosen phrases, +unquestionably won the admiration of all, even of those who could not +reconcile their personal views with the Covenant, as reported by the +Commission. It was a masterly effort, an example of literary rather than +emotional oratory, peculiarly fitting to the occasion and to the temper +and intellectual character of the audience. + +Considering the brief time given to its discussion in the Commission and +the necessary haste required to complete the document before the +President's departure, the Covenant as reported to the Conference was a +creditable piece of work. Many of the more glaring errors of expression +and some of the especially objectionable features of the President's +revised draft were eliminated. There were others which persisted, but +the improvement was so marked that the gross defects in word and phrase +largely disappeared. If one accepted the President's theory of +organization, there was little to criticize in the report, except a +certain inexactness of expression which indicated a lack of technical +knowledge on the part of those who put the Covenant into final form. But +these crudities and ambiguities of language would, it was fair to +presume, disappear if the articles passed through the hands of +drafting experts. + +Fundamentally, however, the Covenant as reported was as wrong as the +President's original draft, since it contained the affirmative guaranty +of political independence and territorial integrity, the primacy of the +Five Great Powers on the Executive Council, and the perplexing and +seemingly unsound system of mandates. In this I could not willingly +follow President Wilson, but I felt that I had done all that I could +properly do in opposition to his theory. The responsibility of decision +rested with him and he had made his decision. There was nothing more +to be said. + +On the evening of the day of the plenary session, at which the report of +the League of Nations was submitted, the President left Paris for Brest +where the George Washington was waiting to convey him to the United +States. He carried with him the report of the Commission, whose +deliberations and decisions he had so manifestly dominated. He went +prepared to meet his political antagonists and the enemies of the +League, confidently believing that he could win a popular support that +would silence the opposition which had been increasingly manifest in the +Halls of Congress and in some of the Republican newspapers which +declined to follow Mr. Taft, Mr. Wickersham, Mr. Straus, and other +influential Republican members of the League to Enforce Peace. + +During the ten days preceding February 14, when the Commission on the +League of Nations held daily sessions, the President had no conferences +with the American Commissioners except, of course, with Colonel House, +his American colleague on the Commission on the League. On the morning +of the 14th, however, he called a meeting of the Commissioners and +delivered to them the printed report which was to be presented that +afternoon to the plenary session. As the meetings of the Commission on +the League of Nations had been secret, the American Commissioners, other +than Colonel House, were almost entirely ignorant of the proceedings and +of the progress being made. Colonel House's office staff knew far more +about it than did Mr. White, General Bliss, or I. When the President +delivered the report to the Commissioners they were, therefore, in no +position to express an opinion concerning it. The only remarks were +expressions of congratulation that he had been able to complete the work +before his departure. They were merely complimentary. As to the merits +of the document nothing was or could be said by the three Commissioners, +since no opportunity had been given them to study it, and without a +critical examination any comment concerning its provisions would have +been worthless. I felt and I presume that my two colleagues, who had not +been consulted as to the work of the Commission on the League, felt, +that it was, in any event, too late to offer suggestions or make +criticisms. The report was in print; it was that afternoon to be laid +before the Conference; in twelve hours the President would be on his way +to the United States. Clearly it would have been useless to find fault +with the report, especially if the objections related to the fundamental +ideas of the organization which it was intended to create. The President +having in the report declared the American policy, his commissioned +representatives were bound to acquiesce in his decision whatever their +personal views were. Acquiescence or resignation was the choice, and +resignation would have undoubtedly caused an unfortunate, if not a +critical, situation. In the circumstances acquiescence seemed the only +practical and proper course. + +The fact that in ten meetings and in a week and a half a Commission +composed of fifteen members, ten of whom represented the Five Great +Powers and five of whom represented the lesser powers (to which were +later added four others), completed the drafting of a detailed plan of a +League of Nations, is sufficient in itself to raise doubts as to the +thoroughness with which the work was done and as to the care with which +the various plans and numerous provisions proposed were studied, +compared, and discussed. It gives the impression that many clauses were +accepted under the pressing necessity of ending the Commission's labors +within a fixed time. The document itself bears evidence of the haste +with which it was prepared, and is almost conclusive proof in itself +that it was adopted through personal influence rather than because of +belief in the wisdom of all its provisions. + +The Covenant of the League of Nations was intended to be the greatest +international compact that had ever been written. It was to be the +_Maxima Charta_ of mankind securing to the nations their rights and +liberties and uniting them for the preservation of universal peace. To +harmonize the conflicting views of the members of the Commission--and it +was well known that they were conflicting--and to produce in eleven days +a world charter, which would contain the elements of greatness or even +of perpetuity, was on the face of it an undertaking impossible of +accomplishment. The document which was produced sufficiently establishes +the truth of this assertion. + +It required a dominant personality on the Commission to force through a +detailed plan of a League in so short a time. President Wilson was such +a personality. By adopting the scheme of an oligarchy of the Great +Powers he silenced the dangerous opposition of the French and British +members of the Commission who willingly passed over minor defects in the +plan provided this Concert of Powers, this Quintuple Alliance, was +incorporated in the Covenant. And for the same reason it may be assumed +the Japanese and Italians found the President's plan acceptable. Mr. +Wilson won a great personal triumph, but he did so by surrendering the +fundamental principle of the equality of nations. In his eagerness to +"make the world safe for democracy" he abandoned international democracy +and became the advocate of international autocracy. + +It is not my purpose to analyze the provisions of the Covenant which was +submitted to the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on February +14, 1919. My objections to it have been sufficiently discussed in the +preceding pages. It would be superfluous to repeat them. The innumerable +published articles and the endless debates on the Covenant have brought +out its good features as well as its defects. Unfortunately for the +opponents and defenders of the document alike some of the objections +urged have been flagrantly unjustifiable and based on false premises and +misstatements of fact and of law, which seem to show political motives +and not infrequently personal animosity toward Mr. Wilson. The +exaggerated statements and unfair arguments of some of the Senators, +larded, as they often were, with caustic sarcasm and vindictive +personalities, did much to prevent an honest and useful discussion of +the merits and demerits of the Covenant. + +The effect upon President Wilson of this campaign against him +personally--and it seems to me that it would have had the same effect +upon any man of spirit--was to arouse his indignation. Possibly a less +stubborn man would not have assumed so uncompromising an attitude as he +did or have permitted his ire to find expression in threats, but it +cannot be denied that there was provocation for the resentment which he +exhibited. The President has been blamed for not having sought more +constantly to placate the opponents of the Covenant and to meet them on +a common ground of compromise, especially during his visit to the United +States in February, 1919. From the point of view of policy there is +justice in blaming him, but, when one considers the personal animus +shown and the insolent tone assumed by some of his critics, his conduct +was very human; not wise, but human. Mr. Wilson had never shown a spirit +of conciliation in dealing with those who opposed him. Even in the case +of a purely political question he appeared to consider opposition to be +a personal affront and he was disposed to retaliate in a personal way. +In a measure this explains the personal enmity of many of his political +foes. I think that it is not unjust to say that President Wilson was +stronger in his hatreds than in his friendships. He seemed to lack the +ability to forgive one who had in any way offended him or opposed him. + +Believing that much of the criticism of the Covenant was in reality +criticism of him as its author, a belief that was in a measure +justified, the President made it a personal matter. He threatened, in a +public address delivered in the New York Opera House on the eve of his +departure for France, to force the Republican majority to accept the +Covenant by interweaving the League of Nations into the terms of peace +to such an extent that they could not be separated, so that, if they +rejected the League, they would be responsible for defeating the Treaty +and preventing a restoration of peace. With the general demand for peace +this seemed no empty threat, although the propriety of making it may be +questioned. It had, however, exactly the opposite effect from that which +the President intended. Its utterance proved to be as unwise as it was +ineffective. The opposition Senators resented the idea of being coerced. +They became more than ever determined to defeat a President whom they +charged with attempting to disregard and nullify the right of the Senate +to exercise independently its constitutional share in the treaty-making +power. Thus at the very outset of the struggle between the President and +the Senate a feeling of hostility was engendered which continued with +increasing bitterness on both sides and prevented any compromise or +concession in regard to the Covenant as it finally appeared in the +Treaty of Versailles. + +When President Wilson returned to Paris after the adjournment of the +Sixty-Fifth Congress on March 4, 1919, he left behind him opponents who +were stronger and more confident than they were when he landed ten days +before. While his appeal to public opinion in favor of the League of +Nations had been to an extent successful, there was a general feeling +that the Covenant as then drafted required amendment so that the +sovereign rights and the traditional policies of the United States +should be safeguarded. Until the document was amended it seemed that the +opposition had the better of the argument with the people. Furthermore, +when the new Congress met, the Republicans would have a majority in the +Senate which was of special importance in the matter of the Treaty which +would contain the Covenant, because it would, when sent to the Senate, +be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations to report on its +ratification and a majority of that Committee, under a Republican +organization, would presumably be hostile to the plan for a League +advocated by the President. The Committee could hinder and possibly +prevent the acceptance of the Covenant, while it would have the +opportunity to place the opposition's case in a favorable light before +the American people and to attack the President's conduct of the +negotiations at Paris. + +I believe that the President realized the loss of strategic position +which he had sustained by the Democratic defeat at the polls in +November, 1918, but was persuaded that, by making certain alterations in +the Covenant suggested by Republicans favorable to the formation of a +League, and especially those advocating a League to Enforce Peace, he +would be able to win sufficient support in the Senate and from the +people to deprive his antagonists of the advantage which they had gained +by the elections. This he sought to do on his return to Paris about the +middle of March. If the same spirit of compromise had been shown while +he was in America it would doubtless have gone far to weaken hostility +to the Covenant. Unfortunately for his purpose he assumed a contrary +attitude, and in consequence the sentiment against the League was +crystallized and less responsive to the concessions which the President +appeared willing to make when the Commission on the League of Nations +resumed its sittings, especially as the obnoxious Article 10 +remained intact. + +In the formulation of the amendments to the Covenant, which were +incorporated in it after the President's return from the United States +and before its final adoption by the Conference, I had no part and I +have no reason to think that Mr. White or General Bliss shared in the +work. As these amendments or modifications did not affect the theory of +organization or the fundamental principles of the League, they in no way +changed my views or lessened the differences between the President's +judgment and mine. Our differences were as to the bases and not as to +the details of the Covenant. Since there was no disposition to change +the former we were no nearer an agreement than we were in January. + +The President's visit to the United States had been disappointing to the +friends of a League in that he had failed to rally to the support of the +Covenant an overwhelming popular sentiment in its favor which the +opposition in the Senate could not resist. The natural reaction was that +the peoples of Europe and their statesmen lost a measure of their +enthusiasm and faith in the project. Except in the case of a few +idealists, there was a growing disposition to view it from the purely +practical point of view and to speculate on its efficacy as an +instrument to interpret and carry out the international will. Among the +leaders of political thought in the principal Allied countries, the +reports of the President's reception in the United States were +sufficiently conflicting to arouse doubt as to whether the American +people were actually behind him in his plan for a League, and this doubt +was not diminished by his proposed changes in the Covenant, which +indicated that he was not in full control of the situation at home. + +Two weeks after the President had resumed his duties as a negotiator and +had begun the work of revising the Covenant, I made a memorandum of my +views as to the situation that then existed. The memorandum is +as follows: + + "_March_ 25, 1919 + + "With the increasing military preparations and operations throughout + Eastern Europe and the evident purpose of all these quarreling + nations to ignore any idea of disarmament and to rely upon force to + obtain and retain territory and rights, the League of Nations is + being discussed with something like contempt by the cynical, + hard-headed statesmen of those countries which are being put on a + war-footing. They are cautious and courteous out of regard for the + President. I doubt if the truth reaches him, but it comes to me from + various sources. + + "These men say that in theory the idea is all right and is an ideal + to work toward, but that under present conditions it is not practical + in preventing war. They ask, what nation is going to rely on the + guaranty in the Covenant if a jealous or hostile neighbor maintains a + large army. They want to know whether it would be wise or not to + disarm under such conditions. Of course the answers are obvious. But, + if the guaranty is not sufficient, or accepted as sufficient, + protection, what becomes of the central purpose of the League and the + chief reason for creating it? + + "I believe that the President and Colonel House see this, though they + do not admit it, and that to save the League from being cast into the + discard they will attempt to make of it a sort of international + agency to do certain things which would normally be done by + independent international commissions. Such a course would save the + League from being still-born and would so interweave it with the + terms of peace that to eliminate it would be to open up some + difficult questions. + + "Of course the League of Nations as originally planned had one + supreme object and that was to prevent future wars. That was + substantially all that it purposed to do. Since then new functions + have been gradually added until the chief argument for the League's + existence has been almost lost to sight. The League has been made a + convenient 'catch-all' for all sorts of international actions. At + first this was undoubtedly done to give the League something to do, + and now it is being done to save it from extinction or from + being ignored. + + "I am not denying that a common international agent may be a good + thing. In fact the plan has decided merit. But the organization of + the League does not seem to me suitable to perform efficiently and + properly these new functions. + + "However, giving this character to the League may save it from being + merely an agreeable dream. As the repository of international + controversies requiring long and careful consideration it may live + and be useful. + + "My impression is that the principal sponsors for the League are + searching through the numerous disputes which are clogging the wheels + of the Conference, seizing upon every one which can possibly be + referred, and heaping them on the League of Nations to give it + standing as a useful and necessary adjunct to the Treaty. + + "At least that is an interesting view of what is taking place and + opens a wide field for speculation as to the future of the League and + the verdict which history will render as to its origin, its nature, + and its real value." + +I quote this memorandum because it gives my thoughts at the time +concerning the process of weaving the League into the terms of peace as +the President had threatened to do. I thought then that it had a double +purpose, to give a practical reason for the existence of the League and +to make certain the ratification of the Covenant by the Senate. No fact +has since developed which has induced me to change my opinion. + +In consequence of the functions which were added to the League, the +character of the League itself underwent a change. Instead of an agency +created solely for the prevention of international wars, it was +converted into an agency to carry out the terms of peace. Its idealistic +conception was subordinated to the materialistic purpose of confirming +to the victorious nations the rewards of victory. It is true that during +the long struggle between the President and the Senate on the question +of ratification there was in the debates a general return to the +original purpose of the League by both the proponents and opponents of +the Covenant, but that fact in no way affects the truth of the assertion +that, in order to save the League of Nations, its character was changed +by extending its powers and duties as a common agent of the nations +which had triumphed over the Central Alliance. + +The day before the Treaty of Peace was delivered to the German +plenipotentiaries (May 6) its terms induced me to write a note entitled +"The Greatest Loss Caused by the War," referring to the loss of idealism +to the world. In that note I wrote of the League of Nations as follows: + + "Even the measure of idealism, with which the League of Nations was + at the first impregnated, has, under the influence and intrigue of + ambitious statesmen of the Old World, been supplanted by an open + recognition that force and selfishness are primary elements in + international co-operation. The League has succumbed to this + reversion to a cynical materialism. It is no longer a creature of + idealism. Its very source and reason have been dried up and have + almost disappeared. The danger is that it will become a bulwark of + the old order, a check upon all efforts to bring man again under the + influence which he has lost." + +The President, in the addresses which he afterward made in advocacy of +the Covenant and of ratification of the Treaty, indicated clearly the +wide divergence of opinion between us as to the character of the League +provided for in the Treaty. I do not remember that the subject was +directly discussed by us, but I certainly took no pains to hide my +misgivings as to the place it would have in the international relations +of the future. However, as Mr. Wilson knew that I disapproved of the +theory and basic principles of the organization, especially the +recognition of the oligarchy of the Five Powers, he could not but +realize that I considered that idealism had given place to political +expediency in order to secure for the Covenant the support of the +powerful nations represented at the Conference. This was my belief as to +our relations when the Treaty of Peace containing the Covenant was laid +before the Germans at the Hôtel des Reservoirs in Versailles. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES + + +In the foregoing review of the opposite views held by the President and +by me in regard to the plan for a League of Nations and specifically in +regard to the Covenant as originally drawn and as revised, mention was +made of the proposed mandatory system as one of the subjects concerning +which we were not in agreement. My objections to the system were +advanced chiefly on the ground of the legal difficulties which it +presented because it seemed probable that the President would give more +weight to my opinion on that ground than on one which concerned the +policy of adopting the system. Viewed from the latter standpoint it +appeared to me most unwise for the President to propose a plan, in which +the United States would be expected to participate and which, if it did +participate, would involve it in the political quarrels of the Old +World. To do so would manifestly require a departure from the +traditional American policy of keeping aloof from the political +jealousies and broils of Europe. Without denying that present conditions +have, of necessity, modified the old policy of isolation and without +minimizing the influence of that fact on the conduct of American foreign +affairs, it did not seem essential for the United States to become the +guardian of any of the peoples of the Near East, who were aspiring to +become independent nationalities, a guardianship which the President +held to be a duty that the United States was bound to perform as its +share of the burden imposed by the international coöperation which he +considered vital to the new world order. + +The question of mandates issuing from the League of Nations was +discussed at length by the Council of Ten in connection with the +disposition and future control of the German colonies and incidentally +as to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The discussions were +chiefly along the lines of practicability, of policy, and of moral +obligation. The President's strong support of the mandatory system and +his equally strong objection to the idea of _condominium_ showed that +his mind was made up in favor of the issuance of mandates by the League. +Since it would have been highly improper for me to oppose openly a +policy which the President had declared under his constitutional +authority, there was no proper opportunity to present the legal +difficulties of the system to the Council. + +However, the seriousness of these difficulties and the possible troubles +and controversies which might be anticipated from attempting to put the +system into operation induced me, after one of the sessions of the +Council of Ten, to state briefly to the President some of the serious +objections to League mandates from the standpoint of international law +and the philosophy of government. President Wilson listened with his +usual attentiveness to what I had to say, though the objections +evidently did not appeal to him, as he characterized them as "mere +technicalities" which could be cured or disregarded. Impressed myself +with the importance of these "technicalities" and their direct bearing +on the policy of adopting the mandatory system, I later, on February 2, +1919, embodied them in a memorandum. At the time I hoped and believed +that the negotiation of the completed Covenant might be postponed and +that there would be another opportunity to raise the question. The +memorandum, prepared with this end in view, is as follows: + + "The system of 'mandatories under the League of Nations,' when + applied to territories which were formerly colonies of Germany, the + system which has been practically adopted and will be written into + the plan for the League, raises some interesting and difficult + questions: + + "The one, which is the most prominent since it enters into nearly all + of the international problems presented, is--Where does the + sovereignty over these territories reside? + + "Sovereignty is inherent in the very conception of government. It + cannot be destroyed, though it may be absorbed by another sovereignty + either by compulsion or cession. When the Germans were ousted from + their colonies, the sovereignty passed to the power or powers which + took possession. The location of the sovereignty up to the present is + clear, but with the introduction of the League of Nations as an + international primate superior to the conquerors some rather + perplexing questions will have to be answered. + + "Do those who have seized the sovereignty transfer it or does Germany + transfer it to the League of Nations? If so, how? + + "Does the League assume possession of the sovereignty on its + renunciation by Germany? If so, how? + + "Does the League merely direct the disposition of the sovereignty + without taking possession of it? + + "Assuming that the latter question is answered in the affirmative, + then after such disposition of the right to exercise sovereignty, + which will presumably be a limited right, where does the actual + sovereignty reside? + + "The appointment of a mandatory to exercise sovereign rights over + territory is to create an agent for the real sovereign. But who is + the real sovereign? + + "Is the League of Nations the sovereign, or is it a common agent of + the nations composing the League, to whom is confided solely the duty + of naming the mandatory and issuing the mandate? + + "If the League is the sovereign, can it avoid responsibility for the + misconduct of the mandatory, its agent? + + "If it is not the League, who is responsible for the mandatory's + conduct? + + "Assuming that the mandatory in faithfully performing the provisions + of the mandate unavoidably works an injustice upon another party, can + or ought the mandatory to be held responsible? If not, how can the + injured party obtain redress? Manifestly the answer is, 'From the + sovereign,' but who is the sovereign? + + "In the Treaty of Peace Germany will be called upon to renounce + sovereignty over her colonial possessions. To whom will the + sovereignty pass? + + "If the reply is, 'The League of Nations,' the question is: Does the + League possess the attributes of an independent state so that it can + function as an owner of territory? If so, what is it? A world state? + + "If the League does not constitute a world state, then the + sovereignty would have to pass to some national state. What national + state? What would be the relation of the national state to + the League? + + "If the League is to receive title to the sovereignty, what officers + of the League are empowered to receive it and to transfer its + exercise to a mandatory? + + "What form of acceptance should be adopted? + + "Would every nation which is a member of the League have to give its + representatives full powers to accept the title? + + "Assuming that certain members decline to issue such powers or to + accept title as to one or more of the territories, what relation + would those members have to the mandatory named?" + +There is no attempt in the memorandum to analyze or classify the queries +raised, and, as I review them in the light of the terms of the Treaty of +Versailles, I do not think that some of them can be asked with any +helpful purpose. On the other hand, many of the questions, I believe the +large majority, were as pertinent after the Treaty was completed as they +were when the memorandum was made. + +As Colonel House was the other member of the Commission on the League of +Nations and would have to consider the practicability and expediency of +including the mandatory system in the Covenant, I read the memorandum to +him stating that I had orally presented most of the questions to the +President who characterized them as "legal technicalities" and for that +reason unimportant. I said to the Colonel that I differed with the +President, as I hoped he did, not only as to the importance of +considering the difficulties raised by the questions before the system +of mandates was adopted, but also as to the importance of viewing from +every standpoint the wisdom of the system and the difficulties that +might arise in its practical operation. I stated that, in my opinion, a +simpler and better plan was to transfer the sovereignty over territory +to a particular nation by a treaty of cession under such terms as seemed +wise and, in the case of some of the newly erected states, to have them +execute treaties accepting protectorates by Powers mutually acceptable +to those states and to the League of Nations. + +Colonel House, though he listened attentively to the memorandum and to +my suggestions, did not seem convinced of the importance of the +questions or of the advantages of adopting any other plan than that of +the proposed mandatory system. To abandon the system meant to abandon +one of the ideas of international supervision, which the President +especially cherished and strongly advocated. It meant also to surrender +one of the proposed functions of the League as an agent in carrying out +the peace settlements under the Treaty, functions which would form the +basis of an argument in favor of the organization of the League and +furnish a practical reason for its existence. Of course the presumed +arguments against the abandonment of mandates may not have been +considered, but at the time I believed that they were potent with +Colonel House and with the President. The subsequent advocacy of the +system by these two influential members of the Commission on the League +of Nations, which resulted in its adoption, in no way lessened my belief +as to the reasons for their support. + +The mandatory system, a product of the creative mind of General Smuts, +was a novelty in international relations which appealed strongly to +those who preferred to adopt unusual and untried methods rather than to +accept those which had been tested by experience and found practical of +operation. The self-satisfaction of inventing something new or of +evolving a new theory is inherent with not a few men. They are +determined to try out their ideas and are impatient of opposition which +seeks to prevent the experiment. In fact opposition seems sometimes to +enhance the virtue of a novelty in the minds of those who propose or +advocate its adoption. Many reformers suffer from this form of vanity. + +In the case of the system of mandates its adoption by the Conference and +the conferring on the League of Nations the power to issue mandates +seemed at least to the more conservative thinkers at Paris a very +doubtful venture. It appeared to possess no peculiar advantages over the +old method of transferring and exercising sovereign control either in +providing added protection to the inhabitants of territory subject to a +mandate or greater certainty of international equality in the matter of +commerce and trade, the two principal arguments urged in favor of the +proposed system. + +If the advocates of the system intended to avoid through its operation +the appearance of taking enemy territory as the spoils of war, it was a +subterfuge which deceived no one. It seemed obvious from the very first +that the Powers, which under the old practice would have obtained +sovereignty over certain conquered territories, would not be denied +mandates over those territories. The League of Nations might reserve in +the mandate a right of supervision of administration and even of +revocation of authority, but that right would be nominal and of little, +if any, real value provided the mandatory was one of the Great Powers as +it undoubtedly would be. The almost irresistible conclusion is that the +protagonists of the theory saw in it a means of clothing the League of +Nations with an apparent usefulness which justified the League by making +it the guardian of uncivilized and semi-civilized peoples and the +international agent to watch over and prevent any deviation from the +principle of equality in the commercial and industrial development of +the mandated territories. + +It may appear surprising that the Great Powers so readily gave their +support to the new method of obtaining an apparently limited control +over the conquered territories, and did not seek to obtain complete +sovereignty over them. It is not necessary to look far for a sufficient +and very practical reason. If the colonial possessions of Germany had, +under the old practice, been divided among the victorious Powers and +been ceded to them directly in full sovereignty, Germany might justly +have asked that the value of such territorial cessions be applied on any +war indemnities to which the Powers were entitled. On the other hand, +the League of Nations in the distribution of mandates would presumably +do so in the interests of the inhabitants of the colonies and the +mandates would be accepted by the Powers as a duty and not to obtain new +possessions. Thus under the mandatory system Germany lost her +territorial assets, which might have greatly reduced her financial debt +to the Allies, while the latter obtained the German colonial possessions +without the loss of any of their claims for indemnity. In actual +operation the apparent altruism of the mandatory system worked in favor +of the selfish and material interests of the Powers which accepted the +mandates. And the same may be said of the dismemberment of Turkey. It +should not be a matter of surprise, therefore, that the President found +little opposition to the adoption of his theory, or, to be more +accurate, of the Smuts theory, on the part of the European statesmen. + +There was one case, however, in which the issuance of a mandate appeared +to have a definite and practical value and to be superior to a direct +transfer of complete sovereignty or of the conditional sovereignty +resulting from the establishment of a protectorate. The case was that of +a territory with or without a national government, which, not being +self-supporting and not sufficiently strong to protect its borders from +aggressive neighbors, or its people sufficiently enlightened to govern +themselves properly, would be a constant source of expense instead of +profit to the Power, which as its protector and tutor became its +overlord. Under such conditions there was more probability of persuading +a nation inspired by humanitarian and altruistic motives to assume the +burden for the common good under the mandatory system than under the old +method of cession or of protectorate. As to nations, however, which +placed national interests first and made selfishness the standard of +international policy it was to be assumed that an appeal under either +system would be ineffective. + +The truth of this was very apparent at Paris. In the tentative +distribution of mandates among the Powers, which took place on the +strong presumption that the mandatory system would be adopted, the +principal European Powers appeared to be willing and even eager to +become mandatories over territories possessing natural resources which +could be profitably developed and showed an unwillingness to accept +mandates for territories which, barren of mineral or agricultural +wealth, would be continuing liabilities rather than assets. This is not +stated by way of criticism, but only in explanation of what took place. + +From the beginning to the end of the discussions on mandates and their +distribution among the Powers it was repeatedly declared that the United +States ought to participate in the general plan for the upbuilding of +the new states which under mandatories would finally become independent +nationalities, but it was never, to my knowledge, proposed, except by +the inhabitants of the region in question, that the United States should +accept a mandate for Syria or the Asiatic coast of the Aegean Sea. Those +regions were rich in natural resources and their economic future under a +stable government was bright. Expenditures in their behalf and the +direction of their public affairs would bring ample returns to the +mandatory nations. On the other hand, there was a sustained +propaganda--for it amounted to that--in favor of the United States +assuming mandates over Armenia and the municipal district of +Constantinople, both of which, if limited by the boundaries which it was +then purposed to draw, would be a constant financial burden to the Power +accepting the mandate, and, in the case of Armenia, would require that +Power to furnish a military force estimated at not less than 50,000 men +to prevent the aggression of warlike neighbors and to preserve domestic +order and peace. + +It is not too severe to say of those who engaged in this propaganda that +the purpose was to take advantage of the unselfishness of the American +people and of the altruism and idealism of President Wilson in order to +impose on the United States the burdensome mandates and to divide those +which covered desirable territories among the European Powers. I do not +think that the President realized at the time that an actual propaganda +was going on, and I doubt very much whether he would have believed it if +he had been told. Deeply impressed with the idea that it was the moral +duty of the great and enlightened nations to aid the less fortunate and +especially to guard the nationalities freed from autocratic rule until +they were capable of self-government and self-protection, the President +apparently looked upon the appeals made to him as genuine expressions of +humanitarianism and as manifestations of the opinion of mankind +concerning the part that the United States ought to take in the +reconstruction of the world. His high-mindedness and loftiness of +thought blinded him to the sordidness of purpose which appears to have +induced the general acquiescence in his desired system of mandates, and +the same qualities of mind caused him to listen sympathetically to +proposals, the acceptance of which would give actual proof of the +unselfishness of the United States. + +Reading the situation thus and convinced of the objections against the +mandatory system from the point of view of international law, of policy +and of American interests, I opposed the inclusion of the system in the +plan for a League of Nations. In view of the attitude which Mr. Wilson +had taken toward my advice regarding policies I confined the objections +which I presented to him, as I have stated, to those based on legal +difficulties. The objections on the ground of policy were made to +Colonel House in the hope that through him they might reach the +President and open his eyes to the true state of affairs. Whether they +ever did reach him I do not know. Nothing in his subsequent course of +action indicated that they did. + +But, if they did, he evidently considered them as invalid as he did the +objections arising from legal difficulties. The system of mandates was +written into the Treaty and a year after the Treaty was signed President +Wilson asked the Congress for authority to accept for the United States +a mandate over Armenia. This the Congress refused. It is needless to +make further comment. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED + + +The differences between the President's views and mine in regard to the +character of the League of Nations and to the provisions of the Covenant +relating to the organization and functions of the League were +irreconcilable, and we were equally in disagreement as to the duties of +the League in carrying out certain provisions of the Treaty of Peace as +the common agent of the signatory Powers. As a commissioned +representative of the President of the United States acting under his +instructions I had no alternative but to accept his decisions and to +follow his directions, since surrender of my commission as Peace +Commissioner seemed to me at the time to be practically out of the +question. I followed his directions, however, with extreme reluctance +because I felt that Mr. Wilson's policies were fundamentally wrong and +would unavoidably result in loss of prestige to the United States and to +him as its Chief Magistrate. It seemed to me that he had endangered, if +he had not destroyed, his preeminent position in world affairs in order +to obtain the acceptance of his plan for a League of Nations, a plan +which in theory and in detail was so defective that it would be +difficult to defend it successfully from critical attack. + +The objections to the terms of the Covenant, which I had raised at the +outset, were based on principle and also on policy, as has been shown in +the preceding pages; and on the same grounds I had opposed their hasty +adoption and their inclusion in the Peace Treaty to be negotiated at +Paris by the Conference. These objections and the arguments advanced in +their support did not apparently have any effect on President Wilson, +for they failed to change his views or to modify the plan which he, with +General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil, had worked out for an international +organization. They did not swerve him one jot from his avowed purpose to +make the creation of the League of Nations the principal feature of the +negotiations and the provisions of the Covenant the most prominent +articles in the Treaties of Peace with the Central Powers. + +Instead of accomplishing their designed purpose, my efforts to induce +the President to change his policy resulted only in my losing his +confidence in my judgment and in arousing in his mind, if I do not +misinterpret his conduct, doubts of my loyalty to him personally. It was +characteristic of Mr. Wilson that his firm conviction as to the +soundness of his conclusions regarding the character of the League of +Nations and his fixity of purpose in seeking to compel its adoption by +the Peace Conference were so intense as to brook no opposition, +especially from one whom he expected to accept his judgment without +question and to give support in thought and word to any plan or policy +which he advocated. In view of this mental attitude of the President it +is not difficult to understand his opinion of my course of action at +Paris. The breach in our confidential relations was unavoidable in view +of my conviction of the duty of an official adviser and his belief that +objections ought not to be urged as to a matter concerning which he had +expressed his opinion. To give implied assent to policies and intentions +which seemed to me wrong or unwise would have been violative of a public +trust, though doubtless by remaining silent I might have won favor and +approval from the President and retained his confidence. + +In summarizing briefly the subjects of disagreement between the +President and myself concerning the League of Nations I will follow the +order of importance rather than the order in which they arose. While +they also divide into two classes, those based on principle and those +based on policy, it does not seem advisable to treat them by classes in +the summary. + +The most serious defect in the President's Covenant was, in my opinion, +one of principle. It was the practical denial of the equality of nations +in the regulation of international affairs in times of peace through the +recognition in the Executive Council of the League of the right of +primacy of the Five Great Powers. This was an abandonment of a +fundamental principle of international law and comity and was +destructive of the very conception of national sovereignty both as a +term of political philosophy and as a term of constitutional law. The +denial of the equal independence and the free exercise of sovereign +rights of all states in the conduct of their foreign affairs, and the +establishment of this group of primates, amounted to a recognition of +the doctrine that the powerful are, in law as well as in fact, entitled +to be the overlords of the weak. If adopted, it legalized the mastery of +might, which in international relations, when peace prevailed, had been +universally condemned as illegal and its assertion as reprehensible. + +It was this doctrine, that the possessors of superior physical power +were as a matter of right the supervisors, if not the dictators, of +those lacking the physical power to resist their commands, which was the +vital element of ancient imperialism and of modern Prussianism. Belief +in it as a true theory of world polity justified the Great War in the +eyes of the German people even when they doubted the plea of their +Government that their national safety was in peril. The victors, +although they had fought the war with the announced purpose of proving +the falsity of this pernicious doctrine and of emancipating the +oppressed nationalities subject to the Central Powers, revived the +doctrine with little hesitation during the negotiations at Paris and +wrote it into the Covenant of the League of Nations by contriving an +organization which would give practical control over the destinies of +the world to an oligarchy of the Five Great Powers. It was an assumption +of the right of supremacy based on the fact that the united strength of +these Powers could compel obedience. It was a full endorsement of the +theory of "the balance of power" in spite of the recognized evils of +that doctrine in its practical application. Beneath the banner of the +democracies of the world was the same sinister idea which had found +expression in the Congress of Vienna with its purpose of protecting the +monarchical institutions of a century ago. It proclaimed in fact that +mankind must look to might rather than right, to force rather than law, +in the regulation of international affairs for the future. + +This defect in the theory, on which the League of Nations was to be +organized, was emphasized and given permanency by the adoption of a +mutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence +against external aggression. Since the burden of enforcing the guaranty +would unavoidably fall upon the more powerful nations, they could +reasonably demand the control over affairs which might develop into a +situation requiring a resort to the guaranty. In fact during a plenary +session of the Peace Conference held on May 31, 1919, President Wilson +stated as a broad principle that responsibility for protecting and +maintaining a settlement under one of the Peace Treaties carried with it +the right to determine what that settlement should be. The application +to the case of responsible guarantors is obvious and was apparently in +mind when the Covenant was being evolved. The same principle was applied +throughout the negotiations at Paris. + +The mutual guaranty from its affirmative nature compelled in fact, +though not in form, the establishment of a ruling group, a coalition of +the Great Powers, and denied, though not in terms, the equality of +nations. The oligarchy was the logical result of entering into the +guaranty or the guaranty was the logical result of the creation of the +oligarchy through the perpetuation of the basic idea of the Supreme War +Council. No distinction was made as to a state of war and a state of +peace. Strongly opposed to the abandonment of the principle of the +equality of nations in times of peace I naturally opposed the +affirmative guaranty and endeavored to persuade the President to accept +as a substitute for it a self-denying or negative covenant which +amounted to a promise of "hands-off" and in no way required the +formation of an international oligarchy to make it effective. + +In addition to the foregoing objection I opposed the guaranty on the +ground that it was politically inexpedient to attempt to bind the United +States by a treaty provision which by its terms would certainly invite +attack as to its constitutionality. Without entering into the strength +of the legal argument, and without denying that there are two sides to +the question, the fact that it was open to debate whether the +treaty-making power under the Constitution could or could not obligate +the Government of the United States to make war under certain conditions +was in my judgment a practical reason for avoiding the issue. If the +power existed to so bind the United States by treaty on the theory that +the Federal Government could not be restricted in its right to make +international agreements, then the guaranty would be attacked as an +unwise and needless departure from the traditional policies of the +Republic. If the power did not exist, then the violation of the +Constitution would be an effective argument against such an undertaking. +Whatever the conclusion might be, therefore, as to the legality of the +guaranty or as to whether the obligation was legal or moral in nature, +it did not seem possible for it to escape criticism and vigorous attack +in America. + +It seemed to me that the President's guaranty was so vulnerable from +every angle that to insist upon it would endanger the acceptance of any +treaty negotiated if the Covenant was, in accordance with the +President's plan, made an integral part of it. Then, too, opposition +would, in my opinion, develop on the ground that the guaranty would +permit European Powers to participate, if they could not act +independently, in the forcible settlement of international quarrels in +the Western Hemisphere whenever there was an actual invasion of +territory or violation of sovereignty, while conversely the United +States would be morally, if not legally, bound to take part in coercive +measures in composing European differences under similar conditions. It +could be urged with much force that the Monroe Doctrine in the one case +and the Washington policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" in the +other would be so affected that they would both have to be substantially +abandoned or else rewritten. If the American people were convinced that +this would be the consequence of accepting the affirmative guaranty, it +meant its rejection. In any event it was bound to produce an acrimonious +controversy. From the point of view of policy alone it seemed unwise to +include the guaranty in the Covenant, and believing that an objection on +that ground would appeal to the President more strongly than one based +on principle, I emphasized that objection, though in my own mind the +other was the more vital and more compelling. + +The points of difference relating to the League of Nations between the +President's views and mine, other than the recognition of the primacy of +the Great Powers, the affirmative guaranty and the resulting denial in +fact of the equality of nations in times of peace, were the provisions +in the President's original draft of the Covenant relating to +international arbitrations, the subordination of the judicial power to +the political power, and the proposed system of mandates. Having +discussed with sufficient detail the reasons which caused me to oppose +these provisions, and having stated the efforts made to induce President +Wilson to abandon or modify them, repetition would be superfluous. It is +also needless, in view of the full narrative of events contained in +these pages, to state that I failed entirely in my endeavor to divert +the President from his determination to have these provisions inserted +in the Covenant, except in the case of international arbitrations, and +even in that case I do not believe that my advice had anything to do +with his abandonment of his ideas as to the method of selecting +arbitrators and the right of appeal from arbitral awards. Those changes +and the substitution of an article providing for the future creation of +a Permanent Court of International Justice, were, in my opinion, as I +have said, a concession to the European statesmen and due to their +insistence. + +President Wilson knew that I disagreed with him as to the relative +importance of restoring a state of peace at the earliest date possible +and of securing the adoption of a plan for the creation of a League of +Nations. He was clearly convinced that the drafting and acceptance of +the Covenant was superior to every other task imposed on the Conference, +that it must be done before any other settlement was reached and that it +ought to have precedence in the negotiations. His course of action was +conclusive evidence of this conviction. + +On the other hand, I favored the speedy negotiation of a short and +simple preliminary treaty, in which, so far as the League of Nations was +concerned, there would be a series of declarations and an agreement for +a future international conference called for the purpose of drafting a +convention in harmony with the declarations in the preliminary treaty. +By adopting this course a state of peace would have been restored in the +early months of 1919, official intercourse and commercial relations +would have been resumed, the more complex and difficult problems of +settlement would have been postponed to the negotiation of the +definitive Treaty of Peace, and there would have been time to study +exhaustively the purposes, powers, and practical operations of a League +before the organic agreement was put into final form. Postponement would +also have given opportunity to the nations, which had continued neutral +throughout the war, to participate in the formation of the plan for a +League on an equal footing with the nations which had been belligerents. +In the establishment of a world organization universality of +international representation in reaching an agreement seemed to me +advisable, if not essential, provided the nations represented were +democracies and not autocracies. + +It was to be presumed also that at a conference entirely independent of +the peace negotiations and free from the influences affecting the terms +of peace, there would be more general and more frank discussions +regarding the various phases of the subject than was possible at a +conference ruled by the Five Great Powers and dominated in its +decisions, if not in its opinions, by the statesmen of those Powers. + +To perfect such a document, as the Covenant of the League of Nations was +intended to be, required expert knowledge, practical experience in +international relations, and an exchange of ideas untrammeled by +immediate questions of policy or by the prejudices resulting from the +war and from national hatreds and jealousies. It was not a work for +politicians, novices, or inexperienced theorists, but for trained +statesmen and jurists, who were conversant with the fundamental +principles of international law, with the usages of nations in their +intercourse with one another, and with the successes and failures of +previous experiments in international association. The President was +right in his conception as to the greatness of the task to be +accomplished, but he was wrong, radically wrong, in believing that it +could be properly done at the Paris Conference under the conditions +which there prevailed and in the time given for consideration of +the subject. + +To believe for a moment that a world constitution--for so its advocates +looked upon the Covenant--could be drafted perfectly or even wisely in +eleven days, however much thought individuals may have previously given +to the subject, seems on the face of it to show an utter lack of +appreciation of the problems to be solved or else an abnormal confidence +in the talents and wisdom of those charged with the duty. If one +compares the learned and comprehensive debates that took place in the +convention which drafted the Constitution of the United States, and the +months that were spent in the critical examination word by word of the +proposed articles, with the ten meetings of the Commission on the League +of Nations prior to its report of February 14 and with the few hours +given to debating the substance and language of the Covenant, the +inferior character of the document produced by the Commission ought not +to be a matter of wonder. It was a foregone conclusion that it would be +found defective. Some of these defects were subsequently corrected, but +the theory and basic principles, which were the chief defects in the +plan, were preserved with no substantial change. + +But the fact, which has been repeatedly asserted in the preceding pages +and which cannot be too strongly emphasized by repetition, is that the +most potent and most compelling reason for postponing the consideration +of a detailed plan for an international organization was that such a +consideration at the outset of the negotiations at Paris obstructed and +delayed the discussion and settlement of the general terms necessary to +the immediate restoration of a state of peace. Those who recall the +political and social conditions in Europe during the winter of 1918-19, +to which reference has already been made, will comprehend the +apprehension caused by anything which interrupted the negotiation of the +peace. No one dared to prophesy what might happen if the state of +political uncertainty and industrial stagnation, which existed under the +armistices, continued. + +The time given to the formulation of the Covenant of the League of +Nations and the determination that it should have first place in the +negotiations caused such a delay in the proceedings and prevented a +speedy restoration of peace. Denial of this is useless. It is too +manifest to require proof or argument to support it. It is equally true, +I regret to say, that President Wilson was chiefly responsible for this. +If he had not insisted that a complete and detailed plan for the League +should be part of the treaty negotiated at Paris, and if he had not also +insisted that the Covenant be taken up and settled in terms before other +matters were considered, a preliminary treaty of peace would in all +probability have been signed, ratified, and in effect during +April, 1919. + +Whatever evils resulted from the failure of the Paris Conference to +negotiate promptly a preliminary treaty--and it must be admitted they +were not a few--must be credited to those who caused the delay. The +personal interviews and secret conclaves before the Commission on the +League of Nations met occupied a month and a half. Practically another +half month was consumed in sessions of the Commission. The month +following was spent by President Wilson on his visit to the United +States explaining the reported Covenant and listening to criticisms. +While much was done during his absence toward the settlement of numerous +questions, final decision in every case awaited his return to Paris. +After his arrival the Commission on the League renewed its sittings to +consider amendments to its report, and it required over a month to put +it in final form for adoption; but during this latter period much time +was given to the actual terms of peace, which on account of the delay +caused in attempting to perfect the Covenant had taken the form of a +definitive rather than a preliminary treaty. + +It is conservative to say that between two and three months were spent +in the drafting of a document which in the end was rejected by the +Senate of the United States and was responsible for the non-ratification +of the Treaty of Versailles. In view of the warnings that President +Wilson had received as to the probable result of insisting on the plan +of a League which he had prepared and his failure to heed the warnings, +his persistency in pressing for acceptance of the Covenant before +anything else was done makes the resulting delay in the peace less +excusable. + +Two weeks after the President returned from the United States in March +the common opinion was that the drafting of the Covenant had delayed the +restoration of peace, an opinion which was endorsed in the press of many +countries. The belief became so general and aroused so much popular +condemnation that Mr. Wilson considered it necessary to make a public +denial, in which he expressed surprise at the published views and +declared that the negotiations in regard to the League of Nations had in +no way delayed the peace. Concerning the denial and the subject with +which it dealt, I made on March 28 the following memorandum: + + "The President has issued a public statement, which appears in this + morning's papers, in which he refers to the 'surprising impression' + that the discussions concerning the League of Nations have delayed + the making of peace and he flatly denies that the impression is + justified. + + "I doubt if this statement will remove the general impression which + amounts almost to a conviction. Every one knows that the President's + thoughts and a great deal of his time prior to his departure for the + United States were given to the formulation of the plan for a League + and that he insisted that the 'Covenant' should be drafted and + reported before the other features of the peace were considered. The + _real_ difficulties of the present situation, which had to be settled + before the treaty could be drafted, were postponed until his return + here on March 13th. + + "In fact the real bases of peace have only just begun to receive the + attention which they deserve. + + "If such questions as the Rhine Provinces, Poland, reparations, and + economic arrangements had been taken up by the President and Premiers + in January, and if they had sat day and night, as they are now + sitting _in camera,_ until each was settled, the peace treaty would, + I believe, be to-day on the Conference's table, if not + actually signed. + + "Of course the insistence that the plan of the League be first pushed + to a draft before all else prevented the settlement of the other + questions. Why attempt to refute what is manifestly true? I regret + that the President made the statement because I do not think that it + carries conviction. I fear that it will invite controversy and + denial, and that it puts the President on the defensive." + +The views expressed in this memorandum were those held, I believe, by +the great majority of persons who participated in the Peace Conference +or were in intimate touch with its proceedings. Mr. Wilson's published +denial may have converted some to the belief that the drafting of the +Covenant was in no way responsible for the delay of the peace, but the +number of converts must have been very few, as it meant utter ignorance +of or indifference to the circumstances which conclusively proved the +incorrectness of the statement. + +The effect of this attempt of President Wilson to check the growing +popular antipathy to the League as an obstacle to the speedy restoration +of peace was to cause speculation as to whether he really appreciated +the situation. If he did not, it was affirmed that he was ignorant of +public opinion or else was lacking in mental acuteness. If he did +appreciate the state of affairs, it was said that his statement was +uttered with the sole purpose of deceiving the people. In either case he +fell in public estimation. It shows the unwisdom of having issued +the denial. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE + + +There is one subject, connected with the consideration of the mutual +guaranty which, as finally reported by the Commission on the League of +Nations, appears as Article 10 of the Covenant, that should be briefly +reviewed, as it directly bears upon the value placed upon the guaranty +by the French statesmen who accepted it. I refer to the treaties +negotiated by France with the United States and Great Britain +respectively. These treaties provided that, in the event of France being +again attacked by Germany without provocation, the two Powers severally +agreed to come to the aid of the French Republic in repelling the +invasion. The joint nature of the undertaking was in a provision in each +treaty that a similar treaty would be signed by the other Power, +otherwise the agreement failed. The undertakings stated in practically +identical terms in the two treaties constituted, in fact, a triple +defensive alliance for the preservation of the integrity of French +territory and French independence. It had the same object as the +guaranty in the Covenant, though it went even further in the assurance +of affirmative action, and was, therefore, open to the same objections +on the grounds of constitutionality and policy as Article 10. + +In a note, dated March 20, stating my "Impressions as to the Present +Situation," I discussed the endeavors being made by the President to +overcome opposition and to remove obstacles to the acceptance of his +plan for a League of Nations by means of compromises and concessions. In +the note appears the following: + + "An instance of the lengths to which these compromises and makeshifts + are going, occurred this morning when Colonel House sent to Mr. + White, General Bliss, and me for our opinion the following proposal: + That the United States, Great Britain, and France enter into a formal + alliance to resist any aggressive action by Germany against France or + Belgium, and to employ their military, financial, and economic + resources for this purpose in addition to exerting their moral + influence to prevent such aggression. + + "We three agreed that, if that agreement was made, the chief reason + for a League of Nations, as now planned, disappeared. So far as + France and Belgium were concerned the alliance was all they needed + for their future safety. They might or might not accept the League. + Of course they would if the alliance depended upon their acceptance. + They would do most anything to get such an alliance. + + "The proposal was doubtless made to remove two provisions on which + the French are most insistent: _First_, an international military + staff to be prepared to use force against Germany if there were signs + of military activity; _second_, the creation of an independent + Rhenish Republic to act as a 'buffer' state. Of course the triple + alliance would make these measures needless. + + "What impressed me most was that to gain French support for the + League the proposer of the alliance was willing to destroy the chief + feature of the League. It seemed to me that here was utter blindness + as to the consequences of such action. There appears to have been no + thought given as to the way other nations, like Poland, Bohemia, and + the Southern Slavs, would view the formation of an alliance to + protect France and Belgium alone. Manifestly it would increase rather + than decrease their danger from Germany since she would have to look + eastward and southward for expansion. Of course they would not accept + as sufficient the guaranty in the Covenant when France and Belgium + declined to do it. + + "How would such a proposal be received in the United States with its + traditional policy of avoiding 'entangling alliances'? Of course, + when one considers it, the proposal is preposterous and would be + laughed at and rejected." + +This was the impression made upon me at the time that this triple +alliance against Germany was first proposed. I later came to look upon +it more seriously and to recognize the fact that there were some valid +reasons in favor of the proposal. The subject was not further discussed +by the Commissioners for several weeks, but it is clear from what +followed that M. Clemenceau, who naturally favored the idea, continued +to press the President to agree to the plan. What arguments were +employed to persuade him I cannot say, but, knowing the shrewdness of +the French Premier in taking advantage of a situation, my belief is that +he threatened to withdraw or at least gave the impression that he would +withdraw his support of the League of Nations or else would insist on a +provision in the Covenant creating a general staff and an international +military force and on a provision in the treaty establishing a Rhenish +Republic or else ceding to France all territory west of the Rhine. To +avoid the adoption of either of these provisions, which would have +endangered the approval of his plan for world organization, the +President submitted to the French demand. At least I assume that was the +reason, for he promised to enter into the treaty of assistance which M. +Clemenceau insisted should be signed. + +It is of course possible that he was influenced in his decision by the +belief that the knowledge that such an agreement existed would be +sufficient to deter Germany from even planning another invasion of +France, but my opinion is that the desire to win French support for the +Covenant was the chief reason for the promise that he gave. It should be +remembered that at the time both the Italians and Japanese were +threatening to make trouble unless their territorial ambitions were +satisfied. With these two Powers disaffected and showing a disposition +to refuse to accept membership in the proposed League of Nations the +opposition of France to the Covenant would have been fatal. It would +have been the end of the President's dream of a world organized to +maintain peace by an international guaranty of national boundaries and +sovereignties. Whether France would in the end have insisted on the +additional guaranty of protection I doubt, but it is evident that Mr. +Wilson believed that she would and decided to prevent a disaster to his +plan by acceding to the wishes of his French colleague. + +Some time in April prior to the acceptance of the Treaty of Peace by the +Premiers of the Allied Powers, the President and Mr. Lloyd George agreed +with M. Clemenceau to negotiate the treaties of protective alliance +which the French demanded. The President advised me of his decision on +the day before the Treaty was delivered to the German plenipotentiaries +stating in substance that his promise to enter into the alliance formed +a part of the settlements as fully as if written into the Treaty. I told +him that personally I considered an agreement to negotiate the treaty of +assistance a mistake, as it discredited Article 10 of the Covenant, +which he considered all-important, and as it would, I was convinced, be +the cause of serious opposition in the United States. He replied that he +considered it necessary to adopt this policy in the circumstances, and +that, at any rate, having passed his word with M. Clemenceau, who was +accepting the Treaty because of his promise, it was too late to +reconsider the matter and useless to discuss it. + +Subsequently the President instructed me to have a treaty drafted in +accordance with a memorandum which he sent me. This was done by Dr. +James Brown Scott and the draft was approved and prepared for signature. +On the morning of June 28, the same day on which the Treaty of +Versailles was signed, the protective treaty with France was signed at +the President's residence in the Place des Etats Unis by M. Clemenceau +and M. Pichon for the French Republic and by President Wilson and myself +for the United States, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour signing at the +same time a similar treaty for Great Britain. Though disagreeing with +the policy of the President in regard to this special treaty it would +have been futile for me to have refused to accept the full powers issued +to me on June 27 or to have declined to follow the directions to act as +a plenipotentiary in signing the document. Such a course would not have +prevented Mr. Wilson from entering into the defensive alliance with +France and Great Britain and might have actually delayed the peace. +Feeling strongly the supreme necessity of ending the existing state of +war as soon as possible I did not consider that I would be justified in +refusing to act as the formal agent of the President or in disobeying +his instructions as such agent. In view of the long delay in +ratification of the Treaty of the Peace, I have since doubted whether I +acted wisely. But at the time I was convinced that the right course was +the one which I followed. + +In spite of the fact that my judgment was contrary to the President's as +to the wisdom of negotiating this treaty because I considered the policy +of doing so bad from the standpoint of national interests and of +doubtful expediency in view of the almost certain rejection of it by the +United States Senate and of its probable effect on any plan for general +disarmament, I was not entirely satisfied because I could not disregard +the fact that an argument could be made in its favor which was not +without force. + +The United States entered the war to check the progress of the +autocratic imperialism of Germany. That purpose became generally +recognized before the victory was won. In making peace it was deemed, +therefore, a matter of first importance to make impossible a revival of +the aggressive spirit and ambitious designs of Germany. The prevailing +bitterness against France because of the territorial cessions and the +reparations demanded by the victor would naturally cause the German +people to seek future opportunity to be revenged. With a population +almost, if not quite, double that of the French Republic, Germany would +be a constant menace to the nation which had suffered so terribly in the +past by reason of the imperialistic spirit prevalent in the German +Empire. The fear of that menace strongly influenced the French policies +during the negotiations at Paris. In fact it was hard to avoid the +feeling that this fear dominated the conduct of the French delegates and +the attitude of their Government. They demanded much, and recognizing +the probable effect of their demands on the German people sought to +obtain special protection in case their vanquished enemy attempted in +the future to dispossess them by force of the land which he had been +compelled to surrender or attempted to make them restore the +indemnity paid. + +Whether France could have avoided the danger of German attack in the +future by lessening her demands, however just they might be, is neither +here nor there. It makes little practical difference how that question +is answered. The important fact is that the settlements in favor of +France under the Treaty were of a nature which made the continuance of +peace between the two nations doubtful if Germany possessed the ability +to regain her military strength and if nothing was done to prevent her +from using it. In these circumstances a special protective treaty seemed +a practical way to check the conversion of the revengeful spirit of the +Germans into another war of invasion. + +However valid this argument in favor of the two treaties of assistance, +and though my personal sympathy for France inclined me to satisfy her +wishes, my judgment, as an American Commissioner, was that American +interests and the traditional policies of the United States were against +this alliance. Possibly the President recognized the force of the +argument in favor of the treaty and valued it so highly that he +considered it decisive. Knowing, however, his general attitude toward +French demands and his confidence in the effectiveness of the guaranty +in the Covenant, I believe that the controlling reason for promising the +alliance and negotiating the treaty was his conviction that it was +necessary to make this concession to the French in order to secure their +support for the Covenant and to check the disposition in certain +quarters to make the League of Nations essentially a military coalition +under a general international staff organized and controlled by +the French. + +There were those who favored the mutual guaranty in the Covenant, but +who strongly opposed the separate treaty with France. Their objection +was that, in view of the general guaranty, the treaty of assistance was +superfluous, or, if it were considered necessary, then it discredited +the Covenant's guaranty. The argument was logical and difficult to +controvert. It was the one taken by delegates of the smaller nations who +relied on the general guaranty to protect their countries from future +aggressions on the part of their powerful neighbors. If the guaranty of +the Covenant was sufficient protection for them, they declared that it +ought to be sufficient for France. If France doubted its sufficiency, +how could they be content with it? + +Since my own judgment was against any form of guaranty imposing upon the +United States either a legal or a moral obligation to employ coercive +measures under certain conditions arising in international affairs, I +could not conscientiously support the idea of the French treaty. This +further departure from America's historic policy caused me to accept +President Wilson's "guidance and direction ... with increasing +reluctance," as he aptly expressed it in his letter of February 11, +1920. We did not agree, we could not agree, since our points of view +were so much at variance. + +Yet, in spite of the divergence of our views as to the negotiations +which constantly increased and became more and more pronounced during +the six months at Paris, our personal relations continued unchanged; at +least there was no outward evidence of the actual breach which existed. +As there never had been the personal intimacy between the President and +myself, such as existed in the case of Colonel House and a few others of +his advisers, and as our intercourse had always been more or less formal +in character, it was easier to continue the official relations that had +previously prevailed. I presume that Mr. Wilson felt, as I did, that it +would create an embarrassing situation in the negotiations if there was +an open rupture between us or if my commission was withdrawn or +surrendered and I returned to the United States before the Treaty of +Peace was signed. The effect, too, upon the situation in the Senate +would be to strengthen the opposition to the President's purposes and +furnish his personal, as well as his political, enemies with new grounds +for attacking him. + +I think, however, that our reasons for avoiding a public break in our +official relations were different. The President undoubtedly believed +that such an event would jeopardize the acceptance of the Covenant by +the United States Senate in view of the hostility to it which had +already developed and which was supplemented by the bitter animosity to +him personally which was undisguised. On my part, the chief reason for +leaving the situation undisturbed was that I was fully convinced that my +withdrawal from the American Commission would seriously delay the +restoration of peace, possibly in the signature of the Treaty at Paris +and certainly in its ratification at Washington. Considering that the +time had passed to make an attempt to change Mr. Wilson's views on any +fundamental principle, and believing it a duty to place no obstacle in +the way of the signature and ratification of the Treaty of Peace with +Germany, I felt that there was no course for me as a representative of +the United States other than to obey the President's orders however +strong my personal inclination might be to refuse to follow a line of +action which seemed to me wrong in principle and unwise in policy. + +In view of the subsequent contest between the President and the +opposition Senators over the Treaty of Versailles, resulting in its +non-ratification and the consequent delay in the restoration of a state +of peace between the United States and Germany, my failure at Paris to +decline to follow the President may be open to criticism, if not to +censure. But it can hardly be considered just to pass judgment on my +conduct by what occurred after the signature of the Treaty unless what +would occur was a foregone conclusion, and at that time it was not even +suggested that the Treaty would fail of ratification. The decision had +to be made under the conditions and expectations which then prevailed. +Unquestionably there was on June 28, 1919, a common belief that the +President would compose his differences with a sufficient number of the +Republican Senators to obtain the necessary consent of two thirds of the +Senate to the ratification of the Treaty, and that the delay in +senatorial action would be brief. I personally believed that that would +be the result, although Mr. Wilson's experience in Washington in +February and the rigid attitude, which he then assumed, might have been +a warning as to the future. Seeing the situation as I did, no man would +have been willing to imperil immediate ratification by resigning as +Commissioner on the ground that he was opposed to the President's +policies. A return to peace was at stake, and peace was the supreme need +of the world, the universal appeal of all peoples. I could not +conscientiously assume the responsibility of placing any obstacle in the +way of a return to peace at the earliest possible moment. It would have +been to do the very thing which I condemned in the President when he +prevented an early signing of the peace by insisting on the acceptance +of the Covenant of the League of Nations as a condition precedent. +Whatever the consequence of my action would have been, whether it +resulted in delay or in defeat of ratification, I should have felt +guilty of having prevented an immediate peace which from the first +seemed to me vitally important to all nations. Personal feelings and +even personal beliefs were insufficient to excuse such action. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME + + +Having reviewed the radical differences between the President and myself +in regard to the League of Nations and the inclusion of the Covenant in +the Treaty of Peace with Germany, it is necessary to revert to the early +days of the negotiations at Paris in order to explain the divergence of +our views as to the necessity of a definite programme for the American +Commission to direct it in its work and to guide its members in their +intercourse with the delegates of other countries. + +If the President had a programme, other than the general principles and +the few territorial settlements included in his Fourteen Points, and the +generalities contained in his "subsequent addresses," he did not show a +copy of the programme to the Commissioners or advise them of its +contents. The natural conclusion was that he had never worked out in +detail the application of his announced principles or put into concrete +form the specific settlements which he had declared ought to be in the +terms of peace. The definition of the principles, the interpretation of +the policies, and the detailing of the provisions regarding territorial +settlements were not apparently attempted by Mr. Wilson. They were in +large measure left uncertain by the phrases in which they were +delivered. Without authoritative explanation, interpretation, or +application to actual facts they formed incomplete and inadequate +instructions to Commissioners who were authorized "to negotiate peace." + +An examination of the familiar Fourteen Points uttered by the President +in his address of January 8, 1918, will indicate the character of the +declarations, which may be, by reason of their thought and expression, +termed "Wilsonian" (Appendix IV, p. 314). The first five Points are +announcements of principle which should govern the peace negotiations. +The succeeding eight Points refer to territorial adjustments, but make +no attempt to define actual boundaries, so essential in conducting +negotiations regarding territory. The Fourteenth Point relates to the +formation of "a general association of the nations for the purpose of +affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial +integrity to great and small nations alike." + +It is hardly worth while to say that the Fourteen Points and the four +principles declared in the address of February 11, 1918 (Appendix V), do +not constitute a sufficient programme for negotiators. Manifestly they +are too indefinite in specific application. They were never intended for +that purpose when they were proclaimed. They might have formed a general +basis for the preparation of instructions for peace commissioners, but +they omitted too many of the essentials to be considered actual +instructions, while the lack of definite terms to-be included in a +treaty further deprived them of that character. Such important and +practical subjects as reparations, financial arrangements, the use and +control of waterways, and other questions of a like nature, are not even +mentioned. As a general statement of the bases of peace the Fourteen +Points and subsequent declarations probably served a useful purpose, +though some critics would deny it, but as a working programme for the +negotiation of a treaty they were inadequate, if not wholly useless. + +Believing in the autumn of 1918 that the end of the war was approaching +and assuming that the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference +would have to be furnished with detailed written instructions as to the +terms of the treaty to be signed, I prepared on September 21, 1918, a +memorandum of my views as to the territorial settlements which would +form, not instructions, but a guide in the drafting of instructions for +the American Commissioners. At the time I had no intimation that the +President purposed to be present in person at the peace table and had +not even thought of such a possibility. The memorandum, which follows, +was written with the sole purpose of being ready to draft definite +instructions which could be submitted to the President when the time +came to prepare for the negotiation of the peace. The memorandum +follows: + + "The present Russian situation, which is unspeakably horrible and + which seems beyond present hope of betterment, presents new problems + to be solved at the peace table. + + "The Pan-Germans now have in shattered and impotent Russia the + opportunity to develop an alternative or supplemental scheme to their + 'Mittel-Europa' project. German domination over Southern Russia would + offer as advantageous, if not a more advantageous, route to the + Persian Gulf than through the turbulent Balkans and unreliable + Turkey. If both routes, north and south of the Black Sea, could be + controlled, the Pan-Germans would have gained more than they dreamed + of obtaining. I believe, however, that Bulgaria fears the Germans and + will be disposed to resist German domination possibly to the extent + of making a separate peace with the Allies. Nevertheless, if the + Germans could obtain the route north of the Black Sea, they would + with reason consider the war a successful venture because it would + give them the opportunity to rebuild the imperial power and to carry + out the Prussian ambition of world-mastery. + + "The treaty of peace must not leave Germany in possession directly or + indirectly of either of these routes to the Orient. There must be + territorial barriers erected to prevent that Empire from ever being + able by political or economic penetration to become dominant in + those regions. + + "With this in view I would state the essentials for a stable peace as + follows, though I do so in the most tentative way because conditions + may change materially. These 'essentials' relate to territory and + waters, and do not deal with military protection. + + "_First._ The complete abrogation or denouncement of the + Brest-Litovsk Treaty and all treaties relating in any way to Russian + territory or commerce; and also the same action as to the Treaty of + Bucharest. This applies to all treaties made by the German Empire or + Germany's allies. + + "_Second._ The Baltic Provinces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia + should be autonomous states of a Russian Confederation. + + "_Third_. Finland raises a different question and it should be + carefully considered whether it should not be an independent state. + + "_Fourth_. An independent Poland, composed of Polish provinces of + Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and in possession of the port + of Danzig. + + "_Fifth_. An independent state, either single or federal composed of + Bohemia, Slovakia, and Moravia (and possibly a portion of Silesia) + and possessing an international right of way by land or water to a + free port. + + "_Sixth_. The Ukraine to be a state of the Russian Confederation, to + which should be annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire + in which the Ruthenians predominate. + + "_Seventh_. Roumania, in addition to her former territory, should + ultimately be given sovereignty over Bessarabia, Transylvania, and + the upper portion of the Dobrudja, leaving the central mouth of the + Danube as the boundary of Bulgaria, or else the northern half. (As to + the boundary there is doubt.) + + "_Eighth_. The territories in which the Jugo-Slavs predominate, + namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should + be united with Serbia and Montenegro forming a single or a federal + state. The sovereignty over Trieste or some other port should be + later settled in drawing a boundary line between the new state and + Italy. My present view is that there should be a good Jugo-Slav port. + + "_Ninth_. Hungary should be separated from Austria and possess rights + of free navigation of the Danube. + + "_Tenth_. Restoration to Italy of all the Italian provinces of + Austria. Italy's territory to extend along the northern Adriatic + shore to the Jugo-Slav boundary. Certain ports on the eastern side of + the Adriatic should be considered as possible naval bases of Italy. + (This last is doubtful.) + + "_Eleventh._ Reduction of Austria to the ancient boundaries and title + of the Archduchy of Austria. Incorporation of Archduchy in the + Imperial German Confederation. Austrian outlet to the sea would be + like that of Baden and Saxony through German ports on the North Sea + and the Baltic. + + "_Twelfth_. The boundaries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to follow + in general those established after the First Balkan War, though + Bulgaria should surrender to Greece more of the Aegean coast and + obtain the southern half only of the Dobrudja (or else as far as the + Danube) and the Turkish territory up to the district surrounding + Constantinople, to be subsequently decided upon. + + "_Thirteenth_. Albania to be under Italian or Serbian sovereignty or + incorporated in the Jugo-Slav Confederation. + + "_Fourteenth._ Greece to obtain more of the Aegean littoral at the + expense of Bulgaria, the Greek-inhabited islands adjacent to Asia + Minor and possibly certain ports and adjoining territory in + Asia Minor. + + "_Fifteenth._ The Ottoman Empire to be reduced to Anatolia and have + no possessions in Europe. (This requires consideration.) + + "_Sixteenth_. Constantinople to be erected into an international + protectorate surrounded by a land zone to allow for expansion of + population. The form of government to be determined upon by an + international commission or by one Government acting as the mandatory + of the Powers. The commission or mandatory to have the regulation and + control of the navigation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as + international waterways. + + "_Seventeenth._ Armenia and Syria to be erected into protectorates of + such Government or Governments as seems expedient from a domestic as + well as an international point of view; the guaranty being that both + countries will be given self-government as soon as possible and that + an 'Open-Door' policy as to commerce and industrial development will + be rigidly observed. + + "_Eighteenth._ Palestine to be an autonomous state under a general + international protectorate or under the protectorate of a Power + designated to act as the mandatory of the Powers. + + "_Nineteenth._ Arabia to receive careful consideration as to the full + or partial sovereignty of the state or states established. + + "_Twentieth_. Great Britain to have the sovereignty of Egypt, or a + full protectorate over it. + + "_Twenty-first._ Persia to be freed from all treaties establishing + spheres of influence. Rigid application of the 'Open-Door' policy in + regard to commercial and industrial development. + + "_Twenty-second._ All Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France + without conditions. + + "_Twenty-third._ Belgium to be restored to full sovereignty. + + "_Twenty-fourth._ A consideration of the union of Luxemburg to + Belgium. (This is open to question.) + + "_Twenty-fifth._ The Kiel Canal to be internationalized and an + international zone twenty miles from the Canal on either side to be + erected which should be, with the Canal, under the control and + regulation of Denmark as the mandatory of the Powers. (This last is + doubtful.) + + "_Twenty-sixth._ All land north of the Kiel Canal Zone to be ceded to + Denmark. + + "_Twenty-seventh._ The fortifications of the Kiel Canal and of + Heligoland to be dismantled. Heligoland to be ceded to Denmark. + + "_Twenty-eighth._ The sovereignty of the archipelago of Spitzbergen + to be granted to Norway. + + "_Twenty-ninth._ The disposition of the colonial possessions formerly + belonging to Germany to be determined by an international commission + having in mind the interests of the inhabitants and the possibility + of employing these colonies as a means of indemnification for wrongs + done. The 'Open-Door' policy should be guaranteed. + + "While the foregoing definitive statement as to territory contains my + views at the present time (September 21, 1918), I feel that no + proposition should be considered unalterable, as further study and + conditions which have not been disclosed may materially change + some of them. + + "Three things must constantly be kept in mind, the natural stability + of race, language, and nationality, the necessity of every nation + having an outlet to the sea so that it may maintain its own merchant + marine, and the imperative need of rendering Germany impotent as a + military power." + +Later I realized that another factor should be given as important a +place in the terms of peace as any of the three, namely, the economic +interdependence of adjoining areas and the mutual industrial benefit to +their inhabitants by close political affiliation. This factor in the +territorial settlements made more and more impression upon me as it was +disclosed by a detailed study of the numerous problems which the Peace +Conference had to solve. + +I made other memoranda on various subjects relating to the general peace +for the purpose of crystallizing my ideas, so that I could lay them in +concrete form before the President when the time came to draft +instructions for the American plenipotentiaries charged with the +negotiation of the Treaty of Peace. When the President reached the +decision to attend the Conference and to direct in person the +negotiations, it became evident that, in place of the instructions +customarily issued to negotiators, a more practical and proper form of +defining the objects to be sought by the United States would be an +outline of a treaty setting forth in detail the features of the peace, +or else a memorandum containing definite declarations of policy in +regard to the numerous problems presented. Unless there was some +framework of this sort on which to build, it would manifestly be very +embarrassing for the American Commissioners in their intercourse with +their foreign colleagues, as they would be unable to discuss +authoritatively or even informally the questions at issue or express +opinions upon them without the danger of unwittingly opposing the +President's wishes or of contradicting the views which might be +expressed by some other of their associates on the American Commission. +A definite plan seemed essential if the Americans were to take any part +in the personal exchanges of views which are so usual during the +progress of negotiations. + +Prior to the departure of the American delegation from the United States +and for two weeks after their arrival in Paris, it was expected that the +President would submit to the Commissioners for their guidance a +_projet_ of a treaty or a very complete programme as to policies. +Nothing, however, was done, and in the conferences which took place +between the President and his American associates he confined his +remarks almost exclusively to the League of Nations and to his plan for +its organization. It was evident--at least that was the natural +inference--that President Wilson was without a programme of any sort or +even of a list of subjects suitable as an outline for the preparation of +a programme. How he purposed to conduct the negotiations no one seemed +to know. It was all very uncertain and unsatisfactory. + +In the circumstances, which seemed to be due to the President's failure +to appreciate the necessity for a definite programme, I felt that +something ought to be done, as the probable result would be that the +terms of the Treaty, other than the provisions regarding a League of +Nations, would be drafted by foreign delegates and not by the President. + +Impressed by the unsatisfactory state of affairs and desirous of +remedying it if possible, I asked Dr. James Brown Scott and Mr. David +Hunter Miller, the legal advisers of the American Commission, to prepare +a skeleton treaty covering the subjects to be dealt with in the +negotiations which could be used in working out a complete programme. +After several conferences with these advisers concerning the subjects to +be included and their arrangement in the Treaty, the work was +sufficiently advanced to lay before the Commissioners. Copies were, +therefore, furnished to them with the request that they give the +document consideration in order that they might make criticisms and +suggest changes. I had not sent a copy to the President, intending to +await the views of my colleagues before doing so, but during the +conference of January 10, to which I have been compelled reluctantly to +refer in discussing the Covenant of the League of Nations, I mentioned +the fact that our legal advisers had been for some time at work on a +"skeleton treaty" and had made a tentative draft. The President at once +showed his displeasure and resented the action taken, evidently +considering the request that a draft be prepared to be a usurpation of +his authority to direct the activities of the Commission. It was this +incident which called forth his remark, to which reference was made in +Chapter VIII, that he did not propose to have lawyers drafting +the Treaty. + +In view of Mr. Wilson's attitude it was useless for Dr. Scott and Mr. +Miller to proceed with their outline of a treaty or for the +Commissioners to give consideration to the tentative draft already made. +It was a disagreeable situation. If the President had had anything, +however crude and imperfect it might have been, to submit in place of +the Scott-Miller draft, it would have been a different matter and +removed to an extent the grounds for complaint at his attitude. But he +offered nothing at all as a substitute. It is fair to assume that he had +no programme prepared and was unwilling to have any one else make a +tentative one for his consideration. It left the American Commission +without a chart marking out the course which they were to pursue in the +negotiations and apparently without a pilot who knew the channel. + +Six days after the enforced abandonment of the plan to prepare a +skeleton treaty as a foundation for a definite and detailed programme, I +made the following note which expresses my views on the situation at +that time: + + "_January_ 16, 1919 + + "No plan of work has been prepared. Unless something is done we will + be here for many weeks, possibly for months. After the President's + remarks the other day about a draft-treaty no one except the + President would think of preparing a plan. He must do it himself, and + he is not doing it. He has not even given us a list of subjects to be + considered and of course has made no division of our labors. + + "If the President does not take up this matter of organization and + systematically apportion the subjects between us, we may possibly + have no peace before June. This would be preposterous because with + proper order and division of questions we ought to have a treaty + signed by April first. + + "I feel as if we, the Commissioners, were like a lot of skilled + workmen who are ordered to build a house. We have the materials and + tools, but there are no plans and specifications and no + master-workman in charge of the construction. We putter around in an + aimless sort of way and get nowhere. + + "With all his natural capacity the President seems to lack the + faculty of employing team-work and of adopting a system to utilize + the brains of other men. It is a decided defect in an executive. He + would not make a good head of a governmental department. The result + is, so far as our Commission is concerned, a state of confusion and + uncertainty with a definite loss and delay through effort being + undirected." + +On several occasions I spoke to the President about a programme for the +work of the Commission and its corps of experts, but he seemed +indisposed to consider the subject and gave the impression that he +intended to call on the experts for his own information which would be +all that was necessary. I knew that Colonel House, through Dr. Mezes, +the head of the organization, was directing the preparation of certain +data, but whether he was doing so under the President's directions I did +not know, though I presumed such was the case. Whatever data were +furnished did not, however, pass through the hands of the other +Commissioners who met every morning in my office to exchange information +and discuss matters pertaining to the negotiations and to direct the +routine work of the Commission. + +It is difficult, even with the entire record of the proceedings at Paris +before one, to find a satisfactory explanation for the President's +objection to having a definite programme other than the general +declarations contained in the Fourteen Points and his "subsequent +addresses." It may be that he was unwilling to bind himself to a fixed +programme, since it would restrict him, to an extent, in his freedom of +action and prevent him from assuming any position which seemed to him +expedient at the time when a question arose during the negotiations. It +may be that he did not wish to commit himself in any way to the contents +of a treaty until the Covenant of the League of Nations had been +accepted. It may be that he preferred not to let the American +Commissioners know his views, as they would then be in a position to +take an active part in the informal discussions which he apparently +wished to handle alone. None of these explanations is at all +satisfactory, and yet any one of them may be the true one. + +Whatever was the chief reason for the President's failure to furnish a +working plan to the American Commissioners, he knowingly adopted the +policy and clung to it with the tenacity of purpose which has been one +of the qualities of mind that account for his great successes and for +his great failures. I use the adverb "knowingly" because it had been +made clear to him that, in the judgment of others, the Commissioners +ought to have the guidance furnished by a draft-treaty or by a definite +statement of policies no matter how tentative or subject to change the +draft or statement might be. + +On the day that the President left Paris to return to the United States +(February 14, 1919) I asked him if he had any instructions for the +Commissioners during his absence concerning the settlements which should +be included in the preliminary treaty of peace, as it was understood +that the Council of Ten would continue its sessions for the +consideration of the subjects requiring investigation and decision. The +President replied that he had no instructions, that the decisions could +wait until he returned, though the hearings could proceed and reports +could be made during his absence. Astonished as I was at this wish to +delay these matters, I suggested to him the subjects which I thought +ought to go into the Treaty. He answered that he did not care to discuss +them at that time, which, as he was about to depart from Paris, meant +that everything must rest until he had returned from his visit to +Washington. + +Since I was the head of the American Commission when the President was +absent and became the spokesman for the United States on the Council of +Ten, this refusal to disclose his views even in a general way placed me +in a very awkward position. Without instructions and without knowledge +of the President's wishes or purposes the conduct of the negotiations +was difficult and progress toward actual settlements practically +impossible. As a matter of fact the Council did accomplish a great +amount of work, while the President was away, in the collection of data +and preparing questions for final settlement. But so far as deciding +questions was concerned, which ought to have been the principal duty of +the Council of Ten, it simply "marked time," as I had no power to decide +or even to express an authoritative opinion on any subject. It showed +very clearly that the President intended to do everything himself and to +allow no one to act for him unless it was upon some highly technical +matter. All actual decisions in regard to the terms of peace which +involved policy were thus forced to await his time and pleasure. + +Even after Mr. Wilson returned to Paris and resumed his place as head of +the American delegation he was apparently without a programme. On March +20, six days after his return, I made a note that "the President, so far +as I can judge, has yet no definite programme," and that I was unable to +"find that he has talked over a plan of a treaty even with Colonel +House." It is needless to quote the thoughts, which I recorded at the +time, in regard to the method in which the President was handling a +great international negotiation, a method as unusual as it was unwise. I +referred to Colonel House's lack of information concerning the +President's purposes because he was then and had been from the beginning +on more intimate terms with the President than any other American. If he +did not know the President's mind, it was safe to assume that no +one knew it. + +I had, as has been stated, expressed to Mr. Wilson my views as to what +the procedure should be and had obtained no action. With the +responsibility resting on him for the conduct and success of the +negotiations and with his constitutional authority to exercise his own +judgment in regard to every matter pertaining to the treaty, there was +nothing further to be done in relieving the situation of the American +Commissioners from embarrassment or in inducing the President to adopt a +better course than the haphazard one that he was pursuing. + +It is apparent that we differed radically as to the necessity for a +clearly defined programme and equally so as to the advantages to be +gained by having a draft-treaty made or a full statement prepared +embodying the provisions to be sought by the United States in the +negotiations. I did not attempt to hide my disapproval of the vagueness +and uncertainty of the President's method, and there is no doubt in my +own mind that Mr. Wilson was fully cognizant of my opinion. How far this +lack of system in the work of the Commission and the failure to provide +a plan for a treaty affected the results written into the Treaty of +Versailles is speculative, but my belief is that they impaired in many +particulars the character of the settlements by frequent abandonment of +principle for the sake of expediency. + +The want of a programme or even of an unwritten plan as to the +negotiations was further evidenced by the fact that the President, +certainly as late as March 19, had not made up his mind whether the +treaty which was being negotiated should be preliminary or final. He had +up to that time the peculiar idea that a preliminary treaty was in the +nature of a _modus vivendi_ which could be entered into independently by +the Executive and which would restore peace without going through the +formalities of senatorial consent to ratification. + +The purpose of Mr. Wilson, so far as one could judge, was to include in +a preliminary treaty of the sort that he intended to negotiate, the +entire Covenant of the League of Nations and other principal +settlements, binding the signatories to repeat these provisions in the +final and definitive treaty when that was later negotiated. By this +method peace would be at once restored, the United States and other +nations associated with it in the war would be obligated to renew +diplomatic and consular relations with Germany, and commercial +intercourse would follow as a matter of course. All this was to be done +without going through the American constitutional process of obtaining +the advice and consent of the Senate to the Covenant and to the +principal settlements. The intent seemed to be to respond to the popular +demand for an immediate peace and at the same time to checkmate the +opponents of the Covenant in the Senate by having the League of Nations +organized and functioning before the definitive treaty was laid before +that body. + +When the President advanced this extraordinary theory of the nature of a +preliminary treaty during a conversation, of which I made a full +memorandum, I told him that it was entirely wrong, that by whatever name +the document was called, whether it was "armistice," "agreement," +"protocol," or "_modus_," it would be a treaty and would have to be sent +by him to the Senate for its approval. I said, "If we change the +_status_ from war to peace, it has to be by a ratified treaty. There is +no other way save by a joint resolution of Congress." At this statement +the President was evidently much perturbed. He did not accept it as +conclusive, for he asked me to obtain the opinion of others on the +subject. He was evidently loath to abandon the plan that he had +presumably worked out as a means of preventing the Senate from rejecting +or modifying the Covenant before it came into actual operation. It seems +almost needless to say that all the legal experts, among them Thomas W. +Gregory, the retiring Attorney-General of the United States, who chanced +to be in Paris at the time, agreed with my opinion, and upon being so +informed the President abandoned his purpose. + +It is probable that the conviction, which was forced upon Mr. Wilson, +that he could not independently of the Senate put into operation a +preliminary treaty, determined him to abandon that type of treaty and to +proceed with the negotiation of a definitive one. At least I had by +March 30 reached the conclusion that there would be no preliminary +treaty as is disclosed by the following memorandum written on that day: + + "I am sure now that there will be no preliminary treaty of peace, but + that the treaty will be complete and definitive. This is a serious + mistake. Time should be given for passions to cool. The operations of + a preliminary treaty should be tested and studied. It would hasten a + restoration of peace. Certainly this is the wise course as to + territorial settlements and the financial and economic burdens to be + imposed upon Germany. The same comment applies to the organization of + a League of Nations. Unfortunately the President insists on a + full-blown Covenant and not a declaration of principles. This has + much to do with preventing a preliminary treaty, since he wishes to + make the League an agent for enforcement of definite terms. + + "When the President departed for the United States in February, I + assumed and I am certain that he had in mind that there would be a + preliminary treaty. With that in view I drafted at the time a + memorandum setting forth what the preliminary treaty of peace should + contain. Here are the subjects I then set down: + + "1. Restoration of Peace and official relations. + + "2. Restoration of commercial and financial relations subject to + conditions. + + "3. Renunciation by Germany of all territory and territorial rights + outside of Europe. + + "4. Minimum territory of Germany in Europe, the boundaries to be + fixed in the Definitive Treaty. + + "5. Maximum military and naval establishments and production of arms + and munitions. + + "6. Maximum amount of money and property to be surrendered by Germany + with time limits for payment and delivery. + + "7. German property and territory to be held as security by the + Allies until the Definitive Treaty is ratified. + + "8. Declaration as to the organization of a League of Nations. + + "The President's obsession as to a League of Nations blinds him to + everything else. An immediate peace is nothing to him compared to the + adoption of the Covenant. The whole world wants peace. The President + wants his League. I think that the world will have to wait." + +The eight subjects, above stated, were the ones which I called to the +President's attention at the time he was leaving Paris for the United +States and which he said he did not care to discuss. + +The views that are expressed in the memorandum of March 30 are those +that I have continued to hold. The President was anxious to have the +Treaty, even though preliminary in character, contain detailed rather +than general provisions, especially as to the League of Nations. With +that view I entirely disagreed, as detailed terms of settlement and the +articles of the Covenant as proposed would cause discussion and +unquestionably delay the peace. To restore the peaceful intercourse +between the belligerents, to open the long-closed channels of commerce, +and to give to the war-stricken peoples of Europe opportunity to resume +their normal industrial life seemed to me the first and greatest task to +be accomplished. It was in my judgment superior to every other object of +the Paris negotiations. Compared with it the creation of a League of +Nations was insignificant and could well be postponed. President Wilson +thought otherwise. We were very far apart in this matter as he well +knew, and he rightly assumed that I followed his instructions with +reluctance, and, he might have added, with grave concern. + +As a matter of interest in this connection and as a possible source from +which the President may have acquired knowledge of my views as to the +conduct of the negotiations, I would call attention again to the +conference which I had with Colonel House on December 17, 1918, and to +which I have referred in connection with the subject of international +arbitration. During that conference I said to the Colonel "that I +thought that there ought to be a preliminary treaty of peace negotiated +without delay, and that all the details as to a League of Nations, +boundaries, and indemnities should wait for the time being. The Colonel +replied that he was not so sure about delaying the creation of a League, +as he was afraid that it never could be put through unless it was done +at once. I told him that possibly he was right, but that I was opposed +to anything which delayed the peace." This quotation is from my +memorandum made at the time of our conversation. I think that the same +reason for insisting on negotiating the Covenant largely influenced the +course of the President. My impression at the time was that the Colonel +favored a preliminary treaty provided that there was included in it the +full plan for a League of Nations, which to me seemed to be +impracticable. + +There can be little doubt that, if there had been a settled programme +prepared or a tentative treaty drafted, there would have been a +preliminary treaty which might and probably would have postponed the +negotiations as to a League. Possibly the President realized that this +danger of excluding the Covenant existed and for that reason was +unwilling to make a definite programme or to let a draft-treaty be +drawn. At least it may have added another reason for his proceeding +without advising the Commissioners of his purposes. + +As I review the entire negotiations and the incidents which took place +at Paris, President Wilson's inherent dislike to depart in the least +from an announced course, a characteristic already referred to, seems to +me to have been the most potent influence in determining his method of +work during the Peace Conference. He seemed to think that, having marked +out a definite plan of action, any deviation from it would show +intellectual weakness or vacillation of purpose. Even when there could +be no doubt that in view of changed conditions it was wise to change a +policy, which he had openly adopted or approved, he clung to it with +peculiar tenacity refusing or merely failing to modify it. Mr. Wilson's +mind once made up seemed to become inflexible. It appeared to grow +impervious to arguments and even to facts. It lacked the elasticity and +receptivity which have always been characteristic of sound judgment and +right thinking. He might break, but he would not bend. This rigidity of +mind accounts in large measure for the deplorable, and, as it seemed to +me, needless, conflict between the President and the Senate over the +Treaty of Versailles. It accounts for other incidents in his career +which have materially weakened his influence and cast doubts on his +wisdom. It also accounts, in my opinion, for the President's failure to +prepare or to adopt a programme at Paris or to commit himself to a draft +of a treaty as a basis for the negotiations, which failure, I am +convinced, not only prevented the signature of a short preliminary +treaty of peace, but lost Mr. Wilson the leadership in the proceedings, +as the statesmen of the other Great Powers outlined the Treaty +negotiated and suggested the majority of the articles which were written +into it. It would have made a vast difference if the President had known +definitely what he sought, but he apparently did not. He dealt in +generalities leaving, but not committing, to others their definition and +application. He was always in the position of being able to repudiate +the interpretation which others might place upon his declarations of +principle. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +SECRET DIPLOMACY + + +Another matter, concerning which the President and I disagreed, was the +secrecy with which the negotiations were carried on between him and the +principal European statesmen, incidental to which was the willingness, +if not the desire, to prevent the proceedings and decisions from +becoming known even to the delegates of the smaller nations which were +represented at the Peace Conference. + +Confidential personal interviews were to a certain extent unavoidable +and necessary, but to conduct the entire negotiation through a small +group sitting behind closed doors and to shroud their proceedings with +mystery and uncertainty made a very unfortunate impression on those who +were not members of the secret councils. + +At the first there was no Council of the Heads of States (the so-called +Council of Four); in fact it was not recognized as an organized body +until the latter part of March, 1919. Prior to that time the directing +body of the Conference was the self-constituted Council of Ten composed +of the President and the British, French, and Italian Premiers with +their Secretaries or Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and two Japanese +delegates of ambassadorial rank. This Council had a membership identical +with that of the Supreme War Council, which controlled the armistices, +their enforcement, and other military matters. It assumed authority over +the negotiations and proceedings of the Conference, though it was never +authorized so to do by the body of delegates. The Council of Four, when +later formed, was equally without a mandate from the Conference. They +assumed the authority and exercised it as a matter of right. + +From the time of his arrival in Paris President Wilson held almost daily +conversations with the leading foreign statesmen. It would be of little +value to speculate on what took place at these interviews, since the +President seldom told the American Commission of the meetings or +disclosed to them, unless possibly to Colonel House, the subjects which +were discussed. My conviction is, from the little information which the +President volunteered, that these consultations were--certainly at +first--devoted to inducing the European leaders to give their support to +his plan for a League of Nations, and that, as other matters relating to +the terms of peace were in a measure involved because of their possible +relation to the functions of the League, they too became more and more +subjects of discussion. + +The introduction of this personal and clandestine method of negotiation +was probably due to the President's belief that he could in this way +exercise more effectively his personal influence in favor of the +acceptance of a League. It is not unlikely that this belief was in a +measure justified. In Colonel House he found one to aid him in this +course of procedure, as the Colonel's intimate association with the +principal statesmen of the Allied Powers during previous visits to +Europe as the President's personal envoy was an asset which he could +utilize as an intermediary between the President and those with whom he +wished to confer. Mr. Wilson relied upon Colonel House for his knowledge +of the views and temperaments of the men with whom he had to deal. It +was not strange that he should adopt a method which the Colonel had +found successful in the past and that he should seek the latter's aid +and advice in connection with the secret conferences which usually took +place at the residence of the President. + +Mr. Wilson pursued this method of handling the subjects of negotiation +the more readily because he was by nature and by inclination secretive. +He had always shown a preference for a private interview with an +individual. In his conduct of the executive affairs of the Government at +Washington he avoided as far as possible general conferences. He talked +a good deal about "taking common counsel," but showed no disposition to +put it into practice. He followed the same course in the matter of +foreign affairs. At Paris this characteristic, which had often been the +subject of remark in Washington, was more pronounced, or at least more +noticeable. He was not disposed to discuss matters with the American +Commission as a whole or even to announce to them his decisions unless +something arose which compelled him to do so. He easily fell into the +practice of seeing men separately and of keeping secret the knowledge +acquired as well as the effect of this knowledge on his views and +purposes. To him this was the normal and most satisfactory method of +doing business. + +From the time that the President arrived in Paris up to the time that +the Commission on the League of Nations made its report--that is, from +December 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919--the negotiations regarding the +League were conducted with great secrecy. Colonel House, the President's +collaborator in drafting the Covenant, if he was not, as many believed, +the real author, was the only American with whom Mr. Wilson freely +conferred and to whom he confided the progress that he was making in his +interviews with the foreign statesmen, at many of which interviews the +Colonel was present. It is true that the President held an occasional +conference with all the American Commissioners, but these conferences +were casual and perfunctory in nature and were very evidently not for +the purpose of obtaining the opinions and counsel of the Commissioners. +There was none of the frankness that should have existed between the +Chief Executive and his chosen agents and advisers. The impression made +was that he summoned the conferences to satisfy the _amour propre_ of +the Commissioners rather than out of any personal wish to do so. + +The consequence was that the American Commissioners, other than Colonel +House, were kept in almost complete ignorance of the preliminary +negotiations and were left to gather such information as they were able +from the delegates of other Powers, who, naturally assuming that the +Americans possessed the full confidence of the President, spoke with +much freedom. As Mr. Wilson never held a conference with the American +Commission from the first meeting of the Commission on the League of +Nations until its report was printed, his American colleagues did not +know, except indirectly, of the questions at issue or of the progress +that was being made. The fact is that, as the Commission on the League +met in Colonel House's office at the Hôtel Crillon, his office force +knew far more about the proceedings than did the three American +Commissioners who were not present. As the House organization made no +effort to hide the fact that they had inside information, the +representatives of the press as a consequence frequented the office of +the Colonel in search of the latest news concerning the Commission on +the League of Nations. + +But, in addition to the embarrassment caused the American Commissioners +and the unenviable position in which they were placed by the secrecy +with which the President surrounded his intercourse with the foreign +statesmen and the proceedings of the Commission on the League of +Nations, his secret negotiations caused the majority of the delegates to +the Conference and the public at large to lose in a large measure their +confidence in the actuality of his devotion to "open diplomacy," which +he had so unconditionally proclaimed in the first of his Fourteen +Points. If the policy of secrecy had ceased with the discussions +preliminary to the organization of the Conference, or even with those +preceding the meetings of the Commission on the League of Nations, +criticism and complaint would doubtless have ceased, but as the +negotiations progressed the secrecy of the conferences of the leaders +increased rather than decreased, culminating at last in the organization +of the Council of Four, the most powerful and most seclusive of the +councils which directed the proceedings at Paris. Behind closed doors +these four individuals, who controlled the policies of the United +States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, passed final judgment on the +mass of articles which entered into the Treaties of Peace, but kept +their decisions secret except from the committee which was drafting +the articles. + +The organization of the Council of Four and the mystery which enveloped +its deliberations emphasized as nothing else could have done the +secretiveness with which adjustments were being made and compromises +were being effected. It directed attention also to the fact that the +Four Great Powers had taken supreme control of settling the terms of +peace, that they were primates among the assembled nations and that they +intended to have their authority acknowledged. This extraordinary +secrecy and arrogation of power by the Council of Four excited +astonishment and complaint throughout the body of delegates to the +Conference, and caused widespread criticism in the press and among the +people of many countries. + +A week after the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of the +Heads of States, the official title of the Council of Four, and the +Council of Foreign Ministers, the official title of the Council of Five +(popularly nick-named "The Big Four" and "The Little Five"), I made the +following note on the subject of secret negotiations: + + "After the experience of the last three months [January-March, 1919] + I am convinced that the method of personal interviews and private + conclaves is a failure. It has given every opportunity for intrigue, + plotting, bargaining, and combining. The President, as I now see it, + should have insisted on everything being brought before the Plenary + Conference. He would then have had the confidence and support of all + the smaller nations because they would have looked up to him as their + champion and guide. They would have followed him. + + "The result of the present method has been to destroy their faith and + arouse their resentment. They look upon the President as in favor of + a world ruled by Five Great Powers, an international despotism of the + strong, in which the little nations are merely rubber-stamps. + + "The President has undoubtedly found himself in a most difficult + position. He has put himself on a level with politicians experienced + in intrigue, whom he will find a pretty difficult lot. He will sink + in the estimation of the delegates who are not within the inner + circle, and what will be still more disastrous will be the loss of + confidence among the peoples of the nations represented here. A + grievous blunder has been made." + +The views, which I expressed in this note in regard to the unwisdom of +the President's course, were not new at the time that I wrote them. Over +two months before I had watched the practice of secret negotiation with +apprehension as to what the effect would be upon the President's +influence and standing with the delegates to the Conference. I then +believed that he was taking a dangerous course which he would in the end +regret. So strong was this conviction that during a meeting, which the +President held with the American Commissioners on the evening of January +29, I told him bluntly--perhaps too bluntly from the point of view of +policy--that I considered the secret interviews which he was holding +with the European statesmen, where no witnesses were present, were +unwise, that he was far more successful in accomplishment and less +liable to be misunderstood if he confined his negotiating to the Council +of Ten, and that, furthermore, acting through the Council he would be +much less subject to public criticism. I supported these views with the +statement that the general secrecy, which was being practiced, was +making a very bad impression everywhere, and for that reason, if for no +other, I was opposed to it. The silence with which the President +received my remarks appeared to me significant of his attitude toward +this advice, and his subsequent continuance of secret methods without +change, unless it was to increase the secrecy, proved that our judgments +were not in accord on the subject. The only result of my +representations, it would seem, was to cause Mr. Wilson to realize that +I was not in sympathy with his way of conducting the negotiations. In +the circumstances I think now that it was a blunder on my part to have +stated my views so frankly. + +Two days after I wrote the note, which is quoted (April 2, 1919), I made +another note more general in character, but in which appears the +following: + + "Everywhere there are developing bitterness and resentment against a + secretiveness which is interpreted to mean failure. The patience of + the people is worn threadbare. Their temper has grown ragged. They + are sick of whispering diplomats. + + "Muttered confidences, secret intrigues, and the tactics of the + 'gum-shoer' are discredited. The world wants none of them these days. + It despises and loathes them. What the world asks are honest + declarations openly proclaimed. The statesman who seeks to gain his + end by tortuous and underground ways is foolish or badly advised. The + public man who is sly and secretive rather than frank and bold, whose + methods are devious rather than obvious, pursues a dangerous path + which leads neither to glory nor to success. + + "Secret diplomacy, the bane of the past, is a menace from which man + believed himself to be rid. He who resurrects it invites + condemnation. The whole world will rejoice when the day of the + whisperer is over." + +This note, read at the present time, sounds extravagant in thought and +intemperate in expression. It was written under the influence of +emotions which had been deeply stirred by the conditions then existing. +Time usually softens one's judgments and the passage of events makes +less vivid one's impressions. The perspective, however, grows clearer +and the proportions more accurate when the observer stands at a +distance. While the language of the note might well be changed and made +less florid, the thought needs little modification. The public criticism +was widespread and outspoken, and from the expressions used it was very +evident that there prevailed a general popular disapproval of the way +the negotiations were being conducted. The Council of Four won the +press-name of "The Olympians," and much was said of "the thick cloud of +mystery" which hid them from the anxious multitudes, and of the secrecy +which veiled their deliberations. The newspapers and the correspondents +at Paris openly complained and the delegates to the Conference in a more +guarded way showed their bitterness at the overlordship assumed by the +leading statesmen of the Great Powers and the secretive methods which +they employed. It was, as may be gathered from the note quoted, a +distressing and depressing time. + +As concrete examples of the evils of secret negotiations the "Fiume +Affair" and the "Shantung Settlement" are the best known because of the +storm of criticism and protest which they caused. As the Shantung +Settlement was one of the chief matters of difference between the +President and myself, it will be treated later. The case of Fiume is +different. As to the merits of the question I was very much in accord +with the President, but to the bungling way in which it was handled I +was strongly opposed believing that secret interviews, at which false +hopes were encouraged, were at the bottom of all the trouble which later +developed. But for this secrecy I firmly believe that there would have +been no "Fiume Affair." + +The discussion of the Italian claims to territory along the northern +boundary of the Kingdom and about the head of the Adriatic Sea began as +soon as the American Commission was installed at Paris, about the middle +of December, 1918. The endeavor of the Italian emissaries was to induce +the Americans, particularly the President, to recognize the boundary +laid down in the Pact of London. That agreement, which Italy had +required Great Britain and France to accept in April, 1915, before she +consented to declare war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, committed +the Entente Powers to the recognition of Italy's right to certain +territorial acquisitions at the expense of Austria-Hungary in the event +of the defeat of the Central Empires. By the boundary line agreed upon +in the Pact, Italy would obtain certain important islands and ports on +the Dalmatian coast in addition to the Austrian Tyrol and the Italian +provinces of the Dual Monarchy at the head of the Adriatic. + +When this agreement was signed, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was +not in contemplation, or at least, if it was considered, the possibility +of its accomplishment seemed very remote. It was assumed that the +Dalmatian territory to be acquired under the treaty to be negotiated in +accordance with the terms of the Pact would, with the return of the +Italian provinces, give to Italy naval control over the Adriatic Sea and +secure the harborless eastern coast of the Italian peninsula against +future hostile attack by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The boundary laid +down in the agreement was essentially strategic and based primarily on +considerations of Italian national safety. As long as the Empire existed +as a Great Power the boundary of the Pact of London, so far as it +related to the Adriatic littoral and islands, was not unreasonable or +the territorial demands excessive. + +But the close of active warfare in the autumn of 1918, when the +armistice went into effect, found conditions wholly different from those +upon which these territorial demands had been predicated. The +Austro-Hungarian Empire had fallen to pieces beyond the hope of becoming +again one of the Great Powers. The various nationalities, which had long +been restless and unhappy under the rule of the Hapsburgs, threw off the +imperial yoke, proclaimed their independence, and sought the recognition +and protection of the Allies. The Poles of the Empire joined their +brethren of the Polish provinces of Russia and Prussia in the +resurrection of their ancient nation; Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia +united in forming the new state of Czecho-Slovakia; the southern Slavs +of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia announced their +union with their kindred of the Kingdom of Serbia; and Hungary declared +the severance of her political union with Austria. In a word the Dual +Empire ceased to exist. It was no longer a menace to the national safety +of Italy. This was the state of affairs when the delegates to the Peace +Conference began to assemble at Paris. + +The Italian statesmen realized that these new conditions might raise +serious questions as to certain territorial cessions which would come to +Italy under the terms of the Pact of London, because their strategic +necessity had disappeared with the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. While +they had every reason to assume that Great Britain and France would live +up to their agreement, it was hardly to be expected that under the +changed conditions and in the circumstances attending the negotiation +and signature of the Pact, the British and French statesmen would be +disposed to protest against modifications of the proposed boundary if +the United States and other nations, not parties to the agreement, +should insist upon changes as a matter of justice to the new state of +the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It apparently was considered expedient, +by the Italian representatives, in view of the situation which had +developed, to increase rather than to reduce their claims along the +Dalmatian coast in order that they might have something which could be +surrendered in a compromise without giving up the boundaries laid down +in the Pact of London. + +It is probable, too, that these additional claims were advanced by Italy +in order to offset in a measure the claims of the Jugo-Slavs, who +through the Serbian delegates at Paris were making territorial demands +which the Italians declared to be extravagant and which, if granted, +would materially reduce the proposed cessions to Italy under the Pact of +London. Furthermore, the Italian Government appeared to be by no means +pleased with the idea of a Jugo-Slav state so strong that it might +become a commercial, if not a naval, rival of Italy in the Adriatic. The +Italian delegates in private interviews showed great bitterness toward +the Slavs, who, they declared, had, as Austrian subjects, waged war +against Italy and taken part in the cruel and wanton acts attendant upon +the invasion of the northern Italian provinces. They asserted that it +was unjust to permit these people, by merely changing their allegiance +after defeat, to escape punishment for the outrages which they had +committed against Italians and actually to profit by being vanquished. +This antipathy to the Slavs of the former Empire was in a measure +transferred to the Serbs, who were naturally sympathetic with their +kinsmen and who were also ambitious to build up a strong Slav state with +a large territory and with commercial facilities on the Adriatic coast +which would be ample to meet the trade needs of the interior. + +While there may have been a certain fear for the national safety of +Italy in having as a neighbor a Slav state with a large and virile +population, extensive resources, and opportunity to become a naval power +in the Mediterranean, the real cause of apprehension seemed to be that +the new nation would become a commercial rival of Italy in the Adriatic +and prevent her from securing the exclusive control of the trade which +her people coveted and which the complete victory over Austria-Hungary +appeared to assure to them. + +The two principal ports having extensive facilities for shipping and +rail-transportation to and from the Danubian provinces of the Dual +Empire were Trieste and Fiume. The other Dalmatian ports were small and +without possibilities of extensive development, while the precipitous +mountain barrier between the coast and the interior which rose almost +from the water-line rendered railway construction from an engineering +standpoint impracticable if not impossible. It was apparent that, if +Italy could obtain both the port of Trieste and the port of Fiume, the +two available outlets for foreign trade to the territories lying north +and east of the Adriatic Sea, she would have a substantial monopoly of +the sea-borne commerce of the Dalmatian coast and its hinterland. It was +equally apparent that Italian possession of the two ports would place +the new Slav state at a great disadvantage commercially, as the +principal volume of its exports and imports would have to pass through a +port in the hands of a trade rival which could, in case of controversy +or in order to check competition, be closed to Slav ships and goods on +this or that pretext, even if the new state found it practicable to +maintain a merchant marine under an agreement granting it the use of +the port. + +In view of the new conditions which had thus arisen through the +dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the union of the Southern +Slavs, the Italian delegates at Paris began a vigorous campaign to +obtain sovereignty, or at least administrative control, over Fiume and +the adjacent coasts and islands, it having been generally conceded that +Trieste should be ceded to Italy. The Italian demand for Fiume had +become real instead of artificial. This campaign was conducted by means +of personal interviews with the representatives of the principal Powers, +and particularly with those of the United States because it was +apparently felt that the chief opposition to the demand would come from +that quarter, since the President was known to favor the general +proposition that every nation should have free access to the sea and, if +possible, a seaport under its own sovereignty. + +The Italian delegates were undoubtedly encouraged by some Americans to +believe that, while the President had not actually declared in favor of +Italian control of Fiume, he was sympathetic to the idea and would +ultimately assent to it just as he had in the case of the cession to +Italy of the Tyrol with its Austrian population. Convinced by these +assurances of success the Italian leaders began a nationwide propaganda +at home for the purpose of arousing a strong public sentiment for the +acquisition of the port. This propaganda was begun, it would seem, for +two reasons, first, the political advantage to be gained when it was +announced that Signor Orlando and his colleagues at Paris had succeeded +in having their demand recognized, and, second, the possibility of +influencing the President to a speedy decision by exhibiting the +intensity and unity of the Italian national spirit in demanding the +annexation of the little city, the major part of the population of which +was asserted to be of Italian blood. + +The idea, which was industriously circulated throughout Italy, that +Fiume was an Italian city, aroused the feelings of the people more than +any political or economic argument could have done. The fact that the +suburbs, which were really as much a part of the municipality as the +area within the city proper, were inhabited largely by Jugo-Slavs was +ignored, ridiculed, or denied. That the Jugo-Slavs undoubtedly exceeded +in numbers the Italians in the community when it was treated as a whole +made no difference to the propagandists who asserted that Fiume was +Italian. They clamored for its annexation on the ground of +"self-determination," though refusing to accept that principle as +applicable to the inhabitants of the Austrian Tyrol and failing to raise +any question in regard to it in the case of the port of Danzig. The +Italian orators and press were not disturbed by the inconsistency of +their positions, and the Italian statesmen at Paris, when their +attention was called to it, replied that the cases were not the same, an +assertion which it would have been difficult to establish with facts or +support with convincing arguments. + +While the propaganda went forward in Italy with increasing energy, +additional assurances, I was informed by one of the Italian group, were +given to Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino that President Wilson was +almost on the point of conceding the justice of the Italian claim to +Fiume. It was not until the latter part of March, 1919, that these +statesmen began to suspect that they had been misinformed and that the +influence of their American friends was not as powerful with Mr. Wilson +as they had been led to believe. It was an unpleasant awakening. They +were placed in a difficult position. Too late to calm the inflamed +temper of the Italian people the Italian leaders at Paris had no +alternative but to press their demands with greater vigor since the +failure to obtain Fiume meant almost inevitable disaster to the +Orlando Ministry. + +Following conversations with Baron Sonnino and some others connected +with the Italian delegation, I drew the conclusion that they would go so +far as to refuse to make peace with Germany unless the Adriatic Question +was first settled to their satisfaction. In a memorandum dated March 29, +I wrote: "This will cause a dangerous crisis," and in commenting on the +probable future of the subject I stated: + + "My fear is that the President will continue to rely upon private + interviews and his powers of persuasion to induce the Italians to + abandon their extravagant claim. I am sure that he will not be able + to do it. On the contrary, his conversations will strengthen rather + than weaken Italian determination. He ought to tell them _now_ that + he will not consent to have Fiume given to Italy. It would cause + anger and bitterness, but nothing to compare with the resentment + which will be aroused if the uncertainty is permitted to go on much + longer. I shall tell the President my opinion at the first + opportunity. [I did this a few days later.] + + "The future is darkened by the Adriatic situation and I look to an + explosion before the matter is settled. It is a good thing that the + President visited Italy when he did and when blessings rather than + curses greeted him. Secret diplomacy is reaping a new harvest of + execrations and condemnations. Will the practice ever cease?" + +During the first three weeks of April the efforts to shake the +determination of the President to support the Jugo-Slav claims to Fiume +and the adjacent territory were redoubled, but without avail. Every form +of compromise as to boundary and port privileges, which did not deprive +Italy of the sovereignty, was proposed, but found to be unacceptable. +The Italians, held by the pressure of the aroused national spirit, and +the President, firm in the conviction that the Italian claim to the port +was unjust, remained obdurate. Attempts were made by both sides to reach +some common ground for an agreement, but none was found. As the time +approached to submit the Treaty to the German plenipotentiaries, who +were expected to arrive at Paris on April 26, the Italian delegates let +it be known that they would absent themselves from the meeting at which +the document was to be presented unless a satisfactory understanding in +regard to Fiume was obtained before the meeting. I doubt whether this +threat was with the approval and upon the advice of the American friends +of the Italians who had been industrious in attempting to persuade the +President to accept a compromise. An American familiar with Mr. Wilson's +disposition would have realized that to try to coerce him in that manner +would be folly, as in all probability it would have just the contrary +effect to the one desired. + +The Italian delegates did not apparently read the President's temper +aright. They made a mistake. Their threat of withdrawal from the +Conference resulted far differently from their expectation and hope. +When Mr. Wilson learned of the Italian threat he met it with a public +announcement of his position in regard to the controversy, which was +intended as an appeal to the people of Italy to abandon the claim to +Fiume and to reject their Government's policy of insisting on an unjust +settlement. This declaration was given to the press late in the +afternoon of April 23, and a French newspaper containing it was handed, +it was said, to Signor Orlando at the President's residence where the +Council of Four were assembled. He immediately withdrew, issued a +counter-statement, and the following day left Paris for Rome more on +account of his indignation at the course taken by the President than +because of the threat which he had made. Baron Sonnino also departed +the next day. + +It is not my purpose to pursue further the course of events following +the crisis which was precipitated by the President's published statement +and the resulting departure of the principal Italian delegates. The +effect on the Italian people is common knowledge. A tempest of popular +fury against the President swept over Italy from end to end. From being +the most revered of all men by the Italians, he became the most +detested. As no words of praise and admiration were too extravagant to +be spoken of him when he visited Rome in January, so no words of insult +or execration were too gross to characterize him after his public +announcement regarding the Adriatic Question. There was never a more +complete reversal of public sentiment toward an individual. + +The reason for reciting the facts of the Fiume dispute, which was one of +the most unpleasant incidents that took place at Paris during the +negotiations, is to bring out clearly the consequences of secret +diplomacy. A discussion of the reasons, or of the probable reasons, for +the return of the Italian statesmen to Paris before the Treaty was +handed to the Germans would add nothing to the subject under +consideration, while the same may be said of the subsequent occupation +of Fiume by Italian nationalists under the fanatical D'Annunzio, without +authority of their Government, but with the enthusiastic approval of the +Italian people. + +Five days after the Italian Premier and his Minister of Foreign Affairs +had departed from Paris I had a long interview with a well-known Italian +diplomat, who was an intimate friend of both Signor Orlando and Baron +Sonnino and who had been very active in the secret negotiations +regarding the Italian boundaries which had been taking place at Paris +since the middle of December. This diplomat was extremely bitter about +the whole affair and took no pains to hide his views as to the causes of +the critical situation which existed. In the memorandum of our +conversation, which I wrote immediately after he left my office, appears +the following: + + "He exclaimed: 'One tells you one thing and that is not true; then + another tells you another thing and that too is not true. What is one + to believe? What can one do? It is hopeless. So many secret meetings + with different persons are simply awful'--He threw up his hands--'Now + we have the result. It is terrible!' + + "I laughed and said, 'I conclude that you do not like secret + diplomacy.' + + "'I do not; I do not,' he fervently exclaimed. 'All our trouble comes + from these secret meetings of four men [referring to the Big Four], + who keep no records and who tell different stories of what takes + place. Secrecy is to blame. We have been unable to rely on any one. + To have to run around and see this man and that man is not the way to + do. Most all sympathize with you when alone and then they desert you + when they get with others. This is the cause of much bitterness and + distrust. _Secret diplomacy is an utter failure._ It is too hard to + endure. Some men know only how to whisper. They are not to be + trusted. I do not like it.' + + "'Well,' I said, 'you cannot charge me with that way of doing + business.' + + "'I cannot,' he replied, 'you tell me the truth. I may not like it, + but at least you do not hold out false hopes.'" + +The foregoing conversation no doubt expressed the real sentiments of the +members of the Italian delegation at that time. Disgust with +confidential personal interviews and with relying upon personal +influence rather than upon the merits of their case was the natural +reaction following the failure to win by these means the President's +approval of Italy's demands. + +The Italian policy in relation to Flume was wrecked on the rock of +President Wilson's firm determination that the Jugo-Slavs should have a +seaport on the Adriatic sufficient for their needs and that Italy should +not control the approaches to that port. With the wreck of the Fiume +policy went in time the Orlando Government which had failed to make good +the promises which they had given to their people. Too late they +realized that secret diplomacy had failed, and that they had made a +mistake in relying upon it. It is no wonder that the two leaders of the +Italian delegation on returning to Paris and resuming their duties in +the Conference refrained from attempting to arrange clandestinely the +settlement of the Adriatic Question. The "go-betweens," on whom they had +previously relied, were no longer employed. Secret diplomacy was +anathema. They had paid a heavy price for the lesson, which they +had learned. + +When one reviews the negotiations at Paris from December, 1918, to June, +1919, the secretiveness which characterized them is very evident. +Everybody seemed to talk in whispers and never to say anything worth +while except in confidence. The open sessions of the Conference were +arranged beforehand. They were formal and perfunctory. The agreements +and bargains were made behind closed doors. This secrecy began with the +exchange of views concerning the League of Nations, following which came +the creation of the Council of Ten, whose meetings were intended to be +secret. Then came the secret sessions of the Commission on the League +and the numerous informal interviews of the President with one or more +of the Premiers of the Allied Powers, the facts concerning which were +not divulged to the American Commissioners. Later, on Mr. Wilson's +return from the United States, dissatisfaction with and complaint of the +publicity given to some of the proceedings of the Council of Ten induced +the formation of the Council of Four with the result that the secrecy of +the negotiations was practically unbroken. If to this brief summary of +the increasing secretiveness of the proceedings of the controlling +bodies of the Peace Conference are added the intrigues and personal +bargainings which were constantly going on, the "log-rolling"--to use a +term familiar to American politics--which was practiced, the record is +one which invites no praise and will find many who condemn it. In view +of the frequent and emphatic declarations in favor of "open diplomacy" +and the popular interpretation placed upon the phrase "Open covenants +openly arrived at," the effect of the secretive methods employed by the +leading negotiators at Paris was to destroy public confidence in the +sincerity of these statesmen and to subject them to the charge of +pursuing a policy which they had themselves condemned and repudiated. +Naturally President Wilson, who had been especially earnest in his +denunciation of secret negotiations, suffered more than his foreign +colleagues, whose real support of "open diplomacy" had always been +doubted, though all of them in a measure fell in public estimation as a +consequence of the way in which the negotiations were conducted. + +The criticism and condemnation, expressed with varying degrees of +intensity, resulted from the disappointed hopes of the peoples of the +world, who had looked forward confidently to the Peace Conference at +Paris as the first great and decisive change to a new diplomacy which +would cast aside the cloak of mystery that had been in the past the +recognized livery of diplomatic negotiations. The record of the Paris +proceedings in this particular is a sorry one. It is the record of the +abandonment of principle, of the failure to follow precepts +unconditionally proclaimed, of the repudiation by act, if not by word, +of a new and better type of international intercourse. + +It is not my purpose or desire to fix the blame for this perpetuation of +old and discredited practices on any one individual. To do so would be +unjust, since more than one preferred the old way and should share the +responsibility for its continuance. But, as the secrecy became more and +more impenetrable and as the President gave silent acquiescence or at +least failed to show displeasure with the practice, I realized that in +this matter, as in others, our judgments were at variance and our views +irreconcilable. As my opposition to the method of conducting the +proceedings was evident, I cannot but assume that this decided +difference was one that materially affected the relations between Mr. +Wilson and myself and that he looked upon me as an unfavorable critic of +his course in permitting to go unprotested the secrecy which +characterized the negotiations. + +The attention of the delegates to the Peace Conference who represented +the smaller nations was early directed to their being denied knowledge +of the terms of the Treaty which were being formulated by the principal +members of the delegations of the Five Great Powers. There is no doubt +that at the first their mental attitude was one of confidence that the +policy of secrecy would not be continued beyond the informal meetings +preliminary to and necessary for arranging the organization and +procedure of the Conference; but, as the days lengthened into weeks and +the weeks into months, and as the information concerning the actual +negotiations, which reached them, became more and more meager, they +could no longer close their eyes to the fact that their national rights +and aspirations were to be recognized or denied by the leaders of the +Great Powers without the consent and even without the full knowledge of +the delegates of the nations vitally interested. + +Except in the case of a few of these delegates, who had been able to +establish intimate personal relations with some of the "Big Four," the +secretiveness of the discussions and decisions regarding the Treaty +settlements aroused amazement and indignation. It was evident that it +was to be a "dictated peace" and not a "negotiated peace," a peace +dictated by the Great Powers not only to the enemy, but also to their +fellow belligerents. Some of the delegates spoke openly in criticism of +the furtive methods that were being employed, but the majority held +their peace. It can hardly be doubted, however, that the body of +delegates were practically unanimous in disapproving the secrecy of the +proceedings, and this disapproval was to be found even among the +delegations of the Great Powers. It was accepted by the lesser nations +because it seemed impolitic and useless to oppose the united will of the +controlling oligarchy. It was natural that the delegates of the less +influential states should feel that their countries would suffer in the +terms of peace if they openly denounced the treatment accorded them as +violative of the dignity of representatives of independent +sovereignties. In any event no formal protest was entered against their +being deprived of a knowledge to which they were entitled, a deprivation +which placed them and their countries in a subordinate, and, to an +extent, a humiliating, position. + +The climax of this policy of secrecy toward the body of delegates came +on the eve of the delivery of the Treaty of Peace to the German +representatives who were awaiting that event at Versailles. By a +decision of the Council of the Heads of States, reached three weeks +before the time, only a digest or summary of the Treaty was laid before +the plenary session of the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on +the day preceding the delivery of the full text of the Treaty to the +Germans. The delegates of the smaller belligerent nations were not +permitted to examine the actual text of the document before it was seen +by their defeated adversaries. Nations, which had fought valiantly and +suffered agonies during the war, were treated with no more consideration +than their enemies so far as knowledge of the exact terms of peace were +concerned. The arguments, which could be urged on the ground of the +practical necessity of a small group dealing with the questions and +determining the settlements, seem insufficient to justify the +application of the rule of secrecy to the delegates who sat in the +Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace. It is not too severe to say +that it outraged the equal rights of independent and sovereign states +and under less critical conditions would have been resented as an insult +by the plenipotentiaries of the lesser nations. Even within the +delegations of the Great Powers there were indignant murmurings against +this indefensible and unheard-of treatment of allies. No man, whose mind +was not warped by prejudice or dominated by political expediency, could +give it his approval or become its apologist. Secrecy, and intrigues +which were only possible through secrecy, stained nearly all the +negotiations at Paris, but in this final act of withholding knowledge of +the actual text of the Treaty from the delegates of most of the nations +represented in the Conference the spirit of secretiveness seems to +have gone mad. + +The psychological effects of secrecy on those who are kept in ignorance +are not difficult to analyze. They follow normal processes and may be +thus stated: Secrecy breeds suspicion; suspicion, doubt; doubt, +distrust; and distrust produces lack of frankness, which is closely akin +to secrecy. The result is a vicious circle, of which deceit and intrigue +are the very essence. Secrecy and its natural consequences have given to +diplomacy a popular reputation for trickery, for double-dealing, and in +a more or less degree for unscrupulous and dishonest methods of +obtaining desired ends, a reputation that has found expression in the +ironic definition of a diplomat as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for +the good of his country." + +The time had arrived when the bad name which diplomacy had so long borne +could and should have been removed. "Open covenants openly arrived at" +appealed to the popular feeling of antipathy toward secret diplomacy, of +which the Great War was generally believed to be the product. The Paris +Conference appeared to offer an inviting opportunity to turn the page +and to begin a new and better chapter in the annals of international +intercourse. To do this required a fixed purpose to abandon the old +methods, to insist on openness and candor, to refuse to be drawn into +whispered agreements. The choice between the old and the new ways had to +be definite and final. It had to be made at the very beginning of the +negotiations. It was made. Secrecy was adopted. Thus diplomacy, in spite +of the announced intention to reform its practices, has retained the +evil taint which makes it out of harmony with the spirit of good faith +and of open dealing which is characteristic of the best thought of the +present epoch. There is little to show that diplomacy has been raised to +a higher plane or has won a better reputation in the world at large than +it possessed before the nations assembled at Paris to make peace. This +failure to lift the necessary agency of international relations out of +the rut worn deep by centuries of practice is one of the deplorable +consequences of the peace negotiations. So much might have been done; +nothing was done. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT + + +The Shantung Settlement was not so evidently chargeable to secret +negotiations as the crisis over the disposition of Fiume, but the +decision was finally reached through that method. The controversy +between Japan and China as to which country should become the possessor +of the former German property and rights in the Shantung Peninsula was +not decided until almost the last moment before the Treaty with Germany +was completed. Under pressure of the necessity of making the document +ready for delivery to the German delegates, President Wilson, M. +Clemenceau, and Mr. Lloyd George, composing the Council of the Heads of +States in the absence of Signor Orlando in Rome, issued an order +directing the Drafting Committee of the Conference to prepare articles +for the Treaty embodying the decision that the Council had made. This +decision, which was favorable to the Japanese claims, was the result of +a confidential arrangement with the Japanese delegates by which, in the +event of their claims being granted, they withdrew their threat to +decline to sign the Treaty of Peace, agreed not to insist on a proposed +amendment to the Covenant declaring for racial equality, and orally +promised to restore to China in the near future certain rights of +sovereignty over the territory, which promise failed of confirmation in +writing or by formal public declaration. + +It is fair to presume that, if the conflicting claims of Japan and China +to the alleged rights of Germany in Chinese territory had been settled +upon the merits through the medium of an impartial commission named by +the Conference, the Treaty provisions relating to the disposition of +those rights would have been very different from those which "The Three" +ordered to be drafted. Before a commission of the Conference no +persuasive reasons for conceding the Japanese claims could have been +urged on the basis of an agreement on the part of Japan to adhere to the +League of Nations or to abandon the attempt to have included in the +Covenant a declaration of equality between races. It was only through +secret interviews and secret agreements that the threat of the Japanese +delegates could be successfully made. An adjustment on such a basis had +nothing to do with the justice of the case or with the legal rights and +principles involved. The threat was intended to coerce the arbiters of +the treaty terms by menacing the success of the plan to establish a +League of Nations--to use an ugly word, it was a species of "blackmail" +not unknown to international relations in the past. It was made possible +because the sessions of the Council of the Heads of States and the +conversations concerning Shantung were secret. + +It was a calamity for the Republic of China and unfortunate for the +presumed justice written into the Treaty that President Wilson was +convinced that the Japanese delegates would decline to accept the +Covenant of the League of Nations if the claims of Japan to the German +rights were denied. It was equally unfortunate that the President felt +that without Japan's adherence to the Covenant the formation of the +League would be endangered if not actually prevented. And it was +especially unfortunate that the President considered the formation of +the League in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant to be +superior to every other consideration and that to accomplish this object +almost any sacrifice would be justifiable. It is my impression that the +departure of Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino from Paris and the +uncertainty of their return to give formal assent to the Treaty with +Germany, an uncertainty which existed at the time of the decision of the +Shantung Question, had much to do with the anxiety of the President as +to Japan's attitude. He doubtless felt that to have two of the Five +Great Powers decline at the last moment to accept the Treaty containing +the Covenant would jeopardize the plan for a League and would greatly +encourage his opponents in the United States. His line of reasoning was +logical, but in my judgment was based on the false premise that the +Japanese would carry out their threat to refuse to accept the Treaty and +enter the League of Nations unless they obtained a cession of the German +rights. I did not believe at the time, and I do not believe now, that +Japan would have made good her threat. The superior international +position, which she held as one of the Five Great Powers in the +Conference, and which she would hold in the League of Nations as one of +the Principal Powers in the constitution of the Executive Council, would +never have been abandoned by the Tokio Government. The Japanese +delegates would not have run the risk of losing this position by +adopting the course pursued by the Italians. + +The cases were different. No matter what action was taken by Italy she +would have continued to be a Great Power in any organization of the +world based on a classification of the nations. If she did not enter the +League under the German Treaty, she certainly would later and would +undoubtedly hold an influential position in the organization whether her +delegates signed the Covenant or accepted it in another treaty or by +adherence. It was not so with Japan. There were reasons to believe that, +if she failed to become one of the Principal Powers at the outset, +another opportunity might never be given her to obtain so high a place +in the concert of the nations. The seats that her delegates had in the +Council of Ten had caused criticism and dissatisfaction in certain +quarters, and the elimination of a Japanese from the Council of the +Heads of States showed that the Japanese position as an equal of the +other Great Powers was by no means secure. These indications of Japan's +place in the international oligarchy must have been evident to her +plenipotentiaries at Paris, who in all probability reported the +situation to Tokio. From the point of view of policy the execution of +the threat of withdrawal presented dangers to Japan's prestige which the +diplomats who represented her would never have incurred if they were as +cautious and shrewd as they appeared to be. The President did not hold +this opinion. We differed radically in our judgment as to the sincerity +of the Japanese threat. He showed that he believed it would be carried +out. I believed that it would not be. + +It has not come to my knowledge what the attitude of the British and +French statesmen was concerning the disposition of the Shantung rights, +although I have read the views of certain authors on the subject, but I +do know that the actual decision lay with the President. If he had +declined to recognize the Japanese claims, they would never have been +granted nor would the grant have been written into the Treaty. +Everything goes to show that he realized this responsibility and that +the cession to Japan was not made through error or misconception of the +rights of the parties, but was done deliberately and with a full +appreciation that China was being denied that which in other +circumstances would have been awarded to her. If it had not been for +reasons wholly independent and outside of the question in dispute, the +President would not have decided as he did. + +It is not my purpose to enter into the details of the origin of the +German lease of Kiao-Chau (the port of Tsingtau) and of the economic +concessions in the Province of Shantung acquired by Germany. Suffice it +to say that, taking advantage of a situation caused by the murder of +some missionary priests in the province, the German Government in 1898 +forced the Chinese Government to make treaties granting for the period +of ninety-nine years the lease and concessions, by which the sovereign +authority over this "Holy Land" of China was to all intents ceded to +Germany, which at once improved the harbor, fortified the leased area, +and began railway construction and the exploitation of the Shantung +Peninsula. + +The outbreak of the World War found Germany in possession of the leased +area and in substantial control of the territory under the concession. +On August 15, 1914, the Japanese Government presented an _ultimatum_ to +the German Government, in which the latter was required "to deliver on a +date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, +without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of +Kiao-Chau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." + +On the German failure to comply with these demands the Japanese +Government landed troops and, in company with a small British +contingent, took possession of the leased port and occupied the +territory traversed by the German railway, even to the extent of +establishing a civil government in addition to garrisoning the line with +Japanese troops. Apparently the actual occupation of this Chinese +territory induced a change in the policy of the Imperial Government at +Tokio, for in December, 1914, Baron Kato, the Minister of Foreign +Affairs, declared that the restoration of Tsingtau to China "is to be +settled in the future" and that the Japanese Government had made no +promises to do so. + +This statement, which seemed in contradiction of the _ultimatum_ to +Germany, was made in the Japanese Diet. It was followed up in January, +1915, by the famous "Twenty-one Demands" made upon the Government at +Peking. It is needless to go into these demands further than to quote +the first to which China was to subscribe. + + "The Chinese Government agrees that when the Japanese Government + hereafter approaches the German Government for the transfer of all + rights and privileges of whatsoever nature enjoyed by Germany in the + Province of Shantung, whether secured by treaty or in any other + manner, China shall give her full assent thereto." + +The important point to be noted in this demand is that Japan did not +consider that the occupation of Kiao-Chau and the seizure of the German +concessions transferred title to her, but looked forward to a future +transfer by treaty. + +The "Twenty-one Demands" were urged with persistency by the Japanese +Government and finally took the form of an _ultimatum_ as to all but +Group V of the "Demands." The Peking Government was in no political or +military condition to resist, and, in order to avoid an open rupture +with their aggressive neighbor, entered into a treaty granting the +Japanese demands. + +China, following the action which the United States had taken on +February 3, 1917, severed diplomatic relations with Germany on March 14, +and five months later declared war against her announcing at the same +time that the treaties, conventions, and agreements between the two +countries were by the declaration abrogated. As to whether a state of +war does in fact abrogate a treaty of the character of the Sino-German +Treaty of 1898 some question may be raised under the accepted rules of +international law, on the ground that it was a cession of sovereign +rights and constituted an international servitude in favor of Germany +over the territory affected by it. But in this particular case the +indefensible duress employed by the German Government to compel China to +enter into the treaty introduces another factor into the problem and +excepts it from any general rule that treaties of that nature are merely +suspended and not abrogated by war between the parties. It would seem as +if no valid argument could be made in favor of suspension because the +effect of the rule would be to revive and perpetuate an inequitable and +unjustifiable act. Morally and legally the Chinese Government was right +in denouncing the treaty and agreements with Germany and in treating the +territorial rights acquired by coercion as extinguished. + +It would appear, therefore, that, as the Japanese Government recognized +that the rights in the Province of Shantung had not passed to Japan by +the forcible occupation of Kiao-Chau and the German concessions, those +rights ceased to exist when China declared war against Germany, and that +China was, therefore, entitled to resume full sovereignty over the area +where such rights previously existed. + +It is true that subsequently, on September 24, 1918, the Chinese and +Japanese Governments by exchange of notes at Tokio entered into +agreements affecting the Japanese occupation of the Kiao-Chau Tsinan +Railway and the adjoining territory, but the governmental situation at +Peking was too precarious to refuse any demands made by the Japanese +Government. In fact the action of the Japanese Government was very +similar to that of the German Government in 1898. An examination of +these notes discloses the fact that the Japanese were in possession of +the denounced German rights, but nothing in the notes indicates that +they were there as a matter of legal right, or that the Chinese +Government conceded their right of occupation. + +This was the state of affairs when the Peace Conference assembled at +Paris. Germany had by force compelled China in 1898 to cede to her +certain rights in the Province of Shantung. Japan had seized these +rights by force in 1914 and had by threats forced China in 1915 to agree +to accept her disposition of them when they were legally transferred by +treaty at the end of the war. China in 1917 had, on entering the war +against Germany, denounced all treaties and agreements with Germany, so +that the ceded rights no longer existed and could not legally be +transferred by Germany to Japan by the Treaty of Peace, since the title +was in China. In fact any transfer or disposition of the rights in +Shantung formerly belonging to Germany was a transfer or disposition of +rights belonging wholly to China and would deprive that country of a +portion of its full sovereignty over the territory affected. + +While this view of the extinguishment of the German rights in Shantung +was manifestly the just one and its adoption would make for the +preservation of permanent peace in the Far East, the Governments of the +Allied Powers had, early in 1917, and prior to the severance of +diplomatic relations between China and Germany, acceded to the request +of Japan to support, "on the occasion of the Peace Conference," her +claims in regard to these rights which then existed. The representatives +of Great Britain, France, and Italy at Paris were thus restricted, or at +least embarrassed, by the promises which their Governments had made at a +time when they were in no position to refuse Japan's request. They might +have stood on the legal ground that the Treaty of 1898 having been +abrogated by China no German rights in Shantung were in being at the +time of the Peace Conference, but they apparently were unwilling to take +that position. Possibly they assumed that the ground was one which they +could not take in view of the undertakings of their Governments; or +possibly they preferred to let the United States bear the brunt of +Japanese resentment for interfering with the ambitious schemes of the +Japanese Government in regard to China. There can be little doubt that +political, and possibly commercial, interests influenced the attitude of +the European Powers in regard to the Shantung Question. + +President Wilson and the American Commissioners, unhampered by previous +commitments, were strongly opposed to acceding to the demands of the +Japanese Government. The subject had been frequently considered during +the early days of the negotiations and there seemed to be no divergence +of views as to the justice of the Chinese claim of right to the +resumption of full sovereignty over the territory affected by the lease +and the concessions to Germany. These views were further strengthened by +the presentation of the question before the Council of Ten. On January +27 the Japanese argued their case before the Council, the Chinese +delegates being present; and on the 28th Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo spoke +on behalf of China. In a note on the meeting I recorded that "he simply +overwhelmed the Japanese with his argument." I believe that that opinion +was common to all those who heard the two presentations. In fact it made +such an impression on the Japanese themselves, that one of the delegates +called upon me the following day and attempted to offset the effect by +declaring that the United States, since it had not promised to support +Japan's contention, would be blamed if Kiao-Chau was returned directly +to China. He added that there was intense feeling in Japan in regard to +the matter. It was an indirect threat of what would happen to the +friendly relations between the two countries if Japan's claim +was denied. + +The sessions of the Commission on the League of Nations and the absence +of President Wilson from Paris interrupted further consideration of the +Shantung Question until the latter part of March, when the Council of +Four came into being. As the subject had been fully debated in January +before the Council of Ten, final decision lay with the Council of Four. +What discussions took place in the latter council I do not know on +account of the secrecy which was observed as to their deliberations. But +I presume that the President stood firmly for the Chinese rights, as the +matter remained undecided until the latter part of April. + +On the 21st of April Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda called upon me in +regard to the question, and I frankly told them that they ought to prove +the justice of the Japanese claim, that they had not done it and that I +doubted their ability to do so. I found, too, that the President had +proposed that the Five Powers act as trustees of the former German +rights in Shantung, but that the Japanese delegates had declared that +they could not consent to the proposition, which was in the nature of a +compromise intended to bridge over the existing situation that, on +account of the near approach of the completion of the Treaty, was +becoming more and more acute. + +On April 26 the President, at a conference with the American +Commissioners, showed deep concern over the existing state of the +controversy, and asked me to see the Japanese delegates again and +endeavor to dissuade them from insisting on their demands and to induce +them to consider the international trusteeship proposed. The evening of +the same day the two Japanese came by request to my office and conferred +with Professor E.T. Williams, the Commission's principal adviser on Far +Eastern affairs, and with me. After an hour's conversation Viscount +Chinda made it very clear that Japan intended to insist on her "pound of +flesh." It was apparent both to Mr. Williams and to me that nothing +could be done to obtain even a compromise, though it was on the face +favorable to Japan, since it recognized the existence of the German +rights, which China claimed were annulled. + +On April 28 I gave a full report of the interview to Mr. White and +General Bliss at our regular morning meeting. Later in the morning the +President telephoned me and I informed him of the fixed determination of +the Japanese to insist upon their claims. What occurred between the time +of my conversation with the President and the plenary session of the +Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace in the afternoon, at which the +Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted, I do not actually know, +but the presumption is that the Japanese were promised a satisfactory +settlement in regard to Shantung, since they announced that they would +not press an amendment on "racial equality" at the session, an amendment +upon which they had indicated they intended to insist. + +After the meeting of the Conference I made the following memorandum of +the situation: + + "At the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference this afternoon Baron + Makino spoke of his proposed amendment to the Covenant declaring + 'racial equality,' but said he would not press it. + + "I concluded from what the President said to me that he was disposed + to accede to Japan's claims in regard to Kiao-Chau and Shantung. He + also showed me a letter from ---- to Makino saying he was sorry their + claims had not been finally settled before the Session. + + "From all this I am forced to the conclusion that a bargain has been + struck by which the Japanese agree to sign the Covenant in exchange + for admission of their claims. If so, it is an iniquitous agreement. + + "Apparently the President is going to do this to avoid Japan's + declining to enter the League of Nations. It is a surrender of the + principle of self-determination, a transfer of millions of Chinese + from one foreign master to another. This is another of those secret + arrangements which have riddled the 'Fourteen Points' and are + wrecking a just peace. + + "In my opinion it would be better to let Japan stay out of the League + than to abandon China and surrender our prestige in the Far East for + 'a mess of pottage'--and a mess it is. I fear that it is too late to + do anything to save the situation." + +Mr. White, General Bliss, and I, at our meeting that morning before the +plenary session, and later when we conferred as to what had taken place +at the session, were unanimous in our opinions that China's rights +should be sustained even if Japan withdrew from the Peace Conference. We +were all indignant at the idea of submitting to the Japanese demands and +agreed that the President should be told of our attitude, because we +were unwilling to have it appear that we in any way approved of acceding +to Japan's claims or even of compromising them. + +General Bliss volunteered to write the President a letter on the +subject, a course which Mr. White and I heartily endorsed. + +The next morning the General read the following letter to us and with +our entire approval sent it to Mr. Wilson: + + "_Hôtel de Crillon, Paris_ + + "_April 29, 1919_ + + "MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "Last Saturday morning you told the American Delegation that you + desired suggestions, although not at that moment, in regard to the + pending matter of certain conflicting claims between Japan and China + centering about the alleged German rights. My principal interest in + the matter is with sole reference to the question of the moral right + or wrong involved. From this point of view I discussed the matter + this morning with Mr. Lansing and Mr. White. They concurred with me + and requested me to draft a hasty note to you on the subject. + + "Since your conference with us last Saturday, I have asked myself + three or four Socratic questions the answers to which make me, + personally, quite sure on which side the moral right lies. + + "_First._ Japan bases certain of her claims on the right acquired by + conquest. I asked myself the following questions: Suppose Japan had + not succeeded in her efforts to force the capitulation of the Germans + at Tsing-Tsau; suppose that the armistice of November 11th had found + her still fighting the Germans at that place, just as the armistice + found the English still fighting the Germans in South-East Africa. We + would then oblige Germany to dispose of her claims in China by a + clause in the Treaty of Peace. Would it occur to any one that, as a + matter of right, we should force Germany to cede her claims to Japan + rather than to China? It seems to me that it would occur to every + American that we would then have the opportunity that we have long + desired to force Germany to correct, in favor of China, the great + wrong which she began to do to the latter in 1898. What moral right + has Japan acquired by her conquest of Shantung assisted by the + British? If Great Britain and Japan secured no moral right to + sovereignty over various savages inhabiting islands in the Pacific + Ocean, but, on the other hand, we held that these peoples shall be + governed by mandates under the League of Nations, what moral right + has Japan acquired to the suzerainty (which she would undoubtedly + eventually have) over 30,000,000 Chinese in the sacred province + of Shantung? + + "_Second._ Japan must base her claims either on the Convention with + China or on the right of conquest, or on both. Let us consider her + moral right under either of these points. + + "_a)_ If the United States has not before this recognized the + validity of the rights claimed by Japan under her Convention with + China, what has happened since the Armistice that would justify us in + recognizing their validity now? + + "_b)_ If Germany had possessed territory, in full sovereignty, on the + east coast of Asia, a right to this territory, under international + law, could have been obtained by conquest. But Germany possessed no + such territory. What then was left for Japan to acquire by conquest? + Apparently nothing but a lease extorted under compulsion from China + by Germany. I understand that international lawyers hold that such a + lease, or the rights acquired, justly or unjustly, under it, cannot + be acquired by conquest. + + "_Third._ Suppose Germany says to us, 'We will cede our lease and all + rights under it, but we will cede them back to China.' Will we + recognize the justice of Japan's claims to such an extent that we + will threaten Germany with further war unless she cedes these rights + to Japan rather than to China? + + "Again, suppose that Germany, in her hopelessness of resistance to + our demands, should sign without question a clause ceding these + rights to Japan, even though we know that this is so wrong that we + would not fight in order to compel Germany to do it, what moral + justification would we have in making Germany do this? + + "_Fourth._ Stripped of all words that befog the issue, would we not, + under the guise of making a treaty with Germany, really be making a + treaty with Japan by which we compel one of our Allies (China) to + cede against her will these things to Japan? Would not this action be + really more unjustifiable than the one which you have refused to be a + party to on the Dalmatian Coast? Because, in the latter case, the + territory in dispute did not belong to one of the Allies, but to one + of the Central Powers; the question in Dalmatia is as to which of two + friendly powers we shall give territory taken from an enemy power; in + China the question is, shall we take certain claimed rights from one + friendly power in order to give them to another friendly power. + + "It would seem to be advisable to call particular attention to what + the Japanese mean when they say that they will return Kiao-chow to + China. They _do not_ offer to return the railway, the mines or the + port, i.e., Tsingtau. The leased territory included a portion of land + on the north-east side of the entrance of the Bay and another on the + south-west and some islands. It is a small territory. The 50 + Kilometer Zone was not included. That was a _limitation_ put upon the + movement of German troops. They could not go beyond the boundary of + the zone. Within this zone China enjoyed all rights of sovereignty + and administration. + + "Japan's proposal to abandon the zone is somewhat of an impertinence, + since she has violated it ever since she took possession. She kept + troops all along the railway line until recently and insists on + maintaining in the future a guard at Tsinan, 254 miles away. The zone + would restrict her military movements, consequently she gives it up. + + "The proposals she makes are (1) to open the whole bay. It is from 15 + to 20 miles from the entrance to the northern shore of the bay. (2) + To have a Japanese exclusive concession _at a-place_ to be designated + by her, i.e., she can take just as much as she likes of the territory + around the bay. It may be as large as the present leased territory, + but more likely it will include only the best part of Tsingtau. What + then does she give up? Nothing but such parts of the leased territory + as are of no value. + + "The operation then would amount chiefly to an exchange of two pieces + of paper--one cancelling the lease for 78 years, the other granting a + more valuable concession which would amount to a permanent title to + the port. Why take two years to go through this operation? + + "If it be right for a policeman, who recovers your purse, to keep the + contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in returning the + empty purse, then Japan's conduct may be tolerated. + + "If it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an Ally, then it + cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from the enemy. + + "If we support Japan's claim, we abandon the democracy of China to + the domination of the Prussianized militarism of Japan. + + "We shall be sowing dragons' teeth. + + "It can't be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is + desirable, but there are things dearer than peace, justice + and freedom. + + "Sincerely yours + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "T.H. BLISS" + +I have not discussed certain modifications proposed by the Japanese +delegates, since, as is clear from General Bliss's letter, they amounted +to nothing and were merely a pretense of concession and without +substantial value. + +The day following the delivery of this letter to the President (April +30), by which he was fully advised of the attitude of General Bliss, Mr. +White, and myself in regard to the Japanese claims, the Council of Four +reached its final decision of the matter, in which necessarily Mr. +Wilson acquiesced. I learned of this decision the same evening. The +memorandum which I made the next morning in regard to the matter is +as follows: + + "China has been abandoned to Japanese rapacity. A democratic + territory has been given over to an autocratic government. The + President has conceded to Japan all that, if not more than, she ever + hoped to obtain. This is the information contained in a memorandum + handed by Ray Stannard Baker under the President's direction to the + Chinese delegation last evening, a copy of which reached me through + Mr. ---- [of the Chinese delegation]. + + "Mr. ---- also said that Mr. Baker stated that the President desired + him to say that the President was very sorry that he had not been + able to do more for China but that he had been compelled to accede to + Japan's demand 'in order _to save the League of Nations._' + + "The memorandum was most depressing. Though I had anticipated + something of the sort three days ago [see note of April 28 previously + quoted], I had unconsciously cherished a hope that the President + would stand to his guns and champion China's cause. He has failed to + do so. It is true that China is given the shell called 'sovereignty,' + but the economic control, the kernel, is turned over to Japan. + + "However logical may appear the argument that China's political + integrity is preserved and will be maintained under the guaranty of + the League of Nations, the fact is that Japan will rule over millions + of Chinese. Furthermore it is still a matter of conjecture how + valuable the guaranty of the League will prove to be. It has, of + course, never been tried, and Japan's representation on the Council + will possibly thwart any international action in regard to China. + + "Frankly my policy would have been to say to the Japanese, 'If you do + not give back to China what Germany stole from her, we don't want you + in the League of Nations.' If the Japanese had taken offense and + gone, I would have welcomed it, for we would have been well rid of a + government with such imperial designs. But she would not have gone. + She would have submitted. She has attained a high place in world + councils. Her astute statesmen would never have abandoned her present + exalted position even for the sake of Kiao-Chau. The whole affair + assumes a sordid and sinister character, in which the President, + acting undoubtedly with the best of motives, became the cat's-paw. + + "I have no doubt that the President fully believed that the League of + Nations was in jeopardy and that to save it he was compelled to + subordinate every other consideration. The result was that China was + offered up as a sacrifice to propitiate the threatening Moloch of + Japan. When you get down to facts the threats were nothing + but 'bluff.' + + "I do not think that anything that has happened here has caused more + severe or more outspoken criticism than this affair. I am heartsick + over it, because I see how much good-will and regard the President is + bound to lose. I can offer no adequate explanation to the critics. + There seems to be none." + +It is manifest, from the foregoing recital of events leading up to the +decision in regard to the Shantung Question and the apparent reasons for +the President's agreement to support the Japanese claims, that we +radically differed as to the decision which was embodied in Articles +156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles (see Appendix VI, p. 318). +I do not think that we held different opinions as to the justice of the +Chinese position, though probably the soundness of the legal argument in +favor of the extinguishment of the German rights appealed more strongly +to me than it did to Mr. Wilson. Our chief differences were, first, that +it was more important to insure the acceptance of the Covenant of the +League of Nations than to do strict justice to China; second, that the +Japanese withdrawal from the Conference would prevent the formation of +the League; and, third, that Japan would have withdrawn if her claims +had been denied. As to these differences our opposite views remained +unchanged after the Treaty of Versailles was signed. + +When I was summoned before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on +August 6, 1919, I told the Committee that, in my opinion, the Japanese +signatures would have been affixed to the Treaty containing the Covenant +even though Shantung had not been delivered over to Japan, and that the +only reason that I had yielded was because it was my duty to follow the +decision of the President of the United States. + +About two weeks later, August 19, the President had a conference at the +White House with the same Committee. In answer to questions regarding +the Shantung Settlement, Mr. Wilson said concerning my statement that +his judgment was different from mine, that in his judgment the +signatures could not have been obtained if he had not given Shantung to +Japan, and that he had been notified that the Japanese delegates had +been instructed not to sign the Treaty unless the cession of the German +rights in Shantung to Japan was included. + +Presumably the opinion which Mr. Wilson held in the summer of 1919 he +continues to hold, and for my part my views and feelings remain the same +now as they were then, with possibly the difference that the indignation +and shame that I felt at the time in being in any way a participant in +robbing China of her just rights have increased rather than lessened. + +So intense was the bitterness among the American Commissioners over the +flagrant wrong being perpetrated that, when the decision of the Council +of Four was known, some of them considered whether or not they ought to +resign or give notice that they would not sign the Treaty if the +articles concerning Shantung appeared. The presence at Versailles of the +German plenipotentiaries, the uncertainty of the return of the Italian +delegates then in Rome, and the murmurs of dissatisfaction among the +delegates of the lesser nations made the international situation +precarious. To have added to the serious conditions and to have possibly +precipitated a crisis by openly rebelling against the President was to +assume a responsibility which no Commissioner was willing to take. With +the greatest reluctance the American Commissioners submitted to the +decision of the Council of Four; and, when the Chinese delegates refused +to sign the Treaty after they had been denied the right to sign it with +reservations to the Shantung articles, the American Commissioners, who +had so strongly opposed the settlement, silently approved their conduct +as the only patriotic and statesmanlike course to take. So far as China +was concerned the Shantung Question remained open, and the Chinese +Government very properly refused, after the Treaty of Versailles was +signed, to enter into any negotiations with Japan looking toward its +settlement upon the basis of the treaty provisions. + +There was one exception to the President's usual practice which is +especially noticeable in connection with the Shantung controversy, and +that was the greater participation which he permitted the members of the +American Commission in negotiating with both the Japanese and the +Chinese. It is true he did not disclose his intentions to the +Commissioners, but he did express a wish for their advice and he +directed me to confer with the Japanese and obtain their views. Just why +he adopted this course, for him unusual, I do not know unless he felt +that so far as the equity of China's claim was concerned we were all in +agreement, and if there was to be a departure from strict justice he +desired to have his colleagues suggest a way to do so. It is possible, +too, that he felt the question was in large measure a legal one, and +decided that the illegality of transferring the German rights to Japan +could be more successfully presented to the Japanese delegates by a +lawyer. In any event, in this particular case he adopted a course more +in accord with established custom and practice than he did in any other +of the many perplexing and difficult problems which he was called upon +to solve during the Paris negotiations, excepting of course the subjects +submitted to commissions of the Conference. As has been shown, Mr. +Wilson did not follow the advice of the three Commissioners given him in +General Bliss's letter, but that does not detract from the +noteworthiness of the fact that in the case of Shantung he sought advice +from his Commissioners. + +This ends the account of the Shantung Settlement and the negotiations +which led up to it. The consequences were those which were bound to +follow so indefensible a decision as the one that was reached. Public +opinion in the United States was almost unanimous in condemning it and +in denouncing those responsible for so evident a departure from legal +justice and the principles of international morality. No plea of +expediency or of necessity excused such a flagrant denial of undoubted +right. The popular recognition that a great wrong had been done to a +nation weak because of political discord and an insufficient military +establishment, in order to win favor with a nation strong because of its +military power and national unity, had much to do with increasing the +hostility to the Treaty and preventing its acceptance by the Senate of +the United States. The whole affair furnishes another example of the +results of secret diplomacy, for the arguments which prevailed with the +President were those to which he listened when he sat in secret council +with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +THE BULLITT AFFAIR + + +The foregoing chapters have related to subjects which were known to +President Wilson to be matters of difference between us while we were +together in Paris and which are presumably referred to in his letter of +February 11, 1920, extracts from which are quoted in the opening +chapter. The narration might be concluded with our difference of opinion +as to the Shantung Settlement, but in view of subsequent information +which the President received I am convinced that he felt that my +objections to his decisions in regard to the terms of the peace with +Germany extended further than he knew at the time, and that he resented +the fact that my mind did not go along with his as to these decisions. +This undoubtedly added to the reasons for his letter and possibly +influenced him to write as he did in February, 1920, even more than our +known divergence of judgment during the negotiations. + +I do not feel, therefore, that the story is complete without at least a +brief reference to my views concerning the Treaty of Versailles at the +time of its delivery to the German delegates, which were imperfectly +disclosed in a statement made by William C. Bullitt on September 12, +1919, at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign +Relations. As to the conduct of Mr. Bullitt, who had held a responsible +position with the American Commission at Paris, in voluntarily repeating +a conversation which was from its nature highly confidential, I make +no comment. + +The portion of the statement, which I have no doubt deeply incensed the +President because it was published while he was in the West making his +appeals to the people in behalf of the Treaty and especially of the +League of Nations, is as follows: + + "Mr. Lansing said that he, too, considered many parts of the Treaty + thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the + League of Nations. He said: 'I consider that the League of Nations at + present is entirely useless. The Great Powers have simply gone ahead + and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France have + gotten out of the Treaty everything that they wanted, and the League + of Nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the + Treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the League, and + the Great Powers will never give their consent to changes in the + interests of weaker peoples.' + + "We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. + Mr. Lansing said: 'I believe that if the Senate could only understand + what this Treaty means, and if the American people could really + understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they + will ever understand what it lets them in for.'" (Senate Doc. 106, + 66th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1276.) + +It does not seem an unwarranted conjecture that the President believed +that this statement, which was asserted by Mr. Bullitt to be from a +memorandum made at the time, indicated that I had been unfaithful to +him. He may even have concluded that I had been working against the +League of Nations with the intention of bringing about the rejection of +the Covenant by the Senate. If he did believe this, I cannot feel that +it was other than natural in the circumstances, especially if I did not +at once publicly deny the truth of the Bullitt statement. That I could +not do because there was sufficient truth in it to compel me to show +how, by slight variations and by omissions in the conversation, my words +were misunderstood or misinterpreted. + +In view of the fact that I found it impossible to make an absolute +denial, I telegraphed the President stating the facts and offering to +make them public if he considered it wise to do so. The important part +of the telegram, which was dated September 16, 1919, is as follows: + + "On May 17th Bullitt resigned by letter giving his reasons, with + which you are familiar. I replied by letter on the 18th without any + comment on his reasons. Bullitt on the 19th asked to see me to say + good-bye and I saw him. He elaborated on the reasons for his + resignation and said that he could not conscientiously give + countenance to a treaty which was based on injustice. I told him that + I would say nothing against his resigning since he put it on + conscientious grounds, and that I recognized that certain features of + the Treaty were bad, as I presumed most every one did, but that was + probably unavoidable in view of conflicting claims and that nothing + ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace by + signing the Treaty. Bullitt then discussed the numerous European + commissions provided for by the Treaty on which the United States was + to be represented. I told him that I was disturbed by this fact + because I was afraid the Senate and possibly the people, if they + understood this, would refuse ratification, and that anything which + was an obstacle to ratification was unfortunate because we ought to + have peace as soon as possible." + +It is very easy to see how by making a record of one side of this +conversation without reference to the other side and by an omission here +and there, possibly unintentionally, the sense was altered. Thus Mr. +Bullitt, by repeating only a part of my words and by omitting the +context, entirely changed the meaning of what was said. My attitude was, +and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signed +and ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration of +peace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which might +delay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification, +was to be deplored. + +Having submitted to the President the question of making a public +explanation of my interview with Mr. Bullitt which would in a measure at +least correct the impression caused by his statement, I could not do so +until I received the President's approval. That was never received. The +telegram, which was sent to Mr. Wilson, through the Department of State, +was never answered. It was not even acknowledged. The consequence was +that the version of the conversation given by Mr. Bullitt was the only +one that up to the present time has been published. + +The almost unavoidable conclusion from the President's silence is that +he considered my explanation was insufficient to destroy or even to +weaken materially the effect of Mr. Bullitt's account of what had taken +place, and that the public would believe in spite of it that I was +opposed to the Treaty and hostile to the League of Nations. I am not +disposed to blame the President for holding this opinion considering +what had taken place at Paris. From his point of view a statement, such +as I was willing to make, would in no way help the situation. I would +still be on record as opposed to certain provisions of the Treaty, +provisions which he was so earnestly defending in his addresses. While +Mr. Bullitt had given an incomplete report of our conversation, there +was sufficient truth in it to make anything but a flat denial seem of +little value to the President; and, as I could not make such a denial, +his point of view seemed to be that the damage was done and could not be +undone. I am inclined to think that he was right. + +My views concerning the Treaty at the time of the conversation with Mr. +Bullitt are expressed in a memorandum of May 8, 1919, which is +as follows: + + "The terms of peace were yesterday delivered to the German + plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in these days of feverish + rush of preparation there is time to consider the Treaty as a + complete document. + + "The impression made by it is one of disappointment, of regret, and + of depression. The terms of peace appear immeasurably harsh and + humiliating, while many of them seem to me impossible of performance. + + "The League of Nations created by the Treaty is relied upon to + preserve the artificial structure which has been erected by + compromise of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers and to + prevent the germination of the seeds of war which are sown in so many + articles and which under normal conditions would soon bear fruit. The + League might as well attempt to prevent the growth of plant life in a + tropical jungle. Wars will come sooner or later. + + "It must be admitted in honesty that the League is an instrument of + the mighty to check the normal growth of national power and national + aspirations among those who have been rendered impotent by defeat. + Examine the Treaty and you will find peoples delivered against their + wills into the hands of those whom they hate, while their economic + resources are torn from them and given to others. Resentment and + bitterness, if not desperation, are bound to be the consequences of + such provisions. It may be years before these oppressed peoples are + able to throw off the yoke, but as sure as day follows night the time + will come when they will make the effort. + + "This war was fought by the United States to destroy forever the + conditions which produced it. Those conditions have not been + destroyed. They have been supplanted by other conditions equally + productive of hatred, jealousy, and suspicion. In place of the Triple + Alliance and the Entente has arisen the Quintuple Alliance which is + to rule the world. The victors in this war intend to impose their + combined will upon the vanquished and to subordinate all interests to + their own. + + "It is true that to please the aroused public opinion of mankind and + to respond to the idealism of the moralist they have surrounded the + new alliance with a halo and called it 'The League of Nations,' but + whatever it may be called or however it may be disguised it is an + alliance of the Five Great Military Powers. + + "It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that the power to compel + obedience by the exercise of the united strength of 'The Five' is the + fundamental principle of the League. Justice is secondary. Might + is primary. + + "The League as now constituted will be the prey of greed and + intrigue; and the law of unanimity in the Council, which may offer a + restraint, will be broken or render the organization powerless. It is + called upon to stamp as just what is unjust. + + "We have a treaty of peace, but it will not bring permanent peace + because it is founded on the shifting sands of self-interest." + +In the views thus expressed I was not alone. A few days after they were +written I was in London where I discussed the Treaty with several of the +leading British statesmen. I noted their opinions thus: "The consensus +was that the Treaty was unwise and unworkable, that it was conceived in +intrigue and fashioned in cupidity, and that it would produce rather +than prevent wars." One of these leaders of political thought in Great +Britain said that "the only apparent purpose of the League of Nations +seems to be to perpetuate the series of unjust provisions which were +being imposed." + +The day following my return from London, which was on May 17, I received +Mr. Bullitt's letter of resignation and also letters from five of our +principal experts protesting against the terms of peace and stating that +they considered them to be an abandonment of the principles for which +Americans had fought. One of the officials, whose relations with the +President were of a most intimate nature, said that he was in a quandary +about resigning; that he did not think that the conditions in the Treaty +would make for peace because they were too oppressive; that the +obnoxious things in the Treaty were due to secret diplomacy; and that +the President should have stuck rigidly to his principles, which he had +not. This official was evidently deeply incensed, but in the end he did +not resign, nor did the five experts who sent letters, because they were +told that it would seriously cripple the American Commission in the +preparation of the Austrian Treaty if they did not continue to serve. +Another and more prominent adviser of the President felt very bitterly +over the terms of peace. In speaking of his disapproval of them he told +me that he had found the same feeling among the British in Paris, who +were disposed to blame the President since "they had counted upon him to +stand firmly by his principles and face down the intriguers." + +It is needless to cite other instances indicating the general state of +mind among the Americans and British at Paris to show the views that +were being exchanged and the frank comments that were being made at the +time of my interview with Mr. Bullitt. In truth I said less to him in +criticism of the Treaty than I did to some others, but they have seen +fit to respect the confidential nature of our conversations. + +It is not pertinent to the present subject to recite the events between +the delivery of the Treaty to the Germans on May 7 and its signature on +June 28. In spite of the dissatisfaction, which even went so far that +some of the delegates of the Great Powers threatened to decline to sign +the Treaty unless certain of its terms were modified, the supreme +necessity of restoring peace as soon as possible overcame all obstacles. +It was the appreciation of this supreme necessity which caused many +Americans to urge consent to ratification when the Treaty was laid +before the Senate. + +My own position was paradoxical. I was opposed to the Treaty, but signed +it and favored its ratification. The explanation is this: Convinced +after conversations with the President in July and August, 1919, that he +would not consent to any effective reservations, the politic course +seemed to be to endeavor to secure ratification without reservations. It +appeared to be the only possible way of obtaining that for which all the +world longed and which in the months succeeding the signature appeared +absolutely essential to prevent the widespread disaster resulting from +political and economic chaos which seemed to threaten many nations if +not civilization itself. Even if the Treaty was bad in certain +provisions, so long as the President remained inflexible and insistent, +its ratification without change seemed a duty to humanity. At least that +was my conviction in the summer and autumn of 1919, and I am not yet +satisfied that it was erroneous. My views after January, 1920, are not +pertinent to the subject under consideration. The consequences of the +failure to ratify promptly the Treaty of Versailles are still uncertain. +They may be more serious or they may be less serious than they appeared +in 1919. Time alone will disclose the truth and fix the responsibility +for what occurred after the Treaty of Versailles was laid before the +Senate of the United States. + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +The narration of my relations to the peace negotiations as one of the +American Commissioners to the Paris Conference, which has been confined +within the limits laid down in the opening chapter of this volume, +concludes with the recital of the views which I held concerning the +terms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and which were brought to the +attention of Mr. Wilson through the press reports of William C. +Bullitt's statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on +September 12, 1919. + +The endeavor has been to present, as fully as possible in the +circumstances, a review of my association with President Wilson in +connection with the negotiations at Paris setting forth our differences +of opinion and divergence of judgment upon the subjects coming before +the Peace Conference, the conduct of the proceedings, and the terms of +peace imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. + +It is evident from this review that, from a time prior to Mr. Wilson's +departure from the United States on December 4, 1918, to attend the +Peace Conference up to the delivery of the text of the Treaty to the +German plenipotentiaries on May 7, 1919, there were many subjects of +disagreement between the President and myself; that he was disposed to +reject or ignore the advice and suggestions which I volunteered; and +that in consequence of my convictions I followed his guidance and obeyed +his instructions unwillingly. + +While there were other matters of friction between us they were of a +personal nature and of minor importance. Though they may have +contributed to the formality of our relations they played no real part +in the increasing difficulty of the situation. The matters narrated +were, in my opinion, the principal causes for the letters written by +President Wilson in February, 1920; at least they seem sufficient to +explain the origin of the correspondence, while the causes specifically +stated by him--my calling together of the heads of the executive +departments for consultation during his illness and my attempts to +anticipate his judgment--are insufficient. + +The reasons given in the President's letter of February 11, the +essential portions of which have been quoted, for stating that my +resignation as Secretary of State would be acceptable to him, are the +embarrassment caused him by my "reluctance and divergence of judgment" +and the implication that my mind did not "willingly go along" with his. +As neither of these reasons applies to the calling of Cabinet meetings +or to the anticipation of his judgment in regard to foreign affairs, the +unavoidable conclusion is that these grounds of complaint were not the +real causes leading up to the severance of our official association. + +The real causes--which are the only ones worthy of consideration--are to +be found in the record of the relations between President Wilson and +myself in connection with the peace negotiations. Upon that record must +rest the justification or the refutation of Mr. Wilson's implied charge +that I was not entirely loyal to him as President and that I failed to +perform my full duty to my country as Secretary of State and as a +Commissioner to Negotiate Peace by opposing the way in which he +exercised his constitutional authority to conduct the foreign affairs of +the United States. + + +THE END + + + + +APPENDIX I + + +THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, +LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION ON JANUARY 10, 1919 + +PREAMBLE + +In order to secure peace, security, and orderly government by the +prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by +the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the +actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of +justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the +dealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to +this covenant and agreement jointly and severally adopt this +constitution of the League of Nations. + +ARTICLE I + +The action of the Signatory Powers under the terms of this agreement +shall be effected through the instrumentality of a Body of Delegates +which shall consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contracting +Powers accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. The +meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the seat of +government of H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. shall be the +presiding officer of the Body. + +Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meet +temporarily at the seat of government of B. or of S., in which case the +Ambassador or Minister to H. of the country in which the meeting is held +shall be the presiding officer _pro tempore_. + +It shall be the privilege of any of the contracting Powers to assist its +representative in the Body of Delegates by any method of conference, +counsel, or advice that may seem best to it, and also to substitute upon +occasion a special representative for its regular diplomatic +representative accredited to H. + + +ARTICLE II + +The Body of Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and shall have +power to appoint such committees as they may deem necessary to inquire +into and report upon any matters that lie within the field of +their action. + +It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the initiative of +any member, to discuss, either publicly or privately as it may deem +best, any matter lying within the jurisdiction of the League of Nations +as defined in this Covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace of +the world; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the +exercise of the functions and powers granted to them under this Covenant +shall be first formulated and agreed upon by an Executive Council, which +shall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and which shall +consist of the representatives of the Great Powers together with +representatives drawn in annual rotation from two panels, one of which +shall be made up of the representatives of the States ranking next after +the Great Powers and the other of the representatives of the minor +States (a classification which the Body of Delegates shall itself +establish and may from time to time alter), such a number being drawn +from these panels as will be but one less than the representatives of +the Great Powers; and three or more negative votes in the Council shall +operate as a veto upon any action or resolution proposed. + +All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Body of Delegates upon +the recommendation of the Executive Council, except those adopted in +execution of any direct powers herein granted to the Body of Delegates +themselves, shall have the effect of recommendations to the several +governments of the League. + +The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent Secretariat and staff +and may appoint joint committees chosen from the Body of Delegates or +consisting of specially qualified persons outside of that Body, for the +study and systematic consideration of the international questions with +which the Council may have to deal, or of questions likely to lead to +international complications or disputes. It shall also take the +necessary steps to establish and maintain proper liaison both with the +foreign offices of the signatory powers and with any governments or +agencies which may be acting as mandatories of the League of Nations in +any part of the world. + + +ARTICLE III + +The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political +independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between +them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future +become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and +aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to +the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial +readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates +be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples +concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that +territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The +Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the +peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of +political jurisdiction or boundary. + + +ARTICLE IV + +The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that the establishment +and maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national +armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the +enforcement by common action of international obligations; and the +Delegates are directed to formulate at once plans by which such a +reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall be binding +when, and only when, unanimously approved by the Governments signatory +to this Covenant. + +As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the Powers +subscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant constitutes a +part hereby agree to abolish conscription and all other forms of +compulsory military service, and also agree that their future forces of +defence and of international action shall consist of militia or +volunteers, whose numbers and methods of training shall be fixed, after +expert inquiry, by the agreements with regard to the reduction of +armaments referred to in the last preceding paragraph. + +The Body of Delegates shall also determine for the consideration and +action of the several governments what direct military equipment and +armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces +laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when +adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body of +Delegates. + +The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions and implements of +war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise or for private +profit, and that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all +national armaments and military or naval programmes. + + +ARTICLE V + +The Contracting Powers jointly and severally agree that, should disputes +or difficulties arise between or among them which cannot be +satisfactorily settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes of +diplomacy, they will in no case resort to armed force without previously +submitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration or +to inquiry by the Executive Council of the Body of Delegates or until +there has been an award by the arbitrators or a decision by the +Executive Council; and that they will not even then resort to armed +force as against a member of the League of Nations who complies with the +award of the arbitrators or the decision of the Executive Council. + +The Powers signatory to this Covenant undertake and agree that whenever +any dispute or difficulty shall arise between or among them with regard +to any questions of the law of nations, with regard to the +interpretation of a treaty, as to any fact which would, if established, +constitute a breach of international obligation, or as to any alleged +damage and the nature and measure of the reparation to be made therefor, +if such dispute or difficulty cannot be satisfactorily settled by the +ordinary processes of negotiation, to submit the whole subject-matter to +arbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award or decision +that may be rendered. + +In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue shall be referred +to three arbitrators, one of the three to be selected by each of the +parties to the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and the +third by the two thus selected. When there are more than two parties to +the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the several +parties, and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their number others +of their own choice, the number thus added to be limited to the number +which will suffice to give a deciding voice to the arbitrators thus +added in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the +contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending +parties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, the +additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Body of +Delegates. + +On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of the arbitrators +may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths of the Delegates, in case +the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, or by a vote of +two-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators was +not unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and +conclusive. + +When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside, the +dispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators chosen as heretofore +provided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted as +arbitrators in the dispute in question, and the decision of the +arbitrators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding +and conclusive without right of appeal. + +If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer any matter in +dispute to arbitration, the parties to the dispute shall apply to the +Executive Council to take the matter under consideration for such +mediatory action or recommendation as it may deem wise in the +circumstances. The Council shall immediately accept the reference and +give notice to the other party or parties, and shall make the necessary +arrangements for a full hearing, investigation, and consideration. It +shall ascertain all the facts involved in the dispute and shall make +such recommendations as it may deem wise and practicable based on the +merits of the controversy and calculated to secure a just and lasting +settlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of +the Executive Council any and all information that may be in their +possession which in any way bears upon the facts or merits of the +controversy; and the Executive Council shall do everything in its power +by way of mediation or conciliation to bring about a peaceful +settlement. The decisions of the Executive Council shall be addressed to +the disputants, and shall not have the force of a binding verdict. +Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall +be the privilege of the members of the Executive Council to publish +their several conclusions or recommendations; and such publications +shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of the +disputants. + + +ARTICLE VI + +Should any contracting Power break or disregard its covenants under +ARTICLE V, it shall thereby _ipso facto_ commit an act of war with all +the members of the League, which shall immediately subject it to a +complete economic and financial boycott, including the severance of all +trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between +their subjects and the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and the +prevention, so far as possible, of all financial, commercial, or +personal intercourse between the subjects of the covenant-breaking State +and the subjects of any other State, whether a member of the League of +Nations or not. + +It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive Council of the Body +of Delegates in such a case to recommend what effective military or +naval force the members of the League of Nations shall severally +contribute, and to advise, if it should think best, that the smaller +members of the League be excused from making any contribution to the +armed forces to be used against the covenant-breaking State. + +The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restoration of peace, be +subject to perpetual disarmament and to the regulations with regard to a +peace establishment provided for new States under the terms of +SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE IV. + + +ARTICLE VII + +If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile +step short of war, against another Power before submitting the dispute +involved to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council as +herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any +hostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has been +decided adversely to it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as herein +provided, the Contracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only to +cease all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to unite in +blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to commerce or +intercourse with any part of the world and to use any force that may be +necessary to accomplish that object. + + +ARTICLE VIII + +Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the +Contracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the +League of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and those +Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed +wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. + +It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each +of the nations signatory or adherent to this Covenant to draw the +attention of the Body of Delegates to any circumstances anywhere which +threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding +between nations upon which peace depends. + +The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace whenever war is +rumored or threatened, and also whenever the Delegate of any Power shall +inform the Delegates that a meeting and conference in the interest of +peace is advisable. + +The Delegates may also meet at such other times and upon such other +occasions as they shall from time to time deem best and determine. + + +ARTICLE IX + +In the event of a dispute arising between one of the Contracting Powers +and a Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involved +hereby binds itself to endeavour to obtain the submission of the dispute +to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other Power will not +agree to submit the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration, the +Contracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention of the Body of +Delegates. The Delegates shall in such a case, in the name of the League +of Nations, invite the Power not a party to this Covenant to become _ad +hoc_ a party and to submit its case to judicial decision or to +arbitration, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed that the +provisions hereinbefore contained and applicable to the submission of +disputes to arbitration or discussion shall be in all respects +applicable to the dispute both in favour of and against such Power as if +it were a party to this Covenant. + +In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall not accept the +invitation of the Delegates to become _ad hoc_ a party, it shall be the +duty of the Executive Council immediately to institute an inquiry into +the circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to recommend +such joint action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and most +effectual in the circumstances disclosed. + + +ARTICLE X + +If hostilities should be begun or any hostile action taken against the +Contracting Power by the Power not a party to this Covenant before a +decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, report +and recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, or +contrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers shall thereupon +cease all commerce and communication with that Power and shall also +unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to all +commerce or intercourse with any part of the world, employing jointly +any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object. The +Contracting Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance of the +Contracting Power against which hostile action has been taken, combining +their armed forces in its behalf. + + +ARTICLE XI + +In case of a dispute between states not parties to this Covenant, any +Contracting Power may bring the matter to the attention of the +Delegates, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the League of +Nations with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute. + +If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and agree to +submit its interests and causes of action wholly to the control and +decision of the League of Nations, that state shall _ad hoc_ be deemed a +Contracting Power. If no one of the states, parties to the dispute, +shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall, through the Executive +Council, of their own motion take such action and make such +recommendation to their governments as will prevent hostilities and +result in the settlement of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE XII + +Any Power not a party to this Covenant, whose government is based upon +the principle of popular self-government, may apply to the Body of +Delegates for leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard the +granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order, and security of +the World, they may act favourably on the application, and their +favourable action shall operate to constitute the Power so applying in +all respects a full signatory party to this Covenant. This action shall +require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Delegates. + + +ARTICLE XIII + +The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Covenant and +Convention is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations _inter se_ +which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly engage that +they will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the +terms hereof. + +In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to +the League of Nations shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant, +have undertaken any treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the +terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take +immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. + + + + +_SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS_ + +I + +In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to +Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerly +under the dominion of the German Empire, the League of Nations shall be +regarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimate +disposal or of continued administration in accordance with certain +fundamental principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion and +control shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation on the part +of any Power. + +These principles are, that there shall in no case be any annexation of +any of these territories by any State either within the League or +outside of it, and that in the future government of these peoples and +territories the rule of self-determination, or the consent of the +governed to their form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably +applied, and all policies of administration or economic development be +based primarily upon the well-considered interests of the people +themselves. + +II + +Any authority, control, or administration which may be necessary in +respect of these peoples or territories other than their own +self-determined and self-organized autonomy shall be the exclusive +function of and shall be vested in the League of Nations and exercised +or undertaken by or on behalf of it. + +It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate its authority, +control, or administration of any such people or territory to some +single State or organized agency which it may designate and appoint as +its agent or mandatory; but whenever or wherever possible or feasible +the agent or mandatory so appointed shall be nominated or approved by +the autonomous people or territory. + +III + +The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by +the mandatary State or agency shall in each case be explicitly defined +by the League in a special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the +League complete power of supervision and of intimate control, and which +shall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental +unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of +any breach of the mandate by the mandatary State or agency or for the +substitution of some other State or agency, as mandatary. + +The mandatary State or agency shall in all cases be bound and required +to maintain the policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for all +the signatories to this Covenant, in respect of the use and development +of the economic resources of such people or territory. + +The mandatary State or agency shall in no case form or maintain any +military or naval force in excess of definite standards laid down by the +League itself for the purposes of internal police. + +IV + +No new State arising or created from the old Empires of Austria-Hungary, +or Turkey shall be recognized by the League or admitted into its +membership except on condition that its military and naval forces and +armaments shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in respect +of it from time to time. + +As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, +directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations +_inter se_ of all new independent States arising or created out of the +Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating and +composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance of +settled order and the general peace. + +V + +The Powers signatory or adherent to this Covenant agree that they will +themselves seek to establish and maintain fair hours and humane +conditions of labour for all those within their several jurisdictions +who are engaged in manual labour and that they will exert their +influence in favour of the adoption and maintenance of a similar policy +and like safeguards wherever their industrial and commercial +relations extend. + +VI + +The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as +a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous +States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their +several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in +law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of +their people. + + + + +APPENDIX II + +LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +(_Plan of Lord Robert Cecil_[1]) + +I + +ORGANIZATION + + +The general treaty setting up the league of nations will explicitly +provide for regular conferences between the responsible representatives +of the contracting powers. + +These conferences would review the general conditions of international +relations and would naturally pay special attention to any difficulty +which might seem to threaten the peace of the world. They would also +receive and as occasion demanded discuss reports as to the work of any +international administrative or investigating bodies working under +the League. + +These conferences would constitute the pivot of the league. They would +be meetings of statesmen responsible to their own sovereign parliaments, +and any decisions taken would therefore, as in the case of the various +allied conferences during the war, have to be unanimous. + +The following form of organization is suggested: + +I. _The conference_. Annual meeting of prime ministers and foreign +secretaries of British Empire, United States, France, Italy, Japan, and +any other States recognized by them as great powers. Quadrennial meeting +of representatives of all States included in the league. There should +also be provision for the summoning of special conferences on the demand +of any one of the great powers or, if there were danger of an outbreak +of war, of any member of the league. (The composition of the league will +be determined at the peace conference. Definitely untrustworthy and +hostile States, e.g., Russia, should the Bolshevist government remain in +power, should be excluded. Otherwise it is desirable not to be too rigid +in scrutinizing qualifications, since the small powers will in any case +not exercise any considerable influence.) + +2. For the conduct of its work the interstate conference will require a +permanent secretariat. The general secretary should be appointed by the +great powers, if possible choosing a national of some other country. + +3. _International bodies_. The secretariat would be the responsible +channel of communication between the interstate conference and all +international bodies functioning under treaties guaranteed by the +league. These would fall into three classes: + +_(a)_ Judicial; i.e., the existing Hague organization with any additions +or modifications made by the league. + +_(b)_ International administrative bodies. Such as the suggested transit +commission. To these would be added bodies already formed under existing +treaties (which are very numerous and deal with very important +interests, e.g., postal union, international labor office, etc.). + +_(c)_ International commissions of enquiry: e.g., commission on industrial +conditions (labor legislation), African commission, armaments +commission. + +4. In addition to the above arrangements guaranteed by or arising out of +the general treaty, there would probably be a periodical congress of +delegates of the parliaments of the States belonging to the league, as a +development out of the existing Interparliamentary Union. A regular +staple of discussion for this body would be afforded by the reports of +the interstate conference and of the different international bodies. The +congress would thus cover the ground that is at present occupied by the +periodical Hague Conference and also the ground claimed by the Socialist +International. + +For the efficient conduct of all these activities it is essential that +there should be a permanent central meeting-place, where the officials +and officers of the league would enjoy the privileges of +extra-territoriality. Geneva is suggested as the most suitable place. + + +II + +PREVENTION OF WAR + +The covenants for the prevention of war which would be embodied in the +general treaty would be as follows: + +(1) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war +until they had submitted the questions at issue to an international +conference or an arbitral court, and until the conference or court had +issued a report or handed down an award. + +(2) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war +with any member of the league complying with the award of a court or +with the report of a conference. For the purpose of this clause, the +report of the conference must be unanimous, excluding the litigants. + +(3) The members of the league would undertake to regard themselves, as +_ipso facto_, at war with any one of them acting contrary to the above +covenants, and to take, jointly and severally, appropriate military, +economic and other measure against the recalcitrant State. + +(4) The members of the league would bind themselves to take similar +action, in the sense of the above clause, against any State not being a +member of the league which is involved in a dispute with a member of +the league. + +(This is a stronger provision than that proposed in the Phillimore +Report.) + +The above covenants mark an advance upon the practice of international +relations previous to the war in two respects: (i) In insuring a +necessary period of delay before war can break out (except between two +States which are neither of them members of the league); (2) In securing +public discussion and probably a public report upon matters in dispute. + +It should be observed that even in cases where the conference report is +not unanimous, and therefore in no sense binding, a majority report may +be issued and that this would be likely to carry weight with the public +opinion of the States in the league. + + + + +APPENDIX III + +THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES + + +ARTICLE I + +The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the +Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such +of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without +reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a +Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the +coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all +other Members of the League. + +Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the +Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by +two thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective +guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international +obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by +the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and +armaments. + +Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention +so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international +obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been +fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. + + +ARTICLE 2 + +The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through +the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent +Secretariat. + + +ARTICLE 3 + +The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the +League. + +The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as +occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as +may be decided upon. + +The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere +of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. + +At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one +vote, and may have not more than three Representatives. + + +ARTICLE 4 + +The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and +Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members +of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the +Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of +the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by +the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece +shall be members of the Council. + +With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name +additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be +members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the +number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for +representation on the Council. + +The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at +least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as +may be decided upon. + +The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere +of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. + +Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited +to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the +Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the +interests of that Member of the League. + +At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the +Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one +Representative. + + +ARTICLE 5 + +Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the +terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or +of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the +League represented at the meeting. + +All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, +including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular +matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be +decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at +the meeting. + +The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council +shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. + + +ARTICLE 6 + +The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the +League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such +secretaries and staff as may be required. + +The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex; +thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with +the approval of the majority of the Assembly. + +The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the +Secretary General with the approval of the Council. + +The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the +Assembly and of the Council. + +The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the +League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the +International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. + + +ARTICLE 7 + +The Seat of the League is established at Geneva. + +The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be +established elsewhere. + +All positions under or in connection with the League, including the +Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. + +Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League +when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic +privileges and immunities. + +The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials +or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable. + + +ARTICLE 8 + +The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace +requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point +consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of +international obligations. + +The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and +circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction +for the consideration and action of the several Governments. + +Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least +every ten years. + +After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, +the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the +concurrence of the Council. + +The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private +enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave +objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon +such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the +necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to +manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for +their safety. + +The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank +information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval +and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are +adaptable to warlike purposes. + + +ARTICLE 9 + +A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the +execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval +and air questions generally. + + +ARTICLE 10 + +The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against +external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political +independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such +aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the +Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be +fulfilled. + + +ARTICLE 11 + +Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the +Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to +the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be +deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any +such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request +of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. + +It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the +League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any +circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens +to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations +upon which peace depends. + + +ARTICLE 12 + +The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them +any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter +either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no +case to resort to war until three months after the award by the +arbitrators or the report by the Council. + +In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be +made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be +made within six months after the submission of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 13 + +The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise +between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to +arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, +they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration. + +Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of +international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established +would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the +extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are +declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission +to arbitration. + +For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to +which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties +to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. + +The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good +faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to +war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the +event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall +propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. + + +ARTICLE 14 + +The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for +adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of +International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and +determine any dispute of an international character which the parties +thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon +any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by +the Assembly. + + +ARTICLE 15 + +If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely +to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in +accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they +will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may +effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute +to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a +full investigation and consideration thereof. + +For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the +Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case +with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith +direct the publication thereof. + +The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and +if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving +such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of +settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate. + +If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by +a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement +of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed +just and proper in regard thereto. + +Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a +statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions +regarding the same. + +If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members +thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to +the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to +war with any party to the dispute which complies with the +recommendations of the report. + +If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by +the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of +the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to +themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider +necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. + +If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is +found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international +law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the +Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its +settlement. + +The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the +Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either +party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen +days after the submission of the dispute to the Council. + +In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article +and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall +apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report +made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those +Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of +the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the +Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force +as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other +than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 16 + +Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its +covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed +to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, +which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all +trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between +their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and +the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse +between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals +of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. + +It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the +several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air +force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed +forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. + +The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually +support one another in the financial and economic measures which are +taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and +inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will +mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at +one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will +take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to +the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to +protect the covenants of the League. + +Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League +may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the +Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of +the League represented thereon. + + +ARTICLE 17 + +In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State +which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of +the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be +invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the +purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem +just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to +16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed +necessary by the Council. + +Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute +an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such +action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. + +If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of +membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall +resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article +16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. + +If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the +obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such +dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such +recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the +settlement of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 18 + +Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any +Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat +and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or +international engagement shall be binding until so registered. + + +ARTICLE 19 + +The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members +of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the +consideration of international conditions whose continuance might +endanger the peace of the world. + + +ARTICLE 20 + +The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted +as abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_ which are +inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they +will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the +terms thereof. + +In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the +League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of +this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate +steps to procure its release from such obligations. + + +ARTICLE 21 + +Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of +international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional +understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance +of peace. + + +ARTICLE 22 + +To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war +have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly +governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand +by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there +should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of +such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for +the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. + +The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the +tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by +reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical +position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to +accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as +Mandatories on behalf of the League. + +The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the +development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, +its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. + +Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have +reached a stage of development where their existence as independent +nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of +administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as +they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a +principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. + +Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage +that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the +territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience +and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and +morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms +traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment +of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training +of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of +territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and +commerce of other Members of the League. + +There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the +South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their +population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of +civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the +Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the +laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to +the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous +population. + +In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an +annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. + +The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by +the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the +League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council. + +A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the +annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all +matters relating to the observance of the mandates. + + +ARTICLE 23 + +Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international +conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of +the League: + +_(a)_ will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions +of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and +in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations +extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary +international organisations; + +_(b)_ undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of +territories under their control; + +_(c)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision over the +execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and +children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; + +_(d)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade +in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this +traffic is necessary in the common interest; + +_(e)_ will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of +communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce +of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special +necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall +be borne in mind; + +_(f)_ will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern +for the prevention and control of disease. + + +ARTICLE 24 + +There shall be placed under the direction of the League all +international bureaux already established by general treaties if the +parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all +commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest +hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League. + +In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general +conventions but which are not placed under the control of international +bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to +the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and +distribute all relevant information and shall render any other +assistance which may be necessary or desirable. + +The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the +expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction +of the League. + + +ARTICLE 25 + +The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the +establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red +Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the +prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout +the world. + + +ARTICLE 26 + +Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the +Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a +majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the +Assembly. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which +signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a +Member of the League. + + + + +APPENDIX IV + +THE FOURTEEN POINTS[2] + +The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that +program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this: + +I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall +be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy +shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. + +II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial +waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in +whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of +international covenants. + +III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the +establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations +consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. + +IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be +reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. + +V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all +colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in +determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the +populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims +of the government whose title is to be determined. + +VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all +questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest +cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an +unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent +determination of her own political development and national policy and +assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under +institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance +also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The +treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come +will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her +needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their +intelligent and unselfish sympathy. + +VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and +restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys +in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as +this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws +which they have themselves set and determined for the government of +their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole +structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. + +VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions +restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter +of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for +nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more +be made secure in the interest of all. + +IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along +clearly recognizable lines of nationality. + +X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish +to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest +opportunity of autonomous development. + +XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied +territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; +and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined +by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance +and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and +economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan +states should be entered into. + +XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be +assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now +under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and +an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the +Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships +and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. + +XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include +the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which +should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose +political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be +guaranteed by international covenant. + +XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific +covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political +independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. + + + + +APPENDIX V + +PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 11, +1918 + + +The principles to be applied are these: + +_First_, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the +essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as +are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent; + +_Second_, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from +sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a +game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of +power; but that + +_Third_, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made +in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and +not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst +rival states; and + +_Fourth_, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded +the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing +new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be +likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of +the world. + + + + +APPENDIX VI + +THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG + + +ARTICLE 156 + +Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and +privileges--particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, +railways, mines, and submarine cables--which she acquired in virtue of +the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all +other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung. + +All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch +lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, +shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the +exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together +with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. + +The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from +Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties +attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of +all charges and encumbrances. + + +ARTICLE 157 + +The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the +territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might +claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the +expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with +this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all +charges and encumbrances. + + +ARTICLE 158 + +Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming +into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, +title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating +to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or +other, of the territory of Kiaochow. + +Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all +treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or +privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles. + + +[Footnote 1: Reprinted from Senate Doc. No. 106, 66th Congress, 1st +Session, p. 1163.] + +[Footnote 2: From the address of President Wilson delivered at a Joint +Session of Congress on January 8, 1918.] + + + + +INDEX + + +Abrogation of treaties contrary to the League, in Wilson's original + draft; in Treaty, + +Affirmative guaranty of territory and independence, plan; Wilson adopts, + in Fourteen Points; Lansing's opposition; constitutional and + political arguments against; Lansing's "self-denying covenant" as + substitute; in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty; as continuing + balance of power; Wilson adheres to; not in Cecil plan; in Lansing's + resolution of principles; other substitute; as reason for rejection + of Treaty by Senate; retained in reported Covenant; and dominance of + Great Powers. _See also_ Equality of nations; League; + Self-denying covenant. + +Albania, disposition. + +Alliances. _See_ French alliance. + +Alsace-Lorraine, to be restored to France. + +Amendment of League, provision for. + +American Bar Association, Lansing's address. + +American Commission, members; ignored in League negotiations; conference + of January 10; ignorant of preliminary negotiations; question of + resignation over Shantung settlement; shares in Shantung + negotiations. _See also_ Bliss; House; Lansing; White; Wilson. + +American Peace Society. + +American programme, lack of definite, as subject of disagreement; + Fourteen Points announced; not worked out; insufficiency of Fourteen + Points; Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; effect of + President's attendance at Conference; embarrassment to delegates of + lack; _projet_ of treaty prepared for Lansing; President resents it; + no system or team-work in American Commission; reason for President's + attitude; no instructions during President's absence; results of + lack; and Preliminary Treaty; influence of lack on Wilson's + leadership; text of Fourteen Points. + +Annunzio, Gabriele d', at Fiume. + +Arabia, disposition. _See also_ Near East. + +Arbitral Tribunal, in Lansing's plan. + +Arbitration, as form of peace promotion; in Lansing's plan; in Wilson's + original draft; in Cecil plan; in Treaty. _See also_ Diplomatic + adjustment; Judicial settlement. + +Armenia, mandate for; protectorate. _See also_ Near East. + +Armistice, American conference on. + +Article X. _See_ Affirmative guaranty. + +Assembly (Body of Delegates), in Wilson's original draft; analogous body + in Cecil plan; in Treaty. + +Auchincloss, Gordon, and drafting of League. + +Austria, Archduchy and union with Germany, outlet to sea. + +Austria-Hungary, dissolution; Fourteen Points on subject people. + +Azerbaidjan, Wilson and. + +Baker, Ray Stannard, and Shantung. + +Balance of power, Clemenceau advocates; Wilson denounces; and Cecil + plan; League and. _See also_ Affirmative guaranty; Equality of + nations. + +Balfour, Arthur, signs French alliance. + +Balkans, Fourteen Points on. _See also_ states by names. + +Belgium, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, full sovereignty, + +Bessarabia disposition, + +Bliss, Tasker H. American delegate, opposes affirmative guaranty, and + Covenant as reported, and proposed French alliance, and Shantung, + letter to President, _See also_ American Commission; American + programme. + +Body of Delegates. _See_ Assembly. + +Boers, and self-determination, + +Bohemia, disposition, + +Bolshevism, peace as check to spread, + +Bosnia, disposition, + +Boundaries, principles in drawing, + +Bowman, Isaiah, Commission of Inquiry + +Brest-Litovsk Treaty, to be abrogated, + +Bucharest Treaty, to be abrogated, + +Buffer state on the Rhine, + +Bulgaria, boundaries, + +Bullitt, William C., on revision of Covenant, testimony on Lansing + interview, Lansing's telegram to President on testimony, no reply + received, and Wilson's western speeches, + +Canada, Papineau Rebellion and self-determination, + +Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, + +Cecil, Lord Robert, plan for League, Wilson opposes it, text of plan, + +Central Powers, Wilson and need of defeat, hope in Wilson's attitude, + peace or Bolshevism, _See also_ Mandates, and states by name. + +China. _See_ Shantung. + +Chinda, Viscount, and Shantung, + +Civil War, and self-determination, + +Clemenceau, Georges, Supreme War Council, advocates balance of power, + and Cecil plan, and Franco-American alliance, _See also_ Council of + Four. + +Codification of international law, in Lansing's plan, + +Colonies, disposition of, in Lansing's plan, Fourteen Points on, _See + also_ Mandates. + +Commerce. _See_ Non-intercourse; Open Door. + +Commission of Inquiry, work, + +Commission on the League of Nations, appointed, and Wilson's return to + United States, meets, Wilson's draft as groundwork, meetings and + report, Wilson's address, character of report and work, secrecy, + Wilson's domination, + +Constantinople, disposition, + +Constitutional objections, to affirmative guaranty, and to Cecil plan, + +Council of Foreign Ministers, established, nickname, + +Council of Four, self-constituted, secrecy, "Olympians," gives only + digest of Treaty to other delegates, Shantung bargain, _See also_ + Secret diplomacy. + +Council of Ten, and Lansing's substitute resolution on League, during + Wilson's absence, self-constituted organization, and Supreme War + Council, divided, and secrecy, + +Council of the Heads of States. _See_ Council of Four. + +Council (Executive Council) of the League, in Wilson's original draft, + analogous body in Cecil plan, in Treaty, + +Covenant. _See_ League of Nations. + +Croatia, disposition, + +Czecho-Slovakia, erection, + +Dalmatia, in Pact of London, + +Danzig, for Poland, + +Dardanelles, Fourteen Points on, + +Declaration of war, affirmative guaranty and power over, + +Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Heligoland, + +Diplomacy. _See_ Secret diplomacy. + +Diplomatic adjustment, as basis of Covenant, exalted, Lansing on + judicial settlement and, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, _See + also_ Judicial settlement. + +Disarmament, not touched in Lansing's plan; in Lansing's resolution of + principles; in Wilson's original draft; in Treaty. + +Dobrudja, disposition. + +East Indians, and self-determination. + +Economic influence on boundary lines. + +Economic interdependence, importance in peace negotiations. + +Economic pressure. _See_ Non-intercourse. + +Egypt, and self-determination; disposition. + +Election of 1918, as rebuke to Wilson. + +Entangling alliances. _See_ Isolation. + +Equality of nations, sacrifice in Wilson's draft of League; in Lansing's + form for League; ignored in Cecil plan; primacy of Great Powers + retained in reported Covenant; violation by Treaty; and secret + diplomacy at Conference. + +Esthonia, Wilson and; autonomy. + +Ethnic influence on boundary lines. _See also_ Racial minorities; + Self-determination. + +Finland, question of independence. + +Fiume affair, Lansing's attitude; Pact of London in light of dissolution + of Austria-Hungary; resulting increase in Italian claims as basis for + compromise; attitude of Italy toward Jugo-Slavia; commercial + importance of Fiume to Jugo-Slavia; campaign of Italian delegates for + Fiume; Italian public sentiment; character of population, + self-determination question; efforts to get Wilson's approval; threat + to retire from Conference; Wilson's statement against Italian claim; + withdrawal of delegation; Italian resentment against Wilson; as + lesson on secret diplomacy; delegation returns; and Shantung. + +Fourteen Points, announced; affirmative guaranty in; insufficient as + programme; text. + +France, Alsace-Lorraine; restoration. _See also_ Clemenceau; French + alliance; Great Powers. + +Freedom of the seas, in Fourteen Points. + +French alliance, as subject of disagreement; provisions of treaty; + relation to League; and removal of certain French demands from Treaty + of Peace; and French adherence to League; Lansing's opposition; + drafted, signed; Lansing and signing; arguments for. + +Geographic influence on boundary lines. + +Georgia, Wilson and. + +Germany, buffer state on the Rhine; and Russian route to the East; + Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; military impotence. + _See also_ Central Powers; French alliance; Mandates. + +Ginn Peace Foundation. + +Great Britain, and clause on self-determination; Egypt. _See also_ + French alliance; Great Powers; Lloyd George. + +Great Powers, and mandates. _See also_ Balance of power; Council of + Four; Equality of nations. + +Greece, territory. + +Gregory, Thomas W., and Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea. + +Guaranty. _See_ Affirmative; Self-denying. + +Hague Conventions, and international peace. + +Hague Tribunal, and Lansing's plan; Wilson's contempt; recognition in + Cecil plan. + +Hands Off, as basis of Lansing's plan. + +Health, promotion in Treaty. + +Heligoland, dismantlement, disposition. + +Herzegovina, disposition. + +Historic influence on boundary lines. + +Hostilities. _See_ Prevention of war. + +House, Edward M., joins Supreme War Council; conference on armistice + terms; selection as peace negotiator and President as delegate, + Commission of Inquiry, and drafting of League, and international + court, and "self-denying covenant," and balance of power, of + Commission on the League of Nations, and mandates, and data, ignorant + of Wilson's programme, and Preliminary Treaty with detailed Covenant, + and private consultations, _See also_ American Commission. + +Hungary, separation from Austria. + +Immoral traffic, prevention in Treaty, + +Immunities of League representatives, + +Indemnities, and mandates, + +India, German routes to, + +International commissions, in Cecil plan, in Treaty, + +International court. _See_ Judicial settlement. + +International enforcement. _See_ Affirmative guaranty. + +International military force, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, + +International military staff, proposal, + +Interparliamentary Congress, in Cecil plan, + +Inviolability of League property, + +Irish, and self-determination, + +Isolation, policy, and affirmative guaranty, and mandates, and French + alliance, + +Italy, and Cecil plan, territory, _See also_ Fiume; Great Powers. + +Japan, and Cecil plan, in Council of Ten, _See also_ Great Powers; + Shantung. + +Judicial settlement of international disputes, Lansing's plan, + subordinated in Wilson's draft, Lansing on diplomatic adjustment and, + Lansing urges as nucleus of League, in Lansing's resolution of + principles, Lansing's appeal for, in Covenant, arbitrators of + litigant nations, difficulties in procedure, cost, elimination from + Covenant of appeal from arbitral awards, how effected, Lansing's + appeal ignored, in Cecil plan, _See also_ Arbitration; Diplomatic + adjustment. + +Jugo-Slavia, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, port, erected, _See + also_ Fiume. + +Kato, Baron, and Shantung, + +Kiao-Chau. _See_ Shantung. + +Kiel Canal, internationalization, + +Koo, V.K. Wellington, argument on Shantung, + +Labor article, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, + +Lansing, Robert, resignation asked and given, divergence of judgment + from President, reasons for retaining office, reasons for narrative, + imputation of faithlessness, personal narrative, subjects of + disagreement, attitude toward duty as negotiator, policy as to advice + to President, President's attitude towards opinions, method of + treatment of subject, conference on armistice terms, selected as a + negotiator, opposition to President being a delegate, President's + attitude toward this opposition, and Commission of Inquiry, arrival + in Paris, and balance of power, and paramount need of speedy peace, + opposition to mandates, opposition to French alliance treaty, signs + it, personal relations with President, memorandum on American + programme (1918), has _projet_ of treaty prepared, Wilson resents it, + on lack of organization in American Commission, and lack of + programme, and American Commission during President's absence, on + Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea, opposition to secret diplomacy, effect + on Wilson, and Fiume, and Shantung, Bullitt affair, views on Treaty + when presented to Germans, and ratification of Treaty _See also_ + American Commission; League; Wilson. + +Latvia Wilson and autonomy + +League of Nations principles as subject of disagreement as object of + peace negotiations as reason for President's participation in + Conference Wilson's belief in necessity American support of idea, + earlier plans and associations divergence of opinion on form + political and juridical forms of organization Wilson's belief in + international force and affirmative guaranty affirmative guaranty in + Fourteen Points Phillimore's report preparation of Wilson's original + draft, House as author Lansing not consulted, reason Lansing's + opposition to affirmative guaranty Lansing and non-intercourse peace + plan draft impracticable and equality of nations Lansing's + "self-denying covenant" Lansing accepts guaranty as matter of + expediency diplomatic adjustment as basis of Wilson's draft guaranty + in first draft, later draft, and Treaty Lansing's substitute, his + communications not acknowledged, incorporation of detailed Covenant + in Treaty irreconcilable differences between Wilson's and Lansing's + plans Lansing on diplomatic adjustment versus judicial settlement + Lansing urges international court as nucleus three doctrines of + Lansing's plan Lansing's first view of Wilson's draft his opinion of + its form of its principles Wilson considers affirmative guaranty + essential, effect on Treaty American Commission ignored on matters + concerning Cecil plan Wilson's opposition to it question of + self-determination Lansing's proposed resolution of principles in + Treaty and later detailing detailed Covenant or speedy peace Wilson + utilizes desire for peace to force acceptance of League Lansing + proposes resolution to Wilson and to Council of Ten drafted + resolution of principles Commission on the League of Nations + appointed, American members resolution and Wilson's return to United + States Wilson's draft before Commission Wilson pigeonholes resolution + revision of Wilson's draft Lansing's appeal for international court + it is ignored elimination of appeal from arbitral awards, how + effected report of Commission, Wilson's address character of report + and work of Commission, main principles unaltered Wilson and American + opposition (Feb.) American Commission and report amendments to + placate American opinion reaction in Europe due to American + opposition change in character and addition of functions to preserve + it summary of Lansing's objections and French alliance in a + preliminary treaty as a _modus vivendi_ as subject of Wilson's + private consultations secrecy in negotiations and Shantung bargain + Bullitt's report of Lansing's attitude and carrying out of the Treaty + as merely a name for the Quintuple Alliance text of Wilson's original + draft of Cecil plan in Treaty _See also_ Mandates. + +League to Enforce Peace Wilson's address + +Lithuania Wilson and autonomy + +Lloyd George, David, Supreme War Council, 14 and French alliance _See + also_ Council of Four. + +Log-rolling at Conference + +London, Pact of + +Makino, Baron and Shantung + +Mandates, in Smuts plan, Wilson adopts it Lansing's criticism retained + in reported Covenant political difficulties Wilson's attitude legal + difficulties usefulness questioned as means of justifying the League + and indemnities altruistic, to be share of United States in Wilson's + original draft in Treaty. + +Meeting-place of League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in + Treaty. + +Membership in League in Wilson's original draft in Treaty withdrawal. + +Mezes, Sidney E., Commission of Inquiry and data. + +Miller, David Hunter and drafting of Covenant and _projet_ of a treaty. + +_Modus vivendi_, Wilson and a preliminary treaty as + +Monroe Doctrine and affirmative covenant preservation in Treaty + +Montenegro in Jugo-Slavia Fourteen Points on + +Moravia, disposition + +Munitions regulation of manufacture and trade in Wilson's original draft + in Treaty + +National safety, dominance of principle + +Near East United States and mandates Lansing's memorandum on territorial + settlements mandates in Wilson's original draft mandates in Treaty + Fourteen points on + +Negative guaranty. _See_ Self-denying covenant. + +Non-intercourse as form of peace promotion constitutionality in Wilson's + original draft in Treaty + +Norway, Spitzbergen + +Open Door in Lansing's plan in Near East in former German colonies + principle in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty in Fourteen Points + +Outlet to the sea for each nation + +Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele + +Palestine autonomy _See also_ Near East. + +Pan-America, proposed mutual guaranty treaty + +Papineau Rebellion, and self-determination + +Peace, Treaty of inclusion of detailed Covenant as subject of + disagreement expected preliminary treaty speedy restoration of peace + versus detailed Covenant Wilson employs desire for, to force + acceptance of League, resulting delay, delay, delay on League causes + definitive rather than preliminary treaty subjects for a preliminary + treaty influence of lack of American programme Wilson's decision for + a definitive treaty Lansing's views of finished treaty British + opinion protests of experts and officials of American Commission + Lansing and ratification _See also_ League. + +Persia, disposition + +Phillimore, Lord, report on League of Nations + +Poland and Anglo-Franco-American alliance independence Danzig + +Postponement of hostilities as form of peace promotion in Wilson's + original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty + +President as delegate as subject of disagreement Lansing's opposition + origin of Wilson's intention influence of belligerency on plan + influence of presence on domination of situation personal reasons for + attending decision to go to Paris decision to be a delegate attitude + of House League as reason for decision + +Prevention of war in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty + _Sec also_ Arbitration; League. + +Publication of treaties in Lansing's plan in Treaty + +Publicity as basis of Lansing's plan _See also_ Secret diplomacy. + +Quintuple Alliance, League of Nations as name for + +Racial equality issue in Shantung bargain + +Racial minorities protection, in Wilson's original draft + +Ratification of Treaty Lansing's attitude + +Red Cross promotion in Treaty + +Rhenish Republic as buffer state + +Roumania Bucharest Treaty to be abrogated territory Fourteen Points on + +Russia Wilson's policy and route for Germany to the East Lansing's notes + on territorial settlement Fourteen Points on + +Ruthenians and Ukraine + +Schleswig-Holstein disposition + +Scott, James Brown drafts French alliance treaty and _projet_ of a + treaty + +Secret diplomacy as subject of disagreement in negotiation of League as + evil at Conference Lansing's opposition, its effect on Wilson + Wilson's consultations and Wilson's "open diplomacy" in Council of + Four public resentment Fiume affair as lesson on perfunctory open + plenary sessions of Conference Council of Ten effect on Wilson's + prestige responsibility effect on delegates of smaller nations + climax, text of Treaty withheld from delegates psychological effect + great opportunity for reform missed and Shantung Fourteen Points on + _See also_ Publicity + +Secretariat of the League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in + Treaty + +"Self-denying covenant" for guaranty of territory and independence + Lansing's advocacy House and Wilson rejects suggested by others to + Wilson + +Self-determination in Wilson's draft of Covenant why omitted from treaty + in theory and in practice Wilson abandons violation in the treaties + and Civil War and Fiume colonial, in Fourteen Points Wilson's + statement (Feb. 1918) + +Senate of United States and affirmative guaranty opposition and Wilson's + threat plan to check opposition by a _modus vivendi_ + +Separation of powers Wilson's attitude + +Serbia Jugo-Slavia territory Fourteen Points on + +Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes _See_ Jugoslavia + +Shantung Settlement as subject of disagreement and secret diplomacy + bargain injustice, blackmail influence of Japanese bluff not to agree + to the League German control Japanese occupation moral effect Chinese + agreement to Japanese demands, resulting legal and moral status + status after China's declaration of war on Germany attitude of Allied + delegates attitude of American Commission, letter to Wilson argument + before Council of Ten Japanese threat to American Commission before + Council of Four value of Japanese promises questioned and Fiume + question of resignation of American Commission over China refuses to + sign Treaty Wilson permits American Commission to share in + negotiations American public opinion text of Treaty articles on + +Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia + +Slavonia disposition + +Slovakia disposition + +Small nations _See_ Equality. + +Smuts, General and disarmament plan for mandates + +Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes + +Sonnino, Baron Sidney _See_ Fiume + +Sovereignty question in system of mandates + +Spitzbergen disposition + +Strategic influence on boundary lines + +Straus, Oscar S. favors League as reported + +Supreme War Council, American members added, 14; and Cecil plan; and + Council of Ten. + +Syria, protectorate. _See also_ Near East. + +Taft, William H., supports League as reported. + +Transylvania, disposition, + +Treaty of Peace. _See_ Peace. + +Treaty-making power, President's responsibility, duties of negotiators, + and affirmative guaranty, + +Trieste, disposition; importance, + +Turkey, dismemberment and mandates, _See also_ Near East. + +Ukraine, Wilson and; autonomy, and Ruthenians. + +Unanimity, requirement in League. + +Violation of the League, action concerning, in Wilson's original draft, + in Cecil plan; in Treaty, + +War. _See_ Arbitration; League of Nations; Prevention. + +White, Henry, arrival in Paris; opposes affirmative guaranty; and + Covenant as reported and later amendments; and proposed French + alliance; and Shantung question. _See also_ American programme; + American Commission. + +Wickersham, George W., supports League as reported. + +Williams, E. T., and Shantung question, + +Wilson, Woodrow, responsibility for foreign relations; duties of + negotiators to, and opposition, presumption of self-assurance, + conference on armistice terms; disregard of precedent; and need of + defeat of enemy; and Commission of Inquiry; open-mindedness; and + advice on personal conduct; positiveness and indecision; and election + of 1918; prejudice against legal attitude; prefers written advice, + arrives in Paris, reception abroad, on equality of nations, and + separation of powers, denounces balance of power, and + self-determination, conference of Jan. 10, contempt for Hague + Tribunal, fidelity to convictions, return to United States, return to + Paris, and mandates, and French alliance, and open rupture with + Lansing, and team-work, decides for a definitive treaty only, + rigidity of mind, secretive nature, and Fiume, Italian resentment and + Shantung, and Bullitt affair, Treaty as abandonment of his + principles, Fourteen Points, principles of peace (Feb. 1918), _See + also_ American programme; Commission on the League; Council of Four; + Lansing; League; Peace; President as delegate; Secret diplomacy. + +Withdrawal from League, provision in Treaty, through failure to approve + amendments. + +World Peace Foundation, + +Zionism, and self-determination, + +Zone system in mutual guaranty plan, + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10444 *** diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b043dcf --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #10444 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10444) diff --git a/old/10444-8.txt b/old/10444-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88bbebd --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10444-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9700 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Peace Negotiations, by Robert Lansing + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + + + + +Title: The Peace Negotiations + +Author: Robert Lansing + +Release Date: December 13, 2003 [eBook #10444] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS*** + + +E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, Debra Storr, and Prooject Gutenberg +Distributed Proofreaders + + + +THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS + +A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + +BY ROBERT LANSING + + +WITH ILLUSTRATIONS + + + + + + +CONTENTS + + I. REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + + II. MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE + + III. GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + IV. SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED + + V. THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER + + VI. THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN + + VII. SELF-DETERMINATION + + VIII. THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919 + + IX. A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT + + X. THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT + + XI. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION + + XII. REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + XIII. THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES + + XIV. DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED + + XV. THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE + + XVI. LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME + + XVII. SECRET DIPLOMACY + +XVIII. THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT + + XIX. THE BULLITT AFFAIR + + CONCLUSION + + +APPENDICES + + I. THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE + LEAGUE OF NATIONS, LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION + ON JANUARY 10, 1919 + + II. LEAGUE OF NATIONS PLAN OF LORD ROBERT CECIL + + III. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF + VERSAILLES + + IV. THE FOURTEEN POINTS + + V. PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF + FEBRUARY 11, 1918 + + VI. THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG + + +INDEX + + + + +ILLUSTRATIONS + +THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AT PARIS +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S COMMISSION AS A COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY +TO NEGOTIATE PEACE + +THE RUE ROYALE ON THE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT WILSON ON DECEMBER 14, 1918 +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AND STAFF +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +A MEETING AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY AFTER PRESIDENT WILSON'S +DEPARTURE FROM PARIS + +FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S "FULL POWERS" TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY OF +ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE + +THE DAILY CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION +Photograph by Isabey, Paris + + + + + + +CHRONOLOGY + +The Declaration of the Fourteen Points January 18, 1918 + + +Declaration of Four Additional Bases of Peace February 11, 1918 + +Departure of Colonel House for Paris to represent the + President on Supreme War Council October 17, 1918 + +Signature of Armistice, 5 A.M.; effective, 11 A.M. + November 11, 1918 + +Departure of President and American Commission + for France December 4, 1918 + +Arrival of President and American Commission in + Paris December 14, 1918 + +Meeting of Supreme War Council January 12, 1919 + +First Plenary Session of Peace Conference January 25, 1919 + +Plenary Session at which Report on the League of Nations + was Submitted February 14, 1919 + +Departure of President from Paris for United States + February 14, 1919 + +President lands at Boston February 24, 1919 + +Departure of President from New York for France March 5, 1919 + +President arrives in Paris March 14, 1919 + +Organization of Council of Four About March 24, 1919 + +President's public statement in regard to Fiume April 23, 1919 + +Adoption of Commission's Report on League of Nations + by the Conference April 28, 1919 + +The Shantung Settlement April 30, 1919 + +Delivery of the Peace Treaty to the German + Plenipotentiaries May 7, 1919 + +Signing of Treaty of Versailles June 28, 1919 + +Signing of Treaty of Assistance with France June 28, 1919 + +Departure of President for the United States June 28, 1919 + +Departure of Mr. Lansing from Paris for United + States July 12, 1919 + +Hearing of Mr. Lansing before Senate Committee on + Foreign Relations August 6, 1919 + +Conference of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations + with the President at the White House August 19, 1919 + +Hearing of Mr. Bullitt before Senate Committee on + Foreign Relations September 12, 1919 + +Return of President to Washington from tour + of West September 28, 1919 + +Resignation of Mr. Lansing as Secretary + of State February 13, 1920 + + + + + + +CHAPTER I + +REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + + +"While we were still in Paris, I felt, and have felt increasingly ever +since, that you accepted my guidance and direction on questions with +regard to which I had to instruct you only with increasing +reluctance.... + +"... I must say that it would relieve me of embarrassment, Mr. +Secretary, the embarrassment of feeling your reluctance and divergence +of judgment, if you would give your present office up and afford me an +opportunity to select some one whose mind would more willingly go along +with mine." + +These words are taken from the letter which President Wilson wrote to me +on February 11, 1920. On the following day I tendered my resignation as +Secretary of State by a letter, in which I said: + + "Ever since January, 1919, I have been conscious of the fact that you + no longer were disposed to welcome my advice in matters pertaining to + the negotiations in Paris, to our foreign service, or to + international affairs in general. Holding these views I would, if I + had consulted my personal inclination alone, have resigned as + Secretary of State and as a Commissioner to Negotiate Peace. I felt, + however, that such a step might have been misinterpreted both at home + and abroad, and that it was my duty to cause you no embarrassment in + carrying forward the great task in which you were then engaged." + +The President was right in his impression that, "while we were still in +Paris," I had accepted his guidance and direction with reluctance. It +was as correct as my statement that, as early as January, 1919, I was +conscious that he was no longer disposed to welcome my advice in matters +pertaining to the peace negotiations at Paris. + +There have been obvious reasons of propriety for my silence until now as +to the divergence of judgment, the differences of opinion and the +consequent breach in the relations between President Wilson and myself. +They have been the subject of speculation and inference which have left +uncertain the true record. The time has come when a frank account of our +differences can be given publicity without a charge being made of +disloyalty to the Administration in power. + +The President, in his letter of February 11, 1920, from which the +quotation is made, indicated my unwillingness to follow him in the +course which he adopted at Paris, but he does not specifically point out +the particular subjects as to which we were not in accord. It is +unsatisfactory, if not criticizable, to leave the American people in +doubt as to a disagreement between two of their official representatives +upon a matter of so grave importance to the country as the negotiation +of the Treaty of Versailles. They are entitled to know the truth in +order that they may pass judgment upon the merits of the differences +which existed. I am not willing that the present uncertainty as to the +facts should continue. Possibly some may think that I have remained +silent too long. If I have, it has been only from a sense of obligation +to an Administration of which I was so long a member. It has not been +through lack of desire to lay the record before the public. + +The statements which will be made in the succeeding pages will not be +entirely approved by some of my readers. In the circumstances it is far +too much to expect to escape criticism. The review of facts and the +comments upon them may be characterized in certain quarters as disloyal +to a superior and as violative of the seal of silence which is +considered generally to apply to the intercourse and communications +between the President and his official advisers. Under normal conditions +such a characterization would not be unjustified. But the present case +is different from the usual one in which a disagreement arises between a +President and a high official of his Administration. + +Mr. Wilson made our differences at Paris one of the chief grounds for +stating that he would be pleased to take advantage of my expressed +willingness to resign. The manifest imputation was that I had advised +him wrongly and that, after he had decided to adopt a course contrary to +my advice, I had continued to oppose his views and had with reluctance +obeyed his instructions. Certainly no American official is in honor +bound to remain silent under such an imputation which approaches a +charge of faithlessness and of a secret, if not open, avoidance of duty. +He has, in my judgment, the right to present the case to the American +people in order that they may decide whether the imputation was +justified by the facts, and whether his conduct was or was not in the +circumstances in accord with the best traditions of the public service +of the United States. + +A review of this sort becomes necessarily a personal narrative, which, +because of its intimate nature, is embarrassing to the writer, since he +must record his own acts, words, desires, and purposes, his own views as +to a course of action, and his own doubts, fears, and speculations as to +the future. If there were another method of treatment which would retain +the authoritative character of a personal statement, it would be a +satisfaction to adopt it. But I know of none. The true story can only be +told from the intimate and personal point of view. As I intend to tell +the true story I offer no further apology for its personal character. + +Before beginning a recital of the relations existing between President +Wilson and myself during the Paris Conference, I wish to state, and to +emphasize the statement, that I was never for a moment unmindful that +the Constitution of the United States confides to the President the +absolute right of conducting the foreign relations of the Republic, and +that it is the duty of a Commissioner to follow the President's +instructions in the negotiation of a treaty. Many Americans, some of +whom are national legislators and solicitous about the Constitution, +seem to have ignored or to have forgotten this delegation of exclusive +authority, with the result that they have condemned the President in +intemperate language for exercising this executive right. As to the +wisdom of the way in which Mr. Wilson exercised it in directing the +negotiations at Paris individual opinions may differ, but as to the +legality of his conduct there ought to be but one mind. From first to +last he acted entirely within his constitutional powers as President of +the United States. + +The duties of a diplomatic representative commissioned by the President +and given full powers to negotiate a treaty are, in addition to the +formal carrying out of his instructions, twofold, namely, to advise the +President during the negotiation of his views as to the wise course to +be adopted, and to prevent the President, in so far as possible, from +taking any step in the proceedings which may impair the rights of his +country or may be injurious to its interests. These duties, in my +opinion, are equally imperative whether the President directs the +negotiations through written instructions issuing from the White House +or conducts them in person. For an American plenipotentiary to remain +silent, and by his silence to give the impression that he approves a +course of action which he in fact believes to be wrong in principle or +contrary to good policy, constitutes a failure to perform his full duty +to the President and to the country. It is his duty to speak and to +speak frankly and plainly. + +With this conception of the obligations of a Commissioner to Negotiate +Peace, obligations which were the more compelling in my case because of +my official position as Secretary of State, I felt it incumbent upon me +to offer advice to the President whenever it seemed necessary to me to +consider the adoption of a line of action in regard to the negotiations, +and particularly so when the indications were that the President +purposed to reach a decision which seemed to me unwise or impolitic. +Though from the first I felt that my suggestions were received with +coldness and my criticisms with disfavor, because they did not conform +to the President's wishes and intentions, I persevered in my efforts to +induce him to abandon in some cases or to modify in others a course +which would in my judgment be a violation of principle or a mistake in +policy. It seemed to me that duty demanded this, and that, whatever the +consequences might be, I ought not to give tacit assent to that which I +believed wrong or even injudicious. + +The principal subjects, concerning which President Wilson and I were in +marked disagreement, were the following: His presence in Paris during +the peace negotiations and especially his presence there as a delegate +to the Peace Conference; the fundamental principles of the constitution +and functions of a League of Nations as proposed or advocated by him; +the form of the organic act, known as the "Covenant," its elaborate +character and its inclusion in the treaty restoring a state of peace; +the treaty of defensive alliance with France; the necessity for a +definite programme which the American Commissioners could follow in +carrying on the negotiations; the employment of private interviews and +confidential agreements in reaching settlements, a practice which gave +color to the charge of "secret diplomacy"; and, lastly, the admission of +the Japanese claims to possession of German treaty rights at Kiao-Chau +and in the Province of Shantung. + +Of these seven subjects of difference the most important were those +relating to the League of Nations and the Covenant, though our opposite +views as to Shantung were more generally known and more frequently the +subject of public comment. While chief consideration will be given to +the differences regarding the League and the Covenant, the record would +be incomplete if the other subjects were omitted. In fact nearly all of +these matters of difference are more or less interwoven and have a +collateral, if not a direct, bearing upon one another. They all +contributed in affecting the attitude of President Wilson toward the +advice that I felt it my duty to volunteer, an attitude which was +increasingly impatient of unsolicited criticism and suggestion and which +resulted at last in the correspondence of February, 1920, that ended +with the acceptance of my resignation as Secretary of State. + +The review of these subjects will be, so far as it is possible, treated +in chronological order, because, as the matters of difference increased +in number, they gave emphasis to the divergence of judgment which +existed between the President and myself. The effect was cumulative, and +tended not only to widen the breach, but to make less and less possible +a restoration of our former relations. It was my personal desire to +support the President's views concerning the negotiations at Paris, but, +when in order to do so it became necessary to deny a settled conviction +and to suppress a conception of the true principle or the wise policy to +be followed, I could not do it and feel that to give support under such +conditions accorded with true loyalty to the President of the +United States. + +It was in this spirit that my advice was given and my suggestions were +made, though in doing so I believed it justifiable to conform as far as +it was possible to the expressed views of Mr. Wilson, or to what seemed +to be his views, concerning less important matters and to concentrate on +those which seemed vital. I went in fact as far as I could in adopting +his views in the hope that my advice would be less unpalatable and +would, as a consequence, receive more sympathetic consideration. +Believing that I understood the President's temperament, success in an +attempt to change his views seemed to lie in moderation and in partial +approval of his purpose rather than in bluntly arguing that it was +wholly wrong and should be abandoned. This method of approach, which +seemed the expedient one at the time, weakened, in some instances at +least, the criticisms and objections which I made. It is very possible +that even in this diluted form my views were credited with wrong motives +by the President so that he suspected my purpose. It is to be hoped that +this was the true explanation of Mr. Wilson's attitude of mind, for the +alternative forces a conclusion as to the cause for his resentful +reception of honest differences of opinion, which no one, who admires +his many sterling qualities and great attainments, will +willingly accept. + +Whatever the cause of the President's attitude toward the opinions which +I expressed on the subjects concerning which our views were at +variance--and I prefer to assume that the cause was a misapprehension of +my reasons for giving them--the result was that he was disposed to give +them little weight. The impression made was that he was irritated by +opposition to his views, however moderately urged, and that he did not +like to have his judgment questioned even in a friendly way. It is, of +course, possible that this is not a true estimate of the President's +feelings. It may do him an injustice. But his manner of meeting +criticism and his disposition to ignore opposition can hardly be +interpreted in any other way. + +There is the alternative possibility that Mr. Wilson was convinced that, +after he had given a subject mature consideration and reached a +decision, his judgment was right or at least better than that of any +adviser. A conviction of this nature, if it existed, would naturally +have caused him to feel impatient with any one who attempted to +controvert his decisions and would tend to make him believe that +improper motives induced the opposition or criticism. This alternative, +which is based of necessity on a presumption as to the temperament of +Mr. Wilson that an unprejudiced and cautious student of personality +would hesitate to adopt, I mention only because there were many who +believed it to be the correct explanation of his attitude. In view of my +intimate relations with the President prior to the Paris Conference I +feel that in justice to him I should say that he did not, except on rare +occasions, resent criticism of a proposed course of action, and, while +he seemed in a measure changed after departing from the United States in +December, 1918, I do not think that the change was sufficient to justify +the presumption of self-assurance which it would be necessary to adopt +if the alternative possibility is considered to furnish the better +explanation. + +It is, however, natural, considering what occurred at Paris, to search +out the reason or reasons for the President's evident unwillingness to +listen to advice when he did not solicit it, and for his failure to take +all the American Commissioners into his confidence. But to attempt to +dissect the mentality and to analyze the intellectual processes of +Woodrow Wilson is not my purpose. It would only invite discussion and +controversy as to the truth of the premises and the accuracy of the +deductions reached. The facts will be presented and to an extent the +impressions made upon me at the time will be reviewed, but impressions +of that character which are not the result of comparison with subsequent +events and of mature deliberation are not always justified. They may +later prove to be partially or wholly wrong. They have the value, +nevertheless, of explaining in many cases why I did or did not do +certain things, and of disclosing the state of mind that in a measure +determined my conduct which without this recital of contemporaneous +impressions might mystify one familiar with what afterwards took place. +The notes, letters, and memoranda which are quoted in the succeeding +pages, as well as the opinions and beliefs held at the time (of which, +in accordance with a practice of years, I kept a record supplementing my +daily journal of events), should be weighed and measured by the +situation which existed when they were written and not alone in the +light of the complete review of the proceedings. In forming an opinion +as to my differences with the President it should be the reader's +endeavor to place himself in my position at the time and not judge them +solely by the results of the negotiations at Paris. It comes to this: +Was I justified then? Am I justified now? If those questions are +answered impartially and without prejudice, there is nothing further +that I would ask of the reader. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE + + +Early in October, 1918, it required no prophetic vision to perceive that +the World War would come to an end in the near future. Austria-Hungary, +acting with the full approval of the German Government, had made +overtures for peace, and Bulgaria, recognizing the futility of further +struggle, had signed an armistice which amounted to an unconditional +surrender. These events were soon followed by the collapse of Turkish +resistance and by the German proposals which resulted in the armistice +which went into effect on November 11, 1918. + +In view of the importance of the conditions of the armistice with +Germany and their relation to the terms of peace to be later negotiated, +the President considered it essential to have an American member added +to the Supreme War Council, which then consisted of M. Clemenceau, Mr. +Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando, the premiers of the three Allied +Powers. He selected Colonel Edward M. House for this important post and +named him a Special Commissioner to represent him personally. Colonel +House with a corps of secretaries and assistants sailed from New York on +October 17, _en route_ for Paris where the Supreme War Council was +in session. + +Three days before his departure the Colonel was in Washington and we had +two long conferences with the President regarding the correspondence +with Germany and with the Allies relating to a cessation of hostilities, +during which we discussed the position which the United States should +take as to the terms of the armistice and the bases of peace which +should be incorporated in the document. + +It was after one of these conferences that Colonel House informed me +that the President had decided to name him (the Colonel) and me as two +of the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference, and that the +President was considering attending the Conference and in person +directing the negotiations. This latter intention of Mr. Wilson +surprised and disturbed me, and I expressed the hope that the +President's mind was not made up, as I believed that if he gave more +consideration to the project he would abandon it, since it was manifest +that his influence over the negotiations would be much greater if he +remained in Washington and issued instructions to his representatives in +the Conference. Colonel House did not say that he agreed with my +judgment in this matter, though he did not openly disagree with it. +However, I drew the conclusion, though without actual knowledge, that he +approved of the President's purpose, and, possibly, had encouraged him +to become an actual participant in the preliminary conferences. + +The President's idea of attending the Peace Conference was not a new +one. Though I cannot recollect the source of my information, I know that +in December, 1916, when it will be remembered Mr. Wilson was endeavoring +to induce the belligerents to state their objects in the war and to +enter into a conference looking toward peace, he had an idea that he +might, as a friend of both parties, preside over such a conference and +exert his personal influence to bring the belligerents into agreement. A +service of this sort undoubtedly appealed to the President's +humanitarian instinct and to his earnest desire to end the devastating +war, while the novelty of the position in which he would be placed would +not have been displeasing to one who in his public career seemed to find +satisfaction in departing from the established paths marked out by +custom and usage. + +When, however, the attempt at mediation failed and when six weeks later, +on February 1, 1917, the German Government renewed indiscriminate +submarine warfare resulting in the severance of diplomatic relations +between the United States and Germany, President Wilson continued to +cherish the hope that he might yet assume the role of mediator. He even +went so far as to prepare a draft of the bases of peace, which he +purposed to submit to the belligerents if they could be induced to meet +in conference. I cannot conceive how he could have expected to bring +this about in view of the elation of the Allies at the dismissal of +Count von Bernstorff and the seeming certainty that the United States +would declare war against Germany if the latter persisted in her +ruthless sinking of American merchant vessels. But I know, in spite of +the logic of the situation, that he expected or at least hoped to +succeed in his mediatory programme and made ready to play his part in +the negotiation of a peace. + +From the time that Congress declared that a state of war existed between +the United States and the Imperial German Government up to the autumn of +1918, when the Central Alliance made overtures to end the war, the +President made no attempt so far as I am aware to enter upon peace +negotiations with the enemy nations. In fact he showed a disposition to +reject all peace proposals. He appears to have reached the conclusion +that the defeat of Germany and her allies was essential before permanent +peace could be restored. At all events, he took no steps to bring the +belligerents together until a military decision had been practically +reached. He did, however, on January 8,1918, lay down his famous +"Fourteen Points," which he supplemented with certain declarations in +"subsequent addresses," thus proclaiming his ideas as to the proper +bases of peace when the time should come to negotiate. + +Meanwhile, in anticipation of the final triumph of the armies of the +Allied and Associated Powers, the President, in the spring of 1917, +directed the organization, under the Department of State, of a body of +experts to collect data and prepare monographs, charts, and maps, +covering all historical, territorial, economic, and legal subjects which +would probably arise in the negotiation of a treaty of peace. This +Commission of Inquiry, as it was called, had its offices in New York and +was under Colonel House so far as the selection of its members was +concerned. The nominal head of the Commission was Dr. Mezes, President +of the College of the City of New York and a brother-in-law of Colonel +House, though the actual and efficient executive head was Dr. Isaiah +Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society. The plans of +organization, the outline of work, and the proposed expenditures for the +maintenance of the Commission were submitted to me as Secretary of +State. I examined them and, after several conferences with Dr. Mezes, +approved them and recommended to the President that he allot the funds +necessary to carry out the programme. + +In addition to the subjects which were dealt with by this excellent +corps of students and experts, whose work was of the highest order, the +creation of some sort of an international association to prevent wars in +the future received special attention from the President as it did from +Americans of prominence not connected with the Government. It caused +considerable discussion in the press and many schemes were proposed and +pamphlets written on the subject. To organize such an association became +a generally recognized object to be attained in the negotiation of the +peace which would end the World War; and there can be no doubt that the +President believed more and more in the vital necessity of forming an +effective organization of the nations to preserve peace in the future +and make another great war impossible. + +The idea of being present and taking an active part in formulating the +terms of peace had, in my opinion, never been abandoned by President +Wilson, although it had remained dormant while the result of the +conflict was uncertain. When, however, in early October, 1918, there +could no longer be any doubt that the end of the war was approaching, +the President appears to have revived the idea and to have decided, if +possible, to carry out the purpose which he had so long cherished. He +seemed to have failed to appreciate, or, if he did appreciate, to have +ignored the fact that the conditions were wholly different in October, +1918, from what they were in December, 1916. + +In December, 1916, the United States was a neutral nation, and the +President, in a spirit of mutual friendliness, which was real and not +assumed, was seeking to bring the warring powers together in conference +looking toward the negotiation of "a peace without victory." In the +event that he was able to persuade them to meet, his presence at the +conference as a pacificator and probably as the presiding officer would +not improbably have been in the interests of peace, because, as the +executive head of the greatest of the neutral nations of the world and +as the impartial friend of both parties, his personal influence would +presumably have been very great in preventing a rupture in the +negotiations and in inducing the parties to act in a spirit of +conciliation and compromise. + +In October, 1918, however, the United States was a belligerent. Its +national interests were involved; its armies were in conflict with the +Germans on the soil of France; its naval vessels were patrolling the +Atlantic; and the American people, bitterly hostile, were demanding +vengeance on the Governments and peoples of the Central Powers, +particularly those of Germany. President Wilson, it is true, had +endeavored with a measure of success to maintain the position of an +unbiased arbiter in the discussions leading up to the armistice of +November 11, and Germany undoubtedly looked to him as the one hope of +checking the spirit of revenge which animated the Allied Powers in view +of all that they had suffered at the hands of the Germans. It is +probable too that the Allies recognized that Mr. Wilson was entitled to +be satisfied as to the terms of peace since American man power and +American resources had turned the scale against Germany and made victory +a certainty. The President, in fact, dominated the situation. If he +remained in Washington and carried on the negotiations through his +Commissioners, he would in all probability retain his superior place and +be able to dictate such terms of peace as he considered just. But, if he +did as he purposed doing and attended the Peace Conference, he would +lose the unique position which he held and would have to submit to the +combined will of his foreign colleagues becoming a prey to intrigue and +to the impulses arising from their hatred for the vanquished nations. + +A practical view of the situation so clearly pointed to the unwisdom of +the President's personal participation in the peace negotiations that a +very probable explanation for his determination to be present at the +Conference is the assumption that the idea had become so firmly embedded +in his mind that nothing could dislodge it or divert him from his +purpose. How far the spectacular feature of a President crossing the +ocean to control in person the making of peace appealed to him I do not +know. It may have been the deciding factor. It may have had no effect at +all. How far the belief that a just peace could only be secured by the +exercise of his personal influence over the delegates I cannot say. How +far he doubted the ability of the men whom he proposed to name as +plenipotentiaries is wholly speculative. Whatever plausible reason may +be given, the true reason will probably never be known. + +Not appreciating, at the time that Colonel House informed me of the +President's plan to be present at the Conference, that the matter had +gone as far as it had, and feeling very strongly that it would be a +grave mistake for the President to take part in person in the +negotiations, I felt it to be my duty, as his official adviser in +foreign affairs and as one desirous to have him adopt a wise course, to +state plainly to him my views. It was with hesitation that I did this +because the consequence of the non-attendance of the President would be +to make me the head of the American Peace Commission at Paris. There was +the danger that my motive in opposing the President's attending the +Conference would be misconstrued and that I might be suspected of acting +from self-interest rather than from a sense of loyalty to my chief. +When, however, the armistice went into effect and the time arrived for +completing the personnel of the American Commission, I determined that I +ought not to remain silent. + +The day after the cessation of hostilities, that is, on November 12, I +made the following note: + + "I had a conference this noon with the President at the White House + in relation to the Peace Conference. I told him frankly that I + thought the plan for him to attend was unwise and would be a mistake. + I said that I felt embarrassed in speaking to him about it because it + would leave me at the head of the delegation, and I hoped that he + understood that I spoke only out of a sense of duty. I pointed out + that he held at present a dominant position in the world, which I was + afraid he would lose if he went into conference with the foreign + statesmen; that he could practically dictate the terms of peace if he + held aloof; that he would be criticized severely in this country for + leaving at a time when Congress particularly needed his guidance; and + that he would be greatly embarrassed in directing domestic affairs + from overseas." + +I also recorded as significant that the President listened to my remarks +without comment and turned the conversation into other channels. + +For a week after this interview I heard nothing from the President on +the subject, though the fact that no steps were taken to prepare written +instructions for the American Commissioners convinced me that he +intended to follow his original intention. My fears were confirmed. On +the evening of Monday, November 18, the President came to my residence +and told me that he had finally decided to go to the Peace Conference +and that he had given out to the press an announcement to that effect. +In view of the publicity given to his decision it would have been futile +to have attempted to dissuade him from his purpose. He knew my opinion +and that it was contrary to his. + +After the President departed I made a note of the interview, in which +among other things I wrote: + + "I am convinced that he is making one of the greatest mistakes of his + career and will imperil his reputation. I may be in error and hope + that I am, but I prophesy trouble in Paris and worse than trouble + here. I believe the President's place is here in America." + +Whether the decision of Mr. Wilson was wise and whether my prophecy was +unfulfilled, I leave to the judgment of others. His visit to Europe and +its consequences are facts of history. It should be understood that the +incident is not referred to here to justify my views or to prove that +the President was wrong in what he did. The reference is made solely +because it shows that at the very outset there was a decided divergence +of judgment between us in regard to the peace negotiations. + +While this difference of opinion apparently in no way affected our +cordial relations, I cannot but feel, in reviewing this period of our +intercourse, that my open opposition to his attending the Conference was +considered by the President to be an unwarranted meddling with his +personal affairs and was none of my business. It was, I believe, the +beginning of his loss of confidence in my judgment and advice, which +became increasingly marked during the Paris negotiations. At the time, +however, I did not realize that my honest opinion affected the President +in the way which I now believe that it did. It had always been my +practice as Secretary of State to speak to him with candor and to +disagree with him whenever I thought he was reaching a wrong decision in +regard to any matter pertaining to foreign affairs. There was a general +belief that Mr. Wilson was not open-minded and that he was quick to +resent any opposition however well founded. I had not found him so +during the years we had been associated. Except in a few instances he +listened with consideration to arguments and apparently endeavored to +value them correctly. If, however, the matter related even remotely to +his personal conduct he seemed unwilling to debate the question. My +conclusion is that he considered his going to the Peace Conference was +his affair solely and that he viewed my objections as a direct criticism +of him personally for thinking of going. He may, too, have felt that my +opposition arose from a selfish desire to become the head of the +American Commission. From that time forward any suggestion or advice +volunteered by me was seemingly viewed with suspicion. It was, however, +long after this incident that I began to feel that the President was +imputing to me improper motives and crediting me with disloyalty to him +personally, an attitude which was as unwarranted as it was unjust. + +The President having determined to go to Paris, it seemed almost useless +to urge him not to become a delegate in view of the fact that he had +named but four Commissioners, although it had been arranged that the +Great Powers should each have five delegates in the Conference. This +clearly indicated that the President was at least considering sitting as +the fifth member of the American group. At the same time it seemed that, +if he did not take his place in the Conference as a delegate, he might +retain in a measure his superior place of influence even though he was +in Paris. Four days after the Commission landed at Brest I had a long +conference with Colonel House on matters pertaining to the approaching +negotiations, during which he informed me that there was a determined +effort being made by the European statesmen to induce the President to +sit at the peace table and that he was afraid that the President was +disposed to accede to their wishes. This information indicated that, +while the President had come to Paris prepared to act as a delegate, he +had, after discussing the subject with the Colonel and possibly with +others, become doubtful as to the wisdom of doing so, but that through +the pressure of his foreign colleagues he was turning again to the +favorable view of personal participation which he had held before he +left the United States. + +In my conversation with Colonel House I told him my reasons for opposing +the President's taking an active part in the Conference and explained to +him the embarrassment that I felt in advising the President to adopt a +course which would make me the head of the American Commission. I am +sure that the Colonel fully agreed with me that it was impolitic for Mr. +Wilson to become a delegate, but whether he actively opposed the plan I +do not know, although I believe that he did. It was some days before the +President announced that he would become the head of the American +Commission. I believe that he did this with grave doubts in his own mind +as to the wisdom of his decision, and I do not think that any new +arguments were advanced during those days which materially affected +his judgment. + +This delay in reaching a final determination as to a course of action +was characteristic of Mr. Wilson. There is in his mentality a strange +mixture of positiveness and indecision which is almost paradoxical. It +is a peculiarity which it is hard to analyze and which has often been an +embarrassment in the conduct of public affairs. Suddenness rather than +promptness has always marked his decisions. Procrastination in +announcing a policy or a programme makes coöperation difficult and not +infrequently defeats the desired purpose. To put off a decision to the +last moment is a trait of Mr. Wilson's character which has caused much +anxiety to those who, dealing with matters of vital importance, realized +that delay was perilous if not disastrous. + +Of the consequences of the President's acting as one of his own +representatives to negotiate peace it is not my purpose to speak. The +events of the six months succeeding his decision to exercise in person +his constitutional right to conduct the foreign relations of the United +States are in a general way matters of common knowledge and furnish +sufficient data for the formulation of individual opinions without the +aid of argument or discussion. The important fact in connection with the +general topic being considered is the difference of opinion between the +President and myself as to the wisdom of his assuming the role of a +delegate. While I did not discuss the matter with him except at the +first when I opposed his attending the Peace Conference, I have little +doubt that Colonel House, if he urged the President to decline to sit as +a delegate, which I think may be presumed, or if he discussed it at all, +mentioned to him my opinion that such a step would be unwise. In any +event Mr. Wilson knew my views and that they were at variance with the +decision which he reached. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +It appears, from a general review of the situation prior and subsequent +to the assembling of the delegates to the Peace Conference, that +President Wilson's decision to go to Paris and to engage in person in +the negotiations was strongly influenced by his belief that it was the +only sure way of providing in the treaty of peace for the organization +of a League of Nations. While his presence in Paris was probably +affected to an extent by other considerations, as I have pointed out, it +is to be presumed that he was anxious to participate directly in the +drafting of the plan of organization of the League and to exert his +personal influence on the delegates in favor of its acceptance by +publicly addressing the Conference. This he could hardly have done +without becoming a delegate. It would seem, therefore, that the purpose +of creating a League of Nations and obtaining the incorporation of a +plan of organization in the treaty to be negotiated had much to do with +the President's presence at the peace table. + +From the time that the United States entered the war in April, 1917, Mr. +Wilson held firmly to the idea that the salvation of the world from +imperialism would not be lasting unless provision was made in the peace +treaty for an international agency strong enough to prevent a future +attack upon the rights and liberties of the nations which were at so +great a cost holding in check the German armies and preventing them from +carrying out their evil designs of conquest. The object sought by the +United States in the war would not, in the views of many, be achieved +unless the world was organized to resist future aggression. The +essential thing, as the President saw it, in order to "make the world +safe for democracy" was to give permanency to the peace which would be +negotiated at the conclusion of the war. A union of the nations for the +purpose of preventing wars of aggression and conquest seemed to him the +most practical, if not the only, way of accomplishing this supreme +object, and he urged it with earnestness and eloquence in his public +addresses relating to the bases of peace. + +There was much to be said in favor of the President's point of view. +Unquestionably the American people as a whole supported him in the +belief that there ought to be some international agreement, association, +or concord which would lessen the possibility of future wars. An +international organization to remove in a measure the immediate causes +of war, to provide means for the peaceable settlement of disputes +between nations, and to draw the governments into closer friendship +appealed to the general desire of the peoples of America and Europe. The +four years and more of horror and agony through which mankind had passed +must be made impossible of repetition, and there seemed no other way +than to form an international union devoted to the maintenance of peace +by composing, as far as possible, controversies which might ripen +into war. + +For many years prior to 1914 an organization devoted to the prevention +of international wars had been discussed by those who gave thought to +warfare of the nations and who realized in a measure the precarious +state of international peace. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and of 1907 +had been negotiated with that object, and it was only because of the +improper aspirations and hidden designs of certain powers, which were +represented at those great historic conferences, that the measures +adopted were not more expressive of the common desire of mankind and +more effective in securing the object sought. The Carnegie Endowment for +International Peace, the Ginn, now the World, Peace Foundation, and the +American Peace Society, and later the Society for the Judicial +Settlement of International Disputes, the League to Enforce Peace, and +many other organizations in America and in Europe were actively engaged +in considering ways and means to prevent war, to strengthen the bonds of +international good-will, and to insure the more general application of +the principles of justice to disputes between nations. + +The outbreak of the war and the dreadful waste and suffering which +followed impelled the societies and associations then organized to +redoubled effort and induced the formation of new organizations. People +everywhere began to realize that their objects were real and not merely +sentimental or academic, that they were seeking practical means to +remove the conditions which had made the Great War possible. Public +opinion became more and more pronounced as the subject was more widely +discussed in the journals and periodicals of the day and at public +meetings, the divergence of views being chiefly in regard to the means +to be employed by the proposed organization and not as to the creation +of the organization, the necessity for which appeared to be +generally conceded. + +With popular sentiment overwhelmingly in favor of some sort of world +union which would to an extent insure the nations against another +tragedy like the one which in November, 1918, had left the belligerents +wasted and exhausted and the whole world a prey to social and industrial +unrest, there was beyond question a demand that out of the great +international assembly at Paris there should come some common agency +devoted to the prevention of war. To ignore this all-prevalent sentiment +would have been to misrepresent the peoples of the civilized world and +would have aroused almost universal condemnation and protest. The +President was, therefore, entirely right in giving prominence to the +idea of an international union against war and in insisting that the +Peace Conference should make provision for the establishment of an +organization of the world with the prevention of future wars as its +central thought and purpose. + +The great bulk of the American people, at the time that the President +left the United States to attend the Peace Conference, undoubtedly +believed that some sort of organization of this nature was necessary, +and I am convinced that the same popular belief prevailed in all other +civilized countries. It is possible that this assertion may seem too +emphatic to some who have opposed the plan for a League of Nations, +which appears in the first articles of the Treaty of Versailles, but, if +these opponents of the plan will go back to the time of which I am +writing, and avoid the impressions made upon them by subsequent events, +they will find, I believe, that even their own views have materially +changed since December, 1918. It is true that concrete plans had then +been suggested, but so far as the public knew the President had not +adopted any of them or formulated one of his own. He had not then +disclosed the provisions of his "Covenant." + +The mass of the people were only concerned with the general idea. There +was no well-defined opposition to that idea. At least it was not vocal. +Even the defeat of the Democratic Party in the Congressional elections +of November, 1918, could not be interpreted to be a repudiation of the +formation of a world organization. That election, by which both Houses +of Congress became Republican, was a popular rebuke to Mr. Wilson for +the partisanship shown in his letter of October addressed to the +American people, in which he practically asserted that it was +unpatriotic to support the Republican candidates. The indignation and +resentment aroused by that injudicious and unwarranted attack upon the +loyalty of his political opponents lost to the Democratic Party the +Senate and largely reduced its membership in the House of +Representatives if it did not in fact deprive the party of control of +that body. The result, however, did not mean that the President's ideas +as to the terms of peace were repudiated, but that his practical +assertion, that refusal to accept his policies was unpatriotic, was +repudiated by the American people. + +It is very apparent to one, who without prejudice reviews the state of +public sentiment in December, 1918, that the trouble, which later +developed as to a League of Nations, did not lie in the necessity of +convincing the peoples of the world, their governments, and their +delegates to the Paris Conference that it was desirable to organize the +world to prevent future wars, but in deciding upon the form and +functions of the organization to be created. As to these details, which +of course affected the character, the powers, and the duties of the +organization, there had been for years a wide divergence of opinion. +Some advocated the use of international force to prevent a nation from +warring against another. Some favored coercion by means of general +ostracism and non-intercourse. Some believed that the application of +legal justice through the medium of international tribunals and +commissions was the only practical method of settling disputes which +might become causes of war. And some emphasized the importance of a +mutual agreement to postpone actual hostilities until there could be an +investigation as to the merits of a controversy. There were thus two +general classes of powers proposed which were in the one case political +and in the other juridical. The cleavage of opinion was along these +lines, although it possibly was not recognized by the general public. It +was not only shown in the proposed powers, but also in the proposed form +of the organization, the one centering on a politico-diplomatic body, +and the other on an international judiciary. Naturally the details of +any plan proposed would become the subject of discussion and the +advisability of adopting the provisions would arouse controversy and +dispute. Thus unanimity in approving a world organization did not mean +that opinions might not differ radically in working out the fundamental +principles of its form and functions, to say nothing of the detailed +plan based on these principles. + +In May, 1916, President Wilson accepted an invitation to address the +first annual meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, which was to be +held in Washington. After preparing his address he went over it and +erased all reference to the use of physical force in preventing wars. I +mention this as indicative of the state of uncertainty in which he was +in the spring of 1916 as to the functions and powers of the +international organization to maintain peace which he then advocated. By +January, 1917, he had become convinced that the use of force was the +practical method of checking aggressions. This conversion was probably +due to the fact that he had in his own mind worked out, as one of the +essential bases of peace, to which he was then giving much thought, a +mutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence, +which had been the chief article of a proposed Pan-American Treaty +prepared early in 1915 and to which he referred in his address before +the League to Enforce Peace. He appears to have reached the conclusion +that a guaranty of this sort would be of little value unless supported +by the threatened, and, if necessary, the actual, employment of force. +The President was entirely logical in this attitude. A guaranty against +physical aggression would be practically worthless if it did not rest on +an agreement to protect with physical force. An undertaking to protect +carried with it the idea of using effectual measures to insure +protection. They were inseparable; and the President, having adopted an +affirmative guaranty against aggression as a cardinal provision--perhaps +I should say _the_ cardinal provision--of the anticipated peace treaty, +could not avoid becoming the advocate of the use of force in making good +the guaranty. + +During the year 1918 the general idea of the formation of an +international organization to prevent war was increasingly discussed in +the press of the United States and Europe and engaged the thought of the +Governments of the Powers at war with the German Empire. On January 8 of +that year President Wilson in an address to Congress proclaimed his +"Fourteen Points," the adoption of which he considered necessary to a +just and stable peace. The last of these "Points" explicitly states the +basis of the proposed international organization and the fundamental +reason for its formation. It is as follows: + + "XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific + covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political + independence and territorial integrity to great and small + states alike." + +This declaration may be considered in view of subsequent developments to +be a sufficiently clear announcement of the President's theory as to the +plan of organization which ought to be adopted, but at the time the +exact character of the "mutual guarantees" was not disclosed and aroused +little comment. I do not believe that Congress, much less the public at +large, understood the purpose that the President had in mind. +Undoubtedly, too, a sense of loyalty to the Chief Executive, while the +war was in progress, and the desire to avoid giving comfort of any sort +to the enemy, prevented a critical discussion of the announced bases of +peace, some of which were at the time academic, premature, and liable to +modification if conditions changed. + +In March Lord Phillimore and his colleagues made their preliminary +report to the British Government on "a League of Nations" and this was +followed in July by their final report, copies of which reached the +President soon after they were made. The time had arrived for putting +into concrete form the general ideas that the President held, and +Colonel House, whom some believed to be the real author of Mr. Wilson's +conception of a world union, prepared, I am informed, the draft of a +scheme of organization. This draft was either sent or handed to the +President and discussed with him. To what extent it was amended or +revised by Mr. Wilson I do not know, but in a modified form it became +the typewritten draft of the Covenant which he took with him to Paris, +where it underwent several changes. In it was the guaranty of 1915, +1916, 1917, and 1918, which, from the form in which it appeared, +logically required the use of force to give it effect. + +Previous to the departure of the American Commission for Paris, on +December 4, 1918, the President did not consult me as to his plan for a +League of Nations. He did not show me a copy of the plan or even mention +that one had been put into writing. I think that there were two reasons +for his not doing so, although I was the official adviser whom he should +naturally consult on such matters. + +The first reason, I believe, was due to the following facts. In our +conversations prior to 1918 I had uniformly opposed the idea of the +employment of international force to compel a nation to respect the +rights of other nations and had repeatedly urged judicial settlement as +the practical way of composing international controversies, though I did +not favor the use of force to compel such settlement. + +To show my opposition to an international agreement providing for the +use of force and to show that President Wilson knew of this opposition +and the reasons for it, I quote a letter which I wrote to him in May, +1916, that is, two years and a half before the end of the war: + + "_May 25, 1916_ + + "My DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "I had hoped to see you to-morrow at Cabinet meeting, but to-day the + Doctor refused to allow me to leave the house this week. I intended + when I saw you to say something about the purposes of the League to + Enforce Peace, which is to meet here, and at the banquet of which I + understand you are to speak on Saturday night. I would have preferred + to talk the matter over with you, but as that is impossible I have + taken the liberty to write you this letter, although in doing so I am + violating the directions of the Doctor. + + "While I have not had time or opportunity to study carefully the + objects of the proposed League to Enforce Peace, I understand the + fundamental ideas are these, which are to be embodied in a general + treaty of the nations: _First_, an agreement to submit all + differences which fail of diplomatic adjustment to arbitration or a + board of conciliation; and, _second_, in case a government fails to + comply with this provision, an agreement that the other parties will + unite in compelling it to do so by an exercise of force. + + "With the first agreement I am in accord to an extent, but I cannot + see how it is practicable to apply it in case of a continuing + invasion of fundamental national or individual rights unless some + authoritative international body has the power to impose and enforce + an order in the nature of an injunction, which will prevent the + aggressor from further action until arbitration has settled the + rights of the parties. How this can be done in a practical way I have + not attempted to work out, but the problem is not easy, especially + the part which relates to the enforcement of the order. + + "It is, however, the second agreement in regard to the imposition of + international arbitration by force, which seems to me the most + difficult, especially when viewed from the standpoint of its effects + on our national sovereignty and national interests. It is needless to + go into the manifest questions arising when the _modus operandi_ of + the agreement is considered. Such questions as: Who may demand + international intervention? What body will decide whether the demand + should be complied with? How will the international forces be + constituted? Who will take charge of the military and naval + operations? Who will pay the expenses of the war (for war it + will be)? + + "Perplexing as these questions appear to me, I am more concerned with + the direct effect on this country. I do not believe that it is wise + to limit our independence of action, a sovereign right, to the will + of other powers beyond this hemisphere. In any representative + international body clothed with authority to require of the nations + to employ their armies and navies to coerce one of their number, we + would be in the minority. I do not believe that we should put + ourselves in the position of being compelled to send our armed forces + to Europe or Asia or, in the alternative, of repudiating our treaty + obligation. Neither our sovereignty nor our interests would accord + with such a proposition, and I am convinced that popular opinion as + well as the Senate would reject a treaty framed along such lines. + + "It is possible that the difficulty might be obviated by the + establishment of geographical zones, and leaving to the groups of + nations thus formed the enforcement of the peaceful settlement of + disputes. But if that is done why should all the world participate? + We have adopted a much modified form of this idea in the proposed + Pan-American Treaty by the 'guaranty' article. But I would not like + to see its stipulations extended to the European powers so that they, + with our full agreement, would have the right to cross the ocean and + stop quarrels between two American Republics. Such authority would be + a serious menace to the Monroe Doctrine and a greater menace to the + Pan-American Doctrine. + + "It appears to me that, if the first idea of the League can be worked + out in a practical way and an international body constituted to + determine when steps should be taken to enforce compliance, the use + of force might be avoided by outlawing the offending nation. No + nation to-day can live unto itself. The industrial and commercial + activities of the world are too closely interwoven for a nation + isolated from the other nations to thrive and prosper. A tremendous + economic pressure could be imposed on the outlawed nation by all + other nations denying it intercourse of every nature, even + communication, in a word make that nation a pariah, and so to remain + until it was willing to perform its obligations. + + "I am not at all sure that this means is entirely feasible. I see + many difficulties which would have to be met under certain + conditions. But I do think that it is more practical in operation and + less objectionable from the standpoint of national rights and + interests than the one proposed by the League. It does not appear to + me that the use of physical force is in any way practical or + advisable. + + "I presume that you are far more familiar than I am with the details + of the plans of the League and that it may be presumptuous on my part + to write you as I have. I nevertheless felt it my duty to frankly + give you my views on the subject and I have done so. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "_The White House_" + +The President, thus early advised of my unqualified opposition to any +plan which was similar in principle to the one advocated by the League +to Enforce Peace, naturally concluded that I would look with disfavor on +an international guaranty which by implication, if not by declaration, +compelled the use of force to give it effect. Doubtless he felt that I +would not be disposed to aid in perfecting a plan which had as its +central idea a guaranty of that nature. Disliking opposition to a plan +or policy which he had originated or made his own by adoption, he +preferred to consult those who without debate accepted his judgment and +were in sympathy with his ideas. Undoubtedly the President by refraining +from asking my advice spared himself from listening to arguments against +the guaranty and the use of force which struck at the very root of his +plan, for I should, if I had been asked, have stated my views with +entire frankness. + +The other reason for not consulting me, as I now realize, but did not at +the time, was that I belonged to the legal profession. It is a fact, +which Mr. Wilson has taken no trouble to conceal, that he does not value +the advice of lawyers except on strictly legal questions, and that he +considers their objections and criticisms on other subjects to be too +often based on mere technicalities and their judgments to be warped by +an undue regard for precedent. This prejudice against the legal +profession in general was exhibited on more than one occasion during our +sojourn at Paris. Looking back over my years of intercourse with the +President I can now see that he chafed under the restraints imposed by +usage and even by enacted laws if they interfered with his acting in a +way which seemed to him right or justified by conditions. I do not say +that he was lawless. He was not that, but he conformed grudgingly and +with manifest displeasure to legal limitations. It was a thankless task +to question a proposed course of action on the ground of illegality, +because he appeared to be irritated by such an obstacle to his will and +to transfer his irritation against the law to the one who raised it as +an objection. I think that he was especially resentful toward any one +who volunteered criticism based on a legal provision, precept, or +precedent, apparently assuming that the critic opposed his purpose on +the merits and in order to defeat it interposed needless legal +objections. It is unnecessary to comment on the prejudice which such an +attitude of mind made evident. + +After the President's exceptionally strong address at the Metropolitan +Opera House in New York on September 27, 1918, I realized the great +importance which he gave to the creation of a League of Nations and in +view of this I devoted time and study to the subject, giving particular +attention to the British and French suggestions, both of which +emphasized judicial settlement. Knowing that the President had been in +consultation with Colonel House on the various phases of the peace to be +negotiated as well as on the terms of the armistice, I asked the latter +what he knew about the former's scheme for a League of Nations. + +The Colonel discreetly avoided disclosing the details of the plan, but +from our conversation I gained an idea of the general principles of the +proposed organization and the way in which the President intended to +apply them. + +After the Colonel and his party had sailed for France and in expectation +of being consulted on the subject by President Wilson, I put my thoughts +on the League of Nations into writing. In a note, which is dated October +27, 1918, appears the following: + + "From the little I know of the President's plan I am sure that it is + impracticable. There is in it too much altruistic cooperation. No + account is taken of national selfishness and the mutual suspicions + which control international relations. It may be noble thinking, but + it is not true thinking. + + "What I fear is that a lot of dreamers and theorists will be selected + to work out an organization instead of men whose experience and + common sense will tell them not to attempt anything which will not + work. The scheme ought to be simple and practical. If the federation, + or whatever it may be called, is given too much power or if its + machinery is complex, my belief is that it will be unable to function + or else will be defied. I can see lots of trouble ahead unless + impractical enthusiasts and fanatics are suppressed. This is a time + when sober thought, caution, and common sense should control." + +On November 22, 1918, after I had been formally designated as a Peace +Commissioner, I made another note for the purpose of crystallizing my +own thought on the subject of a League of Nations. Although President +Wilson had not then consulted me in any way regarding his plan of +organization, I felt sure that he would, and I wished to be prepared to +give him my opinion concerning the fundamentals of the plan which might +be proposed on behalf of the United States. I saw, or thought that I +saw, a disposition to adopt physical might as the basis of the +organization, because the guaranty, which the President had announced in +Point XIV and evidently purposed to advocate, seemed to require the use +of force in the event that it became necessary to make it good. + +From the note of November 22 I quote the following: + + "The legal principle [of the equality of nations], whatever its basis + in fact, must be preserved, otherwise force rather than law, the + power to act rather than the right to act, becomes the fundamental + principle of organization, just as it has been in all previous + Congresses and Concerts of the European Powers. + + "It appears to me that a positive guaranty of territorial integrity + and political independence by the nations would have to rest upon an + open recognition of dominant coercive power in the articles of + agreement, the power being commercial and economic as well as + physical. The wisdom of entering into such a guaranty is questionable + and should be carefully considered before being adopted. + + "In order to avoid the recognition of force as a basis and the + question of dominant force with the unavoidable classification of + nations into 'big' and 'little,' 'strong' and 'weak,' the desired + result of a guaranty might be attained by entering into a mutual + undertaking _not_ to impair the territorial integrity or to violate + the political sovereignty of any state. The breach of this + undertaking would be a breach of the treaty and would sever the + relations of the offending nation with all other signatories." + +I have given these two extracts from my notes in order to show the views +that I held, at the time the American Commission was about to depart +from the United States, in regard to the character of the guaranty which +the President intended to make the central feature of the League of +Nations. In the carrying out of his scheme and in creating an +organization to give effect to the guaranty I believed that I saw as an +unavoidable consequence an exaltation of force and an overlordship of +the strong nations. Under such conditions it would be impossible to +preserve within the organization the equality of nations, a precept of +international law which was the universally recognized basis of +intercourse between nations in time of peace. This I considered most +unwise and a return to the old order, from which every one hoped that +the victory over the Central Empires had freed the world. + +The views expressed in the notes quoted formed the basis for my +subsequent course of action as an American Commissioner at Paris in +relation to the League of Nations. Convinced from previous experience +that to oppose every form of guaranty by the nations assembled at Paris +would be futile in view of the President's apparent determination to +compel the adoption of that principle, I endeavored to find a form of +guaranty that would be less objectionable than the one which the +President had in mind. The commitment of the United States to any +guaranty seemed to me at least questionable, though to prevent it seemed +impossible in the circumstances. It did not seem politic to try to +persuade the President to abandon the idea altogether. I was certain +that that could not be done. If he could be induced to modify his plan +so as to avoid a direct undertaking to protect other nations from +aggression, the result would be all that could be expected. I was +guided, therefore, chiefly by expediency rather than by principle in +presenting my views to the President and in openly approving the idea of +a guaranty. + +The only opportunity that I had to learn more of the President's plan +for a League before arriving in Paris was an hour's interview with him +on the U.S.S. George Washington some days after we sailed from New York. +He showed me nothing in writing, but explained in a general way his +views as to the form, purpose, and powers of a League. From this +conversation I gathered that my fears as to the proposed organization +were justified and that it was to be based on the principle of +diplomatic adjustment rather than that of judicial settlement and that +political expediency tinctured with morality was to be the standard of +determination of an international controversy rather than strict +legal justice. + +In view of the President's apparent fixity of purpose it seemed unwise +to criticize the plan until I could deliver to him a substitute in +writing for the mutual guaranty which he evidently considered to be the +chief feature of the plan. I did not attempt to debate the subject with +him believing it better to submit my ideas in concrete form, as I had +learned from experience that Mr. Wilson preferred to have matters for +his decision presented in writing rather than by word of mouth. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED + + +The President, Mr. Henry White, and I arrived in Paris on Saturday, +December 14, 1918, where Colonel House and General Bliss awaited us. The +days following our arrival were given over to public functions in honor +of the President and to official exchanges of calls and interviews with +the delegates of other countries who were gathering for the Peace +Conference. On the 23d, when the pressure of formal and social +engagements had in a measure lessened, I decided to present to the +President my views as to the mutual guaranty which he intended to +propose, fearing that, if there were further delay, he would become +absolutely committed to the affirmative form. I, therefore, on that day +sent him the following letter, which was marked "Secret and Urgent": + + "_Hotel de Crillon December 23, 1918_ + + "MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "The plan of guaranty proposed for the League of Nations, which has + been the subject of discussion, will find considerable objection from + other Governments because, even when the principle is agreed to, + there will be a wide divergence of views as to the terms of the + obligation. This difference of opinion will be seized upon by those, + who are openly or secretly opposed to the League, to create + controversy and discord. + + "In addition to this there will be opposition in Congress to assuming + obligations to take affirmative action along either military or + economic lines. On constitutional grounds, on its effect on the + Monroe Doctrine, on jealousy as to Congressional powers, etc., there + will be severe criticism which will materially weaken our position + with other nations, and may, in view of senatorial hostility, defeat + a treaty as to the League of Nations or at least render it impotent. + + "With these thoughts in mind and with an opposition known to exist + among certain European statesmen and already manifest in Washington, + I take the liberty of laying before you a tentative draft of articles + of guaranty which I do not believe can be successfully opposed either + at home or abroad." + +I would interrupt the reader at this point to suggest that it might be +well to peruse the enclosures, which will be found in the succeeding +pages, in order to have a better understanding of the comments which +follow. To continue: + + "I do not see how any nation can refuse to subscribe to them. I do + not see how any question of constitutionality can be raised, as they + are based essentially on powers which are confided to the Executive. + They in no way raise a question as to the Monroe Doctrine. At the + same time I believe that the result would be as efficacious as if + there was an undertaking to take positive action against an offending + nation, which is the present cause of controversy. + + "I am so earnestly in favor of the guaranty, which is the heart of + the League of Nations, that I have endeavored to find a way to + accomplish this and to remove the objections raised which seem to me + to-day to jeopardize the whole plan. + + "I shall be glad, if you desire it, to confer with you in regard to + the enclosed paper or to receive your opinion as to the suggestions + made. In any event it is my hope that you will give the paper + consideration. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "28 _Rue de Monceau_" + +It should be borne in mind in reading this letter that I had reached the +conclusion that modification rather than abandonment of the guaranty was +all that I could hope to accomplish, and that, as a matter of +expediency, it seemed wise to indicate a sympathetic attitude toward the +idea. For that reason I expressed myself as favorable to the guaranty +and termed it "the heart of the League of Nations," a phrase which the +President by his subsequent use of it considered to be a proper +characterization. + +The memoranda contained in the paper enclosed in the letter were as +follows: + +_The Constitutional Power to provide Coercion in a Treaty_ + + "_December_ 20, 1918 + + "In the institution of a League of Nations we must bear in mind the + limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States upon the + Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government in defining + their respective powers. + + "The Constitution confers upon Congress the right to declare war. + This right, I do not believe, can be delegated and it certainly + cannot be taken away by treaty. The question arises, therefore, as to + how far a provision in an agreement as to a League of Nations, which + imposes on the United States the obligation to employ its military or + naval forces in enforcing the terms of the agreement, would be + constitutional. + + "It would seem that the utilization of forces, whether independently + or in conjunction with other nations, would in fact by being an act + of war create a state of war, which constitutionally can only be done + by a declaration of Congress. To contract by treaty to create a state + of war upon certain contingencies arising would be equally tainted + with unconstitutionality and would be null and inoperative. + + "I do not think, therefore, that, even if it were advisable, any + treaty can provide for the independent or joint use of the military + or naval forces of the United States to compel compliance with a + treaty or to make good a guaranty made in a treaty. + + "The other method of international coercion is non-intercourse, + especially commercial non-intercourse. Would a treaty provision to + employ this method be constitutional? + + "As to this my mind is less clear. The Constitution in delegating + powers to Congress includes the regulation of commerce. Does + non-intercourse fall within the idea of regulation? Could an embargo + be imposed without an act of Congress? My impression is that it could + not be done without legislation and that a treaty provision agreeing + in a certain event to impose an embargo against another nation + would be void. + + "Even if Congress was willing to delegate to the Executive for a + certain purpose its powers as to making war and regulating commerce, + I do not think that it could constitutionally do so. It is only in + the event of war that powers conferred by the Constitution on + Congress can be delegated and then only for war purposes. As a state + of war would not exist at the time action was required, I do not + believe that it could be done, and any provision contracting to take + measures of this nature would be contrary to the Constitution and as + a consequence void. + + "But, assuming that Congress possessed the power of delegation, I am + convinced that it would not only refuse to do so, but would resent + such a suggestion because of the fact that both Houses have been and + are extremely jealous of their rights and authority. + + "Viewed from the standpoints of legality and expediency it would seem + necessary to find some other method than coercion in enforcing an + international guaranty, or else to find some substitute for a + guaranty which would be valueless without affirmative action to + support it. + + "I believe that such a substitute can be found." + +The foregoing memorandum was intended as an introduction to the negative +guaranty or "self-denying covenant" which I desired to lay before the +President as a substitute for the one upon which he intended to build +the League of Nations. The memorandum was suggestive merely, but in view +of the necessity for a speedy decision there was no time to prepare an +exhaustive legal opinion. Furthermore, I felt that the President, whose +hours were at that time crowded with numerous personal conferences and +public functions, would find little opportunity to peruse a long and +closely reasoned argument on the subject. + +The most important portion of the document was that entitled "_Suggested +Draft of Articles for Discussion_. December 20, 1918." It reads +as follows: + + "The parties to this convention, for the purpose of maintaining + international peace and preventing future wars between one another, + hereby constitute themselves into a League of Nations and solemnly + undertake jointly and severally to fulfill the obligations imposed + upon them in the following articles: + + "A + + "Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and + guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or + impair the political independence of any other power signatory or + adherent to this convention except when authorized so to do by a + decree of the arbitral tribunal hereinafter referred to or by a + three-fourths vote of the International Council of the League of + Nations created by this convention. + + "B + + "In the event that any power signatory or adherent hereto shall fail + to observe the covenant and guaranty set forth in the preceding + article, such breach of covenant and guaranty shall _ipso facto_ + operate as an abrogation of this convention in so far as it applies + to the offending power and furthermore as an abrogation of all + treaties, conventions, and agreements heretofore or hereafter entered + into between the offending power and all other powers signatory and + adherent to this convention. + + "C + + "A breach of the covenant and guaranty declared in Article A shall + constitute an act unfriendly to all other powers signatory and + adherent hereto, and they shall forthwith sever all diplomatic, + consular, and official relations with the offending power, and shall, + through the International Council, hereinafter provided for, exchange + views as to the measures necessary to restore the power, whose + sovereignty has been invaded, to the rights and liberties which it + possessed prior to such invasion and to prevent further + violation thereof. + + "D + + "Any interference with a vessel on the high seas or with aircraft + proceeding over the high seas, which interference is not + affirmatively sanctioned by the law of nations shall be, for the + purposes of this convention, considered an impairment of political + independence." + +In considering the foregoing series of articles constituting a guaranty +against one's own acts, instead of a guaranty against the acts of +another, it must be remembered that, at the time of their preparation, I +had not seen a draft of the President's proposed guaranty, though from +conversations with Colonel House and from my study of Point XIV of "The +Fourteen Points," I knew that it was affirmative rather than negative in +form and would require positive action to be effective in the event that +the menace of superior force was insufficient to prevent +aggressive acts. + +As far as I am able to judge from subsequently acquired knowledge, +President Wilson at the time he received my letter of December 23 had a +typewritten draft of the document which after certain amendments he +later laid before the American Commissioners and which he had printed +with a few verbal changes under the title of "The Covenant." In order to +understand the two forms of guaranty which he had for consideration +after he received my letter, I quote the article relating to it, which +appears in the first printed draft of the Covenant. + + III + + "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political + independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between + them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the + future become necessary by reasons of changes in present racial + conditions and aspirations or present social and political + relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and + also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three + fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest + interest of the people concerned, may be effected if agreeable to + those peoples; and that territorial changes may involve material + compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the + principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to + every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." + +It seems needless to comment upon the involved language and the +uncertainty of meaning of this article wherein it provided for +"territorial readjustments" of which there appeared to be two classes, +one dependent on "self-determination," the other on the judgment of the +Body of Delegates of the League. In view of the possible reasons which +might be advanced for changes in territory and allegiance, justification +for an appeal to the guarantors was by no means certain. If this article +had been before me when the letter of December 23 was written, I might +have gone much further in opposition to the President's plan for +stabilizing peace in the world on the ground that a guaranty so +conditioned would cause rather than prevent international discord. + +Though without knowledge of the exact terms of the President's proposed +guaranty, I did not feel for the reason stated that I could delay longer +in submitting my views to the President. There was not time to work out +a complete and well-digested plan for a League, but I had prepared in +the rough several articles for discussion which related to the +organization, and which might be incorporated in the organic agreement +which I then assumed would be a separate document from the treaty +restoring peace. While unwilling to lay these articles before the +President until they were more carefully drafted, I enclosed in my +letter the following as indicative of the character of the organization +which it seemed to me would form a simple and practical agency common to +all nations: + + "_Suggestions as to an International Council For Discussion_ + + "_December_ 21, 1918 + + "An International Council of the League of Nations is hereby + constituted, which shall be the channel for communication between the + members of the League, and the agent for common action. + + "The International Council shall consist of the diplomatic + representative of each party signatory or adherent to this + convention at ----. + + "Meetings of the International Council shall be held at ----, or in + the event that the subject to be considered involves the interests of + ---- or its nationals, then at such other place outside the territory + of a power whose interests are involved as the Supervisory Committee + of the Council shall designate. + + "The officer charged with the conduct of the foreign affairs of the + power where a meeting is held shall be the presiding officer thereof. + + "At the first meeting of the International Council a Supervisory + Committee shall be chosen by a majority vote of the members present, + which shall consist of five members and shall remain in office for + two years or until their successors are elected. + + "The Supervisory Committee shall name a Secretariat which shall have + charge of the archives of the Council and receive all communications + addressed to the Council or Committee and send all communications + issued by the Council or Committee. + + "The Supervisory Committee may draft such rules of procedure as it + deems necessary for conducting business coming before the Council or + before the Committee. + + "The Supervisory Committee may call a meeting of the Council at its + discretion and must call a meeting at the request of any member of + the Council provided the request contains a written statement of the + subject to be discussed. + + "The archives of the Council shall be open at any time to any member + of the Council, who may make and retain copies thereof. + + "All expenses of the Supervisory Committee and Secretariat shall be + borne equally by all powers signatory or adherent to this + convention." + +As indicated by the caption, this document was intended merely "for +discussion" of the principal features of the organization. It should be +noted that the basic principle is the equality of nations. No special +privileges are granted to the major powers in the conduct of the +organization. The rights and obligations of one member of the League are +no more and no less than those of every other member. It is based on +international democracy and denies international aristocracy. + +Equality in the exercise of sovereign rights in times of peace, an +equality which is imposed by the very nature of sovereignty, seemed to +me fundamental to a world organization affecting in any way a nation's +independence of action or its exercise of supreme authority over its +external or domestic affairs. In my judgment any departure from that +principle would be a serious error fraught with danger to the general +peace of the world and to the recognized law of nations, since it could +mean nothing less than the primacy of the Great Powers and the +acknowledgment that because they possessed the physical might they had a +right to control the affairs of the world in times of peace as well as +in times of war. For the United States to admit that such primacy ought +to be formed would be bad enough, but to suggest it indirectly by +proposing an international organization based on that idea would be +far worse. + +On January 22, 1917, the President in an address to the Senate had made +the following declaration: + + "The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to + last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must + neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations or + small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right + must be based upon the common strength, not the individual strength, + of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of + territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other + sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate + development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects + anything more than an equality of rights." + +In view of this sound declaration of principle it seemed hardly possible +that the President, after careful consideration of the consequences of +his plan of a guaranty requiring force to make it practical, would not +perceive the fundamental error of creating a primacy of the +Great Powers. + +It was in order to prevent, if possible, the United States from becoming +sponsor for an undemocratic principle that I determined to lay my +partial plan of organization before the President at the earliest moment +that I believed it would receive consideration. + +To my letter of December 23 with its enclosed memoranda I never received +a reply or even an acknowledgment. It is true that the day following its +delivery the President went to Chaumont to spend Christmas at the +headquarters of General Pershing and that almost immediately thereafter +he visited London and two or three days after his return to Paris he set +out for Rome. It is possible that Mr. Wilson in the midst of these +crowded days had no time to digest or even to read my letter and its +enclosed memoranda. It is possible that he was unable or unwilling to +form an opinion as to their merits without time for meditation. I do not +wish to be unjustly critical or to blame the President for a neglect +which was the result of circumstance rather than of intention. + +At the time I assumed that his failure to mention my letter in any way +was because his visits to royalty exacted from him so much of his time +that there was no opportunity to give the matter consideration. While +some doubt was thrown on this assumption by the fact that the President +held an hour's conference with the American Commissioners on January 1, +just before departing for Italy, during which he discussed the favorable +attitude of Mr. Lloyd George toward his (the President's) ideas as to a +League of Nations, but never made any reference to my proposed +substitute for the guaranty, I was still disposed to believe that there +was a reasonable explanation for his silence and that upon his return +from Rome he would discuss it. + +Having this expectation I continued the preparation of tentative +provisions to be included in the charter of a League of Nations in the +event one was negotiated, and which would in any event constitute a +guide for the preparation of declarations to be included in the Treaty +of Peace in case the negotiation as to a League was postponed until +after peace had been restored. As has been said, it was my hope that +there would be a separate convention organizing the League, but I was +not as sanguine of this as many who believed this course would +be followed. + +It later developed that the President never had any other purpose than +to include the detailed plan of organization in the peace treaty, +whether the treaty was preliminary or definitive. When he departed for +Italy he had not declared this purpose to the Commissioners, but from +some source, which I failed to note at the time and cannot now +recollect, I gained the impression that he intended to pursue this +policy, for on December 29 I wrote in my book of notes: + + "It is evident that the President is determined to incorporate in the + peace treaty an elaborate scheme for the League of Nations which will + excite all sorts of opposition at home and abroad and invite much + discussion. + + "The articles relating to the League ought to be few and brief. They + will not be. They will be many and long. If we wait till they are + accepted, it will be four or five months before peace is signed, and + I fear to say how much longer it will take to have it ratified. + + "It is perhaps foolish to prophesy, but I will take the chance. Two + months from now we will still be haggling over the League of Nations + and an exasperated world will be cursing us for not having made + peace. I hope that I am a false prophet, but I fear my prophecy will + come true. We are riding a hobby, and riding to a fall." + +By the time the President returned from his triumphal journey to Rome I +had completed the articles upon which I had been working; at least they +were in form for discussion. At a conference at the Hôtel Crillon +between President Wilson and the American Commissioners on January 7, I +handed to him the draft articles saying that they were supplemental to +my letter of December 23. He took them without comment and without +making any reference to my unanswered letter. + +The first two articles of the "International Agreement," as I termed the +document, were identical in language with the memoranda dealing with a +mutual covenant and with an international council which I had enclosed +in my letter of December 23. It is needless, therefore, to repeat +them here. + +Article III of the so-called "Agreement" was entitled "Peaceful +Settlements of International Disputes," and read as follows: + + "_Clause_ 1 + + "In the event that there is a controversy between two or more members + of the League of Nations which fails of settlement through diplomatic + channels, one of the following means of settlement shall be employed: + + "1. The parties to the controversy shall constitute a joint + commission to investigate and report jointly or severally to their + Governments the facts and make recommendations as to settlement. + After such report a further effort shall be made to reach a + diplomatic settlement of the controversy. + + "2. The parties shall by agreement arrange for the submission of the + controversy to arbitration mutually agreed upon, or to the Arbitral + Tribunal hereinafter referred to. + + "3. Any party may, unless the second means of settlement is mutually + adopted, submit the controversy to the Supervisory Committee of the + International Council; and the Committee shall forthwith (a) name and + direct a special commission to investigate and report upon the + subject; (b) name and direct a commission to mediate between the + parties to the controversy; or (c) direct the parties to submit the + controversy to the Arbitral Tribunal for judicial settlement, it + being understood that the direction to arbitrate may be made at any + time in the event that investigation and mediation fail to result in + a settlement of the controversy. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "No party to a controversy shall assume any authority or perform any + acts based upon disputed rights without authorization of the + Supervisory Committee, such authorization being limited in all cases + to the pendency of the controversy and its final settlement and being + in no way prejudicial to the rights of the parties. An authorization + thus granted by the Supervisory Committee may be modified or + superseded by mutual agreement of the parties, by order of an + arbitrator or arbitrators selected by the parties, or by order of the + Arbitral Tribunal if the controversy is submitted to it. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "The foregoing clause shall not apply to cases in which the + constituted authorities of a power are unable or fail to give + protection to the lives and property of nationals of another power. + In the event that it becomes necessary for a power to use its + military or naval forces to safeguard the lives or property of its + nationals within the territorial jurisdiction of another power, the + facts and reasons for such action shall be forthwith reported to the + Supervisory Committee, which shall determine the course of action to + be adopted in order to protect the rights of all parties, and shall + notify the same to the governments involved which shall comply with + such notification. In the event that a government fails to comply + therewith it shall be deemed to have violated the covenant and + guaranty hereinbefore set forth." + +The other articles follow: + + "ARTICLE IV + + "_Revision of Arbitral Tribunal and Codification of International + Law_ + + "_Clause 1_ + + "The International Council, within one year after its organization, + shall notify to the powers signatory and adherent to this convention + and shall invite all other powers to send delegates to an + international conference at such place and time as the Council may + determine and not later than six months after issuance of such + notification and invitation. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "The International Conference shall consider the revision of the + constitution and procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal and provisions + for the amicable settlement of international disputes established by + the I Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907, and shall formulate codes + embodying the principles of international law applicable in time of + peace and the rules of warfare on land and sea and in the air. The + revision and codification when completed shall be embodied in a + treaty or treaties. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "The International Council shall prepare and submit with the + notification and invitation above provided a preliminary programme of + the International Conference, which shall be subject to modification + or amendment by the Conference. + + "_Clause 4_ + + "Until the treaty of revision of the constitution and procedure of + the Arbitral Tribunal becomes operative, the provisions of the I + Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907 shall continue in force, and all + references herein to the 'Arbitral Tribunal' shall be understood to + be the Tribunal constituted under the I Treaty, but upon the treaty + of revision coming into force the references shall be construed as + applying to the Arbitral Tribunal therein constituted. + + "ARTICLE V + + "_Publication of Treaties and Agreements_ + + "_Clause 1_ + + "Each power, signatory or adherent to this convention, severally + agrees with all other parties hereto that it will not exchange the + ratification of any treaty or convention hereinafter entered into by + it with any other power until thirty days after the full text of such + treaty or convention has been published in the public press of the + parties thereto and a copy has been filed with the Secretariat of the + League of Nations. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "No international agreement, to which a power signatory or adherent + to this convention, is a party, shall become operative or be put in + force until published and filed as aforesaid. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "All treaties, conventions and agreements, to which a power, + signatory or adherent to this convention, is a party, and which are + in force or to come into force and which have not been heretofore + published, shall within six months after the signature of this + convention be published and filed as aforesaid or abrogated or + denounced. + + "ARTICLE VI + + "_Equality of Commercial Privileges_ + + "The powers, signatory and adherent to this convention agree jointly + and severally not to discriminate against or in favor of any power in + the matter of commerce or trade or of industrial privileges; and they + further agree that all treaties, conventions and agreements now in + force or to come into force or hereinafter negotiated shall be + considered as subject to the 'most favored nation' doctrine, whether + they contain or do not contain a clause to that effect. It is + specifically declared that it is the purpose of this article not to + limit any power in imposing upon commerce and trade such restrictions + and burdens as it may deem proper but to make such impositions apply + equally and impartially to all other powers, their nationals + and ships. + + "This article shall not apply, however, to any case, in which a power + has committed an unfriendly act against the members of the League of + Nations as defined in Article I and in which commercial and trade + relations are denied or restricted by agreements between the members + as a measure of restoration or protection of the rights of a power + injured by such unfriendly act." + +These proposed articles, which were intended for discussion before +drafting the provisions constituting a League of Nations and which did +not purport to be a completed document, are given in full because there +seems no simpler method of showing the differences between the President +and me as to the form, functions, and authority of an international +organization. They should be compared with the draft of the "Covenant" +which the President had when these proposed articles were handed to him; +the text of the President's draft appears in the Appendix (page 281). +Comparison will disclose the irreconcilable differences between the +two projects. + +Of these differences the most vital was in the character of the +international guaranty of territorial and political sovereignty. That +difference has already been discussed. The second in importance was the +practical repudiation by the President of the doctrine of the equality +of nations, which, as has been shown, was an unavoidable consequence of +an affirmative guaranty which he had declared to be absolutely essential +to an effective world union. The repudiation, though by indirection, was +none the less evident in the recognition in the President's plan of the +primacy of the Great Powers through giving to them a permanent majority +on the "Executive Council" which body substantially controlled the +activities of the League. A third marked difference was in Mr. Wilson's +exaltation of the executive power of the League and the subordination of +the administration of legal justice to that power, and in my advocacy of +an independent international judiciary, whose decisions would be final +and whose place in the organization of the nations would be superior, +since I considered a judicial tribunal the most practical agency for +removing causes of war. + +The difference as to international courts and the importance of applied +legal justice requires further consideration in order to understand the +divergence of views which existed as to the fundamental idea of +organization of the League. + +President Wilson in his Covenant, as at first submitted to the American +Commissioners, made no provision for the establishment of a World Court +of Justice, and no reference of any sort was made to The Hague Tribunal +of Arbitration. It is not, in my opinion, a misstatement to say that the +President intentionally omitted judicial means of composing +international disputes preferring to leave settlements of that sort to +arrangement between the parties or else to the Body of Delegates or the +Executive Council, both of which bodies being essentially diplomatic or +political in their composition would lack the judicial point of view, +since their members would presumably be influenced by their respective +national interests and by political considerations rather than by a +desire and purpose to do impartial justice by applying legal principles. + +It is true that in Article V of the first draft of the Covenant +(Appendix) there is an agreement to submit to arbitration +certain classes of controversies and a method of selecting arbitrators +is provided--a method, by the way, which the actual experience of a +century has shown to be the least satisfactory in administering legal +justice, since it almost inevitably leads to a compromise which impairs +the just rights of one of the parties. But, to my mind, a provision, far +more objectionable than the antiquated and unsatisfactory method of +arbitration provided, was that which made an arbitral award reviewable +on appeal to the Body of Delegates of the League, which could set aside +the award even if the arbitrators had rendered a unanimous decision and +compel a rehearing before other arbitrators. International arbitration +as a method of applying the principles of justice to disputes between +nations would, in the first instance at least, have become a farce if +this provision had been adopted. As an award based on compromise is +seldom, if ever, satisfactory to both parties, the right of appeal would +in substantially every case have been invoked and the award would have +been reviewed by the Body of Delegates, who would practically render a +final decision since the new arbitrators would presumably adopt it. The +effect of this provision as to appeals was, therefore, to supplant +judicial settlements by political compromises and diplomatic +adjustments, in which the national interests of the judges, many of whom +would be untrained in juridical procedure, would be decided, if not +deciding, factors. Manifestly the expediency of the moment would be far +more potent in the decisions reached than the principles and precepts of +international law. + +I shall not express here my opinion as to the reasons which I believe +impelled the President to insert in the Covenant these extraordinary +provisions which deprived arbitral courts of that independence of the +executive authority which has been in modern times considered essential +to the impartial administration of justice. But, when one considers how +jealously and effectively the Constitution of the United States and the +constitutions of the various States of the Union guard the judiciary +from executive and legislative interference, the proposal in the +President's plan for a League of Nations to abandon that great principle +in the settlement of international disputes of a justiciable nature +causes speculation as to Mr. Wilson's real opinion of the American +political system which emphasizes the separation and independence of the +three coordinate branches of government. + +That a provision found its way into the draft of the Covenant, which the +President, on February 3, 1919, laid before the Commission on the League +of Nations, declaring for the creation by the League of a permanent +court of international justice, was not due, I feel sure, to any +spontaneous thought on the part of President Wilson. + +My own views as to the relative value of the settlement of an +international controversy, which is by its nature justiciable, by a body +of diplomats and of the settlement by a body of trained jurists were +fully set forth in an address which I delivered before the American Bar +Association at its annual meeting at Boston on September 5,1919. + +An extract from that address will show the radical difference between +the President's views and mine. + + "While abstract justice cannot [under present conditions] be depended + upon as a firm basis on which to constitute an international concord + for the preservation of peace and good relations between nations, + legal justice offers a common ground where the nations can meet to + settle their controversies. No nation can refuse in the face of the + opinion of the world to declare its unwillingness to recognize the + legal rights of other nations or to submit to the judgment of an + impartial tribunal a dispute involving the determination of such + rights. The moment, however, that we go beyond the clearly defined + field of legal justice we enter the field of diplomacy where national + interests and ambitions are to-day the controlling factors of + national action. Concession and compromise are the chief agents of + diplomatic settlement instead of the impartial application of legal + justice which is essential to a judicial settlement. Furthermore, the + two modes of settlement differ in that a judicial settlement rests + upon the precept that all nations, whether great or small, are equal, + but in the sphere of diplomacy the inequality of nations is not only + recognized, but unquestionably influences the adjustment of + international differences. Any change in the relative power of + nations, a change which is continually taking place, makes more or + less temporary diplomatic settlements, but in no way affects a + judicial settlement. + + "However, then, international society may be organized for the future + and whatever machinery may be set up to minimize the possibilities of + war, I believe that the agency which may be counted upon to function + with certainty is that which develops and applies legal justice." + +Every other agency, regardless of its form, will be found, when +analyzed, to be diplomatic in character and subject to those impulses +and purposes which generally affect diplomatic negotiations. With a full +appreciation of the advantage to be gained for the world at large +through the common consideration of a vexatious international question +by a body representing all nations, we ought not to lose sight of the +fact that such consideration and the action resulting from it are +essentially diplomatic in nature. It is, in brief, the transference of a +dispute in a particular case from the capitals of the disputants to the +place where the delegates of the nations assemble to deliberate together +on matters which affect their common interests. It does not--and this we +should understand--remove the question from the processes of diplomacy +or prevent the influences which enter into diplomacy from affecting its +consideration. Nor does it to an appreciable extent change the actual +inequality which exists among nations in the matter of power and +influence. + + "On the other hand, justice applied through the agency of an + impartial tribunal clothed with an international jurisdiction + eliminates the diplomatic methods of compromise and concession and + recognizes that before the law all nations are equal and equally + entitled to the exercise of their rights as sovereign and independent + states. In a word, international democracy exists in the sphere of + legal justice and, up to the present time, in no other relation + between nations. + + "Let us, then, with as little delay as possible establish an + international tribunal or tribunals of justice with The Hague Court + as a foundation; let us provide an easier, a cheaper, and better + procedure than now exists; and let us draft a simple and concise body + of legal principles to be applied to the questions to be adjudicated. + When that has been accomplished--and it ought not to be a difficult + task if the delegates of the Governments charged with it are chosen + for their experience and learning in the field of jurisprudence--we + shall, in my judgment, have done more to prevent international wars + through removing their causes than can be done by any other means + that has been devised or suggested." + +The views, which I thus publicly expressed at Boston in September, 1919, +while the President was upon his tour of the country in favor of the +Covenant of the League of Nations, were the same as those that I held at +Paris in December, 1918, before I had seen the President's first draft +of a Covenant, as the following will indicate. + +On December 17, 1918, three days after arriving in Paris, I had, as has +been stated, a long conference with Colonel House on the Peace +Conference and the subjects to come before it. I urged him in the course +of our conversation "to persuade the President to make the nucleus of +his proposed League of Nations an international court pointing out that +it was the simplest and best way of organizing the world for peace, and +that, if in addition the general principles of international law were +codified and the right of inquiry confided to the court, everything +practical would have been done to prevent wars in the future" (quoted +from a memorandum of the conversation made at the time). I also urged +upon the Colonel that The Hague Tribunal be made the basis of the +judicial organization, but that it be expanded and improved to meet the +new conditions. I shall have something further to say on this subject. + +Reverting now to the draft of articles which I had in form on January 5, +1919, it must be borne in mind that I then had no reason to think that +the President would omit from his plan an independent judicial agency +for the administration of legal justice, although I did realize that he +gave first place to the mutual guaranty and intended to build a League +on that as a nucleus. It did not seem probable that an American, a +student of the political institutions of the United States and familiar +with their operation, would fail to incorporate in any scheme for world +organization a judicial system which would be free from the control and +even from the influence of the political and diplomatic branch of the +organization. The benefit, if not the necessity, of such a division of +authority seemed so patent that the omission of a provision to that +effect in the original draft of the Covenant condemned it to one who +believed in the principles of government which found expression in +American institutions. Fortunately the defect was in a measure cured +before the Commission on the League of Nations formally met to discuss +the subject, though not before the Covenant had been laid before the +American Commissioners. + +The articles of a proposed convention for the creation of an +international organization were not intended, as I have said, to form a +complete convention. They were suggestive only of the principal features +of a plan which could, if the President desired, arouse discussion as to +the right theory and the fundamental principles of the international +organization which there seemed little doubt would be declared by the +Paris Conference. + +Among the suggested articles there was none covering the subject of +disarmament, because the problem was highly technical requiring the +consideration of military and naval experts. Nor was there any reference +to the mandatory system because there had not been, to my knowledge, any +mention of it at that time in connection with the President's plan, +though General Smuts had given it prominence in his proposed scheme. + +During the preparation of these suggestive articles I made a brief +memorandum on the features, which seemed to me salient, of any +international agreement to prevent wars in the future, and which in my +opinion ought to be in mind when drafting such an agreement. The first +three paragraphs of the memorandum follow: + + "There are three doctrines which should be incorporated in the Treaty + of Peace if wars are to be avoided and equal justice is to prevail in + international affairs. + + "These three doctrines may be popularly termed 'Hands Off,' the 'Open + Door,' and 'Publicity.' + + "The first pertains to national possessions and national rights; the + second to international commerce and economic conditions; and the + third, to international agreements." + +An examination of the articles which I prepared shows that these +doctrines are developed in them, although at the time I was uncertain +whether they ought to appear in the convention creating the League or in +the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, which I believed, in common with the +prevailing belief, would be negotiated. My impression was that they +should appear in the Peace Treaty and possibly be repeated in the League +Treaty, if the two were kept distinct. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER + + +While I was engaged in the preparation of these articles for discussion, +which were based primarily on the equality of nations and avoided a +mutual guaranty or other undertaking necessitating a departure from that +principle, M. Clemenceau delivered an important address in the Chamber +of Deputies at its session on December 30, 1918. In this address the +French Premier declared himself in favor of maintaining the doctrine of +"the balance of power" and of supporting it by a concert of the Great +Powers. During his remarks he made the following significant assertion, +"This system of alliances, which I do not renounce, will be my guiding +thought at the Conference, if your confidence sends me to it, so that +there will be no separation in peace of the four powers which have +battled side by side." + +M. Clemenceau's words caused a decided sensation among the delegates +already in Paris and excited much comment in the press. The public +interest was intensified by the fact that President Wilson had but a day +or two before, in an address at Manchester, England, denounced the +doctrine of "the balance of power" as belonging to the old international +order which had been repudiated because it had produced the conditions +that resulted in the Great War. + +A week after the delivery of M. Clemenceau's address I discussed his +declarations at some length with Colonel House, and he agreed with me +that the doctrine was entirely contrary to the public opinion of the +world and that every effort should be made to prevent its revival and to +end the "system of alliances" which M. Clemenceau desired to continue. + +During this conversation I pointed out that the form of affirmative +guaranty, which the President then had in mind, would unavoidably impose +the burden of enforcing it upon the Great Powers, and that they, having +that responsibility, would demand the right to decide at what time and +in what manner the guaranty should be enforced. This seemed to me to be +only a different application of the principle expressed in the doctrine +of "the balance of power" and to amount to a practical continuance of +the alliances formed for prosecution of the war. I said that, in my +judgment, if the President's guaranty was made the central idea of the +League of Nations, it would play directly into the hands of M. +Clemenceau because it could mean nothing other than the primacy of the +great military and naval powers; that I could not understand how the +President was able to harmonize his plan of a positive guaranty with his +utterances at Manchester; and that, if he clung to his plan, he would +have to accept the Clemenceau doctrine, which would to all intents +transform the Conference into a second Congress of Vienna and result in +a reversion to the old undesirable order, and its continuance in the +League of Nations. + +It was my hope that Colonel House, to whom I had shown the letter and +memoranda which I had sent to the President, would be so impressed with +the inconsistency of favoring the affirmative guaranty and of opposing +the doctrine of "the balance of power," that he would exert his +influence with the President to persuade him to find a substitute for +the guaranty which Mr. Wilson then favored. It seemed politic to +approach the President in this way in view of the fact that he had never +acknowledged my letter or manifested any inclination to discuss the +subject with me. + +This hope was increased when the Colonel came to me on the evening of +the same day that we had the conversation related above and told me that +he was "entirely converted" to my plan for a negative guaranty and for +the organization of a League. + +At this second interview Colonel House gave me a typewritten copy of the +President's plan and asked me to examine it and to suggest a way to +amend it so that it would harmonize with my views. This was the first +time that I had seen the President's complete plan for a League. My +previous knowledge had been gained orally and was general and more or +less vague in character except as to the guaranty of which I had an +accurate idea through the President's "Bases of Peace" of 1917, and +Point XIV of his address of January 8, 1918. At the time that the +typewritten plan was handed to me another copy had already been given to +the printer of the Commission. It was evident, therefore, that the +President was satisfied with the document. It contained the theory and +fundamental principles which he advocated for world organization. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN + + +I immediately began an examination and analysis of the President's plan +for a League, having in mind Colonel House's suggestion that I consider +a way to modify it so that it would harmonize with my views. The more I +studied the document, the less I liked it. A cursory reading of the +plan, which is printed in the Appendix (page 281), will disclose the +looseness of the language and the doubtful interpretation of many of the +provisions. It showed an inexpertness in drafting and a fault in +expression which were chargeable to lack of appreciation of the need of +exactness or else to haste in preparation. This fault in the paper, +which was very apparent, could, however, be cured and was by no means a +fatal defect. As a matter of fact, the faults of expression were to a +certain extent removed by subsequent revisions, though some of the +vagueness and ambiguity of the first draft persisted and appeared in the +final text of the Covenant. + +The more serious defects of the plan were in the principles on which it +was based and in their application under the provisions of the articles +proposed. The contemplated use of force in making good the guaranty of +sovereign rights and the establishment of a primacy of the Great Powers +were provided for in language which was sufficiently explicit to admit +of no denial. In my opinion these provisions were entirely out of +harmony with American ideals, policies, and traditions. Furthermore, the +clauses in regard to arbitration and appeals from arbitral awards, to +which reference has been made, the lack of any provision for the +establishment of a permanent international judiciary, and the +introduction of the mandatory system were strong reasons to reject the +President's plan. + +It should be borne in mind that, at the time that this document was +placed in my hands, the plan of General Smuts for a League of Nations +had, as I have said, been printed in the press and in pamphlet form and +had been given wide publicity. In the Smuts plan, which gave first place +to the system of mandates, appeared the declaration that the League of +Nations was to acquire the mandated territories as "the heir of the +Empires." This clever and attractive phrase caught the fancy of the +President, as was evident from his frequent repetition and approval of +it in discussing mandates under the League. Just as General Smuts had +adopted the President's "self-determination," Mr. Wilson seized upon the +Smuts idea with avidity and incorporated it in his plan. It +unquestionably had a decided influence upon his conception of the right +way to dispose of the colonial possessions of Germany and of the proper +relation of the newly created European states to the League of Nations. +As an example of the way in which President Wilson understood and +applied General Smuts's phrase to the new states, I quote the following +from the "Supplementary Agreements" forming part of the first printed +draft of the President's Covenant, but which I believe were added to the +typewritten draft after the President had examined the plan of the South +African statesman: + + "As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, + directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations + _inter se_ of all new independent states arising or created out of + the Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating + and composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance + of settled order and the general peace." + +There is a natural temptation to a student of international agreements +to analyze critically the composition and language of this provision, +but to do so would in no way advance the consideration of the subject +under discussion and would probably be interpreted as a criticism of the +President's skill in accurately expressing his thoughts, a criticism +which it is not my purpose to make. + +Mr. Wilson's draft also contained a system of mandates over territories +in a form which was, to say the least, rudimentary if not inadequate. By +the proposed system the League of Nations, as "the residuary trustee," +was to take sovereignty over "the peoples and territories" of the +defeated Empires and to issue a mandate to some power or powers to +exercise such sovereignty. A "residuary trustee" was a novelty in +international relations sufficient to arouse conjecture as to its +meaning, but giving to the League the character of an independent state +with the capacity of possessing sovereignty and the power to exercise +sovereign rights through a designated agent was even more extraordinary. +This departure from the long accepted idea of the essentials of +statehood seemed to me an inexpedient and to a degree a dangerous +adventure. The only plausible excuse for the proposal seemed to be a +lack of knowledge as to the nature of sovereignty and as to the +attributes inherent in the very conception of a state. The character of +a mandate, a mandatory, and the authority issuing the mandate presented +many legal perplexities which certainly required very careful study +before the experiment was tried. Until the system was fully worked out +and the problems of practical operation were solved, it seemed to me +unwise to suggest it and still more unwise to adopt it. While the +general idea of mandates issuing from the proposed international +organization was presumably acceptable to the President from the first, +his support was doubtless confirmed by the fact that it followed the +groove which had been made in his mind by the Smuts phrase "the heir of +the Empires." + +In any event it seemed to me the course of wise statesmanship to +postpone the advocacy of mandates, based on the assumption that the +League of Nations could become the possessor of sovereignty, until the +practical application of the theory could be thoroughly considered from +the standpoint of international law as well as from the standpoint of +policy. The experiment was too revolutionary to be tried without +hesitation and without consideration of the effect on established +principles and usage. At an appropriate place this subject will be more +fully discussed. + +As to the organization and functions of the League of Nations planned by +Mr. Wilson there was little that appealed to one who was opposed to the +employment of force in compelling the observance of international +obligations and to the establishment of an international oligarchy of +the Great Powers to direct and control world affairs. The basic +principle of the plan was that the strong should, as a matter of right +recognized by treaty, possess a dominant voice in international +councils. Obviously the principle of the equality of nations was ignored +or abandoned. In the face of the repeated declarations of the Government +of the United States in favor of the equality of independent states as +to their rights in times of peace, this appeared to be a reversal of +policy which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain in a +satisfactory way. Personally I could not subscribe to this principle +which was so destructive of the American theory of the proper relations +between nations. + +It was manifest, when I read the President's plan, that there was no +possible way to harmonize my ideas with it. They were fundamentally +different. There was no common basis on which to build. To attempt to +bring the two theories into accord would have been futile. I, therefore, +told Colonel House that it was useless to try to bring into accord the +two plans, since they were founded on contradictory principles and that +the only course of procedure open to me was to present my views to the +President in written form, hoping that he would give them consideration, +although fearing that his mind was made up, since he had ordered his +plan to be printed. + +In the afternoon of the same day (January 7), on which I informed the +Colonel of the impossibility of harmonizing and uniting the two plans, +President Wilson held a conference with the American Commissioners +during which he declared that he considered the affirmative guaranty +absolutely necessary to the preservation of future peace and the only +effective means of preventing war. Before this declaration could be +discussed M. Clemenceau was announced and the conference came to an end. +While the President did not refer in any way to the "self-denying +covenant" which I had proposed as a substitute, it seemed to me that he +intended it to be understood that the substitute was rejected, and that +he had made the declaration with that end in view. This was the nearest +approach to an answer to my letter of December 23 that I ever received. +Indirect as it was the implication was obvious. + +Although the settled purpose of the President to insist on his form of +mutual guaranty was discouraging and his declaration seemed to be +intended to close debate on the subject, I felt that no effort should be +spared to persuade him to change his views or at least to leave open an +avenue for further consideration. Impelled by this motive I gave to the +President the articles which I had drafted and asked him if he would be +good enough to read them and consider the principles on which they were +based. The President with his usual courtesy of manner smilingly +received them. Whether or not he ever read them I cannot state +positively because he never mentioned them to me or, to my knowledge, to +any one else. I believe, however, that he did read them and realized +that they were wholly opposed to the theory which he had evolved, +because from that time forward he seemed to assume that I was hostile to +his plan for a League of Nations. I drew this conclusion from the fact +that he neither asked my advice as to any provision of the Covenant nor +discussed the subject with me personally. In many little ways he showed +that he preferred to have me direct my activities as a Commissioner into +other channels and to keep away from the subject of a League. The +conviction that my counsel was unwelcome to Mr. Wilson was, of course, +not formed at the time that he received the articles drafted by me. It +only developed after some time had elapsed, during which incidents took +place that aroused a suspicion which finally became a conviction. +Possibly I was over-sensitive as to the President's treatment of my +communications to him. Possibly he considered my advice of no value, +and, therefore, unworthy of discussion. But, in view of his letter of +February 11, 1920, it must be admitted that he recognized that I was +reluctant in accepting certain of his views at Paris, a recognition +which arose from my declared opposition to them. Except in the case of +the Shantung settlement, there was none concerning which our judgments +were so at variance as they were concerning the League of Nations. I +cannot believe, therefore, that I was wrong in my conclusion as to +his attitude. + +On the two days succeeding the one when I handed the President my draft +of articles I had long conferences with Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel +House. Previous to these conferences, or at least previous to the second +one, I examined Lord Robert's plan for a League. His plan was based on +the proposition that the Supreme War Council, consisting of the Heads of +States and the Secretaries and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Five +Great Powers, should be perpetuated as a permanent international body +which should meet once a year and discuss subjects of common interest. +That is, he proposed the formation of a Quintuple Alliance which would +constitute itself primate over all nations and the arbiter in world +affairs, a scheme of organization very similar to the one proposed by +General Smuts. + +Lord Robert made no attempt to disguise the purpose of his plan. It was +intended to place in the hands of the Five Powers the control of +international relations and the direction in large measure of the +foreign policies of all nations. It was based on the power to compel +obedience, on the right of the powerful to rule. Its chief merit was its +honest declaration of purpose, however wrong that purpose might appear +to those who denied that the possession of superior might conferred +special rights upon the possessor. It seemed to provide for a rebirth of +the Congress of Vienna which should be clothed in the modern garb of +democracy. It could only be interpreted as a rejection of the principle +of the equality of nations. Its adoption would mean that the destiny of +the world would be in the hands of a powerful international oligarchy +possessed of dictatorial powers. + +There was nothing idealistic in the plan of Lord Robert Cecil, although +he was reputed to be an idealist favoring a new international order. An +examination of his plan (Appendix) shows it to be a substantial revival +of the old and discredited ideas of a century ago. There could be no +doubt that a plan of this sort, materialistic and selfish as it was, +would win the approval and cordial support of M. Clemenceau, since it +fitted in with his public advocacy of the doctrine of "the balance of +power." Presumably the Italian delegates would not be opposed to a +scheme which gave Italy so influential a voice in international affairs, +while the Japanese, not averse to this recognition of their national +power and importance, would unquestionably favor an alliance of this +nature. I think that it is fair to assume that all of the Five Great +Powers would have readily accepted the Cecil plan--all except the +United States. + +This plan, however, did not meet with the approval of President Wilson, +and his open opposition to it became an obstacle which prevented its +consideration in the form in which it was proposed. It is a matter of +speculation what reasons appealed to the President and caused him to +oppose the plan, although the principle of primacy found application in +a different and less radical form in his own plan of organization. +Possibly he felt that the British statesman's proposal too frankly +declared the coalition and oligarchy of the Five Powers, and that there +should be at least the appearance of cooperation on the part of the +lesser nations. Of course, in view of the perpetual majority of the Five +Powers on the Executive Council, as provided in the President's plan, +the primacy of the Five was weakened little if at all by the minority +membership of the small nations. The rule of unanimity gave to each +nation a veto power, but no one believed that one of the lesser states +represented on the Council would dare to exercise it if the Great Powers +were unanimous in support of a proposition. In theory unanimity was a +just and satisfactory rule; in practice it would amount to nothing. The +President may also have considered the council proposed by Lord Robert +to be inexpedient in view of the political organization of the United +States. The American Government had no actual premier except the +President, and it seemed out of the question for him to attend an annual +meeting of the proposed council. It would result in the President +sending a personal representative who would unavoidably be in a +subordinate position when sitting with the European premiers. I think +this latter reason was a very valid one, but that the first one, which +seemed to appeal especially to the President, had little real merit. + +In addition to his objection to the Cecil plan of administration, +another was doubtless of even greater weight to Mr. Wilson and that was +the entire omission in the Cecil proposal of the mutual guaranty of +political independence and territorial integrity. The method of +preventing wars which was proposed by Lord Robert was for the nations to +enter into a covenant to submit disputes to international investigation +and to obtain a report before engaging in hostilities and also a +covenant not to make war on a disputant nation which accepted a report +which had been unanimously adopted. He further proposed that the members +of the League should undertake to regard themselves as _ipso facto_ at +war with a member violating these covenants and "to take, jointly and +severally, appropriate military, economic, and other measures against +the recalcitrant State," thus following closely the idea of the League +to Enforce Peace. + +Manifestly this last provision in the Cecil plan was open to the same +constitutional objections as those which could be raised against the +President's mutual guaranty. My impression is that Mr. Wilson's +opposition to the provision was not based on the ground that it was in +contravention of the Constitution of the United States, but rather on +the ground that it did not go far enough in stabilizing the terms of +peace which were to be negotiated. The President was seeking permanency +by insuring, through the threat or pressure of international force, a +condition of changelessness in boundaries and sovereign rights, subject, +nevertheless, to territorial changes based either on the principle of +"self-determination" or on a three-fourths vote of the Body of +Delegates. He, nevertheless, discussed the subject with Lord Robert +Cecil prior to laying his draft of a Covenant before the American +Commissioners, as is evident by comparing it with the Cecil plan, for +certain phrases are almost identical in language in the two documents. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +SELF-DETERMINATION + + +The mutual guaranty which was advocated by President Wilson appears as +Article III of his original draft of a Covenant. It reads as follows: + + "ARTICLE III + + "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political + independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between + them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the + future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial + conditions and aspirations or present social and political + relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and + also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three + fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest + interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to + those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve + material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without + reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in + importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." + +In the revised draft, which he laid before the Commission +on the League of Nations at its first session Article III +became Article 7. It is as follows: + + "ARTICLE 7 + + "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as + against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing + political independence of all States members of the League." + +The guaranty was finally incorporated in the Treaty of Peace as Article +10. It reads: + + "ARTICLE 10 + + "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as + against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing + political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any + such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression + the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation + shall be fulfilled." + +In the revision of the original draft the modifying clause providing for +future territorial readjustments was omitted. It does not appear in +Article 7 of the draft which was presented to the Commission on the +League of Nations and which formed the basis of its deliberations. In +addition to this modification the words "unite in guaranteeing" in +Article III became "undertake to respect and preserve" in Article 7. +These changes are only important in that they indicate a disposition to +revise the article to meet the wishes, and to remove to an extent the +objections, of some of the foreign delegates who had prepared plans for +a League or at least had definite ideas as to the purposes and functions +of an international organization. + +It was generally believed that the elimination of the modifying clause +from the President's original form of guaranty was chiefly due to the +opposition of the statesmen who represented the British Empire in +contradistinction to those who represented the self-governing British +Dominions. It was also believed that this opposition was caused by an +unwillingness on their part to recognize or to apply as a right the +principle of "self-determination" in arranging possible future changes +of sovereignty over territories. + +I do not know the arguments which were used to induce the President to +abandon this phrase and to strike it from his article of guaranty. I +personally doubt whether the objection to the words "self-determination" +was urged upon him. Whatever reasons were advanced by his foreign +colleagues, they were successful in freeing the Covenant from the +phrase. It is to be regretted that the influence, which was sufficient +to induce the President to eliminate from his proposed guaranty the +clause containing a formal acceptance of the principle of +"self-determination," was not exerted or else was not potent enough to +obtain from him an open disavowal of the principle as a right standard +for the determination of sovereign authority. Without such a disavowal +the phrase remained as one of the general bases upon which a just peace +should be negotiated. It remained a precept of the international creed +which Mr. Wilson proclaimed while the war was still in progress, for he +had declared, in an address delivered on February 11, 1918, before a +joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives, that +"self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle +of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." + +"Self-determination" is as right in theory as the more famous phrase +"the consent of the governed," which has for three centuries been +repeatedly declared to be sound by political philosophers and has been +generally accepted as just by civilized peoples, but which has been for +three centuries commonly ignored by statesmen because the right could +not be practically applied without imperiling national safety, always +the paramount consideration in international and national affairs. The +two phrases mean substantially the same thing and have to an extent been +used interchangeably by those who advocate the principle as a standard +of right. "Self-determination" was not a new thought. It was a +restatement of the old one. + +Under the present political organization of the world, based as it is on +the idea of nationality, the new phrase is as unsusceptible of universal +application as the old one was found to be. Fixity of national +boundaries and of national allegiance, and political stability would +disappear if this principle was uniformly applied. Impelled by new +social conditions, by economic interests, by racial prejudices, and by +the various forces which affect society, change and uncertainty would +result from an attempt to follow the principle in every case to which it +is possible to apply it. + +Among my notes I find one of December 20, 1918--that is, one week after +the American Commission landed in France--in which I recorded my +thoughts concerning certain phrases or epigrams of the President, which +he had declared to be bases of peace, and which I considered to contain +the seeds of future trouble. In regard to the asserted right of +"self-determination" I wrote: + + "When the President talks of 'self-determination' what unit has he in + mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? + Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this + principle is dangerous to peace and stability." + +Ten days later (December 30) the frequent repetition of the phrase in +the press and by members of certain groups and unofficial delegations, +who were in Paris seeking to obtain hearings before the Conference, +caused me to write the following: + + "The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right + of 'self-determination,' the more convinced I am of the danger of + putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be + the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create + trouble in many lands. + + "What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, + and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, + disorder, and rebellion? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and + Palestine and possibly of Morocco and Tripoli rely on it? How can it + be harmonized with Zionism, to which the President is practically + committed? + + "The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which + can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In + the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an + idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check + those who attempt to put the principle in force. What a calamity that + the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!" + +Since the foregoing notes were written the impracticability of the +universal or even of the general application of the principle has been +fully demonstrated. Mr. Wilson resurrected "the consent of the governed" +regardless of the fact that history denied its value as a practical +guide in modern political relations. He proclaimed it in the phrase +"self-determination," declaring it to be an "imperative principle of +action." He made it one of the bases of peace. And yet, in the +negotiations at Paris and in the formulation of the foreign policy of +the United States, he has by his acts denied the existence of the right +other than as the expression of a moral precept, as something to be +desired, but generally unattainable in the lives of nations. In the +actual conduct of affairs, in the practical and concrete relations +between individuals and governments, it doubtless exercises and should +exercise a measure of influence, but it is not a controlling influence. + +In the Treaty of Versailles with Germany the readjustment of the German +boundaries, by which the sovereignty over millions of persons of German +blood was transferred to the new states of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, +and the practical cession to the Empire of Japan of the port of +Kiao-Chau and control over the economic life of the Province of Shantung +are striking examples of the abandonment of the principle. + +In the Treaty of Saint-Germain the Austrian Tyrol was ceded to the +Kingdom of Italy against the known will of substantially the entire +population of that region. + +In both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Saint-Germain Austria +was denied the right to form a political union with Germany, and when an +article of the German Constitution of August, 1919, contemplating a +"reunion" of "German Austria" with the German Empire was objected to by +the Supreme Council, then in session at Paris, as in contradiction of +the terms of the Treaty with Germany, a protocol was signed on September +22, 1919, by plenipotentiaries of Germany and the five Principal Allied +and Associated Powers, declaring the article in the Constitution null +and void. There could hardly be a more open repudiation of the alleged +right of "self-determination" than this refusal to permit Austria to +unite with Germany however unanimous the wish of the Austrian people for +such union. + +But Mr. Wilson even further discredited the phrase by adopting a policy +toward Russia which ignored the principle. The peoples of Esthonia, +Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan have by blood, +language, and racial traits elements of difference which give to each of +them in more or less degree the character of a distinct nationality. +These peoples all possess aspirations to become independent states, and +yet, throughout the negotiations at Paris and since that time, the +Government of the United States has repeatedly refused to recognize the +right of the inhabitants of these territories to determine for +themselves the sovereignty under which they shall live. It has, on the +contrary, declared in favor of a "Great Russia" comprising the vast +territory of the old Empire except the province which belonged to the +dismembered Kingdom of Poland and the lands included within the present +boundaries of the Republic of Finland. + +I do not mention the policy of President Wilson as to an undivided +Russia by way of criticism because I believe the policy was and has +continued to be the right one. The reference to it is made for the +sole purpose of pointing out another example of Mr. Wilson's frequent +departure without explanation from his declared standard for the +determination of political authority and allegiance. I think +that it must be conceded that he has by his acts proved that +"self-determination" _is_ "a mere phrase" which ought to be discarded +as misleading because it cannot be practically applied. + +It may be pointed out as a matter of special interest to the student of +American history that, if the right of "self-determination" were sound +in principle and uniformly applicable in establishing political +allegiance and territorial sovereignty, the endeavor of the Southern +States to secede from the American Union in 1861 would have been wholly +justifiable; and, conversely, the Northern States, in forcibly +preventing secession and compelling the inhabitants of the States +composing the Confederacy to remain under the authority of the Federal +Government, would have perpetrated a great and indefensible wrong +against the people of the South by depriving them of a right to which +they were by nature entitled. This is the logic of the application of +the principle of "self-determination" to the political rights at issue +in the American Civil War. + +I do not believe that there are many Americans of the present generation +who would support the proposition that the South was inherently right +and the North was inherently wrong in that great conflict. There were, +at the time when the sections were arrayed in arms against each other, +and there may still be, differences of opinion as to the _legal_ right +of secession under the Constitution of the United States, but the +inherent right of a people of a State to throw off at will their +allegiance to the Federal Union and resume complete sovereignty over the +territory of the State was never urged as a conclusive argument. It was +the legal right and not the natural right which was emphasized as +justifying those who took up arms in order to disrupt the Union. But if +an American citizen denies that the principle of "self-determination" +can be rightfully applied to the affairs of his own country, how can he +consistently maintain that it is a right inseparable from a true +conception of political liberty and therefore universally applicable, +just in principle, and wise from the practical point of view? + +Of course, those who subscribe to "self-determination" and advocate it +as a great truth fundamental to every political society organized to +protect and promote civil liberty, do not claim it for races, peoples, +or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive them of the +capacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations. As to +peoples or communities, however, who do possess the intelligence to make +a rational choice of political allegiance, no exception is made, so far +as words go, to the undeviating application of the principle. It is the +affirmation of an unqualified right. It is one of those declarations of +principle which sounds true, which in the abstract may be true, and +which appeals strongly to man's innate sense of moral right and to his +conception of natural justice, but which, when the attempt is made to +apply it in every case, becomes a source of political instability and +domestic disorder and not infrequently a cause of rebellion. + +In the settlement of territorial rights and of the sovereignty to be +exercised over particular regions there are several factors which +require consideration. International boundaries may be drawn along +ethnic, economic, geographic, historic, or strategic lines. One or all +of these elements may influence the decision, but whatever argument may +be urged in favor of any one of these factors, the chief object in the +determination of the sovereignty to be exercised within a certain +territory is national safety. National safety is as dominant in the life +of a nation as self-preservation is in the life of an individual. It is +even more so, as nations do not respond to the impulse of +self-sacrifice. With national safety as the primary object to be +attained in territorial settlements, the factors of the problem assume +generally, though not always, the following order of importance: the +strategic, to which is closely allied the geographic and historic; the +economic, affecting the commercial and industrial life of a nation; and +lastly the ethnic, including in the terms such conditions as +consanguinity, common language, and similar social and religious +institutions. + +The national safety and the economic welfare of the United States were +at stake in the War of Secession, although the attempt to secede +resulted from institutional rather than ethnic causes. The same was true +when in the Papineau Rebellion of 1837 the French inhabitants of the +Province of Lower Canada attempted for ethnic reasons to free themselves +from British sovereignty. Had the right of "self-determination" in the +latter case been recognized as "imperative" by Great Britain, the +national life and economic growth of Canada would have been strangled +because the lines of communication and the commercial routes to the +Atlantic seaboard would have been across an alien state. The future of +Canada, with its vast undeveloped resources, its very life as a British +colony, depended upon denying the right of "self-determination." It was +denied and the French inhabitants of Quebec were forced against their +will to accept British sovereignty. + +Experience has already demonstrated the unwisdom of having given +currency to the phrase "self-determination." As the expression of an +actual right, the application of which is universal and invariable, the +phrase has been repudiated or at least violated by many of the terms of +the treaties which brought to an end the World War. Since the time that +the principle was proclaimed, it has been the excuse for turbulent +political elements in various lands to resist established governmental +authority; it has induced the use of force in an endeavor to wrest the +sovereignty over a territory or over a community from those who have +long possessed and justly exercised it. It has formed the basis for +territorial claims by avaricious nations. And it has introduced into +domestic as well as international affairs a new spirit of disorder. It +is an evil thing to permit the principle of "self-determination" to +continue to have the apparent sanction of the nations when it has been +in fact thoroughly discredited and will always be cast aside whenever it +comes in conflict with national safety, with historic political rights, +or with national economic interests affecting the prosperity of +a nation. + +This discussion of the right of "self-determination," which was one of +the bases of peace which President Wilson declared in the winter of +1918, and which was included in the modifying clause of his guaranty as +originally drafted, is introduced for the purpose of showing the +reluctance which I felt in accepting his guidance in the adoption of a +principle so menacing to peace and so impossible of practical +application. As a matter of fact I never discussed the subject with Mr. +Wilson as I purposed doing, because a situation arose on January 10, +1919, which discouraged me from volunteering to him advice on matters +which did not directly pertain to legal questions and to the +international administration of legal justice. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919 + + +It is with extreme reluctance, as the reader will understand, that I +make any reference to the conference which the President held with the +American Commissioners at the Hotel Crillon on January 10, because of +the personal nature of what occurred. It would be far more agreeable to +omit an account of this unpleasant episode. But without referring to it +I cannot satisfactorily explain the sudden decision I then reached to +take no further part in the preparation or revision of the text of the +Covenant of the League of Nations. Without explanation my subsequent +conduct would be, and not without reason, open to the charge of neglect +of duty and possibly of disloyalty. I do not feel called upon to rest +under that suspicion, or to remain silent when a brief statement of what +occurred at that conference will disclose the reason for the cessation +of my efforts to effect changes in the plan of world organization which +the President had prepared. In the circumstances there can be no +impropriety in disclosing the truth as to the cause for a course of +action when the course of action itself must be set forth to complete +the record and to explain an ignorance of the subsequent negotiations +regarding the League of Nations, an ignorance which has been the subject +of public comment. Certainly no one who participated in the conference +can object to the truth being known unless for personal reasons he +prefers that a false impression should go forth. After careful +consideration I can see no public reason for withholding the facts. At +this meeting, to which I refer, the President took up the provisions of +his original draft of a Covenant, which was at the time in typewritten +form, and indicated the features which he considered fundamental to the +proper organization of a League of Nations. I pointed out certain +provisions which appeared to me objectionable in principle or at least +of doubtful policy. Mr. Wilson, however, clearly indicated--at least so +I interpreted his words and manner--that he was not disposed to receive +these criticisms in good part and was unwilling to discuss them. He also +said with great candor and emphasis that he did not intend to have +lawyers drafting the treaty of peace. Although this declaration was +called forth by the statement that the legal advisers of the American +Commission had been, at my request, preparing an outline of a treaty, a +"skeleton treaty" in fact, the President's sweeping disapproval of +members of the legal profession participating in the treaty-making +seemed to be, and I believe was, intended to be notice to me that my +counsel was unwelcome. Being the only lawyer on the delegation I +naturally took this remark to myself, and I know that other American +Commissioners held the same view of its purpose. If my belief was +unjustified, I can only regret that I did not persevere in my criticisms +and suggestions, but I could not do so believing as I then did that a +lawyer's advice on any question not wholly legal in nature was +unacceptable to the President, a belief which, up to the present time, I +have had no reason to change. + +It should be understood that this account of the conference of January +10 is given by way of explanation of my conduct subsequent to it and not +in any spirit of complaint or condemnation of Mr. Wilson's attitude. He +had a right to his own opinion of the worth of a lawyer's advice and a +right to act in accordance with that opinion. If there was any injustice +done, it was in his asking a lawyer to become a Peace Commissioner, +thereby giving the impression that he desired his counsel and advice as +to the negotiations in general, when in fact he did not. But, +disregarding the personal element, I consider that he was justified in +his course, as the entire constitutional responsibility for the +negotiation of a treaty was on his shoulders and he was, in the +performance of his duty, entitled to seek advice from those only in +whose judgment he had confidence. + +In spite of this frank avowal of prejudice by the President there was no +outward change in the personal and official relations between him and +myself. The breach, however, regardless of appearances, was too wide and +too deep to be healed. While subsequent events bridged it temporarily, +it remained until my association with President Wilson came to an end in +February, 1920. I never forgot his words and always felt that in his +mind my opinions, even when he sought them, were tainted with legalism. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT + + +As it seemed advisable, in view of the incident of January 10, to have +nothing to do with the drafting of the Covenant unless the entire theory +was changed, the fact that there prevailed at that time a general belief +that a preliminary treaty of peace would be negotiated in the near +future invited an effort to delay the consideration of a complete and +detailed charter of the League of Nations until the definitive treaty or +a separate treaty dealing with the League alone was considered. As delay +would furnish time to study and discuss the subject and prevent hasty +acceptance of an undesirable or defective plan, it seemed to me that the +advisable course to take was to limit reference to the organization in +the preliminary treaty to general principles. + +The method that I had in mind in carrying out this policy was to secure +the adoption, by the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace, of a +resolution embodying a series of declarations as to the creation, the +nature, and the purposes of a League of Nations, which declarations +could be included in the preliminary treaty of peace accompanied by an +article providing for the negotiation of a detailed plan based on these +declarations at the time of the negotiation of the definitive treaty or +else by an article providing for the summoning of a world congress, in +which all nations, neutrals as well as belligerents, would be +represented and have a voice in the drafting of a convention +establishing a League of Nations in accordance with the general +principles declared in the preliminary treaty. Personally I preferred a +separate treaty, but doubted the possibility of obtaining the assent of +the Conference to that plan because some of the delegates showed a +feeling of resentment toward certain neutral nations on account of their +attitude during the war, while the inclusion of the four powers which +had formed the Central Alliance seemed almost out of the question. + +In addition to the advantage to be gained by postponing the +determination of the details of the organization until the theory, the +form, the purposes and the powers of the proposed League could be +thoroughly considered, it would make possible the speedy restoration of +a state of peace. There can be no doubt that peace at the earliest +possible moment was the supreme need of the world. The political and +social chaos in the Central Empires, due to the overthrow of their +strong autocratic governments and the prevailing want, suffering, and +despair, in which the war had left their peoples, offered a fertile +field for the pernicious doctrines of Bolshevism to take root and +thrive. A proletarian revolution seemed imminent. The Spartacists in +Germany, the Radical Socialists in Austria, and the Communists in +Hungary were the best organized and most vigorous of the political +groups in those countries and were conducting an active and seemingly +successful propaganda among the starving and hopeless masses, while the +Russian duumvirs, Lenine and Trotsky, were with funds and emissaries +aiding these movements against established authority and social order. +Eastern Europe seemed to be a volcano on the very point of eruption. +Unless something was speedily done to check the peril, it threatened to +spread to other countries and even to engulf the very foundations of +modern civilization. + +A restoration of commercial relations and of normal industrial +conditions through the medium of a treaty of peace appeared to offer the +only practical means of resisting these movements and of saving Europe +from the horrors of a proletarian despotism which had brought the +Russian people to so low a state. This was the common judgment of those +who at that time watched with increasing impatience the slow progress of +the negotiations at Paris and with apprehension the political turmoil in +the defeated and distracted empires of Central Europe. + +An immediate restoration of peace was, as I then saw it, of vital +importance to the world as it was the universal demand of all mankind. +To delay it for the purpose of completing the organization of a League +of Nations or for any other purpose than the formulation of terms +essential to peace seemed to me to be taking a risk as to the future +wholly unwarranted by the relative importance of the subjects. There is +no question, in the light of subsequent events, that the peoples of the +Central Empires possessed a greater power of resistance to the +temptations of lawlessness and disorder than was presumed in the winter +of 1918-19. And yet it was a critical time. Anything might have +happened. It would have taken very little to turn the scale. What +occurred later cannot excuse the delay in making peace. It was not wise +statesmanship and foresight that saved the world from a great +catastrophe but the fortunate circumstance that a people habituated to +obedience were not led astray by the enemies of the existing order. + +Of the importance of negotiating a peace without waiting to complete a +detailed plan for a League of Nations I was firmly convinced in those +early days at Paris, and I know that the President's judgment as to this +was contrary to mine. He considered--at least his course can only be so +interpreted--that the organization of a League in all its details was +the principal task to be accomplished by the Conference, a task that he +felt must be completed before other matters were settled. The conclusion +is that the necessity of an immediate peace seemed to him subordinate to +the necessity of erecting an international agency to preserve the peace +when it was restored. In fact one may infer that the President was +disposed to employ the general longing for peace as a means of exerting +pressure on the delegates in Paris and on their Governments to accept +his plan for a League. It is generally believed that objections to +certain provisions of the Covenant were not advanced or, if advanced, +were not urged because the discussion of objections would mean delay in +negotiating the peace. + +Mr. Wilson gave most of his time and thought prior to his departure for +the United States in February, 1919, to the revision of the plan of +organization which he had prepared and to the conversion of the more +influential members of the Conference to its support. While other +questions vital to a preliminary peace treaty were brought up in the +Council of Ten, he showed a disposition to keep them open and to avoid +their settlement until the Covenant had been reported to the Conference. +In this I could not conscientiously follow him. I felt that the policy +was wholly wrong since it delayed the peace. + +Though recognizing the President's views as to the relative importance +of organizing a League and of restoring peace without delay, and +suspecting that he purposed to use the impatience and fear of the +delegates to break down objections to his plan of organization, I still +hoped that the critical state of affairs in Europe might induce him to +adopt another course. With that hope I began the preparation of a +resolution to be laid before the Conference, which, if adopted, would +appear in the preliminary treaty in the form of declarations which would +constitute the bases of a future negotiation regarding a League +of Nations. + +At a conference on January 20 between the President and the American +Commissioners, all being present except Colonel House, I asked the +President if he did not think that, in view of the shortness of time +before he would be compelled to return to Washington on account of the +approaching adjournment of Congress, it would be well to prepare a +resolution of this sort and to have it adopted in order that it might +clear the way for the determination of other matters which should be +included in a preliminary treaty. From the point of view of policy I +advanced the argument that a series of declarations would draw the fire +of the opponents and critics of the League and would give opportunity +for an expression of American public opinion which would make possible +the final drafting of the charter of a League in a way to win the +approval of the great mass of the American people and in all probability +insure approval of the Covenant by the Senate of the United States. + +In reviewing what took place at this conference I realize now, as I did +not then, that it was impolitic for me to have presented an argument +based on the assumption that changes in the President's plan might be +necessary, as he might interpret my words to be another effort to revise +the theory of his plan. At the time, however, I was so entirely +convinced of the expediency of this course, from the President's own +point of view as well as from the point of view of those who gave first +place to restoring peace, that I believed he would see the advantage to +be gained and would adopt the course suggested. I found that I was +mistaken. Mr. Wilson without discussing the subject said that he did not +think that a resolution of that sort was either necessary or advisable. + +While this definite rejection of the proposal seemed to close the door +to further effort in that direction, I decided to make another attempt +before abandoning the plan. The next afternoon (January 21) at a meeting +of the Council of Ten, the discussion developed in a way that gave me an +excuse to present the proposal informally to the Council. The advantages +to be gained by adopting the suggested action apparently appealed to the +members, and their general approval of it impressed the President, for +he asked me in an undertone if I had prepared the resolution. I replied +that I had been working upon it, but had ceased when he said to me the +day before that he did not think it necessary or advisable, adding that +I would complete the draft if he wished me to do so. He said that he +would be obliged to me if I would prepare one. + +Encouraged by the support received in the Council and by the seeming +willingness of the President to give the proposal consideration, I +proceeded at once to draft a resolution. + +The task was not an easy one because it would have been useless to +insert in the document any declaration which seemed to be contradictory +of the President's theory of an affirmative guaranty or which was not +sufficiently broad to be interpreted in other terms in the event that +American public opinion was decidedly opposed to his theory, as I felt +that it would be. It was also desirable, from my point of view, that the +resolution should contain a declaration in favor of the equality of +nations or one which would prevent the establishment of an oligarchy of +the Great Powers, and another declaration which would give proper place +to the administration of legal justice in international disputes. + +The handicaps and difficulties under which I labored are manifest, and +the resolution as drafted indicates them in that it does not express as +clearly and unequivocally as it would otherwise do the principles which +formed the bases of the articles which I handed to the President on +January 7 and which have already been quoted _in extenso_. + +The text of the resolution, which was completed on the 22d, reads as +follows: + + "_Resolved_ that the Conference makes the following declaration: + + "That the preservation of international peace is the standing policy + of civilization and to that end a league of nations should be + organized to prevent international wars; + + "That it is a fundamental principle of peace that all nations are + equally entitled to the undisturbed possession of their respective + territories, to the full exercise of their respective sovereignties, + and to the use of the high seas as the common property of all + peoples; and + + "That it is the duty of all nations to engage by mutual covenants-- + + "(1) To safeguard from invasion the sovereign rights of one another; + + "(2) To submit to arbitration all justiciable disputes which fail of + settlement by diplomatic arrangement; + + "(3) To submit to investigation by the league of nations all + non-justiciable disputes which fail of settlement by diplomatic + arrangement; and + + "(4) To abide by the award of an arbitral tribunal and to respect a + report of the league of nations after investigation; + + "That the nations should agree upon-- + + "(1) A plan for general reduction of armaments on land and sea; + + "(2) A plan for the restriction of enforced military service and the + governmental regulation and control of the manufacture and sale of + munitions of war; + + "(3) Full publicity of all treaties and international agreements; + + "(4) The equal application to all other nations of commercial and + trade regulations and restrictions imposed by any nation; and + + "(5) The proper regulation and control of new states pending complete + independence and sovereignty." + +This draft of a resolution was discussed with the other American +Commissioners, and after some changes of a more or less minor character +which it seemed advisable to make because of the appointment of a +Commission on the League of Nations at a plenary session of the +Conference on January 25, of which Commission President Wilson and +Colonel House were the American members, I sent the draft to the +President on the 31st, four days before the Commission held its first +meeting in Colonel House's office at the Hotel Crillon. + +As the Sixty-Fifth Congress would come to an end on March 4, and as the +interpretation which had been placed on certain provisions of the +Federal Constitution required the presence of the Chief Executive in +Washington during the last days of a session in order that he might pass +upon legislation enacted in the days immediately preceding adjournment, +Mr. Wilson had determined that he could not remain in Paris after +February 14. At the time that I sent him the proposed resolution there +remained, therefore, but two weeks for the Commission on the League of +Nations to organize, to deliberate, and to submit its report to the +Conference, provided its report was made prior to the President's +departure for the United States. It did not seem to me conceivable that +the work of the Commission could be properly completed in so short a +time if the President's Covenant became the basis of its deliberations. +This opinion was shared by many others who appreciated the difficulties +and intricacies of the subject and who felt that a hasty and undigested +report would be unwise and endanger the whole plan of a world +organization. + +In view of this situation, which seemed to be a strong argument for +delay in drafting the plan of international organization, I wrote a +letter to the President, at the time I sent him the proposed resolution, +saying that in my opinion no plan could be prepared with sufficient care +to warrant its submission to the Conference on the Preliminaries of +Peace before he left Paris and that unless a plan was reported he would +be in the position of returning empty-handed to the United States. I +urged him in the circumstances to secure the adoption of a resolution by +the delegates similar in nature, if not in language, to the draft which +was enclosed, thereby avoiding a state of affairs which would be very +disheartening to the advocates of a League of Nations and cause general +discontent among all peoples who impatiently expected evidence that the +restoration of peace was not far distant. + +It would be presumptuous on my part to speculate on the President's +feelings when he received and read my letter and the proposed +resolution. It was never answered or acknowledged, and he did not act +upon the suggestion or discuss acting upon it, to my knowledge, with any +of his colleagues. On the contrary, he summoned the Commission on the +League of Nations to meet on February 3, eleven days before the date +fixed for his departure for the United States, and laid before that body +his revised draft of a Covenant which formed the groundwork for the +Commission's report presented to the Conference on February 14. + +The question naturally arises--Why did the President ask me to complete +and send to him the resolution embodying a series of declarations if he +did not intend to make it a subject of consideration and discussion? It +is a pertinent question, but the true answer remains with Mr. Wilson +himself. Possibly he concluded that the only way to obtain his plan for +a League was to insist upon its practical acceptance before peace was +negotiated, and that, unless he took advantage of the universal demand +for peace by making the acceptance of the Covenant a condition +precedent, he would be unable to obtain its adoption. While I believe +this is a correct supposition, it is not responsive to the question as +to the reason why he wished me to deliver to him a draft resolution. In +fact it suggests another question--What, from the President's point of +view, was to be gained by having the resolution in his hands? + +I think the answer is not difficult to find when one remembers that Mr. +Wilson had disapproved a resolution of that sort and that the Council of +Ten had seemed disposed to approve it. There was no surer way to prevent +me from bringing the subject again before the Council than by having the +proposed resolution before him for action. Having submitted it to him I +was bound, on account of our official relationship, to await his +decision before taking any further steps. In a word, his request for a +draft practically closed my mouth and tied my hands. If he sought to +check my activities with the members of the Council in favor of the +proposed course of action, he could have taken no more effectual way +than the one which he did take. It was undoubtedly an effective means of +"pigeonholing" a resolution, the further discussion of which might +interfere with his plan to force through a report upon the Covenant +before the middle of February. + +This opinion as to the motive which impelled the President to pursue the +course that he did in regard to a resolution was not the one held by me +at the time. It was formed only after subsequent events threw new light +on the subject. The delay perplexed me at the time, but the reason for +it was not evident. I continued to hope, even after the Commission on +the League of Nations had assembled and had begun its deliberations, +that the policy of a resolution would be adopted. But, as the days went +by and the President made no mention of the proposal, I realized that he +did not intend to discuss it, and the conviction was forced upon me that +he had never intended to have it discussed. It was a disappointing +result and one which impressed me with the belief that Mr. Wilson was +prejudiced against any suggestion that I might make, if it in any way +differed with his own ideas even though it found favor with others. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT + + +During the three weeks preceding the meeting of the Commission on the +League the work of revising the President's original draft of the +Covenant had been in progress, the President and Colonel House holding +frequent interviews with the more influential delegates, particularly +the British and French statesmen who had been charged with the duty of +studying the subject. While I cannot speak from personal knowledge, I +learned that the suggested changes in terms and language were put into +form by members of the Colonel's office staff. In addition to +modifications which were made to meet the wishes of the foreign +statesmen, especially the British, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, the +son-in-law and secretary of Colonel House, and Mr. David Hunter Miller, +Auchincloss's law partner and one of the accredited legal advisers of +the American Commission, prepared an elaborate memorandum on the +President's draft of a Covenant which contained comments and also +suggested changes in the text. On account of the intimate relations +existing between Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss and Colonel House it +seems reasonable to assume that their comments and suggestions were +approved by, if they did not to an extent originate with, the Colonel. +The memorandum was first made public by Mr. William C. Bullitt during +his hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in +September, 1919 (Senate Doc. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, pages 1177 +_et seq._). + +The most important amendment to the Covenant suggested by these advisers +was, in my judgment, the one relating to Article III of the draft, which +became Article 10 in the Treaty. After a long criticism of the +President's proposed guaranty, in which it is declared that "such an +agreement would destroy the Monroe Doctrine," and that "any guaranty of +independence and integrity means war by the guarantor if a breach of the +independence or integrity of the guaranteed State is attempted and +persisted in," the memorandum proposed that the following be +substituted: + + "Each Contracting Power severally covenants and guarantees that it + will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political + independence of any other Contracting Power." + +This proposed substitute should be compared with the language of the +"self-denying covenant" that I sent to the President on December 23, +1918, the pertinent portion of which is repeated here for the purpose of +such comparison: + + "Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and + guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or + impair the political sovereignty of any other power signatory or + adherent to this convention, ..." + +The practical adoption of the language of my proposed substitute in the +memorandum furnishes conclusive proof that Colonel House was "entirely +converted" to my form of a guaranty as he had frankly assured me that he +was on the evening of January 6. I am convinced also that Mr. Henry +White and General Bliss held the same views on the subject. It is +obvious that President Wilson was the only one of the American +representatives at Paris who favored the affirmative guaranty, but, as +he possessed the constitutional authority to determine independently the +policy of the United States, his form of a guaranty was written into the +revised draft of a Covenant submitted to the Commission on the League of +Nations and with comparatively little change was finally adopted in the +Treaty of Peace with Germany. + +The memorandum prepared by Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss was apparently +in the President's hands before the revised draft was completed, for +certain changes in the original draft were in accord with the +suggestions made in their memorandum. His failure to modify the guaranty +may be considered another rejection of the "self-denying covenant" and a +final decision to insist on the affirmative form of guaranty in spite of +the unanimous opposition of his American colleagues. + +In view of what later occurred a very definite conclusion may be reached +concerning the President's rejection of the proposed substitute for his +guaranty. Article 10 was from the first the storm center of opposition +to the report of the Commission on the League of Nations and the chief +cause for refusal of consent to the ratification of the Treaty of +Versailles by the Senate of the United States. The vulnerable nature of +the provision, which had been so plainly pointed out to the President +before the Covenant was submitted to the Commission, invited attack. If +he had listened to the advice of his colleagues, in fact if he had +listened to any American who expressed an opinion on the subject, the +Treaty would probably have obtained the speedy approval of the Senate. +There would have been opposition from those inimical to the United +States entering any international organization, but it would have been +insufficient to prevent ratification of the Treaty. + +As it was, the President's unalterable determination to have his form of +guaranty in the Covenant, in which he was successful, and his firm +refusal to modify it in any substantial way resulted in strengthening +the opponents to the League to such an extent that they were able to +prevent the Treaty from obtaining the necessary consent of two thirds of +the Senators. + +The sincerity of Mr. Wilson's belief in the absolute necessity of the +guaranty, which he proposed, to the preservation of international peace +cannot be doubted. While his advisers were practically unanimous in the +opinion that policy, as well as principle, demanded a change in the +guaranty, he clung tenaciously to the affirmative form. The result was +that which was feared and predicted by his colleagues. The President, +and the President alone, must bear the responsibility for the result. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION + + +On the day that the Commission on the League of Nations held its first +meeting and before I had reason to suspect that Mr. Wilson intended to +ignore the letter which I had sent him with the suggested resolution +enclosed, I determined to appeal to him in behalf of international +arbitration. I decided to do this on the assumption that, even if the +plan for a resolution was approved, the Commission would continue its +sessions in preparation for the subsequent negotiation of an agreement +of some sort providing for world organization. The provision as to +arbitration in the President's original draft of a Covenant was so wrong +from my point of view and showed such a lack of knowledge of the +practical side of the subject that I was impelled to make an effort to +induce him to change the provision. Except for the fact that the matter +was wholly legal in character and invited an opinion based on technical +knowledge, I would have remained silent in accordance with my feeling +that it would be inadvisable for me to have anything to do with drafting +the Covenant. I felt, however, that the constitution and procedure of +international courts were subjects which did not affect the general +theory of organization and concerning which my views might influence the +President and be of aid to him in the formulation of the judicial +feature of any plan adopted. + +With this object in view I wrote to him the following letter: + + "_Hôtel Crillon, Paris + + "February_ 3, 1919 + + "My Dear Mr. President: + + "I am deeply interested, as you know, in the constitution and + procedure of international courts of arbitration, and having + participated in five proceedings of this sort I feel that I can speak + with a measure of authority. + + "In the first place let me say that a tribunal, on which + representatives of the litigants sit as judges, has not proved + satisfactory even though the majority of the tribunal are nationals + of other countries. However well prepared from experience on the + bench to render strict justice, the litigants' arbitrators act in + fact as advocates. As a consequence the neutral arbitrators are + decidedly hampered in giving full and free expression to their views, + and there is not that frank exchange of opinion which should + characterize the conference of judges. It has generally resulted in a + compromise, in which the nation in the wrong gains a measure of + benefit and the nation in the right is deprived of a part of the + remedy to which it is entitled. In fact an arbitration award is more + of a political and diplomatic arrangement than it is a judicial + determination. I believe that this undesirable result can be in large + measure avoided by eliminating arbitrators of the litigant nations. + It is only in the case of monetary claims that these observations do + not apply. + + "Another difficulty has been the method of procedure before + international tribunals. This does not apply to monetary claims, but + to disputes arising out of boundaries, interpretation of treaties, + national rights, etc. The present method of an exchange of cases and + of counter-cases is more diplomatic than judicial, since it does not + put the parties in the relation of complainant and defendant. This + relation can in every case be established, if not by mutual + agreement, then by some agency of the League of Nations charged with + that duty. Until this reform of procedure takes place there will be + no definition of issues, and arbitration will continue to be the long + and elaborate proceeding it has been in the past. + + "There is another practical obstacle to international arbitration as + now conducted which ought to be considered, and that is the cost. + This obstacle does not affect wealthy nations, but it does prevent + small and poor nations from resorting to it as a means of settling + disputes. Just how this can be remedied I am not prepared to say, + although possibly the international support of all arbitral tribunals + might be provided. At any rate, I feel that something should be done + to relieve the great expense which now prevents many of the smaller + nations from resorting to arbitration. + + "I would suggest, therefore, that the Peace Treaty contain a + provision directing the League of Nations to hold a conference or to + summon a conference to take up this whole matter and draft an + international treaty dealing with the constitution of arbitral + tribunals and radically revising the procedure. + + "On account of the difficulties of the subject, which do not appear + on the surface, but which experience has shown to be very real, I + feel that it would be impracticable to provide in the Peace Treaty + too definitely the method of constituting arbitral tribunals. It will + require considerable thought and discussion to make arbitration + available to the poor as well as the rich, to make an award a + judicial settlement rather than a diplomatic compromise, and to + supersede the cumbersome and prolonged procedure with its duplication + of documents and maps by a simple method which will settle the issues + and materially shorten the proceedings which now unavoidably drag + along for months, if not for years. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "28 _Rue de Monceau_" + +At the time that I sent this letter to Mr. Wilson I had not seen the +revised draft of the Covenant which he laid before the Commission on the +League of Nations. The probability is that, if I had seen it, the letter +would not have been written, for in the revision of the original draft +the objectionable Article V, relating to arbitration and appeals from +arbitral awards, was omitted. In place of it there were substituted two +articles, 11 and 12, the first being an agreement to arbitrate under +certain conditions and the other providing that "the Executive Council +will formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of +International Justice, and this Court will be competent to hear and +determine any matter which the parties recognize as suitable for +submission to it for arbitration." + +Unadvised as to this change, which promised a careful consideration of +the method of applying legal principles of justice to international +disputes, I did not feel that I could let pass without challenge the +unsatisfactory provisions of the President's original draft. Knowing the +contempt which Mr. Wilson felt for The Hague Tribunal and his general +suspicion of the justice of decisions which it might render, it seemed +to me inexpedient to suggest that it should form the basis of a newly +constituted judiciary, a suggestion which I should have made had I been +dealing with any one other than President Wilson. In view of the +intensity of the President's prejudices and of the uselessness of +attempting to remove them, my letter was intended to induce him to +postpone a determination of the subject until the problems which it +presented could be thoroughly studied and a judicial system developed by +an international body of representatives more expert in juridical +matters than the Commission on the League of Nations, the American +members of which were incompetent by training, knowledge, and practical +experience to consider the subject. + +No acknowledgment, either written or oral, was ever made of my letter of +February 3. Possibly President Wilson considered it unnecessary to do so +in view of the provision in his revised Covenant postponing discussion +of the subject. At the time, however, I naturally assumed that my +voluntary advice was unwelcome to him. His silence as to my +communications, which seemed to be intended to discourage a continuance +of them, gave the impression that he considered an uninvited opinion on +any subject connected with the League of Nations an unwarranted +interference with a phase of the negotiations which he looked upon as +his own special province, and that comment or suggestion, which did not +conform wholly to his views, was interpreted into opposition and +possibly into criticism of him personally. + +This judgment of the President's mental attitude, which was formed at +the time, may have been too harsh. It is possible that the shortness of +time in which to complete the drafting of the report of the Commission +on the League of Nations, upon which he had set his heart, caused him to +be impatient of any criticism or suggestion which tended to interrupt +his work or that of the Commission. It may have been that pressure for +time prevented him from answering letters of the character of the one of +February 3. Whatever the real reason was, the fact remains that the +letter went unnoticed and the impression was made that it was futile to +attempt to divert the President from the single purpose which he had in +mind. His fidelity to his own convictions and his unswerving +determination to attain what he sought are characteristics of Mr. Wilson +which are sources of weakness as well as of strength. Through them +success has generally crowned his efforts, success which in some +instances has been more disastrous than failure would have been. + +By what means the change of Article V of the original draft of the +Covenant took place, I cannot say. In the memorandum of Messrs. Miller +and Auchincloss no suggestion of a Court of International Justice +appears, which seems to indicate that the provision in the revised draft +did not originate with them or with Colonel House. In fact on more than +one occasion I had mentioned arbitration to the Colonel and found his +views on the subject extremely vague, though I concluded that he had +almost as poor an opinion of The Hague Tribunal as did the President. +The probability is that the change was suggested to Mr. Wilson by one of +the foreign statesmen in a personal interview during January and that +upon sounding others he found that they were practically unanimous in +favor of a Permanent Court of Justice. As a matter of policy it seemed +wise to forestall amendment by providing for its future establishment. +If this is the true explanation, Article 12 was not of American origin, +though it appears in the President's revised draft. + +To be entirely frank in stating my views in regard to Mr. Wilson's +attitude toward international arbitration and its importance in a plan +of world organization, I have always been and still am skeptical of the +sincerity of the apparent willingness of the President to accept the +change which was inserted in his revised draft. It is difficult to avoid +the belief that Article V of the original draft indicated his true +opinion of the application of legal principles to controversies between +nations. That article, by depriving an arbitral award of finality and +conferring the power of review on a political body with authority to +order a rehearing, shows that the President believed that more complete +justice would be rendered if the precepts and rules of international law +were in a measure subordinated to political expediency and if the judges +were not permitted to view the questions solely from the standpoint of +legal justice. There is nothing that occurred, to my knowledge, between +the printing of the original draft of the Covenant and the printing of +the revised draft, which indicated a change of opinion by the President. +It may be that this is a misinterpretation of Mr. Wilson's attitude, and +that the change toward international arbitration was due to conviction +rather than to expediency; but my belief is that expediency was the +sole cause. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +The Commission on the League of Nations, over which President Wilson +presided, held ten meetings between February 3 and February 14, on which +latter day it submitted a report at a plenary session of the Conference +on the Preliminaries of Peace. The report was presented by the President +in an address of exceptional excellence which made a deep impression on +his hearers. His dignity of manner, his earnestness, and his logical +presentation of the subject, clothed as it was in well-chosen phrases, +unquestionably won the admiration of all, even of those who could not +reconcile their personal views with the Covenant, as reported by the +Commission. It was a masterly effort, an example of literary rather than +emotional oratory, peculiarly fitting to the occasion and to the temper +and intellectual character of the audience. + +Considering the brief time given to its discussion in the Commission and +the necessary haste required to complete the document before the +President's departure, the Covenant as reported to the Conference was a +creditable piece of work. Many of the more glaring errors of expression +and some of the especially objectionable features of the President's +revised draft were eliminated. There were others which persisted, but +the improvement was so marked that the gross defects in word and phrase +largely disappeared. If one accepted the President's theory of +organization, there was little to criticize in the report, except a +certain inexactness of expression which indicated a lack of technical +knowledge on the part of those who put the Covenant into final form. But +these crudities and ambiguities of language would, it was fair to +presume, disappear if the articles passed through the hands of +drafting experts. + +Fundamentally, however, the Covenant as reported was as wrong as the +President's original draft, since it contained the affirmative guaranty +of political independence and territorial integrity, the primacy of the +Five Great Powers on the Executive Council, and the perplexing and +seemingly unsound system of mandates. In this I could not willingly +follow President Wilson, but I felt that I had done all that I could +properly do in opposition to his theory. The responsibility of decision +rested with him and he had made his decision. There was nothing more +to be said. + +On the evening of the day of the plenary session, at which the report of +the League of Nations was submitted, the President left Paris for Brest +where the George Washington was waiting to convey him to the United +States. He carried with him the report of the Commission, whose +deliberations and decisions he had so manifestly dominated. He went +prepared to meet his political antagonists and the enemies of the +League, confidently believing that he could win a popular support that +would silence the opposition which had been increasingly manifest in the +Halls of Congress and in some of the Republican newspapers which +declined to follow Mr. Taft, Mr. Wickersham, Mr. Straus, and other +influential Republican members of the League to Enforce Peace. + +During the ten days preceding February 14, when the Commission on the +League of Nations held daily sessions, the President had no conferences +with the American Commissioners except, of course, with Colonel House, +his American colleague on the Commission on the League. On the morning +of the 14th, however, he called a meeting of the Commissioners and +delivered to them the printed report which was to be presented that +afternoon to the plenary session. As the meetings of the Commission on +the League of Nations had been secret, the American Commissioners, other +than Colonel House, were almost entirely ignorant of the proceedings and +of the progress being made. Colonel House's office staff knew far more +about it than did Mr. White, General Bliss, or I. When the President +delivered the report to the Commissioners they were, therefore, in no +position to express an opinion concerning it. The only remarks were +expressions of congratulation that he had been able to complete the work +before his departure. They were merely complimentary. As to the merits +of the document nothing was or could be said by the three Commissioners, +since no opportunity had been given them to study it, and without a +critical examination any comment concerning its provisions would have +been worthless. I felt and I presume that my two colleagues, who had not +been consulted as to the work of the Commission on the League, felt, +that it was, in any event, too late to offer suggestions or make +criticisms. The report was in print; it was that afternoon to be laid +before the Conference; in twelve hours the President would be on his way +to the United States. Clearly it would have been useless to find fault +with the report, especially if the objections related to the fundamental +ideas of the organization which it was intended to create. The President +having in the report declared the American policy, his commissioned +representatives were bound to acquiesce in his decision whatever their +personal views were. Acquiescence or resignation was the choice, and +resignation would have undoubtedly caused an unfortunate, if not a +critical, situation. In the circumstances acquiescence seemed the only +practical and proper course. + +The fact that in ten meetings and in a week and a half a Commission +composed of fifteen members, ten of whom represented the Five Great +Powers and five of whom represented the lesser powers (to which were +later added four others), completed the drafting of a detailed plan of a +League of Nations, is sufficient in itself to raise doubts as to the +thoroughness with which the work was done and as to the care with which +the various plans and numerous provisions proposed were studied, +compared, and discussed. It gives the impression that many clauses were +accepted under the pressing necessity of ending the Commission's labors +within a fixed time. The document itself bears evidence of the haste +with which it was prepared, and is almost conclusive proof in itself +that it was adopted through personal influence rather than because of +belief in the wisdom of all its provisions. + +The Covenant of the League of Nations was intended to be the greatest +international compact that had ever been written. It was to be the +_Maxima Charta_ of mankind securing to the nations their rights and +liberties and uniting them for the preservation of universal peace. To +harmonize the conflicting views of the members of the Commission--and it +was well known that they were conflicting--and to produce in eleven days +a world charter, which would contain the elements of greatness or even +of perpetuity, was on the face of it an undertaking impossible of +accomplishment. The document which was produced sufficiently establishes +the truth of this assertion. + +It required a dominant personality on the Commission to force through a +detailed plan of a League in so short a time. President Wilson was such +a personality. By adopting the scheme of an oligarchy of the Great +Powers he silenced the dangerous opposition of the French and British +members of the Commission who willingly passed over minor defects in the +plan provided this Concert of Powers, this Quintuple Alliance, was +incorporated in the Covenant. And for the same reason it may be assumed +the Japanese and Italians found the President's plan acceptable. Mr. +Wilson won a great personal triumph, but he did so by surrendering the +fundamental principle of the equality of nations. In his eagerness to +"make the world safe for democracy" he abandoned international democracy +and became the advocate of international autocracy. + +It is not my purpose to analyze the provisions of the Covenant which was +submitted to the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on February +14, 1919. My objections to it have been sufficiently discussed in the +preceding pages. It would be superfluous to repeat them. The innumerable +published articles and the endless debates on the Covenant have brought +out its good features as well as its defects. Unfortunately for the +opponents and defenders of the document alike some of the objections +urged have been flagrantly unjustifiable and based on false premises and +misstatements of fact and of law, which seem to show political motives +and not infrequently personal animosity toward Mr. Wilson. The +exaggerated statements and unfair arguments of some of the Senators, +larded, as they often were, with caustic sarcasm and vindictive +personalities, did much to prevent an honest and useful discussion of +the merits and demerits of the Covenant. + +The effect upon President Wilson of this campaign against him +personally--and it seems to me that it would have had the same effect +upon any man of spirit--was to arouse his indignation. Possibly a less +stubborn man would not have assumed so uncompromising an attitude as he +did or have permitted his ire to find expression in threats, but it +cannot be denied that there was provocation for the resentment which he +exhibited. The President has been blamed for not having sought more +constantly to placate the opponents of the Covenant and to meet them on +a common ground of compromise, especially during his visit to the United +States in February, 1919. From the point of view of policy there is +justice in blaming him, but, when one considers the personal animus +shown and the insolent tone assumed by some of his critics, his conduct +was very human; not wise, but human. Mr. Wilson had never shown a spirit +of conciliation in dealing with those who opposed him. Even in the case +of a purely political question he appeared to consider opposition to be +a personal affront and he was disposed to retaliate in a personal way. +In a measure this explains the personal enmity of many of his political +foes. I think that it is not unjust to say that President Wilson was +stronger in his hatreds than in his friendships. He seemed to lack the +ability to forgive one who had in any way offended him or opposed him. + +Believing that much of the criticism of the Covenant was in reality +criticism of him as its author, a belief that was in a measure +justified, the President made it a personal matter. He threatened, in a +public address delivered in the New York Opera House on the eve of his +departure for France, to force the Republican majority to accept the +Covenant by interweaving the League of Nations into the terms of peace +to such an extent that they could not be separated, so that, if they +rejected the League, they would be responsible for defeating the Treaty +and preventing a restoration of peace. With the general demand for peace +this seemed no empty threat, although the propriety of making it may be +questioned. It had, however, exactly the opposite effect from that which +the President intended. Its utterance proved to be as unwise as it was +ineffective. The opposition Senators resented the idea of being coerced. +They became more than ever determined to defeat a President whom they +charged with attempting to disregard and nullify the right of the Senate +to exercise independently its constitutional share in the treaty-making +power. Thus at the very outset of the struggle between the President and +the Senate a feeling of hostility was engendered which continued with +increasing bitterness on both sides and prevented any compromise or +concession in regard to the Covenant as it finally appeared in the +Treaty of Versailles. + +When President Wilson returned to Paris after the adjournment of the +Sixty-Fifth Congress on March 4, 1919, he left behind him opponents who +were stronger and more confident than they were when he landed ten days +before. While his appeal to public opinion in favor of the League of +Nations had been to an extent successful, there was a general feeling +that the Covenant as then drafted required amendment so that the +sovereign rights and the traditional policies of the United States +should be safeguarded. Until the document was amended it seemed that the +opposition had the better of the argument with the people. Furthermore, +when the new Congress met, the Republicans would have a majority in the +Senate which was of special importance in the matter of the Treaty which +would contain the Covenant, because it would, when sent to the Senate, +be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations to report on its +ratification and a majority of that Committee, under a Republican +organization, would presumably be hostile to the plan for a League +advocated by the President. The Committee could hinder and possibly +prevent the acceptance of the Covenant, while it would have the +opportunity to place the opposition's case in a favorable light before +the American people and to attack the President's conduct of the +negotiations at Paris. + +I believe that the President realized the loss of strategic position +which he had sustained by the Democratic defeat at the polls in +November, 1918, but was persuaded that, by making certain alterations in +the Covenant suggested by Republicans favorable to the formation of a +League, and especially those advocating a League to Enforce Peace, he +would be able to win sufficient support in the Senate and from the +people to deprive his antagonists of the advantage which they had gained +by the elections. This he sought to do on his return to Paris about the +middle of March. If the same spirit of compromise had been shown while +he was in America it would doubtless have gone far to weaken hostility +to the Covenant. Unfortunately for his purpose he assumed a contrary +attitude, and in consequence the sentiment against the League was +crystallized and less responsive to the concessions which the President +appeared willing to make when the Commission on the League of Nations +resumed its sittings, especially as the obnoxious Article 10 +remained intact. + +In the formulation of the amendments to the Covenant, which were +incorporated in it after the President's return from the United States +and before its final adoption by the Conference, I had no part and I +have no reason to think that Mr. White or General Bliss shared in the +work. As these amendments or modifications did not affect the theory of +organization or the fundamental principles of the League, they in no way +changed my views or lessened the differences between the President's +judgment and mine. Our differences were as to the bases and not as to +the details of the Covenant. Since there was no disposition to change +the former we were no nearer an agreement than we were in January. + +The President's visit to the United States had been disappointing to the +friends of a League in that he had failed to rally to the support of the +Covenant an overwhelming popular sentiment in its favor which the +opposition in the Senate could not resist. The natural reaction was that +the peoples of Europe and their statesmen lost a measure of their +enthusiasm and faith in the project. Except in the case of a few +idealists, there was a growing disposition to view it from the purely +practical point of view and to speculate on its efficacy as an +instrument to interpret and carry out the international will. Among the +leaders of political thought in the principal Allied countries, the +reports of the President's reception in the United States were +sufficiently conflicting to arouse doubt as to whether the American +people were actually behind him in his plan for a League, and this doubt +was not diminished by his proposed changes in the Covenant, which +indicated that he was not in full control of the situation at home. + +Two weeks after the President had resumed his duties as a negotiator and +had begun the work of revising the Covenant, I made a memorandum of my +views as to the situation that then existed. The memorandum is +as follows: + + "_March_ 25, 1919 + + "With the increasing military preparations and operations throughout + Eastern Europe and the evident purpose of all these quarreling + nations to ignore any idea of disarmament and to rely upon force to + obtain and retain territory and rights, the League of Nations is + being discussed with something like contempt by the cynical, + hard-headed statesmen of those countries which are being put on a + war-footing. They are cautious and courteous out of regard for the + President. I doubt if the truth reaches him, but it comes to me from + various sources. + + "These men say that in theory the idea is all right and is an ideal + to work toward, but that under present conditions it is not practical + in preventing war. They ask, what nation is going to rely on the + guaranty in the Covenant if a jealous or hostile neighbor maintains a + large army. They want to know whether it would be wise or not to + disarm under such conditions. Of course the answers are obvious. But, + if the guaranty is not sufficient, or accepted as sufficient, + protection, what becomes of the central purpose of the League and the + chief reason for creating it? + + "I believe that the President and Colonel House see this, though they + do not admit it, and that to save the League from being cast into the + discard they will attempt to make of it a sort of international + agency to do certain things which would normally be done by + independent international commissions. Such a course would save the + League from being still-born and would so interweave it with the + terms of peace that to eliminate it would be to open up some + difficult questions. + + "Of course the League of Nations as originally planned had one + supreme object and that was to prevent future wars. That was + substantially all that it purposed to do. Since then new functions + have been gradually added until the chief argument for the League's + existence has been almost lost to sight. The League has been made a + convenient 'catch-all' for all sorts of international actions. At + first this was undoubtedly done to give the League something to do, + and now it is being done to save it from extinction or from + being ignored. + + "I am not denying that a common international agent may be a good + thing. In fact the plan has decided merit. But the organization of + the League does not seem to me suitable to perform efficiently and + properly these new functions. + + "However, giving this character to the League may save it from being + merely an agreeable dream. As the repository of international + controversies requiring long and careful consideration it may live + and be useful. + + "My impression is that the principal sponsors for the League are + searching through the numerous disputes which are clogging the wheels + of the Conference, seizing upon every one which can possibly be + referred, and heaping them on the League of Nations to give it + standing as a useful and necessary adjunct to the Treaty. + + "At least that is an interesting view of what is taking place and + opens a wide field for speculation as to the future of the League and + the verdict which history will render as to its origin, its nature, + and its real value." + +I quote this memorandum because it gives my thoughts at the time +concerning the process of weaving the League into the terms of peace as +the President had threatened to do. I thought then that it had a double +purpose, to give a practical reason for the existence of the League and +to make certain the ratification of the Covenant by the Senate. No fact +has since developed which has induced me to change my opinion. + +In consequence of the functions which were added to the League, the +character of the League itself underwent a change. Instead of an agency +created solely for the prevention of international wars, it was +converted into an agency to carry out the terms of peace. Its idealistic +conception was subordinated to the materialistic purpose of confirming +to the victorious nations the rewards of victory. It is true that during +the long struggle between the President and the Senate on the question +of ratification there was in the debates a general return to the +original purpose of the League by both the proponents and opponents of +the Covenant, but that fact in no way affects the truth of the assertion +that, in order to save the League of Nations, its character was changed +by extending its powers and duties as a common agent of the nations +which had triumphed over the Central Alliance. + +The day before the Treaty of Peace was delivered to the German +plenipotentiaries (May 6) its terms induced me to write a note entitled +"The Greatest Loss Caused by the War," referring to the loss of idealism +to the world. In that note I wrote of the League of Nations as follows: + + "Even the measure of idealism, with which the League of Nations was + at the first impregnated, has, under the influence and intrigue of + ambitious statesmen of the Old World, been supplanted by an open + recognition that force and selfishness are primary elements in + international co-operation. The League has succumbed to this + reversion to a cynical materialism. It is no longer a creature of + idealism. Its very source and reason have been dried up and have + almost disappeared. The danger is that it will become a bulwark of + the old order, a check upon all efforts to bring man again under the + influence which he has lost." + +The President, in the addresses which he afterward made in advocacy of +the Covenant and of ratification of the Treaty, indicated clearly the +wide divergence of opinion between us as to the character of the League +provided for in the Treaty. I do not remember that the subject was +directly discussed by us, but I certainly took no pains to hide my +misgivings as to the place it would have in the international relations +of the future. However, as Mr. Wilson knew that I disapproved of the +theory and basic principles of the organization, especially the +recognition of the oligarchy of the Five Powers, he could not but +realize that I considered that idealism had given place to political +expediency in order to secure for the Covenant the support of the +powerful nations represented at the Conference. This was my belief as to +our relations when the Treaty of Peace containing the Covenant was laid +before the Germans at the Hôtel des Reservoirs in Versailles. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES + + +In the foregoing review of the opposite views held by the President and +by me in regard to the plan for a League of Nations and specifically in +regard to the Covenant as originally drawn and as revised, mention was +made of the proposed mandatory system as one of the subjects concerning +which we were not in agreement. My objections to the system were +advanced chiefly on the ground of the legal difficulties which it +presented because it seemed probable that the President would give more +weight to my opinion on that ground than on one which concerned the +policy of adopting the system. Viewed from the latter standpoint it +appeared to me most unwise for the President to propose a plan, in which +the United States would be expected to participate and which, if it did +participate, would involve it in the political quarrels of the Old +World. To do so would manifestly require a departure from the +traditional American policy of keeping aloof from the political +jealousies and broils of Europe. Without denying that present conditions +have, of necessity, modified the old policy of isolation and without +minimizing the influence of that fact on the conduct of American foreign +affairs, it did not seem essential for the United States to become the +guardian of any of the peoples of the Near East, who were aspiring to +become independent nationalities, a guardianship which the President +held to be a duty that the United States was bound to perform as its +share of the burden imposed by the international coöperation which he +considered vital to the new world order. + +The question of mandates issuing from the League of Nations was +discussed at length by the Council of Ten in connection with the +disposition and future control of the German colonies and incidentally +as to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The discussions were +chiefly along the lines of practicability, of policy, and of moral +obligation. The President's strong support of the mandatory system and +his equally strong objection to the idea of _condominium_ showed that +his mind was made up in favor of the issuance of mandates by the League. +Since it would have been highly improper for me to oppose openly a +policy which the President had declared under his constitutional +authority, there was no proper opportunity to present the legal +difficulties of the system to the Council. + +However, the seriousness of these difficulties and the possible troubles +and controversies which might be anticipated from attempting to put the +system into operation induced me, after one of the sessions of the +Council of Ten, to state briefly to the President some of the serious +objections to League mandates from the standpoint of international law +and the philosophy of government. President Wilson listened with his +usual attentiveness to what I had to say, though the objections +evidently did not appeal to him, as he characterized them as "mere +technicalities" which could be cured or disregarded. Impressed myself +with the importance of these "technicalities" and their direct bearing +on the policy of adopting the mandatory system, I later, on February 2, +1919, embodied them in a memorandum. At the time I hoped and believed +that the negotiation of the completed Covenant might be postponed and +that there would be another opportunity to raise the question. The +memorandum, prepared with this end in view, is as follows: + + "The system of 'mandatories under the League of Nations,' when + applied to territories which were formerly colonies of Germany, the + system which has been practically adopted and will be written into + the plan for the League, raises some interesting and difficult + questions: + + "The one, which is the most prominent since it enters into nearly all + of the international problems presented, is--Where does the + sovereignty over these territories reside? + + "Sovereignty is inherent in the very conception of government. It + cannot be destroyed, though it may be absorbed by another sovereignty + either by compulsion or cession. When the Germans were ousted from + their colonies, the sovereignty passed to the power or powers which + took possession. The location of the sovereignty up to the present is + clear, but with the introduction of the League of Nations as an + international primate superior to the conquerors some rather + perplexing questions will have to be answered. + + "Do those who have seized the sovereignty transfer it or does Germany + transfer it to the League of Nations? If so, how? + + "Does the League assume possession of the sovereignty on its + renunciation by Germany? If so, how? + + "Does the League merely direct the disposition of the sovereignty + without taking possession of it? + + "Assuming that the latter question is answered in the affirmative, + then after such disposition of the right to exercise sovereignty, + which will presumably be a limited right, where does the actual + sovereignty reside? + + "The appointment of a mandatory to exercise sovereign rights over + territory is to create an agent for the real sovereign. But who is + the real sovereign? + + "Is the League of Nations the sovereign, or is it a common agent of + the nations composing the League, to whom is confided solely the duty + of naming the mandatory and issuing the mandate? + + "If the League is the sovereign, can it avoid responsibility for the + misconduct of the mandatory, its agent? + + "If it is not the League, who is responsible for the mandatory's + conduct? + + "Assuming that the mandatory in faithfully performing the provisions + of the mandate unavoidably works an injustice upon another party, can + or ought the mandatory to be held responsible? If not, how can the + injured party obtain redress? Manifestly the answer is, 'From the + sovereign,' but who is the sovereign? + + "In the Treaty of Peace Germany will be called upon to renounce + sovereignty over her colonial possessions. To whom will the + sovereignty pass? + + "If the reply is, 'The League of Nations,' the question is: Does the + League possess the attributes of an independent state so that it can + function as an owner of territory? If so, what is it? A world state? + + "If the League does not constitute a world state, then the + sovereignty would have to pass to some national state. What national + state? What would be the relation of the national state to + the League? + + "If the League is to receive title to the sovereignty, what officers + of the League are empowered to receive it and to transfer its + exercise to a mandatory? + + "What form of acceptance should be adopted? + + "Would every nation which is a member of the League have to give its + representatives full powers to accept the title? + + "Assuming that certain members decline to issue such powers or to + accept title as to one or more of the territories, what relation + would those members have to the mandatory named?" + +There is no attempt in the memorandum to analyze or classify the queries +raised, and, as I review them in the light of the terms of the Treaty of +Versailles, I do not think that some of them can be asked with any +helpful purpose. On the other hand, many of the questions, I believe the +large majority, were as pertinent after the Treaty was completed as they +were when the memorandum was made. + +As Colonel House was the other member of the Commission on the League of +Nations and would have to consider the practicability and expediency of +including the mandatory system in the Covenant, I read the memorandum to +him stating that I had orally presented most of the questions to the +President who characterized them as "legal technicalities" and for that +reason unimportant. I said to the Colonel that I differed with the +President, as I hoped he did, not only as to the importance of +considering the difficulties raised by the questions before the system +of mandates was adopted, but also as to the importance of viewing from +every standpoint the wisdom of the system and the difficulties that +might arise in its practical operation. I stated that, in my opinion, a +simpler and better plan was to transfer the sovereignty over territory +to a particular nation by a treaty of cession under such terms as seemed +wise and, in the case of some of the newly erected states, to have them +execute treaties accepting protectorates by Powers mutually acceptable +to those states and to the League of Nations. + +Colonel House, though he listened attentively to the memorandum and to +my suggestions, did not seem convinced of the importance of the +questions or of the advantages of adopting any other plan than that of +the proposed mandatory system. To abandon the system meant to abandon +one of the ideas of international supervision, which the President +especially cherished and strongly advocated. It meant also to surrender +one of the proposed functions of the League as an agent in carrying out +the peace settlements under the Treaty, functions which would form the +basis of an argument in favor of the organization of the League and +furnish a practical reason for its existence. Of course the presumed +arguments against the abandonment of mandates may not have been +considered, but at the time I believed that they were potent with +Colonel House and with the President. The subsequent advocacy of the +system by these two influential members of the Commission on the League +of Nations, which resulted in its adoption, in no way lessened my belief +as to the reasons for their support. + +The mandatory system, a product of the creative mind of General Smuts, +was a novelty in international relations which appealed strongly to +those who preferred to adopt unusual and untried methods rather than to +accept those which had been tested by experience and found practical of +operation. The self-satisfaction of inventing something new or of +evolving a new theory is inherent with not a few men. They are +determined to try out their ideas and are impatient of opposition which +seeks to prevent the experiment. In fact opposition seems sometimes to +enhance the virtue of a novelty in the minds of those who propose or +advocate its adoption. Many reformers suffer from this form of vanity. + +In the case of the system of mandates its adoption by the Conference and +the conferring on the League of Nations the power to issue mandates +seemed at least to the more conservative thinkers at Paris a very +doubtful venture. It appeared to possess no peculiar advantages over the +old method of transferring and exercising sovereign control either in +providing added protection to the inhabitants of territory subject to a +mandate or greater certainty of international equality in the matter of +commerce and trade, the two principal arguments urged in favor of the +proposed system. + +If the advocates of the system intended to avoid through its operation +the appearance of taking enemy territory as the spoils of war, it was a +subterfuge which deceived no one. It seemed obvious from the very first +that the Powers, which under the old practice would have obtained +sovereignty over certain conquered territories, would not be denied +mandates over those territories. The League of Nations might reserve in +the mandate a right of supervision of administration and even of +revocation of authority, but that right would be nominal and of little, +if any, real value provided the mandatory was one of the Great Powers as +it undoubtedly would be. The almost irresistible conclusion is that the +protagonists of the theory saw in it a means of clothing the League of +Nations with an apparent usefulness which justified the League by making +it the guardian of uncivilized and semi-civilized peoples and the +international agent to watch over and prevent any deviation from the +principle of equality in the commercial and industrial development of +the mandated territories. + +It may appear surprising that the Great Powers so readily gave their +support to the new method of obtaining an apparently limited control +over the conquered territories, and did not seek to obtain complete +sovereignty over them. It is not necessary to look far for a sufficient +and very practical reason. If the colonial possessions of Germany had, +under the old practice, been divided among the victorious Powers and +been ceded to them directly in full sovereignty, Germany might justly +have asked that the value of such territorial cessions be applied on any +war indemnities to which the Powers were entitled. On the other hand, +the League of Nations in the distribution of mandates would presumably +do so in the interests of the inhabitants of the colonies and the +mandates would be accepted by the Powers as a duty and not to obtain new +possessions. Thus under the mandatory system Germany lost her +territorial assets, which might have greatly reduced her financial debt +to the Allies, while the latter obtained the German colonial possessions +without the loss of any of their claims for indemnity. In actual +operation the apparent altruism of the mandatory system worked in favor +of the selfish and material interests of the Powers which accepted the +mandates. And the same may be said of the dismemberment of Turkey. It +should not be a matter of surprise, therefore, that the President found +little opposition to the adoption of his theory, or, to be more +accurate, of the Smuts theory, on the part of the European statesmen. + +There was one case, however, in which the issuance of a mandate appeared +to have a definite and practical value and to be superior to a direct +transfer of complete sovereignty or of the conditional sovereignty +resulting from the establishment of a protectorate. The case was that of +a territory with or without a national government, which, not being +self-supporting and not sufficiently strong to protect its borders from +aggressive neighbors, or its people sufficiently enlightened to govern +themselves properly, would be a constant source of expense instead of +profit to the Power, which as its protector and tutor became its +overlord. Under such conditions there was more probability of persuading +a nation inspired by humanitarian and altruistic motives to assume the +burden for the common good under the mandatory system than under the old +method of cession or of protectorate. As to nations, however, which +placed national interests first and made selfishness the standard of +international policy it was to be assumed that an appeal under either +system would be ineffective. + +The truth of this was very apparent at Paris. In the tentative +distribution of mandates among the Powers, which took place on the +strong presumption that the mandatory system would be adopted, the +principal European Powers appeared to be willing and even eager to +become mandatories over territories possessing natural resources which +could be profitably developed and showed an unwillingness to accept +mandates for territories which, barren of mineral or agricultural +wealth, would be continuing liabilities rather than assets. This is not +stated by way of criticism, but only in explanation of what took place. + +From the beginning to the end of the discussions on mandates and their +distribution among the Powers it was repeatedly declared that the United +States ought to participate in the general plan for the upbuilding of +the new states which under mandatories would finally become independent +nationalities, but it was never, to my knowledge, proposed, except by +the inhabitants of the region in question, that the United States should +accept a mandate for Syria or the Asiatic coast of the Aegean Sea. Those +regions were rich in natural resources and their economic future under a +stable government was bright. Expenditures in their behalf and the +direction of their public affairs would bring ample returns to the +mandatory nations. On the other hand, there was a sustained +propaganda--for it amounted to that--in favor of the United States +assuming mandates over Armenia and the municipal district of +Constantinople, both of which, if limited by the boundaries which it was +then purposed to draw, would be a constant financial burden to the Power +accepting the mandate, and, in the case of Armenia, would require that +Power to furnish a military force estimated at not less than 50,000 men +to prevent the aggression of warlike neighbors and to preserve domestic +order and peace. + +It is not too severe to say of those who engaged in this propaganda that +the purpose was to take advantage of the unselfishness of the American +people and of the altruism and idealism of President Wilson in order to +impose on the United States the burdensome mandates and to divide those +which covered desirable territories among the European Powers. I do not +think that the President realized at the time that an actual propaganda +was going on, and I doubt very much whether he would have believed it if +he had been told. Deeply impressed with the idea that it was the moral +duty of the great and enlightened nations to aid the less fortunate and +especially to guard the nationalities freed from autocratic rule until +they were capable of self-government and self-protection, the President +apparently looked upon the appeals made to him as genuine expressions of +humanitarianism and as manifestations of the opinion of mankind +concerning the part that the United States ought to take in the +reconstruction of the world. His high-mindedness and loftiness of +thought blinded him to the sordidness of purpose which appears to have +induced the general acquiescence in his desired system of mandates, and +the same qualities of mind caused him to listen sympathetically to +proposals, the acceptance of which would give actual proof of the +unselfishness of the United States. + +Reading the situation thus and convinced of the objections against the +mandatory system from the point of view of international law, of policy +and of American interests, I opposed the inclusion of the system in the +plan for a League of Nations. In view of the attitude which Mr. Wilson +had taken toward my advice regarding policies I confined the objections +which I presented to him, as I have stated, to those based on legal +difficulties. The objections on the ground of policy were made to +Colonel House in the hope that through him they might reach the +President and open his eyes to the true state of affairs. Whether they +ever did reach him I do not know. Nothing in his subsequent course of +action indicated that they did. + +But, if they did, he evidently considered them as invalid as he did the +objections arising from legal difficulties. The system of mandates was +written into the Treaty and a year after the Treaty was signed President +Wilson asked the Congress for authority to accept for the United States +a mandate over Armenia. This the Congress refused. It is needless to +make further comment. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED + + +The differences between the President's views and mine in regard to the +character of the League of Nations and to the provisions of the Covenant +relating to the organization and functions of the League were +irreconcilable, and we were equally in disagreement as to the duties of +the League in carrying out certain provisions of the Treaty of Peace as +the common agent of the signatory Powers. As a commissioned +representative of the President of the United States acting under his +instructions I had no alternative but to accept his decisions and to +follow his directions, since surrender of my commission as Peace +Commissioner seemed to me at the time to be practically out of the +question. I followed his directions, however, with extreme reluctance +because I felt that Mr. Wilson's policies were fundamentally wrong and +would unavoidably result in loss of prestige to the United States and to +him as its Chief Magistrate. It seemed to me that he had endangered, if +he had not destroyed, his preeminent position in world affairs in order +to obtain the acceptance of his plan for a League of Nations, a plan +which in theory and in detail was so defective that it would be +difficult to defend it successfully from critical attack. + +The objections to the terms of the Covenant, which I had raised at the +outset, were based on principle and also on policy, as has been shown in +the preceding pages; and on the same grounds I had opposed their hasty +adoption and their inclusion in the Peace Treaty to be negotiated at +Paris by the Conference. These objections and the arguments advanced in +their support did not apparently have any effect on President Wilson, +for they failed to change his views or to modify the plan which he, with +General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil, had worked out for an international +organization. They did not swerve him one jot from his avowed purpose to +make the creation of the League of Nations the principal feature of the +negotiations and the provisions of the Covenant the most prominent +articles in the Treaties of Peace with the Central Powers. + +Instead of accomplishing their designed purpose, my efforts to induce +the President to change his policy resulted only in my losing his +confidence in my judgment and in arousing in his mind, if I do not +misinterpret his conduct, doubts of my loyalty to him personally. It was +characteristic of Mr. Wilson that his firm conviction as to the +soundness of his conclusions regarding the character of the League of +Nations and his fixity of purpose in seeking to compel its adoption by +the Peace Conference were so intense as to brook no opposition, +especially from one whom he expected to accept his judgment without +question and to give support in thought and word to any plan or policy +which he advocated. In view of this mental attitude of the President it +is not difficult to understand his opinion of my course of action at +Paris. The breach in our confidential relations was unavoidable in view +of my conviction of the duty of an official adviser and his belief that +objections ought not to be urged as to a matter concerning which he had +expressed his opinion. To give implied assent to policies and intentions +which seemed to me wrong or unwise would have been violative of a public +trust, though doubtless by remaining silent I might have won favor and +approval from the President and retained his confidence. + +In summarizing briefly the subjects of disagreement between the +President and myself concerning the League of Nations I will follow the +order of importance rather than the order in which they arose. While +they also divide into two classes, those based on principle and those +based on policy, it does not seem advisable to treat them by classes in +the summary. + +The most serious defect in the President's Covenant was, in my opinion, +one of principle. It was the practical denial of the equality of nations +in the regulation of international affairs in times of peace through the +recognition in the Executive Council of the League of the right of +primacy of the Five Great Powers. This was an abandonment of a +fundamental principle of international law and comity and was +destructive of the very conception of national sovereignty both as a +term of political philosophy and as a term of constitutional law. The +denial of the equal independence and the free exercise of sovereign +rights of all states in the conduct of their foreign affairs, and the +establishment of this group of primates, amounted to a recognition of +the doctrine that the powerful are, in law as well as in fact, entitled +to be the overlords of the weak. If adopted, it legalized the mastery of +might, which in international relations, when peace prevailed, had been +universally condemned as illegal and its assertion as reprehensible. + +It was this doctrine, that the possessors of superior physical power +were as a matter of right the supervisors, if not the dictators, of +those lacking the physical power to resist their commands, which was the +vital element of ancient imperialism and of modern Prussianism. Belief +in it as a true theory of world polity justified the Great War in the +eyes of the German people even when they doubted the plea of their +Government that their national safety was in peril. The victors, +although they had fought the war with the announced purpose of proving +the falsity of this pernicious doctrine and of emancipating the +oppressed nationalities subject to the Central Powers, revived the +doctrine with little hesitation during the negotiations at Paris and +wrote it into the Covenant of the League of Nations by contriving an +organization which would give practical control over the destinies of +the world to an oligarchy of the Five Great Powers. It was an assumption +of the right of supremacy based on the fact that the united strength of +these Powers could compel obedience. It was a full endorsement of the +theory of "the balance of power" in spite of the recognized evils of +that doctrine in its practical application. Beneath the banner of the +democracies of the world was the same sinister idea which had found +expression in the Congress of Vienna with its purpose of protecting the +monarchical institutions of a century ago. It proclaimed in fact that +mankind must look to might rather than right, to force rather than law, +in the regulation of international affairs for the future. + +This defect in the theory, on which the League of Nations was to be +organized, was emphasized and given permanency by the adoption of a +mutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence +against external aggression. Since the burden of enforcing the guaranty +would unavoidably fall upon the more powerful nations, they could +reasonably demand the control over affairs which might develop into a +situation requiring a resort to the guaranty. In fact during a plenary +session of the Peace Conference held on May 31, 1919, President Wilson +stated as a broad principle that responsibility for protecting and +maintaining a settlement under one of the Peace Treaties carried with it +the right to determine what that settlement should be. The application +to the case of responsible guarantors is obvious and was apparently in +mind when the Covenant was being evolved. The same principle was applied +throughout the negotiations at Paris. + +The mutual guaranty from its affirmative nature compelled in fact, +though not in form, the establishment of a ruling group, a coalition of +the Great Powers, and denied, though not in terms, the equality of +nations. The oligarchy was the logical result of entering into the +guaranty or the guaranty was the logical result of the creation of the +oligarchy through the perpetuation of the basic idea of the Supreme War +Council. No distinction was made as to a state of war and a state of +peace. Strongly opposed to the abandonment of the principle of the +equality of nations in times of peace I naturally opposed the +affirmative guaranty and endeavored to persuade the President to accept +as a substitute for it a self-denying or negative covenant which +amounted to a promise of "hands-off" and in no way required the +formation of an international oligarchy to make it effective. + +In addition to the foregoing objection I opposed the guaranty on the +ground that it was politically inexpedient to attempt to bind the United +States by a treaty provision which by its terms would certainly invite +attack as to its constitutionality. Without entering into the strength +of the legal argument, and without denying that there are two sides to +the question, the fact that it was open to debate whether the +treaty-making power under the Constitution could or could not obligate +the Government of the United States to make war under certain conditions +was in my judgment a practical reason for avoiding the issue. If the +power existed to so bind the United States by treaty on the theory that +the Federal Government could not be restricted in its right to make +international agreements, then the guaranty would be attacked as an +unwise and needless departure from the traditional policies of the +Republic. If the power did not exist, then the violation of the +Constitution would be an effective argument against such an undertaking. +Whatever the conclusion might be, therefore, as to the legality of the +guaranty or as to whether the obligation was legal or moral in nature, +it did not seem possible for it to escape criticism and vigorous attack +in America. + +It seemed to me that the President's guaranty was so vulnerable from +every angle that to insist upon it would endanger the acceptance of any +treaty negotiated if the Covenant was, in accordance with the +President's plan, made an integral part of it. Then, too, opposition +would, in my opinion, develop on the ground that the guaranty would +permit European Powers to participate, if they could not act +independently, in the forcible settlement of international quarrels in +the Western Hemisphere whenever there was an actual invasion of +territory or violation of sovereignty, while conversely the United +States would be morally, if not legally, bound to take part in coercive +measures in composing European differences under similar conditions. It +could be urged with much force that the Monroe Doctrine in the one case +and the Washington policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" in the +other would be so affected that they would both have to be substantially +abandoned or else rewritten. If the American people were convinced that +this would be the consequence of accepting the affirmative guaranty, it +meant its rejection. In any event it was bound to produce an acrimonious +controversy. From the point of view of policy alone it seemed unwise to +include the guaranty in the Covenant, and believing that an objection on +that ground would appeal to the President more strongly than one based +on principle, I emphasized that objection, though in my own mind the +other was the more vital and more compelling. + +The points of difference relating to the League of Nations between the +President's views and mine, other than the recognition of the primacy of +the Great Powers, the affirmative guaranty and the resulting denial in +fact of the equality of nations in times of peace, were the provisions +in the President's original draft of the Covenant relating to +international arbitrations, the subordination of the judicial power to +the political power, and the proposed system of mandates. Having +discussed with sufficient detail the reasons which caused me to oppose +these provisions, and having stated the efforts made to induce President +Wilson to abandon or modify them, repetition would be superfluous. It is +also needless, in view of the full narrative of events contained in +these pages, to state that I failed entirely in my endeavor to divert +the President from his determination to have these provisions inserted +in the Covenant, except in the case of international arbitrations, and +even in that case I do not believe that my advice had anything to do +with his abandonment of his ideas as to the method of selecting +arbitrators and the right of appeal from arbitral awards. Those changes +and the substitution of an article providing for the future creation of +a Permanent Court of International Justice, were, in my opinion, as I +have said, a concession to the European statesmen and due to their +insistence. + +President Wilson knew that I disagreed with him as to the relative +importance of restoring a state of peace at the earliest date possible +and of securing the adoption of a plan for the creation of a League of +Nations. He was clearly convinced that the drafting and acceptance of +the Covenant was superior to every other task imposed on the Conference, +that it must be done before any other settlement was reached and that it +ought to have precedence in the negotiations. His course of action was +conclusive evidence of this conviction. + +On the other hand, I favored the speedy negotiation of a short and +simple preliminary treaty, in which, so far as the League of Nations was +concerned, there would be a series of declarations and an agreement for +a future international conference called for the purpose of drafting a +convention in harmony with the declarations in the preliminary treaty. +By adopting this course a state of peace would have been restored in the +early months of 1919, official intercourse and commercial relations +would have been resumed, the more complex and difficult problems of +settlement would have been postponed to the negotiation of the +definitive Treaty of Peace, and there would have been time to study +exhaustively the purposes, powers, and practical operations of a League +before the organic agreement was put into final form. Postponement would +also have given opportunity to the nations, which had continued neutral +throughout the war, to participate in the formation of the plan for a +League on an equal footing with the nations which had been belligerents. +In the establishment of a world organization universality of +international representation in reaching an agreement seemed to me +advisable, if not essential, provided the nations represented were +democracies and not autocracies. + +It was to be presumed also that at a conference entirely independent of +the peace negotiations and free from the influences affecting the terms +of peace, there would be more general and more frank discussions +regarding the various phases of the subject than was possible at a +conference ruled by the Five Great Powers and dominated in its +decisions, if not in its opinions, by the statesmen of those Powers. + +To perfect such a document, as the Covenant of the League of Nations was +intended to be, required expert knowledge, practical experience in +international relations, and an exchange of ideas untrammeled by +immediate questions of policy or by the prejudices resulting from the +war and from national hatreds and jealousies. It was not a work for +politicians, novices, or inexperienced theorists, but for trained +statesmen and jurists, who were conversant with the fundamental +principles of international law, with the usages of nations in their +intercourse with one another, and with the successes and failures of +previous experiments in international association. The President was +right in his conception as to the greatness of the task to be +accomplished, but he was wrong, radically wrong, in believing that it +could be properly done at the Paris Conference under the conditions +which there prevailed and in the time given for consideration of +the subject. + +To believe for a moment that a world constitution--for so its advocates +looked upon the Covenant--could be drafted perfectly or even wisely in +eleven days, however much thought individuals may have previously given +to the subject, seems on the face of it to show an utter lack of +appreciation of the problems to be solved or else an abnormal confidence +in the talents and wisdom of those charged with the duty. If one +compares the learned and comprehensive debates that took place in the +convention which drafted the Constitution of the United States, and the +months that were spent in the critical examination word by word of the +proposed articles, with the ten meetings of the Commission on the League +of Nations prior to its report of February 14 and with the few hours +given to debating the substance and language of the Covenant, the +inferior character of the document produced by the Commission ought not +to be a matter of wonder. It was a foregone conclusion that it would be +found defective. Some of these defects were subsequently corrected, but +the theory and basic principles, which were the chief defects in the +plan, were preserved with no substantial change. + +But the fact, which has been repeatedly asserted in the preceding pages +and which cannot be too strongly emphasized by repetition, is that the +most potent and most compelling reason for postponing the consideration +of a detailed plan for an international organization was that such a +consideration at the outset of the negotiations at Paris obstructed and +delayed the discussion and settlement of the general terms necessary to +the immediate restoration of a state of peace. Those who recall the +political and social conditions in Europe during the winter of 1918-19, +to which reference has already been made, will comprehend the +apprehension caused by anything which interrupted the negotiation of the +peace. No one dared to prophesy what might happen if the state of +political uncertainty and industrial stagnation, which existed under the +armistices, continued. + +The time given to the formulation of the Covenant of the League of +Nations and the determination that it should have first place in the +negotiations caused such a delay in the proceedings and prevented a +speedy restoration of peace. Denial of this is useless. It is too +manifest to require proof or argument to support it. It is equally true, +I regret to say, that President Wilson was chiefly responsible for this. +If he had not insisted that a complete and detailed plan for the League +should be part of the treaty negotiated at Paris, and if he had not also +insisted that the Covenant be taken up and settled in terms before other +matters were considered, a preliminary treaty of peace would in all +probability have been signed, ratified, and in effect during +April, 1919. + +Whatever evils resulted from the failure of the Paris Conference to +negotiate promptly a preliminary treaty--and it must be admitted they +were not a few--must be credited to those who caused the delay. The +personal interviews and secret conclaves before the Commission on the +League of Nations met occupied a month and a half. Practically another +half month was consumed in sessions of the Commission. The month +following was spent by President Wilson on his visit to the United +States explaining the reported Covenant and listening to criticisms. +While much was done during his absence toward the settlement of numerous +questions, final decision in every case awaited his return to Paris. +After his arrival the Commission on the League renewed its sittings to +consider amendments to its report, and it required over a month to put +it in final form for adoption; but during this latter period much time +was given to the actual terms of peace, which on account of the delay +caused in attempting to perfect the Covenant had taken the form of a +definitive rather than a preliminary treaty. + +It is conservative to say that between two and three months were spent +in the drafting of a document which in the end was rejected by the +Senate of the United States and was responsible for the non-ratification +of the Treaty of Versailles. In view of the warnings that President +Wilson had received as to the probable result of insisting on the plan +of a League which he had prepared and his failure to heed the warnings, +his persistency in pressing for acceptance of the Covenant before +anything else was done makes the resulting delay in the peace less +excusable. + +Two weeks after the President returned from the United States in March +the common opinion was that the drafting of the Covenant had delayed the +restoration of peace, an opinion which was endorsed in the press of many +countries. The belief became so general and aroused so much popular +condemnation that Mr. Wilson considered it necessary to make a public +denial, in which he expressed surprise at the published views and +declared that the negotiations in regard to the League of Nations had in +no way delayed the peace. Concerning the denial and the subject with +which it dealt, I made on March 28 the following memorandum: + + "The President has issued a public statement, which appears in this + morning's papers, in which he refers to the 'surprising impression' + that the discussions concerning the League of Nations have delayed + the making of peace and he flatly denies that the impression is + justified. + + "I doubt if this statement will remove the general impression which + amounts almost to a conviction. Every one knows that the President's + thoughts and a great deal of his time prior to his departure for the + United States were given to the formulation of the plan for a League + and that he insisted that the 'Covenant' should be drafted and + reported before the other features of the peace were considered. The + _real_ difficulties of the present situation, which had to be settled + before the treaty could be drafted, were postponed until his return + here on March 13th. + + "In fact the real bases of peace have only just begun to receive the + attention which they deserve. + + "If such questions as the Rhine Provinces, Poland, reparations, and + economic arrangements had been taken up by the President and Premiers + in January, and if they had sat day and night, as they are now + sitting _in camera,_ until each was settled, the peace treaty would, + I believe, be to-day on the Conference's table, if not + actually signed. + + "Of course the insistence that the plan of the League be first pushed + to a draft before all else prevented the settlement of the other + questions. Why attempt to refute what is manifestly true? I regret + that the President made the statement because I do not think that it + carries conviction. I fear that it will invite controversy and + denial, and that it puts the President on the defensive." + +The views expressed in this memorandum were those held, I believe, by +the great majority of persons who participated in the Peace Conference +or were in intimate touch with its proceedings. Mr. Wilson's published +denial may have converted some to the belief that the drafting of the +Covenant was in no way responsible for the delay of the peace, but the +number of converts must have been very few, as it meant utter ignorance +of or indifference to the circumstances which conclusively proved the +incorrectness of the statement. + +The effect of this attempt of President Wilson to check the growing +popular antipathy to the League as an obstacle to the speedy restoration +of peace was to cause speculation as to whether he really appreciated +the situation. If he did not, it was affirmed that he was ignorant of +public opinion or else was lacking in mental acuteness. If he did +appreciate the state of affairs, it was said that his statement was +uttered with the sole purpose of deceiving the people. In either case he +fell in public estimation. It shows the unwisdom of having issued +the denial. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE + + +There is one subject, connected with the consideration of the mutual +guaranty which, as finally reported by the Commission on the League of +Nations, appears as Article 10 of the Covenant, that should be briefly +reviewed, as it directly bears upon the value placed upon the guaranty +by the French statesmen who accepted it. I refer to the treaties +negotiated by France with the United States and Great Britain +respectively. These treaties provided that, in the event of France being +again attacked by Germany without provocation, the two Powers severally +agreed to come to the aid of the French Republic in repelling the +invasion. The joint nature of the undertaking was in a provision in each +treaty that a similar treaty would be signed by the other Power, +otherwise the agreement failed. The undertakings stated in practically +identical terms in the two treaties constituted, in fact, a triple +defensive alliance for the preservation of the integrity of French +territory and French independence. It had the same object as the +guaranty in the Covenant, though it went even further in the assurance +of affirmative action, and was, therefore, open to the same objections +on the grounds of constitutionality and policy as Article 10. + +In a note, dated March 20, stating my "Impressions as to the Present +Situation," I discussed the endeavors being made by the President to +overcome opposition and to remove obstacles to the acceptance of his +plan for a League of Nations by means of compromises and concessions. In +the note appears the following: + + "An instance of the lengths to which these compromises and makeshifts + are going, occurred this morning when Colonel House sent to Mr. + White, General Bliss, and me for our opinion the following proposal: + That the United States, Great Britain, and France enter into a formal + alliance to resist any aggressive action by Germany against France or + Belgium, and to employ their military, financial, and economic + resources for this purpose in addition to exerting their moral + influence to prevent such aggression. + + "We three agreed that, if that agreement was made, the chief reason + for a League of Nations, as now planned, disappeared. So far as + France and Belgium were concerned the alliance was all they needed + for their future safety. They might or might not accept the League. + Of course they would if the alliance depended upon their acceptance. + They would do most anything to get such an alliance. + + "The proposal was doubtless made to remove two provisions on which + the French are most insistent: _First_, an international military + staff to be prepared to use force against Germany if there were signs + of military activity; _second_, the creation of an independent + Rhenish Republic to act as a 'buffer' state. Of course the triple + alliance would make these measures needless. + + "What impressed me most was that to gain French support for the + League the proposer of the alliance was willing to destroy the chief + feature of the League. It seemed to me that here was utter blindness + as to the consequences of such action. There appears to have been no + thought given as to the way other nations, like Poland, Bohemia, and + the Southern Slavs, would view the formation of an alliance to + protect France and Belgium alone. Manifestly it would increase rather + than decrease their danger from Germany since she would have to look + eastward and southward for expansion. Of course they would not accept + as sufficient the guaranty in the Covenant when France and Belgium + declined to do it. + + "How would such a proposal be received in the United States with its + traditional policy of avoiding 'entangling alliances'? Of course, + when one considers it, the proposal is preposterous and would be + laughed at and rejected." + +This was the impression made upon me at the time that this triple +alliance against Germany was first proposed. I later came to look upon +it more seriously and to recognize the fact that there were some valid +reasons in favor of the proposal. The subject was not further discussed +by the Commissioners for several weeks, but it is clear from what +followed that M. Clemenceau, who naturally favored the idea, continued +to press the President to agree to the plan. What arguments were +employed to persuade him I cannot say, but, knowing the shrewdness of +the French Premier in taking advantage of a situation, my belief is that +he threatened to withdraw or at least gave the impression that he would +withdraw his support of the League of Nations or else would insist on a +provision in the Covenant creating a general staff and an international +military force and on a provision in the treaty establishing a Rhenish +Republic or else ceding to France all territory west of the Rhine. To +avoid the adoption of either of these provisions, which would have +endangered the approval of his plan for world organization, the +President submitted to the French demand. At least I assume that was the +reason, for he promised to enter into the treaty of assistance which M. +Clemenceau insisted should be signed. + +It is of course possible that he was influenced in his decision by the +belief that the knowledge that such an agreement existed would be +sufficient to deter Germany from even planning another invasion of +France, but my opinion is that the desire to win French support for the +Covenant was the chief reason for the promise that he gave. It should be +remembered that at the time both the Italians and Japanese were +threatening to make trouble unless their territorial ambitions were +satisfied. With these two Powers disaffected and showing a disposition +to refuse to accept membership in the proposed League of Nations the +opposition of France to the Covenant would have been fatal. It would +have been the end of the President's dream of a world organized to +maintain peace by an international guaranty of national boundaries and +sovereignties. Whether France would in the end have insisted on the +additional guaranty of protection I doubt, but it is evident that Mr. +Wilson believed that she would and decided to prevent a disaster to his +plan by acceding to the wishes of his French colleague. + +Some time in April prior to the acceptance of the Treaty of Peace by the +Premiers of the Allied Powers, the President and Mr. Lloyd George agreed +with M. Clemenceau to negotiate the treaties of protective alliance +which the French demanded. The President advised me of his decision on +the day before the Treaty was delivered to the German plenipotentiaries +stating in substance that his promise to enter into the alliance formed +a part of the settlements as fully as if written into the Treaty. I told +him that personally I considered an agreement to negotiate the treaty of +assistance a mistake, as it discredited Article 10 of the Covenant, +which he considered all-important, and as it would, I was convinced, be +the cause of serious opposition in the United States. He replied that he +considered it necessary to adopt this policy in the circumstances, and +that, at any rate, having passed his word with M. Clemenceau, who was +accepting the Treaty because of his promise, it was too late to +reconsider the matter and useless to discuss it. + +Subsequently the President instructed me to have a treaty drafted in +accordance with a memorandum which he sent me. This was done by Dr. +James Brown Scott and the draft was approved and prepared for signature. +On the morning of June 28, the same day on which the Treaty of +Versailles was signed, the protective treaty with France was signed at +the President's residence in the Place des Etats Unis by M. Clemenceau +and M. Pichon for the French Republic and by President Wilson and myself +for the United States, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour signing at the +same time a similar treaty for Great Britain. Though disagreeing with +the policy of the President in regard to this special treaty it would +have been futile for me to have refused to accept the full powers issued +to me on June 27 or to have declined to follow the directions to act as +a plenipotentiary in signing the document. Such a course would not have +prevented Mr. Wilson from entering into the defensive alliance with +France and Great Britain and might have actually delayed the peace. +Feeling strongly the supreme necessity of ending the existing state of +war as soon as possible I did not consider that I would be justified in +refusing to act as the formal agent of the President or in disobeying +his instructions as such agent. In view of the long delay in +ratification of the Treaty of the Peace, I have since doubted whether I +acted wisely. But at the time I was convinced that the right course was +the one which I followed. + +In spite of the fact that my judgment was contrary to the President's as +to the wisdom of negotiating this treaty because I considered the policy +of doing so bad from the standpoint of national interests and of +doubtful expediency in view of the almost certain rejection of it by the +United States Senate and of its probable effect on any plan for general +disarmament, I was not entirely satisfied because I could not disregard +the fact that an argument could be made in its favor which was not +without force. + +The United States entered the war to check the progress of the +autocratic imperialism of Germany. That purpose became generally +recognized before the victory was won. In making peace it was deemed, +therefore, a matter of first importance to make impossible a revival of +the aggressive spirit and ambitious designs of Germany. The prevailing +bitterness against France because of the territorial cessions and the +reparations demanded by the victor would naturally cause the German +people to seek future opportunity to be revenged. With a population +almost, if not quite, double that of the French Republic, Germany would +be a constant menace to the nation which had suffered so terribly in the +past by reason of the imperialistic spirit prevalent in the German +Empire. The fear of that menace strongly influenced the French policies +during the negotiations at Paris. In fact it was hard to avoid the +feeling that this fear dominated the conduct of the French delegates and +the attitude of their Government. They demanded much, and recognizing +the probable effect of their demands on the German people sought to +obtain special protection in case their vanquished enemy attempted in +the future to dispossess them by force of the land which he had been +compelled to surrender or attempted to make them restore the +indemnity paid. + +Whether France could have avoided the danger of German attack in the +future by lessening her demands, however just they might be, is neither +here nor there. It makes little practical difference how that question +is answered. The important fact is that the settlements in favor of +France under the Treaty were of a nature which made the continuance of +peace between the two nations doubtful if Germany possessed the ability +to regain her military strength and if nothing was done to prevent her +from using it. In these circumstances a special protective treaty seemed +a practical way to check the conversion of the revengeful spirit of the +Germans into another war of invasion. + +However valid this argument in favor of the two treaties of assistance, +and though my personal sympathy for France inclined me to satisfy her +wishes, my judgment, as an American Commissioner, was that American +interests and the traditional policies of the United States were against +this alliance. Possibly the President recognized the force of the +argument in favor of the treaty and valued it so highly that he +considered it decisive. Knowing, however, his general attitude toward +French demands and his confidence in the effectiveness of the guaranty +in the Covenant, I believe that the controlling reason for promising the +alliance and negotiating the treaty was his conviction that it was +necessary to make this concession to the French in order to secure their +support for the Covenant and to check the disposition in certain +quarters to make the League of Nations essentially a military coalition +under a general international staff organized and controlled by +the French. + +There were those who favored the mutual guaranty in the Covenant, but +who strongly opposed the separate treaty with France. Their objection +was that, in view of the general guaranty, the treaty of assistance was +superfluous, or, if it were considered necessary, then it discredited +the Covenant's guaranty. The argument was logical and difficult to +controvert. It was the one taken by delegates of the smaller nations who +relied on the general guaranty to protect their countries from future +aggressions on the part of their powerful neighbors. If the guaranty of +the Covenant was sufficient protection for them, they declared that it +ought to be sufficient for France. If France doubted its sufficiency, +how could they be content with it? + +Since my own judgment was against any form of guaranty imposing upon the +United States either a legal or a moral obligation to employ coercive +measures under certain conditions arising in international affairs, I +could not conscientiously support the idea of the French treaty. This +further departure from America's historic policy caused me to accept +President Wilson's "guidance and direction ... with increasing +reluctance," as he aptly expressed it in his letter of February 11, +1920. We did not agree, we could not agree, since our points of view +were so much at variance. + +Yet, in spite of the divergence of our views as to the negotiations +which constantly increased and became more and more pronounced during +the six months at Paris, our personal relations continued unchanged; at +least there was no outward evidence of the actual breach which existed. +As there never had been the personal intimacy between the President and +myself, such as existed in the case of Colonel House and a few others of +his advisers, and as our intercourse had always been more or less formal +in character, it was easier to continue the official relations that had +previously prevailed. I presume that Mr. Wilson felt, as I did, that it +would create an embarrassing situation in the negotiations if there was +an open rupture between us or if my commission was withdrawn or +surrendered and I returned to the United States before the Treaty of +Peace was signed. The effect, too, upon the situation in the Senate +would be to strengthen the opposition to the President's purposes and +furnish his personal, as well as his political, enemies with new grounds +for attacking him. + +I think, however, that our reasons for avoiding a public break in our +official relations were different. The President undoubtedly believed +that such an event would jeopardize the acceptance of the Covenant by +the United States Senate in view of the hostility to it which had +already developed and which was supplemented by the bitter animosity to +him personally which was undisguised. On my part, the chief reason for +leaving the situation undisturbed was that I was fully convinced that my +withdrawal from the American Commission would seriously delay the +restoration of peace, possibly in the signature of the Treaty at Paris +and certainly in its ratification at Washington. Considering that the +time had passed to make an attempt to change Mr. Wilson's views on any +fundamental principle, and believing it a duty to place no obstacle in +the way of the signature and ratification of the Treaty of Peace with +Germany, I felt that there was no course for me as a representative of +the United States other than to obey the President's orders however +strong my personal inclination might be to refuse to follow a line of +action which seemed to me wrong in principle and unwise in policy. + +In view of the subsequent contest between the President and the +opposition Senators over the Treaty of Versailles, resulting in its +non-ratification and the consequent delay in the restoration of a state +of peace between the United States and Germany, my failure at Paris to +decline to follow the President may be open to criticism, if not to +censure. But it can hardly be considered just to pass judgment on my +conduct by what occurred after the signature of the Treaty unless what +would occur was a foregone conclusion, and at that time it was not even +suggested that the Treaty would fail of ratification. The decision had +to be made under the conditions and expectations which then prevailed. +Unquestionably there was on June 28, 1919, a common belief that the +President would compose his differences with a sufficient number of the +Republican Senators to obtain the necessary consent of two thirds of the +Senate to the ratification of the Treaty, and that the delay in +senatorial action would be brief. I personally believed that that would +be the result, although Mr. Wilson's experience in Washington in +February and the rigid attitude, which he then assumed, might have been +a warning as to the future. Seeing the situation as I did, no man would +have been willing to imperil immediate ratification by resigning as +Commissioner on the ground that he was opposed to the President's +policies. A return to peace was at stake, and peace was the supreme need +of the world, the universal appeal of all peoples. I could not +conscientiously assume the responsibility of placing any obstacle in the +way of a return to peace at the earliest possible moment. It would have +been to do the very thing which I condemned in the President when he +prevented an early signing of the peace by insisting on the acceptance +of the Covenant of the League of Nations as a condition precedent. +Whatever the consequence of my action would have been, whether it +resulted in delay or in defeat of ratification, I should have felt +guilty of having prevented an immediate peace which from the first +seemed to me vitally important to all nations. Personal feelings and +even personal beliefs were insufficient to excuse such action. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME + + +Having reviewed the radical differences between the President and myself +in regard to the League of Nations and the inclusion of the Covenant in +the Treaty of Peace with Germany, it is necessary to revert to the early +days of the negotiations at Paris in order to explain the divergence of +our views as to the necessity of a definite programme for the American +Commission to direct it in its work and to guide its members in their +intercourse with the delegates of other countries. + +If the President had a programme, other than the general principles and +the few territorial settlements included in his Fourteen Points, and the +generalities contained in his "subsequent addresses," he did not show a +copy of the programme to the Commissioners or advise them of its +contents. The natural conclusion was that he had never worked out in +detail the application of his announced principles or put into concrete +form the specific settlements which he had declared ought to be in the +terms of peace. The definition of the principles, the interpretation of +the policies, and the detailing of the provisions regarding territorial +settlements were not apparently attempted by Mr. Wilson. They were in +large measure left uncertain by the phrases in which they were +delivered. Without authoritative explanation, interpretation, or +application to actual facts they formed incomplete and inadequate +instructions to Commissioners who were authorized "to negotiate peace." + +An examination of the familiar Fourteen Points uttered by the President +in his address of January 8, 1918, will indicate the character of the +declarations, which may be, by reason of their thought and expression, +termed "Wilsonian" (Appendix IV, p. 314). The first five Points are +announcements of principle which should govern the peace negotiations. +The succeeding eight Points refer to territorial adjustments, but make +no attempt to define actual boundaries, so essential in conducting +negotiations regarding territory. The Fourteenth Point relates to the +formation of "a general association of the nations for the purpose of +affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial +integrity to great and small nations alike." + +It is hardly worth while to say that the Fourteen Points and the four +principles declared in the address of February 11, 1918 (Appendix V), do +not constitute a sufficient programme for negotiators. Manifestly they +are too indefinite in specific application. They were never intended for +that purpose when they were proclaimed. They might have formed a general +basis for the preparation of instructions for peace commissioners, but +they omitted too many of the essentials to be considered actual +instructions, while the lack of definite terms to-be included in a +treaty further deprived them of that character. Such important and +practical subjects as reparations, financial arrangements, the use and +control of waterways, and other questions of a like nature, are not even +mentioned. As a general statement of the bases of peace the Fourteen +Points and subsequent declarations probably served a useful purpose, +though some critics would deny it, but as a working programme for the +negotiation of a treaty they were inadequate, if not wholly useless. + +Believing in the autumn of 1918 that the end of the war was approaching +and assuming that the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference +would have to be furnished with detailed written instructions as to the +terms of the treaty to be signed, I prepared on September 21, 1918, a +memorandum of my views as to the territorial settlements which would +form, not instructions, but a guide in the drafting of instructions for +the American Commissioners. At the time I had no intimation that the +President purposed to be present in person at the peace table and had +not even thought of such a possibility. The memorandum, which follows, +was written with the sole purpose of being ready to draft definite +instructions which could be submitted to the President when the time +came to prepare for the negotiation of the peace. The memorandum +follows: + + "The present Russian situation, which is unspeakably horrible and + which seems beyond present hope of betterment, presents new problems + to be solved at the peace table. + + "The Pan-Germans now have in shattered and impotent Russia the + opportunity to develop an alternative or supplemental scheme to their + 'Mittel-Europa' project. German domination over Southern Russia would + offer as advantageous, if not a more advantageous, route to the + Persian Gulf than through the turbulent Balkans and unreliable + Turkey. If both routes, north and south of the Black Sea, could be + controlled, the Pan-Germans would have gained more than they dreamed + of obtaining. I believe, however, that Bulgaria fears the Germans and + will be disposed to resist German domination possibly to the extent + of making a separate peace with the Allies. Nevertheless, if the + Germans could obtain the route north of the Black Sea, they would + with reason consider the war a successful venture because it would + give them the opportunity to rebuild the imperial power and to carry + out the Prussian ambition of world-mastery. + + "The treaty of peace must not leave Germany in possession directly or + indirectly of either of these routes to the Orient. There must be + territorial barriers erected to prevent that Empire from ever being + able by political or economic penetration to become dominant in + those regions. + + "With this in view I would state the essentials for a stable peace as + follows, though I do so in the most tentative way because conditions + may change materially. These 'essentials' relate to territory and + waters, and do not deal with military protection. + + "_First._ The complete abrogation or denouncement of the + Brest-Litovsk Treaty and all treaties relating in any way to Russian + territory or commerce; and also the same action as to the Treaty of + Bucharest. This applies to all treaties made by the German Empire or + Germany's allies. + + "_Second._ The Baltic Provinces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia + should be autonomous states of a Russian Confederation. + + "_Third_. Finland raises a different question and it should be + carefully considered whether it should not be an independent state. + + "_Fourth_. An independent Poland, composed of Polish provinces of + Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and in possession of the port + of Danzig. + + "_Fifth_. An independent state, either single or federal composed of + Bohemia, Slovakia, and Moravia (and possibly a portion of Silesia) + and possessing an international right of way by land or water to a + free port. + + "_Sixth_. The Ukraine to be a state of the Russian Confederation, to + which should be annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire + in which the Ruthenians predominate. + + "_Seventh_. Roumania, in addition to her former territory, should + ultimately be given sovereignty over Bessarabia, Transylvania, and + the upper portion of the Dobrudja, leaving the central mouth of the + Danube as the boundary of Bulgaria, or else the northern half. (As to + the boundary there is doubt.) + + "_Eighth_. The territories in which the Jugo-Slavs predominate, + namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should + be united with Serbia and Montenegro forming a single or a federal + state. The sovereignty over Trieste or some other port should be + later settled in drawing a boundary line between the new state and + Italy. My present view is that there should be a good Jugo-Slav port. + + "_Ninth_. Hungary should be separated from Austria and possess rights + of free navigation of the Danube. + + "_Tenth_. Restoration to Italy of all the Italian provinces of + Austria. Italy's territory to extend along the northern Adriatic + shore to the Jugo-Slav boundary. Certain ports on the eastern side of + the Adriatic should be considered as possible naval bases of Italy. + (This last is doubtful.) + + "_Eleventh._ Reduction of Austria to the ancient boundaries and title + of the Archduchy of Austria. Incorporation of Archduchy in the + Imperial German Confederation. Austrian outlet to the sea would be + like that of Baden and Saxony through German ports on the North Sea + and the Baltic. + + "_Twelfth_. The boundaries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to follow + in general those established after the First Balkan War, though + Bulgaria should surrender to Greece more of the Aegean coast and + obtain the southern half only of the Dobrudja (or else as far as the + Danube) and the Turkish territory up to the district surrounding + Constantinople, to be subsequently decided upon. + + "_Thirteenth_. Albania to be under Italian or Serbian sovereignty or + incorporated in the Jugo-Slav Confederation. + + "_Fourteenth._ Greece to obtain more of the Aegean littoral at the + expense of Bulgaria, the Greek-inhabited islands adjacent to Asia + Minor and possibly certain ports and adjoining territory in + Asia Minor. + + "_Fifteenth._ The Ottoman Empire to be reduced to Anatolia and have + no possessions in Europe. (This requires consideration.) + + "_Sixteenth_. Constantinople to be erected into an international + protectorate surrounded by a land zone to allow for expansion of + population. The form of government to be determined upon by an + international commission or by one Government acting as the mandatory + of the Powers. The commission or mandatory to have the regulation and + control of the navigation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as + international waterways. + + "_Seventeenth._ Armenia and Syria to be erected into protectorates of + such Government or Governments as seems expedient from a domestic as + well as an international point of view; the guaranty being that both + countries will be given self-government as soon as possible and that + an 'Open-Door' policy as to commerce and industrial development will + be rigidly observed. + + "_Eighteenth._ Palestine to be an autonomous state under a general + international protectorate or under the protectorate of a Power + designated to act as the mandatory of the Powers. + + "_Nineteenth._ Arabia to receive careful consideration as to the full + or partial sovereignty of the state or states established. + + "_Twentieth_. Great Britain to have the sovereignty of Egypt, or a + full protectorate over it. + + "_Twenty-first._ Persia to be freed from all treaties establishing + spheres of influence. Rigid application of the 'Open-Door' policy in + regard to commercial and industrial development. + + "_Twenty-second._ All Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France + without conditions. + + "_Twenty-third._ Belgium to be restored to full sovereignty. + + "_Twenty-fourth._ A consideration of the union of Luxemburg to + Belgium. (This is open to question.) + + "_Twenty-fifth._ The Kiel Canal to be internationalized and an + international zone twenty miles from the Canal on either side to be + erected which should be, with the Canal, under the control and + regulation of Denmark as the mandatory of the Powers. (This last is + doubtful.) + + "_Twenty-sixth._ All land north of the Kiel Canal Zone to be ceded to + Denmark. + + "_Twenty-seventh._ The fortifications of the Kiel Canal and of + Heligoland to be dismantled. Heligoland to be ceded to Denmark. + + "_Twenty-eighth._ The sovereignty of the archipelago of Spitzbergen + to be granted to Norway. + + "_Twenty-ninth._ The disposition of the colonial possessions formerly + belonging to Germany to be determined by an international commission + having in mind the interests of the inhabitants and the possibility + of employing these colonies as a means of indemnification for wrongs + done. The 'Open-Door' policy should be guaranteed. + + "While the foregoing definitive statement as to territory contains my + views at the present time (September 21, 1918), I feel that no + proposition should be considered unalterable, as further study and + conditions which have not been disclosed may materially change + some of them. + + "Three things must constantly be kept in mind, the natural stability + of race, language, and nationality, the necessity of every nation + having an outlet to the sea so that it may maintain its own merchant + marine, and the imperative need of rendering Germany impotent as a + military power." + +Later I realized that another factor should be given as important a +place in the terms of peace as any of the three, namely, the economic +interdependence of adjoining areas and the mutual industrial benefit to +their inhabitants by close political affiliation. This factor in the +territorial settlements made more and more impression upon me as it was +disclosed by a detailed study of the numerous problems which the Peace +Conference had to solve. + +I made other memoranda on various subjects relating to the general peace +for the purpose of crystallizing my ideas, so that I could lay them in +concrete form before the President when the time came to draft +instructions for the American plenipotentiaries charged with the +negotiation of the Treaty of Peace. When the President reached the +decision to attend the Conference and to direct in person the +negotiations, it became evident that, in place of the instructions +customarily issued to negotiators, a more practical and proper form of +defining the objects to be sought by the United States would be an +outline of a treaty setting forth in detail the features of the peace, +or else a memorandum containing definite declarations of policy in +regard to the numerous problems presented. Unless there was some +framework of this sort on which to build, it would manifestly be very +embarrassing for the American Commissioners in their intercourse with +their foreign colleagues, as they would be unable to discuss +authoritatively or even informally the questions at issue or express +opinions upon them without the danger of unwittingly opposing the +President's wishes or of contradicting the views which might be +expressed by some other of their associates on the American Commission. +A definite plan seemed essential if the Americans were to take any part +in the personal exchanges of views which are so usual during the +progress of negotiations. + +Prior to the departure of the American delegation from the United States +and for two weeks after their arrival in Paris, it was expected that the +President would submit to the Commissioners for their guidance a +_projet_ of a treaty or a very complete programme as to policies. +Nothing, however, was done, and in the conferences which took place +between the President and his American associates he confined his +remarks almost exclusively to the League of Nations and to his plan for +its organization. It was evident--at least that was the natural +inference--that President Wilson was without a programme of any sort or +even of a list of subjects suitable as an outline for the preparation of +a programme. How he purposed to conduct the negotiations no one seemed +to know. It was all very uncertain and unsatisfactory. + +In the circumstances, which seemed to be due to the President's failure +to appreciate the necessity for a definite programme, I felt that +something ought to be done, as the probable result would be that the +terms of the Treaty, other than the provisions regarding a League of +Nations, would be drafted by foreign delegates and not by the President. + +Impressed by the unsatisfactory state of affairs and desirous of +remedying it if possible, I asked Dr. James Brown Scott and Mr. David +Hunter Miller, the legal advisers of the American Commission, to prepare +a skeleton treaty covering the subjects to be dealt with in the +negotiations which could be used in working out a complete programme. +After several conferences with these advisers concerning the subjects to +be included and their arrangement in the Treaty, the work was +sufficiently advanced to lay before the Commissioners. Copies were, +therefore, furnished to them with the request that they give the +document consideration in order that they might make criticisms and +suggest changes. I had not sent a copy to the President, intending to +await the views of my colleagues before doing so, but during the +conference of January 10, to which I have been compelled reluctantly to +refer in discussing the Covenant of the League of Nations, I mentioned +the fact that our legal advisers had been for some time at work on a +"skeleton treaty" and had made a tentative draft. The President at once +showed his displeasure and resented the action taken, evidently +considering the request that a draft be prepared to be a usurpation of +his authority to direct the activities of the Commission. It was this +incident which called forth his remark, to which reference was made in +Chapter VIII, that he did not propose to have lawyers drafting +the Treaty. + +In view of Mr. Wilson's attitude it was useless for Dr. Scott and Mr. +Miller to proceed with their outline of a treaty or for the +Commissioners to give consideration to the tentative draft already made. +It was a disagreeable situation. If the President had had anything, +however crude and imperfect it might have been, to submit in place of +the Scott-Miller draft, it would have been a different matter and +removed to an extent the grounds for complaint at his attitude. But he +offered nothing at all as a substitute. It is fair to assume that he had +no programme prepared and was unwilling to have any one else make a +tentative one for his consideration. It left the American Commission +without a chart marking out the course which they were to pursue in the +negotiations and apparently without a pilot who knew the channel. + +Six days after the enforced abandonment of the plan to prepare a +skeleton treaty as a foundation for a definite and detailed programme, I +made the following note which expresses my views on the situation at +that time: + + "_January_ 16, 1919 + + "No plan of work has been prepared. Unless something is done we will + be here for many weeks, possibly for months. After the President's + remarks the other day about a draft-treaty no one except the + President would think of preparing a plan. He must do it himself, and + he is not doing it. He has not even given us a list of subjects to be + considered and of course has made no division of our labors. + + "If the President does not take up this matter of organization and + systematically apportion the subjects between us, we may possibly + have no peace before June. This would be preposterous because with + proper order and division of questions we ought to have a treaty + signed by April first. + + "I feel as if we, the Commissioners, were like a lot of skilled + workmen who are ordered to build a house. We have the materials and + tools, but there are no plans and specifications and no + master-workman in charge of the construction. We putter around in an + aimless sort of way and get nowhere. + + "With all his natural capacity the President seems to lack the + faculty of employing team-work and of adopting a system to utilize + the brains of other men. It is a decided defect in an executive. He + would not make a good head of a governmental department. The result + is, so far as our Commission is concerned, a state of confusion and + uncertainty with a definite loss and delay through effort being + undirected." + +On several occasions I spoke to the President about a programme for the +work of the Commission and its corps of experts, but he seemed +indisposed to consider the subject and gave the impression that he +intended to call on the experts for his own information which would be +all that was necessary. I knew that Colonel House, through Dr. Mezes, +the head of the organization, was directing the preparation of certain +data, but whether he was doing so under the President's directions I did +not know, though I presumed such was the case. Whatever data were +furnished did not, however, pass through the hands of the other +Commissioners who met every morning in my office to exchange information +and discuss matters pertaining to the negotiations and to direct the +routine work of the Commission. + +It is difficult, even with the entire record of the proceedings at Paris +before one, to find a satisfactory explanation for the President's +objection to having a definite programme other than the general +declarations contained in the Fourteen Points and his "subsequent +addresses." It may be that he was unwilling to bind himself to a fixed +programme, since it would restrict him, to an extent, in his freedom of +action and prevent him from assuming any position which seemed to him +expedient at the time when a question arose during the negotiations. It +may be that he did not wish to commit himself in any way to the contents +of a treaty until the Covenant of the League of Nations had been +accepted. It may be that he preferred not to let the American +Commissioners know his views, as they would then be in a position to +take an active part in the informal discussions which he apparently +wished to handle alone. None of these explanations is at all +satisfactory, and yet any one of them may be the true one. + +Whatever was the chief reason for the President's failure to furnish a +working plan to the American Commissioners, he knowingly adopted the +policy and clung to it with the tenacity of purpose which has been one +of the qualities of mind that account for his great successes and for +his great failures. I use the adverb "knowingly" because it had been +made clear to him that, in the judgment of others, the Commissioners +ought to have the guidance furnished by a draft-treaty or by a definite +statement of policies no matter how tentative or subject to change the +draft or statement might be. + +On the day that the President left Paris to return to the United States +(February 14, 1919) I asked him if he had any instructions for the +Commissioners during his absence concerning the settlements which should +be included in the preliminary treaty of peace, as it was understood +that the Council of Ten would continue its sessions for the +consideration of the subjects requiring investigation and decision. The +President replied that he had no instructions, that the decisions could +wait until he returned, though the hearings could proceed and reports +could be made during his absence. Astonished as I was at this wish to +delay these matters, I suggested to him the subjects which I thought +ought to go into the Treaty. He answered that he did not care to discuss +them at that time, which, as he was about to depart from Paris, meant +that everything must rest until he had returned from his visit to +Washington. + +Since I was the head of the American Commission when the President was +absent and became the spokesman for the United States on the Council of +Ten, this refusal to disclose his views even in a general way placed me +in a very awkward position. Without instructions and without knowledge +of the President's wishes or purposes the conduct of the negotiations +was difficult and progress toward actual settlements practically +impossible. As a matter of fact the Council did accomplish a great +amount of work, while the President was away, in the collection of data +and preparing questions for final settlement. But so far as deciding +questions was concerned, which ought to have been the principal duty of +the Council of Ten, it simply "marked time," as I had no power to decide +or even to express an authoritative opinion on any subject. It showed +very clearly that the President intended to do everything himself and to +allow no one to act for him unless it was upon some highly technical +matter. All actual decisions in regard to the terms of peace which +involved policy were thus forced to await his time and pleasure. + +Even after Mr. Wilson returned to Paris and resumed his place as head of +the American delegation he was apparently without a programme. On March +20, six days after his return, I made a note that "the President, so far +as I can judge, has yet no definite programme," and that I was unable to +"find that he has talked over a plan of a treaty even with Colonel +House." It is needless to quote the thoughts, which I recorded at the +time, in regard to the method in which the President was handling a +great international negotiation, a method as unusual as it was unwise. I +referred to Colonel House's lack of information concerning the +President's purposes because he was then and had been from the beginning +on more intimate terms with the President than any other American. If he +did not know the President's mind, it was safe to assume that no +one knew it. + +I had, as has been stated, expressed to Mr. Wilson my views as to what +the procedure should be and had obtained no action. With the +responsibility resting on him for the conduct and success of the +negotiations and with his constitutional authority to exercise his own +judgment in regard to every matter pertaining to the treaty, there was +nothing further to be done in relieving the situation of the American +Commissioners from embarrassment or in inducing the President to adopt a +better course than the haphazard one that he was pursuing. + +It is apparent that we differed radically as to the necessity for a +clearly defined programme and equally so as to the advantages to be +gained by having a draft-treaty made or a full statement prepared +embodying the provisions to be sought by the United States in the +negotiations. I did not attempt to hide my disapproval of the vagueness +and uncertainty of the President's method, and there is no doubt in my +own mind that Mr. Wilson was fully cognizant of my opinion. How far this +lack of system in the work of the Commission and the failure to provide +a plan for a treaty affected the results written into the Treaty of +Versailles is speculative, but my belief is that they impaired in many +particulars the character of the settlements by frequent abandonment of +principle for the sake of expediency. + +The want of a programme or even of an unwritten plan as to the +negotiations was further evidenced by the fact that the President, +certainly as late as March 19, had not made up his mind whether the +treaty which was being negotiated should be preliminary or final. He had +up to that time the peculiar idea that a preliminary treaty was in the +nature of a _modus vivendi_ which could be entered into independently by +the Executive and which would restore peace without going through the +formalities of senatorial consent to ratification. + +The purpose of Mr. Wilson, so far as one could judge, was to include in +a preliminary treaty of the sort that he intended to negotiate, the +entire Covenant of the League of Nations and other principal +settlements, binding the signatories to repeat these provisions in the +final and definitive treaty when that was later negotiated. By this +method peace would be at once restored, the United States and other +nations associated with it in the war would be obligated to renew +diplomatic and consular relations with Germany, and commercial +intercourse would follow as a matter of course. All this was to be done +without going through the American constitutional process of obtaining +the advice and consent of the Senate to the Covenant and to the +principal settlements. The intent seemed to be to respond to the popular +demand for an immediate peace and at the same time to checkmate the +opponents of the Covenant in the Senate by having the League of Nations +organized and functioning before the definitive treaty was laid before +that body. + +When the President advanced this extraordinary theory of the nature of a +preliminary treaty during a conversation, of which I made a full +memorandum, I told him that it was entirely wrong, that by whatever name +the document was called, whether it was "armistice," "agreement," +"protocol," or "_modus_," it would be a treaty and would have to be sent +by him to the Senate for its approval. I said, "If we change the +_status_ from war to peace, it has to be by a ratified treaty. There is +no other way save by a joint resolution of Congress." At this statement +the President was evidently much perturbed. He did not accept it as +conclusive, for he asked me to obtain the opinion of others on the +subject. He was evidently loath to abandon the plan that he had +presumably worked out as a means of preventing the Senate from rejecting +or modifying the Covenant before it came into actual operation. It seems +almost needless to say that all the legal experts, among them Thomas W. +Gregory, the retiring Attorney-General of the United States, who chanced +to be in Paris at the time, agreed with my opinion, and upon being so +informed the President abandoned his purpose. + +It is probable that the conviction, which was forced upon Mr. Wilson, +that he could not independently of the Senate put into operation a +preliminary treaty, determined him to abandon that type of treaty and to +proceed with the negotiation of a definitive one. At least I had by +March 30 reached the conclusion that there would be no preliminary +treaty as is disclosed by the following memorandum written on that day: + + "I am sure now that there will be no preliminary treaty of peace, but + that the treaty will be complete and definitive. This is a serious + mistake. Time should be given for passions to cool. The operations of + a preliminary treaty should be tested and studied. It would hasten a + restoration of peace. Certainly this is the wise course as to + territorial settlements and the financial and economic burdens to be + imposed upon Germany. The same comment applies to the organization of + a League of Nations. Unfortunately the President insists on a + full-blown Covenant and not a declaration of principles. This has + much to do with preventing a preliminary treaty, since he wishes to + make the League an agent for enforcement of definite terms. + + "When the President departed for the United States in February, I + assumed and I am certain that he had in mind that there would be a + preliminary treaty. With that in view I drafted at the time a + memorandum setting forth what the preliminary treaty of peace should + contain. Here are the subjects I then set down: + + "1. Restoration of Peace and official relations. + + "2. Restoration of commercial and financial relations subject to + conditions. + + "3. Renunciation by Germany of all territory and territorial rights + outside of Europe. + + "4. Minimum territory of Germany in Europe, the boundaries to be + fixed in the Definitive Treaty. + + "5. Maximum military and naval establishments and production of arms + and munitions. + + "6. Maximum amount of money and property to be surrendered by Germany + with time limits for payment and delivery. + + "7. German property and territory to be held as security by the + Allies until the Definitive Treaty is ratified. + + "8. Declaration as to the organization of a League of Nations. + + "The President's obsession as to a League of Nations blinds him to + everything else. An immediate peace is nothing to him compared to the + adoption of the Covenant. The whole world wants peace. The President + wants his League. I think that the world will have to wait." + +The eight subjects, above stated, were the ones which I called to the +President's attention at the time he was leaving Paris for the United +States and which he said he did not care to discuss. + +The views that are expressed in the memorandum of March 30 are those +that I have continued to hold. The President was anxious to have the +Treaty, even though preliminary in character, contain detailed rather +than general provisions, especially as to the League of Nations. With +that view I entirely disagreed, as detailed terms of settlement and the +articles of the Covenant as proposed would cause discussion and +unquestionably delay the peace. To restore the peaceful intercourse +between the belligerents, to open the long-closed channels of commerce, +and to give to the war-stricken peoples of Europe opportunity to resume +their normal industrial life seemed to me the first and greatest task to +be accomplished. It was in my judgment superior to every other object of +the Paris negotiations. Compared with it the creation of a League of +Nations was insignificant and could well be postponed. President Wilson +thought otherwise. We were very far apart in this matter as he well +knew, and he rightly assumed that I followed his instructions with +reluctance, and, he might have added, with grave concern. + +As a matter of interest in this connection and as a possible source from +which the President may have acquired knowledge of my views as to the +conduct of the negotiations, I would call attention again to the +conference which I had with Colonel House on December 17, 1918, and to +which I have referred in connection with the subject of international +arbitration. During that conference I said to the Colonel "that I +thought that there ought to be a preliminary treaty of peace negotiated +without delay, and that all the details as to a League of Nations, +boundaries, and indemnities should wait for the time being. The Colonel +replied that he was not so sure about delaying the creation of a League, +as he was afraid that it never could be put through unless it was done +at once. I told him that possibly he was right, but that I was opposed +to anything which delayed the peace." This quotation is from my +memorandum made at the time of our conversation. I think that the same +reason for insisting on negotiating the Covenant largely influenced the +course of the President. My impression at the time was that the Colonel +favored a preliminary treaty provided that there was included in it the +full plan for a League of Nations, which to me seemed to be +impracticable. + +There can be little doubt that, if there had been a settled programme +prepared or a tentative treaty drafted, there would have been a +preliminary treaty which might and probably would have postponed the +negotiations as to a League. Possibly the President realized that this +danger of excluding the Covenant existed and for that reason was +unwilling to make a definite programme or to let a draft-treaty be +drawn. At least it may have added another reason for his proceeding +without advising the Commissioners of his purposes. + +As I review the entire negotiations and the incidents which took place +at Paris, President Wilson's inherent dislike to depart in the least +from an announced course, a characteristic already referred to, seems to +me to have been the most potent influence in determining his method of +work during the Peace Conference. He seemed to think that, having marked +out a definite plan of action, any deviation from it would show +intellectual weakness or vacillation of purpose. Even when there could +be no doubt that in view of changed conditions it was wise to change a +policy, which he had openly adopted or approved, he clung to it with +peculiar tenacity refusing or merely failing to modify it. Mr. Wilson's +mind once made up seemed to become inflexible. It appeared to grow +impervious to arguments and even to facts. It lacked the elasticity and +receptivity which have always been characteristic of sound judgment and +right thinking. He might break, but he would not bend. This rigidity of +mind accounts in large measure for the deplorable, and, as it seemed to +me, needless, conflict between the President and the Senate over the +Treaty of Versailles. It accounts for other incidents in his career +which have materially weakened his influence and cast doubts on his +wisdom. It also accounts, in my opinion, for the President's failure to +prepare or to adopt a programme at Paris or to commit himself to a draft +of a treaty as a basis for the negotiations, which failure, I am +convinced, not only prevented the signature of a short preliminary +treaty of peace, but lost Mr. Wilson the leadership in the proceedings, +as the statesmen of the other Great Powers outlined the Treaty +negotiated and suggested the majority of the articles which were written +into it. It would have made a vast difference if the President had known +definitely what he sought, but he apparently did not. He dealt in +generalities leaving, but not committing, to others their definition and +application. He was always in the position of being able to repudiate +the interpretation which others might place upon his declarations of +principle. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +SECRET DIPLOMACY + + +Another matter, concerning which the President and I disagreed, was the +secrecy with which the negotiations were carried on between him and the +principal European statesmen, incidental to which was the willingness, +if not the desire, to prevent the proceedings and decisions from +becoming known even to the delegates of the smaller nations which were +represented at the Peace Conference. + +Confidential personal interviews were to a certain extent unavoidable +and necessary, but to conduct the entire negotiation through a small +group sitting behind closed doors and to shroud their proceedings with +mystery and uncertainty made a very unfortunate impression on those who +were not members of the secret councils. + +At the first there was no Council of the Heads of States (the so-called +Council of Four); in fact it was not recognized as an organized body +until the latter part of March, 1919. Prior to that time the directing +body of the Conference was the self-constituted Council of Ten composed +of the President and the British, French, and Italian Premiers with +their Secretaries or Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and two Japanese +delegates of ambassadorial rank. This Council had a membership identical +with that of the Supreme War Council, which controlled the armistices, +their enforcement, and other military matters. It assumed authority over +the negotiations and proceedings of the Conference, though it was never +authorized so to do by the body of delegates. The Council of Four, when +later formed, was equally without a mandate from the Conference. They +assumed the authority and exercised it as a matter of right. + +From the time of his arrival in Paris President Wilson held almost daily +conversations with the leading foreign statesmen. It would be of little +value to speculate on what took place at these interviews, since the +President seldom told the American Commission of the meetings or +disclosed to them, unless possibly to Colonel House, the subjects which +were discussed. My conviction is, from the little information which the +President volunteered, that these consultations were--certainly at +first--devoted to inducing the European leaders to give their support to +his plan for a League of Nations, and that, as other matters relating to +the terms of peace were in a measure involved because of their possible +relation to the functions of the League, they too became more and more +subjects of discussion. + +The introduction of this personal and clandestine method of negotiation +was probably due to the President's belief that he could in this way +exercise more effectively his personal influence in favor of the +acceptance of a League. It is not unlikely that this belief was in a +measure justified. In Colonel House he found one to aid him in this +course of procedure, as the Colonel's intimate association with the +principal statesmen of the Allied Powers during previous visits to +Europe as the President's personal envoy was an asset which he could +utilize as an intermediary between the President and those with whom he +wished to confer. Mr. Wilson relied upon Colonel House for his knowledge +of the views and temperaments of the men with whom he had to deal. It +was not strange that he should adopt a method which the Colonel had +found successful in the past and that he should seek the latter's aid +and advice in connection with the secret conferences which usually took +place at the residence of the President. + +Mr. Wilson pursued this method of handling the subjects of negotiation +the more readily because he was by nature and by inclination secretive. +He had always shown a preference for a private interview with an +individual. In his conduct of the executive affairs of the Government at +Washington he avoided as far as possible general conferences. He talked +a good deal about "taking common counsel," but showed no disposition to +put it into practice. He followed the same course in the matter of +foreign affairs. At Paris this characteristic, which had often been the +subject of remark in Washington, was more pronounced, or at least more +noticeable. He was not disposed to discuss matters with the American +Commission as a whole or even to announce to them his decisions unless +something arose which compelled him to do so. He easily fell into the +practice of seeing men separately and of keeping secret the knowledge +acquired as well as the effect of this knowledge on his views and +purposes. To him this was the normal and most satisfactory method of +doing business. + +From the time that the President arrived in Paris up to the time that +the Commission on the League of Nations made its report--that is, from +December 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919--the negotiations regarding the +League were conducted with great secrecy. Colonel House, the President's +collaborator in drafting the Covenant, if he was not, as many believed, +the real author, was the only American with whom Mr. Wilson freely +conferred and to whom he confided the progress that he was making in his +interviews with the foreign statesmen, at many of which interviews the +Colonel was present. It is true that the President held an occasional +conference with all the American Commissioners, but these conferences +were casual and perfunctory in nature and were very evidently not for +the purpose of obtaining the opinions and counsel of the Commissioners. +There was none of the frankness that should have existed between the +Chief Executive and his chosen agents and advisers. The impression made +was that he summoned the conferences to satisfy the _amour propre_ of +the Commissioners rather than out of any personal wish to do so. + +The consequence was that the American Commissioners, other than Colonel +House, were kept in almost complete ignorance of the preliminary +negotiations and were left to gather such information as they were able +from the delegates of other Powers, who, naturally assuming that the +Americans possessed the full confidence of the President, spoke with +much freedom. As Mr. Wilson never held a conference with the American +Commission from the first meeting of the Commission on the League of +Nations until its report was printed, his American colleagues did not +know, except indirectly, of the questions at issue or of the progress +that was being made. The fact is that, as the Commission on the League +met in Colonel House's office at the Hôtel Crillon, his office force +knew far more about the proceedings than did the three American +Commissioners who were not present. As the House organization made no +effort to hide the fact that they had inside information, the +representatives of the press as a consequence frequented the office of +the Colonel in search of the latest news concerning the Commission on +the League of Nations. + +But, in addition to the embarrassment caused the American Commissioners +and the unenviable position in which they were placed by the secrecy +with which the President surrounded his intercourse with the foreign +statesmen and the proceedings of the Commission on the League of +Nations, his secret negotiations caused the majority of the delegates to +the Conference and the public at large to lose in a large measure their +confidence in the actuality of his devotion to "open diplomacy," which +he had so unconditionally proclaimed in the first of his Fourteen +Points. If the policy of secrecy had ceased with the discussions +preliminary to the organization of the Conference, or even with those +preceding the meetings of the Commission on the League of Nations, +criticism and complaint would doubtless have ceased, but as the +negotiations progressed the secrecy of the conferences of the leaders +increased rather than decreased, culminating at last in the organization +of the Council of Four, the most powerful and most seclusive of the +councils which directed the proceedings at Paris. Behind closed doors +these four individuals, who controlled the policies of the United +States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, passed final judgment on the +mass of articles which entered into the Treaties of Peace, but kept +their decisions secret except from the committee which was drafting +the articles. + +The organization of the Council of Four and the mystery which enveloped +its deliberations emphasized as nothing else could have done the +secretiveness with which adjustments were being made and compromises +were being effected. It directed attention also to the fact that the +Four Great Powers had taken supreme control of settling the terms of +peace, that they were primates among the assembled nations and that they +intended to have their authority acknowledged. This extraordinary +secrecy and arrogation of power by the Council of Four excited +astonishment and complaint throughout the body of delegates to the +Conference, and caused widespread criticism in the press and among the +people of many countries. + +A week after the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of the +Heads of States, the official title of the Council of Four, and the +Council of Foreign Ministers, the official title of the Council of Five +(popularly nick-named "The Big Four" and "The Little Five"), I made the +following note on the subject of secret negotiations: + + "After the experience of the last three months [January-March, 1919] + I am convinced that the method of personal interviews and private + conclaves is a failure. It has given every opportunity for intrigue, + plotting, bargaining, and combining. The President, as I now see it, + should have insisted on everything being brought before the Plenary + Conference. He would then have had the confidence and support of all + the smaller nations because they would have looked up to him as their + champion and guide. They would have followed him. + + "The result of the present method has been to destroy their faith and + arouse their resentment. They look upon the President as in favor of + a world ruled by Five Great Powers, an international despotism of the + strong, in which the little nations are merely rubber-stamps. + + "The President has undoubtedly found himself in a most difficult + position. He has put himself on a level with politicians experienced + in intrigue, whom he will find a pretty difficult lot. He will sink + in the estimation of the delegates who are not within the inner + circle, and what will be still more disastrous will be the loss of + confidence among the peoples of the nations represented here. A + grievous blunder has been made." + +The views, which I expressed in this note in regard to the unwisdom of +the President's course, were not new at the time that I wrote them. Over +two months before I had watched the practice of secret negotiation with +apprehension as to what the effect would be upon the President's +influence and standing with the delegates to the Conference. I then +believed that he was taking a dangerous course which he would in the end +regret. So strong was this conviction that during a meeting, which the +President held with the American Commissioners on the evening of January +29, I told him bluntly--perhaps too bluntly from the point of view of +policy--that I considered the secret interviews which he was holding +with the European statesmen, where no witnesses were present, were +unwise, that he was far more successful in accomplishment and less +liable to be misunderstood if he confined his negotiating to the Council +of Ten, and that, furthermore, acting through the Council he would be +much less subject to public criticism. I supported these views with the +statement that the general secrecy, which was being practiced, was +making a very bad impression everywhere, and for that reason, if for no +other, I was opposed to it. The silence with which the President +received my remarks appeared to me significant of his attitude toward +this advice, and his subsequent continuance of secret methods without +change, unless it was to increase the secrecy, proved that our judgments +were not in accord on the subject. The only result of my +representations, it would seem, was to cause Mr. Wilson to realize that +I was not in sympathy with his way of conducting the negotiations. In +the circumstances I think now that it was a blunder on my part to have +stated my views so frankly. + +Two days after I wrote the note, which is quoted (April 2, 1919), I made +another note more general in character, but in which appears the +following: + + "Everywhere there are developing bitterness and resentment against a + secretiveness which is interpreted to mean failure. The patience of + the people is worn threadbare. Their temper has grown ragged. They + are sick of whispering diplomats. + + "Muttered confidences, secret intrigues, and the tactics of the + 'gum-shoer' are discredited. The world wants none of them these days. + It despises and loathes them. What the world asks are honest + declarations openly proclaimed. The statesman who seeks to gain his + end by tortuous and underground ways is foolish or badly advised. The + public man who is sly and secretive rather than frank and bold, whose + methods are devious rather than obvious, pursues a dangerous path + which leads neither to glory nor to success. + + "Secret diplomacy, the bane of the past, is a menace from which man + believed himself to be rid. He who resurrects it invites + condemnation. The whole world will rejoice when the day of the + whisperer is over." + +This note, read at the present time, sounds extravagant in thought and +intemperate in expression. It was written under the influence of +emotions which had been deeply stirred by the conditions then existing. +Time usually softens one's judgments and the passage of events makes +less vivid one's impressions. The perspective, however, grows clearer +and the proportions more accurate when the observer stands at a +distance. While the language of the note might well be changed and made +less florid, the thought needs little modification. The public criticism +was widespread and outspoken, and from the expressions used it was very +evident that there prevailed a general popular disapproval of the way +the negotiations were being conducted. The Council of Four won the +press-name of "The Olympians," and much was said of "the thick cloud of +mystery" which hid them from the anxious multitudes, and of the secrecy +which veiled their deliberations. The newspapers and the correspondents +at Paris openly complained and the delegates to the Conference in a more +guarded way showed their bitterness at the overlordship assumed by the +leading statesmen of the Great Powers and the secretive methods which +they employed. It was, as may be gathered from the note quoted, a +distressing and depressing time. + +As concrete examples of the evils of secret negotiations the "Fiume +Affair" and the "Shantung Settlement" are the best known because of the +storm of criticism and protest which they caused. As the Shantung +Settlement was one of the chief matters of difference between the +President and myself, it will be treated later. The case of Fiume is +different. As to the merits of the question I was very much in accord +with the President, but to the bungling way in which it was handled I +was strongly opposed believing that secret interviews, at which false +hopes were encouraged, were at the bottom of all the trouble which later +developed. But for this secrecy I firmly believe that there would have +been no "Fiume Affair." + +The discussion of the Italian claims to territory along the northern +boundary of the Kingdom and about the head of the Adriatic Sea began as +soon as the American Commission was installed at Paris, about the middle +of December, 1918. The endeavor of the Italian emissaries was to induce +the Americans, particularly the President, to recognize the boundary +laid down in the Pact of London. That agreement, which Italy had +required Great Britain and France to accept in April, 1915, before she +consented to declare war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, committed +the Entente Powers to the recognition of Italy's right to certain +territorial acquisitions at the expense of Austria-Hungary in the event +of the defeat of the Central Empires. By the boundary line agreed upon +in the Pact, Italy would obtain certain important islands and ports on +the Dalmatian coast in addition to the Austrian Tyrol and the Italian +provinces of the Dual Monarchy at the head of the Adriatic. + +When this agreement was signed, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was +not in contemplation, or at least, if it was considered, the possibility +of its accomplishment seemed very remote. It was assumed that the +Dalmatian territory to be acquired under the treaty to be negotiated in +accordance with the terms of the Pact would, with the return of the +Italian provinces, give to Italy naval control over the Adriatic Sea and +secure the harborless eastern coast of the Italian peninsula against +future hostile attack by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The boundary laid +down in the agreement was essentially strategic and based primarily on +considerations of Italian national safety. As long as the Empire existed +as a Great Power the boundary of the Pact of London, so far as it +related to the Adriatic littoral and islands, was not unreasonable or +the territorial demands excessive. + +But the close of active warfare in the autumn of 1918, when the +armistice went into effect, found conditions wholly different from those +upon which these territorial demands had been predicated. The +Austro-Hungarian Empire had fallen to pieces beyond the hope of becoming +again one of the Great Powers. The various nationalities, which had long +been restless and unhappy under the rule of the Hapsburgs, threw off the +imperial yoke, proclaimed their independence, and sought the recognition +and protection of the Allies. The Poles of the Empire joined their +brethren of the Polish provinces of Russia and Prussia in the +resurrection of their ancient nation; Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia +united in forming the new state of Czecho-Slovakia; the southern Slavs +of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia announced their +union with their kindred of the Kingdom of Serbia; and Hungary declared +the severance of her political union with Austria. In a word the Dual +Empire ceased to exist. It was no longer a menace to the national safety +of Italy. This was the state of affairs when the delegates to the Peace +Conference began to assemble at Paris. + +The Italian statesmen realized that these new conditions might raise +serious questions as to certain territorial cessions which would come to +Italy under the terms of the Pact of London, because their strategic +necessity had disappeared with the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. While +they had every reason to assume that Great Britain and France would live +up to their agreement, it was hardly to be expected that under the +changed conditions and in the circumstances attending the negotiation +and signature of the Pact, the British and French statesmen would be +disposed to protest against modifications of the proposed boundary if +the United States and other nations, not parties to the agreement, +should insist upon changes as a matter of justice to the new state of +the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It apparently was considered expedient, +by the Italian representatives, in view of the situation which had +developed, to increase rather than to reduce their claims along the +Dalmatian coast in order that they might have something which could be +surrendered in a compromise without giving up the boundaries laid down +in the Pact of London. + +It is probable, too, that these additional claims were advanced by Italy +in order to offset in a measure the claims of the Jugo-Slavs, who +through the Serbian delegates at Paris were making territorial demands +which the Italians declared to be extravagant and which, if granted, +would materially reduce the proposed cessions to Italy under the Pact of +London. Furthermore, the Italian Government appeared to be by no means +pleased with the idea of a Jugo-Slav state so strong that it might +become a commercial, if not a naval, rival of Italy in the Adriatic. The +Italian delegates in private interviews showed great bitterness toward +the Slavs, who, they declared, had, as Austrian subjects, waged war +against Italy and taken part in the cruel and wanton acts attendant upon +the invasion of the northern Italian provinces. They asserted that it +was unjust to permit these people, by merely changing their allegiance +after defeat, to escape punishment for the outrages which they had +committed against Italians and actually to profit by being vanquished. +This antipathy to the Slavs of the former Empire was in a measure +transferred to the Serbs, who were naturally sympathetic with their +kinsmen and who were also ambitious to build up a strong Slav state with +a large territory and with commercial facilities on the Adriatic coast +which would be ample to meet the trade needs of the interior. + +While there may have been a certain fear for the national safety of +Italy in having as a neighbor a Slav state with a large and virile +population, extensive resources, and opportunity to become a naval power +in the Mediterranean, the real cause of apprehension seemed to be that +the new nation would become a commercial rival of Italy in the Adriatic +and prevent her from securing the exclusive control of the trade which +her people coveted and which the complete victory over Austria-Hungary +appeared to assure to them. + +The two principal ports having extensive facilities for shipping and +rail-transportation to and from the Danubian provinces of the Dual +Empire were Trieste and Fiume. The other Dalmatian ports were small and +without possibilities of extensive development, while the precipitous +mountain barrier between the coast and the interior which rose almost +from the water-line rendered railway construction from an engineering +standpoint impracticable if not impossible. It was apparent that, if +Italy could obtain both the port of Trieste and the port of Fiume, the +two available outlets for foreign trade to the territories lying north +and east of the Adriatic Sea, she would have a substantial monopoly of +the sea-borne commerce of the Dalmatian coast and its hinterland. It was +equally apparent that Italian possession of the two ports would place +the new Slav state at a great disadvantage commercially, as the +principal volume of its exports and imports would have to pass through a +port in the hands of a trade rival which could, in case of controversy +or in order to check competition, be closed to Slav ships and goods on +this or that pretext, even if the new state found it practicable to +maintain a merchant marine under an agreement granting it the use of +the port. + +In view of the new conditions which had thus arisen through the +dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the union of the Southern +Slavs, the Italian delegates at Paris began a vigorous campaign to +obtain sovereignty, or at least administrative control, over Fiume and +the adjacent coasts and islands, it having been generally conceded that +Trieste should be ceded to Italy. The Italian demand for Fiume had +become real instead of artificial. This campaign was conducted by means +of personal interviews with the representatives of the principal Powers, +and particularly with those of the United States because it was +apparently felt that the chief opposition to the demand would come from +that quarter, since the President was known to favor the general +proposition that every nation should have free access to the sea and, if +possible, a seaport under its own sovereignty. + +The Italian delegates were undoubtedly encouraged by some Americans to +believe that, while the President had not actually declared in favor of +Italian control of Fiume, he was sympathetic to the idea and would +ultimately assent to it just as he had in the case of the cession to +Italy of the Tyrol with its Austrian population. Convinced by these +assurances of success the Italian leaders began a nationwide propaganda +at home for the purpose of arousing a strong public sentiment for the +acquisition of the port. This propaganda was begun, it would seem, for +two reasons, first, the political advantage to be gained when it was +announced that Signor Orlando and his colleagues at Paris had succeeded +in having their demand recognized, and, second, the possibility of +influencing the President to a speedy decision by exhibiting the +intensity and unity of the Italian national spirit in demanding the +annexation of the little city, the major part of the population of which +was asserted to be of Italian blood. + +The idea, which was industriously circulated throughout Italy, that +Fiume was an Italian city, aroused the feelings of the people more than +any political or economic argument could have done. The fact that the +suburbs, which were really as much a part of the municipality as the +area within the city proper, were inhabited largely by Jugo-Slavs was +ignored, ridiculed, or denied. That the Jugo-Slavs undoubtedly exceeded +in numbers the Italians in the community when it was treated as a whole +made no difference to the propagandists who asserted that Fiume was +Italian. They clamored for its annexation on the ground of +"self-determination," though refusing to accept that principle as +applicable to the inhabitants of the Austrian Tyrol and failing to raise +any question in regard to it in the case of the port of Danzig. The +Italian orators and press were not disturbed by the inconsistency of +their positions, and the Italian statesmen at Paris, when their +attention was called to it, replied that the cases were not the same, an +assertion which it would have been difficult to establish with facts or +support with convincing arguments. + +While the propaganda went forward in Italy with increasing energy, +additional assurances, I was informed by one of the Italian group, were +given to Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino that President Wilson was +almost on the point of conceding the justice of the Italian claim to +Fiume. It was not until the latter part of March, 1919, that these +statesmen began to suspect that they had been misinformed and that the +influence of their American friends was not as powerful with Mr. Wilson +as they had been led to believe. It was an unpleasant awakening. They +were placed in a difficult position. Too late to calm the inflamed +temper of the Italian people the Italian leaders at Paris had no +alternative but to press their demands with greater vigor since the +failure to obtain Fiume meant almost inevitable disaster to the +Orlando Ministry. + +Following conversations with Baron Sonnino and some others connected +with the Italian delegation, I drew the conclusion that they would go so +far as to refuse to make peace with Germany unless the Adriatic Question +was first settled to their satisfaction. In a memorandum dated March 29, +I wrote: "This will cause a dangerous crisis," and in commenting on the +probable future of the subject I stated: + + "My fear is that the President will continue to rely upon private + interviews and his powers of persuasion to induce the Italians to + abandon their extravagant claim. I am sure that he will not be able + to do it. On the contrary, his conversations will strengthen rather + than weaken Italian determination. He ought to tell them _now_ that + he will not consent to have Fiume given to Italy. It would cause + anger and bitterness, but nothing to compare with the resentment + which will be aroused if the uncertainty is permitted to go on much + longer. I shall tell the President my opinion at the first + opportunity. [I did this a few days later.] + + "The future is darkened by the Adriatic situation and I look to an + explosion before the matter is settled. It is a good thing that the + President visited Italy when he did and when blessings rather than + curses greeted him. Secret diplomacy is reaping a new harvest of + execrations and condemnations. Will the practice ever cease?" + +During the first three weeks of April the efforts to shake the +determination of the President to support the Jugo-Slav claims to Fiume +and the adjacent territory were redoubled, but without avail. Every form +of compromise as to boundary and port privileges, which did not deprive +Italy of the sovereignty, was proposed, but found to be unacceptable. +The Italians, held by the pressure of the aroused national spirit, and +the President, firm in the conviction that the Italian claim to the port +was unjust, remained obdurate. Attempts were made by both sides to reach +some common ground for an agreement, but none was found. As the time +approached to submit the Treaty to the German plenipotentiaries, who +were expected to arrive at Paris on April 26, the Italian delegates let +it be known that they would absent themselves from the meeting at which +the document was to be presented unless a satisfactory understanding in +regard to Fiume was obtained before the meeting. I doubt whether this +threat was with the approval and upon the advice of the American friends +of the Italians who had been industrious in attempting to persuade the +President to accept a compromise. An American familiar with Mr. Wilson's +disposition would have realized that to try to coerce him in that manner +would be folly, as in all probability it would have just the contrary +effect to the one desired. + +The Italian delegates did not apparently read the President's temper +aright. They made a mistake. Their threat of withdrawal from the +Conference resulted far differently from their expectation and hope. +When Mr. Wilson learned of the Italian threat he met it with a public +announcement of his position in regard to the controversy, which was +intended as an appeal to the people of Italy to abandon the claim to +Fiume and to reject their Government's policy of insisting on an unjust +settlement. This declaration was given to the press late in the +afternoon of April 23, and a French newspaper containing it was handed, +it was said, to Signor Orlando at the President's residence where the +Council of Four were assembled. He immediately withdrew, issued a +counter-statement, and the following day left Paris for Rome more on +account of his indignation at the course taken by the President than +because of the threat which he had made. Baron Sonnino also departed +the next day. + +It is not my purpose to pursue further the course of events following +the crisis which was precipitated by the President's published statement +and the resulting departure of the principal Italian delegates. The +effect on the Italian people is common knowledge. A tempest of popular +fury against the President swept over Italy from end to end. From being +the most revered of all men by the Italians, he became the most +detested. As no words of praise and admiration were too extravagant to +be spoken of him when he visited Rome in January, so no words of insult +or execration were too gross to characterize him after his public +announcement regarding the Adriatic Question. There was never a more +complete reversal of public sentiment toward an individual. + +The reason for reciting the facts of the Fiume dispute, which was one of +the most unpleasant incidents that took place at Paris during the +negotiations, is to bring out clearly the consequences of secret +diplomacy. A discussion of the reasons, or of the probable reasons, for +the return of the Italian statesmen to Paris before the Treaty was +handed to the Germans would add nothing to the subject under +consideration, while the same may be said of the subsequent occupation +of Fiume by Italian nationalists under the fanatical D'Annunzio, without +authority of their Government, but with the enthusiastic approval of the +Italian people. + +Five days after the Italian Premier and his Minister of Foreign Affairs +had departed from Paris I had a long interview with a well-known Italian +diplomat, who was an intimate friend of both Signor Orlando and Baron +Sonnino and who had been very active in the secret negotiations +regarding the Italian boundaries which had been taking place at Paris +since the middle of December. This diplomat was extremely bitter about +the whole affair and took no pains to hide his views as to the causes of +the critical situation which existed. In the memorandum of our +conversation, which I wrote immediately after he left my office, appears +the following: + + "He exclaimed: 'One tells you one thing and that is not true; then + another tells you another thing and that too is not true. What is one + to believe? What can one do? It is hopeless. So many secret meetings + with different persons are simply awful'--He threw up his hands--'Now + we have the result. It is terrible!' + + "I laughed and said, 'I conclude that you do not like secret + diplomacy.' + + "'I do not; I do not,' he fervently exclaimed. 'All our trouble comes + from these secret meetings of four men [referring to the Big Four], + who keep no records and who tell different stories of what takes + place. Secrecy is to blame. We have been unable to rely on any one. + To have to run around and see this man and that man is not the way to + do. Most all sympathize with you when alone and then they desert you + when they get with others. This is the cause of much bitterness and + distrust. _Secret diplomacy is an utter failure._ It is too hard to + endure. Some men know only how to whisper. They are not to be + trusted. I do not like it.' + + "'Well,' I said, 'you cannot charge me with that way of doing + business.' + + "'I cannot,' he replied, 'you tell me the truth. I may not like it, + but at least you do not hold out false hopes.'" + +The foregoing conversation no doubt expressed the real sentiments of the +members of the Italian delegation at that time. Disgust with +confidential personal interviews and with relying upon personal +influence rather than upon the merits of their case was the natural +reaction following the failure to win by these means the President's +approval of Italy's demands. + +The Italian policy in relation to Flume was wrecked on the rock of +President Wilson's firm determination that the Jugo-Slavs should have a +seaport on the Adriatic sufficient for their needs and that Italy should +not control the approaches to that port. With the wreck of the Fiume +policy went in time the Orlando Government which had failed to make good +the promises which they had given to their people. Too late they +realized that secret diplomacy had failed, and that they had made a +mistake in relying upon it. It is no wonder that the two leaders of the +Italian delegation on returning to Paris and resuming their duties in +the Conference refrained from attempting to arrange clandestinely the +settlement of the Adriatic Question. The "go-betweens," on whom they had +previously relied, were no longer employed. Secret diplomacy was +anathema. They had paid a heavy price for the lesson, which they +had learned. + +When one reviews the negotiations at Paris from December, 1918, to June, +1919, the secretiveness which characterized them is very evident. +Everybody seemed to talk in whispers and never to say anything worth +while except in confidence. The open sessions of the Conference were +arranged beforehand. They were formal and perfunctory. The agreements +and bargains were made behind closed doors. This secrecy began with the +exchange of views concerning the League of Nations, following which came +the creation of the Council of Ten, whose meetings were intended to be +secret. Then came the secret sessions of the Commission on the League +and the numerous informal interviews of the President with one or more +of the Premiers of the Allied Powers, the facts concerning which were +not divulged to the American Commissioners. Later, on Mr. Wilson's +return from the United States, dissatisfaction with and complaint of the +publicity given to some of the proceedings of the Council of Ten induced +the formation of the Council of Four with the result that the secrecy of +the negotiations was practically unbroken. If to this brief summary of +the increasing secretiveness of the proceedings of the controlling +bodies of the Peace Conference are added the intrigues and personal +bargainings which were constantly going on, the "log-rolling"--to use a +term familiar to American politics--which was practiced, the record is +one which invites no praise and will find many who condemn it. In view +of the frequent and emphatic declarations in favor of "open diplomacy" +and the popular interpretation placed upon the phrase "Open covenants +openly arrived at," the effect of the secretive methods employed by the +leading negotiators at Paris was to destroy public confidence in the +sincerity of these statesmen and to subject them to the charge of +pursuing a policy which they had themselves condemned and repudiated. +Naturally President Wilson, who had been especially earnest in his +denunciation of secret negotiations, suffered more than his foreign +colleagues, whose real support of "open diplomacy" had always been +doubted, though all of them in a measure fell in public estimation as a +consequence of the way in which the negotiations were conducted. + +The criticism and condemnation, expressed with varying degrees of +intensity, resulted from the disappointed hopes of the peoples of the +world, who had looked forward confidently to the Peace Conference at +Paris as the first great and decisive change to a new diplomacy which +would cast aside the cloak of mystery that had been in the past the +recognized livery of diplomatic negotiations. The record of the Paris +proceedings in this particular is a sorry one. It is the record of the +abandonment of principle, of the failure to follow precepts +unconditionally proclaimed, of the repudiation by act, if not by word, +of a new and better type of international intercourse. + +It is not my purpose or desire to fix the blame for this perpetuation of +old and discredited practices on any one individual. To do so would be +unjust, since more than one preferred the old way and should share the +responsibility for its continuance. But, as the secrecy became more and +more impenetrable and as the President gave silent acquiescence or at +least failed to show displeasure with the practice, I realized that in +this matter, as in others, our judgments were at variance and our views +irreconcilable. As my opposition to the method of conducting the +proceedings was evident, I cannot but assume that this decided +difference was one that materially affected the relations between Mr. +Wilson and myself and that he looked upon me as an unfavorable critic of +his course in permitting to go unprotested the secrecy which +characterized the negotiations. + +The attention of the delegates to the Peace Conference who represented +the smaller nations was early directed to their being denied knowledge +of the terms of the Treaty which were being formulated by the principal +members of the delegations of the Five Great Powers. There is no doubt +that at the first their mental attitude was one of confidence that the +policy of secrecy would not be continued beyond the informal meetings +preliminary to and necessary for arranging the organization and +procedure of the Conference; but, as the days lengthened into weeks and +the weeks into months, and as the information concerning the actual +negotiations, which reached them, became more and more meager, they +could no longer close their eyes to the fact that their national rights +and aspirations were to be recognized or denied by the leaders of the +Great Powers without the consent and even without the full knowledge of +the delegates of the nations vitally interested. + +Except in the case of a few of these delegates, who had been able to +establish intimate personal relations with some of the "Big Four," the +secretiveness of the discussions and decisions regarding the Treaty +settlements aroused amazement and indignation. It was evident that it +was to be a "dictated peace" and not a "negotiated peace," a peace +dictated by the Great Powers not only to the enemy, but also to their +fellow belligerents. Some of the delegates spoke openly in criticism of +the furtive methods that were being employed, but the majority held +their peace. It can hardly be doubted, however, that the body of +delegates were practically unanimous in disapproving the secrecy of the +proceedings, and this disapproval was to be found even among the +delegations of the Great Powers. It was accepted by the lesser nations +because it seemed impolitic and useless to oppose the united will of the +controlling oligarchy. It was natural that the delegates of the less +influential states should feel that their countries would suffer in the +terms of peace if they openly denounced the treatment accorded them as +violative of the dignity of representatives of independent +sovereignties. In any event no formal protest was entered against their +being deprived of a knowledge to which they were entitled, a deprivation +which placed them and their countries in a subordinate, and, to an +extent, a humiliating, position. + +The climax of this policy of secrecy toward the body of delegates came +on the eve of the delivery of the Treaty of Peace to the German +representatives who were awaiting that event at Versailles. By a +decision of the Council of the Heads of States, reached three weeks +before the time, only a digest or summary of the Treaty was laid before +the plenary session of the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on +the day preceding the delivery of the full text of the Treaty to the +Germans. The delegates of the smaller belligerent nations were not +permitted to examine the actual text of the document before it was seen +by their defeated adversaries. Nations, which had fought valiantly and +suffered agonies during the war, were treated with no more consideration +than their enemies so far as knowledge of the exact terms of peace were +concerned. The arguments, which could be urged on the ground of the +practical necessity of a small group dealing with the questions and +determining the settlements, seem insufficient to justify the +application of the rule of secrecy to the delegates who sat in the +Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace. It is not too severe to say +that it outraged the equal rights of independent and sovereign states +and under less critical conditions would have been resented as an insult +by the plenipotentiaries of the lesser nations. Even within the +delegations of the Great Powers there were indignant murmurings against +this indefensible and unheard-of treatment of allies. No man, whose mind +was not warped by prejudice or dominated by political expediency, could +give it his approval or become its apologist. Secrecy, and intrigues +which were only possible through secrecy, stained nearly all the +negotiations at Paris, but in this final act of withholding knowledge of +the actual text of the Treaty from the delegates of most of the nations +represented in the Conference the spirit of secretiveness seems to +have gone mad. + +The psychological effects of secrecy on those who are kept in ignorance +are not difficult to analyze. They follow normal processes and may be +thus stated: Secrecy breeds suspicion; suspicion, doubt; doubt, +distrust; and distrust produces lack of frankness, which is closely akin +to secrecy. The result is a vicious circle, of which deceit and intrigue +are the very essence. Secrecy and its natural consequences have given to +diplomacy a popular reputation for trickery, for double-dealing, and in +a more or less degree for unscrupulous and dishonest methods of +obtaining desired ends, a reputation that has found expression in the +ironic definition of a diplomat as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for +the good of his country." + +The time had arrived when the bad name which diplomacy had so long borne +could and should have been removed. "Open covenants openly arrived at" +appealed to the popular feeling of antipathy toward secret diplomacy, of +which the Great War was generally believed to be the product. The Paris +Conference appeared to offer an inviting opportunity to turn the page +and to begin a new and better chapter in the annals of international +intercourse. To do this required a fixed purpose to abandon the old +methods, to insist on openness and candor, to refuse to be drawn into +whispered agreements. The choice between the old and the new ways had to +be definite and final. It had to be made at the very beginning of the +negotiations. It was made. Secrecy was adopted. Thus diplomacy, in spite +of the announced intention to reform its practices, has retained the +evil taint which makes it out of harmony with the spirit of good faith +and of open dealing which is characteristic of the best thought of the +present epoch. There is little to show that diplomacy has been raised to +a higher plane or has won a better reputation in the world at large than +it possessed before the nations assembled at Paris to make peace. This +failure to lift the necessary agency of international relations out of +the rut worn deep by centuries of practice is one of the deplorable +consequences of the peace negotiations. So much might have been done; +nothing was done. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT + + +The Shantung Settlement was not so evidently chargeable to secret +negotiations as the crisis over the disposition of Fiume, but the +decision was finally reached through that method. The controversy +between Japan and China as to which country should become the possessor +of the former German property and rights in the Shantung Peninsula was +not decided until almost the last moment before the Treaty with Germany +was completed. Under pressure of the necessity of making the document +ready for delivery to the German delegates, President Wilson, M. +Clemenceau, and Mr. Lloyd George, composing the Council of the Heads of +States in the absence of Signor Orlando in Rome, issued an order +directing the Drafting Committee of the Conference to prepare articles +for the Treaty embodying the decision that the Council had made. This +decision, which was favorable to the Japanese claims, was the result of +a confidential arrangement with the Japanese delegates by which, in the +event of their claims being granted, they withdrew their threat to +decline to sign the Treaty of Peace, agreed not to insist on a proposed +amendment to the Covenant declaring for racial equality, and orally +promised to restore to China in the near future certain rights of +sovereignty over the territory, which promise failed of confirmation in +writing or by formal public declaration. + +It is fair to presume that, if the conflicting claims of Japan and China +to the alleged rights of Germany in Chinese territory had been settled +upon the merits through the medium of an impartial commission named by +the Conference, the Treaty provisions relating to the disposition of +those rights would have been very different from those which "The Three" +ordered to be drafted. Before a commission of the Conference no +persuasive reasons for conceding the Japanese claims could have been +urged on the basis of an agreement on the part of Japan to adhere to the +League of Nations or to abandon the attempt to have included in the +Covenant a declaration of equality between races. It was only through +secret interviews and secret agreements that the threat of the Japanese +delegates could be successfully made. An adjustment on such a basis had +nothing to do with the justice of the case or with the legal rights and +principles involved. The threat was intended to coerce the arbiters of +the treaty terms by menacing the success of the plan to establish a +League of Nations--to use an ugly word, it was a species of "blackmail" +not unknown to international relations in the past. It was made possible +because the sessions of the Council of the Heads of States and the +conversations concerning Shantung were secret. + +It was a calamity for the Republic of China and unfortunate for the +presumed justice written into the Treaty that President Wilson was +convinced that the Japanese delegates would decline to accept the +Covenant of the League of Nations if the claims of Japan to the German +rights were denied. It was equally unfortunate that the President felt +that without Japan's adherence to the Covenant the formation of the +League would be endangered if not actually prevented. And it was +especially unfortunate that the President considered the formation of +the League in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant to be +superior to every other consideration and that to accomplish this object +almost any sacrifice would be justifiable. It is my impression that the +departure of Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino from Paris and the +uncertainty of their return to give formal assent to the Treaty with +Germany, an uncertainty which existed at the time of the decision of the +Shantung Question, had much to do with the anxiety of the President as +to Japan's attitude. He doubtless felt that to have two of the Five +Great Powers decline at the last moment to accept the Treaty containing +the Covenant would jeopardize the plan for a League and would greatly +encourage his opponents in the United States. His line of reasoning was +logical, but in my judgment was based on the false premise that the +Japanese would carry out their threat to refuse to accept the Treaty and +enter the League of Nations unless they obtained a cession of the German +rights. I did not believe at the time, and I do not believe now, that +Japan would have made good her threat. The superior international +position, which she held as one of the Five Great Powers in the +Conference, and which she would hold in the League of Nations as one of +the Principal Powers in the constitution of the Executive Council, would +never have been abandoned by the Tokio Government. The Japanese +delegates would not have run the risk of losing this position by +adopting the course pursued by the Italians. + +The cases were different. No matter what action was taken by Italy she +would have continued to be a Great Power in any organization of the +world based on a classification of the nations. If she did not enter the +League under the German Treaty, she certainly would later and would +undoubtedly hold an influential position in the organization whether her +delegates signed the Covenant or accepted it in another treaty or by +adherence. It was not so with Japan. There were reasons to believe that, +if she failed to become one of the Principal Powers at the outset, +another opportunity might never be given her to obtain so high a place +in the concert of the nations. The seats that her delegates had in the +Council of Ten had caused criticism and dissatisfaction in certain +quarters, and the elimination of a Japanese from the Council of the +Heads of States showed that the Japanese position as an equal of the +other Great Powers was by no means secure. These indications of Japan's +place in the international oligarchy must have been evident to her +plenipotentiaries at Paris, who in all probability reported the +situation to Tokio. From the point of view of policy the execution of +the threat of withdrawal presented dangers to Japan's prestige which the +diplomats who represented her would never have incurred if they were as +cautious and shrewd as they appeared to be. The President did not hold +this opinion. We differed radically in our judgment as to the sincerity +of the Japanese threat. He showed that he believed it would be carried +out. I believed that it would not be. + +It has not come to my knowledge what the attitude of the British and +French statesmen was concerning the disposition of the Shantung rights, +although I have read the views of certain authors on the subject, but I +do know that the actual decision lay with the President. If he had +declined to recognize the Japanese claims, they would never have been +granted nor would the grant have been written into the Treaty. +Everything goes to show that he realized this responsibility and that +the cession to Japan was not made through error or misconception of the +rights of the parties, but was done deliberately and with a full +appreciation that China was being denied that which in other +circumstances would have been awarded to her. If it had not been for +reasons wholly independent and outside of the question in dispute, the +President would not have decided as he did. + +It is not my purpose to enter into the details of the origin of the +German lease of Kiao-Chau (the port of Tsingtau) and of the economic +concessions in the Province of Shantung acquired by Germany. Suffice it +to say that, taking advantage of a situation caused by the murder of +some missionary priests in the province, the German Government in 1898 +forced the Chinese Government to make treaties granting for the period +of ninety-nine years the lease and concessions, by which the sovereign +authority over this "Holy Land" of China was to all intents ceded to +Germany, which at once improved the harbor, fortified the leased area, +and began railway construction and the exploitation of the Shantung +Peninsula. + +The outbreak of the World War found Germany in possession of the leased +area and in substantial control of the territory under the concession. +On August 15, 1914, the Japanese Government presented an _ultimatum_ to +the German Government, in which the latter was required "to deliver on a +date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, +without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of +Kiao-Chau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." + +On the German failure to comply with these demands the Japanese +Government landed troops and, in company with a small British +contingent, took possession of the leased port and occupied the +territory traversed by the German railway, even to the extent of +establishing a civil government in addition to garrisoning the line with +Japanese troops. Apparently the actual occupation of this Chinese +territory induced a change in the policy of the Imperial Government at +Tokio, for in December, 1914, Baron Kato, the Minister of Foreign +Affairs, declared that the restoration of Tsingtau to China "is to be +settled in the future" and that the Japanese Government had made no +promises to do so. + +This statement, which seemed in contradiction of the _ultimatum_ to +Germany, was made in the Japanese Diet. It was followed up in January, +1915, by the famous "Twenty-one Demands" made upon the Government at +Peking. It is needless to go into these demands further than to quote +the first to which China was to subscribe. + + "The Chinese Government agrees that when the Japanese Government + hereafter approaches the German Government for the transfer of all + rights and privileges of whatsoever nature enjoyed by Germany in the + Province of Shantung, whether secured by treaty or in any other + manner, China shall give her full assent thereto." + +The important point to be noted in this demand is that Japan did not +consider that the occupation of Kiao-Chau and the seizure of the German +concessions transferred title to her, but looked forward to a future +transfer by treaty. + +The "Twenty-one Demands" were urged with persistency by the Japanese +Government and finally took the form of an _ultimatum_ as to all but +Group V of the "Demands." The Peking Government was in no political or +military condition to resist, and, in order to avoid an open rupture +with their aggressive neighbor, entered into a treaty granting the +Japanese demands. + +China, following the action which the United States had taken on +February 3, 1917, severed diplomatic relations with Germany on March 14, +and five months later declared war against her announcing at the same +time that the treaties, conventions, and agreements between the two +countries were by the declaration abrogated. As to whether a state of +war does in fact abrogate a treaty of the character of the Sino-German +Treaty of 1898 some question may be raised under the accepted rules of +international law, on the ground that it was a cession of sovereign +rights and constituted an international servitude in favor of Germany +over the territory affected by it. But in this particular case the +indefensible duress employed by the German Government to compel China to +enter into the treaty introduces another factor into the problem and +excepts it from any general rule that treaties of that nature are merely +suspended and not abrogated by war between the parties. It would seem as +if no valid argument could be made in favor of suspension because the +effect of the rule would be to revive and perpetuate an inequitable and +unjustifiable act. Morally and legally the Chinese Government was right +in denouncing the treaty and agreements with Germany and in treating the +territorial rights acquired by coercion as extinguished. + +It would appear, therefore, that, as the Japanese Government recognized +that the rights in the Province of Shantung had not passed to Japan by +the forcible occupation of Kiao-Chau and the German concessions, those +rights ceased to exist when China declared war against Germany, and that +China was, therefore, entitled to resume full sovereignty over the area +where such rights previously existed. + +It is true that subsequently, on September 24, 1918, the Chinese and +Japanese Governments by exchange of notes at Tokio entered into +agreements affecting the Japanese occupation of the Kiao-Chau Tsinan +Railway and the adjoining territory, but the governmental situation at +Peking was too precarious to refuse any demands made by the Japanese +Government. In fact the action of the Japanese Government was very +similar to that of the German Government in 1898. An examination of +these notes discloses the fact that the Japanese were in possession of +the denounced German rights, but nothing in the notes indicates that +they were there as a matter of legal right, or that the Chinese +Government conceded their right of occupation. + +This was the state of affairs when the Peace Conference assembled at +Paris. Germany had by force compelled China in 1898 to cede to her +certain rights in the Province of Shantung. Japan had seized these +rights by force in 1914 and had by threats forced China in 1915 to agree +to accept her disposition of them when they were legally transferred by +treaty at the end of the war. China in 1917 had, on entering the war +against Germany, denounced all treaties and agreements with Germany, so +that the ceded rights no longer existed and could not legally be +transferred by Germany to Japan by the Treaty of Peace, since the title +was in China. In fact any transfer or disposition of the rights in +Shantung formerly belonging to Germany was a transfer or disposition of +rights belonging wholly to China and would deprive that country of a +portion of its full sovereignty over the territory affected. + +While this view of the extinguishment of the German rights in Shantung +was manifestly the just one and its adoption would make for the +preservation of permanent peace in the Far East, the Governments of the +Allied Powers had, early in 1917, and prior to the severance of +diplomatic relations between China and Germany, acceded to the request +of Japan to support, "on the occasion of the Peace Conference," her +claims in regard to these rights which then existed. The representatives +of Great Britain, France, and Italy at Paris were thus restricted, or at +least embarrassed, by the promises which their Governments had made at a +time when they were in no position to refuse Japan's request. They might +have stood on the legal ground that the Treaty of 1898 having been +abrogated by China no German rights in Shantung were in being at the +time of the Peace Conference, but they apparently were unwilling to take +that position. Possibly they assumed that the ground was one which they +could not take in view of the undertakings of their Governments; or +possibly they preferred to let the United States bear the brunt of +Japanese resentment for interfering with the ambitious schemes of the +Japanese Government in regard to China. There can be little doubt that +political, and possibly commercial, interests influenced the attitude of +the European Powers in regard to the Shantung Question. + +President Wilson and the American Commissioners, unhampered by previous +commitments, were strongly opposed to acceding to the demands of the +Japanese Government. The subject had been frequently considered during +the early days of the negotiations and there seemed to be no divergence +of views as to the justice of the Chinese claim of right to the +resumption of full sovereignty over the territory affected by the lease +and the concessions to Germany. These views were further strengthened by +the presentation of the question before the Council of Ten. On January +27 the Japanese argued their case before the Council, the Chinese +delegates being present; and on the 28th Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo spoke +on behalf of China. In a note on the meeting I recorded that "he simply +overwhelmed the Japanese with his argument." I believe that that opinion +was common to all those who heard the two presentations. In fact it made +such an impression on the Japanese themselves, that one of the delegates +called upon me the following day and attempted to offset the effect by +declaring that the United States, since it had not promised to support +Japan's contention, would be blamed if Kiao-Chau was returned directly +to China. He added that there was intense feeling in Japan in regard to +the matter. It was an indirect threat of what would happen to the +friendly relations between the two countries if Japan's claim +was denied. + +The sessions of the Commission on the League of Nations and the absence +of President Wilson from Paris interrupted further consideration of the +Shantung Question until the latter part of March, when the Council of +Four came into being. As the subject had been fully debated in January +before the Council of Ten, final decision lay with the Council of Four. +What discussions took place in the latter council I do not know on +account of the secrecy which was observed as to their deliberations. But +I presume that the President stood firmly for the Chinese rights, as the +matter remained undecided until the latter part of April. + +On the 21st of April Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda called upon me in +regard to the question, and I frankly told them that they ought to prove +the justice of the Japanese claim, that they had not done it and that I +doubted their ability to do so. I found, too, that the President had +proposed that the Five Powers act as trustees of the former German +rights in Shantung, but that the Japanese delegates had declared that +they could not consent to the proposition, which was in the nature of a +compromise intended to bridge over the existing situation that, on +account of the near approach of the completion of the Treaty, was +becoming more and more acute. + +On April 26 the President, at a conference with the American +Commissioners, showed deep concern over the existing state of the +controversy, and asked me to see the Japanese delegates again and +endeavor to dissuade them from insisting on their demands and to induce +them to consider the international trusteeship proposed. The evening of +the same day the two Japanese came by request to my office and conferred +with Professor E.T. Williams, the Commission's principal adviser on Far +Eastern affairs, and with me. After an hour's conversation Viscount +Chinda made it very clear that Japan intended to insist on her "pound of +flesh." It was apparent both to Mr. Williams and to me that nothing +could be done to obtain even a compromise, though it was on the face +favorable to Japan, since it recognized the existence of the German +rights, which China claimed were annulled. + +On April 28 I gave a full report of the interview to Mr. White and +General Bliss at our regular morning meeting. Later in the morning the +President telephoned me and I informed him of the fixed determination of +the Japanese to insist upon their claims. What occurred between the time +of my conversation with the President and the plenary session of the +Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace in the afternoon, at which the +Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted, I do not actually know, +but the presumption is that the Japanese were promised a satisfactory +settlement in regard to Shantung, since they announced that they would +not press an amendment on "racial equality" at the session, an amendment +upon which they had indicated they intended to insist. + +After the meeting of the Conference I made the following memorandum of +the situation: + + "At the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference this afternoon Baron + Makino spoke of his proposed amendment to the Covenant declaring + 'racial equality,' but said he would not press it. + + "I concluded from what the President said to me that he was disposed + to accede to Japan's claims in regard to Kiao-Chau and Shantung. He + also showed me a letter from ---- to Makino saying he was sorry their + claims had not been finally settled before the Session. + + "From all this I am forced to the conclusion that a bargain has been + struck by which the Japanese agree to sign the Covenant in exchange + for admission of their claims. If so, it is an iniquitous agreement. + + "Apparently the President is going to do this to avoid Japan's + declining to enter the League of Nations. It is a surrender of the + principle of self-determination, a transfer of millions of Chinese + from one foreign master to another. This is another of those secret + arrangements which have riddled the 'Fourteen Points' and are + wrecking a just peace. + + "In my opinion it would be better to let Japan stay out of the League + than to abandon China and surrender our prestige in the Far East for + 'a mess of pottage'--and a mess it is. I fear that it is too late to + do anything to save the situation." + +Mr. White, General Bliss, and I, at our meeting that morning before the +plenary session, and later when we conferred as to what had taken place +at the session, were unanimous in our opinions that China's rights +should be sustained even if Japan withdrew from the Peace Conference. We +were all indignant at the idea of submitting to the Japanese demands and +agreed that the President should be told of our attitude, because we +were unwilling to have it appear that we in any way approved of acceding +to Japan's claims or even of compromising them. + +General Bliss volunteered to write the President a letter on the +subject, a course which Mr. White and I heartily endorsed. + +The next morning the General read the following letter to us and with +our entire approval sent it to Mr. Wilson: + + "_Hôtel de Crillon, Paris_ + + "_April 29, 1919_ + + "MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "Last Saturday morning you told the American Delegation that you + desired suggestions, although not at that moment, in regard to the + pending matter of certain conflicting claims between Japan and China + centering about the alleged German rights. My principal interest in + the matter is with sole reference to the question of the moral right + or wrong involved. From this point of view I discussed the matter + this morning with Mr. Lansing and Mr. White. They concurred with me + and requested me to draft a hasty note to you on the subject. + + "Since your conference with us last Saturday, I have asked myself + three or four Socratic questions the answers to which make me, + personally, quite sure on which side the moral right lies. + + "_First._ Japan bases certain of her claims on the right acquired by + conquest. I asked myself the following questions: Suppose Japan had + not succeeded in her efforts to force the capitulation of the Germans + at Tsing-Tsau; suppose that the armistice of November 11th had found + her still fighting the Germans at that place, just as the armistice + found the English still fighting the Germans in South-East Africa. We + would then oblige Germany to dispose of her claims in China by a + clause in the Treaty of Peace. Would it occur to any one that, as a + matter of right, we should force Germany to cede her claims to Japan + rather than to China? It seems to me that it would occur to every + American that we would then have the opportunity that we have long + desired to force Germany to correct, in favor of China, the great + wrong which she began to do to the latter in 1898. What moral right + has Japan acquired by her conquest of Shantung assisted by the + British? If Great Britain and Japan secured no moral right to + sovereignty over various savages inhabiting islands in the Pacific + Ocean, but, on the other hand, we held that these peoples shall be + governed by mandates under the League of Nations, what moral right + has Japan acquired to the suzerainty (which she would undoubtedly + eventually have) over 30,000,000 Chinese in the sacred province + of Shantung? + + "_Second._ Japan must base her claims either on the Convention with + China or on the right of conquest, or on both. Let us consider her + moral right under either of these points. + + "_a)_ If the United States has not before this recognized the + validity of the rights claimed by Japan under her Convention with + China, what has happened since the Armistice that would justify us in + recognizing their validity now? + + "_b)_ If Germany had possessed territory, in full sovereignty, on the + east coast of Asia, a right to this territory, under international + law, could have been obtained by conquest. But Germany possessed no + such territory. What then was left for Japan to acquire by conquest? + Apparently nothing but a lease extorted under compulsion from China + by Germany. I understand that international lawyers hold that such a + lease, or the rights acquired, justly or unjustly, under it, cannot + be acquired by conquest. + + "_Third._ Suppose Germany says to us, 'We will cede our lease and all + rights under it, but we will cede them back to China.' Will we + recognize the justice of Japan's claims to such an extent that we + will threaten Germany with further war unless she cedes these rights + to Japan rather than to China? + + "Again, suppose that Germany, in her hopelessness of resistance to + our demands, should sign without question a clause ceding these + rights to Japan, even though we know that this is so wrong that we + would not fight in order to compel Germany to do it, what moral + justification would we have in making Germany do this? + + "_Fourth._ Stripped of all words that befog the issue, would we not, + under the guise of making a treaty with Germany, really be making a + treaty with Japan by which we compel one of our Allies (China) to + cede against her will these things to Japan? Would not this action be + really more unjustifiable than the one which you have refused to be a + party to on the Dalmatian Coast? Because, in the latter case, the + territory in dispute did not belong to one of the Allies, but to one + of the Central Powers; the question in Dalmatia is as to which of two + friendly powers we shall give territory taken from an enemy power; in + China the question is, shall we take certain claimed rights from one + friendly power in order to give them to another friendly power. + + "It would seem to be advisable to call particular attention to what + the Japanese mean when they say that they will return Kiao-chow to + China. They _do not_ offer to return the railway, the mines or the + port, i.e., Tsingtau. The leased territory included a portion of land + on the north-east side of the entrance of the Bay and another on the + south-west and some islands. It is a small territory. The 50 + Kilometer Zone was not included. That was a _limitation_ put upon the + movement of German troops. They could not go beyond the boundary of + the zone. Within this zone China enjoyed all rights of sovereignty + and administration. + + "Japan's proposal to abandon the zone is somewhat of an impertinence, + since she has violated it ever since she took possession. She kept + troops all along the railway line until recently and insists on + maintaining in the future a guard at Tsinan, 254 miles away. The zone + would restrict her military movements, consequently she gives it up. + + "The proposals she makes are (1) to open the whole bay. It is from 15 + to 20 miles from the entrance to the northern shore of the bay. (2) + To have a Japanese exclusive concession _at a-place_ to be designated + by her, i.e., she can take just as much as she likes of the territory + around the bay. It may be as large as the present leased territory, + but more likely it will include only the best part of Tsingtau. What + then does she give up? Nothing but such parts of the leased territory + as are of no value. + + "The operation then would amount chiefly to an exchange of two pieces + of paper--one cancelling the lease for 78 years, the other granting a + more valuable concession which would amount to a permanent title to + the port. Why take two years to go through this operation? + + "If it be right for a policeman, who recovers your purse, to keep the + contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in returning the + empty purse, then Japan's conduct may be tolerated. + + "If it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an Ally, then it + cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from the enemy. + + "If we support Japan's claim, we abandon the democracy of China to + the domination of the Prussianized militarism of Japan. + + "We shall be sowing dragons' teeth. + + "It can't be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is + desirable, but there are things dearer than peace, justice + and freedom. + + "Sincerely yours + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "T.H. BLISS" + +I have not discussed certain modifications proposed by the Japanese +delegates, since, as is clear from General Bliss's letter, they amounted +to nothing and were merely a pretense of concession and without +substantial value. + +The day following the delivery of this letter to the President (April +30), by which he was fully advised of the attitude of General Bliss, Mr. +White, and myself in regard to the Japanese claims, the Council of Four +reached its final decision of the matter, in which necessarily Mr. +Wilson acquiesced. I learned of this decision the same evening. The +memorandum which I made the next morning in regard to the matter is +as follows: + + "China has been abandoned to Japanese rapacity. A democratic + territory has been given over to an autocratic government. The + President has conceded to Japan all that, if not more than, she ever + hoped to obtain. This is the information contained in a memorandum + handed by Ray Stannard Baker under the President's direction to the + Chinese delegation last evening, a copy of which reached me through + Mr. ---- [of the Chinese delegation]. + + "Mr. ---- also said that Mr. Baker stated that the President desired + him to say that the President was very sorry that he had not been + able to do more for China but that he had been compelled to accede to + Japan's demand 'in order _to save the League of Nations._' + + "The memorandum was most depressing. Though I had anticipated + something of the sort three days ago [see note of April 28 previously + quoted], I had unconsciously cherished a hope that the President + would stand to his guns and champion China's cause. He has failed to + do so. It is true that China is given the shell called 'sovereignty,' + but the economic control, the kernel, is turned over to Japan. + + "However logical may appear the argument that China's political + integrity is preserved and will be maintained under the guaranty of + the League of Nations, the fact is that Japan will rule over millions + of Chinese. Furthermore it is still a matter of conjecture how + valuable the guaranty of the League will prove to be. It has, of + course, never been tried, and Japan's representation on the Council + will possibly thwart any international action in regard to China. + + "Frankly my policy would have been to say to the Japanese, 'If you do + not give back to China what Germany stole from her, we don't want you + in the League of Nations.' If the Japanese had taken offense and + gone, I would have welcomed it, for we would have been well rid of a + government with such imperial designs. But she would not have gone. + She would have submitted. She has attained a high place in world + councils. Her astute statesmen would never have abandoned her present + exalted position even for the sake of Kiao-Chau. The whole affair + assumes a sordid and sinister character, in which the President, + acting undoubtedly with the best of motives, became the cat's-paw. + + "I have no doubt that the President fully believed that the League of + Nations was in jeopardy and that to save it he was compelled to + subordinate every other consideration. The result was that China was + offered up as a sacrifice to propitiate the threatening Moloch of + Japan. When you get down to facts the threats were nothing + but 'bluff.' + + "I do not think that anything that has happened here has caused more + severe or more outspoken criticism than this affair. I am heartsick + over it, because I see how much good-will and regard the President is + bound to lose. I can offer no adequate explanation to the critics. + There seems to be none." + +It is manifest, from the foregoing recital of events leading up to the +decision in regard to the Shantung Question and the apparent reasons for +the President's agreement to support the Japanese claims, that we +radically differed as to the decision which was embodied in Articles +156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles (see Appendix VI, p. 318). +I do not think that we held different opinions as to the justice of the +Chinese position, though probably the soundness of the legal argument in +favor of the extinguishment of the German rights appealed more strongly +to me than it did to Mr. Wilson. Our chief differences were, first, that +it was more important to insure the acceptance of the Covenant of the +League of Nations than to do strict justice to China; second, that the +Japanese withdrawal from the Conference would prevent the formation of +the League; and, third, that Japan would have withdrawn if her claims +had been denied. As to these differences our opposite views remained +unchanged after the Treaty of Versailles was signed. + +When I was summoned before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on +August 6, 1919, I told the Committee that, in my opinion, the Japanese +signatures would have been affixed to the Treaty containing the Covenant +even though Shantung had not been delivered over to Japan, and that the +only reason that I had yielded was because it was my duty to follow the +decision of the President of the United States. + +About two weeks later, August 19, the President had a conference at the +White House with the same Committee. In answer to questions regarding +the Shantung Settlement, Mr. Wilson said concerning my statement that +his judgment was different from mine, that in his judgment the +signatures could not have been obtained if he had not given Shantung to +Japan, and that he had been notified that the Japanese delegates had +been instructed not to sign the Treaty unless the cession of the German +rights in Shantung to Japan was included. + +Presumably the opinion which Mr. Wilson held in the summer of 1919 he +continues to hold, and for my part my views and feelings remain the same +now as they were then, with possibly the difference that the indignation +and shame that I felt at the time in being in any way a participant in +robbing China of her just rights have increased rather than lessened. + +So intense was the bitterness among the American Commissioners over the +flagrant wrong being perpetrated that, when the decision of the Council +of Four was known, some of them considered whether or not they ought to +resign or give notice that they would not sign the Treaty if the +articles concerning Shantung appeared. The presence at Versailles of the +German plenipotentiaries, the uncertainty of the return of the Italian +delegates then in Rome, and the murmurs of dissatisfaction among the +delegates of the lesser nations made the international situation +precarious. To have added to the serious conditions and to have possibly +precipitated a crisis by openly rebelling against the President was to +assume a responsibility which no Commissioner was willing to take. With +the greatest reluctance the American Commissioners submitted to the +decision of the Council of Four; and, when the Chinese delegates refused +to sign the Treaty after they had been denied the right to sign it with +reservations to the Shantung articles, the American Commissioners, who +had so strongly opposed the settlement, silently approved their conduct +as the only patriotic and statesmanlike course to take. So far as China +was concerned the Shantung Question remained open, and the Chinese +Government very properly refused, after the Treaty of Versailles was +signed, to enter into any negotiations with Japan looking toward its +settlement upon the basis of the treaty provisions. + +There was one exception to the President's usual practice which is +especially noticeable in connection with the Shantung controversy, and +that was the greater participation which he permitted the members of the +American Commission in negotiating with both the Japanese and the +Chinese. It is true he did not disclose his intentions to the +Commissioners, but he did express a wish for their advice and he +directed me to confer with the Japanese and obtain their views. Just why +he adopted this course, for him unusual, I do not know unless he felt +that so far as the equity of China's claim was concerned we were all in +agreement, and if there was to be a departure from strict justice he +desired to have his colleagues suggest a way to do so. It is possible, +too, that he felt the question was in large measure a legal one, and +decided that the illegality of transferring the German rights to Japan +could be more successfully presented to the Japanese delegates by a +lawyer. In any event, in this particular case he adopted a course more +in accord with established custom and practice than he did in any other +of the many perplexing and difficult problems which he was called upon +to solve during the Paris negotiations, excepting of course the subjects +submitted to commissions of the Conference. As has been shown, Mr. +Wilson did not follow the advice of the three Commissioners given him in +General Bliss's letter, but that does not detract from the +noteworthiness of the fact that in the case of Shantung he sought advice +from his Commissioners. + +This ends the account of the Shantung Settlement and the negotiations +which led up to it. The consequences were those which were bound to +follow so indefensible a decision as the one that was reached. Public +opinion in the United States was almost unanimous in condemning it and +in denouncing those responsible for so evident a departure from legal +justice and the principles of international morality. No plea of +expediency or of necessity excused such a flagrant denial of undoubted +right. The popular recognition that a great wrong had been done to a +nation weak because of political discord and an insufficient military +establishment, in order to win favor with a nation strong because of its +military power and national unity, had much to do with increasing the +hostility to the Treaty and preventing its acceptance by the Senate of +the United States. The whole affair furnishes another example of the +results of secret diplomacy, for the arguments which prevailed with the +President were those to which he listened when he sat in secret council +with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +THE BULLITT AFFAIR + + +The foregoing chapters have related to subjects which were known to +President Wilson to be matters of difference between us while we were +together in Paris and which are presumably referred to in his letter of +February 11, 1920, extracts from which are quoted in the opening +chapter. The narration might be concluded with our difference of opinion +as to the Shantung Settlement, but in view of subsequent information +which the President received I am convinced that he felt that my +objections to his decisions in regard to the terms of the peace with +Germany extended further than he knew at the time, and that he resented +the fact that my mind did not go along with his as to these decisions. +This undoubtedly added to the reasons for his letter and possibly +influenced him to write as he did in February, 1920, even more than our +known divergence of judgment during the negotiations. + +I do not feel, therefore, that the story is complete without at least a +brief reference to my views concerning the Treaty of Versailles at the +time of its delivery to the German delegates, which were imperfectly +disclosed in a statement made by William C. Bullitt on September 12, +1919, at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign +Relations. As to the conduct of Mr. Bullitt, who had held a responsible +position with the American Commission at Paris, in voluntarily repeating +a conversation which was from its nature highly confidential, I make +no comment. + +The portion of the statement, which I have no doubt deeply incensed the +President because it was published while he was in the West making his +appeals to the people in behalf of the Treaty and especially of the +League of Nations, is as follows: + + "Mr. Lansing said that he, too, considered many parts of the Treaty + thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the + League of Nations. He said: 'I consider that the League of Nations at + present is entirely useless. The Great Powers have simply gone ahead + and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France have + gotten out of the Treaty everything that they wanted, and the League + of Nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the + Treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the League, and + the Great Powers will never give their consent to changes in the + interests of weaker peoples.' + + "We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. + Mr. Lansing said: 'I believe that if the Senate could only understand + what this Treaty means, and if the American people could really + understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they + will ever understand what it lets them in for.'" (Senate Doc. 106, + 66th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1276.) + +It does not seem an unwarranted conjecture that the President believed +that this statement, which was asserted by Mr. Bullitt to be from a +memorandum made at the time, indicated that I had been unfaithful to +him. He may even have concluded that I had been working against the +League of Nations with the intention of bringing about the rejection of +the Covenant by the Senate. If he did believe this, I cannot feel that +it was other than natural in the circumstances, especially if I did not +at once publicly deny the truth of the Bullitt statement. That I could +not do because there was sufficient truth in it to compel me to show +how, by slight variations and by omissions in the conversation, my words +were misunderstood or misinterpreted. + +In view of the fact that I found it impossible to make an absolute +denial, I telegraphed the President stating the facts and offering to +make them public if he considered it wise to do so. The important part +of the telegram, which was dated September 16, 1919, is as follows: + + "On May 17th Bullitt resigned by letter giving his reasons, with + which you are familiar. I replied by letter on the 18th without any + comment on his reasons. Bullitt on the 19th asked to see me to say + good-bye and I saw him. He elaborated on the reasons for his + resignation and said that he could not conscientiously give + countenance to a treaty which was based on injustice. I told him that + I would say nothing against his resigning since he put it on + conscientious grounds, and that I recognized that certain features of + the Treaty were bad, as I presumed most every one did, but that was + probably unavoidable in view of conflicting claims and that nothing + ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace by + signing the Treaty. Bullitt then discussed the numerous European + commissions provided for by the Treaty on which the United States was + to be represented. I told him that I was disturbed by this fact + because I was afraid the Senate and possibly the people, if they + understood this, would refuse ratification, and that anything which + was an obstacle to ratification was unfortunate because we ought to + have peace as soon as possible." + +It is very easy to see how by making a record of one side of this +conversation without reference to the other side and by an omission here +and there, possibly unintentionally, the sense was altered. Thus Mr. +Bullitt, by repeating only a part of my words and by omitting the +context, entirely changed the meaning of what was said. My attitude was, +and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signed +and ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration of +peace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which might +delay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification, +was to be deplored. + +Having submitted to the President the question of making a public +explanation of my interview with Mr. Bullitt which would in a measure at +least correct the impression caused by his statement, I could not do so +until I received the President's approval. That was never received. The +telegram, which was sent to Mr. Wilson, through the Department of State, +was never answered. It was not even acknowledged. The consequence was +that the version of the conversation given by Mr. Bullitt was the only +one that up to the present time has been published. + +The almost unavoidable conclusion from the President's silence is that +he considered my explanation was insufficient to destroy or even to +weaken materially the effect of Mr. Bullitt's account of what had taken +place, and that the public would believe in spite of it that I was +opposed to the Treaty and hostile to the League of Nations. I am not +disposed to blame the President for holding this opinion considering +what had taken place at Paris. From his point of view a statement, such +as I was willing to make, would in no way help the situation. I would +still be on record as opposed to certain provisions of the Treaty, +provisions which he was so earnestly defending in his addresses. While +Mr. Bullitt had given an incomplete report of our conversation, there +was sufficient truth in it to make anything but a flat denial seem of +little value to the President; and, as I could not make such a denial, +his point of view seemed to be that the damage was done and could not be +undone. I am inclined to think that he was right. + +My views concerning the Treaty at the time of the conversation with Mr. +Bullitt are expressed in a memorandum of May 8, 1919, which is +as follows: + + "The terms of peace were yesterday delivered to the German + plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in these days of feverish + rush of preparation there is time to consider the Treaty as a + complete document. + + "The impression made by it is one of disappointment, of regret, and + of depression. The terms of peace appear immeasurably harsh and + humiliating, while many of them seem to me impossible of performance. + + "The League of Nations created by the Treaty is relied upon to + preserve the artificial structure which has been erected by + compromise of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers and to + prevent the germination of the seeds of war which are sown in so many + articles and which under normal conditions would soon bear fruit. The + League might as well attempt to prevent the growth of plant life in a + tropical jungle. Wars will come sooner or later. + + "It must be admitted in honesty that the League is an instrument of + the mighty to check the normal growth of national power and national + aspirations among those who have been rendered impotent by defeat. + Examine the Treaty and you will find peoples delivered against their + wills into the hands of those whom they hate, while their economic + resources are torn from them and given to others. Resentment and + bitterness, if not desperation, are bound to be the consequences of + such provisions. It may be years before these oppressed peoples are + able to throw off the yoke, but as sure as day follows night the time + will come when they will make the effort. + + "This war was fought by the United States to destroy forever the + conditions which produced it. Those conditions have not been + destroyed. They have been supplanted by other conditions equally + productive of hatred, jealousy, and suspicion. In place of the Triple + Alliance and the Entente has arisen the Quintuple Alliance which is + to rule the world. The victors in this war intend to impose their + combined will upon the vanquished and to subordinate all interests to + their own. + + "It is true that to please the aroused public opinion of mankind and + to respond to the idealism of the moralist they have surrounded the + new alliance with a halo and called it 'The League of Nations,' but + whatever it may be called or however it may be disguised it is an + alliance of the Five Great Military Powers. + + "It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that the power to compel + obedience by the exercise of the united strength of 'The Five' is the + fundamental principle of the League. Justice is secondary. Might + is primary. + + "The League as now constituted will be the prey of greed and + intrigue; and the law of unanimity in the Council, which may offer a + restraint, will be broken or render the organization powerless. It is + called upon to stamp as just what is unjust. + + "We have a treaty of peace, but it will not bring permanent peace + because it is founded on the shifting sands of self-interest." + +In the views thus expressed I was not alone. A few days after they were +written I was in London where I discussed the Treaty with several of the +leading British statesmen. I noted their opinions thus: "The consensus +was that the Treaty was unwise and unworkable, that it was conceived in +intrigue and fashioned in cupidity, and that it would produce rather +than prevent wars." One of these leaders of political thought in Great +Britain said that "the only apparent purpose of the League of Nations +seems to be to perpetuate the series of unjust provisions which were +being imposed." + +The day following my return from London, which was on May 17, I received +Mr. Bullitt's letter of resignation and also letters from five of our +principal experts protesting against the terms of peace and stating that +they considered them to be an abandonment of the principles for which +Americans had fought. One of the officials, whose relations with the +President were of a most intimate nature, said that he was in a quandary +about resigning; that he did not think that the conditions in the Treaty +would make for peace because they were too oppressive; that the +obnoxious things in the Treaty were due to secret diplomacy; and that +the President should have stuck rigidly to his principles, which he had +not. This official was evidently deeply incensed, but in the end he did +not resign, nor did the five experts who sent letters, because they were +told that it would seriously cripple the American Commission in the +preparation of the Austrian Treaty if they did not continue to serve. +Another and more prominent adviser of the President felt very bitterly +over the terms of peace. In speaking of his disapproval of them he told +me that he had found the same feeling among the British in Paris, who +were disposed to blame the President since "they had counted upon him to +stand firmly by his principles and face down the intriguers." + +It is needless to cite other instances indicating the general state of +mind among the Americans and British at Paris to show the views that +were being exchanged and the frank comments that were being made at the +time of my interview with Mr. Bullitt. In truth I said less to him in +criticism of the Treaty than I did to some others, but they have seen +fit to respect the confidential nature of our conversations. + +It is not pertinent to the present subject to recite the events between +the delivery of the Treaty to the Germans on May 7 and its signature on +June 28. In spite of the dissatisfaction, which even went so far that +some of the delegates of the Great Powers threatened to decline to sign +the Treaty unless certain of its terms were modified, the supreme +necessity of restoring peace as soon as possible overcame all obstacles. +It was the appreciation of this supreme necessity which caused many +Americans to urge consent to ratification when the Treaty was laid +before the Senate. + +My own position was paradoxical. I was opposed to the Treaty, but signed +it and favored its ratification. The explanation is this: Convinced +after conversations with the President in July and August, 1919, that he +would not consent to any effective reservations, the politic course +seemed to be to endeavor to secure ratification without reservations. It +appeared to be the only possible way of obtaining that for which all the +world longed and which in the months succeeding the signature appeared +absolutely essential to prevent the widespread disaster resulting from +political and economic chaos which seemed to threaten many nations if +not civilization itself. Even if the Treaty was bad in certain +provisions, so long as the President remained inflexible and insistent, +its ratification without change seemed a duty to humanity. At least that +was my conviction in the summer and autumn of 1919, and I am not yet +satisfied that it was erroneous. My views after January, 1920, are not +pertinent to the subject under consideration. The consequences of the +failure to ratify promptly the Treaty of Versailles are still uncertain. +They may be more serious or they may be less serious than they appeared +in 1919. Time alone will disclose the truth and fix the responsibility +for what occurred after the Treaty of Versailles was laid before the +Senate of the United States. + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +The narration of my relations to the peace negotiations as one of the +American Commissioners to the Paris Conference, which has been confined +within the limits laid down in the opening chapter of this volume, +concludes with the recital of the views which I held concerning the +terms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and which were brought to the +attention of Mr. Wilson through the press reports of William C. +Bullitt's statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on +September 12, 1919. + +The endeavor has been to present, as fully as possible in the +circumstances, a review of my association with President Wilson in +connection with the negotiations at Paris setting forth our differences +of opinion and divergence of judgment upon the subjects coming before +the Peace Conference, the conduct of the proceedings, and the terms of +peace imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. + +It is evident from this review that, from a time prior to Mr. Wilson's +departure from the United States on December 4, 1918, to attend the +Peace Conference up to the delivery of the text of the Treaty to the +German plenipotentiaries on May 7, 1919, there were many subjects of +disagreement between the President and myself; that he was disposed to +reject or ignore the advice and suggestions which I volunteered; and +that in consequence of my convictions I followed his guidance and obeyed +his instructions unwillingly. + +While there were other matters of friction between us they were of a +personal nature and of minor importance. Though they may have +contributed to the formality of our relations they played no real part +in the increasing difficulty of the situation. The matters narrated +were, in my opinion, the principal causes for the letters written by +President Wilson in February, 1920; at least they seem sufficient to +explain the origin of the correspondence, while the causes specifically +stated by him--my calling together of the heads of the executive +departments for consultation during his illness and my attempts to +anticipate his judgment--are insufficient. + +The reasons given in the President's letter of February 11, the +essential portions of which have been quoted, for stating that my +resignation as Secretary of State would be acceptable to him, are the +embarrassment caused him by my "reluctance and divergence of judgment" +and the implication that my mind did not "willingly go along" with his. +As neither of these reasons applies to the calling of Cabinet meetings +or to the anticipation of his judgment in regard to foreign affairs, the +unavoidable conclusion is that these grounds of complaint were not the +real causes leading up to the severance of our official association. + +The real causes--which are the only ones worthy of consideration--are to +be found in the record of the relations between President Wilson and +myself in connection with the peace negotiations. Upon that record must +rest the justification or the refutation of Mr. Wilson's implied charge +that I was not entirely loyal to him as President and that I failed to +perform my full duty to my country as Secretary of State and as a +Commissioner to Negotiate Peace by opposing the way in which he +exercised his constitutional authority to conduct the foreign affairs of +the United States. + + +THE END + + + + +APPENDIX I + + +THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, +LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION ON JANUARY 10, 1919 + +PREAMBLE + +In order to secure peace, security, and orderly government by the +prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by +the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the +actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of +justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the +dealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to +this covenant and agreement jointly and severally adopt this +constitution of the League of Nations. + +ARTICLE I + +The action of the Signatory Powers under the terms of this agreement +shall be effected through the instrumentality of a Body of Delegates +which shall consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contracting +Powers accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. The +meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the seat of +government of H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. shall be the +presiding officer of the Body. + +Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meet +temporarily at the seat of government of B. or of S., in which case the +Ambassador or Minister to H. of the country in which the meeting is held +shall be the presiding officer _pro tempore_. + +It shall be the privilege of any of the contracting Powers to assist its +representative in the Body of Delegates by any method of conference, +counsel, or advice that may seem best to it, and also to substitute upon +occasion a special representative for its regular diplomatic +representative accredited to H. + + +ARTICLE II + +The Body of Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and shall have +power to appoint such committees as they may deem necessary to inquire +into and report upon any matters that lie within the field of +their action. + +It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the initiative of +any member, to discuss, either publicly or privately as it may deem +best, any matter lying within the jurisdiction of the League of Nations +as defined in this Covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace of +the world; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the +exercise of the functions and powers granted to them under this Covenant +shall be first formulated and agreed upon by an Executive Council, which +shall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and which shall +consist of the representatives of the Great Powers together with +representatives drawn in annual rotation from two panels, one of which +shall be made up of the representatives of the States ranking next after +the Great Powers and the other of the representatives of the minor +States (a classification which the Body of Delegates shall itself +establish and may from time to time alter), such a number being drawn +from these panels as will be but one less than the representatives of +the Great Powers; and three or more negative votes in the Council shall +operate as a veto upon any action or resolution proposed. + +All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Body of Delegates upon +the recommendation of the Executive Council, except those adopted in +execution of any direct powers herein granted to the Body of Delegates +themselves, shall have the effect of recommendations to the several +governments of the League. + +The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent Secretariat and staff +and may appoint joint committees chosen from the Body of Delegates or +consisting of specially qualified persons outside of that Body, for the +study and systematic consideration of the international questions with +which the Council may have to deal, or of questions likely to lead to +international complications or disputes. It shall also take the +necessary steps to establish and maintain proper liaison both with the +foreign offices of the signatory powers and with any governments or +agencies which may be acting as mandatories of the League of Nations in +any part of the world. + + +ARTICLE III + +The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political +independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between +them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future +become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and +aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to +the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial +readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates +be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples +concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that +territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The +Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the +peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of +political jurisdiction or boundary. + + +ARTICLE IV + +The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that the establishment +and maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national +armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the +enforcement by common action of international obligations; and the +Delegates are directed to formulate at once plans by which such a +reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall be binding +when, and only when, unanimously approved by the Governments signatory +to this Covenant. + +As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the Powers +subscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant constitutes a +part hereby agree to abolish conscription and all other forms of +compulsory military service, and also agree that their future forces of +defence and of international action shall consist of militia or +volunteers, whose numbers and methods of training shall be fixed, after +expert inquiry, by the agreements with regard to the reduction of +armaments referred to in the last preceding paragraph. + +The Body of Delegates shall also determine for the consideration and +action of the several governments what direct military equipment and +armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces +laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when +adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body of +Delegates. + +The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions and implements of +war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise or for private +profit, and that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all +national armaments and military or naval programmes. + + +ARTICLE V + +The Contracting Powers jointly and severally agree that, should disputes +or difficulties arise between or among them which cannot be +satisfactorily settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes of +diplomacy, they will in no case resort to armed force without previously +submitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration or +to inquiry by the Executive Council of the Body of Delegates or until +there has been an award by the arbitrators or a decision by the +Executive Council; and that they will not even then resort to armed +force as against a member of the League of Nations who complies with the +award of the arbitrators or the decision of the Executive Council. + +The Powers signatory to this Covenant undertake and agree that whenever +any dispute or difficulty shall arise between or among them with regard +to any questions of the law of nations, with regard to the +interpretation of a treaty, as to any fact which would, if established, +constitute a breach of international obligation, or as to any alleged +damage and the nature and measure of the reparation to be made therefor, +if such dispute or difficulty cannot be satisfactorily settled by the +ordinary processes of negotiation, to submit the whole subject-matter to +arbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award or decision +that may be rendered. + +In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue shall be referred +to three arbitrators, one of the three to be selected by each of the +parties to the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and the +third by the two thus selected. When there are more than two parties to +the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the several +parties, and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their number others +of their own choice, the number thus added to be limited to the number +which will suffice to give a deciding voice to the arbitrators thus +added in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the +contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending +parties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, the +additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Body of +Delegates. + +On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of the arbitrators +may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths of the Delegates, in case +the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, or by a vote of +two-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators was +not unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and +conclusive. + +When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside, the +dispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators chosen as heretofore +provided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted as +arbitrators in the dispute in question, and the decision of the +arbitrators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding +and conclusive without right of appeal. + +If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer any matter in +dispute to arbitration, the parties to the dispute shall apply to the +Executive Council to take the matter under consideration for such +mediatory action or recommendation as it may deem wise in the +circumstances. The Council shall immediately accept the reference and +give notice to the other party or parties, and shall make the necessary +arrangements for a full hearing, investigation, and consideration. It +shall ascertain all the facts involved in the dispute and shall make +such recommendations as it may deem wise and practicable based on the +merits of the controversy and calculated to secure a just and lasting +settlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of +the Executive Council any and all information that may be in their +possession which in any way bears upon the facts or merits of the +controversy; and the Executive Council shall do everything in its power +by way of mediation or conciliation to bring about a peaceful +settlement. The decisions of the Executive Council shall be addressed to +the disputants, and shall not have the force of a binding verdict. +Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall +be the privilege of the members of the Executive Council to publish +their several conclusions or recommendations; and such publications +shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of the +disputants. + + +ARTICLE VI + +Should any contracting Power break or disregard its covenants under +ARTICLE V, it shall thereby _ipso facto_ commit an act of war with all +the members of the League, which shall immediately subject it to a +complete economic and financial boycott, including the severance of all +trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between +their subjects and the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and the +prevention, so far as possible, of all financial, commercial, or +personal intercourse between the subjects of the covenant-breaking State +and the subjects of any other State, whether a member of the League of +Nations or not. + +It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive Council of the Body +of Delegates in such a case to recommend what effective military or +naval force the members of the League of Nations shall severally +contribute, and to advise, if it should think best, that the smaller +members of the League be excused from making any contribution to the +armed forces to be used against the covenant-breaking State. + +The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restoration of peace, be +subject to perpetual disarmament and to the regulations with regard to a +peace establishment provided for new States under the terms of +SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE IV. + + +ARTICLE VII + +If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile +step short of war, against another Power before submitting the dispute +involved to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council as +herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any +hostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has been +decided adversely to it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as herein +provided, the Contracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only to +cease all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to unite in +blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to commerce or +intercourse with any part of the world and to use any force that may be +necessary to accomplish that object. + + +ARTICLE VIII + +Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the +Contracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the +League of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and those +Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed +wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. + +It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each +of the nations signatory or adherent to this Covenant to draw the +attention of the Body of Delegates to any circumstances anywhere which +threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding +between nations upon which peace depends. + +The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace whenever war is +rumored or threatened, and also whenever the Delegate of any Power shall +inform the Delegates that a meeting and conference in the interest of +peace is advisable. + +The Delegates may also meet at such other times and upon such other +occasions as they shall from time to time deem best and determine. + + +ARTICLE IX + +In the event of a dispute arising between one of the Contracting Powers +and a Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involved +hereby binds itself to endeavour to obtain the submission of the dispute +to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other Power will not +agree to submit the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration, the +Contracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention of the Body of +Delegates. The Delegates shall in such a case, in the name of the League +of Nations, invite the Power not a party to this Covenant to become _ad +hoc_ a party and to submit its case to judicial decision or to +arbitration, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed that the +provisions hereinbefore contained and applicable to the submission of +disputes to arbitration or discussion shall be in all respects +applicable to the dispute both in favour of and against such Power as if +it were a party to this Covenant. + +In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall not accept the +invitation of the Delegates to become _ad hoc_ a party, it shall be the +duty of the Executive Council immediately to institute an inquiry into +the circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to recommend +such joint action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and most +effectual in the circumstances disclosed. + + +ARTICLE X + +If hostilities should be begun or any hostile action taken against the +Contracting Power by the Power not a party to this Covenant before a +decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, report +and recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, or +contrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers shall thereupon +cease all commerce and communication with that Power and shall also +unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to all +commerce or intercourse with any part of the world, employing jointly +any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object. The +Contracting Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance of the +Contracting Power against which hostile action has been taken, combining +their armed forces in its behalf. + + +ARTICLE XI + +In case of a dispute between states not parties to this Covenant, any +Contracting Power may bring the matter to the attention of the +Delegates, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the League of +Nations with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute. + +If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and agree to +submit its interests and causes of action wholly to the control and +decision of the League of Nations, that state shall _ad hoc_ be deemed a +Contracting Power. If no one of the states, parties to the dispute, +shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall, through the Executive +Council, of their own motion take such action and make such +recommendation to their governments as will prevent hostilities and +result in the settlement of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE XII + +Any Power not a party to this Covenant, whose government is based upon +the principle of popular self-government, may apply to the Body of +Delegates for leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard the +granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order, and security of +the World, they may act favourably on the application, and their +favourable action shall operate to constitute the Power so applying in +all respects a full signatory party to this Covenant. This action shall +require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Delegates. + + +ARTICLE XIII + +The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Covenant and +Convention is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations _inter se_ +which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly engage that +they will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the +terms hereof. + +In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to +the League of Nations shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant, +have undertaken any treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the +terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take +immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. + + + + +_SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS_ + +I + +In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to +Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerly +under the dominion of the German Empire, the League of Nations shall be +regarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimate +disposal or of continued administration in accordance with certain +fundamental principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion and +control shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation on the part +of any Power. + +These principles are, that there shall in no case be any annexation of +any of these territories by any State either within the League or +outside of it, and that in the future government of these peoples and +territories the rule of self-determination, or the consent of the +governed to their form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably +applied, and all policies of administration or economic development be +based primarily upon the well-considered interests of the people +themselves. + +II + +Any authority, control, or administration which may be necessary in +respect of these peoples or territories other than their own +self-determined and self-organized autonomy shall be the exclusive +function of and shall be vested in the League of Nations and exercised +or undertaken by or on behalf of it. + +It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate its authority, +control, or administration of any such people or territory to some +single State or organized agency which it may designate and appoint as +its agent or mandatory; but whenever or wherever possible or feasible +the agent or mandatory so appointed shall be nominated or approved by +the autonomous people or territory. + +III + +The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by +the mandatary State or agency shall in each case be explicitly defined +by the League in a special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the +League complete power of supervision and of intimate control, and which +shall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental +unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of +any breach of the mandate by the mandatary State or agency or for the +substitution of some other State or agency, as mandatary. + +The mandatary State or agency shall in all cases be bound and required +to maintain the policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for all +the signatories to this Covenant, in respect of the use and development +of the economic resources of such people or territory. + +The mandatary State or agency shall in no case form or maintain any +military or naval force in excess of definite standards laid down by the +League itself for the purposes of internal police. + +IV + +No new State arising or created from the old Empires of Austria-Hungary, +or Turkey shall be recognized by the League or admitted into its +membership except on condition that its military and naval forces and +armaments shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in respect +of it from time to time. + +As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, +directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations +_inter se_ of all new independent States arising or created out of the +Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating and +composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance of +settled order and the general peace. + +V + +The Powers signatory or adherent to this Covenant agree that they will +themselves seek to establish and maintain fair hours and humane +conditions of labour for all those within their several jurisdictions +who are engaged in manual labour and that they will exert their +influence in favour of the adoption and maintenance of a similar policy +and like safeguards wherever their industrial and commercial +relations extend. + +VI + +The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as +a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous +States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their +several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in +law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of +their people. + + + + +APPENDIX II + +LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +(_Plan of Lord Robert Cecil_[1]) + +I + +ORGANIZATION + + +The general treaty setting up the league of nations will explicitly +provide for regular conferences between the responsible representatives +of the contracting powers. + +These conferences would review the general conditions of international +relations and would naturally pay special attention to any difficulty +which might seem to threaten the peace of the world. They would also +receive and as occasion demanded discuss reports as to the work of any +international administrative or investigating bodies working under +the League. + +These conferences would constitute the pivot of the league. They would +be meetings of statesmen responsible to their own sovereign parliaments, +and any decisions taken would therefore, as in the case of the various +allied conferences during the war, have to be unanimous. + +The following form of organization is suggested: + +I. _The conference_. Annual meeting of prime ministers and foreign +secretaries of British Empire, United States, France, Italy, Japan, and +any other States recognized by them as great powers. Quadrennial meeting +of representatives of all States included in the league. There should +also be provision for the summoning of special conferences on the demand +of any one of the great powers or, if there were danger of an outbreak +of war, of any member of the league. (The composition of the league will +be determined at the peace conference. Definitely untrustworthy and +hostile States, e.g., Russia, should the Bolshevist government remain in +power, should be excluded. Otherwise it is desirable not to be too rigid +in scrutinizing qualifications, since the small powers will in any case +not exercise any considerable influence.) + +2. For the conduct of its work the interstate conference will require a +permanent secretariat. The general secretary should be appointed by the +great powers, if possible choosing a national of some other country. + +3. _International bodies_. The secretariat would be the responsible +channel of communication between the interstate conference and all +international bodies functioning under treaties guaranteed by the +league. These would fall into three classes: + +_(a)_ Judicial; i.e., the existing Hague organization with any additions +or modifications made by the league. + +_(b)_ International administrative bodies. Such as the suggested transit +commission. To these would be added bodies already formed under existing +treaties (which are very numerous and deal with very important +interests, e.g., postal union, international labor office, etc.). + +_(c)_ International commissions of enquiry: e.g., commission on industrial +conditions (labor legislation), African commission, armaments +commission. + +4. In addition to the above arrangements guaranteed by or arising out of +the general treaty, there would probably be a periodical congress of +delegates of the parliaments of the States belonging to the league, as a +development out of the existing Interparliamentary Union. A regular +staple of discussion for this body would be afforded by the reports of +the interstate conference and of the different international bodies. The +congress would thus cover the ground that is at present occupied by the +periodical Hague Conference and also the ground claimed by the Socialist +International. + +For the efficient conduct of all these activities it is essential that +there should be a permanent central meeting-place, where the officials +and officers of the league would enjoy the privileges of +extra-territoriality. Geneva is suggested as the most suitable place. + + +II + +PREVENTION OF WAR + +The covenants for the prevention of war which would be embodied in the +general treaty would be as follows: + +(1) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war +until they had submitted the questions at issue to an international +conference or an arbitral court, and until the conference or court had +issued a report or handed down an award. + +(2) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war +with any member of the league complying with the award of a court or +with the report of a conference. For the purpose of this clause, the +report of the conference must be unanimous, excluding the litigants. + +(3) The members of the league would undertake to regard themselves, as +_ipso facto_, at war with any one of them acting contrary to the above +covenants, and to take, jointly and severally, appropriate military, +economic and other measure against the recalcitrant State. + +(4) The members of the league would bind themselves to take similar +action, in the sense of the above clause, against any State not being a +member of the league which is involved in a dispute with a member of +the league. + +(This is a stronger provision than that proposed in the Phillimore +Report.) + +The above covenants mark an advance upon the practice of international +relations previous to the war in two respects: (i) In insuring a +necessary period of delay before war can break out (except between two +States which are neither of them members of the league); (2) In securing +public discussion and probably a public report upon matters in dispute. + +It should be observed that even in cases where the conference report is +not unanimous, and therefore in no sense binding, a majority report may +be issued and that this would be likely to carry weight with the public +opinion of the States in the league. + + + + +APPENDIX III + +THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES + + +ARTICLE I + +The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the +Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such +of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without +reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a +Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the +coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all +other Members of the League. + +Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the +Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by +two thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective +guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international +obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by +the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and +armaments. + +Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention +so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international +obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been +fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. + + +ARTICLE 2 + +The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through +the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent +Secretariat. + + +ARTICLE 3 + +The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the +League. + +The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as +occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as +may be decided upon. + +The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere +of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. + +At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one +vote, and may have not more than three Representatives. + + +ARTICLE 4 + +The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and +Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members +of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the +Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of +the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by +the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece +shall be members of the Council. + +With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name +additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be +members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the +number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for +representation on the Council. + +The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at +least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as +may be decided upon. + +The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere +of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. + +Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited +to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the +Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the +interests of that Member of the League. + +At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the +Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one +Representative. + + +ARTICLE 5 + +Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the +terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or +of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the +League represented at the meeting. + +All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, +including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular +matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be +decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at +the meeting. + +The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council +shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. + + +ARTICLE 6 + +The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the +League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such +secretaries and staff as may be required. + +The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex; +thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with +the approval of the majority of the Assembly. + +The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the +Secretary General with the approval of the Council. + +The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the +Assembly and of the Council. + +The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the +League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the +International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. + + +ARTICLE 7 + +The Seat of the League is established at Geneva. + +The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be +established elsewhere. + +All positions under or in connection with the League, including the +Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. + +Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League +when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic +privileges and immunities. + +The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials +or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable. + + +ARTICLE 8 + +The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace +requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point +consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of +international obligations. + +The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and +circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction +for the consideration and action of the several Governments. + +Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least +every ten years. + +After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, +the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the +concurrence of the Council. + +The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private +enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave +objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon +such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the +necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to +manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for +their safety. + +The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank +information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval +and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are +adaptable to warlike purposes. + + +ARTICLE 9 + +A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the +execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval +and air questions generally. + + +ARTICLE 10 + +The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against +external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political +independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such +aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the +Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be +fulfilled. + + +ARTICLE 11 + +Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the +Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to +the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be +deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any +such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request +of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. + +It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the +League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any +circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens +to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations +upon which peace depends. + + +ARTICLE 12 + +The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them +any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter +either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no +case to resort to war until three months after the award by the +arbitrators or the report by the Council. + +In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be +made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be +made within six months after the submission of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 13 + +The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise +between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to +arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, +they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration. + +Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of +international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established +would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the +extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are +declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission +to arbitration. + +For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to +which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties +to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. + +The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good +faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to +war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the +event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall +propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. + + +ARTICLE 14 + +The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for +adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of +International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and +determine any dispute of an international character which the parties +thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon +any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by +the Assembly. + + +ARTICLE 15 + +If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely +to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in +accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they +will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may +effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute +to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a +full investigation and consideration thereof. + +For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the +Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case +with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith +direct the publication thereof. + +The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and +if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving +such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of +settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate. + +If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by +a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement +of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed +just and proper in regard thereto. + +Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a +statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions +regarding the same. + +If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members +thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to +the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to +war with any party to the dispute which complies with the +recommendations of the report. + +If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by +the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of +the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to +themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider +necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. + +If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is +found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international +law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the +Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its +settlement. + +The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the +Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either +party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen +days after the submission of the dispute to the Council. + +In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article +and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall +apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report +made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those +Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of +the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the +Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force +as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other +than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 16 + +Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its +covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed +to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, +which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all +trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between +their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and +the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse +between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals +of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. + +It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the +several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air +force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed +forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. + +The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually +support one another in the financial and economic measures which are +taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and +inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will +mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at +one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will +take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to +the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to +protect the covenants of the League. + +Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League +may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the +Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of +the League represented thereon. + + +ARTICLE 17 + +In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State +which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of +the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be +invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the +purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem +just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to +16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed +necessary by the Council. + +Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute +an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such +action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. + +If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of +membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall +resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article +16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. + +If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the +obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such +dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such +recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the +settlement of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 18 + +Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any +Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat +and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or +international engagement shall be binding until so registered. + + +ARTICLE 19 + +The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members +of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the +consideration of international conditions whose continuance might +endanger the peace of the world. + + +ARTICLE 20 + +The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted +as abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_ which are +inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they +will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the +terms thereof. + +In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the +League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of +this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate +steps to procure its release from such obligations. + + +ARTICLE 21 + +Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of +international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional +understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance +of peace. + + +ARTICLE 22 + +To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war +have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly +governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand +by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there +should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of +such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for +the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. + +The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the +tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by +reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical +position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to +accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as +Mandatories on behalf of the League. + +The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the +development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, +its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. + +Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have +reached a stage of development where their existence as independent +nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of +administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as +they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a +principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. + +Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage +that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the +territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience +and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and +morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms +traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment +of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training +of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of +territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and +commerce of other Members of the League. + +There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the +South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their +population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of +civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the +Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the +laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to +the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous +population. + +In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an +annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. + +The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by +the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the +League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council. + +A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the +annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all +matters relating to the observance of the mandates. + + +ARTICLE 23 + +Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international +conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of +the League: + +_(a)_ will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions +of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and +in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations +extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary +international organisations; + +_(b)_ undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of +territories under their control; + +_(c)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision over the +execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and +children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; + +_(d)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade +in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this +traffic is necessary in the common interest; + +_(e)_ will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of +communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce +of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special +necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall +be borne in mind; + +_(f)_ will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern +for the prevention and control of disease. + + +ARTICLE 24 + +There shall be placed under the direction of the League all +international bureaux already established by general treaties if the +parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all +commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest +hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League. + +In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general +conventions but which are not placed under the control of international +bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to +the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and +distribute all relevant information and shall render any other +assistance which may be necessary or desirable. + +The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the +expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction +of the League. + + +ARTICLE 25 + +The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the +establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red +Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the +prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout +the world. + + +ARTICLE 26 + +Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the +Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a +majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the +Assembly. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which +signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a +Member of the League. + + + + +APPENDIX IV + +THE FOURTEEN POINTS[2] + +The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that +program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this: + +I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall +be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy +shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. + +II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial +waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in +whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of +international covenants. + +III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the +establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations +consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. + +IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be +reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. + +V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all +colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in +determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the +populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims +of the government whose title is to be determined. + +VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all +questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest +cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an +unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent +determination of her own political development and national policy and +assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under +institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance +also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The +treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come +will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her +needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their +intelligent and unselfish sympathy. + +VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and +restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys +in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as +this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws +which they have themselves set and determined for the government of +their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole +structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. + +VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions +restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter +of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for +nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more +be made secure in the interest of all. + +IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along +clearly recognizable lines of nationality. + +X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish +to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest +opportunity of autonomous development. + +XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied +territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; +and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined +by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance +and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and +economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan +states should be entered into. + +XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be +assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now +under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and +an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the +Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships +and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. + +XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include +the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which +should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose +political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be +guaranteed by international covenant. + +XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific +covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political +independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. + + + + +APPENDIX V + +PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 11, +1918 + + +The principles to be applied are these: + +_First_, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the +essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as +are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent; + +_Second_, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from +sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a +game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of +power; but that + +_Third_, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made +in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and +not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst +rival states; and + +_Fourth_, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded +the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing +new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be +likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of +the world. + + + + +APPENDIX VI + +THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG + + +ARTICLE 156 + +Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and +privileges--particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, +railways, mines, and submarine cables--which she acquired in virtue of +the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all +other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung. + +All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch +lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, +shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the +exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together +with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. + +The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from +Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties +attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of +all charges and encumbrances. + + +ARTICLE 157 + +The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the +territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might +claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the +expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with +this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all +charges and encumbrances. + + +ARTICLE 158 + +Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming +into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, +title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating +to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or +other, of the territory of Kiaochow. + +Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all +treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or +privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles. + + +[Footnote 1: Reprinted from Senate Doc. No. 106, 66th Congress, 1st +Session, p. 1163.] + +[Footnote 2: From the address of President Wilson delivered at a Joint +Session of Congress on January 8, 1918.] + + + + +INDEX + + +Abrogation of treaties contrary to the League, in Wilson's original + draft; in Treaty, + +Affirmative guaranty of territory and independence, plan; Wilson adopts, + in Fourteen Points; Lansing's opposition; constitutional and + political arguments against; Lansing's "self-denying covenant" as + substitute; in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty; as continuing + balance of power; Wilson adheres to; not in Cecil plan; in Lansing's + resolution of principles; other substitute; as reason for rejection + of Treaty by Senate; retained in reported Covenant; and dominance of + Great Powers. _See also_ Equality of nations; League; + Self-denying covenant. + +Albania, disposition. + +Alliances. _See_ French alliance. + +Alsace-Lorraine, to be restored to France. + +Amendment of League, provision for. + +American Bar Association, Lansing's address. + +American Commission, members; ignored in League negotiations; conference + of January 10; ignorant of preliminary negotiations; question of + resignation over Shantung settlement; shares in Shantung + negotiations. _See also_ Bliss; House; Lansing; White; Wilson. + +American Peace Society. + +American programme, lack of definite, as subject of disagreement; + Fourteen Points announced; not worked out; insufficiency of Fourteen + Points; Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; effect of + President's attendance at Conference; embarrassment to delegates of + lack; _projet_ of treaty prepared for Lansing; President resents it; + no system or team-work in American Commission; reason for President's + attitude; no instructions during President's absence; results of + lack; and Preliminary Treaty; influence of lack on Wilson's + leadership; text of Fourteen Points. + +Annunzio, Gabriele d', at Fiume. + +Arabia, disposition. _See also_ Near East. + +Arbitral Tribunal, in Lansing's plan. + +Arbitration, as form of peace promotion; in Lansing's plan; in Wilson's + original draft; in Cecil plan; in Treaty. _See also_ Diplomatic + adjustment; Judicial settlement. + +Armenia, mandate for; protectorate. _See also_ Near East. + +Armistice, American conference on. + +Article X. _See_ Affirmative guaranty. + +Assembly (Body of Delegates), in Wilson's original draft; analogous body + in Cecil plan; in Treaty. + +Auchincloss, Gordon, and drafting of League. + +Austria, Archduchy and union with Germany, outlet to sea. + +Austria-Hungary, dissolution; Fourteen Points on subject people. + +Azerbaidjan, Wilson and. + +Baker, Ray Stannard, and Shantung. + +Balance of power, Clemenceau advocates; Wilson denounces; and Cecil + plan; League and. _See also_ Affirmative guaranty; Equality of + nations. + +Balfour, Arthur, signs French alliance. + +Balkans, Fourteen Points on. _See also_ states by names. + +Belgium, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, full sovereignty, + +Bessarabia disposition, + +Bliss, Tasker H. American delegate, opposes affirmative guaranty, and + Covenant as reported, and proposed French alliance, and Shantung, + letter to President, _See also_ American Commission; American + programme. + +Body of Delegates. _See_ Assembly. + +Boers, and self-determination, + +Bohemia, disposition, + +Bolshevism, peace as check to spread, + +Bosnia, disposition, + +Boundaries, principles in drawing, + +Bowman, Isaiah, Commission of Inquiry + +Brest-Litovsk Treaty, to be abrogated, + +Bucharest Treaty, to be abrogated, + +Buffer state on the Rhine, + +Bulgaria, boundaries, + +Bullitt, William C., on revision of Covenant, testimony on Lansing + interview, Lansing's telegram to President on testimony, no reply + received, and Wilson's western speeches, + +Canada, Papineau Rebellion and self-determination, + +Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, + +Cecil, Lord Robert, plan for League, Wilson opposes it, text of plan, + +Central Powers, Wilson and need of defeat, hope in Wilson's attitude, + peace or Bolshevism, _See also_ Mandates, and states by name. + +China. _See_ Shantung. + +Chinda, Viscount, and Shantung, + +Civil War, and self-determination, + +Clemenceau, Georges, Supreme War Council, advocates balance of power, + and Cecil plan, and Franco-American alliance, _See also_ Council of + Four. + +Codification of international law, in Lansing's plan, + +Colonies, disposition of, in Lansing's plan, Fourteen Points on, _See + also_ Mandates. + +Commerce. _See_ Non-intercourse; Open Door. + +Commission of Inquiry, work, + +Commission on the League of Nations, appointed, and Wilson's return to + United States, meets, Wilson's draft as groundwork, meetings and + report, Wilson's address, character of report and work, secrecy, + Wilson's domination, + +Constantinople, disposition, + +Constitutional objections, to affirmative guaranty, and to Cecil plan, + +Council of Foreign Ministers, established, nickname, + +Council of Four, self-constituted, secrecy, "Olympians," gives only + digest of Treaty to other delegates, Shantung bargain, _See also_ + Secret diplomacy. + +Council of Ten, and Lansing's substitute resolution on League, during + Wilson's absence, self-constituted organization, and Supreme War + Council, divided, and secrecy, + +Council of the Heads of States. _See_ Council of Four. + +Council (Executive Council) of the League, in Wilson's original draft, + analogous body in Cecil plan, in Treaty, + +Covenant. _See_ League of Nations. + +Croatia, disposition, + +Czecho-Slovakia, erection, + +Dalmatia, in Pact of London, + +Danzig, for Poland, + +Dardanelles, Fourteen Points on, + +Declaration of war, affirmative guaranty and power over, + +Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Heligoland, + +Diplomacy. _See_ Secret diplomacy. + +Diplomatic adjustment, as basis of Covenant, exalted, Lansing on + judicial settlement and, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, _See + also_ Judicial settlement. + +Disarmament, not touched in Lansing's plan; in Lansing's resolution of + principles; in Wilson's original draft; in Treaty. + +Dobrudja, disposition. + +East Indians, and self-determination. + +Economic influence on boundary lines. + +Economic interdependence, importance in peace negotiations. + +Economic pressure. _See_ Non-intercourse. + +Egypt, and self-determination; disposition. + +Election of 1918, as rebuke to Wilson. + +Entangling alliances. _See_ Isolation. + +Equality of nations, sacrifice in Wilson's draft of League; in Lansing's + form for League; ignored in Cecil plan; primacy of Great Powers + retained in reported Covenant; violation by Treaty; and secret + diplomacy at Conference. + +Esthonia, Wilson and; autonomy. + +Ethnic influence on boundary lines. _See also_ Racial minorities; + Self-determination. + +Finland, question of independence. + +Fiume affair, Lansing's attitude; Pact of London in light of dissolution + of Austria-Hungary; resulting increase in Italian claims as basis for + compromise; attitude of Italy toward Jugo-Slavia; commercial + importance of Fiume to Jugo-Slavia; campaign of Italian delegates for + Fiume; Italian public sentiment; character of population, + self-determination question; efforts to get Wilson's approval; threat + to retire from Conference; Wilson's statement against Italian claim; + withdrawal of delegation; Italian resentment against Wilson; as + lesson on secret diplomacy; delegation returns; and Shantung. + +Fourteen Points, announced; affirmative guaranty in; insufficient as + programme; text. + +France, Alsace-Lorraine; restoration. _See also_ Clemenceau; French + alliance; Great Powers. + +Freedom of the seas, in Fourteen Points. + +French alliance, as subject of disagreement; provisions of treaty; + relation to League; and removal of certain French demands from Treaty + of Peace; and French adherence to League; Lansing's opposition; + drafted, signed; Lansing and signing; arguments for. + +Geographic influence on boundary lines. + +Georgia, Wilson and. + +Germany, buffer state on the Rhine; and Russian route to the East; + Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; military impotence. + _See also_ Central Powers; French alliance; Mandates. + +Ginn Peace Foundation. + +Great Britain, and clause on self-determination; Egypt. _See also_ + French alliance; Great Powers; Lloyd George. + +Great Powers, and mandates. _See also_ Balance of power; Council of + Four; Equality of nations. + +Greece, territory. + +Gregory, Thomas W., and Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea. + +Guaranty. _See_ Affirmative; Self-denying. + +Hague Conventions, and international peace. + +Hague Tribunal, and Lansing's plan; Wilson's contempt; recognition in + Cecil plan. + +Hands Off, as basis of Lansing's plan. + +Health, promotion in Treaty. + +Heligoland, dismantlement, disposition. + +Herzegovina, disposition. + +Historic influence on boundary lines. + +Hostilities. _See_ Prevention of war. + +House, Edward M., joins Supreme War Council; conference on armistice + terms; selection as peace negotiator and President as delegate, + Commission of Inquiry, and drafting of League, and international + court, and "self-denying covenant," and balance of power, of + Commission on the League of Nations, and mandates, and data, ignorant + of Wilson's programme, and Preliminary Treaty with detailed Covenant, + and private consultations, _See also_ American Commission. + +Hungary, separation from Austria. + +Immoral traffic, prevention in Treaty, + +Immunities of League representatives, + +Indemnities, and mandates, + +India, German routes to, + +International commissions, in Cecil plan, in Treaty, + +International court. _See_ Judicial settlement. + +International enforcement. _See_ Affirmative guaranty. + +International military force, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, + +International military staff, proposal, + +Interparliamentary Congress, in Cecil plan, + +Inviolability of League property, + +Irish, and self-determination, + +Isolation, policy, and affirmative guaranty, and mandates, and French + alliance, + +Italy, and Cecil plan, territory, _See also_ Fiume; Great Powers. + +Japan, and Cecil plan, in Council of Ten, _See also_ Great Powers; + Shantung. + +Judicial settlement of international disputes, Lansing's plan, + subordinated in Wilson's draft, Lansing on diplomatic adjustment and, + Lansing urges as nucleus of League, in Lansing's resolution of + principles, Lansing's appeal for, in Covenant, arbitrators of + litigant nations, difficulties in procedure, cost, elimination from + Covenant of appeal from arbitral awards, how effected, Lansing's + appeal ignored, in Cecil plan, _See also_ Arbitration; Diplomatic + adjustment. + +Jugo-Slavia, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, port, erected, _See + also_ Fiume. + +Kato, Baron, and Shantung, + +Kiao-Chau. _See_ Shantung. + +Kiel Canal, internationalization, + +Koo, V.K. Wellington, argument on Shantung, + +Labor article, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, + +Lansing, Robert, resignation asked and given, divergence of judgment + from President, reasons for retaining office, reasons for narrative, + imputation of faithlessness, personal narrative, subjects of + disagreement, attitude toward duty as negotiator, policy as to advice + to President, President's attitude towards opinions, method of + treatment of subject, conference on armistice terms, selected as a + negotiator, opposition to President being a delegate, President's + attitude toward this opposition, and Commission of Inquiry, arrival + in Paris, and balance of power, and paramount need of speedy peace, + opposition to mandates, opposition to French alliance treaty, signs + it, personal relations with President, memorandum on American + programme (1918), has _projet_ of treaty prepared, Wilson resents it, + on lack of organization in American Commission, and lack of + programme, and American Commission during President's absence, on + Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea, opposition to secret diplomacy, effect + on Wilson, and Fiume, and Shantung, Bullitt affair, views on Treaty + when presented to Germans, and ratification of Treaty _See also_ + American Commission; League; Wilson. + +Latvia Wilson and autonomy + +League of Nations principles as subject of disagreement as object of + peace negotiations as reason for President's participation in + Conference Wilson's belief in necessity American support of idea, + earlier plans and associations divergence of opinion on form + political and juridical forms of organization Wilson's belief in + international force and affirmative guaranty affirmative guaranty in + Fourteen Points Phillimore's report preparation of Wilson's original + draft, House as author Lansing not consulted, reason Lansing's + opposition to affirmative guaranty Lansing and non-intercourse peace + plan draft impracticable and equality of nations Lansing's + "self-denying covenant" Lansing accepts guaranty as matter of + expediency diplomatic adjustment as basis of Wilson's draft guaranty + in first draft, later draft, and Treaty Lansing's substitute, his + communications not acknowledged, incorporation of detailed Covenant + in Treaty irreconcilable differences between Wilson's and Lansing's + plans Lansing on diplomatic adjustment versus judicial settlement + Lansing urges international court as nucleus three doctrines of + Lansing's plan Lansing's first view of Wilson's draft his opinion of + its form of its principles Wilson considers affirmative guaranty + essential, effect on Treaty American Commission ignored on matters + concerning Cecil plan Wilson's opposition to it question of + self-determination Lansing's proposed resolution of principles in + Treaty and later detailing detailed Covenant or speedy peace Wilson + utilizes desire for peace to force acceptance of League Lansing + proposes resolution to Wilson and to Council of Ten drafted + resolution of principles Commission on the League of Nations + appointed, American members resolution and Wilson's return to United + States Wilson's draft before Commission Wilson pigeonholes resolution + revision of Wilson's draft Lansing's appeal for international court + it is ignored elimination of appeal from arbitral awards, how + effected report of Commission, Wilson's address character of report + and work of Commission, main principles unaltered Wilson and American + opposition (Feb.) American Commission and report amendments to + placate American opinion reaction in Europe due to American + opposition change in character and addition of functions to preserve + it summary of Lansing's objections and French alliance in a + preliminary treaty as a _modus vivendi_ as subject of Wilson's + private consultations secrecy in negotiations and Shantung bargain + Bullitt's report of Lansing's attitude and carrying out of the Treaty + as merely a name for the Quintuple Alliance text of Wilson's original + draft of Cecil plan in Treaty _See also_ Mandates. + +League to Enforce Peace Wilson's address + +Lithuania Wilson and autonomy + +Lloyd George, David, Supreme War Council, 14 and French alliance _See + also_ Council of Four. + +Log-rolling at Conference + +London, Pact of + +Makino, Baron and Shantung + +Mandates, in Smuts plan, Wilson adopts it Lansing's criticism retained + in reported Covenant political difficulties Wilson's attitude legal + difficulties usefulness questioned as means of justifying the League + and indemnities altruistic, to be share of United States in Wilson's + original draft in Treaty. + +Meeting-place of League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in + Treaty. + +Membership in League in Wilson's original draft in Treaty withdrawal. + +Mezes, Sidney E., Commission of Inquiry and data. + +Miller, David Hunter and drafting of Covenant and _projet_ of a treaty. + +_Modus vivendi_, Wilson and a preliminary treaty as + +Monroe Doctrine and affirmative covenant preservation in Treaty + +Montenegro in Jugo-Slavia Fourteen Points on + +Moravia, disposition + +Munitions regulation of manufacture and trade in Wilson's original draft + in Treaty + +National safety, dominance of principle + +Near East United States and mandates Lansing's memorandum on territorial + settlements mandates in Wilson's original draft mandates in Treaty + Fourteen points on + +Negative guaranty. _See_ Self-denying covenant. + +Non-intercourse as form of peace promotion constitutionality in Wilson's + original draft in Treaty + +Norway, Spitzbergen + +Open Door in Lansing's plan in Near East in former German colonies + principle in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty in Fourteen Points + +Outlet to the sea for each nation + +Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele + +Palestine autonomy _See also_ Near East. + +Pan-America, proposed mutual guaranty treaty + +Papineau Rebellion, and self-determination + +Peace, Treaty of inclusion of detailed Covenant as subject of + disagreement expected preliminary treaty speedy restoration of peace + versus detailed Covenant Wilson employs desire for, to force + acceptance of League, resulting delay, delay, delay on League causes + definitive rather than preliminary treaty subjects for a preliminary + treaty influence of lack of American programme Wilson's decision for + a definitive treaty Lansing's views of finished treaty British + opinion protests of experts and officials of American Commission + Lansing and ratification _See also_ League. + +Persia, disposition + +Phillimore, Lord, report on League of Nations + +Poland and Anglo-Franco-American alliance independence Danzig + +Postponement of hostilities as form of peace promotion in Wilson's + original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty + +President as delegate as subject of disagreement Lansing's opposition + origin of Wilson's intention influence of belligerency on plan + influence of presence on domination of situation personal reasons for + attending decision to go to Paris decision to be a delegate attitude + of House League as reason for decision + +Prevention of war in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty + _Sec also_ Arbitration; League. + +Publication of treaties in Lansing's plan in Treaty + +Publicity as basis of Lansing's plan _See also_ Secret diplomacy. + +Quintuple Alliance, League of Nations as name for + +Racial equality issue in Shantung bargain + +Racial minorities protection, in Wilson's original draft + +Ratification of Treaty Lansing's attitude + +Red Cross promotion in Treaty + +Rhenish Republic as buffer state + +Roumania Bucharest Treaty to be abrogated territory Fourteen Points on + +Russia Wilson's policy and route for Germany to the East Lansing's notes + on territorial settlement Fourteen Points on + +Ruthenians and Ukraine + +Schleswig-Holstein disposition + +Scott, James Brown drafts French alliance treaty and _projet_ of a + treaty + +Secret diplomacy as subject of disagreement in negotiation of League as + evil at Conference Lansing's opposition, its effect on Wilson + Wilson's consultations and Wilson's "open diplomacy" in Council of + Four public resentment Fiume affair as lesson on perfunctory open + plenary sessions of Conference Council of Ten effect on Wilson's + prestige responsibility effect on delegates of smaller nations + climax, text of Treaty withheld from delegates psychological effect + great opportunity for reform missed and Shantung Fourteen Points on + _See also_ Publicity + +Secretariat of the League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in + Treaty + +"Self-denying covenant" for guaranty of territory and independence + Lansing's advocacy House and Wilson rejects suggested by others to + Wilson + +Self-determination in Wilson's draft of Covenant why omitted from treaty + in theory and in practice Wilson abandons violation in the treaties + and Civil War and Fiume colonial, in Fourteen Points Wilson's + statement (Feb. 1918) + +Senate of United States and affirmative guaranty opposition and Wilson's + threat plan to check opposition by a _modus vivendi_ + +Separation of powers Wilson's attitude + +Serbia Jugo-Slavia territory Fourteen Points on + +Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes _See_ Jugoslavia + +Shantung Settlement as subject of disagreement and secret diplomacy + bargain injustice, blackmail influence of Japanese bluff not to agree + to the League German control Japanese occupation moral effect Chinese + agreement to Japanese demands, resulting legal and moral status + status after China's declaration of war on Germany attitude of Allied + delegates attitude of American Commission, letter to Wilson argument + before Council of Ten Japanese threat to American Commission before + Council of Four value of Japanese promises questioned and Fiume + question of resignation of American Commission over China refuses to + sign Treaty Wilson permits American Commission to share in + negotiations American public opinion text of Treaty articles on + +Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia + +Slavonia disposition + +Slovakia disposition + +Small nations _See_ Equality. + +Smuts, General and disarmament plan for mandates + +Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes + +Sonnino, Baron Sidney _See_ Fiume + +Sovereignty question in system of mandates + +Spitzbergen disposition + +Strategic influence on boundary lines + +Straus, Oscar S. favors League as reported + +Supreme War Council, American members added, 14; and Cecil plan; and + Council of Ten. + +Syria, protectorate. _See also_ Near East. + +Taft, William H., supports League as reported. + +Transylvania, disposition, + +Treaty of Peace. _See_ Peace. + +Treaty-making power, President's responsibility, duties of negotiators, + and affirmative guaranty, + +Trieste, disposition; importance, + +Turkey, dismemberment and mandates, _See also_ Near East. + +Ukraine, Wilson and; autonomy, and Ruthenians. + +Unanimity, requirement in League. + +Violation of the League, action concerning, in Wilson's original draft, + in Cecil plan; in Treaty, + +War. _See_ Arbitration; League of Nations; Prevention. + +White, Henry, arrival in Paris; opposes affirmative guaranty; and + Covenant as reported and later amendments; and proposed French + alliance; and Shantung question. _See also_ American programme; + American Commission. + +Wickersham, George W., supports League as reported. + +Williams, E. T., and Shantung question, + +Wilson, Woodrow, responsibility for foreign relations; duties of + negotiators to, and opposition, presumption of self-assurance, + conference on armistice terms; disregard of precedent; and need of + defeat of enemy; and Commission of Inquiry; open-mindedness; and + advice on personal conduct; positiveness and indecision; and election + of 1918; prejudice against legal attitude; prefers written advice, + arrives in Paris, reception abroad, on equality of nations, and + separation of powers, denounces balance of power, and + self-determination, conference of Jan. 10, contempt for Hague + Tribunal, fidelity to convictions, return to United States, return to + Paris, and mandates, and French alliance, and open rupture with + Lansing, and team-work, decides for a definitive treaty only, + rigidity of mind, secretive nature, and Fiume, Italian resentment and + Shantung, and Bullitt affair, Treaty as abandonment of his + principles, Fourteen Points, principles of peace (Feb. 1918), _See + also_ American programme; Commission on the League; Council of Four; + Lansing; League; Peace; President as delegate; Secret diplomacy. + +Withdrawal from League, provision in Treaty, through failure to approve + amendments. + +World Peace Foundation, + +Zionism, and self-determination, + +Zone system in mutual guaranty plan, + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS*** + + +******* This file should be named 10444-8.txt or 10444-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/4/4/10444 + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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For +example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at: + +https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234 + +or filename 24689 would be found at: +https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689 + +An alternative method of locating eBooks: +https://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL + +*** END: FULL LICENSE *** diff --git a/old/10444-8.zip b/old/10444-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ebb625 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10444-8.zip diff --git a/old/10444.txt b/old/10444.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..39c0ffc --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10444.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9700 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Peace Negotiations, by Robert Lansing + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + + + + +Title: The Peace Negotiations + +Author: Robert Lansing + +Release Date: December 13, 2003 [eBook #10444] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: US-ASCII + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS*** + + +E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, Debra Storr, and Prooject Gutenberg +Distributed Proofreaders + + + +THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS + +A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + +BY ROBERT LANSING + + +WITH ILLUSTRATIONS + + + + + + +CONTENTS + + I. REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + + II. MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE + + III. GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + IV. SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED + + V. THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER + + VI. THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN + + VII. SELF-DETERMINATION + + VIII. THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919 + + IX. A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT + + X. THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT + + XI. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION + + XII. REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + XIII. THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES + + XIV. DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED + + XV. THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE + + XVI. LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME + + XVII. SECRET DIPLOMACY + +XVIII. THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT + + XIX. THE BULLITT AFFAIR + + CONCLUSION + + +APPENDICES + + I. THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE + LEAGUE OF NATIONS, LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION + ON JANUARY 10, 1919 + + II. LEAGUE OF NATIONS PLAN OF LORD ROBERT CECIL + + III. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF + VERSAILLES + + IV. THE FOURTEEN POINTS + + V. PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF + FEBRUARY 11, 1918 + + VI. THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG + + +INDEX + + + + +ILLUSTRATIONS + +THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AT PARIS +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S COMMISSION AS A COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY +TO NEGOTIATE PEACE + +THE RUE ROYALE ON THE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT WILSON ON DECEMBER 14, 1918 +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AND STAFF +Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. + +A MEETING AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY AFTER PRESIDENT WILSON'S +DEPARTURE FROM PARIS + +FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S "FULL POWERS" TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY OF +ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE + +THE DAILY CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION +Photograph by Isabey, Paris + + + + + + +CHRONOLOGY + +The Declaration of the Fourteen Points January 18, 1918 + + +Declaration of Four Additional Bases of Peace February 11, 1918 + +Departure of Colonel House for Paris to represent the + President on Supreme War Council October 17, 1918 + +Signature of Armistice, 5 A.M.; effective, 11 A.M. + November 11, 1918 + +Departure of President and American Commission + for France December 4, 1918 + +Arrival of President and American Commission in + Paris December 14, 1918 + +Meeting of Supreme War Council January 12, 1919 + +First Plenary Session of Peace Conference January 25, 1919 + +Plenary Session at which Report on the League of Nations + was Submitted February 14, 1919 + +Departure of President from Paris for United States + February 14, 1919 + +President lands at Boston February 24, 1919 + +Departure of President from New York for France March 5, 1919 + +President arrives in Paris March 14, 1919 + +Organization of Council of Four About March 24, 1919 + +President's public statement in regard to Fiume April 23, 1919 + +Adoption of Commission's Report on League of Nations + by the Conference April 28, 1919 + +The Shantung Settlement April 30, 1919 + +Delivery of the Peace Treaty to the German + Plenipotentiaries May 7, 1919 + +Signing of Treaty of Versailles June 28, 1919 + +Signing of Treaty of Assistance with France June 28, 1919 + +Departure of President for the United States June 28, 1919 + +Departure of Mr. Lansing from Paris for United + States July 12, 1919 + +Hearing of Mr. Lansing before Senate Committee on + Foreign Relations August 6, 1919 + +Conference of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations + with the President at the White House August 19, 1919 + +Hearing of Mr. Bullitt before Senate Committee on + Foreign Relations September 12, 1919 + +Return of President to Washington from tour + of West September 28, 1919 + +Resignation of Mr. Lansing as Secretary + of State February 13, 1920 + + + + + + +CHAPTER I + +REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE + + +"While we were still in Paris, I felt, and have felt increasingly ever +since, that you accepted my guidance and direction on questions with +regard to which I had to instruct you only with increasing +reluctance.... + +"... I must say that it would relieve me of embarrassment, Mr. +Secretary, the embarrassment of feeling your reluctance and divergence +of judgment, if you would give your present office up and afford me an +opportunity to select some one whose mind would more willingly go along +with mine." + +These words are taken from the letter which President Wilson wrote to me +on February 11, 1920. On the following day I tendered my resignation as +Secretary of State by a letter, in which I said: + + "Ever since January, 1919, I have been conscious of the fact that you + no longer were disposed to welcome my advice in matters pertaining to + the negotiations in Paris, to our foreign service, or to + international affairs in general. Holding these views I would, if I + had consulted my personal inclination alone, have resigned as + Secretary of State and as a Commissioner to Negotiate Peace. I felt, + however, that such a step might have been misinterpreted both at home + and abroad, and that it was my duty to cause you no embarrassment in + carrying forward the great task in which you were then engaged." + +The President was right in his impression that, "while we were still in +Paris," I had accepted his guidance and direction with reluctance. It +was as correct as my statement that, as early as January, 1919, I was +conscious that he was no longer disposed to welcome my advice in matters +pertaining to the peace negotiations at Paris. + +There have been obvious reasons of propriety for my silence until now as +to the divergence of judgment, the differences of opinion and the +consequent breach in the relations between President Wilson and myself. +They have been the subject of speculation and inference which have left +uncertain the true record. The time has come when a frank account of our +differences can be given publicity without a charge being made of +disloyalty to the Administration in power. + +The President, in his letter of February 11, 1920, from which the +quotation is made, indicated my unwillingness to follow him in the +course which he adopted at Paris, but he does not specifically point out +the particular subjects as to which we were not in accord. It is +unsatisfactory, if not criticizable, to leave the American people in +doubt as to a disagreement between two of their official representatives +upon a matter of so grave importance to the country as the negotiation +of the Treaty of Versailles. They are entitled to know the truth in +order that they may pass judgment upon the merits of the differences +which existed. I am not willing that the present uncertainty as to the +facts should continue. Possibly some may think that I have remained +silent too long. If I have, it has been only from a sense of obligation +to an Administration of which I was so long a member. It has not been +through lack of desire to lay the record before the public. + +The statements which will be made in the succeeding pages will not be +entirely approved by some of my readers. In the circumstances it is far +too much to expect to escape criticism. The review of facts and the +comments upon them may be characterized in certain quarters as disloyal +to a superior and as violative of the seal of silence which is +considered generally to apply to the intercourse and communications +between the President and his official advisers. Under normal conditions +such a characterization would not be unjustified. But the present case +is different from the usual one in which a disagreement arises between a +President and a high official of his Administration. + +Mr. Wilson made our differences at Paris one of the chief grounds for +stating that he would be pleased to take advantage of my expressed +willingness to resign. The manifest imputation was that I had advised +him wrongly and that, after he had decided to adopt a course contrary to +my advice, I had continued to oppose his views and had with reluctance +obeyed his instructions. Certainly no American official is in honor +bound to remain silent under such an imputation which approaches a +charge of faithlessness and of a secret, if not open, avoidance of duty. +He has, in my judgment, the right to present the case to the American +people in order that they may decide whether the imputation was +justified by the facts, and whether his conduct was or was not in the +circumstances in accord with the best traditions of the public service +of the United States. + +A review of this sort becomes necessarily a personal narrative, which, +because of its intimate nature, is embarrassing to the writer, since he +must record his own acts, words, desires, and purposes, his own views as +to a course of action, and his own doubts, fears, and speculations as to +the future. If there were another method of treatment which would retain +the authoritative character of a personal statement, it would be a +satisfaction to adopt it. But I know of none. The true story can only be +told from the intimate and personal point of view. As I intend to tell +the true story I offer no further apology for its personal character. + +Before beginning a recital of the relations existing between President +Wilson and myself during the Paris Conference, I wish to state, and to +emphasize the statement, that I was never for a moment unmindful that +the Constitution of the United States confides to the President the +absolute right of conducting the foreign relations of the Republic, and +that it is the duty of a Commissioner to follow the President's +instructions in the negotiation of a treaty. Many Americans, some of +whom are national legislators and solicitous about the Constitution, +seem to have ignored or to have forgotten this delegation of exclusive +authority, with the result that they have condemned the President in +intemperate language for exercising this executive right. As to the +wisdom of the way in which Mr. Wilson exercised it in directing the +negotiations at Paris individual opinions may differ, but as to the +legality of his conduct there ought to be but one mind. From first to +last he acted entirely within his constitutional powers as President of +the United States. + +The duties of a diplomatic representative commissioned by the President +and given full powers to negotiate a treaty are, in addition to the +formal carrying out of his instructions, twofold, namely, to advise the +President during the negotiation of his views as to the wise course to +be adopted, and to prevent the President, in so far as possible, from +taking any step in the proceedings which may impair the rights of his +country or may be injurious to its interests. These duties, in my +opinion, are equally imperative whether the President directs the +negotiations through written instructions issuing from the White House +or conducts them in person. For an American plenipotentiary to remain +silent, and by his silence to give the impression that he approves a +course of action which he in fact believes to be wrong in principle or +contrary to good policy, constitutes a failure to perform his full duty +to the President and to the country. It is his duty to speak and to +speak frankly and plainly. + +With this conception of the obligations of a Commissioner to Negotiate +Peace, obligations which were the more compelling in my case because of +my official position as Secretary of State, I felt it incumbent upon me +to offer advice to the President whenever it seemed necessary to me to +consider the adoption of a line of action in regard to the negotiations, +and particularly so when the indications were that the President +purposed to reach a decision which seemed to me unwise or impolitic. +Though from the first I felt that my suggestions were received with +coldness and my criticisms with disfavor, because they did not conform +to the President's wishes and intentions, I persevered in my efforts to +induce him to abandon in some cases or to modify in others a course +which would in my judgment be a violation of principle or a mistake in +policy. It seemed to me that duty demanded this, and that, whatever the +consequences might be, I ought not to give tacit assent to that which I +believed wrong or even injudicious. + +The principal subjects, concerning which President Wilson and I were in +marked disagreement, were the following: His presence in Paris during +the peace negotiations and especially his presence there as a delegate +to the Peace Conference; the fundamental principles of the constitution +and functions of a League of Nations as proposed or advocated by him; +the form of the organic act, known as the "Covenant," its elaborate +character and its inclusion in the treaty restoring a state of peace; +the treaty of defensive alliance with France; the necessity for a +definite programme which the American Commissioners could follow in +carrying on the negotiations; the employment of private interviews and +confidential agreements in reaching settlements, a practice which gave +color to the charge of "secret diplomacy"; and, lastly, the admission of +the Japanese claims to possession of German treaty rights at Kiao-Chau +and in the Province of Shantung. + +Of these seven subjects of difference the most important were those +relating to the League of Nations and the Covenant, though our opposite +views as to Shantung were more generally known and more frequently the +subject of public comment. While chief consideration will be given to +the differences regarding the League and the Covenant, the record would +be incomplete if the other subjects were omitted. In fact nearly all of +these matters of difference are more or less interwoven and have a +collateral, if not a direct, bearing upon one another. They all +contributed in affecting the attitude of President Wilson toward the +advice that I felt it my duty to volunteer, an attitude which was +increasingly impatient of unsolicited criticism and suggestion and which +resulted at last in the correspondence of February, 1920, that ended +with the acceptance of my resignation as Secretary of State. + +The review of these subjects will be, so far as it is possible, treated +in chronological order, because, as the matters of difference increased +in number, they gave emphasis to the divergence of judgment which +existed between the President and myself. The effect was cumulative, and +tended not only to widen the breach, but to make less and less possible +a restoration of our former relations. It was my personal desire to +support the President's views concerning the negotiations at Paris, but, +when in order to do so it became necessary to deny a settled conviction +and to suppress a conception of the true principle or the wise policy to +be followed, I could not do it and feel that to give support under such +conditions accorded with true loyalty to the President of the +United States. + +It was in this spirit that my advice was given and my suggestions were +made, though in doing so I believed it justifiable to conform as far as +it was possible to the expressed views of Mr. Wilson, or to what seemed +to be his views, concerning less important matters and to concentrate on +those which seemed vital. I went in fact as far as I could in adopting +his views in the hope that my advice would be less unpalatable and +would, as a consequence, receive more sympathetic consideration. +Believing that I understood the President's temperament, success in an +attempt to change his views seemed to lie in moderation and in partial +approval of his purpose rather than in bluntly arguing that it was +wholly wrong and should be abandoned. This method of approach, which +seemed the expedient one at the time, weakened, in some instances at +least, the criticisms and objections which I made. It is very possible +that even in this diluted form my views were credited with wrong motives +by the President so that he suspected my purpose. It is to be hoped that +this was the true explanation of Mr. Wilson's attitude of mind, for the +alternative forces a conclusion as to the cause for his resentful +reception of honest differences of opinion, which no one, who admires +his many sterling qualities and great attainments, will +willingly accept. + +Whatever the cause of the President's attitude toward the opinions which +I expressed on the subjects concerning which our views were at +variance--and I prefer to assume that the cause was a misapprehension of +my reasons for giving them--the result was that he was disposed to give +them little weight. The impression made was that he was irritated by +opposition to his views, however moderately urged, and that he did not +like to have his judgment questioned even in a friendly way. It is, of +course, possible that this is not a true estimate of the President's +feelings. It may do him an injustice. But his manner of meeting +criticism and his disposition to ignore opposition can hardly be +interpreted in any other way. + +There is the alternative possibility that Mr. Wilson was convinced that, +after he had given a subject mature consideration and reached a +decision, his judgment was right or at least better than that of any +adviser. A conviction of this nature, if it existed, would naturally +have caused him to feel impatient with any one who attempted to +controvert his decisions and would tend to make him believe that +improper motives induced the opposition or criticism. This alternative, +which is based of necessity on a presumption as to the temperament of +Mr. Wilson that an unprejudiced and cautious student of personality +would hesitate to adopt, I mention only because there were many who +believed it to be the correct explanation of his attitude. In view of my +intimate relations with the President prior to the Paris Conference I +feel that in justice to him I should say that he did not, except on rare +occasions, resent criticism of a proposed course of action, and, while +he seemed in a measure changed after departing from the United States in +December, 1918, I do not think that the change was sufficient to justify +the presumption of self-assurance which it would be necessary to adopt +if the alternative possibility is considered to furnish the better +explanation. + +It is, however, natural, considering what occurred at Paris, to search +out the reason or reasons for the President's evident unwillingness to +listen to advice when he did not solicit it, and for his failure to take +all the American Commissioners into his confidence. But to attempt to +dissect the mentality and to analyze the intellectual processes of +Woodrow Wilson is not my purpose. It would only invite discussion and +controversy as to the truth of the premises and the accuracy of the +deductions reached. The facts will be presented and to an extent the +impressions made upon me at the time will be reviewed, but impressions +of that character which are not the result of comparison with subsequent +events and of mature deliberation are not always justified. They may +later prove to be partially or wholly wrong. They have the value, +nevertheless, of explaining in many cases why I did or did not do +certain things, and of disclosing the state of mind that in a measure +determined my conduct which without this recital of contemporaneous +impressions might mystify one familiar with what afterwards took place. +The notes, letters, and memoranda which are quoted in the succeeding +pages, as well as the opinions and beliefs held at the time (of which, +in accordance with a practice of years, I kept a record supplementing my +daily journal of events), should be weighed and measured by the +situation which existed when they were written and not alone in the +light of the complete review of the proceedings. In forming an opinion +as to my differences with the President it should be the reader's +endeavor to place himself in my position at the time and not judge them +solely by the results of the negotiations at Paris. It comes to this: +Was I justified then? Am I justified now? If those questions are +answered impartially and without prejudice, there is nothing further +that I would ask of the reader. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE + + +Early in October, 1918, it required no prophetic vision to perceive that +the World War would come to an end in the near future. Austria-Hungary, +acting with the full approval of the German Government, had made +overtures for peace, and Bulgaria, recognizing the futility of further +struggle, had signed an armistice which amounted to an unconditional +surrender. These events were soon followed by the collapse of Turkish +resistance and by the German proposals which resulted in the armistice +which went into effect on November 11, 1918. + +In view of the importance of the conditions of the armistice with +Germany and their relation to the terms of peace to be later negotiated, +the President considered it essential to have an American member added +to the Supreme War Council, which then consisted of M. Clemenceau, Mr. +Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando, the premiers of the three Allied +Powers. He selected Colonel Edward M. House for this important post and +named him a Special Commissioner to represent him personally. Colonel +House with a corps of secretaries and assistants sailed from New York on +October 17, _en route_ for Paris where the Supreme War Council was +in session. + +Three days before his departure the Colonel was in Washington and we had +two long conferences with the President regarding the correspondence +with Germany and with the Allies relating to a cessation of hostilities, +during which we discussed the position which the United States should +take as to the terms of the armistice and the bases of peace which +should be incorporated in the document. + +It was after one of these conferences that Colonel House informed me +that the President had decided to name him (the Colonel) and me as two +of the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference, and that the +President was considering attending the Conference and in person +directing the negotiations. This latter intention of Mr. Wilson +surprised and disturbed me, and I expressed the hope that the +President's mind was not made up, as I believed that if he gave more +consideration to the project he would abandon it, since it was manifest +that his influence over the negotiations would be much greater if he +remained in Washington and issued instructions to his representatives in +the Conference. Colonel House did not say that he agreed with my +judgment in this matter, though he did not openly disagree with it. +However, I drew the conclusion, though without actual knowledge, that he +approved of the President's purpose, and, possibly, had encouraged him +to become an actual participant in the preliminary conferences. + +The President's idea of attending the Peace Conference was not a new +one. Though I cannot recollect the source of my information, I know that +in December, 1916, when it will be remembered Mr. Wilson was endeavoring +to induce the belligerents to state their objects in the war and to +enter into a conference looking toward peace, he had an idea that he +might, as a friend of both parties, preside over such a conference and +exert his personal influence to bring the belligerents into agreement. A +service of this sort undoubtedly appealed to the President's +humanitarian instinct and to his earnest desire to end the devastating +war, while the novelty of the position in which he would be placed would +not have been displeasing to one who in his public career seemed to find +satisfaction in departing from the established paths marked out by +custom and usage. + +When, however, the attempt at mediation failed and when six weeks later, +on February 1, 1917, the German Government renewed indiscriminate +submarine warfare resulting in the severance of diplomatic relations +between the United States and Germany, President Wilson continued to +cherish the hope that he might yet assume the role of mediator. He even +went so far as to prepare a draft of the bases of peace, which he +purposed to submit to the belligerents if they could be induced to meet +in conference. I cannot conceive how he could have expected to bring +this about in view of the elation of the Allies at the dismissal of +Count von Bernstorff and the seeming certainty that the United States +would declare war against Germany if the latter persisted in her +ruthless sinking of American merchant vessels. But I know, in spite of +the logic of the situation, that he expected or at least hoped to +succeed in his mediatory programme and made ready to play his part in +the negotiation of a peace. + +From the time that Congress declared that a state of war existed between +the United States and the Imperial German Government up to the autumn of +1918, when the Central Alliance made overtures to end the war, the +President made no attempt so far as I am aware to enter upon peace +negotiations with the enemy nations. In fact he showed a disposition to +reject all peace proposals. He appears to have reached the conclusion +that the defeat of Germany and her allies was essential before permanent +peace could be restored. At all events, he took no steps to bring the +belligerents together until a military decision had been practically +reached. He did, however, on January 8,1918, lay down his famous +"Fourteen Points," which he supplemented with certain declarations in +"subsequent addresses," thus proclaiming his ideas as to the proper +bases of peace when the time should come to negotiate. + +Meanwhile, in anticipation of the final triumph of the armies of the +Allied and Associated Powers, the President, in the spring of 1917, +directed the organization, under the Department of State, of a body of +experts to collect data and prepare monographs, charts, and maps, +covering all historical, territorial, economic, and legal subjects which +would probably arise in the negotiation of a treaty of peace. This +Commission of Inquiry, as it was called, had its offices in New York and +was under Colonel House so far as the selection of its members was +concerned. The nominal head of the Commission was Dr. Mezes, President +of the College of the City of New York and a brother-in-law of Colonel +House, though the actual and efficient executive head was Dr. Isaiah +Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society. The plans of +organization, the outline of work, and the proposed expenditures for the +maintenance of the Commission were submitted to me as Secretary of +State. I examined them and, after several conferences with Dr. Mezes, +approved them and recommended to the President that he allot the funds +necessary to carry out the programme. + +In addition to the subjects which were dealt with by this excellent +corps of students and experts, whose work was of the highest order, the +creation of some sort of an international association to prevent wars in +the future received special attention from the President as it did from +Americans of prominence not connected with the Government. It caused +considerable discussion in the press and many schemes were proposed and +pamphlets written on the subject. To organize such an association became +a generally recognized object to be attained in the negotiation of the +peace which would end the World War; and there can be no doubt that the +President believed more and more in the vital necessity of forming an +effective organization of the nations to preserve peace in the future +and make another great war impossible. + +The idea of being present and taking an active part in formulating the +terms of peace had, in my opinion, never been abandoned by President +Wilson, although it had remained dormant while the result of the +conflict was uncertain. When, however, in early October, 1918, there +could no longer be any doubt that the end of the war was approaching, +the President appears to have revived the idea and to have decided, if +possible, to carry out the purpose which he had so long cherished. He +seemed to have failed to appreciate, or, if he did appreciate, to have +ignored the fact that the conditions were wholly different in October, +1918, from what they were in December, 1916. + +In December, 1916, the United States was a neutral nation, and the +President, in a spirit of mutual friendliness, which was real and not +assumed, was seeking to bring the warring powers together in conference +looking toward the negotiation of "a peace without victory." In the +event that he was able to persuade them to meet, his presence at the +conference as a pacificator and probably as the presiding officer would +not improbably have been in the interests of peace, because, as the +executive head of the greatest of the neutral nations of the world and +as the impartial friend of both parties, his personal influence would +presumably have been very great in preventing a rupture in the +negotiations and in inducing the parties to act in a spirit of +conciliation and compromise. + +In October, 1918, however, the United States was a belligerent. Its +national interests were involved; its armies were in conflict with the +Germans on the soil of France; its naval vessels were patrolling the +Atlantic; and the American people, bitterly hostile, were demanding +vengeance on the Governments and peoples of the Central Powers, +particularly those of Germany. President Wilson, it is true, had +endeavored with a measure of success to maintain the position of an +unbiased arbiter in the discussions leading up to the armistice of +November 11, and Germany undoubtedly looked to him as the one hope of +checking the spirit of revenge which animated the Allied Powers in view +of all that they had suffered at the hands of the Germans. It is +probable too that the Allies recognized that Mr. Wilson was entitled to +be satisfied as to the terms of peace since American man power and +American resources had turned the scale against Germany and made victory +a certainty. The President, in fact, dominated the situation. If he +remained in Washington and carried on the negotiations through his +Commissioners, he would in all probability retain his superior place and +be able to dictate such terms of peace as he considered just. But, if he +did as he purposed doing and attended the Peace Conference, he would +lose the unique position which he held and would have to submit to the +combined will of his foreign colleagues becoming a prey to intrigue and +to the impulses arising from their hatred for the vanquished nations. + +A practical view of the situation so clearly pointed to the unwisdom of +the President's personal participation in the peace negotiations that a +very probable explanation for his determination to be present at the +Conference is the assumption that the idea had become so firmly embedded +in his mind that nothing could dislodge it or divert him from his +purpose. How far the spectacular feature of a President crossing the +ocean to control in person the making of peace appealed to him I do not +know. It may have been the deciding factor. It may have had no effect at +all. How far the belief that a just peace could only be secured by the +exercise of his personal influence over the delegates I cannot say. How +far he doubted the ability of the men whom he proposed to name as +plenipotentiaries is wholly speculative. Whatever plausible reason may +be given, the true reason will probably never be known. + +Not appreciating, at the time that Colonel House informed me of the +President's plan to be present at the Conference, that the matter had +gone as far as it had, and feeling very strongly that it would be a +grave mistake for the President to take part in person in the +negotiations, I felt it to be my duty, as his official adviser in +foreign affairs and as one desirous to have him adopt a wise course, to +state plainly to him my views. It was with hesitation that I did this +because the consequence of the non-attendance of the President would be +to make me the head of the American Peace Commission at Paris. There was +the danger that my motive in opposing the President's attending the +Conference would be misconstrued and that I might be suspected of acting +from self-interest rather than from a sense of loyalty to my chief. +When, however, the armistice went into effect and the time arrived for +completing the personnel of the American Commission, I determined that I +ought not to remain silent. + +The day after the cessation of hostilities, that is, on November 12, I +made the following note: + + "I had a conference this noon with the President at the White House + in relation to the Peace Conference. I told him frankly that I + thought the plan for him to attend was unwise and would be a mistake. + I said that I felt embarrassed in speaking to him about it because it + would leave me at the head of the delegation, and I hoped that he + understood that I spoke only out of a sense of duty. I pointed out + that he held at present a dominant position in the world, which I was + afraid he would lose if he went into conference with the foreign + statesmen; that he could practically dictate the terms of peace if he + held aloof; that he would be criticized severely in this country for + leaving at a time when Congress particularly needed his guidance; and + that he would be greatly embarrassed in directing domestic affairs + from overseas." + +I also recorded as significant that the President listened to my remarks +without comment and turned the conversation into other channels. + +For a week after this interview I heard nothing from the President on +the subject, though the fact that no steps were taken to prepare written +instructions for the American Commissioners convinced me that he +intended to follow his original intention. My fears were confirmed. On +the evening of Monday, November 18, the President came to my residence +and told me that he had finally decided to go to the Peace Conference +and that he had given out to the press an announcement to that effect. +In view of the publicity given to his decision it would have been futile +to have attempted to dissuade him from his purpose. He knew my opinion +and that it was contrary to his. + +After the President departed I made a note of the interview, in which +among other things I wrote: + + "I am convinced that he is making one of the greatest mistakes of his + career and will imperil his reputation. I may be in error and hope + that I am, but I prophesy trouble in Paris and worse than trouble + here. I believe the President's place is here in America." + +Whether the decision of Mr. Wilson was wise and whether my prophecy was +unfulfilled, I leave to the judgment of others. His visit to Europe and +its consequences are facts of history. It should be understood that the +incident is not referred to here to justify my views or to prove that +the President was wrong in what he did. The reference is made solely +because it shows that at the very outset there was a decided divergence +of judgment between us in regard to the peace negotiations. + +While this difference of opinion apparently in no way affected our +cordial relations, I cannot but feel, in reviewing this period of our +intercourse, that my open opposition to his attending the Conference was +considered by the President to be an unwarranted meddling with his +personal affairs and was none of my business. It was, I believe, the +beginning of his loss of confidence in my judgment and advice, which +became increasingly marked during the Paris negotiations. At the time, +however, I did not realize that my honest opinion affected the President +in the way which I now believe that it did. It had always been my +practice as Secretary of State to speak to him with candor and to +disagree with him whenever I thought he was reaching a wrong decision in +regard to any matter pertaining to foreign affairs. There was a general +belief that Mr. Wilson was not open-minded and that he was quick to +resent any opposition however well founded. I had not found him so +during the years we had been associated. Except in a few instances he +listened with consideration to arguments and apparently endeavored to +value them correctly. If, however, the matter related even remotely to +his personal conduct he seemed unwilling to debate the question. My +conclusion is that he considered his going to the Peace Conference was +his affair solely and that he viewed my objections as a direct criticism +of him personally for thinking of going. He may, too, have felt that my +opposition arose from a selfish desire to become the head of the +American Commission. From that time forward any suggestion or advice +volunteered by me was seemingly viewed with suspicion. It was, however, +long after this incident that I began to feel that the President was +imputing to me improper motives and crediting me with disloyalty to him +personally, an attitude which was as unwarranted as it was unjust. + +The President having determined to go to Paris, it seemed almost useless +to urge him not to become a delegate in view of the fact that he had +named but four Commissioners, although it had been arranged that the +Great Powers should each have five delegates in the Conference. This +clearly indicated that the President was at least considering sitting as +the fifth member of the American group. At the same time it seemed that, +if he did not take his place in the Conference as a delegate, he might +retain in a measure his superior place of influence even though he was +in Paris. Four days after the Commission landed at Brest I had a long +conference with Colonel House on matters pertaining to the approaching +negotiations, during which he informed me that there was a determined +effort being made by the European statesmen to induce the President to +sit at the peace table and that he was afraid that the President was +disposed to accede to their wishes. This information indicated that, +while the President had come to Paris prepared to act as a delegate, he +had, after discussing the subject with the Colonel and possibly with +others, become doubtful as to the wisdom of doing so, but that through +the pressure of his foreign colleagues he was turning again to the +favorable view of personal participation which he had held before he +left the United States. + +In my conversation with Colonel House I told him my reasons for opposing +the President's taking an active part in the Conference and explained to +him the embarrassment that I felt in advising the President to adopt a +course which would make me the head of the American Commission. I am +sure that the Colonel fully agreed with me that it was impolitic for Mr. +Wilson to become a delegate, but whether he actively opposed the plan I +do not know, although I believe that he did. It was some days before the +President announced that he would become the head of the American +Commission. I believe that he did this with grave doubts in his own mind +as to the wisdom of his decision, and I do not think that any new +arguments were advanced during those days which materially affected +his judgment. + +This delay in reaching a final determination as to a course of action +was characteristic of Mr. Wilson. There is in his mentality a strange +mixture of positiveness and indecision which is almost paradoxical. It +is a peculiarity which it is hard to analyze and which has often been an +embarrassment in the conduct of public affairs. Suddenness rather than +promptness has always marked his decisions. Procrastination in +announcing a policy or a programme makes cooeperation difficult and not +infrequently defeats the desired purpose. To put off a decision to the +last moment is a trait of Mr. Wilson's character which has caused much +anxiety to those who, dealing with matters of vital importance, realized +that delay was perilous if not disastrous. + +Of the consequences of the President's acting as one of his own +representatives to negotiate peace it is not my purpose to speak. The +events of the six months succeeding his decision to exercise in person +his constitutional right to conduct the foreign relations of the United +States are in a general way matters of common knowledge and furnish +sufficient data for the formulation of individual opinions without the +aid of argument or discussion. The important fact in connection with the +general topic being considered is the difference of opinion between the +President and myself as to the wisdom of his assuming the role of a +delegate. While I did not discuss the matter with him except at the +first when I opposed his attending the Peace Conference, I have little +doubt that Colonel House, if he urged the President to decline to sit as +a delegate, which I think may be presumed, or if he discussed it at all, +mentioned to him my opinion that such a step would be unwise. In any +event Mr. Wilson knew my views and that they were at variance with the +decision which he reached. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +It appears, from a general review of the situation prior and subsequent +to the assembling of the delegates to the Peace Conference, that +President Wilson's decision to go to Paris and to engage in person in +the negotiations was strongly influenced by his belief that it was the +only sure way of providing in the treaty of peace for the organization +of a League of Nations. While his presence in Paris was probably +affected to an extent by other considerations, as I have pointed out, it +is to be presumed that he was anxious to participate directly in the +drafting of the plan of organization of the League and to exert his +personal influence on the delegates in favor of its acceptance by +publicly addressing the Conference. This he could hardly have done +without becoming a delegate. It would seem, therefore, that the purpose +of creating a League of Nations and obtaining the incorporation of a +plan of organization in the treaty to be negotiated had much to do with +the President's presence at the peace table. + +From the time that the United States entered the war in April, 1917, Mr. +Wilson held firmly to the idea that the salvation of the world from +imperialism would not be lasting unless provision was made in the peace +treaty for an international agency strong enough to prevent a future +attack upon the rights and liberties of the nations which were at so +great a cost holding in check the German armies and preventing them from +carrying out their evil designs of conquest. The object sought by the +United States in the war would not, in the views of many, be achieved +unless the world was organized to resist future aggression. The +essential thing, as the President saw it, in order to "make the world +safe for democracy" was to give permanency to the peace which would be +negotiated at the conclusion of the war. A union of the nations for the +purpose of preventing wars of aggression and conquest seemed to him the +most practical, if not the only, way of accomplishing this supreme +object, and he urged it with earnestness and eloquence in his public +addresses relating to the bases of peace. + +There was much to be said in favor of the President's point of view. +Unquestionably the American people as a whole supported him in the +belief that there ought to be some international agreement, association, +or concord which would lessen the possibility of future wars. An +international organization to remove in a measure the immediate causes +of war, to provide means for the peaceable settlement of disputes +between nations, and to draw the governments into closer friendship +appealed to the general desire of the peoples of America and Europe. The +four years and more of horror and agony through which mankind had passed +must be made impossible of repetition, and there seemed no other way +than to form an international union devoted to the maintenance of peace +by composing, as far as possible, controversies which might ripen +into war. + +For many years prior to 1914 an organization devoted to the prevention +of international wars had been discussed by those who gave thought to +warfare of the nations and who realized in a measure the precarious +state of international peace. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and of 1907 +had been negotiated with that object, and it was only because of the +improper aspirations and hidden designs of certain powers, which were +represented at those great historic conferences, that the measures +adopted were not more expressive of the common desire of mankind and +more effective in securing the object sought. The Carnegie Endowment for +International Peace, the Ginn, now the World, Peace Foundation, and the +American Peace Society, and later the Society for the Judicial +Settlement of International Disputes, the League to Enforce Peace, and +many other organizations in America and in Europe were actively engaged +in considering ways and means to prevent war, to strengthen the bonds of +international good-will, and to insure the more general application of +the principles of justice to disputes between nations. + +The outbreak of the war and the dreadful waste and suffering which +followed impelled the societies and associations then organized to +redoubled effort and induced the formation of new organizations. People +everywhere began to realize that their objects were real and not merely +sentimental or academic, that they were seeking practical means to +remove the conditions which had made the Great War possible. Public +opinion became more and more pronounced as the subject was more widely +discussed in the journals and periodicals of the day and at public +meetings, the divergence of views being chiefly in regard to the means +to be employed by the proposed organization and not as to the creation +of the organization, the necessity for which appeared to be +generally conceded. + +With popular sentiment overwhelmingly in favor of some sort of world +union which would to an extent insure the nations against another +tragedy like the one which in November, 1918, had left the belligerents +wasted and exhausted and the whole world a prey to social and industrial +unrest, there was beyond question a demand that out of the great +international assembly at Paris there should come some common agency +devoted to the prevention of war. To ignore this all-prevalent sentiment +would have been to misrepresent the peoples of the civilized world and +would have aroused almost universal condemnation and protest. The +President was, therefore, entirely right in giving prominence to the +idea of an international union against war and in insisting that the +Peace Conference should make provision for the establishment of an +organization of the world with the prevention of future wars as its +central thought and purpose. + +The great bulk of the American people, at the time that the President +left the United States to attend the Peace Conference, undoubtedly +believed that some sort of organization of this nature was necessary, +and I am convinced that the same popular belief prevailed in all other +civilized countries. It is possible that this assertion may seem too +emphatic to some who have opposed the plan for a League of Nations, +which appears in the first articles of the Treaty of Versailles, but, if +these opponents of the plan will go back to the time of which I am +writing, and avoid the impressions made upon them by subsequent events, +they will find, I believe, that even their own views have materially +changed since December, 1918. It is true that concrete plans had then +been suggested, but so far as the public knew the President had not +adopted any of them or formulated one of his own. He had not then +disclosed the provisions of his "Covenant." + +The mass of the people were only concerned with the general idea. There +was no well-defined opposition to that idea. At least it was not vocal. +Even the defeat of the Democratic Party in the Congressional elections +of November, 1918, could not be interpreted to be a repudiation of the +formation of a world organization. That election, by which both Houses +of Congress became Republican, was a popular rebuke to Mr. Wilson for +the partisanship shown in his letter of October addressed to the +American people, in which he practically asserted that it was +unpatriotic to support the Republican candidates. The indignation and +resentment aroused by that injudicious and unwarranted attack upon the +loyalty of his political opponents lost to the Democratic Party the +Senate and largely reduced its membership in the House of +Representatives if it did not in fact deprive the party of control of +that body. The result, however, did not mean that the President's ideas +as to the terms of peace were repudiated, but that his practical +assertion, that refusal to accept his policies was unpatriotic, was +repudiated by the American people. + +It is very apparent to one, who without prejudice reviews the state of +public sentiment in December, 1918, that the trouble, which later +developed as to a League of Nations, did not lie in the necessity of +convincing the peoples of the world, their governments, and their +delegates to the Paris Conference that it was desirable to organize the +world to prevent future wars, but in deciding upon the form and +functions of the organization to be created. As to these details, which +of course affected the character, the powers, and the duties of the +organization, there had been for years a wide divergence of opinion. +Some advocated the use of international force to prevent a nation from +warring against another. Some favored coercion by means of general +ostracism and non-intercourse. Some believed that the application of +legal justice through the medium of international tribunals and +commissions was the only practical method of settling disputes which +might become causes of war. And some emphasized the importance of a +mutual agreement to postpone actual hostilities until there could be an +investigation as to the merits of a controversy. There were thus two +general classes of powers proposed which were in the one case political +and in the other juridical. The cleavage of opinion was along these +lines, although it possibly was not recognized by the general public. It +was not only shown in the proposed powers, but also in the proposed form +of the organization, the one centering on a politico-diplomatic body, +and the other on an international judiciary. Naturally the details of +any plan proposed would become the subject of discussion and the +advisability of adopting the provisions would arouse controversy and +dispute. Thus unanimity in approving a world organization did not mean +that opinions might not differ radically in working out the fundamental +principles of its form and functions, to say nothing of the detailed +plan based on these principles. + +In May, 1916, President Wilson accepted an invitation to address the +first annual meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, which was to be +held in Washington. After preparing his address he went over it and +erased all reference to the use of physical force in preventing wars. I +mention this as indicative of the state of uncertainty in which he was +in the spring of 1916 as to the functions and powers of the +international organization to maintain peace which he then advocated. By +January, 1917, he had become convinced that the use of force was the +practical method of checking aggressions. This conversion was probably +due to the fact that he had in his own mind worked out, as one of the +essential bases of peace, to which he was then giving much thought, a +mutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence, +which had been the chief article of a proposed Pan-American Treaty +prepared early in 1915 and to which he referred in his address before +the League to Enforce Peace. He appears to have reached the conclusion +that a guaranty of this sort would be of little value unless supported +by the threatened, and, if necessary, the actual, employment of force. +The President was entirely logical in this attitude. A guaranty against +physical aggression would be practically worthless if it did not rest on +an agreement to protect with physical force. An undertaking to protect +carried with it the idea of using effectual measures to insure +protection. They were inseparable; and the President, having adopted an +affirmative guaranty against aggression as a cardinal provision--perhaps +I should say _the_ cardinal provision--of the anticipated peace treaty, +could not avoid becoming the advocate of the use of force in making good +the guaranty. + +During the year 1918 the general idea of the formation of an +international organization to prevent war was increasingly discussed in +the press of the United States and Europe and engaged the thought of the +Governments of the Powers at war with the German Empire. On January 8 of +that year President Wilson in an address to Congress proclaimed his +"Fourteen Points," the adoption of which he considered necessary to a +just and stable peace. The last of these "Points" explicitly states the +basis of the proposed international organization and the fundamental +reason for its formation. It is as follows: + + "XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific + covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political + independence and territorial integrity to great and small + states alike." + +This declaration may be considered in view of subsequent developments to +be a sufficiently clear announcement of the President's theory as to the +plan of organization which ought to be adopted, but at the time the +exact character of the "mutual guarantees" was not disclosed and aroused +little comment. I do not believe that Congress, much less the public at +large, understood the purpose that the President had in mind. +Undoubtedly, too, a sense of loyalty to the Chief Executive, while the +war was in progress, and the desire to avoid giving comfort of any sort +to the enemy, prevented a critical discussion of the announced bases of +peace, some of which were at the time academic, premature, and liable to +modification if conditions changed. + +In March Lord Phillimore and his colleagues made their preliminary +report to the British Government on "a League of Nations" and this was +followed in July by their final report, copies of which reached the +President soon after they were made. The time had arrived for putting +into concrete form the general ideas that the President held, and +Colonel House, whom some believed to be the real author of Mr. Wilson's +conception of a world union, prepared, I am informed, the draft of a +scheme of organization. This draft was either sent or handed to the +President and discussed with him. To what extent it was amended or +revised by Mr. Wilson I do not know, but in a modified form it became +the typewritten draft of the Covenant which he took with him to Paris, +where it underwent several changes. In it was the guaranty of 1915, +1916, 1917, and 1918, which, from the form in which it appeared, +logically required the use of force to give it effect. + +Previous to the departure of the American Commission for Paris, on +December 4, 1918, the President did not consult me as to his plan for a +League of Nations. He did not show me a copy of the plan or even mention +that one had been put into writing. I think that there were two reasons +for his not doing so, although I was the official adviser whom he should +naturally consult on such matters. + +The first reason, I believe, was due to the following facts. In our +conversations prior to 1918 I had uniformly opposed the idea of the +employment of international force to compel a nation to respect the +rights of other nations and had repeatedly urged judicial settlement as +the practical way of composing international controversies, though I did +not favor the use of force to compel such settlement. + +To show my opposition to an international agreement providing for the +use of force and to show that President Wilson knew of this opposition +and the reasons for it, I quote a letter which I wrote to him in May, +1916, that is, two years and a half before the end of the war: + + "_May 25, 1916_ + + "My DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "I had hoped to see you to-morrow at Cabinet meeting, but to-day the + Doctor refused to allow me to leave the house this week. I intended + when I saw you to say something about the purposes of the League to + Enforce Peace, which is to meet here, and at the banquet of which I + understand you are to speak on Saturday night. I would have preferred + to talk the matter over with you, but as that is impossible I have + taken the liberty to write you this letter, although in doing so I am + violating the directions of the Doctor. + + "While I have not had time or opportunity to study carefully the + objects of the proposed League to Enforce Peace, I understand the + fundamental ideas are these, which are to be embodied in a general + treaty of the nations: _First_, an agreement to submit all + differences which fail of diplomatic adjustment to arbitration or a + board of conciliation; and, _second_, in case a government fails to + comply with this provision, an agreement that the other parties will + unite in compelling it to do so by an exercise of force. + + "With the first agreement I am in accord to an extent, but I cannot + see how it is practicable to apply it in case of a continuing + invasion of fundamental national or individual rights unless some + authoritative international body has the power to impose and enforce + an order in the nature of an injunction, which will prevent the + aggressor from further action until arbitration has settled the + rights of the parties. How this can be done in a practical way I have + not attempted to work out, but the problem is not easy, especially + the part which relates to the enforcement of the order. + + "It is, however, the second agreement in regard to the imposition of + international arbitration by force, which seems to me the most + difficult, especially when viewed from the standpoint of its effects + on our national sovereignty and national interests. It is needless to + go into the manifest questions arising when the _modus operandi_ of + the agreement is considered. Such questions as: Who may demand + international intervention? What body will decide whether the demand + should be complied with? How will the international forces be + constituted? Who will take charge of the military and naval + operations? Who will pay the expenses of the war (for war it + will be)? + + "Perplexing as these questions appear to me, I am more concerned with + the direct effect on this country. I do not believe that it is wise + to limit our independence of action, a sovereign right, to the will + of other powers beyond this hemisphere. In any representative + international body clothed with authority to require of the nations + to employ their armies and navies to coerce one of their number, we + would be in the minority. I do not believe that we should put + ourselves in the position of being compelled to send our armed forces + to Europe or Asia or, in the alternative, of repudiating our treaty + obligation. Neither our sovereignty nor our interests would accord + with such a proposition, and I am convinced that popular opinion as + well as the Senate would reject a treaty framed along such lines. + + "It is possible that the difficulty might be obviated by the + establishment of geographical zones, and leaving to the groups of + nations thus formed the enforcement of the peaceful settlement of + disputes. But if that is done why should all the world participate? + We have adopted a much modified form of this idea in the proposed + Pan-American Treaty by the 'guaranty' article. But I would not like + to see its stipulations extended to the European powers so that they, + with our full agreement, would have the right to cross the ocean and + stop quarrels between two American Republics. Such authority would be + a serious menace to the Monroe Doctrine and a greater menace to the + Pan-American Doctrine. + + "It appears to me that, if the first idea of the League can be worked + out in a practical way and an international body constituted to + determine when steps should be taken to enforce compliance, the use + of force might be avoided by outlawing the offending nation. No + nation to-day can live unto itself. The industrial and commercial + activities of the world are too closely interwoven for a nation + isolated from the other nations to thrive and prosper. A tremendous + economic pressure could be imposed on the outlawed nation by all + other nations denying it intercourse of every nature, even + communication, in a word make that nation a pariah, and so to remain + until it was willing to perform its obligations. + + "I am not at all sure that this means is entirely feasible. I see + many difficulties which would have to be met under certain + conditions. But I do think that it is more practical in operation and + less objectionable from the standpoint of national rights and + interests than the one proposed by the League. It does not appear to + me that the use of physical force is in any way practical or + advisable. + + "I presume that you are far more familiar than I am with the details + of the plans of the League and that it may be presumptuous on my part + to write you as I have. I nevertheless felt it my duty to frankly + give you my views on the subject and I have done so. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "_The White House_" + +The President, thus early advised of my unqualified opposition to any +plan which was similar in principle to the one advocated by the League +to Enforce Peace, naturally concluded that I would look with disfavor on +an international guaranty which by implication, if not by declaration, +compelled the use of force to give it effect. Doubtless he felt that I +would not be disposed to aid in perfecting a plan which had as its +central idea a guaranty of that nature. Disliking opposition to a plan +or policy which he had originated or made his own by adoption, he +preferred to consult those who without debate accepted his judgment and +were in sympathy with his ideas. Undoubtedly the President by refraining +from asking my advice spared himself from listening to arguments against +the guaranty and the use of force which struck at the very root of his +plan, for I should, if I had been asked, have stated my views with +entire frankness. + +The other reason for not consulting me, as I now realize, but did not at +the time, was that I belonged to the legal profession. It is a fact, +which Mr. Wilson has taken no trouble to conceal, that he does not value +the advice of lawyers except on strictly legal questions, and that he +considers their objections and criticisms on other subjects to be too +often based on mere technicalities and their judgments to be warped by +an undue regard for precedent. This prejudice against the legal +profession in general was exhibited on more than one occasion during our +sojourn at Paris. Looking back over my years of intercourse with the +President I can now see that he chafed under the restraints imposed by +usage and even by enacted laws if they interfered with his acting in a +way which seemed to him right or justified by conditions. I do not say +that he was lawless. He was not that, but he conformed grudgingly and +with manifest displeasure to legal limitations. It was a thankless task +to question a proposed course of action on the ground of illegality, +because he appeared to be irritated by such an obstacle to his will and +to transfer his irritation against the law to the one who raised it as +an objection. I think that he was especially resentful toward any one +who volunteered criticism based on a legal provision, precept, or +precedent, apparently assuming that the critic opposed his purpose on +the merits and in order to defeat it interposed needless legal +objections. It is unnecessary to comment on the prejudice which such an +attitude of mind made evident. + +After the President's exceptionally strong address at the Metropolitan +Opera House in New York on September 27, 1918, I realized the great +importance which he gave to the creation of a League of Nations and in +view of this I devoted time and study to the subject, giving particular +attention to the British and French suggestions, both of which +emphasized judicial settlement. Knowing that the President had been in +consultation with Colonel House on the various phases of the peace to be +negotiated as well as on the terms of the armistice, I asked the latter +what he knew about the former's scheme for a League of Nations. + +The Colonel discreetly avoided disclosing the details of the plan, but +from our conversation I gained an idea of the general principles of the +proposed organization and the way in which the President intended to +apply them. + +After the Colonel and his party had sailed for France and in expectation +of being consulted on the subject by President Wilson, I put my thoughts +on the League of Nations into writing. In a note, which is dated October +27, 1918, appears the following: + + "From the little I know of the President's plan I am sure that it is + impracticable. There is in it too much altruistic cooperation. No + account is taken of national selfishness and the mutual suspicions + which control international relations. It may be noble thinking, but + it is not true thinking. + + "What I fear is that a lot of dreamers and theorists will be selected + to work out an organization instead of men whose experience and + common sense will tell them not to attempt anything which will not + work. The scheme ought to be simple and practical. If the federation, + or whatever it may be called, is given too much power or if its + machinery is complex, my belief is that it will be unable to function + or else will be defied. I can see lots of trouble ahead unless + impractical enthusiasts and fanatics are suppressed. This is a time + when sober thought, caution, and common sense should control." + +On November 22, 1918, after I had been formally designated as a Peace +Commissioner, I made another note for the purpose of crystallizing my +own thought on the subject of a League of Nations. Although President +Wilson had not then consulted me in any way regarding his plan of +organization, I felt sure that he would, and I wished to be prepared to +give him my opinion concerning the fundamentals of the plan which might +be proposed on behalf of the United States. I saw, or thought that I +saw, a disposition to adopt physical might as the basis of the +organization, because the guaranty, which the President had announced in +Point XIV and evidently purposed to advocate, seemed to require the use +of force in the event that it became necessary to make it good. + +From the note of November 22 I quote the following: + + "The legal principle [of the equality of nations], whatever its basis + in fact, must be preserved, otherwise force rather than law, the + power to act rather than the right to act, becomes the fundamental + principle of organization, just as it has been in all previous + Congresses and Concerts of the European Powers. + + "It appears to me that a positive guaranty of territorial integrity + and political independence by the nations would have to rest upon an + open recognition of dominant coercive power in the articles of + agreement, the power being commercial and economic as well as + physical. The wisdom of entering into such a guaranty is questionable + and should be carefully considered before being adopted. + + "In order to avoid the recognition of force as a basis and the + question of dominant force with the unavoidable classification of + nations into 'big' and 'little,' 'strong' and 'weak,' the desired + result of a guaranty might be attained by entering into a mutual + undertaking _not_ to impair the territorial integrity or to violate + the political sovereignty of any state. The breach of this + undertaking would be a breach of the treaty and would sever the + relations of the offending nation with all other signatories." + +I have given these two extracts from my notes in order to show the views +that I held, at the time the American Commission was about to depart +from the United States, in regard to the character of the guaranty which +the President intended to make the central feature of the League of +Nations. In the carrying out of his scheme and in creating an +organization to give effect to the guaranty I believed that I saw as an +unavoidable consequence an exaltation of force and an overlordship of +the strong nations. Under such conditions it would be impossible to +preserve within the organization the equality of nations, a precept of +international law which was the universally recognized basis of +intercourse between nations in time of peace. This I considered most +unwise and a return to the old order, from which every one hoped that +the victory over the Central Empires had freed the world. + +The views expressed in the notes quoted formed the basis for my +subsequent course of action as an American Commissioner at Paris in +relation to the League of Nations. Convinced from previous experience +that to oppose every form of guaranty by the nations assembled at Paris +would be futile in view of the President's apparent determination to +compel the adoption of that principle, I endeavored to find a form of +guaranty that would be less objectionable than the one which the +President had in mind. The commitment of the United States to any +guaranty seemed to me at least questionable, though to prevent it seemed +impossible in the circumstances. It did not seem politic to try to +persuade the President to abandon the idea altogether. I was certain +that that could not be done. If he could be induced to modify his plan +so as to avoid a direct undertaking to protect other nations from +aggression, the result would be all that could be expected. I was +guided, therefore, chiefly by expediency rather than by principle in +presenting my views to the President and in openly approving the idea of +a guaranty. + +The only opportunity that I had to learn more of the President's plan +for a League before arriving in Paris was an hour's interview with him +on the U.S.S. George Washington some days after we sailed from New York. +He showed me nothing in writing, but explained in a general way his +views as to the form, purpose, and powers of a League. From this +conversation I gathered that my fears as to the proposed organization +were justified and that it was to be based on the principle of +diplomatic adjustment rather than that of judicial settlement and that +political expediency tinctured with morality was to be the standard of +determination of an international controversy rather than strict +legal justice. + +In view of the President's apparent fixity of purpose it seemed unwise +to criticize the plan until I could deliver to him a substitute in +writing for the mutual guaranty which he evidently considered to be the +chief feature of the plan. I did not attempt to debate the subject with +him believing it better to submit my ideas in concrete form, as I had +learned from experience that Mr. Wilson preferred to have matters for +his decision presented in writing rather than by word of mouth. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED + + +The President, Mr. Henry White, and I arrived in Paris on Saturday, +December 14, 1918, where Colonel House and General Bliss awaited us. The +days following our arrival were given over to public functions in honor +of the President and to official exchanges of calls and interviews with +the delegates of other countries who were gathering for the Peace +Conference. On the 23d, when the pressure of formal and social +engagements had in a measure lessened, I decided to present to the +President my views as to the mutual guaranty which he intended to +propose, fearing that, if there were further delay, he would become +absolutely committed to the affirmative form. I, therefore, on that day +sent him the following letter, which was marked "Secret and Urgent": + + "_Hotel de Crillon December 23, 1918_ + + "MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "The plan of guaranty proposed for the League of Nations, which has + been the subject of discussion, will find considerable objection from + other Governments because, even when the principle is agreed to, + there will be a wide divergence of views as to the terms of the + obligation. This difference of opinion will be seized upon by those, + who are openly or secretly opposed to the League, to create + controversy and discord. + + "In addition to this there will be opposition in Congress to assuming + obligations to take affirmative action along either military or + economic lines. On constitutional grounds, on its effect on the + Monroe Doctrine, on jealousy as to Congressional powers, etc., there + will be severe criticism which will materially weaken our position + with other nations, and may, in view of senatorial hostility, defeat + a treaty as to the League of Nations or at least render it impotent. + + "With these thoughts in mind and with an opposition known to exist + among certain European statesmen and already manifest in Washington, + I take the liberty of laying before you a tentative draft of articles + of guaranty which I do not believe can be successfully opposed either + at home or abroad." + +I would interrupt the reader at this point to suggest that it might be +well to peruse the enclosures, which will be found in the succeeding +pages, in order to have a better understanding of the comments which +follow. To continue: + + "I do not see how any nation can refuse to subscribe to them. I do + not see how any question of constitutionality can be raised, as they + are based essentially on powers which are confided to the Executive. + They in no way raise a question as to the Monroe Doctrine. At the + same time I believe that the result would be as efficacious as if + there was an undertaking to take positive action against an offending + nation, which is the present cause of controversy. + + "I am so earnestly in favor of the guaranty, which is the heart of + the League of Nations, that I have endeavored to find a way to + accomplish this and to remove the objections raised which seem to me + to-day to jeopardize the whole plan. + + "I shall be glad, if you desire it, to confer with you in regard to + the enclosed paper or to receive your opinion as to the suggestions + made. In any event it is my hope that you will give the paper + consideration. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "28 _Rue de Monceau_" + +It should be borne in mind in reading this letter that I had reached the +conclusion that modification rather than abandonment of the guaranty was +all that I could hope to accomplish, and that, as a matter of +expediency, it seemed wise to indicate a sympathetic attitude toward the +idea. For that reason I expressed myself as favorable to the guaranty +and termed it "the heart of the League of Nations," a phrase which the +President by his subsequent use of it considered to be a proper +characterization. + +The memoranda contained in the paper enclosed in the letter were as +follows: + +_The Constitutional Power to provide Coercion in a Treaty_ + + "_December_ 20, 1918 + + "In the institution of a League of Nations we must bear in mind the + limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States upon the + Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government in defining + their respective powers. + + "The Constitution confers upon Congress the right to declare war. + This right, I do not believe, can be delegated and it certainly + cannot be taken away by treaty. The question arises, therefore, as to + how far a provision in an agreement as to a League of Nations, which + imposes on the United States the obligation to employ its military or + naval forces in enforcing the terms of the agreement, would be + constitutional. + + "It would seem that the utilization of forces, whether independently + or in conjunction with other nations, would in fact by being an act + of war create a state of war, which constitutionally can only be done + by a declaration of Congress. To contract by treaty to create a state + of war upon certain contingencies arising would be equally tainted + with unconstitutionality and would be null and inoperative. + + "I do not think, therefore, that, even if it were advisable, any + treaty can provide for the independent or joint use of the military + or naval forces of the United States to compel compliance with a + treaty or to make good a guaranty made in a treaty. + + "The other method of international coercion is non-intercourse, + especially commercial non-intercourse. Would a treaty provision to + employ this method be constitutional? + + "As to this my mind is less clear. The Constitution in delegating + powers to Congress includes the regulation of commerce. Does + non-intercourse fall within the idea of regulation? Could an embargo + be imposed without an act of Congress? My impression is that it could + not be done without legislation and that a treaty provision agreeing + in a certain event to impose an embargo against another nation + would be void. + + "Even if Congress was willing to delegate to the Executive for a + certain purpose its powers as to making war and regulating commerce, + I do not think that it could constitutionally do so. It is only in + the event of war that powers conferred by the Constitution on + Congress can be delegated and then only for war purposes. As a state + of war would not exist at the time action was required, I do not + believe that it could be done, and any provision contracting to take + measures of this nature would be contrary to the Constitution and as + a consequence void. + + "But, assuming that Congress possessed the power of delegation, I am + convinced that it would not only refuse to do so, but would resent + such a suggestion because of the fact that both Houses have been and + are extremely jealous of their rights and authority. + + "Viewed from the standpoints of legality and expediency it would seem + necessary to find some other method than coercion in enforcing an + international guaranty, or else to find some substitute for a + guaranty which would be valueless without affirmative action to + support it. + + "I believe that such a substitute can be found." + +The foregoing memorandum was intended as an introduction to the negative +guaranty or "self-denying covenant" which I desired to lay before the +President as a substitute for the one upon which he intended to build +the League of Nations. The memorandum was suggestive merely, but in view +of the necessity for a speedy decision there was no time to prepare an +exhaustive legal opinion. Furthermore, I felt that the President, whose +hours were at that time crowded with numerous personal conferences and +public functions, would find little opportunity to peruse a long and +closely reasoned argument on the subject. + +The most important portion of the document was that entitled "_Suggested +Draft of Articles for Discussion_. December 20, 1918." It reads +as follows: + + "The parties to this convention, for the purpose of maintaining + international peace and preventing future wars between one another, + hereby constitute themselves into a League of Nations and solemnly + undertake jointly and severally to fulfill the obligations imposed + upon them in the following articles: + + "A + + "Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and + guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or + impair the political independence of any other power signatory or + adherent to this convention except when authorized so to do by a + decree of the arbitral tribunal hereinafter referred to or by a + three-fourths vote of the International Council of the League of + Nations created by this convention. + + "B + + "In the event that any power signatory or adherent hereto shall fail + to observe the covenant and guaranty set forth in the preceding + article, such breach of covenant and guaranty shall _ipso facto_ + operate as an abrogation of this convention in so far as it applies + to the offending power and furthermore as an abrogation of all + treaties, conventions, and agreements heretofore or hereafter entered + into between the offending power and all other powers signatory and + adherent to this convention. + + "C + + "A breach of the covenant and guaranty declared in Article A shall + constitute an act unfriendly to all other powers signatory and + adherent hereto, and they shall forthwith sever all diplomatic, + consular, and official relations with the offending power, and shall, + through the International Council, hereinafter provided for, exchange + views as to the measures necessary to restore the power, whose + sovereignty has been invaded, to the rights and liberties which it + possessed prior to such invasion and to prevent further + violation thereof. + + "D + + "Any interference with a vessel on the high seas or with aircraft + proceeding over the high seas, which interference is not + affirmatively sanctioned by the law of nations shall be, for the + purposes of this convention, considered an impairment of political + independence." + +In considering the foregoing series of articles constituting a guaranty +against one's own acts, instead of a guaranty against the acts of +another, it must be remembered that, at the time of their preparation, I +had not seen a draft of the President's proposed guaranty, though from +conversations with Colonel House and from my study of Point XIV of "The +Fourteen Points," I knew that it was affirmative rather than negative in +form and would require positive action to be effective in the event that +the menace of superior force was insufficient to prevent +aggressive acts. + +As far as I am able to judge from subsequently acquired knowledge, +President Wilson at the time he received my letter of December 23 had a +typewritten draft of the document which after certain amendments he +later laid before the American Commissioners and which he had printed +with a few verbal changes under the title of "The Covenant." In order to +understand the two forms of guaranty which he had for consideration +after he received my letter, I quote the article relating to it, which +appears in the first printed draft of the Covenant. + + III + + "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political + independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between + them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the + future become necessary by reasons of changes in present racial + conditions and aspirations or present social and political + relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and + also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three + fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest + interest of the people concerned, may be effected if agreeable to + those peoples; and that territorial changes may involve material + compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the + principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to + every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." + +It seems needless to comment upon the involved language and the +uncertainty of meaning of this article wherein it provided for +"territorial readjustments" of which there appeared to be two classes, +one dependent on "self-determination," the other on the judgment of the +Body of Delegates of the League. In view of the possible reasons which +might be advanced for changes in territory and allegiance, justification +for an appeal to the guarantors was by no means certain. If this article +had been before me when the letter of December 23 was written, I might +have gone much further in opposition to the President's plan for +stabilizing peace in the world on the ground that a guaranty so +conditioned would cause rather than prevent international discord. + +Though without knowledge of the exact terms of the President's proposed +guaranty, I did not feel for the reason stated that I could delay longer +in submitting my views to the President. There was not time to work out +a complete and well-digested plan for a League, but I had prepared in +the rough several articles for discussion which related to the +organization, and which might be incorporated in the organic agreement +which I then assumed would be a separate document from the treaty +restoring peace. While unwilling to lay these articles before the +President until they were more carefully drafted, I enclosed in my +letter the following as indicative of the character of the organization +which it seemed to me would form a simple and practical agency common to +all nations: + + "_Suggestions as to an International Council For Discussion_ + + "_December_ 21, 1918 + + "An International Council of the League of Nations is hereby + constituted, which shall be the channel for communication between the + members of the League, and the agent for common action. + + "The International Council shall consist of the diplomatic + representative of each party signatory or adherent to this + convention at ----. + + "Meetings of the International Council shall be held at ----, or in + the event that the subject to be considered involves the interests of + ---- or its nationals, then at such other place outside the territory + of a power whose interests are involved as the Supervisory Committee + of the Council shall designate. + + "The officer charged with the conduct of the foreign affairs of the + power where a meeting is held shall be the presiding officer thereof. + + "At the first meeting of the International Council a Supervisory + Committee shall be chosen by a majority vote of the members present, + which shall consist of five members and shall remain in office for + two years or until their successors are elected. + + "The Supervisory Committee shall name a Secretariat which shall have + charge of the archives of the Council and receive all communications + addressed to the Council or Committee and send all communications + issued by the Council or Committee. + + "The Supervisory Committee may draft such rules of procedure as it + deems necessary for conducting business coming before the Council or + before the Committee. + + "The Supervisory Committee may call a meeting of the Council at its + discretion and must call a meeting at the request of any member of + the Council provided the request contains a written statement of the + subject to be discussed. + + "The archives of the Council shall be open at any time to any member + of the Council, who may make and retain copies thereof. + + "All expenses of the Supervisory Committee and Secretariat shall be + borne equally by all powers signatory or adherent to this + convention." + +As indicated by the caption, this document was intended merely "for +discussion" of the principal features of the organization. It should be +noted that the basic principle is the equality of nations. No special +privileges are granted to the major powers in the conduct of the +organization. The rights and obligations of one member of the League are +no more and no less than those of every other member. It is based on +international democracy and denies international aristocracy. + +Equality in the exercise of sovereign rights in times of peace, an +equality which is imposed by the very nature of sovereignty, seemed to +me fundamental to a world organization affecting in any way a nation's +independence of action or its exercise of supreme authority over its +external or domestic affairs. In my judgment any departure from that +principle would be a serious error fraught with danger to the general +peace of the world and to the recognized law of nations, since it could +mean nothing less than the primacy of the Great Powers and the +acknowledgment that because they possessed the physical might they had a +right to control the affairs of the world in times of peace as well as +in times of war. For the United States to admit that such primacy ought +to be formed would be bad enough, but to suggest it indirectly by +proposing an international organization based on that idea would be +far worse. + +On January 22, 1917, the President in an address to the Senate had made +the following declaration: + + "The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to + last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must + neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations or + small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right + must be based upon the common strength, not the individual strength, + of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of + territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other + sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate + development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects + anything more than an equality of rights." + +In view of this sound declaration of principle it seemed hardly possible +that the President, after careful consideration of the consequences of +his plan of a guaranty requiring force to make it practical, would not +perceive the fundamental error of creating a primacy of the +Great Powers. + +It was in order to prevent, if possible, the United States from becoming +sponsor for an undemocratic principle that I determined to lay my +partial plan of organization before the President at the earliest moment +that I believed it would receive consideration. + +To my letter of December 23 with its enclosed memoranda I never received +a reply or even an acknowledgment. It is true that the day following its +delivery the President went to Chaumont to spend Christmas at the +headquarters of General Pershing and that almost immediately thereafter +he visited London and two or three days after his return to Paris he set +out for Rome. It is possible that Mr. Wilson in the midst of these +crowded days had no time to digest or even to read my letter and its +enclosed memoranda. It is possible that he was unable or unwilling to +form an opinion as to their merits without time for meditation. I do not +wish to be unjustly critical or to blame the President for a neglect +which was the result of circumstance rather than of intention. + +At the time I assumed that his failure to mention my letter in any way +was because his visits to royalty exacted from him so much of his time +that there was no opportunity to give the matter consideration. While +some doubt was thrown on this assumption by the fact that the President +held an hour's conference with the American Commissioners on January 1, +just before departing for Italy, during which he discussed the favorable +attitude of Mr. Lloyd George toward his (the President's) ideas as to a +League of Nations, but never made any reference to my proposed +substitute for the guaranty, I was still disposed to believe that there +was a reasonable explanation for his silence and that upon his return +from Rome he would discuss it. + +Having this expectation I continued the preparation of tentative +provisions to be included in the charter of a League of Nations in the +event one was negotiated, and which would in any event constitute a +guide for the preparation of declarations to be included in the Treaty +of Peace in case the negotiation as to a League was postponed until +after peace had been restored. As has been said, it was my hope that +there would be a separate convention organizing the League, but I was +not as sanguine of this as many who believed this course would +be followed. + +It later developed that the President never had any other purpose than +to include the detailed plan of organization in the peace treaty, +whether the treaty was preliminary or definitive. When he departed for +Italy he had not declared this purpose to the Commissioners, but from +some source, which I failed to note at the time and cannot now +recollect, I gained the impression that he intended to pursue this +policy, for on December 29 I wrote in my book of notes: + + "It is evident that the President is determined to incorporate in the + peace treaty an elaborate scheme for the League of Nations which will + excite all sorts of opposition at home and abroad and invite much + discussion. + + "The articles relating to the League ought to be few and brief. They + will not be. They will be many and long. If we wait till they are + accepted, it will be four or five months before peace is signed, and + I fear to say how much longer it will take to have it ratified. + + "It is perhaps foolish to prophesy, but I will take the chance. Two + months from now we will still be haggling over the League of Nations + and an exasperated world will be cursing us for not having made + peace. I hope that I am a false prophet, but I fear my prophecy will + come true. We are riding a hobby, and riding to a fall." + +By the time the President returned from his triumphal journey to Rome I +had completed the articles upon which I had been working; at least they +were in form for discussion. At a conference at the Hotel Crillon +between President Wilson and the American Commissioners on January 7, I +handed to him the draft articles saying that they were supplemental to +my letter of December 23. He took them without comment and without +making any reference to my unanswered letter. + +The first two articles of the "International Agreement," as I termed the +document, were identical in language with the memoranda dealing with a +mutual covenant and with an international council which I had enclosed +in my letter of December 23. It is needless, therefore, to repeat +them here. + +Article III of the so-called "Agreement" was entitled "Peaceful +Settlements of International Disputes," and read as follows: + + "_Clause_ 1 + + "In the event that there is a controversy between two or more members + of the League of Nations which fails of settlement through diplomatic + channels, one of the following means of settlement shall be employed: + + "1. The parties to the controversy shall constitute a joint + commission to investigate and report jointly or severally to their + Governments the facts and make recommendations as to settlement. + After such report a further effort shall be made to reach a + diplomatic settlement of the controversy. + + "2. The parties shall by agreement arrange for the submission of the + controversy to arbitration mutually agreed upon, or to the Arbitral + Tribunal hereinafter referred to. + + "3. Any party may, unless the second means of settlement is mutually + adopted, submit the controversy to the Supervisory Committee of the + International Council; and the Committee shall forthwith (a) name and + direct a special commission to investigate and report upon the + subject; (b) name and direct a commission to mediate between the + parties to the controversy; or (c) direct the parties to submit the + controversy to the Arbitral Tribunal for judicial settlement, it + being understood that the direction to arbitrate may be made at any + time in the event that investigation and mediation fail to result in + a settlement of the controversy. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "No party to a controversy shall assume any authority or perform any + acts based upon disputed rights without authorization of the + Supervisory Committee, such authorization being limited in all cases + to the pendency of the controversy and its final settlement and being + in no way prejudicial to the rights of the parties. An authorization + thus granted by the Supervisory Committee may be modified or + superseded by mutual agreement of the parties, by order of an + arbitrator or arbitrators selected by the parties, or by order of the + Arbitral Tribunal if the controversy is submitted to it. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "The foregoing clause shall not apply to cases in which the + constituted authorities of a power are unable or fail to give + protection to the lives and property of nationals of another power. + In the event that it becomes necessary for a power to use its + military or naval forces to safeguard the lives or property of its + nationals within the territorial jurisdiction of another power, the + facts and reasons for such action shall be forthwith reported to the + Supervisory Committee, which shall determine the course of action to + be adopted in order to protect the rights of all parties, and shall + notify the same to the governments involved which shall comply with + such notification. In the event that a government fails to comply + therewith it shall be deemed to have violated the covenant and + guaranty hereinbefore set forth." + +The other articles follow: + + "ARTICLE IV + + "_Revision of Arbitral Tribunal and Codification of International + Law_ + + "_Clause 1_ + + "The International Council, within one year after its organization, + shall notify to the powers signatory and adherent to this convention + and shall invite all other powers to send delegates to an + international conference at such place and time as the Council may + determine and not later than six months after issuance of such + notification and invitation. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "The International Conference shall consider the revision of the + constitution and procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal and provisions + for the amicable settlement of international disputes established by + the I Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907, and shall formulate codes + embodying the principles of international law applicable in time of + peace and the rules of warfare on land and sea and in the air. The + revision and codification when completed shall be embodied in a + treaty or treaties. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "The International Council shall prepare and submit with the + notification and invitation above provided a preliminary programme of + the International Conference, which shall be subject to modification + or amendment by the Conference. + + "_Clause 4_ + + "Until the treaty of revision of the constitution and procedure of + the Arbitral Tribunal becomes operative, the provisions of the I + Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907 shall continue in force, and all + references herein to the 'Arbitral Tribunal' shall be understood to + be the Tribunal constituted under the I Treaty, but upon the treaty + of revision coming into force the references shall be construed as + applying to the Arbitral Tribunal therein constituted. + + "ARTICLE V + + "_Publication of Treaties and Agreements_ + + "_Clause 1_ + + "Each power, signatory or adherent to this convention, severally + agrees with all other parties hereto that it will not exchange the + ratification of any treaty or convention hereinafter entered into by + it with any other power until thirty days after the full text of such + treaty or convention has been published in the public press of the + parties thereto and a copy has been filed with the Secretariat of the + League of Nations. + + "_Clause 2_ + + "No international agreement, to which a power signatory or adherent + to this convention, is a party, shall become operative or be put in + force until published and filed as aforesaid. + + "_Clause 3_ + + "All treaties, conventions and agreements, to which a power, + signatory or adherent to this convention, is a party, and which are + in force or to come into force and which have not been heretofore + published, shall within six months after the signature of this + convention be published and filed as aforesaid or abrogated or + denounced. + + "ARTICLE VI + + "_Equality of Commercial Privileges_ + + "The powers, signatory and adherent to this convention agree jointly + and severally not to discriminate against or in favor of any power in + the matter of commerce or trade or of industrial privileges; and they + further agree that all treaties, conventions and agreements now in + force or to come into force or hereinafter negotiated shall be + considered as subject to the 'most favored nation' doctrine, whether + they contain or do not contain a clause to that effect. It is + specifically declared that it is the purpose of this article not to + limit any power in imposing upon commerce and trade such restrictions + and burdens as it may deem proper but to make such impositions apply + equally and impartially to all other powers, their nationals + and ships. + + "This article shall not apply, however, to any case, in which a power + has committed an unfriendly act against the members of the League of + Nations as defined in Article I and in which commercial and trade + relations are denied or restricted by agreements between the members + as a measure of restoration or protection of the rights of a power + injured by such unfriendly act." + +These proposed articles, which were intended for discussion before +drafting the provisions constituting a League of Nations and which did +not purport to be a completed document, are given in full because there +seems no simpler method of showing the differences between the President +and me as to the form, functions, and authority of an international +organization. They should be compared with the draft of the "Covenant" +which the President had when these proposed articles were handed to him; +the text of the President's draft appears in the Appendix (page 281). +Comparison will disclose the irreconcilable differences between the +two projects. + +Of these differences the most vital was in the character of the +international guaranty of territorial and political sovereignty. That +difference has already been discussed. The second in importance was the +practical repudiation by the President of the doctrine of the equality +of nations, which, as has been shown, was an unavoidable consequence of +an affirmative guaranty which he had declared to be absolutely essential +to an effective world union. The repudiation, though by indirection, was +none the less evident in the recognition in the President's plan of the +primacy of the Great Powers through giving to them a permanent majority +on the "Executive Council" which body substantially controlled the +activities of the League. A third marked difference was in Mr. Wilson's +exaltation of the executive power of the League and the subordination of +the administration of legal justice to that power, and in my advocacy of +an independent international judiciary, whose decisions would be final +and whose place in the organization of the nations would be superior, +since I considered a judicial tribunal the most practical agency for +removing causes of war. + +The difference as to international courts and the importance of applied +legal justice requires further consideration in order to understand the +divergence of views which existed as to the fundamental idea of +organization of the League. + +President Wilson in his Covenant, as at first submitted to the American +Commissioners, made no provision for the establishment of a World Court +of Justice, and no reference of any sort was made to The Hague Tribunal +of Arbitration. It is not, in my opinion, a misstatement to say that the +President intentionally omitted judicial means of composing +international disputes preferring to leave settlements of that sort to +arrangement between the parties or else to the Body of Delegates or the +Executive Council, both of which bodies being essentially diplomatic or +political in their composition would lack the judicial point of view, +since their members would presumably be influenced by their respective +national interests and by political considerations rather than by a +desire and purpose to do impartial justice by applying legal principles. + +It is true that in Article V of the first draft of the Covenant +(Appendix) there is an agreement to submit to arbitration +certain classes of controversies and a method of selecting arbitrators +is provided--a method, by the way, which the actual experience of a +century has shown to be the least satisfactory in administering legal +justice, since it almost inevitably leads to a compromise which impairs +the just rights of one of the parties. But, to my mind, a provision, far +more objectionable than the antiquated and unsatisfactory method of +arbitration provided, was that which made an arbitral award reviewable +on appeal to the Body of Delegates of the League, which could set aside +the award even if the arbitrators had rendered a unanimous decision and +compel a rehearing before other arbitrators. International arbitration +as a method of applying the principles of justice to disputes between +nations would, in the first instance at least, have become a farce if +this provision had been adopted. As an award based on compromise is +seldom, if ever, satisfactory to both parties, the right of appeal would +in substantially every case have been invoked and the award would have +been reviewed by the Body of Delegates, who would practically render a +final decision since the new arbitrators would presumably adopt it. The +effect of this provision as to appeals was, therefore, to supplant +judicial settlements by political compromises and diplomatic +adjustments, in which the national interests of the judges, many of whom +would be untrained in juridical procedure, would be decided, if not +deciding, factors. Manifestly the expediency of the moment would be far +more potent in the decisions reached than the principles and precepts of +international law. + +I shall not express here my opinion as to the reasons which I believe +impelled the President to insert in the Covenant these extraordinary +provisions which deprived arbitral courts of that independence of the +executive authority which has been in modern times considered essential +to the impartial administration of justice. But, when one considers how +jealously and effectively the Constitution of the United States and the +constitutions of the various States of the Union guard the judiciary +from executive and legislative interference, the proposal in the +President's plan for a League of Nations to abandon that great principle +in the settlement of international disputes of a justiciable nature +causes speculation as to Mr. Wilson's real opinion of the American +political system which emphasizes the separation and independence of the +three coordinate branches of government. + +That a provision found its way into the draft of the Covenant, which the +President, on February 3, 1919, laid before the Commission on the League +of Nations, declaring for the creation by the League of a permanent +court of international justice, was not due, I feel sure, to any +spontaneous thought on the part of President Wilson. + +My own views as to the relative value of the settlement of an +international controversy, which is by its nature justiciable, by a body +of diplomats and of the settlement by a body of trained jurists were +fully set forth in an address which I delivered before the American Bar +Association at its annual meeting at Boston on September 5,1919. + +An extract from that address will show the radical difference between +the President's views and mine. + + "While abstract justice cannot [under present conditions] be depended + upon as a firm basis on which to constitute an international concord + for the preservation of peace and good relations between nations, + legal justice offers a common ground where the nations can meet to + settle their controversies. No nation can refuse in the face of the + opinion of the world to declare its unwillingness to recognize the + legal rights of other nations or to submit to the judgment of an + impartial tribunal a dispute involving the determination of such + rights. The moment, however, that we go beyond the clearly defined + field of legal justice we enter the field of diplomacy where national + interests and ambitions are to-day the controlling factors of + national action. Concession and compromise are the chief agents of + diplomatic settlement instead of the impartial application of legal + justice which is essential to a judicial settlement. Furthermore, the + two modes of settlement differ in that a judicial settlement rests + upon the precept that all nations, whether great or small, are equal, + but in the sphere of diplomacy the inequality of nations is not only + recognized, but unquestionably influences the adjustment of + international differences. Any change in the relative power of + nations, a change which is continually taking place, makes more or + less temporary diplomatic settlements, but in no way affects a + judicial settlement. + + "However, then, international society may be organized for the future + and whatever machinery may be set up to minimize the possibilities of + war, I believe that the agency which may be counted upon to function + with certainty is that which develops and applies legal justice." + +Every other agency, regardless of its form, will be found, when +analyzed, to be diplomatic in character and subject to those impulses +and purposes which generally affect diplomatic negotiations. With a full +appreciation of the advantage to be gained for the world at large +through the common consideration of a vexatious international question +by a body representing all nations, we ought not to lose sight of the +fact that such consideration and the action resulting from it are +essentially diplomatic in nature. It is, in brief, the transference of a +dispute in a particular case from the capitals of the disputants to the +place where the delegates of the nations assemble to deliberate together +on matters which affect their common interests. It does not--and this we +should understand--remove the question from the processes of diplomacy +or prevent the influences which enter into diplomacy from affecting its +consideration. Nor does it to an appreciable extent change the actual +inequality which exists among nations in the matter of power and +influence. + + "On the other hand, justice applied through the agency of an + impartial tribunal clothed with an international jurisdiction + eliminates the diplomatic methods of compromise and concession and + recognizes that before the law all nations are equal and equally + entitled to the exercise of their rights as sovereign and independent + states. In a word, international democracy exists in the sphere of + legal justice and, up to the present time, in no other relation + between nations. + + "Let us, then, with as little delay as possible establish an + international tribunal or tribunals of justice with The Hague Court + as a foundation; let us provide an easier, a cheaper, and better + procedure than now exists; and let us draft a simple and concise body + of legal principles to be applied to the questions to be adjudicated. + When that has been accomplished--and it ought not to be a difficult + task if the delegates of the Governments charged with it are chosen + for their experience and learning in the field of jurisprudence--we + shall, in my judgment, have done more to prevent international wars + through removing their causes than can be done by any other means + that has been devised or suggested." + +The views, which I thus publicly expressed at Boston in September, 1919, +while the President was upon his tour of the country in favor of the +Covenant of the League of Nations, were the same as those that I held at +Paris in December, 1918, before I had seen the President's first draft +of a Covenant, as the following will indicate. + +On December 17, 1918, three days after arriving in Paris, I had, as has +been stated, a long conference with Colonel House on the Peace +Conference and the subjects to come before it. I urged him in the course +of our conversation "to persuade the President to make the nucleus of +his proposed League of Nations an international court pointing out that +it was the simplest and best way of organizing the world for peace, and +that, if in addition the general principles of international law were +codified and the right of inquiry confided to the court, everything +practical would have been done to prevent wars in the future" (quoted +from a memorandum of the conversation made at the time). I also urged +upon the Colonel that The Hague Tribunal be made the basis of the +judicial organization, but that it be expanded and improved to meet the +new conditions. I shall have something further to say on this subject. + +Reverting now to the draft of articles which I had in form on January 5, +1919, it must be borne in mind that I then had no reason to think that +the President would omit from his plan an independent judicial agency +for the administration of legal justice, although I did realize that he +gave first place to the mutual guaranty and intended to build a League +on that as a nucleus. It did not seem probable that an American, a +student of the political institutions of the United States and familiar +with their operation, would fail to incorporate in any scheme for world +organization a judicial system which would be free from the control and +even from the influence of the political and diplomatic branch of the +organization. The benefit, if not the necessity, of such a division of +authority seemed so patent that the omission of a provision to that +effect in the original draft of the Covenant condemned it to one who +believed in the principles of government which found expression in +American institutions. Fortunately the defect was in a measure cured +before the Commission on the League of Nations formally met to discuss +the subject, though not before the Covenant had been laid before the +American Commissioners. + +The articles of a proposed convention for the creation of an +international organization were not intended, as I have said, to form a +complete convention. They were suggestive only of the principal features +of a plan which could, if the President desired, arouse discussion as to +the right theory and the fundamental principles of the international +organization which there seemed little doubt would be declared by the +Paris Conference. + +Among the suggested articles there was none covering the subject of +disarmament, because the problem was highly technical requiring the +consideration of military and naval experts. Nor was there any reference +to the mandatory system because there had not been, to my knowledge, any +mention of it at that time in connection with the President's plan, +though General Smuts had given it prominence in his proposed scheme. + +During the preparation of these suggestive articles I made a brief +memorandum on the features, which seemed to me salient, of any +international agreement to prevent wars in the future, and which in my +opinion ought to be in mind when drafting such an agreement. The first +three paragraphs of the memorandum follow: + + "There are three doctrines which should be incorporated in the Treaty + of Peace if wars are to be avoided and equal justice is to prevail in + international affairs. + + "These three doctrines may be popularly termed 'Hands Off,' the 'Open + Door,' and 'Publicity.' + + "The first pertains to national possessions and national rights; the + second to international commerce and economic conditions; and the + third, to international agreements." + +An examination of the articles which I prepared shows that these +doctrines are developed in them, although at the time I was uncertain +whether they ought to appear in the convention creating the League or in +the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, which I believed, in common with the +prevailing belief, would be negotiated. My impression was that they +should appear in the Peace Treaty and possibly be repeated in the League +Treaty, if the two were kept distinct. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER + + +While I was engaged in the preparation of these articles for discussion, +which were based primarily on the equality of nations and avoided a +mutual guaranty or other undertaking necessitating a departure from that +principle, M. Clemenceau delivered an important address in the Chamber +of Deputies at its session on December 30, 1918. In this address the +French Premier declared himself in favor of maintaining the doctrine of +"the balance of power" and of supporting it by a concert of the Great +Powers. During his remarks he made the following significant assertion, +"This system of alliances, which I do not renounce, will be my guiding +thought at the Conference, if your confidence sends me to it, so that +there will be no separation in peace of the four powers which have +battled side by side." + +M. Clemenceau's words caused a decided sensation among the delegates +already in Paris and excited much comment in the press. The public +interest was intensified by the fact that President Wilson had but a day +or two before, in an address at Manchester, England, denounced the +doctrine of "the balance of power" as belonging to the old international +order which had been repudiated because it had produced the conditions +that resulted in the Great War. + +A week after the delivery of M. Clemenceau's address I discussed his +declarations at some length with Colonel House, and he agreed with me +that the doctrine was entirely contrary to the public opinion of the +world and that every effort should be made to prevent its revival and to +end the "system of alliances" which M. Clemenceau desired to continue. + +During this conversation I pointed out that the form of affirmative +guaranty, which the President then had in mind, would unavoidably impose +the burden of enforcing it upon the Great Powers, and that they, having +that responsibility, would demand the right to decide at what time and +in what manner the guaranty should be enforced. This seemed to me to be +only a different application of the principle expressed in the doctrine +of "the balance of power" and to amount to a practical continuance of +the alliances formed for prosecution of the war. I said that, in my +judgment, if the President's guaranty was made the central idea of the +League of Nations, it would play directly into the hands of M. +Clemenceau because it could mean nothing other than the primacy of the +great military and naval powers; that I could not understand how the +President was able to harmonize his plan of a positive guaranty with his +utterances at Manchester; and that, if he clung to his plan, he would +have to accept the Clemenceau doctrine, which would to all intents +transform the Conference into a second Congress of Vienna and result in +a reversion to the old undesirable order, and its continuance in the +League of Nations. + +It was my hope that Colonel House, to whom I had shown the letter and +memoranda which I had sent to the President, would be so impressed with +the inconsistency of favoring the affirmative guaranty and of opposing +the doctrine of "the balance of power," that he would exert his +influence with the President to persuade him to find a substitute for +the guaranty which Mr. Wilson then favored. It seemed politic to +approach the President in this way in view of the fact that he had never +acknowledged my letter or manifested any inclination to discuss the +subject with me. + +This hope was increased when the Colonel came to me on the evening of +the same day that we had the conversation related above and told me that +he was "entirely converted" to my plan for a negative guaranty and for +the organization of a League. + +At this second interview Colonel House gave me a typewritten copy of the +President's plan and asked me to examine it and to suggest a way to +amend it so that it would harmonize with my views. This was the first +time that I had seen the President's complete plan for a League. My +previous knowledge had been gained orally and was general and more or +less vague in character except as to the guaranty of which I had an +accurate idea through the President's "Bases of Peace" of 1917, and +Point XIV of his address of January 8, 1918. At the time that the +typewritten plan was handed to me another copy had already been given to +the printer of the Commission. It was evident, therefore, that the +President was satisfied with the document. It contained the theory and +fundamental principles which he advocated for world organization. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN + + +I immediately began an examination and analysis of the President's plan +for a League, having in mind Colonel House's suggestion that I consider +a way to modify it so that it would harmonize with my views. The more I +studied the document, the less I liked it. A cursory reading of the +plan, which is printed in the Appendix (page 281), will disclose the +looseness of the language and the doubtful interpretation of many of the +provisions. It showed an inexpertness in drafting and a fault in +expression which were chargeable to lack of appreciation of the need of +exactness or else to haste in preparation. This fault in the paper, +which was very apparent, could, however, be cured and was by no means a +fatal defect. As a matter of fact, the faults of expression were to a +certain extent removed by subsequent revisions, though some of the +vagueness and ambiguity of the first draft persisted and appeared in the +final text of the Covenant. + +The more serious defects of the plan were in the principles on which it +was based and in their application under the provisions of the articles +proposed. The contemplated use of force in making good the guaranty of +sovereign rights and the establishment of a primacy of the Great Powers +were provided for in language which was sufficiently explicit to admit +of no denial. In my opinion these provisions were entirely out of +harmony with American ideals, policies, and traditions. Furthermore, the +clauses in regard to arbitration and appeals from arbitral awards, to +which reference has been made, the lack of any provision for the +establishment of a permanent international judiciary, and the +introduction of the mandatory system were strong reasons to reject the +President's plan. + +It should be borne in mind that, at the time that this document was +placed in my hands, the plan of General Smuts for a League of Nations +had, as I have said, been printed in the press and in pamphlet form and +had been given wide publicity. In the Smuts plan, which gave first place +to the system of mandates, appeared the declaration that the League of +Nations was to acquire the mandated territories as "the heir of the +Empires." This clever and attractive phrase caught the fancy of the +President, as was evident from his frequent repetition and approval of +it in discussing mandates under the League. Just as General Smuts had +adopted the President's "self-determination," Mr. Wilson seized upon the +Smuts idea with avidity and incorporated it in his plan. It +unquestionably had a decided influence upon his conception of the right +way to dispose of the colonial possessions of Germany and of the proper +relation of the newly created European states to the League of Nations. +As an example of the way in which President Wilson understood and +applied General Smuts's phrase to the new states, I quote the following +from the "Supplementary Agreements" forming part of the first printed +draft of the President's Covenant, but which I believe were added to the +typewritten draft after the President had examined the plan of the South +African statesman: + + "As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, + directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations + _inter se_ of all new independent states arising or created out of + the Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating + and composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance + of settled order and the general peace." + +There is a natural temptation to a student of international agreements +to analyze critically the composition and language of this provision, +but to do so would in no way advance the consideration of the subject +under discussion and would probably be interpreted as a criticism of the +President's skill in accurately expressing his thoughts, a criticism +which it is not my purpose to make. + +Mr. Wilson's draft also contained a system of mandates over territories +in a form which was, to say the least, rudimentary if not inadequate. By +the proposed system the League of Nations, as "the residuary trustee," +was to take sovereignty over "the peoples and territories" of the +defeated Empires and to issue a mandate to some power or powers to +exercise such sovereignty. A "residuary trustee" was a novelty in +international relations sufficient to arouse conjecture as to its +meaning, but giving to the League the character of an independent state +with the capacity of possessing sovereignty and the power to exercise +sovereign rights through a designated agent was even more extraordinary. +This departure from the long accepted idea of the essentials of +statehood seemed to me an inexpedient and to a degree a dangerous +adventure. The only plausible excuse for the proposal seemed to be a +lack of knowledge as to the nature of sovereignty and as to the +attributes inherent in the very conception of a state. The character of +a mandate, a mandatory, and the authority issuing the mandate presented +many legal perplexities which certainly required very careful study +before the experiment was tried. Until the system was fully worked out +and the problems of practical operation were solved, it seemed to me +unwise to suggest it and still more unwise to adopt it. While the +general idea of mandates issuing from the proposed international +organization was presumably acceptable to the President from the first, +his support was doubtless confirmed by the fact that it followed the +groove which had been made in his mind by the Smuts phrase "the heir of +the Empires." + +In any event it seemed to me the course of wise statesmanship to +postpone the advocacy of mandates, based on the assumption that the +League of Nations could become the possessor of sovereignty, until the +practical application of the theory could be thoroughly considered from +the standpoint of international law as well as from the standpoint of +policy. The experiment was too revolutionary to be tried without +hesitation and without consideration of the effect on established +principles and usage. At an appropriate place this subject will be more +fully discussed. + +As to the organization and functions of the League of Nations planned by +Mr. Wilson there was little that appealed to one who was opposed to the +employment of force in compelling the observance of international +obligations and to the establishment of an international oligarchy of +the Great Powers to direct and control world affairs. The basic +principle of the plan was that the strong should, as a matter of right +recognized by treaty, possess a dominant voice in international +councils. Obviously the principle of the equality of nations was ignored +or abandoned. In the face of the repeated declarations of the Government +of the United States in favor of the equality of independent states as +to their rights in times of peace, this appeared to be a reversal of +policy which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain in a +satisfactory way. Personally I could not subscribe to this principle +which was so destructive of the American theory of the proper relations +between nations. + +It was manifest, when I read the President's plan, that there was no +possible way to harmonize my ideas with it. They were fundamentally +different. There was no common basis on which to build. To attempt to +bring the two theories into accord would have been futile. I, therefore, +told Colonel House that it was useless to try to bring into accord the +two plans, since they were founded on contradictory principles and that +the only course of procedure open to me was to present my views to the +President in written form, hoping that he would give them consideration, +although fearing that his mind was made up, since he had ordered his +plan to be printed. + +In the afternoon of the same day (January 7), on which I informed the +Colonel of the impossibility of harmonizing and uniting the two plans, +President Wilson held a conference with the American Commissioners +during which he declared that he considered the affirmative guaranty +absolutely necessary to the preservation of future peace and the only +effective means of preventing war. Before this declaration could be +discussed M. Clemenceau was announced and the conference came to an end. +While the President did not refer in any way to the "self-denying +covenant" which I had proposed as a substitute, it seemed to me that he +intended it to be understood that the substitute was rejected, and that +he had made the declaration with that end in view. This was the nearest +approach to an answer to my letter of December 23 that I ever received. +Indirect as it was the implication was obvious. + +Although the settled purpose of the President to insist on his form of +mutual guaranty was discouraging and his declaration seemed to be +intended to close debate on the subject, I felt that no effort should be +spared to persuade him to change his views or at least to leave open an +avenue for further consideration. Impelled by this motive I gave to the +President the articles which I had drafted and asked him if he would be +good enough to read them and consider the principles on which they were +based. The President with his usual courtesy of manner smilingly +received them. Whether or not he ever read them I cannot state +positively because he never mentioned them to me or, to my knowledge, to +any one else. I believe, however, that he did read them and realized +that they were wholly opposed to the theory which he had evolved, +because from that time forward he seemed to assume that I was hostile to +his plan for a League of Nations. I drew this conclusion from the fact +that he neither asked my advice as to any provision of the Covenant nor +discussed the subject with me personally. In many little ways he showed +that he preferred to have me direct my activities as a Commissioner into +other channels and to keep away from the subject of a League. The +conviction that my counsel was unwelcome to Mr. Wilson was, of course, +not formed at the time that he received the articles drafted by me. It +only developed after some time had elapsed, during which incidents took +place that aroused a suspicion which finally became a conviction. +Possibly I was over-sensitive as to the President's treatment of my +communications to him. Possibly he considered my advice of no value, +and, therefore, unworthy of discussion. But, in view of his letter of +February 11, 1920, it must be admitted that he recognized that I was +reluctant in accepting certain of his views at Paris, a recognition +which arose from my declared opposition to them. Except in the case of +the Shantung settlement, there was none concerning which our judgments +were so at variance as they were concerning the League of Nations. I +cannot believe, therefore, that I was wrong in my conclusion as to +his attitude. + +On the two days succeeding the one when I handed the President my draft +of articles I had long conferences with Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel +House. Previous to these conferences, or at least previous to the second +one, I examined Lord Robert's plan for a League. His plan was based on +the proposition that the Supreme War Council, consisting of the Heads of +States and the Secretaries and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Five +Great Powers, should be perpetuated as a permanent international body +which should meet once a year and discuss subjects of common interest. +That is, he proposed the formation of a Quintuple Alliance which would +constitute itself primate over all nations and the arbiter in world +affairs, a scheme of organization very similar to the one proposed by +General Smuts. + +Lord Robert made no attempt to disguise the purpose of his plan. It was +intended to place in the hands of the Five Powers the control of +international relations and the direction in large measure of the +foreign policies of all nations. It was based on the power to compel +obedience, on the right of the powerful to rule. Its chief merit was its +honest declaration of purpose, however wrong that purpose might appear +to those who denied that the possession of superior might conferred +special rights upon the possessor. It seemed to provide for a rebirth of +the Congress of Vienna which should be clothed in the modern garb of +democracy. It could only be interpreted as a rejection of the principle +of the equality of nations. Its adoption would mean that the destiny of +the world would be in the hands of a powerful international oligarchy +possessed of dictatorial powers. + +There was nothing idealistic in the plan of Lord Robert Cecil, although +he was reputed to be an idealist favoring a new international order. An +examination of his plan (Appendix) shows it to be a substantial revival +of the old and discredited ideas of a century ago. There could be no +doubt that a plan of this sort, materialistic and selfish as it was, +would win the approval and cordial support of M. Clemenceau, since it +fitted in with his public advocacy of the doctrine of "the balance of +power." Presumably the Italian delegates would not be opposed to a +scheme which gave Italy so influential a voice in international affairs, +while the Japanese, not averse to this recognition of their national +power and importance, would unquestionably favor an alliance of this +nature. I think that it is fair to assume that all of the Five Great +Powers would have readily accepted the Cecil plan--all except the +United States. + +This plan, however, did not meet with the approval of President Wilson, +and his open opposition to it became an obstacle which prevented its +consideration in the form in which it was proposed. It is a matter of +speculation what reasons appealed to the President and caused him to +oppose the plan, although the principle of primacy found application in +a different and less radical form in his own plan of organization. +Possibly he felt that the British statesman's proposal too frankly +declared the coalition and oligarchy of the Five Powers, and that there +should be at least the appearance of cooperation on the part of the +lesser nations. Of course, in view of the perpetual majority of the Five +Powers on the Executive Council, as provided in the President's plan, +the primacy of the Five was weakened little if at all by the minority +membership of the small nations. The rule of unanimity gave to each +nation a veto power, but no one believed that one of the lesser states +represented on the Council would dare to exercise it if the Great Powers +were unanimous in support of a proposition. In theory unanimity was a +just and satisfactory rule; in practice it would amount to nothing. The +President may also have considered the council proposed by Lord Robert +to be inexpedient in view of the political organization of the United +States. The American Government had no actual premier except the +President, and it seemed out of the question for him to attend an annual +meeting of the proposed council. It would result in the President +sending a personal representative who would unavoidably be in a +subordinate position when sitting with the European premiers. I think +this latter reason was a very valid one, but that the first one, which +seemed to appeal especially to the President, had little real merit. + +In addition to his objection to the Cecil plan of administration, +another was doubtless of even greater weight to Mr. Wilson and that was +the entire omission in the Cecil proposal of the mutual guaranty of +political independence and territorial integrity. The method of +preventing wars which was proposed by Lord Robert was for the nations to +enter into a covenant to submit disputes to international investigation +and to obtain a report before engaging in hostilities and also a +covenant not to make war on a disputant nation which accepted a report +which had been unanimously adopted. He further proposed that the members +of the League should undertake to regard themselves as _ipso facto_ at +war with a member violating these covenants and "to take, jointly and +severally, appropriate military, economic, and other measures against +the recalcitrant State," thus following closely the idea of the League +to Enforce Peace. + +Manifestly this last provision in the Cecil plan was open to the same +constitutional objections as those which could be raised against the +President's mutual guaranty. My impression is that Mr. Wilson's +opposition to the provision was not based on the ground that it was in +contravention of the Constitution of the United States, but rather on +the ground that it did not go far enough in stabilizing the terms of +peace which were to be negotiated. The President was seeking permanency +by insuring, through the threat or pressure of international force, a +condition of changelessness in boundaries and sovereign rights, subject, +nevertheless, to territorial changes based either on the principle of +"self-determination" or on a three-fourths vote of the Body of +Delegates. He, nevertheless, discussed the subject with Lord Robert +Cecil prior to laying his draft of a Covenant before the American +Commissioners, as is evident by comparing it with the Cecil plan, for +certain phrases are almost identical in language in the two documents. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +SELF-DETERMINATION + + +The mutual guaranty which was advocated by President Wilson appears as +Article III of his original draft of a Covenant. It reads as follows: + + "ARTICLE III + + "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political + independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between + them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the + future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial + conditions and aspirations or present social and political + relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and + also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three + fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest + interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to + those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve + material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without + reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in + importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." + +In the revised draft, which he laid before the Commission +on the League of Nations at its first session Article III +became Article 7. It is as follows: + + "ARTICLE 7 + + "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as + against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing + political independence of all States members of the League." + +The guaranty was finally incorporated in the Treaty of Peace as Article +10. It reads: + + "ARTICLE 10 + + "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as + against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing + political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any + such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression + the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation + shall be fulfilled." + +In the revision of the original draft the modifying clause providing for +future territorial readjustments was omitted. It does not appear in +Article 7 of the draft which was presented to the Commission on the +League of Nations and which formed the basis of its deliberations. In +addition to this modification the words "unite in guaranteeing" in +Article III became "undertake to respect and preserve" in Article 7. +These changes are only important in that they indicate a disposition to +revise the article to meet the wishes, and to remove to an extent the +objections, of some of the foreign delegates who had prepared plans for +a League or at least had definite ideas as to the purposes and functions +of an international organization. + +It was generally believed that the elimination of the modifying clause +from the President's original form of guaranty was chiefly due to the +opposition of the statesmen who represented the British Empire in +contradistinction to those who represented the self-governing British +Dominions. It was also believed that this opposition was caused by an +unwillingness on their part to recognize or to apply as a right the +principle of "self-determination" in arranging possible future changes +of sovereignty over territories. + +I do not know the arguments which were used to induce the President to +abandon this phrase and to strike it from his article of guaranty. I +personally doubt whether the objection to the words "self-determination" +was urged upon him. Whatever reasons were advanced by his foreign +colleagues, they were successful in freeing the Covenant from the +phrase. It is to be regretted that the influence, which was sufficient +to induce the President to eliminate from his proposed guaranty the +clause containing a formal acceptance of the principle of +"self-determination," was not exerted or else was not potent enough to +obtain from him an open disavowal of the principle as a right standard +for the determination of sovereign authority. Without such a disavowal +the phrase remained as one of the general bases upon which a just peace +should be negotiated. It remained a precept of the international creed +which Mr. Wilson proclaimed while the war was still in progress, for he +had declared, in an address delivered on February 11, 1918, before a +joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives, that +"self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle +of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." + +"Self-determination" is as right in theory as the more famous phrase +"the consent of the governed," which has for three centuries been +repeatedly declared to be sound by political philosophers and has been +generally accepted as just by civilized peoples, but which has been for +three centuries commonly ignored by statesmen because the right could +not be practically applied without imperiling national safety, always +the paramount consideration in international and national affairs. The +two phrases mean substantially the same thing and have to an extent been +used interchangeably by those who advocate the principle as a standard +of right. "Self-determination" was not a new thought. It was a +restatement of the old one. + +Under the present political organization of the world, based as it is on +the idea of nationality, the new phrase is as unsusceptible of universal +application as the old one was found to be. Fixity of national +boundaries and of national allegiance, and political stability would +disappear if this principle was uniformly applied. Impelled by new +social conditions, by economic interests, by racial prejudices, and by +the various forces which affect society, change and uncertainty would +result from an attempt to follow the principle in every case to which it +is possible to apply it. + +Among my notes I find one of December 20, 1918--that is, one week after +the American Commission landed in France--in which I recorded my +thoughts concerning certain phrases or epigrams of the President, which +he had declared to be bases of peace, and which I considered to contain +the seeds of future trouble. In regard to the asserted right of +"self-determination" I wrote: + + "When the President talks of 'self-determination' what unit has he in + mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? + Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this + principle is dangerous to peace and stability." + +Ten days later (December 30) the frequent repetition of the phrase in +the press and by members of certain groups and unofficial delegations, +who were in Paris seeking to obtain hearings before the Conference, +caused me to write the following: + + "The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right + of 'self-determination,' the more convinced I am of the danger of + putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be + the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create + trouble in many lands. + + "What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, + and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, + disorder, and rebellion? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and + Palestine and possibly of Morocco and Tripoli rely on it? How can it + be harmonized with Zionism, to which the President is practically + committed? + + "The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which + can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In + the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an + idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check + those who attempt to put the principle in force. What a calamity that + the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!" + +Since the foregoing notes were written the impracticability of the +universal or even of the general application of the principle has been +fully demonstrated. Mr. Wilson resurrected "the consent of the governed" +regardless of the fact that history denied its value as a practical +guide in modern political relations. He proclaimed it in the phrase +"self-determination," declaring it to be an "imperative principle of +action." He made it one of the bases of peace. And yet, in the +negotiations at Paris and in the formulation of the foreign policy of +the United States, he has by his acts denied the existence of the right +other than as the expression of a moral precept, as something to be +desired, but generally unattainable in the lives of nations. In the +actual conduct of affairs, in the practical and concrete relations +between individuals and governments, it doubtless exercises and should +exercise a measure of influence, but it is not a controlling influence. + +In the Treaty of Versailles with Germany the readjustment of the German +boundaries, by which the sovereignty over millions of persons of German +blood was transferred to the new states of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, +and the practical cession to the Empire of Japan of the port of +Kiao-Chau and control over the economic life of the Province of Shantung +are striking examples of the abandonment of the principle. + +In the Treaty of Saint-Germain the Austrian Tyrol was ceded to the +Kingdom of Italy against the known will of substantially the entire +population of that region. + +In both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Saint-Germain Austria +was denied the right to form a political union with Germany, and when an +article of the German Constitution of August, 1919, contemplating a +"reunion" of "German Austria" with the German Empire was objected to by +the Supreme Council, then in session at Paris, as in contradiction of +the terms of the Treaty with Germany, a protocol was signed on September +22, 1919, by plenipotentiaries of Germany and the five Principal Allied +and Associated Powers, declaring the article in the Constitution null +and void. There could hardly be a more open repudiation of the alleged +right of "self-determination" than this refusal to permit Austria to +unite with Germany however unanimous the wish of the Austrian people for +such union. + +But Mr. Wilson even further discredited the phrase by adopting a policy +toward Russia which ignored the principle. The peoples of Esthonia, +Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan have by blood, +language, and racial traits elements of difference which give to each of +them in more or less degree the character of a distinct nationality. +These peoples all possess aspirations to become independent states, and +yet, throughout the negotiations at Paris and since that time, the +Government of the United States has repeatedly refused to recognize the +right of the inhabitants of these territories to determine for +themselves the sovereignty under which they shall live. It has, on the +contrary, declared in favor of a "Great Russia" comprising the vast +territory of the old Empire except the province which belonged to the +dismembered Kingdom of Poland and the lands included within the present +boundaries of the Republic of Finland. + +I do not mention the policy of President Wilson as to an undivided +Russia by way of criticism because I believe the policy was and has +continued to be the right one. The reference to it is made for the +sole purpose of pointing out another example of Mr. Wilson's frequent +departure without explanation from his declared standard for the +determination of political authority and allegiance. I think +that it must be conceded that he has by his acts proved that +"self-determination" _is_ "a mere phrase" which ought to be discarded +as misleading because it cannot be practically applied. + +It may be pointed out as a matter of special interest to the student of +American history that, if the right of "self-determination" were sound +in principle and uniformly applicable in establishing political +allegiance and territorial sovereignty, the endeavor of the Southern +States to secede from the American Union in 1861 would have been wholly +justifiable; and, conversely, the Northern States, in forcibly +preventing secession and compelling the inhabitants of the States +composing the Confederacy to remain under the authority of the Federal +Government, would have perpetrated a great and indefensible wrong +against the people of the South by depriving them of a right to which +they were by nature entitled. This is the logic of the application of +the principle of "self-determination" to the political rights at issue +in the American Civil War. + +I do not believe that there are many Americans of the present generation +who would support the proposition that the South was inherently right +and the North was inherently wrong in that great conflict. There were, +at the time when the sections were arrayed in arms against each other, +and there may still be, differences of opinion as to the _legal_ right +of secession under the Constitution of the United States, but the +inherent right of a people of a State to throw off at will their +allegiance to the Federal Union and resume complete sovereignty over the +territory of the State was never urged as a conclusive argument. It was +the legal right and not the natural right which was emphasized as +justifying those who took up arms in order to disrupt the Union. But if +an American citizen denies that the principle of "self-determination" +can be rightfully applied to the affairs of his own country, how can he +consistently maintain that it is a right inseparable from a true +conception of political liberty and therefore universally applicable, +just in principle, and wise from the practical point of view? + +Of course, those who subscribe to "self-determination" and advocate it +as a great truth fundamental to every political society organized to +protect and promote civil liberty, do not claim it for races, peoples, +or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive them of the +capacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations. As to +peoples or communities, however, who do possess the intelligence to make +a rational choice of political allegiance, no exception is made, so far +as words go, to the undeviating application of the principle. It is the +affirmation of an unqualified right. It is one of those declarations of +principle which sounds true, which in the abstract may be true, and +which appeals strongly to man's innate sense of moral right and to his +conception of natural justice, but which, when the attempt is made to +apply it in every case, becomes a source of political instability and +domestic disorder and not infrequently a cause of rebellion. + +In the settlement of territorial rights and of the sovereignty to be +exercised over particular regions there are several factors which +require consideration. International boundaries may be drawn along +ethnic, economic, geographic, historic, or strategic lines. One or all +of these elements may influence the decision, but whatever argument may +be urged in favor of any one of these factors, the chief object in the +determination of the sovereignty to be exercised within a certain +territory is national safety. National safety is as dominant in the life +of a nation as self-preservation is in the life of an individual. It is +even more so, as nations do not respond to the impulse of +self-sacrifice. With national safety as the primary object to be +attained in territorial settlements, the factors of the problem assume +generally, though not always, the following order of importance: the +strategic, to which is closely allied the geographic and historic; the +economic, affecting the commercial and industrial life of a nation; and +lastly the ethnic, including in the terms such conditions as +consanguinity, common language, and similar social and religious +institutions. + +The national safety and the economic welfare of the United States were +at stake in the War of Secession, although the attempt to secede +resulted from institutional rather than ethnic causes. The same was true +when in the Papineau Rebellion of 1837 the French inhabitants of the +Province of Lower Canada attempted for ethnic reasons to free themselves +from British sovereignty. Had the right of "self-determination" in the +latter case been recognized as "imperative" by Great Britain, the +national life and economic growth of Canada would have been strangled +because the lines of communication and the commercial routes to the +Atlantic seaboard would have been across an alien state. The future of +Canada, with its vast undeveloped resources, its very life as a British +colony, depended upon denying the right of "self-determination." It was +denied and the French inhabitants of Quebec were forced against their +will to accept British sovereignty. + +Experience has already demonstrated the unwisdom of having given +currency to the phrase "self-determination." As the expression of an +actual right, the application of which is universal and invariable, the +phrase has been repudiated or at least violated by many of the terms of +the treaties which brought to an end the World War. Since the time that +the principle was proclaimed, it has been the excuse for turbulent +political elements in various lands to resist established governmental +authority; it has induced the use of force in an endeavor to wrest the +sovereignty over a territory or over a community from those who have +long possessed and justly exercised it. It has formed the basis for +territorial claims by avaricious nations. And it has introduced into +domestic as well as international affairs a new spirit of disorder. It +is an evil thing to permit the principle of "self-determination" to +continue to have the apparent sanction of the nations when it has been +in fact thoroughly discredited and will always be cast aside whenever it +comes in conflict with national safety, with historic political rights, +or with national economic interests affecting the prosperity of +a nation. + +This discussion of the right of "self-determination," which was one of +the bases of peace which President Wilson declared in the winter of +1918, and which was included in the modifying clause of his guaranty as +originally drafted, is introduced for the purpose of showing the +reluctance which I felt in accepting his guidance in the adoption of a +principle so menacing to peace and so impossible of practical +application. As a matter of fact I never discussed the subject with Mr. +Wilson as I purposed doing, because a situation arose on January 10, +1919, which discouraged me from volunteering to him advice on matters +which did not directly pertain to legal questions and to the +international administration of legal justice. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919 + + +It is with extreme reluctance, as the reader will understand, that I +make any reference to the conference which the President held with the +American Commissioners at the Hotel Crillon on January 10, because of +the personal nature of what occurred. It would be far more agreeable to +omit an account of this unpleasant episode. But without referring to it +I cannot satisfactorily explain the sudden decision I then reached to +take no further part in the preparation or revision of the text of the +Covenant of the League of Nations. Without explanation my subsequent +conduct would be, and not without reason, open to the charge of neglect +of duty and possibly of disloyalty. I do not feel called upon to rest +under that suspicion, or to remain silent when a brief statement of what +occurred at that conference will disclose the reason for the cessation +of my efforts to effect changes in the plan of world organization which +the President had prepared. In the circumstances there can be no +impropriety in disclosing the truth as to the cause for a course of +action when the course of action itself must be set forth to complete +the record and to explain an ignorance of the subsequent negotiations +regarding the League of Nations, an ignorance which has been the subject +of public comment. Certainly no one who participated in the conference +can object to the truth being known unless for personal reasons he +prefers that a false impression should go forth. After careful +consideration I can see no public reason for withholding the facts. At +this meeting, to which I refer, the President took up the provisions of +his original draft of a Covenant, which was at the time in typewritten +form, and indicated the features which he considered fundamental to the +proper organization of a League of Nations. I pointed out certain +provisions which appeared to me objectionable in principle or at least +of doubtful policy. Mr. Wilson, however, clearly indicated--at least so +I interpreted his words and manner--that he was not disposed to receive +these criticisms in good part and was unwilling to discuss them. He also +said with great candor and emphasis that he did not intend to have +lawyers drafting the treaty of peace. Although this declaration was +called forth by the statement that the legal advisers of the American +Commission had been, at my request, preparing an outline of a treaty, a +"skeleton treaty" in fact, the President's sweeping disapproval of +members of the legal profession participating in the treaty-making +seemed to be, and I believe was, intended to be notice to me that my +counsel was unwelcome. Being the only lawyer on the delegation I +naturally took this remark to myself, and I know that other American +Commissioners held the same view of its purpose. If my belief was +unjustified, I can only regret that I did not persevere in my criticisms +and suggestions, but I could not do so believing as I then did that a +lawyer's advice on any question not wholly legal in nature was +unacceptable to the President, a belief which, up to the present time, I +have had no reason to change. + +It should be understood that this account of the conference of January +10 is given by way of explanation of my conduct subsequent to it and not +in any spirit of complaint or condemnation of Mr. Wilson's attitude. He +had a right to his own opinion of the worth of a lawyer's advice and a +right to act in accordance with that opinion. If there was any injustice +done, it was in his asking a lawyer to become a Peace Commissioner, +thereby giving the impression that he desired his counsel and advice as +to the negotiations in general, when in fact he did not. But, +disregarding the personal element, I consider that he was justified in +his course, as the entire constitutional responsibility for the +negotiation of a treaty was on his shoulders and he was, in the +performance of his duty, entitled to seek advice from those only in +whose judgment he had confidence. + +In spite of this frank avowal of prejudice by the President there was no +outward change in the personal and official relations between him and +myself. The breach, however, regardless of appearances, was too wide and +too deep to be healed. While subsequent events bridged it temporarily, +it remained until my association with President Wilson came to an end in +February, 1920. I never forgot his words and always felt that in his +mind my opinions, even when he sought them, were tainted with legalism. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT + + +As it seemed advisable, in view of the incident of January 10, to have +nothing to do with the drafting of the Covenant unless the entire theory +was changed, the fact that there prevailed at that time a general belief +that a preliminary treaty of peace would be negotiated in the near +future invited an effort to delay the consideration of a complete and +detailed charter of the League of Nations until the definitive treaty or +a separate treaty dealing with the League alone was considered. As delay +would furnish time to study and discuss the subject and prevent hasty +acceptance of an undesirable or defective plan, it seemed to me that the +advisable course to take was to limit reference to the organization in +the preliminary treaty to general principles. + +The method that I had in mind in carrying out this policy was to secure +the adoption, by the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace, of a +resolution embodying a series of declarations as to the creation, the +nature, and the purposes of a League of Nations, which declarations +could be included in the preliminary treaty of peace accompanied by an +article providing for the negotiation of a detailed plan based on these +declarations at the time of the negotiation of the definitive treaty or +else by an article providing for the summoning of a world congress, in +which all nations, neutrals as well as belligerents, would be +represented and have a voice in the drafting of a convention +establishing a League of Nations in accordance with the general +principles declared in the preliminary treaty. Personally I preferred a +separate treaty, but doubted the possibility of obtaining the assent of +the Conference to that plan because some of the delegates showed a +feeling of resentment toward certain neutral nations on account of their +attitude during the war, while the inclusion of the four powers which +had formed the Central Alliance seemed almost out of the question. + +In addition to the advantage to be gained by postponing the +determination of the details of the organization until the theory, the +form, the purposes and the powers of the proposed League could be +thoroughly considered, it would make possible the speedy restoration of +a state of peace. There can be no doubt that peace at the earliest +possible moment was the supreme need of the world. The political and +social chaos in the Central Empires, due to the overthrow of their +strong autocratic governments and the prevailing want, suffering, and +despair, in which the war had left their peoples, offered a fertile +field for the pernicious doctrines of Bolshevism to take root and +thrive. A proletarian revolution seemed imminent. The Spartacists in +Germany, the Radical Socialists in Austria, and the Communists in +Hungary were the best organized and most vigorous of the political +groups in those countries and were conducting an active and seemingly +successful propaganda among the starving and hopeless masses, while the +Russian duumvirs, Lenine and Trotsky, were with funds and emissaries +aiding these movements against established authority and social order. +Eastern Europe seemed to be a volcano on the very point of eruption. +Unless something was speedily done to check the peril, it threatened to +spread to other countries and even to engulf the very foundations of +modern civilization. + +A restoration of commercial relations and of normal industrial +conditions through the medium of a treaty of peace appeared to offer the +only practical means of resisting these movements and of saving Europe +from the horrors of a proletarian despotism which had brought the +Russian people to so low a state. This was the common judgment of those +who at that time watched with increasing impatience the slow progress of +the negotiations at Paris and with apprehension the political turmoil in +the defeated and distracted empires of Central Europe. + +An immediate restoration of peace was, as I then saw it, of vital +importance to the world as it was the universal demand of all mankind. +To delay it for the purpose of completing the organization of a League +of Nations or for any other purpose than the formulation of terms +essential to peace seemed to me to be taking a risk as to the future +wholly unwarranted by the relative importance of the subjects. There is +no question, in the light of subsequent events, that the peoples of the +Central Empires possessed a greater power of resistance to the +temptations of lawlessness and disorder than was presumed in the winter +of 1918-19. And yet it was a critical time. Anything might have +happened. It would have taken very little to turn the scale. What +occurred later cannot excuse the delay in making peace. It was not wise +statesmanship and foresight that saved the world from a great +catastrophe but the fortunate circumstance that a people habituated to +obedience were not led astray by the enemies of the existing order. + +Of the importance of negotiating a peace without waiting to complete a +detailed plan for a League of Nations I was firmly convinced in those +early days at Paris, and I know that the President's judgment as to this +was contrary to mine. He considered--at least his course can only be so +interpreted--that the organization of a League in all its details was +the principal task to be accomplished by the Conference, a task that he +felt must be completed before other matters were settled. The conclusion +is that the necessity of an immediate peace seemed to him subordinate to +the necessity of erecting an international agency to preserve the peace +when it was restored. In fact one may infer that the President was +disposed to employ the general longing for peace as a means of exerting +pressure on the delegates in Paris and on their Governments to accept +his plan for a League. It is generally believed that objections to +certain provisions of the Covenant were not advanced or, if advanced, +were not urged because the discussion of objections would mean delay in +negotiating the peace. + +Mr. Wilson gave most of his time and thought prior to his departure for +the United States in February, 1919, to the revision of the plan of +organization which he had prepared and to the conversion of the more +influential members of the Conference to its support. While other +questions vital to a preliminary peace treaty were brought up in the +Council of Ten, he showed a disposition to keep them open and to avoid +their settlement until the Covenant had been reported to the Conference. +In this I could not conscientiously follow him. I felt that the policy +was wholly wrong since it delayed the peace. + +Though recognizing the President's views as to the relative importance +of organizing a League and of restoring peace without delay, and +suspecting that he purposed to use the impatience and fear of the +delegates to break down objections to his plan of organization, I still +hoped that the critical state of affairs in Europe might induce him to +adopt another course. With that hope I began the preparation of a +resolution to be laid before the Conference, which, if adopted, would +appear in the preliminary treaty in the form of declarations which would +constitute the bases of a future negotiation regarding a League +of Nations. + +At a conference on January 20 between the President and the American +Commissioners, all being present except Colonel House, I asked the +President if he did not think that, in view of the shortness of time +before he would be compelled to return to Washington on account of the +approaching adjournment of Congress, it would be well to prepare a +resolution of this sort and to have it adopted in order that it might +clear the way for the determination of other matters which should be +included in a preliminary treaty. From the point of view of policy I +advanced the argument that a series of declarations would draw the fire +of the opponents and critics of the League and would give opportunity +for an expression of American public opinion which would make possible +the final drafting of the charter of a League in a way to win the +approval of the great mass of the American people and in all probability +insure approval of the Covenant by the Senate of the United States. + +In reviewing what took place at this conference I realize now, as I did +not then, that it was impolitic for me to have presented an argument +based on the assumption that changes in the President's plan might be +necessary, as he might interpret my words to be another effort to revise +the theory of his plan. At the time, however, I was so entirely +convinced of the expediency of this course, from the President's own +point of view as well as from the point of view of those who gave first +place to restoring peace, that I believed he would see the advantage to +be gained and would adopt the course suggested. I found that I was +mistaken. Mr. Wilson without discussing the subject said that he did not +think that a resolution of that sort was either necessary or advisable. + +While this definite rejection of the proposal seemed to close the door +to further effort in that direction, I decided to make another attempt +before abandoning the plan. The next afternoon (January 21) at a meeting +of the Council of Ten, the discussion developed in a way that gave me an +excuse to present the proposal informally to the Council. The advantages +to be gained by adopting the suggested action apparently appealed to the +members, and their general approval of it impressed the President, for +he asked me in an undertone if I had prepared the resolution. I replied +that I had been working upon it, but had ceased when he said to me the +day before that he did not think it necessary or advisable, adding that +I would complete the draft if he wished me to do so. He said that he +would be obliged to me if I would prepare one. + +Encouraged by the support received in the Council and by the seeming +willingness of the President to give the proposal consideration, I +proceeded at once to draft a resolution. + +The task was not an easy one because it would have been useless to +insert in the document any declaration which seemed to be contradictory +of the President's theory of an affirmative guaranty or which was not +sufficiently broad to be interpreted in other terms in the event that +American public opinion was decidedly opposed to his theory, as I felt +that it would be. It was also desirable, from my point of view, that the +resolution should contain a declaration in favor of the equality of +nations or one which would prevent the establishment of an oligarchy of +the Great Powers, and another declaration which would give proper place +to the administration of legal justice in international disputes. + +The handicaps and difficulties under which I labored are manifest, and +the resolution as drafted indicates them in that it does not express as +clearly and unequivocally as it would otherwise do the principles which +formed the bases of the articles which I handed to the President on +January 7 and which have already been quoted _in extenso_. + +The text of the resolution, which was completed on the 22d, reads as +follows: + + "_Resolved_ that the Conference makes the following declaration: + + "That the preservation of international peace is the standing policy + of civilization and to that end a league of nations should be + organized to prevent international wars; + + "That it is a fundamental principle of peace that all nations are + equally entitled to the undisturbed possession of their respective + territories, to the full exercise of their respective sovereignties, + and to the use of the high seas as the common property of all + peoples; and + + "That it is the duty of all nations to engage by mutual covenants-- + + "(1) To safeguard from invasion the sovereign rights of one another; + + "(2) To submit to arbitration all justiciable disputes which fail of + settlement by diplomatic arrangement; + + "(3) To submit to investigation by the league of nations all + non-justiciable disputes which fail of settlement by diplomatic + arrangement; and + + "(4) To abide by the award of an arbitral tribunal and to respect a + report of the league of nations after investigation; + + "That the nations should agree upon-- + + "(1) A plan for general reduction of armaments on land and sea; + + "(2) A plan for the restriction of enforced military service and the + governmental regulation and control of the manufacture and sale of + munitions of war; + + "(3) Full publicity of all treaties and international agreements; + + "(4) The equal application to all other nations of commercial and + trade regulations and restrictions imposed by any nation; and + + "(5) The proper regulation and control of new states pending complete + independence and sovereignty." + +This draft of a resolution was discussed with the other American +Commissioners, and after some changes of a more or less minor character +which it seemed advisable to make because of the appointment of a +Commission on the League of Nations at a plenary session of the +Conference on January 25, of which Commission President Wilson and +Colonel House were the American members, I sent the draft to the +President on the 31st, four days before the Commission held its first +meeting in Colonel House's office at the Hotel Crillon. + +As the Sixty-Fifth Congress would come to an end on March 4, and as the +interpretation which had been placed on certain provisions of the +Federal Constitution required the presence of the Chief Executive in +Washington during the last days of a session in order that he might pass +upon legislation enacted in the days immediately preceding adjournment, +Mr. Wilson had determined that he could not remain in Paris after +February 14. At the time that I sent him the proposed resolution there +remained, therefore, but two weeks for the Commission on the League of +Nations to organize, to deliberate, and to submit its report to the +Conference, provided its report was made prior to the President's +departure for the United States. It did not seem to me conceivable that +the work of the Commission could be properly completed in so short a +time if the President's Covenant became the basis of its deliberations. +This opinion was shared by many others who appreciated the difficulties +and intricacies of the subject and who felt that a hasty and undigested +report would be unwise and endanger the whole plan of a world +organization. + +In view of this situation, which seemed to be a strong argument for +delay in drafting the plan of international organization, I wrote a +letter to the President, at the time I sent him the proposed resolution, +saying that in my opinion no plan could be prepared with sufficient care +to warrant its submission to the Conference on the Preliminaries of +Peace before he left Paris and that unless a plan was reported he would +be in the position of returning empty-handed to the United States. I +urged him in the circumstances to secure the adoption of a resolution by +the delegates similar in nature, if not in language, to the draft which +was enclosed, thereby avoiding a state of affairs which would be very +disheartening to the advocates of a League of Nations and cause general +discontent among all peoples who impatiently expected evidence that the +restoration of peace was not far distant. + +It would be presumptuous on my part to speculate on the President's +feelings when he received and read my letter and the proposed +resolution. It was never answered or acknowledged, and he did not act +upon the suggestion or discuss acting upon it, to my knowledge, with any +of his colleagues. On the contrary, he summoned the Commission on the +League of Nations to meet on February 3, eleven days before the date +fixed for his departure for the United States, and laid before that body +his revised draft of a Covenant which formed the groundwork for the +Commission's report presented to the Conference on February 14. + +The question naturally arises--Why did the President ask me to complete +and send to him the resolution embodying a series of declarations if he +did not intend to make it a subject of consideration and discussion? It +is a pertinent question, but the true answer remains with Mr. Wilson +himself. Possibly he concluded that the only way to obtain his plan for +a League was to insist upon its practical acceptance before peace was +negotiated, and that, unless he took advantage of the universal demand +for peace by making the acceptance of the Covenant a condition +precedent, he would be unable to obtain its adoption. While I believe +this is a correct supposition, it is not responsive to the question as +to the reason why he wished me to deliver to him a draft resolution. In +fact it suggests another question--What, from the President's point of +view, was to be gained by having the resolution in his hands? + +I think the answer is not difficult to find when one remembers that Mr. +Wilson had disapproved a resolution of that sort and that the Council of +Ten had seemed disposed to approve it. There was no surer way to prevent +me from bringing the subject again before the Council than by having the +proposed resolution before him for action. Having submitted it to him I +was bound, on account of our official relationship, to await his +decision before taking any further steps. In a word, his request for a +draft practically closed my mouth and tied my hands. If he sought to +check my activities with the members of the Council in favor of the +proposed course of action, he could have taken no more effectual way +than the one which he did take. It was undoubtedly an effective means of +"pigeonholing" a resolution, the further discussion of which might +interfere with his plan to force through a report upon the Covenant +before the middle of February. + +This opinion as to the motive which impelled the President to pursue the +course that he did in regard to a resolution was not the one held by me +at the time. It was formed only after subsequent events threw new light +on the subject. The delay perplexed me at the time, but the reason for +it was not evident. I continued to hope, even after the Commission on +the League of Nations had assembled and had begun its deliberations, +that the policy of a resolution would be adopted. But, as the days went +by and the President made no mention of the proposal, I realized that he +did not intend to discuss it, and the conviction was forced upon me that +he had never intended to have it discussed. It was a disappointing +result and one which impressed me with the belief that Mr. Wilson was +prejudiced against any suggestion that I might make, if it in any way +differed with his own ideas even though it found favor with others. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT + + +During the three weeks preceding the meeting of the Commission on the +League the work of revising the President's original draft of the +Covenant had been in progress, the President and Colonel House holding +frequent interviews with the more influential delegates, particularly +the British and French statesmen who had been charged with the duty of +studying the subject. While I cannot speak from personal knowledge, I +learned that the suggested changes in terms and language were put into +form by members of the Colonel's office staff. In addition to +modifications which were made to meet the wishes of the foreign +statesmen, especially the British, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, the +son-in-law and secretary of Colonel House, and Mr. David Hunter Miller, +Auchincloss's law partner and one of the accredited legal advisers of +the American Commission, prepared an elaborate memorandum on the +President's draft of a Covenant which contained comments and also +suggested changes in the text. On account of the intimate relations +existing between Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss and Colonel House it +seems reasonable to assume that their comments and suggestions were +approved by, if they did not to an extent originate with, the Colonel. +The memorandum was first made public by Mr. William C. Bullitt during +his hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in +September, 1919 (Senate Doc. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, pages 1177 +_et seq._). + +The most important amendment to the Covenant suggested by these advisers +was, in my judgment, the one relating to Article III of the draft, which +became Article 10 in the Treaty. After a long criticism of the +President's proposed guaranty, in which it is declared that "such an +agreement would destroy the Monroe Doctrine," and that "any guaranty of +independence and integrity means war by the guarantor if a breach of the +independence or integrity of the guaranteed State is attempted and +persisted in," the memorandum proposed that the following be +substituted: + + "Each Contracting Power severally covenants and guarantees that it + will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political + independence of any other Contracting Power." + +This proposed substitute should be compared with the language of the +"self-denying covenant" that I sent to the President on December 23, +1918, the pertinent portion of which is repeated here for the purpose of +such comparison: + + "Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and + guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or + impair the political sovereignty of any other power signatory or + adherent to this convention, ..." + +The practical adoption of the language of my proposed substitute in the +memorandum furnishes conclusive proof that Colonel House was "entirely +converted" to my form of a guaranty as he had frankly assured me that he +was on the evening of January 6. I am convinced also that Mr. Henry +White and General Bliss held the same views on the subject. It is +obvious that President Wilson was the only one of the American +representatives at Paris who favored the affirmative guaranty, but, as +he possessed the constitutional authority to determine independently the +policy of the United States, his form of a guaranty was written into the +revised draft of a Covenant submitted to the Commission on the League of +Nations and with comparatively little change was finally adopted in the +Treaty of Peace with Germany. + +The memorandum prepared by Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss was apparently +in the President's hands before the revised draft was completed, for +certain changes in the original draft were in accord with the +suggestions made in their memorandum. His failure to modify the guaranty +may be considered another rejection of the "self-denying covenant" and a +final decision to insist on the affirmative form of guaranty in spite of +the unanimous opposition of his American colleagues. + +In view of what later occurred a very definite conclusion may be reached +concerning the President's rejection of the proposed substitute for his +guaranty. Article 10 was from the first the storm center of opposition +to the report of the Commission on the League of Nations and the chief +cause for refusal of consent to the ratification of the Treaty of +Versailles by the Senate of the United States. The vulnerable nature of +the provision, which had been so plainly pointed out to the President +before the Covenant was submitted to the Commission, invited attack. If +he had listened to the advice of his colleagues, in fact if he had +listened to any American who expressed an opinion on the subject, the +Treaty would probably have obtained the speedy approval of the Senate. +There would have been opposition from those inimical to the United +States entering any international organization, but it would have been +insufficient to prevent ratification of the Treaty. + +As it was, the President's unalterable determination to have his form of +guaranty in the Covenant, in which he was successful, and his firm +refusal to modify it in any substantial way resulted in strengthening +the opponents to the League to such an extent that they were able to +prevent the Treaty from obtaining the necessary consent of two thirds of +the Senators. + +The sincerity of Mr. Wilson's belief in the absolute necessity of the +guaranty, which he proposed, to the preservation of international peace +cannot be doubted. While his advisers were practically unanimous in the +opinion that policy, as well as principle, demanded a change in the +guaranty, he clung tenaciously to the affirmative form. The result was +that which was feared and predicted by his colleagues. The President, +and the President alone, must bear the responsibility for the result. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION + + +On the day that the Commission on the League of Nations held its first +meeting and before I had reason to suspect that Mr. Wilson intended to +ignore the letter which I had sent him with the suggested resolution +enclosed, I determined to appeal to him in behalf of international +arbitration. I decided to do this on the assumption that, even if the +plan for a resolution was approved, the Commission would continue its +sessions in preparation for the subsequent negotiation of an agreement +of some sort providing for world organization. The provision as to +arbitration in the President's original draft of a Covenant was so wrong +from my point of view and showed such a lack of knowledge of the +practical side of the subject that I was impelled to make an effort to +induce him to change the provision. Except for the fact that the matter +was wholly legal in character and invited an opinion based on technical +knowledge, I would have remained silent in accordance with my feeling +that it would be inadvisable for me to have anything to do with drafting +the Covenant. I felt, however, that the constitution and procedure of +international courts were subjects which did not affect the general +theory of organization and concerning which my views might influence the +President and be of aid to him in the formulation of the judicial +feature of any plan adopted. + +With this object in view I wrote to him the following letter: + + "_Hotel Crillon, Paris + + "February_ 3, 1919 + + "My Dear Mr. President: + + "I am deeply interested, as you know, in the constitution and + procedure of international courts of arbitration, and having + participated in five proceedings of this sort I feel that I can speak + with a measure of authority. + + "In the first place let me say that a tribunal, on which + representatives of the litigants sit as judges, has not proved + satisfactory even though the majority of the tribunal are nationals + of other countries. However well prepared from experience on the + bench to render strict justice, the litigants' arbitrators act in + fact as advocates. As a consequence the neutral arbitrators are + decidedly hampered in giving full and free expression to their views, + and there is not that frank exchange of opinion which should + characterize the conference of judges. It has generally resulted in a + compromise, in which the nation in the wrong gains a measure of + benefit and the nation in the right is deprived of a part of the + remedy to which it is entitled. In fact an arbitration award is more + of a political and diplomatic arrangement than it is a judicial + determination. I believe that this undesirable result can be in large + measure avoided by eliminating arbitrators of the litigant nations. + It is only in the case of monetary claims that these observations do + not apply. + + "Another difficulty has been the method of procedure before + international tribunals. This does not apply to monetary claims, but + to disputes arising out of boundaries, interpretation of treaties, + national rights, etc. The present method of an exchange of cases and + of counter-cases is more diplomatic than judicial, since it does not + put the parties in the relation of complainant and defendant. This + relation can in every case be established, if not by mutual + agreement, then by some agency of the League of Nations charged with + that duty. Until this reform of procedure takes place there will be + no definition of issues, and arbitration will continue to be the long + and elaborate proceeding it has been in the past. + + "There is another practical obstacle to international arbitration as + now conducted which ought to be considered, and that is the cost. + This obstacle does not affect wealthy nations, but it does prevent + small and poor nations from resorting to it as a means of settling + disputes. Just how this can be remedied I am not prepared to say, + although possibly the international support of all arbitral tribunals + might be provided. At any rate, I feel that something should be done + to relieve the great expense which now prevents many of the smaller + nations from resorting to arbitration. + + "I would suggest, therefore, that the Peace Treaty contain a + provision directing the League of Nations to hold a conference or to + summon a conference to take up this whole matter and draft an + international treaty dealing with the constitution of arbitral + tribunals and radically revising the procedure. + + "On account of the difficulties of the subject, which do not appear + on the surface, but which experience has shown to be very real, I + feel that it would be impracticable to provide in the Peace Treaty + too definitely the method of constituting arbitral tribunals. It will + require considerable thought and discussion to make arbitration + available to the poor as well as the rich, to make an award a + judicial settlement rather than a diplomatic compromise, and to + supersede the cumbersome and prolonged procedure with its duplication + of documents and maps by a simple method which will settle the issues + and materially shorten the proceedings which now unavoidably drag + along for months, if not for years. + + "Faithfully yours + + "ROBERT LANSING + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "28 _Rue de Monceau_" + +At the time that I sent this letter to Mr. Wilson I had not seen the +revised draft of the Covenant which he laid before the Commission on the +League of Nations. The probability is that, if I had seen it, the letter +would not have been written, for in the revision of the original draft +the objectionable Article V, relating to arbitration and appeals from +arbitral awards, was omitted. In place of it there were substituted two +articles, 11 and 12, the first being an agreement to arbitrate under +certain conditions and the other providing that "the Executive Council +will formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of +International Justice, and this Court will be competent to hear and +determine any matter which the parties recognize as suitable for +submission to it for arbitration." + +Unadvised as to this change, which promised a careful consideration of +the method of applying legal principles of justice to international +disputes, I did not feel that I could let pass without challenge the +unsatisfactory provisions of the President's original draft. Knowing the +contempt which Mr. Wilson felt for The Hague Tribunal and his general +suspicion of the justice of decisions which it might render, it seemed +to me inexpedient to suggest that it should form the basis of a newly +constituted judiciary, a suggestion which I should have made had I been +dealing with any one other than President Wilson. In view of the +intensity of the President's prejudices and of the uselessness of +attempting to remove them, my letter was intended to induce him to +postpone a determination of the subject until the problems which it +presented could be thoroughly studied and a judicial system developed by +an international body of representatives more expert in juridical +matters than the Commission on the League of Nations, the American +members of which were incompetent by training, knowledge, and practical +experience to consider the subject. + +No acknowledgment, either written or oral, was ever made of my letter of +February 3. Possibly President Wilson considered it unnecessary to do so +in view of the provision in his revised Covenant postponing discussion +of the subject. At the time, however, I naturally assumed that my +voluntary advice was unwelcome to him. His silence as to my +communications, which seemed to be intended to discourage a continuance +of them, gave the impression that he considered an uninvited opinion on +any subject connected with the League of Nations an unwarranted +interference with a phase of the negotiations which he looked upon as +his own special province, and that comment or suggestion, which did not +conform wholly to his views, was interpreted into opposition and +possibly into criticism of him personally. + +This judgment of the President's mental attitude, which was formed at +the time, may have been too harsh. It is possible that the shortness of +time in which to complete the drafting of the report of the Commission +on the League of Nations, upon which he had set his heart, caused him to +be impatient of any criticism or suggestion which tended to interrupt +his work or that of the Commission. It may have been that pressure for +time prevented him from answering letters of the character of the one of +February 3. Whatever the real reason was, the fact remains that the +letter went unnoticed and the impression was made that it was futile to +attempt to divert the President from the single purpose which he had in +mind. His fidelity to his own convictions and his unswerving +determination to attain what he sought are characteristics of Mr. Wilson +which are sources of weakness as well as of strength. Through them +success has generally crowned his efforts, success which in some +instances has been more disastrous than failure would have been. + +By what means the change of Article V of the original draft of the +Covenant took place, I cannot say. In the memorandum of Messrs. Miller +and Auchincloss no suggestion of a Court of International Justice +appears, which seems to indicate that the provision in the revised draft +did not originate with them or with Colonel House. In fact on more than +one occasion I had mentioned arbitration to the Colonel and found his +views on the subject extremely vague, though I concluded that he had +almost as poor an opinion of The Hague Tribunal as did the President. +The probability is that the change was suggested to Mr. Wilson by one of +the foreign statesmen in a personal interview during January and that +upon sounding others he found that they were practically unanimous in +favor of a Permanent Court of Justice. As a matter of policy it seemed +wise to forestall amendment by providing for its future establishment. +If this is the true explanation, Article 12 was not of American origin, +though it appears in the President's revised draft. + +To be entirely frank in stating my views in regard to Mr. Wilson's +attitude toward international arbitration and its importance in a plan +of world organization, I have always been and still am skeptical of the +sincerity of the apparent willingness of the President to accept the +change which was inserted in his revised draft. It is difficult to avoid +the belief that Article V of the original draft indicated his true +opinion of the application of legal principles to controversies between +nations. That article, by depriving an arbitral award of finality and +conferring the power of review on a political body with authority to +order a rehearing, shows that the President believed that more complete +justice would be rendered if the precepts and rules of international law +were in a measure subordinated to political expediency and if the judges +were not permitted to view the questions solely from the standpoint of +legal justice. There is nothing that occurred, to my knowledge, between +the printing of the original draft of the Covenant and the printing of +the revised draft, which indicated a change of opinion by the President. +It may be that this is a misinterpretation of Mr. Wilson's attitude, and +that the change toward international arbitration was due to conviction +rather than to expediency; but my belief is that expediency was the +sole cause. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +The Commission on the League of Nations, over which President Wilson +presided, held ten meetings between February 3 and February 14, on which +latter day it submitted a report at a plenary session of the Conference +on the Preliminaries of Peace. The report was presented by the President +in an address of exceptional excellence which made a deep impression on +his hearers. His dignity of manner, his earnestness, and his logical +presentation of the subject, clothed as it was in well-chosen phrases, +unquestionably won the admiration of all, even of those who could not +reconcile their personal views with the Covenant, as reported by the +Commission. It was a masterly effort, an example of literary rather than +emotional oratory, peculiarly fitting to the occasion and to the temper +and intellectual character of the audience. + +Considering the brief time given to its discussion in the Commission and +the necessary haste required to complete the document before the +President's departure, the Covenant as reported to the Conference was a +creditable piece of work. Many of the more glaring errors of expression +and some of the especially objectionable features of the President's +revised draft were eliminated. There were others which persisted, but +the improvement was so marked that the gross defects in word and phrase +largely disappeared. If one accepted the President's theory of +organization, there was little to criticize in the report, except a +certain inexactness of expression which indicated a lack of technical +knowledge on the part of those who put the Covenant into final form. But +these crudities and ambiguities of language would, it was fair to +presume, disappear if the articles passed through the hands of +drafting experts. + +Fundamentally, however, the Covenant as reported was as wrong as the +President's original draft, since it contained the affirmative guaranty +of political independence and territorial integrity, the primacy of the +Five Great Powers on the Executive Council, and the perplexing and +seemingly unsound system of mandates. In this I could not willingly +follow President Wilson, but I felt that I had done all that I could +properly do in opposition to his theory. The responsibility of decision +rested with him and he had made his decision. There was nothing more +to be said. + +On the evening of the day of the plenary session, at which the report of +the League of Nations was submitted, the President left Paris for Brest +where the George Washington was waiting to convey him to the United +States. He carried with him the report of the Commission, whose +deliberations and decisions he had so manifestly dominated. He went +prepared to meet his political antagonists and the enemies of the +League, confidently believing that he could win a popular support that +would silence the opposition which had been increasingly manifest in the +Halls of Congress and in some of the Republican newspapers which +declined to follow Mr. Taft, Mr. Wickersham, Mr. Straus, and other +influential Republican members of the League to Enforce Peace. + +During the ten days preceding February 14, when the Commission on the +League of Nations held daily sessions, the President had no conferences +with the American Commissioners except, of course, with Colonel House, +his American colleague on the Commission on the League. On the morning +of the 14th, however, he called a meeting of the Commissioners and +delivered to them the printed report which was to be presented that +afternoon to the plenary session. As the meetings of the Commission on +the League of Nations had been secret, the American Commissioners, other +than Colonel House, were almost entirely ignorant of the proceedings and +of the progress being made. Colonel House's office staff knew far more +about it than did Mr. White, General Bliss, or I. When the President +delivered the report to the Commissioners they were, therefore, in no +position to express an opinion concerning it. The only remarks were +expressions of congratulation that he had been able to complete the work +before his departure. They were merely complimentary. As to the merits +of the document nothing was or could be said by the three Commissioners, +since no opportunity had been given them to study it, and without a +critical examination any comment concerning its provisions would have +been worthless. I felt and I presume that my two colleagues, who had not +been consulted as to the work of the Commission on the League, felt, +that it was, in any event, too late to offer suggestions or make +criticisms. The report was in print; it was that afternoon to be laid +before the Conference; in twelve hours the President would be on his way +to the United States. Clearly it would have been useless to find fault +with the report, especially if the objections related to the fundamental +ideas of the organization which it was intended to create. The President +having in the report declared the American policy, his commissioned +representatives were bound to acquiesce in his decision whatever their +personal views were. Acquiescence or resignation was the choice, and +resignation would have undoubtedly caused an unfortunate, if not a +critical, situation. In the circumstances acquiescence seemed the only +practical and proper course. + +The fact that in ten meetings and in a week and a half a Commission +composed of fifteen members, ten of whom represented the Five Great +Powers and five of whom represented the lesser powers (to which were +later added four others), completed the drafting of a detailed plan of a +League of Nations, is sufficient in itself to raise doubts as to the +thoroughness with which the work was done and as to the care with which +the various plans and numerous provisions proposed were studied, +compared, and discussed. It gives the impression that many clauses were +accepted under the pressing necessity of ending the Commission's labors +within a fixed time. The document itself bears evidence of the haste +with which it was prepared, and is almost conclusive proof in itself +that it was adopted through personal influence rather than because of +belief in the wisdom of all its provisions. + +The Covenant of the League of Nations was intended to be the greatest +international compact that had ever been written. It was to be the +_Maxima Charta_ of mankind securing to the nations their rights and +liberties and uniting them for the preservation of universal peace. To +harmonize the conflicting views of the members of the Commission--and it +was well known that they were conflicting--and to produce in eleven days +a world charter, which would contain the elements of greatness or even +of perpetuity, was on the face of it an undertaking impossible of +accomplishment. The document which was produced sufficiently establishes +the truth of this assertion. + +It required a dominant personality on the Commission to force through a +detailed plan of a League in so short a time. President Wilson was such +a personality. By adopting the scheme of an oligarchy of the Great +Powers he silenced the dangerous opposition of the French and British +members of the Commission who willingly passed over minor defects in the +plan provided this Concert of Powers, this Quintuple Alliance, was +incorporated in the Covenant. And for the same reason it may be assumed +the Japanese and Italians found the President's plan acceptable. Mr. +Wilson won a great personal triumph, but he did so by surrendering the +fundamental principle of the equality of nations. In his eagerness to +"make the world safe for democracy" he abandoned international democracy +and became the advocate of international autocracy. + +It is not my purpose to analyze the provisions of the Covenant which was +submitted to the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on February +14, 1919. My objections to it have been sufficiently discussed in the +preceding pages. It would be superfluous to repeat them. The innumerable +published articles and the endless debates on the Covenant have brought +out its good features as well as its defects. Unfortunately for the +opponents and defenders of the document alike some of the objections +urged have been flagrantly unjustifiable and based on false premises and +misstatements of fact and of law, which seem to show political motives +and not infrequently personal animosity toward Mr. Wilson. The +exaggerated statements and unfair arguments of some of the Senators, +larded, as they often were, with caustic sarcasm and vindictive +personalities, did much to prevent an honest and useful discussion of +the merits and demerits of the Covenant. + +The effect upon President Wilson of this campaign against him +personally--and it seems to me that it would have had the same effect +upon any man of spirit--was to arouse his indignation. Possibly a less +stubborn man would not have assumed so uncompromising an attitude as he +did or have permitted his ire to find expression in threats, but it +cannot be denied that there was provocation for the resentment which he +exhibited. The President has been blamed for not having sought more +constantly to placate the opponents of the Covenant and to meet them on +a common ground of compromise, especially during his visit to the United +States in February, 1919. From the point of view of policy there is +justice in blaming him, but, when one considers the personal animus +shown and the insolent tone assumed by some of his critics, his conduct +was very human; not wise, but human. Mr. Wilson had never shown a spirit +of conciliation in dealing with those who opposed him. Even in the case +of a purely political question he appeared to consider opposition to be +a personal affront and he was disposed to retaliate in a personal way. +In a measure this explains the personal enmity of many of his political +foes. I think that it is not unjust to say that President Wilson was +stronger in his hatreds than in his friendships. He seemed to lack the +ability to forgive one who had in any way offended him or opposed him. + +Believing that much of the criticism of the Covenant was in reality +criticism of him as its author, a belief that was in a measure +justified, the President made it a personal matter. He threatened, in a +public address delivered in the New York Opera House on the eve of his +departure for France, to force the Republican majority to accept the +Covenant by interweaving the League of Nations into the terms of peace +to such an extent that they could not be separated, so that, if they +rejected the League, they would be responsible for defeating the Treaty +and preventing a restoration of peace. With the general demand for peace +this seemed no empty threat, although the propriety of making it may be +questioned. It had, however, exactly the opposite effect from that which +the President intended. Its utterance proved to be as unwise as it was +ineffective. The opposition Senators resented the idea of being coerced. +They became more than ever determined to defeat a President whom they +charged with attempting to disregard and nullify the right of the Senate +to exercise independently its constitutional share in the treaty-making +power. Thus at the very outset of the struggle between the President and +the Senate a feeling of hostility was engendered which continued with +increasing bitterness on both sides and prevented any compromise or +concession in regard to the Covenant as it finally appeared in the +Treaty of Versailles. + +When President Wilson returned to Paris after the adjournment of the +Sixty-Fifth Congress on March 4, 1919, he left behind him opponents who +were stronger and more confident than they were when he landed ten days +before. While his appeal to public opinion in favor of the League of +Nations had been to an extent successful, there was a general feeling +that the Covenant as then drafted required amendment so that the +sovereign rights and the traditional policies of the United States +should be safeguarded. Until the document was amended it seemed that the +opposition had the better of the argument with the people. Furthermore, +when the new Congress met, the Republicans would have a majority in the +Senate which was of special importance in the matter of the Treaty which +would contain the Covenant, because it would, when sent to the Senate, +be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations to report on its +ratification and a majority of that Committee, under a Republican +organization, would presumably be hostile to the plan for a League +advocated by the President. The Committee could hinder and possibly +prevent the acceptance of the Covenant, while it would have the +opportunity to place the opposition's case in a favorable light before +the American people and to attack the President's conduct of the +negotiations at Paris. + +I believe that the President realized the loss of strategic position +which he had sustained by the Democratic defeat at the polls in +November, 1918, but was persuaded that, by making certain alterations in +the Covenant suggested by Republicans favorable to the formation of a +League, and especially those advocating a League to Enforce Peace, he +would be able to win sufficient support in the Senate and from the +people to deprive his antagonists of the advantage which they had gained +by the elections. This he sought to do on his return to Paris about the +middle of March. If the same spirit of compromise had been shown while +he was in America it would doubtless have gone far to weaken hostility +to the Covenant. Unfortunately for his purpose he assumed a contrary +attitude, and in consequence the sentiment against the League was +crystallized and less responsive to the concessions which the President +appeared willing to make when the Commission on the League of Nations +resumed its sittings, especially as the obnoxious Article 10 +remained intact. + +In the formulation of the amendments to the Covenant, which were +incorporated in it after the President's return from the United States +and before its final adoption by the Conference, I had no part and I +have no reason to think that Mr. White or General Bliss shared in the +work. As these amendments or modifications did not affect the theory of +organization or the fundamental principles of the League, they in no way +changed my views or lessened the differences between the President's +judgment and mine. Our differences were as to the bases and not as to +the details of the Covenant. Since there was no disposition to change +the former we were no nearer an agreement than we were in January. + +The President's visit to the United States had been disappointing to the +friends of a League in that he had failed to rally to the support of the +Covenant an overwhelming popular sentiment in its favor which the +opposition in the Senate could not resist. The natural reaction was that +the peoples of Europe and their statesmen lost a measure of their +enthusiasm and faith in the project. Except in the case of a few +idealists, there was a growing disposition to view it from the purely +practical point of view and to speculate on its efficacy as an +instrument to interpret and carry out the international will. Among the +leaders of political thought in the principal Allied countries, the +reports of the President's reception in the United States were +sufficiently conflicting to arouse doubt as to whether the American +people were actually behind him in his plan for a League, and this doubt +was not diminished by his proposed changes in the Covenant, which +indicated that he was not in full control of the situation at home. + +Two weeks after the President had resumed his duties as a negotiator and +had begun the work of revising the Covenant, I made a memorandum of my +views as to the situation that then existed. The memorandum is +as follows: + + "_March_ 25, 1919 + + "With the increasing military preparations and operations throughout + Eastern Europe and the evident purpose of all these quarreling + nations to ignore any idea of disarmament and to rely upon force to + obtain and retain territory and rights, the League of Nations is + being discussed with something like contempt by the cynical, + hard-headed statesmen of those countries which are being put on a + war-footing. They are cautious and courteous out of regard for the + President. I doubt if the truth reaches him, but it comes to me from + various sources. + + "These men say that in theory the idea is all right and is an ideal + to work toward, but that under present conditions it is not practical + in preventing war. They ask, what nation is going to rely on the + guaranty in the Covenant if a jealous or hostile neighbor maintains a + large army. They want to know whether it would be wise or not to + disarm under such conditions. Of course the answers are obvious. But, + if the guaranty is not sufficient, or accepted as sufficient, + protection, what becomes of the central purpose of the League and the + chief reason for creating it? + + "I believe that the President and Colonel House see this, though they + do not admit it, and that to save the League from being cast into the + discard they will attempt to make of it a sort of international + agency to do certain things which would normally be done by + independent international commissions. Such a course would save the + League from being still-born and would so interweave it with the + terms of peace that to eliminate it would be to open up some + difficult questions. + + "Of course the League of Nations as originally planned had one + supreme object and that was to prevent future wars. That was + substantially all that it purposed to do. Since then new functions + have been gradually added until the chief argument for the League's + existence has been almost lost to sight. The League has been made a + convenient 'catch-all' for all sorts of international actions. At + first this was undoubtedly done to give the League something to do, + and now it is being done to save it from extinction or from + being ignored. + + "I am not denying that a common international agent may be a good + thing. In fact the plan has decided merit. But the organization of + the League does not seem to me suitable to perform efficiently and + properly these new functions. + + "However, giving this character to the League may save it from being + merely an agreeable dream. As the repository of international + controversies requiring long and careful consideration it may live + and be useful. + + "My impression is that the principal sponsors for the League are + searching through the numerous disputes which are clogging the wheels + of the Conference, seizing upon every one which can possibly be + referred, and heaping them on the League of Nations to give it + standing as a useful and necessary adjunct to the Treaty. + + "At least that is an interesting view of what is taking place and + opens a wide field for speculation as to the future of the League and + the verdict which history will render as to its origin, its nature, + and its real value." + +I quote this memorandum because it gives my thoughts at the time +concerning the process of weaving the League into the terms of peace as +the President had threatened to do. I thought then that it had a double +purpose, to give a practical reason for the existence of the League and +to make certain the ratification of the Covenant by the Senate. No fact +has since developed which has induced me to change my opinion. + +In consequence of the functions which were added to the League, the +character of the League itself underwent a change. Instead of an agency +created solely for the prevention of international wars, it was +converted into an agency to carry out the terms of peace. Its idealistic +conception was subordinated to the materialistic purpose of confirming +to the victorious nations the rewards of victory. It is true that during +the long struggle between the President and the Senate on the question +of ratification there was in the debates a general return to the +original purpose of the League by both the proponents and opponents of +the Covenant, but that fact in no way affects the truth of the assertion +that, in order to save the League of Nations, its character was changed +by extending its powers and duties as a common agent of the nations +which had triumphed over the Central Alliance. + +The day before the Treaty of Peace was delivered to the German +plenipotentiaries (May 6) its terms induced me to write a note entitled +"The Greatest Loss Caused by the War," referring to the loss of idealism +to the world. In that note I wrote of the League of Nations as follows: + + "Even the measure of idealism, with which the League of Nations was + at the first impregnated, has, under the influence and intrigue of + ambitious statesmen of the Old World, been supplanted by an open + recognition that force and selfishness are primary elements in + international co-operation. The League has succumbed to this + reversion to a cynical materialism. It is no longer a creature of + idealism. Its very source and reason have been dried up and have + almost disappeared. The danger is that it will become a bulwark of + the old order, a check upon all efforts to bring man again under the + influence which he has lost." + +The President, in the addresses which he afterward made in advocacy of +the Covenant and of ratification of the Treaty, indicated clearly the +wide divergence of opinion between us as to the character of the League +provided for in the Treaty. I do not remember that the subject was +directly discussed by us, but I certainly took no pains to hide my +misgivings as to the place it would have in the international relations +of the future. However, as Mr. Wilson knew that I disapproved of the +theory and basic principles of the organization, especially the +recognition of the oligarchy of the Five Powers, he could not but +realize that I considered that idealism had given place to political +expediency in order to secure for the Covenant the support of the +powerful nations represented at the Conference. This was my belief as to +our relations when the Treaty of Peace containing the Covenant was laid +before the Germans at the Hotel des Reservoirs in Versailles. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES + + +In the foregoing review of the opposite views held by the President and +by me in regard to the plan for a League of Nations and specifically in +regard to the Covenant as originally drawn and as revised, mention was +made of the proposed mandatory system as one of the subjects concerning +which we were not in agreement. My objections to the system were +advanced chiefly on the ground of the legal difficulties which it +presented because it seemed probable that the President would give more +weight to my opinion on that ground than on one which concerned the +policy of adopting the system. Viewed from the latter standpoint it +appeared to me most unwise for the President to propose a plan, in which +the United States would be expected to participate and which, if it did +participate, would involve it in the political quarrels of the Old +World. To do so would manifestly require a departure from the +traditional American policy of keeping aloof from the political +jealousies and broils of Europe. Without denying that present conditions +have, of necessity, modified the old policy of isolation and without +minimizing the influence of that fact on the conduct of American foreign +affairs, it did not seem essential for the United States to become the +guardian of any of the peoples of the Near East, who were aspiring to +become independent nationalities, a guardianship which the President +held to be a duty that the United States was bound to perform as its +share of the burden imposed by the international cooeperation which he +considered vital to the new world order. + +The question of mandates issuing from the League of Nations was +discussed at length by the Council of Ten in connection with the +disposition and future control of the German colonies and incidentally +as to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The discussions were +chiefly along the lines of practicability, of policy, and of moral +obligation. The President's strong support of the mandatory system and +his equally strong objection to the idea of _condominium_ showed that +his mind was made up in favor of the issuance of mandates by the League. +Since it would have been highly improper for me to oppose openly a +policy which the President had declared under his constitutional +authority, there was no proper opportunity to present the legal +difficulties of the system to the Council. + +However, the seriousness of these difficulties and the possible troubles +and controversies which might be anticipated from attempting to put the +system into operation induced me, after one of the sessions of the +Council of Ten, to state briefly to the President some of the serious +objections to League mandates from the standpoint of international law +and the philosophy of government. President Wilson listened with his +usual attentiveness to what I had to say, though the objections +evidently did not appeal to him, as he characterized them as "mere +technicalities" which could be cured or disregarded. Impressed myself +with the importance of these "technicalities" and their direct bearing +on the policy of adopting the mandatory system, I later, on February 2, +1919, embodied them in a memorandum. At the time I hoped and believed +that the negotiation of the completed Covenant might be postponed and +that there would be another opportunity to raise the question. The +memorandum, prepared with this end in view, is as follows: + + "The system of 'mandatories under the League of Nations,' when + applied to territories which were formerly colonies of Germany, the + system which has been practically adopted and will be written into + the plan for the League, raises some interesting and difficult + questions: + + "The one, which is the most prominent since it enters into nearly all + of the international problems presented, is--Where does the + sovereignty over these territories reside? + + "Sovereignty is inherent in the very conception of government. It + cannot be destroyed, though it may be absorbed by another sovereignty + either by compulsion or cession. When the Germans were ousted from + their colonies, the sovereignty passed to the power or powers which + took possession. The location of the sovereignty up to the present is + clear, but with the introduction of the League of Nations as an + international primate superior to the conquerors some rather + perplexing questions will have to be answered. + + "Do those who have seized the sovereignty transfer it or does Germany + transfer it to the League of Nations? If so, how? + + "Does the League assume possession of the sovereignty on its + renunciation by Germany? If so, how? + + "Does the League merely direct the disposition of the sovereignty + without taking possession of it? + + "Assuming that the latter question is answered in the affirmative, + then after such disposition of the right to exercise sovereignty, + which will presumably be a limited right, where does the actual + sovereignty reside? + + "The appointment of a mandatory to exercise sovereign rights over + territory is to create an agent for the real sovereign. But who is + the real sovereign? + + "Is the League of Nations the sovereign, or is it a common agent of + the nations composing the League, to whom is confided solely the duty + of naming the mandatory and issuing the mandate? + + "If the League is the sovereign, can it avoid responsibility for the + misconduct of the mandatory, its agent? + + "If it is not the League, who is responsible for the mandatory's + conduct? + + "Assuming that the mandatory in faithfully performing the provisions + of the mandate unavoidably works an injustice upon another party, can + or ought the mandatory to be held responsible? If not, how can the + injured party obtain redress? Manifestly the answer is, 'From the + sovereign,' but who is the sovereign? + + "In the Treaty of Peace Germany will be called upon to renounce + sovereignty over her colonial possessions. To whom will the + sovereignty pass? + + "If the reply is, 'The League of Nations,' the question is: Does the + League possess the attributes of an independent state so that it can + function as an owner of territory? If so, what is it? A world state? + + "If the League does not constitute a world state, then the + sovereignty would have to pass to some national state. What national + state? What would be the relation of the national state to + the League? + + "If the League is to receive title to the sovereignty, what officers + of the League are empowered to receive it and to transfer its + exercise to a mandatory? + + "What form of acceptance should be adopted? + + "Would every nation which is a member of the League have to give its + representatives full powers to accept the title? + + "Assuming that certain members decline to issue such powers or to + accept title as to one or more of the territories, what relation + would those members have to the mandatory named?" + +There is no attempt in the memorandum to analyze or classify the queries +raised, and, as I review them in the light of the terms of the Treaty of +Versailles, I do not think that some of them can be asked with any +helpful purpose. On the other hand, many of the questions, I believe the +large majority, were as pertinent after the Treaty was completed as they +were when the memorandum was made. + +As Colonel House was the other member of the Commission on the League of +Nations and would have to consider the practicability and expediency of +including the mandatory system in the Covenant, I read the memorandum to +him stating that I had orally presented most of the questions to the +President who characterized them as "legal technicalities" and for that +reason unimportant. I said to the Colonel that I differed with the +President, as I hoped he did, not only as to the importance of +considering the difficulties raised by the questions before the system +of mandates was adopted, but also as to the importance of viewing from +every standpoint the wisdom of the system and the difficulties that +might arise in its practical operation. I stated that, in my opinion, a +simpler and better plan was to transfer the sovereignty over territory +to a particular nation by a treaty of cession under such terms as seemed +wise and, in the case of some of the newly erected states, to have them +execute treaties accepting protectorates by Powers mutually acceptable +to those states and to the League of Nations. + +Colonel House, though he listened attentively to the memorandum and to +my suggestions, did not seem convinced of the importance of the +questions or of the advantages of adopting any other plan than that of +the proposed mandatory system. To abandon the system meant to abandon +one of the ideas of international supervision, which the President +especially cherished and strongly advocated. It meant also to surrender +one of the proposed functions of the League as an agent in carrying out +the peace settlements under the Treaty, functions which would form the +basis of an argument in favor of the organization of the League and +furnish a practical reason for its existence. Of course the presumed +arguments against the abandonment of mandates may not have been +considered, but at the time I believed that they were potent with +Colonel House and with the President. The subsequent advocacy of the +system by these two influential members of the Commission on the League +of Nations, which resulted in its adoption, in no way lessened my belief +as to the reasons for their support. + +The mandatory system, a product of the creative mind of General Smuts, +was a novelty in international relations which appealed strongly to +those who preferred to adopt unusual and untried methods rather than to +accept those which had been tested by experience and found practical of +operation. The self-satisfaction of inventing something new or of +evolving a new theory is inherent with not a few men. They are +determined to try out their ideas and are impatient of opposition which +seeks to prevent the experiment. In fact opposition seems sometimes to +enhance the virtue of a novelty in the minds of those who propose or +advocate its adoption. Many reformers suffer from this form of vanity. + +In the case of the system of mandates its adoption by the Conference and +the conferring on the League of Nations the power to issue mandates +seemed at least to the more conservative thinkers at Paris a very +doubtful venture. It appeared to possess no peculiar advantages over the +old method of transferring and exercising sovereign control either in +providing added protection to the inhabitants of territory subject to a +mandate or greater certainty of international equality in the matter of +commerce and trade, the two principal arguments urged in favor of the +proposed system. + +If the advocates of the system intended to avoid through its operation +the appearance of taking enemy territory as the spoils of war, it was a +subterfuge which deceived no one. It seemed obvious from the very first +that the Powers, which under the old practice would have obtained +sovereignty over certain conquered territories, would not be denied +mandates over those territories. The League of Nations might reserve in +the mandate a right of supervision of administration and even of +revocation of authority, but that right would be nominal and of little, +if any, real value provided the mandatory was one of the Great Powers as +it undoubtedly would be. The almost irresistible conclusion is that the +protagonists of the theory saw in it a means of clothing the League of +Nations with an apparent usefulness which justified the League by making +it the guardian of uncivilized and semi-civilized peoples and the +international agent to watch over and prevent any deviation from the +principle of equality in the commercial and industrial development of +the mandated territories. + +It may appear surprising that the Great Powers so readily gave their +support to the new method of obtaining an apparently limited control +over the conquered territories, and did not seek to obtain complete +sovereignty over them. It is not necessary to look far for a sufficient +and very practical reason. If the colonial possessions of Germany had, +under the old practice, been divided among the victorious Powers and +been ceded to them directly in full sovereignty, Germany might justly +have asked that the value of such territorial cessions be applied on any +war indemnities to which the Powers were entitled. On the other hand, +the League of Nations in the distribution of mandates would presumably +do so in the interests of the inhabitants of the colonies and the +mandates would be accepted by the Powers as a duty and not to obtain new +possessions. Thus under the mandatory system Germany lost her +territorial assets, which might have greatly reduced her financial debt +to the Allies, while the latter obtained the German colonial possessions +without the loss of any of their claims for indemnity. In actual +operation the apparent altruism of the mandatory system worked in favor +of the selfish and material interests of the Powers which accepted the +mandates. And the same may be said of the dismemberment of Turkey. It +should not be a matter of surprise, therefore, that the President found +little opposition to the adoption of his theory, or, to be more +accurate, of the Smuts theory, on the part of the European statesmen. + +There was one case, however, in which the issuance of a mandate appeared +to have a definite and practical value and to be superior to a direct +transfer of complete sovereignty or of the conditional sovereignty +resulting from the establishment of a protectorate. The case was that of +a territory with or without a national government, which, not being +self-supporting and not sufficiently strong to protect its borders from +aggressive neighbors, or its people sufficiently enlightened to govern +themselves properly, would be a constant source of expense instead of +profit to the Power, which as its protector and tutor became its +overlord. Under such conditions there was more probability of persuading +a nation inspired by humanitarian and altruistic motives to assume the +burden for the common good under the mandatory system than under the old +method of cession or of protectorate. As to nations, however, which +placed national interests first and made selfishness the standard of +international policy it was to be assumed that an appeal under either +system would be ineffective. + +The truth of this was very apparent at Paris. In the tentative +distribution of mandates among the Powers, which took place on the +strong presumption that the mandatory system would be adopted, the +principal European Powers appeared to be willing and even eager to +become mandatories over territories possessing natural resources which +could be profitably developed and showed an unwillingness to accept +mandates for territories which, barren of mineral or agricultural +wealth, would be continuing liabilities rather than assets. This is not +stated by way of criticism, but only in explanation of what took place. + +From the beginning to the end of the discussions on mandates and their +distribution among the Powers it was repeatedly declared that the United +States ought to participate in the general plan for the upbuilding of +the new states which under mandatories would finally become independent +nationalities, but it was never, to my knowledge, proposed, except by +the inhabitants of the region in question, that the United States should +accept a mandate for Syria or the Asiatic coast of the Aegean Sea. Those +regions were rich in natural resources and their economic future under a +stable government was bright. Expenditures in their behalf and the +direction of their public affairs would bring ample returns to the +mandatory nations. On the other hand, there was a sustained +propaganda--for it amounted to that--in favor of the United States +assuming mandates over Armenia and the municipal district of +Constantinople, both of which, if limited by the boundaries which it was +then purposed to draw, would be a constant financial burden to the Power +accepting the mandate, and, in the case of Armenia, would require that +Power to furnish a military force estimated at not less than 50,000 men +to prevent the aggression of warlike neighbors and to preserve domestic +order and peace. + +It is not too severe to say of those who engaged in this propaganda that +the purpose was to take advantage of the unselfishness of the American +people and of the altruism and idealism of President Wilson in order to +impose on the United States the burdensome mandates and to divide those +which covered desirable territories among the European Powers. I do not +think that the President realized at the time that an actual propaganda +was going on, and I doubt very much whether he would have believed it if +he had been told. Deeply impressed with the idea that it was the moral +duty of the great and enlightened nations to aid the less fortunate and +especially to guard the nationalities freed from autocratic rule until +they were capable of self-government and self-protection, the President +apparently looked upon the appeals made to him as genuine expressions of +humanitarianism and as manifestations of the opinion of mankind +concerning the part that the United States ought to take in the +reconstruction of the world. His high-mindedness and loftiness of +thought blinded him to the sordidness of purpose which appears to have +induced the general acquiescence in his desired system of mandates, and +the same qualities of mind caused him to listen sympathetically to +proposals, the acceptance of which would give actual proof of the +unselfishness of the United States. + +Reading the situation thus and convinced of the objections against the +mandatory system from the point of view of international law, of policy +and of American interests, I opposed the inclusion of the system in the +plan for a League of Nations. In view of the attitude which Mr. Wilson +had taken toward my advice regarding policies I confined the objections +which I presented to him, as I have stated, to those based on legal +difficulties. The objections on the ground of policy were made to +Colonel House in the hope that through him they might reach the +President and open his eyes to the true state of affairs. Whether they +ever did reach him I do not know. Nothing in his subsequent course of +action indicated that they did. + +But, if they did, he evidently considered them as invalid as he did the +objections arising from legal difficulties. The system of mandates was +written into the Treaty and a year after the Treaty was signed President +Wilson asked the Congress for authority to accept for the United States +a mandate over Armenia. This the Congress refused. It is needless to +make further comment. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED + + +The differences between the President's views and mine in regard to the +character of the League of Nations and to the provisions of the Covenant +relating to the organization and functions of the League were +irreconcilable, and we were equally in disagreement as to the duties of +the League in carrying out certain provisions of the Treaty of Peace as +the common agent of the signatory Powers. As a commissioned +representative of the President of the United States acting under his +instructions I had no alternative but to accept his decisions and to +follow his directions, since surrender of my commission as Peace +Commissioner seemed to me at the time to be practically out of the +question. I followed his directions, however, with extreme reluctance +because I felt that Mr. Wilson's policies were fundamentally wrong and +would unavoidably result in loss of prestige to the United States and to +him as its Chief Magistrate. It seemed to me that he had endangered, if +he had not destroyed, his preeminent position in world affairs in order +to obtain the acceptance of his plan for a League of Nations, a plan +which in theory and in detail was so defective that it would be +difficult to defend it successfully from critical attack. + +The objections to the terms of the Covenant, which I had raised at the +outset, were based on principle and also on policy, as has been shown in +the preceding pages; and on the same grounds I had opposed their hasty +adoption and their inclusion in the Peace Treaty to be negotiated at +Paris by the Conference. These objections and the arguments advanced in +their support did not apparently have any effect on President Wilson, +for they failed to change his views or to modify the plan which he, with +General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil, had worked out for an international +organization. They did not swerve him one jot from his avowed purpose to +make the creation of the League of Nations the principal feature of the +negotiations and the provisions of the Covenant the most prominent +articles in the Treaties of Peace with the Central Powers. + +Instead of accomplishing their designed purpose, my efforts to induce +the President to change his policy resulted only in my losing his +confidence in my judgment and in arousing in his mind, if I do not +misinterpret his conduct, doubts of my loyalty to him personally. It was +characteristic of Mr. Wilson that his firm conviction as to the +soundness of his conclusions regarding the character of the League of +Nations and his fixity of purpose in seeking to compel its adoption by +the Peace Conference were so intense as to brook no opposition, +especially from one whom he expected to accept his judgment without +question and to give support in thought and word to any plan or policy +which he advocated. In view of this mental attitude of the President it +is not difficult to understand his opinion of my course of action at +Paris. The breach in our confidential relations was unavoidable in view +of my conviction of the duty of an official adviser and his belief that +objections ought not to be urged as to a matter concerning which he had +expressed his opinion. To give implied assent to policies and intentions +which seemed to me wrong or unwise would have been violative of a public +trust, though doubtless by remaining silent I might have won favor and +approval from the President and retained his confidence. + +In summarizing briefly the subjects of disagreement between the +President and myself concerning the League of Nations I will follow the +order of importance rather than the order in which they arose. While +they also divide into two classes, those based on principle and those +based on policy, it does not seem advisable to treat them by classes in +the summary. + +The most serious defect in the President's Covenant was, in my opinion, +one of principle. It was the practical denial of the equality of nations +in the regulation of international affairs in times of peace through the +recognition in the Executive Council of the League of the right of +primacy of the Five Great Powers. This was an abandonment of a +fundamental principle of international law and comity and was +destructive of the very conception of national sovereignty both as a +term of political philosophy and as a term of constitutional law. The +denial of the equal independence and the free exercise of sovereign +rights of all states in the conduct of their foreign affairs, and the +establishment of this group of primates, amounted to a recognition of +the doctrine that the powerful are, in law as well as in fact, entitled +to be the overlords of the weak. If adopted, it legalized the mastery of +might, which in international relations, when peace prevailed, had been +universally condemned as illegal and its assertion as reprehensible. + +It was this doctrine, that the possessors of superior physical power +were as a matter of right the supervisors, if not the dictators, of +those lacking the physical power to resist their commands, which was the +vital element of ancient imperialism and of modern Prussianism. Belief +in it as a true theory of world polity justified the Great War in the +eyes of the German people even when they doubted the plea of their +Government that their national safety was in peril. The victors, +although they had fought the war with the announced purpose of proving +the falsity of this pernicious doctrine and of emancipating the +oppressed nationalities subject to the Central Powers, revived the +doctrine with little hesitation during the negotiations at Paris and +wrote it into the Covenant of the League of Nations by contriving an +organization which would give practical control over the destinies of +the world to an oligarchy of the Five Great Powers. It was an assumption +of the right of supremacy based on the fact that the united strength of +these Powers could compel obedience. It was a full endorsement of the +theory of "the balance of power" in spite of the recognized evils of +that doctrine in its practical application. Beneath the banner of the +democracies of the world was the same sinister idea which had found +expression in the Congress of Vienna with its purpose of protecting the +monarchical institutions of a century ago. It proclaimed in fact that +mankind must look to might rather than right, to force rather than law, +in the regulation of international affairs for the future. + +This defect in the theory, on which the League of Nations was to be +organized, was emphasized and given permanency by the adoption of a +mutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence +against external aggression. Since the burden of enforcing the guaranty +would unavoidably fall upon the more powerful nations, they could +reasonably demand the control over affairs which might develop into a +situation requiring a resort to the guaranty. In fact during a plenary +session of the Peace Conference held on May 31, 1919, President Wilson +stated as a broad principle that responsibility for protecting and +maintaining a settlement under one of the Peace Treaties carried with it +the right to determine what that settlement should be. The application +to the case of responsible guarantors is obvious and was apparently in +mind when the Covenant was being evolved. The same principle was applied +throughout the negotiations at Paris. + +The mutual guaranty from its affirmative nature compelled in fact, +though not in form, the establishment of a ruling group, a coalition of +the Great Powers, and denied, though not in terms, the equality of +nations. The oligarchy was the logical result of entering into the +guaranty or the guaranty was the logical result of the creation of the +oligarchy through the perpetuation of the basic idea of the Supreme War +Council. No distinction was made as to a state of war and a state of +peace. Strongly opposed to the abandonment of the principle of the +equality of nations in times of peace I naturally opposed the +affirmative guaranty and endeavored to persuade the President to accept +as a substitute for it a self-denying or negative covenant which +amounted to a promise of "hands-off" and in no way required the +formation of an international oligarchy to make it effective. + +In addition to the foregoing objection I opposed the guaranty on the +ground that it was politically inexpedient to attempt to bind the United +States by a treaty provision which by its terms would certainly invite +attack as to its constitutionality. Without entering into the strength +of the legal argument, and without denying that there are two sides to +the question, the fact that it was open to debate whether the +treaty-making power under the Constitution could or could not obligate +the Government of the United States to make war under certain conditions +was in my judgment a practical reason for avoiding the issue. If the +power existed to so bind the United States by treaty on the theory that +the Federal Government could not be restricted in its right to make +international agreements, then the guaranty would be attacked as an +unwise and needless departure from the traditional policies of the +Republic. If the power did not exist, then the violation of the +Constitution would be an effective argument against such an undertaking. +Whatever the conclusion might be, therefore, as to the legality of the +guaranty or as to whether the obligation was legal or moral in nature, +it did not seem possible for it to escape criticism and vigorous attack +in America. + +It seemed to me that the President's guaranty was so vulnerable from +every angle that to insist upon it would endanger the acceptance of any +treaty negotiated if the Covenant was, in accordance with the +President's plan, made an integral part of it. Then, too, opposition +would, in my opinion, develop on the ground that the guaranty would +permit European Powers to participate, if they could not act +independently, in the forcible settlement of international quarrels in +the Western Hemisphere whenever there was an actual invasion of +territory or violation of sovereignty, while conversely the United +States would be morally, if not legally, bound to take part in coercive +measures in composing European differences under similar conditions. It +could be urged with much force that the Monroe Doctrine in the one case +and the Washington policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" in the +other would be so affected that they would both have to be substantially +abandoned or else rewritten. If the American people were convinced that +this would be the consequence of accepting the affirmative guaranty, it +meant its rejection. In any event it was bound to produce an acrimonious +controversy. From the point of view of policy alone it seemed unwise to +include the guaranty in the Covenant, and believing that an objection on +that ground would appeal to the President more strongly than one based +on principle, I emphasized that objection, though in my own mind the +other was the more vital and more compelling. + +The points of difference relating to the League of Nations between the +President's views and mine, other than the recognition of the primacy of +the Great Powers, the affirmative guaranty and the resulting denial in +fact of the equality of nations in times of peace, were the provisions +in the President's original draft of the Covenant relating to +international arbitrations, the subordination of the judicial power to +the political power, and the proposed system of mandates. Having +discussed with sufficient detail the reasons which caused me to oppose +these provisions, and having stated the efforts made to induce President +Wilson to abandon or modify them, repetition would be superfluous. It is +also needless, in view of the full narrative of events contained in +these pages, to state that I failed entirely in my endeavor to divert +the President from his determination to have these provisions inserted +in the Covenant, except in the case of international arbitrations, and +even in that case I do not believe that my advice had anything to do +with his abandonment of his ideas as to the method of selecting +arbitrators and the right of appeal from arbitral awards. Those changes +and the substitution of an article providing for the future creation of +a Permanent Court of International Justice, were, in my opinion, as I +have said, a concession to the European statesmen and due to their +insistence. + +President Wilson knew that I disagreed with him as to the relative +importance of restoring a state of peace at the earliest date possible +and of securing the adoption of a plan for the creation of a League of +Nations. He was clearly convinced that the drafting and acceptance of +the Covenant was superior to every other task imposed on the Conference, +that it must be done before any other settlement was reached and that it +ought to have precedence in the negotiations. His course of action was +conclusive evidence of this conviction. + +On the other hand, I favored the speedy negotiation of a short and +simple preliminary treaty, in which, so far as the League of Nations was +concerned, there would be a series of declarations and an agreement for +a future international conference called for the purpose of drafting a +convention in harmony with the declarations in the preliminary treaty. +By adopting this course a state of peace would have been restored in the +early months of 1919, official intercourse and commercial relations +would have been resumed, the more complex and difficult problems of +settlement would have been postponed to the negotiation of the +definitive Treaty of Peace, and there would have been time to study +exhaustively the purposes, powers, and practical operations of a League +before the organic agreement was put into final form. Postponement would +also have given opportunity to the nations, which had continued neutral +throughout the war, to participate in the formation of the plan for a +League on an equal footing with the nations which had been belligerents. +In the establishment of a world organization universality of +international representation in reaching an agreement seemed to me +advisable, if not essential, provided the nations represented were +democracies and not autocracies. + +It was to be presumed also that at a conference entirely independent of +the peace negotiations and free from the influences affecting the terms +of peace, there would be more general and more frank discussions +regarding the various phases of the subject than was possible at a +conference ruled by the Five Great Powers and dominated in its +decisions, if not in its opinions, by the statesmen of those Powers. + +To perfect such a document, as the Covenant of the League of Nations was +intended to be, required expert knowledge, practical experience in +international relations, and an exchange of ideas untrammeled by +immediate questions of policy or by the prejudices resulting from the +war and from national hatreds and jealousies. It was not a work for +politicians, novices, or inexperienced theorists, but for trained +statesmen and jurists, who were conversant with the fundamental +principles of international law, with the usages of nations in their +intercourse with one another, and with the successes and failures of +previous experiments in international association. The President was +right in his conception as to the greatness of the task to be +accomplished, but he was wrong, radically wrong, in believing that it +could be properly done at the Paris Conference under the conditions +which there prevailed and in the time given for consideration of +the subject. + +To believe for a moment that a world constitution--for so its advocates +looked upon the Covenant--could be drafted perfectly or even wisely in +eleven days, however much thought individuals may have previously given +to the subject, seems on the face of it to show an utter lack of +appreciation of the problems to be solved or else an abnormal confidence +in the talents and wisdom of those charged with the duty. If one +compares the learned and comprehensive debates that took place in the +convention which drafted the Constitution of the United States, and the +months that were spent in the critical examination word by word of the +proposed articles, with the ten meetings of the Commission on the League +of Nations prior to its report of February 14 and with the few hours +given to debating the substance and language of the Covenant, the +inferior character of the document produced by the Commission ought not +to be a matter of wonder. It was a foregone conclusion that it would be +found defective. Some of these defects were subsequently corrected, but +the theory and basic principles, which were the chief defects in the +plan, were preserved with no substantial change. + +But the fact, which has been repeatedly asserted in the preceding pages +and which cannot be too strongly emphasized by repetition, is that the +most potent and most compelling reason for postponing the consideration +of a detailed plan for an international organization was that such a +consideration at the outset of the negotiations at Paris obstructed and +delayed the discussion and settlement of the general terms necessary to +the immediate restoration of a state of peace. Those who recall the +political and social conditions in Europe during the winter of 1918-19, +to which reference has already been made, will comprehend the +apprehension caused by anything which interrupted the negotiation of the +peace. No one dared to prophesy what might happen if the state of +political uncertainty and industrial stagnation, which existed under the +armistices, continued. + +The time given to the formulation of the Covenant of the League of +Nations and the determination that it should have first place in the +negotiations caused such a delay in the proceedings and prevented a +speedy restoration of peace. Denial of this is useless. It is too +manifest to require proof or argument to support it. It is equally true, +I regret to say, that President Wilson was chiefly responsible for this. +If he had not insisted that a complete and detailed plan for the League +should be part of the treaty negotiated at Paris, and if he had not also +insisted that the Covenant be taken up and settled in terms before other +matters were considered, a preliminary treaty of peace would in all +probability have been signed, ratified, and in effect during +April, 1919. + +Whatever evils resulted from the failure of the Paris Conference to +negotiate promptly a preliminary treaty--and it must be admitted they +were not a few--must be credited to those who caused the delay. The +personal interviews and secret conclaves before the Commission on the +League of Nations met occupied a month and a half. Practically another +half month was consumed in sessions of the Commission. The month +following was spent by President Wilson on his visit to the United +States explaining the reported Covenant and listening to criticisms. +While much was done during his absence toward the settlement of numerous +questions, final decision in every case awaited his return to Paris. +After his arrival the Commission on the League renewed its sittings to +consider amendments to its report, and it required over a month to put +it in final form for adoption; but during this latter period much time +was given to the actual terms of peace, which on account of the delay +caused in attempting to perfect the Covenant had taken the form of a +definitive rather than a preliminary treaty. + +It is conservative to say that between two and three months were spent +in the drafting of a document which in the end was rejected by the +Senate of the United States and was responsible for the non-ratification +of the Treaty of Versailles. In view of the warnings that President +Wilson had received as to the probable result of insisting on the plan +of a League which he had prepared and his failure to heed the warnings, +his persistency in pressing for acceptance of the Covenant before +anything else was done makes the resulting delay in the peace less +excusable. + +Two weeks after the President returned from the United States in March +the common opinion was that the drafting of the Covenant had delayed the +restoration of peace, an opinion which was endorsed in the press of many +countries. The belief became so general and aroused so much popular +condemnation that Mr. Wilson considered it necessary to make a public +denial, in which he expressed surprise at the published views and +declared that the negotiations in regard to the League of Nations had in +no way delayed the peace. Concerning the denial and the subject with +which it dealt, I made on March 28 the following memorandum: + + "The President has issued a public statement, which appears in this + morning's papers, in which he refers to the 'surprising impression' + that the discussions concerning the League of Nations have delayed + the making of peace and he flatly denies that the impression is + justified. + + "I doubt if this statement will remove the general impression which + amounts almost to a conviction. Every one knows that the President's + thoughts and a great deal of his time prior to his departure for the + United States were given to the formulation of the plan for a League + and that he insisted that the 'Covenant' should be drafted and + reported before the other features of the peace were considered. The + _real_ difficulties of the present situation, which had to be settled + before the treaty could be drafted, were postponed until his return + here on March 13th. + + "In fact the real bases of peace have only just begun to receive the + attention which they deserve. + + "If such questions as the Rhine Provinces, Poland, reparations, and + economic arrangements had been taken up by the President and Premiers + in January, and if they had sat day and night, as they are now + sitting _in camera,_ until each was settled, the peace treaty would, + I believe, be to-day on the Conference's table, if not + actually signed. + + "Of course the insistence that the plan of the League be first pushed + to a draft before all else prevented the settlement of the other + questions. Why attempt to refute what is manifestly true? I regret + that the President made the statement because I do not think that it + carries conviction. I fear that it will invite controversy and + denial, and that it puts the President on the defensive." + +The views expressed in this memorandum were those held, I believe, by +the great majority of persons who participated in the Peace Conference +or were in intimate touch with its proceedings. Mr. Wilson's published +denial may have converted some to the belief that the drafting of the +Covenant was in no way responsible for the delay of the peace, but the +number of converts must have been very few, as it meant utter ignorance +of or indifference to the circumstances which conclusively proved the +incorrectness of the statement. + +The effect of this attempt of President Wilson to check the growing +popular antipathy to the League as an obstacle to the speedy restoration +of peace was to cause speculation as to whether he really appreciated +the situation. If he did not, it was affirmed that he was ignorant of +public opinion or else was lacking in mental acuteness. If he did +appreciate the state of affairs, it was said that his statement was +uttered with the sole purpose of deceiving the people. In either case he +fell in public estimation. It shows the unwisdom of having issued +the denial. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE + + +There is one subject, connected with the consideration of the mutual +guaranty which, as finally reported by the Commission on the League of +Nations, appears as Article 10 of the Covenant, that should be briefly +reviewed, as it directly bears upon the value placed upon the guaranty +by the French statesmen who accepted it. I refer to the treaties +negotiated by France with the United States and Great Britain +respectively. These treaties provided that, in the event of France being +again attacked by Germany without provocation, the two Powers severally +agreed to come to the aid of the French Republic in repelling the +invasion. The joint nature of the undertaking was in a provision in each +treaty that a similar treaty would be signed by the other Power, +otherwise the agreement failed. The undertakings stated in practically +identical terms in the two treaties constituted, in fact, a triple +defensive alliance for the preservation of the integrity of French +territory and French independence. It had the same object as the +guaranty in the Covenant, though it went even further in the assurance +of affirmative action, and was, therefore, open to the same objections +on the grounds of constitutionality and policy as Article 10. + +In a note, dated March 20, stating my "Impressions as to the Present +Situation," I discussed the endeavors being made by the President to +overcome opposition and to remove obstacles to the acceptance of his +plan for a League of Nations by means of compromises and concessions. In +the note appears the following: + + "An instance of the lengths to which these compromises and makeshifts + are going, occurred this morning when Colonel House sent to Mr. + White, General Bliss, and me for our opinion the following proposal: + That the United States, Great Britain, and France enter into a formal + alliance to resist any aggressive action by Germany against France or + Belgium, and to employ their military, financial, and economic + resources for this purpose in addition to exerting their moral + influence to prevent such aggression. + + "We three agreed that, if that agreement was made, the chief reason + for a League of Nations, as now planned, disappeared. So far as + France and Belgium were concerned the alliance was all they needed + for their future safety. They might or might not accept the League. + Of course they would if the alliance depended upon their acceptance. + They would do most anything to get such an alliance. + + "The proposal was doubtless made to remove two provisions on which + the French are most insistent: _First_, an international military + staff to be prepared to use force against Germany if there were signs + of military activity; _second_, the creation of an independent + Rhenish Republic to act as a 'buffer' state. Of course the triple + alliance would make these measures needless. + + "What impressed me most was that to gain French support for the + League the proposer of the alliance was willing to destroy the chief + feature of the League. It seemed to me that here was utter blindness + as to the consequences of such action. There appears to have been no + thought given as to the way other nations, like Poland, Bohemia, and + the Southern Slavs, would view the formation of an alliance to + protect France and Belgium alone. Manifestly it would increase rather + than decrease their danger from Germany since she would have to look + eastward and southward for expansion. Of course they would not accept + as sufficient the guaranty in the Covenant when France and Belgium + declined to do it. + + "How would such a proposal be received in the United States with its + traditional policy of avoiding 'entangling alliances'? Of course, + when one considers it, the proposal is preposterous and would be + laughed at and rejected." + +This was the impression made upon me at the time that this triple +alliance against Germany was first proposed. I later came to look upon +it more seriously and to recognize the fact that there were some valid +reasons in favor of the proposal. The subject was not further discussed +by the Commissioners for several weeks, but it is clear from what +followed that M. Clemenceau, who naturally favored the idea, continued +to press the President to agree to the plan. What arguments were +employed to persuade him I cannot say, but, knowing the shrewdness of +the French Premier in taking advantage of a situation, my belief is that +he threatened to withdraw or at least gave the impression that he would +withdraw his support of the League of Nations or else would insist on a +provision in the Covenant creating a general staff and an international +military force and on a provision in the treaty establishing a Rhenish +Republic or else ceding to France all territory west of the Rhine. To +avoid the adoption of either of these provisions, which would have +endangered the approval of his plan for world organization, the +President submitted to the French demand. At least I assume that was the +reason, for he promised to enter into the treaty of assistance which M. +Clemenceau insisted should be signed. + +It is of course possible that he was influenced in his decision by the +belief that the knowledge that such an agreement existed would be +sufficient to deter Germany from even planning another invasion of +France, but my opinion is that the desire to win French support for the +Covenant was the chief reason for the promise that he gave. It should be +remembered that at the time both the Italians and Japanese were +threatening to make trouble unless their territorial ambitions were +satisfied. With these two Powers disaffected and showing a disposition +to refuse to accept membership in the proposed League of Nations the +opposition of France to the Covenant would have been fatal. It would +have been the end of the President's dream of a world organized to +maintain peace by an international guaranty of national boundaries and +sovereignties. Whether France would in the end have insisted on the +additional guaranty of protection I doubt, but it is evident that Mr. +Wilson believed that she would and decided to prevent a disaster to his +plan by acceding to the wishes of his French colleague. + +Some time in April prior to the acceptance of the Treaty of Peace by the +Premiers of the Allied Powers, the President and Mr. Lloyd George agreed +with M. Clemenceau to negotiate the treaties of protective alliance +which the French demanded. The President advised me of his decision on +the day before the Treaty was delivered to the German plenipotentiaries +stating in substance that his promise to enter into the alliance formed +a part of the settlements as fully as if written into the Treaty. I told +him that personally I considered an agreement to negotiate the treaty of +assistance a mistake, as it discredited Article 10 of the Covenant, +which he considered all-important, and as it would, I was convinced, be +the cause of serious opposition in the United States. He replied that he +considered it necessary to adopt this policy in the circumstances, and +that, at any rate, having passed his word with M. Clemenceau, who was +accepting the Treaty because of his promise, it was too late to +reconsider the matter and useless to discuss it. + +Subsequently the President instructed me to have a treaty drafted in +accordance with a memorandum which he sent me. This was done by Dr. +James Brown Scott and the draft was approved and prepared for signature. +On the morning of June 28, the same day on which the Treaty of +Versailles was signed, the protective treaty with France was signed at +the President's residence in the Place des Etats Unis by M. Clemenceau +and M. Pichon for the French Republic and by President Wilson and myself +for the United States, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour signing at the +same time a similar treaty for Great Britain. Though disagreeing with +the policy of the President in regard to this special treaty it would +have been futile for me to have refused to accept the full powers issued +to me on June 27 or to have declined to follow the directions to act as +a plenipotentiary in signing the document. Such a course would not have +prevented Mr. Wilson from entering into the defensive alliance with +France and Great Britain and might have actually delayed the peace. +Feeling strongly the supreme necessity of ending the existing state of +war as soon as possible I did not consider that I would be justified in +refusing to act as the formal agent of the President or in disobeying +his instructions as such agent. In view of the long delay in +ratification of the Treaty of the Peace, I have since doubted whether I +acted wisely. But at the time I was convinced that the right course was +the one which I followed. + +In spite of the fact that my judgment was contrary to the President's as +to the wisdom of negotiating this treaty because I considered the policy +of doing so bad from the standpoint of national interests and of +doubtful expediency in view of the almost certain rejection of it by the +United States Senate and of its probable effect on any plan for general +disarmament, I was not entirely satisfied because I could not disregard +the fact that an argument could be made in its favor which was not +without force. + +The United States entered the war to check the progress of the +autocratic imperialism of Germany. That purpose became generally +recognized before the victory was won. In making peace it was deemed, +therefore, a matter of first importance to make impossible a revival of +the aggressive spirit and ambitious designs of Germany. The prevailing +bitterness against France because of the territorial cessions and the +reparations demanded by the victor would naturally cause the German +people to seek future opportunity to be revenged. With a population +almost, if not quite, double that of the French Republic, Germany would +be a constant menace to the nation which had suffered so terribly in the +past by reason of the imperialistic spirit prevalent in the German +Empire. The fear of that menace strongly influenced the French policies +during the negotiations at Paris. In fact it was hard to avoid the +feeling that this fear dominated the conduct of the French delegates and +the attitude of their Government. They demanded much, and recognizing +the probable effect of their demands on the German people sought to +obtain special protection in case their vanquished enemy attempted in +the future to dispossess them by force of the land which he had been +compelled to surrender or attempted to make them restore the +indemnity paid. + +Whether France could have avoided the danger of German attack in the +future by lessening her demands, however just they might be, is neither +here nor there. It makes little practical difference how that question +is answered. The important fact is that the settlements in favor of +France under the Treaty were of a nature which made the continuance of +peace between the two nations doubtful if Germany possessed the ability +to regain her military strength and if nothing was done to prevent her +from using it. In these circumstances a special protective treaty seemed +a practical way to check the conversion of the revengeful spirit of the +Germans into another war of invasion. + +However valid this argument in favor of the two treaties of assistance, +and though my personal sympathy for France inclined me to satisfy her +wishes, my judgment, as an American Commissioner, was that American +interests and the traditional policies of the United States were against +this alliance. Possibly the President recognized the force of the +argument in favor of the treaty and valued it so highly that he +considered it decisive. Knowing, however, his general attitude toward +French demands and his confidence in the effectiveness of the guaranty +in the Covenant, I believe that the controlling reason for promising the +alliance and negotiating the treaty was his conviction that it was +necessary to make this concession to the French in order to secure their +support for the Covenant and to check the disposition in certain +quarters to make the League of Nations essentially a military coalition +under a general international staff organized and controlled by +the French. + +There were those who favored the mutual guaranty in the Covenant, but +who strongly opposed the separate treaty with France. Their objection +was that, in view of the general guaranty, the treaty of assistance was +superfluous, or, if it were considered necessary, then it discredited +the Covenant's guaranty. The argument was logical and difficult to +controvert. It was the one taken by delegates of the smaller nations who +relied on the general guaranty to protect their countries from future +aggressions on the part of their powerful neighbors. If the guaranty of +the Covenant was sufficient protection for them, they declared that it +ought to be sufficient for France. If France doubted its sufficiency, +how could they be content with it? + +Since my own judgment was against any form of guaranty imposing upon the +United States either a legal or a moral obligation to employ coercive +measures under certain conditions arising in international affairs, I +could not conscientiously support the idea of the French treaty. This +further departure from America's historic policy caused me to accept +President Wilson's "guidance and direction ... with increasing +reluctance," as he aptly expressed it in his letter of February 11, +1920. We did not agree, we could not agree, since our points of view +were so much at variance. + +Yet, in spite of the divergence of our views as to the negotiations +which constantly increased and became more and more pronounced during +the six months at Paris, our personal relations continued unchanged; at +least there was no outward evidence of the actual breach which existed. +As there never had been the personal intimacy between the President and +myself, such as existed in the case of Colonel House and a few others of +his advisers, and as our intercourse had always been more or less formal +in character, it was easier to continue the official relations that had +previously prevailed. I presume that Mr. Wilson felt, as I did, that it +would create an embarrassing situation in the negotiations if there was +an open rupture between us or if my commission was withdrawn or +surrendered and I returned to the United States before the Treaty of +Peace was signed. The effect, too, upon the situation in the Senate +would be to strengthen the opposition to the President's purposes and +furnish his personal, as well as his political, enemies with new grounds +for attacking him. + +I think, however, that our reasons for avoiding a public break in our +official relations were different. The President undoubtedly believed +that such an event would jeopardize the acceptance of the Covenant by +the United States Senate in view of the hostility to it which had +already developed and which was supplemented by the bitter animosity to +him personally which was undisguised. On my part, the chief reason for +leaving the situation undisturbed was that I was fully convinced that my +withdrawal from the American Commission would seriously delay the +restoration of peace, possibly in the signature of the Treaty at Paris +and certainly in its ratification at Washington. Considering that the +time had passed to make an attempt to change Mr. Wilson's views on any +fundamental principle, and believing it a duty to place no obstacle in +the way of the signature and ratification of the Treaty of Peace with +Germany, I felt that there was no course for me as a representative of +the United States other than to obey the President's orders however +strong my personal inclination might be to refuse to follow a line of +action which seemed to me wrong in principle and unwise in policy. + +In view of the subsequent contest between the President and the +opposition Senators over the Treaty of Versailles, resulting in its +non-ratification and the consequent delay in the restoration of a state +of peace between the United States and Germany, my failure at Paris to +decline to follow the President may be open to criticism, if not to +censure. But it can hardly be considered just to pass judgment on my +conduct by what occurred after the signature of the Treaty unless what +would occur was a foregone conclusion, and at that time it was not even +suggested that the Treaty would fail of ratification. The decision had +to be made under the conditions and expectations which then prevailed. +Unquestionably there was on June 28, 1919, a common belief that the +President would compose his differences with a sufficient number of the +Republican Senators to obtain the necessary consent of two thirds of the +Senate to the ratification of the Treaty, and that the delay in +senatorial action would be brief. I personally believed that that would +be the result, although Mr. Wilson's experience in Washington in +February and the rigid attitude, which he then assumed, might have been +a warning as to the future. Seeing the situation as I did, no man would +have been willing to imperil immediate ratification by resigning as +Commissioner on the ground that he was opposed to the President's +policies. A return to peace was at stake, and peace was the supreme need +of the world, the universal appeal of all peoples. I could not +conscientiously assume the responsibility of placing any obstacle in the +way of a return to peace at the earliest possible moment. It would have +been to do the very thing which I condemned in the President when he +prevented an early signing of the peace by insisting on the acceptance +of the Covenant of the League of Nations as a condition precedent. +Whatever the consequence of my action would have been, whether it +resulted in delay or in defeat of ratification, I should have felt +guilty of having prevented an immediate peace which from the first +seemed to me vitally important to all nations. Personal feelings and +even personal beliefs were insufficient to excuse such action. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME + + +Having reviewed the radical differences between the President and myself +in regard to the League of Nations and the inclusion of the Covenant in +the Treaty of Peace with Germany, it is necessary to revert to the early +days of the negotiations at Paris in order to explain the divergence of +our views as to the necessity of a definite programme for the American +Commission to direct it in its work and to guide its members in their +intercourse with the delegates of other countries. + +If the President had a programme, other than the general principles and +the few territorial settlements included in his Fourteen Points, and the +generalities contained in his "subsequent addresses," he did not show a +copy of the programme to the Commissioners or advise them of its +contents. The natural conclusion was that he had never worked out in +detail the application of his announced principles or put into concrete +form the specific settlements which he had declared ought to be in the +terms of peace. The definition of the principles, the interpretation of +the policies, and the detailing of the provisions regarding territorial +settlements were not apparently attempted by Mr. Wilson. They were in +large measure left uncertain by the phrases in which they were +delivered. Without authoritative explanation, interpretation, or +application to actual facts they formed incomplete and inadequate +instructions to Commissioners who were authorized "to negotiate peace." + +An examination of the familiar Fourteen Points uttered by the President +in his address of January 8, 1918, will indicate the character of the +declarations, which may be, by reason of their thought and expression, +termed "Wilsonian" (Appendix IV, p. 314). The first five Points are +announcements of principle which should govern the peace negotiations. +The succeeding eight Points refer to territorial adjustments, but make +no attempt to define actual boundaries, so essential in conducting +negotiations regarding territory. The Fourteenth Point relates to the +formation of "a general association of the nations for the purpose of +affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial +integrity to great and small nations alike." + +It is hardly worth while to say that the Fourteen Points and the four +principles declared in the address of February 11, 1918 (Appendix V), do +not constitute a sufficient programme for negotiators. Manifestly they +are too indefinite in specific application. They were never intended for +that purpose when they were proclaimed. They might have formed a general +basis for the preparation of instructions for peace commissioners, but +they omitted too many of the essentials to be considered actual +instructions, while the lack of definite terms to-be included in a +treaty further deprived them of that character. Such important and +practical subjects as reparations, financial arrangements, the use and +control of waterways, and other questions of a like nature, are not even +mentioned. As a general statement of the bases of peace the Fourteen +Points and subsequent declarations probably served a useful purpose, +though some critics would deny it, but as a working programme for the +negotiation of a treaty they were inadequate, if not wholly useless. + +Believing in the autumn of 1918 that the end of the war was approaching +and assuming that the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference +would have to be furnished with detailed written instructions as to the +terms of the treaty to be signed, I prepared on September 21, 1918, a +memorandum of my views as to the territorial settlements which would +form, not instructions, but a guide in the drafting of instructions for +the American Commissioners. At the time I had no intimation that the +President purposed to be present in person at the peace table and had +not even thought of such a possibility. The memorandum, which follows, +was written with the sole purpose of being ready to draft definite +instructions which could be submitted to the President when the time +came to prepare for the negotiation of the peace. The memorandum +follows: + + "The present Russian situation, which is unspeakably horrible and + which seems beyond present hope of betterment, presents new problems + to be solved at the peace table. + + "The Pan-Germans now have in shattered and impotent Russia the + opportunity to develop an alternative or supplemental scheme to their + 'Mittel-Europa' project. German domination over Southern Russia would + offer as advantageous, if not a more advantageous, route to the + Persian Gulf than through the turbulent Balkans and unreliable + Turkey. If both routes, north and south of the Black Sea, could be + controlled, the Pan-Germans would have gained more than they dreamed + of obtaining. I believe, however, that Bulgaria fears the Germans and + will be disposed to resist German domination possibly to the extent + of making a separate peace with the Allies. Nevertheless, if the + Germans could obtain the route north of the Black Sea, they would + with reason consider the war a successful venture because it would + give them the opportunity to rebuild the imperial power and to carry + out the Prussian ambition of world-mastery. + + "The treaty of peace must not leave Germany in possession directly or + indirectly of either of these routes to the Orient. There must be + territorial barriers erected to prevent that Empire from ever being + able by political or economic penetration to become dominant in + those regions. + + "With this in view I would state the essentials for a stable peace as + follows, though I do so in the most tentative way because conditions + may change materially. These 'essentials' relate to territory and + waters, and do not deal with military protection. + + "_First._ The complete abrogation or denouncement of the + Brest-Litovsk Treaty and all treaties relating in any way to Russian + territory or commerce; and also the same action as to the Treaty of + Bucharest. This applies to all treaties made by the German Empire or + Germany's allies. + + "_Second._ The Baltic Provinces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia + should be autonomous states of a Russian Confederation. + + "_Third_. Finland raises a different question and it should be + carefully considered whether it should not be an independent state. + + "_Fourth_. An independent Poland, composed of Polish provinces of + Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and in possession of the port + of Danzig. + + "_Fifth_. An independent state, either single or federal composed of + Bohemia, Slovakia, and Moravia (and possibly a portion of Silesia) + and possessing an international right of way by land or water to a + free port. + + "_Sixth_. The Ukraine to be a state of the Russian Confederation, to + which should be annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire + in which the Ruthenians predominate. + + "_Seventh_. Roumania, in addition to her former territory, should + ultimately be given sovereignty over Bessarabia, Transylvania, and + the upper portion of the Dobrudja, leaving the central mouth of the + Danube as the boundary of Bulgaria, or else the northern half. (As to + the boundary there is doubt.) + + "_Eighth_. The territories in which the Jugo-Slavs predominate, + namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should + be united with Serbia and Montenegro forming a single or a federal + state. The sovereignty over Trieste or some other port should be + later settled in drawing a boundary line between the new state and + Italy. My present view is that there should be a good Jugo-Slav port. + + "_Ninth_. Hungary should be separated from Austria and possess rights + of free navigation of the Danube. + + "_Tenth_. Restoration to Italy of all the Italian provinces of + Austria. Italy's territory to extend along the northern Adriatic + shore to the Jugo-Slav boundary. Certain ports on the eastern side of + the Adriatic should be considered as possible naval bases of Italy. + (This last is doubtful.) + + "_Eleventh._ Reduction of Austria to the ancient boundaries and title + of the Archduchy of Austria. Incorporation of Archduchy in the + Imperial German Confederation. Austrian outlet to the sea would be + like that of Baden and Saxony through German ports on the North Sea + and the Baltic. + + "_Twelfth_. The boundaries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to follow + in general those established after the First Balkan War, though + Bulgaria should surrender to Greece more of the Aegean coast and + obtain the southern half only of the Dobrudja (or else as far as the + Danube) and the Turkish territory up to the district surrounding + Constantinople, to be subsequently decided upon. + + "_Thirteenth_. Albania to be under Italian or Serbian sovereignty or + incorporated in the Jugo-Slav Confederation. + + "_Fourteenth._ Greece to obtain more of the Aegean littoral at the + expense of Bulgaria, the Greek-inhabited islands adjacent to Asia + Minor and possibly certain ports and adjoining territory in + Asia Minor. + + "_Fifteenth._ The Ottoman Empire to be reduced to Anatolia and have + no possessions in Europe. (This requires consideration.) + + "_Sixteenth_. Constantinople to be erected into an international + protectorate surrounded by a land zone to allow for expansion of + population. The form of government to be determined upon by an + international commission or by one Government acting as the mandatory + of the Powers. The commission or mandatory to have the regulation and + control of the navigation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as + international waterways. + + "_Seventeenth._ Armenia and Syria to be erected into protectorates of + such Government or Governments as seems expedient from a domestic as + well as an international point of view; the guaranty being that both + countries will be given self-government as soon as possible and that + an 'Open-Door' policy as to commerce and industrial development will + be rigidly observed. + + "_Eighteenth._ Palestine to be an autonomous state under a general + international protectorate or under the protectorate of a Power + designated to act as the mandatory of the Powers. + + "_Nineteenth._ Arabia to receive careful consideration as to the full + or partial sovereignty of the state or states established. + + "_Twentieth_. Great Britain to have the sovereignty of Egypt, or a + full protectorate over it. + + "_Twenty-first._ Persia to be freed from all treaties establishing + spheres of influence. Rigid application of the 'Open-Door' policy in + regard to commercial and industrial development. + + "_Twenty-second._ All Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France + without conditions. + + "_Twenty-third._ Belgium to be restored to full sovereignty. + + "_Twenty-fourth._ A consideration of the union of Luxemburg to + Belgium. (This is open to question.) + + "_Twenty-fifth._ The Kiel Canal to be internationalized and an + international zone twenty miles from the Canal on either side to be + erected which should be, with the Canal, under the control and + regulation of Denmark as the mandatory of the Powers. (This last is + doubtful.) + + "_Twenty-sixth._ All land north of the Kiel Canal Zone to be ceded to + Denmark. + + "_Twenty-seventh._ The fortifications of the Kiel Canal and of + Heligoland to be dismantled. Heligoland to be ceded to Denmark. + + "_Twenty-eighth._ The sovereignty of the archipelago of Spitzbergen + to be granted to Norway. + + "_Twenty-ninth._ The disposition of the colonial possessions formerly + belonging to Germany to be determined by an international commission + having in mind the interests of the inhabitants and the possibility + of employing these colonies as a means of indemnification for wrongs + done. The 'Open-Door' policy should be guaranteed. + + "While the foregoing definitive statement as to territory contains my + views at the present time (September 21, 1918), I feel that no + proposition should be considered unalterable, as further study and + conditions which have not been disclosed may materially change + some of them. + + "Three things must constantly be kept in mind, the natural stability + of race, language, and nationality, the necessity of every nation + having an outlet to the sea so that it may maintain its own merchant + marine, and the imperative need of rendering Germany impotent as a + military power." + +Later I realized that another factor should be given as important a +place in the terms of peace as any of the three, namely, the economic +interdependence of adjoining areas and the mutual industrial benefit to +their inhabitants by close political affiliation. This factor in the +territorial settlements made more and more impression upon me as it was +disclosed by a detailed study of the numerous problems which the Peace +Conference had to solve. + +I made other memoranda on various subjects relating to the general peace +for the purpose of crystallizing my ideas, so that I could lay them in +concrete form before the President when the time came to draft +instructions for the American plenipotentiaries charged with the +negotiation of the Treaty of Peace. When the President reached the +decision to attend the Conference and to direct in person the +negotiations, it became evident that, in place of the instructions +customarily issued to negotiators, a more practical and proper form of +defining the objects to be sought by the United States would be an +outline of a treaty setting forth in detail the features of the peace, +or else a memorandum containing definite declarations of policy in +regard to the numerous problems presented. Unless there was some +framework of this sort on which to build, it would manifestly be very +embarrassing for the American Commissioners in their intercourse with +their foreign colleagues, as they would be unable to discuss +authoritatively or even informally the questions at issue or express +opinions upon them without the danger of unwittingly opposing the +President's wishes or of contradicting the views which might be +expressed by some other of their associates on the American Commission. +A definite plan seemed essential if the Americans were to take any part +in the personal exchanges of views which are so usual during the +progress of negotiations. + +Prior to the departure of the American delegation from the United States +and for two weeks after their arrival in Paris, it was expected that the +President would submit to the Commissioners for their guidance a +_projet_ of a treaty or a very complete programme as to policies. +Nothing, however, was done, and in the conferences which took place +between the President and his American associates he confined his +remarks almost exclusively to the League of Nations and to his plan for +its organization. It was evident--at least that was the natural +inference--that President Wilson was without a programme of any sort or +even of a list of subjects suitable as an outline for the preparation of +a programme. How he purposed to conduct the negotiations no one seemed +to know. It was all very uncertain and unsatisfactory. + +In the circumstances, which seemed to be due to the President's failure +to appreciate the necessity for a definite programme, I felt that +something ought to be done, as the probable result would be that the +terms of the Treaty, other than the provisions regarding a League of +Nations, would be drafted by foreign delegates and not by the President. + +Impressed by the unsatisfactory state of affairs and desirous of +remedying it if possible, I asked Dr. James Brown Scott and Mr. David +Hunter Miller, the legal advisers of the American Commission, to prepare +a skeleton treaty covering the subjects to be dealt with in the +negotiations which could be used in working out a complete programme. +After several conferences with these advisers concerning the subjects to +be included and their arrangement in the Treaty, the work was +sufficiently advanced to lay before the Commissioners. Copies were, +therefore, furnished to them with the request that they give the +document consideration in order that they might make criticisms and +suggest changes. I had not sent a copy to the President, intending to +await the views of my colleagues before doing so, but during the +conference of January 10, to which I have been compelled reluctantly to +refer in discussing the Covenant of the League of Nations, I mentioned +the fact that our legal advisers had been for some time at work on a +"skeleton treaty" and had made a tentative draft. The President at once +showed his displeasure and resented the action taken, evidently +considering the request that a draft be prepared to be a usurpation of +his authority to direct the activities of the Commission. It was this +incident which called forth his remark, to which reference was made in +Chapter VIII, that he did not propose to have lawyers drafting +the Treaty. + +In view of Mr. Wilson's attitude it was useless for Dr. Scott and Mr. +Miller to proceed with their outline of a treaty or for the +Commissioners to give consideration to the tentative draft already made. +It was a disagreeable situation. If the President had had anything, +however crude and imperfect it might have been, to submit in place of +the Scott-Miller draft, it would have been a different matter and +removed to an extent the grounds for complaint at his attitude. But he +offered nothing at all as a substitute. It is fair to assume that he had +no programme prepared and was unwilling to have any one else make a +tentative one for his consideration. It left the American Commission +without a chart marking out the course which they were to pursue in the +negotiations and apparently without a pilot who knew the channel. + +Six days after the enforced abandonment of the plan to prepare a +skeleton treaty as a foundation for a definite and detailed programme, I +made the following note which expresses my views on the situation at +that time: + + "_January_ 16, 1919 + + "No plan of work has been prepared. Unless something is done we will + be here for many weeks, possibly for months. After the President's + remarks the other day about a draft-treaty no one except the + President would think of preparing a plan. He must do it himself, and + he is not doing it. He has not even given us a list of subjects to be + considered and of course has made no division of our labors. + + "If the President does not take up this matter of organization and + systematically apportion the subjects between us, we may possibly + have no peace before June. This would be preposterous because with + proper order and division of questions we ought to have a treaty + signed by April first. + + "I feel as if we, the Commissioners, were like a lot of skilled + workmen who are ordered to build a house. We have the materials and + tools, but there are no plans and specifications and no + master-workman in charge of the construction. We putter around in an + aimless sort of way and get nowhere. + + "With all his natural capacity the President seems to lack the + faculty of employing team-work and of adopting a system to utilize + the brains of other men. It is a decided defect in an executive. He + would not make a good head of a governmental department. The result + is, so far as our Commission is concerned, a state of confusion and + uncertainty with a definite loss and delay through effort being + undirected." + +On several occasions I spoke to the President about a programme for the +work of the Commission and its corps of experts, but he seemed +indisposed to consider the subject and gave the impression that he +intended to call on the experts for his own information which would be +all that was necessary. I knew that Colonel House, through Dr. Mezes, +the head of the organization, was directing the preparation of certain +data, but whether he was doing so under the President's directions I did +not know, though I presumed such was the case. Whatever data were +furnished did not, however, pass through the hands of the other +Commissioners who met every morning in my office to exchange information +and discuss matters pertaining to the negotiations and to direct the +routine work of the Commission. + +It is difficult, even with the entire record of the proceedings at Paris +before one, to find a satisfactory explanation for the President's +objection to having a definite programme other than the general +declarations contained in the Fourteen Points and his "subsequent +addresses." It may be that he was unwilling to bind himself to a fixed +programme, since it would restrict him, to an extent, in his freedom of +action and prevent him from assuming any position which seemed to him +expedient at the time when a question arose during the negotiations. It +may be that he did not wish to commit himself in any way to the contents +of a treaty until the Covenant of the League of Nations had been +accepted. It may be that he preferred not to let the American +Commissioners know his views, as they would then be in a position to +take an active part in the informal discussions which he apparently +wished to handle alone. None of these explanations is at all +satisfactory, and yet any one of them may be the true one. + +Whatever was the chief reason for the President's failure to furnish a +working plan to the American Commissioners, he knowingly adopted the +policy and clung to it with the tenacity of purpose which has been one +of the qualities of mind that account for his great successes and for +his great failures. I use the adverb "knowingly" because it had been +made clear to him that, in the judgment of others, the Commissioners +ought to have the guidance furnished by a draft-treaty or by a definite +statement of policies no matter how tentative or subject to change the +draft or statement might be. + +On the day that the President left Paris to return to the United States +(February 14, 1919) I asked him if he had any instructions for the +Commissioners during his absence concerning the settlements which should +be included in the preliminary treaty of peace, as it was understood +that the Council of Ten would continue its sessions for the +consideration of the subjects requiring investigation and decision. The +President replied that he had no instructions, that the decisions could +wait until he returned, though the hearings could proceed and reports +could be made during his absence. Astonished as I was at this wish to +delay these matters, I suggested to him the subjects which I thought +ought to go into the Treaty. He answered that he did not care to discuss +them at that time, which, as he was about to depart from Paris, meant +that everything must rest until he had returned from his visit to +Washington. + +Since I was the head of the American Commission when the President was +absent and became the spokesman for the United States on the Council of +Ten, this refusal to disclose his views even in a general way placed me +in a very awkward position. Without instructions and without knowledge +of the President's wishes or purposes the conduct of the negotiations +was difficult and progress toward actual settlements practically +impossible. As a matter of fact the Council did accomplish a great +amount of work, while the President was away, in the collection of data +and preparing questions for final settlement. But so far as deciding +questions was concerned, which ought to have been the principal duty of +the Council of Ten, it simply "marked time," as I had no power to decide +or even to express an authoritative opinion on any subject. It showed +very clearly that the President intended to do everything himself and to +allow no one to act for him unless it was upon some highly technical +matter. All actual decisions in regard to the terms of peace which +involved policy were thus forced to await his time and pleasure. + +Even after Mr. Wilson returned to Paris and resumed his place as head of +the American delegation he was apparently without a programme. On March +20, six days after his return, I made a note that "the President, so far +as I can judge, has yet no definite programme," and that I was unable to +"find that he has talked over a plan of a treaty even with Colonel +House." It is needless to quote the thoughts, which I recorded at the +time, in regard to the method in which the President was handling a +great international negotiation, a method as unusual as it was unwise. I +referred to Colonel House's lack of information concerning the +President's purposes because he was then and had been from the beginning +on more intimate terms with the President than any other American. If he +did not know the President's mind, it was safe to assume that no +one knew it. + +I had, as has been stated, expressed to Mr. Wilson my views as to what +the procedure should be and had obtained no action. With the +responsibility resting on him for the conduct and success of the +negotiations and with his constitutional authority to exercise his own +judgment in regard to every matter pertaining to the treaty, there was +nothing further to be done in relieving the situation of the American +Commissioners from embarrassment or in inducing the President to adopt a +better course than the haphazard one that he was pursuing. + +It is apparent that we differed radically as to the necessity for a +clearly defined programme and equally so as to the advantages to be +gained by having a draft-treaty made or a full statement prepared +embodying the provisions to be sought by the United States in the +negotiations. I did not attempt to hide my disapproval of the vagueness +and uncertainty of the President's method, and there is no doubt in my +own mind that Mr. Wilson was fully cognizant of my opinion. How far this +lack of system in the work of the Commission and the failure to provide +a plan for a treaty affected the results written into the Treaty of +Versailles is speculative, but my belief is that they impaired in many +particulars the character of the settlements by frequent abandonment of +principle for the sake of expediency. + +The want of a programme or even of an unwritten plan as to the +negotiations was further evidenced by the fact that the President, +certainly as late as March 19, had not made up his mind whether the +treaty which was being negotiated should be preliminary or final. He had +up to that time the peculiar idea that a preliminary treaty was in the +nature of a _modus vivendi_ which could be entered into independently by +the Executive and which would restore peace without going through the +formalities of senatorial consent to ratification. + +The purpose of Mr. Wilson, so far as one could judge, was to include in +a preliminary treaty of the sort that he intended to negotiate, the +entire Covenant of the League of Nations and other principal +settlements, binding the signatories to repeat these provisions in the +final and definitive treaty when that was later negotiated. By this +method peace would be at once restored, the United States and other +nations associated with it in the war would be obligated to renew +diplomatic and consular relations with Germany, and commercial +intercourse would follow as a matter of course. All this was to be done +without going through the American constitutional process of obtaining +the advice and consent of the Senate to the Covenant and to the +principal settlements. The intent seemed to be to respond to the popular +demand for an immediate peace and at the same time to checkmate the +opponents of the Covenant in the Senate by having the League of Nations +organized and functioning before the definitive treaty was laid before +that body. + +When the President advanced this extraordinary theory of the nature of a +preliminary treaty during a conversation, of which I made a full +memorandum, I told him that it was entirely wrong, that by whatever name +the document was called, whether it was "armistice," "agreement," +"protocol," or "_modus_," it would be a treaty and would have to be sent +by him to the Senate for its approval. I said, "If we change the +_status_ from war to peace, it has to be by a ratified treaty. There is +no other way save by a joint resolution of Congress." At this statement +the President was evidently much perturbed. He did not accept it as +conclusive, for he asked me to obtain the opinion of others on the +subject. He was evidently loath to abandon the plan that he had +presumably worked out as a means of preventing the Senate from rejecting +or modifying the Covenant before it came into actual operation. It seems +almost needless to say that all the legal experts, among them Thomas W. +Gregory, the retiring Attorney-General of the United States, who chanced +to be in Paris at the time, agreed with my opinion, and upon being so +informed the President abandoned his purpose. + +It is probable that the conviction, which was forced upon Mr. Wilson, +that he could not independently of the Senate put into operation a +preliminary treaty, determined him to abandon that type of treaty and to +proceed with the negotiation of a definitive one. At least I had by +March 30 reached the conclusion that there would be no preliminary +treaty as is disclosed by the following memorandum written on that day: + + "I am sure now that there will be no preliminary treaty of peace, but + that the treaty will be complete and definitive. This is a serious + mistake. Time should be given for passions to cool. The operations of + a preliminary treaty should be tested and studied. It would hasten a + restoration of peace. Certainly this is the wise course as to + territorial settlements and the financial and economic burdens to be + imposed upon Germany. The same comment applies to the organization of + a League of Nations. Unfortunately the President insists on a + full-blown Covenant and not a declaration of principles. This has + much to do with preventing a preliminary treaty, since he wishes to + make the League an agent for enforcement of definite terms. + + "When the President departed for the United States in February, I + assumed and I am certain that he had in mind that there would be a + preliminary treaty. With that in view I drafted at the time a + memorandum setting forth what the preliminary treaty of peace should + contain. Here are the subjects I then set down: + + "1. Restoration of Peace and official relations. + + "2. Restoration of commercial and financial relations subject to + conditions. + + "3. Renunciation by Germany of all territory and territorial rights + outside of Europe. + + "4. Minimum territory of Germany in Europe, the boundaries to be + fixed in the Definitive Treaty. + + "5. Maximum military and naval establishments and production of arms + and munitions. + + "6. Maximum amount of money and property to be surrendered by Germany + with time limits for payment and delivery. + + "7. German property and territory to be held as security by the + Allies until the Definitive Treaty is ratified. + + "8. Declaration as to the organization of a League of Nations. + + "The President's obsession as to a League of Nations blinds him to + everything else. An immediate peace is nothing to him compared to the + adoption of the Covenant. The whole world wants peace. The President + wants his League. I think that the world will have to wait." + +The eight subjects, above stated, were the ones which I called to the +President's attention at the time he was leaving Paris for the United +States and which he said he did not care to discuss. + +The views that are expressed in the memorandum of March 30 are those +that I have continued to hold. The President was anxious to have the +Treaty, even though preliminary in character, contain detailed rather +than general provisions, especially as to the League of Nations. With +that view I entirely disagreed, as detailed terms of settlement and the +articles of the Covenant as proposed would cause discussion and +unquestionably delay the peace. To restore the peaceful intercourse +between the belligerents, to open the long-closed channels of commerce, +and to give to the war-stricken peoples of Europe opportunity to resume +their normal industrial life seemed to me the first and greatest task to +be accomplished. It was in my judgment superior to every other object of +the Paris negotiations. Compared with it the creation of a League of +Nations was insignificant and could well be postponed. President Wilson +thought otherwise. We were very far apart in this matter as he well +knew, and he rightly assumed that I followed his instructions with +reluctance, and, he might have added, with grave concern. + +As a matter of interest in this connection and as a possible source from +which the President may have acquired knowledge of my views as to the +conduct of the negotiations, I would call attention again to the +conference which I had with Colonel House on December 17, 1918, and to +which I have referred in connection with the subject of international +arbitration. During that conference I said to the Colonel "that I +thought that there ought to be a preliminary treaty of peace negotiated +without delay, and that all the details as to a League of Nations, +boundaries, and indemnities should wait for the time being. The Colonel +replied that he was not so sure about delaying the creation of a League, +as he was afraid that it never could be put through unless it was done +at once. I told him that possibly he was right, but that I was opposed +to anything which delayed the peace." This quotation is from my +memorandum made at the time of our conversation. I think that the same +reason for insisting on negotiating the Covenant largely influenced the +course of the President. My impression at the time was that the Colonel +favored a preliminary treaty provided that there was included in it the +full plan for a League of Nations, which to me seemed to be +impracticable. + +There can be little doubt that, if there had been a settled programme +prepared or a tentative treaty drafted, there would have been a +preliminary treaty which might and probably would have postponed the +negotiations as to a League. Possibly the President realized that this +danger of excluding the Covenant existed and for that reason was +unwilling to make a definite programme or to let a draft-treaty be +drawn. At least it may have added another reason for his proceeding +without advising the Commissioners of his purposes. + +As I review the entire negotiations and the incidents which took place +at Paris, President Wilson's inherent dislike to depart in the least +from an announced course, a characteristic already referred to, seems to +me to have been the most potent influence in determining his method of +work during the Peace Conference. He seemed to think that, having marked +out a definite plan of action, any deviation from it would show +intellectual weakness or vacillation of purpose. Even when there could +be no doubt that in view of changed conditions it was wise to change a +policy, which he had openly adopted or approved, he clung to it with +peculiar tenacity refusing or merely failing to modify it. Mr. Wilson's +mind once made up seemed to become inflexible. It appeared to grow +impervious to arguments and even to facts. It lacked the elasticity and +receptivity which have always been characteristic of sound judgment and +right thinking. He might break, but he would not bend. This rigidity of +mind accounts in large measure for the deplorable, and, as it seemed to +me, needless, conflict between the President and the Senate over the +Treaty of Versailles. It accounts for other incidents in his career +which have materially weakened his influence and cast doubts on his +wisdom. It also accounts, in my opinion, for the President's failure to +prepare or to adopt a programme at Paris or to commit himself to a draft +of a treaty as a basis for the negotiations, which failure, I am +convinced, not only prevented the signature of a short preliminary +treaty of peace, but lost Mr. Wilson the leadership in the proceedings, +as the statesmen of the other Great Powers outlined the Treaty +negotiated and suggested the majority of the articles which were written +into it. It would have made a vast difference if the President had known +definitely what he sought, but he apparently did not. He dealt in +generalities leaving, but not committing, to others their definition and +application. He was always in the position of being able to repudiate +the interpretation which others might place upon his declarations of +principle. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +SECRET DIPLOMACY + + +Another matter, concerning which the President and I disagreed, was the +secrecy with which the negotiations were carried on between him and the +principal European statesmen, incidental to which was the willingness, +if not the desire, to prevent the proceedings and decisions from +becoming known even to the delegates of the smaller nations which were +represented at the Peace Conference. + +Confidential personal interviews were to a certain extent unavoidable +and necessary, but to conduct the entire negotiation through a small +group sitting behind closed doors and to shroud their proceedings with +mystery and uncertainty made a very unfortunate impression on those who +were not members of the secret councils. + +At the first there was no Council of the Heads of States (the so-called +Council of Four); in fact it was not recognized as an organized body +until the latter part of March, 1919. Prior to that time the directing +body of the Conference was the self-constituted Council of Ten composed +of the President and the British, French, and Italian Premiers with +their Secretaries or Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and two Japanese +delegates of ambassadorial rank. This Council had a membership identical +with that of the Supreme War Council, which controlled the armistices, +their enforcement, and other military matters. It assumed authority over +the negotiations and proceedings of the Conference, though it was never +authorized so to do by the body of delegates. The Council of Four, when +later formed, was equally without a mandate from the Conference. They +assumed the authority and exercised it as a matter of right. + +From the time of his arrival in Paris President Wilson held almost daily +conversations with the leading foreign statesmen. It would be of little +value to speculate on what took place at these interviews, since the +President seldom told the American Commission of the meetings or +disclosed to them, unless possibly to Colonel House, the subjects which +were discussed. My conviction is, from the little information which the +President volunteered, that these consultations were--certainly at +first--devoted to inducing the European leaders to give their support to +his plan for a League of Nations, and that, as other matters relating to +the terms of peace were in a measure involved because of their possible +relation to the functions of the League, they too became more and more +subjects of discussion. + +The introduction of this personal and clandestine method of negotiation +was probably due to the President's belief that he could in this way +exercise more effectively his personal influence in favor of the +acceptance of a League. It is not unlikely that this belief was in a +measure justified. In Colonel House he found one to aid him in this +course of procedure, as the Colonel's intimate association with the +principal statesmen of the Allied Powers during previous visits to +Europe as the President's personal envoy was an asset which he could +utilize as an intermediary between the President and those with whom he +wished to confer. Mr. Wilson relied upon Colonel House for his knowledge +of the views and temperaments of the men with whom he had to deal. It +was not strange that he should adopt a method which the Colonel had +found successful in the past and that he should seek the latter's aid +and advice in connection with the secret conferences which usually took +place at the residence of the President. + +Mr. Wilson pursued this method of handling the subjects of negotiation +the more readily because he was by nature and by inclination secretive. +He had always shown a preference for a private interview with an +individual. In his conduct of the executive affairs of the Government at +Washington he avoided as far as possible general conferences. He talked +a good deal about "taking common counsel," but showed no disposition to +put it into practice. He followed the same course in the matter of +foreign affairs. At Paris this characteristic, which had often been the +subject of remark in Washington, was more pronounced, or at least more +noticeable. He was not disposed to discuss matters with the American +Commission as a whole or even to announce to them his decisions unless +something arose which compelled him to do so. He easily fell into the +practice of seeing men separately and of keeping secret the knowledge +acquired as well as the effect of this knowledge on his views and +purposes. To him this was the normal and most satisfactory method of +doing business. + +From the time that the President arrived in Paris up to the time that +the Commission on the League of Nations made its report--that is, from +December 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919--the negotiations regarding the +League were conducted with great secrecy. Colonel House, the President's +collaborator in drafting the Covenant, if he was not, as many believed, +the real author, was the only American with whom Mr. Wilson freely +conferred and to whom he confided the progress that he was making in his +interviews with the foreign statesmen, at many of which interviews the +Colonel was present. It is true that the President held an occasional +conference with all the American Commissioners, but these conferences +were casual and perfunctory in nature and were very evidently not for +the purpose of obtaining the opinions and counsel of the Commissioners. +There was none of the frankness that should have existed between the +Chief Executive and his chosen agents and advisers. The impression made +was that he summoned the conferences to satisfy the _amour propre_ of +the Commissioners rather than out of any personal wish to do so. + +The consequence was that the American Commissioners, other than Colonel +House, were kept in almost complete ignorance of the preliminary +negotiations and were left to gather such information as they were able +from the delegates of other Powers, who, naturally assuming that the +Americans possessed the full confidence of the President, spoke with +much freedom. As Mr. Wilson never held a conference with the American +Commission from the first meeting of the Commission on the League of +Nations until its report was printed, his American colleagues did not +know, except indirectly, of the questions at issue or of the progress +that was being made. The fact is that, as the Commission on the League +met in Colonel House's office at the Hotel Crillon, his office force +knew far more about the proceedings than did the three American +Commissioners who were not present. As the House organization made no +effort to hide the fact that they had inside information, the +representatives of the press as a consequence frequented the office of +the Colonel in search of the latest news concerning the Commission on +the League of Nations. + +But, in addition to the embarrassment caused the American Commissioners +and the unenviable position in which they were placed by the secrecy +with which the President surrounded his intercourse with the foreign +statesmen and the proceedings of the Commission on the League of +Nations, his secret negotiations caused the majority of the delegates to +the Conference and the public at large to lose in a large measure their +confidence in the actuality of his devotion to "open diplomacy," which +he had so unconditionally proclaimed in the first of his Fourteen +Points. If the policy of secrecy had ceased with the discussions +preliminary to the organization of the Conference, or even with those +preceding the meetings of the Commission on the League of Nations, +criticism and complaint would doubtless have ceased, but as the +negotiations progressed the secrecy of the conferences of the leaders +increased rather than decreased, culminating at last in the organization +of the Council of Four, the most powerful and most seclusive of the +councils which directed the proceedings at Paris. Behind closed doors +these four individuals, who controlled the policies of the United +States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, passed final judgment on the +mass of articles which entered into the Treaties of Peace, but kept +their decisions secret except from the committee which was drafting +the articles. + +The organization of the Council of Four and the mystery which enveloped +its deliberations emphasized as nothing else could have done the +secretiveness with which adjustments were being made and compromises +were being effected. It directed attention also to the fact that the +Four Great Powers had taken supreme control of settling the terms of +peace, that they were primates among the assembled nations and that they +intended to have their authority acknowledged. This extraordinary +secrecy and arrogation of power by the Council of Four excited +astonishment and complaint throughout the body of delegates to the +Conference, and caused widespread criticism in the press and among the +people of many countries. + +A week after the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of the +Heads of States, the official title of the Council of Four, and the +Council of Foreign Ministers, the official title of the Council of Five +(popularly nick-named "The Big Four" and "The Little Five"), I made the +following note on the subject of secret negotiations: + + "After the experience of the last three months [January-March, 1919] + I am convinced that the method of personal interviews and private + conclaves is a failure. It has given every opportunity for intrigue, + plotting, bargaining, and combining. The President, as I now see it, + should have insisted on everything being brought before the Plenary + Conference. He would then have had the confidence and support of all + the smaller nations because they would have looked up to him as their + champion and guide. They would have followed him. + + "The result of the present method has been to destroy their faith and + arouse their resentment. They look upon the President as in favor of + a world ruled by Five Great Powers, an international despotism of the + strong, in which the little nations are merely rubber-stamps. + + "The President has undoubtedly found himself in a most difficult + position. He has put himself on a level with politicians experienced + in intrigue, whom he will find a pretty difficult lot. He will sink + in the estimation of the delegates who are not within the inner + circle, and what will be still more disastrous will be the loss of + confidence among the peoples of the nations represented here. A + grievous blunder has been made." + +The views, which I expressed in this note in regard to the unwisdom of +the President's course, were not new at the time that I wrote them. Over +two months before I had watched the practice of secret negotiation with +apprehension as to what the effect would be upon the President's +influence and standing with the delegates to the Conference. I then +believed that he was taking a dangerous course which he would in the end +regret. So strong was this conviction that during a meeting, which the +President held with the American Commissioners on the evening of January +29, I told him bluntly--perhaps too bluntly from the point of view of +policy--that I considered the secret interviews which he was holding +with the European statesmen, where no witnesses were present, were +unwise, that he was far more successful in accomplishment and less +liable to be misunderstood if he confined his negotiating to the Council +of Ten, and that, furthermore, acting through the Council he would be +much less subject to public criticism. I supported these views with the +statement that the general secrecy, which was being practiced, was +making a very bad impression everywhere, and for that reason, if for no +other, I was opposed to it. The silence with which the President +received my remarks appeared to me significant of his attitude toward +this advice, and his subsequent continuance of secret methods without +change, unless it was to increase the secrecy, proved that our judgments +were not in accord on the subject. The only result of my +representations, it would seem, was to cause Mr. Wilson to realize that +I was not in sympathy with his way of conducting the negotiations. In +the circumstances I think now that it was a blunder on my part to have +stated my views so frankly. + +Two days after I wrote the note, which is quoted (April 2, 1919), I made +another note more general in character, but in which appears the +following: + + "Everywhere there are developing bitterness and resentment against a + secretiveness which is interpreted to mean failure. The patience of + the people is worn threadbare. Their temper has grown ragged. They + are sick of whispering diplomats. + + "Muttered confidences, secret intrigues, and the tactics of the + 'gum-shoer' are discredited. The world wants none of them these days. + It despises and loathes them. What the world asks are honest + declarations openly proclaimed. The statesman who seeks to gain his + end by tortuous and underground ways is foolish or badly advised. The + public man who is sly and secretive rather than frank and bold, whose + methods are devious rather than obvious, pursues a dangerous path + which leads neither to glory nor to success. + + "Secret diplomacy, the bane of the past, is a menace from which man + believed himself to be rid. He who resurrects it invites + condemnation. The whole world will rejoice when the day of the + whisperer is over." + +This note, read at the present time, sounds extravagant in thought and +intemperate in expression. It was written under the influence of +emotions which had been deeply stirred by the conditions then existing. +Time usually softens one's judgments and the passage of events makes +less vivid one's impressions. The perspective, however, grows clearer +and the proportions more accurate when the observer stands at a +distance. While the language of the note might well be changed and made +less florid, the thought needs little modification. The public criticism +was widespread and outspoken, and from the expressions used it was very +evident that there prevailed a general popular disapproval of the way +the negotiations were being conducted. The Council of Four won the +press-name of "The Olympians," and much was said of "the thick cloud of +mystery" which hid them from the anxious multitudes, and of the secrecy +which veiled their deliberations. The newspapers and the correspondents +at Paris openly complained and the delegates to the Conference in a more +guarded way showed their bitterness at the overlordship assumed by the +leading statesmen of the Great Powers and the secretive methods which +they employed. It was, as may be gathered from the note quoted, a +distressing and depressing time. + +As concrete examples of the evils of secret negotiations the "Fiume +Affair" and the "Shantung Settlement" are the best known because of the +storm of criticism and protest which they caused. As the Shantung +Settlement was one of the chief matters of difference between the +President and myself, it will be treated later. The case of Fiume is +different. As to the merits of the question I was very much in accord +with the President, but to the bungling way in which it was handled I +was strongly opposed believing that secret interviews, at which false +hopes were encouraged, were at the bottom of all the trouble which later +developed. But for this secrecy I firmly believe that there would have +been no "Fiume Affair." + +The discussion of the Italian claims to territory along the northern +boundary of the Kingdom and about the head of the Adriatic Sea began as +soon as the American Commission was installed at Paris, about the middle +of December, 1918. The endeavor of the Italian emissaries was to induce +the Americans, particularly the President, to recognize the boundary +laid down in the Pact of London. That agreement, which Italy had +required Great Britain and France to accept in April, 1915, before she +consented to declare war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, committed +the Entente Powers to the recognition of Italy's right to certain +territorial acquisitions at the expense of Austria-Hungary in the event +of the defeat of the Central Empires. By the boundary line agreed upon +in the Pact, Italy would obtain certain important islands and ports on +the Dalmatian coast in addition to the Austrian Tyrol and the Italian +provinces of the Dual Monarchy at the head of the Adriatic. + +When this agreement was signed, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was +not in contemplation, or at least, if it was considered, the possibility +of its accomplishment seemed very remote. It was assumed that the +Dalmatian territory to be acquired under the treaty to be negotiated in +accordance with the terms of the Pact would, with the return of the +Italian provinces, give to Italy naval control over the Adriatic Sea and +secure the harborless eastern coast of the Italian peninsula against +future hostile attack by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The boundary laid +down in the agreement was essentially strategic and based primarily on +considerations of Italian national safety. As long as the Empire existed +as a Great Power the boundary of the Pact of London, so far as it +related to the Adriatic littoral and islands, was not unreasonable or +the territorial demands excessive. + +But the close of active warfare in the autumn of 1918, when the +armistice went into effect, found conditions wholly different from those +upon which these territorial demands had been predicated. The +Austro-Hungarian Empire had fallen to pieces beyond the hope of becoming +again one of the Great Powers. The various nationalities, which had long +been restless and unhappy under the rule of the Hapsburgs, threw off the +imperial yoke, proclaimed their independence, and sought the recognition +and protection of the Allies. The Poles of the Empire joined their +brethren of the Polish provinces of Russia and Prussia in the +resurrection of their ancient nation; Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia +united in forming the new state of Czecho-Slovakia; the southern Slavs +of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia announced their +union with their kindred of the Kingdom of Serbia; and Hungary declared +the severance of her political union with Austria. In a word the Dual +Empire ceased to exist. It was no longer a menace to the national safety +of Italy. This was the state of affairs when the delegates to the Peace +Conference began to assemble at Paris. + +The Italian statesmen realized that these new conditions might raise +serious questions as to certain territorial cessions which would come to +Italy under the terms of the Pact of London, because their strategic +necessity had disappeared with the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. While +they had every reason to assume that Great Britain and France would live +up to their agreement, it was hardly to be expected that under the +changed conditions and in the circumstances attending the negotiation +and signature of the Pact, the British and French statesmen would be +disposed to protest against modifications of the proposed boundary if +the United States and other nations, not parties to the agreement, +should insist upon changes as a matter of justice to the new state of +the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It apparently was considered expedient, +by the Italian representatives, in view of the situation which had +developed, to increase rather than to reduce their claims along the +Dalmatian coast in order that they might have something which could be +surrendered in a compromise without giving up the boundaries laid down +in the Pact of London. + +It is probable, too, that these additional claims were advanced by Italy +in order to offset in a measure the claims of the Jugo-Slavs, who +through the Serbian delegates at Paris were making territorial demands +which the Italians declared to be extravagant and which, if granted, +would materially reduce the proposed cessions to Italy under the Pact of +London. Furthermore, the Italian Government appeared to be by no means +pleased with the idea of a Jugo-Slav state so strong that it might +become a commercial, if not a naval, rival of Italy in the Adriatic. The +Italian delegates in private interviews showed great bitterness toward +the Slavs, who, they declared, had, as Austrian subjects, waged war +against Italy and taken part in the cruel and wanton acts attendant upon +the invasion of the northern Italian provinces. They asserted that it +was unjust to permit these people, by merely changing their allegiance +after defeat, to escape punishment for the outrages which they had +committed against Italians and actually to profit by being vanquished. +This antipathy to the Slavs of the former Empire was in a measure +transferred to the Serbs, who were naturally sympathetic with their +kinsmen and who were also ambitious to build up a strong Slav state with +a large territory and with commercial facilities on the Adriatic coast +which would be ample to meet the trade needs of the interior. + +While there may have been a certain fear for the national safety of +Italy in having as a neighbor a Slav state with a large and virile +population, extensive resources, and opportunity to become a naval power +in the Mediterranean, the real cause of apprehension seemed to be that +the new nation would become a commercial rival of Italy in the Adriatic +and prevent her from securing the exclusive control of the trade which +her people coveted and which the complete victory over Austria-Hungary +appeared to assure to them. + +The two principal ports having extensive facilities for shipping and +rail-transportation to and from the Danubian provinces of the Dual +Empire were Trieste and Fiume. The other Dalmatian ports were small and +without possibilities of extensive development, while the precipitous +mountain barrier between the coast and the interior which rose almost +from the water-line rendered railway construction from an engineering +standpoint impracticable if not impossible. It was apparent that, if +Italy could obtain both the port of Trieste and the port of Fiume, the +two available outlets for foreign trade to the territories lying north +and east of the Adriatic Sea, she would have a substantial monopoly of +the sea-borne commerce of the Dalmatian coast and its hinterland. It was +equally apparent that Italian possession of the two ports would place +the new Slav state at a great disadvantage commercially, as the +principal volume of its exports and imports would have to pass through a +port in the hands of a trade rival which could, in case of controversy +or in order to check competition, be closed to Slav ships and goods on +this or that pretext, even if the new state found it practicable to +maintain a merchant marine under an agreement granting it the use of +the port. + +In view of the new conditions which had thus arisen through the +dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the union of the Southern +Slavs, the Italian delegates at Paris began a vigorous campaign to +obtain sovereignty, or at least administrative control, over Fiume and +the adjacent coasts and islands, it having been generally conceded that +Trieste should be ceded to Italy. The Italian demand for Fiume had +become real instead of artificial. This campaign was conducted by means +of personal interviews with the representatives of the principal Powers, +and particularly with those of the United States because it was +apparently felt that the chief opposition to the demand would come from +that quarter, since the President was known to favor the general +proposition that every nation should have free access to the sea and, if +possible, a seaport under its own sovereignty. + +The Italian delegates were undoubtedly encouraged by some Americans to +believe that, while the President had not actually declared in favor of +Italian control of Fiume, he was sympathetic to the idea and would +ultimately assent to it just as he had in the case of the cession to +Italy of the Tyrol with its Austrian population. Convinced by these +assurances of success the Italian leaders began a nationwide propaganda +at home for the purpose of arousing a strong public sentiment for the +acquisition of the port. This propaganda was begun, it would seem, for +two reasons, first, the political advantage to be gained when it was +announced that Signor Orlando and his colleagues at Paris had succeeded +in having their demand recognized, and, second, the possibility of +influencing the President to a speedy decision by exhibiting the +intensity and unity of the Italian national spirit in demanding the +annexation of the little city, the major part of the population of which +was asserted to be of Italian blood. + +The idea, which was industriously circulated throughout Italy, that +Fiume was an Italian city, aroused the feelings of the people more than +any political or economic argument could have done. The fact that the +suburbs, which were really as much a part of the municipality as the +area within the city proper, were inhabited largely by Jugo-Slavs was +ignored, ridiculed, or denied. That the Jugo-Slavs undoubtedly exceeded +in numbers the Italians in the community when it was treated as a whole +made no difference to the propagandists who asserted that Fiume was +Italian. They clamored for its annexation on the ground of +"self-determination," though refusing to accept that principle as +applicable to the inhabitants of the Austrian Tyrol and failing to raise +any question in regard to it in the case of the port of Danzig. The +Italian orators and press were not disturbed by the inconsistency of +their positions, and the Italian statesmen at Paris, when their +attention was called to it, replied that the cases were not the same, an +assertion which it would have been difficult to establish with facts or +support with convincing arguments. + +While the propaganda went forward in Italy with increasing energy, +additional assurances, I was informed by one of the Italian group, were +given to Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino that President Wilson was +almost on the point of conceding the justice of the Italian claim to +Fiume. It was not until the latter part of March, 1919, that these +statesmen began to suspect that they had been misinformed and that the +influence of their American friends was not as powerful with Mr. Wilson +as they had been led to believe. It was an unpleasant awakening. They +were placed in a difficult position. Too late to calm the inflamed +temper of the Italian people the Italian leaders at Paris had no +alternative but to press their demands with greater vigor since the +failure to obtain Fiume meant almost inevitable disaster to the +Orlando Ministry. + +Following conversations with Baron Sonnino and some others connected +with the Italian delegation, I drew the conclusion that they would go so +far as to refuse to make peace with Germany unless the Adriatic Question +was first settled to their satisfaction. In a memorandum dated March 29, +I wrote: "This will cause a dangerous crisis," and in commenting on the +probable future of the subject I stated: + + "My fear is that the President will continue to rely upon private + interviews and his powers of persuasion to induce the Italians to + abandon their extravagant claim. I am sure that he will not be able + to do it. On the contrary, his conversations will strengthen rather + than weaken Italian determination. He ought to tell them _now_ that + he will not consent to have Fiume given to Italy. It would cause + anger and bitterness, but nothing to compare with the resentment + which will be aroused if the uncertainty is permitted to go on much + longer. I shall tell the President my opinion at the first + opportunity. [I did this a few days later.] + + "The future is darkened by the Adriatic situation and I look to an + explosion before the matter is settled. It is a good thing that the + President visited Italy when he did and when blessings rather than + curses greeted him. Secret diplomacy is reaping a new harvest of + execrations and condemnations. Will the practice ever cease?" + +During the first three weeks of April the efforts to shake the +determination of the President to support the Jugo-Slav claims to Fiume +and the adjacent territory were redoubled, but without avail. Every form +of compromise as to boundary and port privileges, which did not deprive +Italy of the sovereignty, was proposed, but found to be unacceptable. +The Italians, held by the pressure of the aroused national spirit, and +the President, firm in the conviction that the Italian claim to the port +was unjust, remained obdurate. Attempts were made by both sides to reach +some common ground for an agreement, but none was found. As the time +approached to submit the Treaty to the German plenipotentiaries, who +were expected to arrive at Paris on April 26, the Italian delegates let +it be known that they would absent themselves from the meeting at which +the document was to be presented unless a satisfactory understanding in +regard to Fiume was obtained before the meeting. I doubt whether this +threat was with the approval and upon the advice of the American friends +of the Italians who had been industrious in attempting to persuade the +President to accept a compromise. An American familiar with Mr. Wilson's +disposition would have realized that to try to coerce him in that manner +would be folly, as in all probability it would have just the contrary +effect to the one desired. + +The Italian delegates did not apparently read the President's temper +aright. They made a mistake. Their threat of withdrawal from the +Conference resulted far differently from their expectation and hope. +When Mr. Wilson learned of the Italian threat he met it with a public +announcement of his position in regard to the controversy, which was +intended as an appeal to the people of Italy to abandon the claim to +Fiume and to reject their Government's policy of insisting on an unjust +settlement. This declaration was given to the press late in the +afternoon of April 23, and a French newspaper containing it was handed, +it was said, to Signor Orlando at the President's residence where the +Council of Four were assembled. He immediately withdrew, issued a +counter-statement, and the following day left Paris for Rome more on +account of his indignation at the course taken by the President than +because of the threat which he had made. Baron Sonnino also departed +the next day. + +It is not my purpose to pursue further the course of events following +the crisis which was precipitated by the President's published statement +and the resulting departure of the principal Italian delegates. The +effect on the Italian people is common knowledge. A tempest of popular +fury against the President swept over Italy from end to end. From being +the most revered of all men by the Italians, he became the most +detested. As no words of praise and admiration were too extravagant to +be spoken of him when he visited Rome in January, so no words of insult +or execration were too gross to characterize him after his public +announcement regarding the Adriatic Question. There was never a more +complete reversal of public sentiment toward an individual. + +The reason for reciting the facts of the Fiume dispute, which was one of +the most unpleasant incidents that took place at Paris during the +negotiations, is to bring out clearly the consequences of secret +diplomacy. A discussion of the reasons, or of the probable reasons, for +the return of the Italian statesmen to Paris before the Treaty was +handed to the Germans would add nothing to the subject under +consideration, while the same may be said of the subsequent occupation +of Fiume by Italian nationalists under the fanatical D'Annunzio, without +authority of their Government, but with the enthusiastic approval of the +Italian people. + +Five days after the Italian Premier and his Minister of Foreign Affairs +had departed from Paris I had a long interview with a well-known Italian +diplomat, who was an intimate friend of both Signor Orlando and Baron +Sonnino and who had been very active in the secret negotiations +regarding the Italian boundaries which had been taking place at Paris +since the middle of December. This diplomat was extremely bitter about +the whole affair and took no pains to hide his views as to the causes of +the critical situation which existed. In the memorandum of our +conversation, which I wrote immediately after he left my office, appears +the following: + + "He exclaimed: 'One tells you one thing and that is not true; then + another tells you another thing and that too is not true. What is one + to believe? What can one do? It is hopeless. So many secret meetings + with different persons are simply awful'--He threw up his hands--'Now + we have the result. It is terrible!' + + "I laughed and said, 'I conclude that you do not like secret + diplomacy.' + + "'I do not; I do not,' he fervently exclaimed. 'All our trouble comes + from these secret meetings of four men [referring to the Big Four], + who keep no records and who tell different stories of what takes + place. Secrecy is to blame. We have been unable to rely on any one. + To have to run around and see this man and that man is not the way to + do. Most all sympathize with you when alone and then they desert you + when they get with others. This is the cause of much bitterness and + distrust. _Secret diplomacy is an utter failure._ It is too hard to + endure. Some men know only how to whisper. They are not to be + trusted. I do not like it.' + + "'Well,' I said, 'you cannot charge me with that way of doing + business.' + + "'I cannot,' he replied, 'you tell me the truth. I may not like it, + but at least you do not hold out false hopes.'" + +The foregoing conversation no doubt expressed the real sentiments of the +members of the Italian delegation at that time. Disgust with +confidential personal interviews and with relying upon personal +influence rather than upon the merits of their case was the natural +reaction following the failure to win by these means the President's +approval of Italy's demands. + +The Italian policy in relation to Flume was wrecked on the rock of +President Wilson's firm determination that the Jugo-Slavs should have a +seaport on the Adriatic sufficient for their needs and that Italy should +not control the approaches to that port. With the wreck of the Fiume +policy went in time the Orlando Government which had failed to make good +the promises which they had given to their people. Too late they +realized that secret diplomacy had failed, and that they had made a +mistake in relying upon it. It is no wonder that the two leaders of the +Italian delegation on returning to Paris and resuming their duties in +the Conference refrained from attempting to arrange clandestinely the +settlement of the Adriatic Question. The "go-betweens," on whom they had +previously relied, were no longer employed. Secret diplomacy was +anathema. They had paid a heavy price for the lesson, which they +had learned. + +When one reviews the negotiations at Paris from December, 1918, to June, +1919, the secretiveness which characterized them is very evident. +Everybody seemed to talk in whispers and never to say anything worth +while except in confidence. The open sessions of the Conference were +arranged beforehand. They were formal and perfunctory. The agreements +and bargains were made behind closed doors. This secrecy began with the +exchange of views concerning the League of Nations, following which came +the creation of the Council of Ten, whose meetings were intended to be +secret. Then came the secret sessions of the Commission on the League +and the numerous informal interviews of the President with one or more +of the Premiers of the Allied Powers, the facts concerning which were +not divulged to the American Commissioners. Later, on Mr. Wilson's +return from the United States, dissatisfaction with and complaint of the +publicity given to some of the proceedings of the Council of Ten induced +the formation of the Council of Four with the result that the secrecy of +the negotiations was practically unbroken. If to this brief summary of +the increasing secretiveness of the proceedings of the controlling +bodies of the Peace Conference are added the intrigues and personal +bargainings which were constantly going on, the "log-rolling"--to use a +term familiar to American politics--which was practiced, the record is +one which invites no praise and will find many who condemn it. In view +of the frequent and emphatic declarations in favor of "open diplomacy" +and the popular interpretation placed upon the phrase "Open covenants +openly arrived at," the effect of the secretive methods employed by the +leading negotiators at Paris was to destroy public confidence in the +sincerity of these statesmen and to subject them to the charge of +pursuing a policy which they had themselves condemned and repudiated. +Naturally President Wilson, who had been especially earnest in his +denunciation of secret negotiations, suffered more than his foreign +colleagues, whose real support of "open diplomacy" had always been +doubted, though all of them in a measure fell in public estimation as a +consequence of the way in which the negotiations were conducted. + +The criticism and condemnation, expressed with varying degrees of +intensity, resulted from the disappointed hopes of the peoples of the +world, who had looked forward confidently to the Peace Conference at +Paris as the first great and decisive change to a new diplomacy which +would cast aside the cloak of mystery that had been in the past the +recognized livery of diplomatic negotiations. The record of the Paris +proceedings in this particular is a sorry one. It is the record of the +abandonment of principle, of the failure to follow precepts +unconditionally proclaimed, of the repudiation by act, if not by word, +of a new and better type of international intercourse. + +It is not my purpose or desire to fix the blame for this perpetuation of +old and discredited practices on any one individual. To do so would be +unjust, since more than one preferred the old way and should share the +responsibility for its continuance. But, as the secrecy became more and +more impenetrable and as the President gave silent acquiescence or at +least failed to show displeasure with the practice, I realized that in +this matter, as in others, our judgments were at variance and our views +irreconcilable. As my opposition to the method of conducting the +proceedings was evident, I cannot but assume that this decided +difference was one that materially affected the relations between Mr. +Wilson and myself and that he looked upon me as an unfavorable critic of +his course in permitting to go unprotested the secrecy which +characterized the negotiations. + +The attention of the delegates to the Peace Conference who represented +the smaller nations was early directed to their being denied knowledge +of the terms of the Treaty which were being formulated by the principal +members of the delegations of the Five Great Powers. There is no doubt +that at the first their mental attitude was one of confidence that the +policy of secrecy would not be continued beyond the informal meetings +preliminary to and necessary for arranging the organization and +procedure of the Conference; but, as the days lengthened into weeks and +the weeks into months, and as the information concerning the actual +negotiations, which reached them, became more and more meager, they +could no longer close their eyes to the fact that their national rights +and aspirations were to be recognized or denied by the leaders of the +Great Powers without the consent and even without the full knowledge of +the delegates of the nations vitally interested. + +Except in the case of a few of these delegates, who had been able to +establish intimate personal relations with some of the "Big Four," the +secretiveness of the discussions and decisions regarding the Treaty +settlements aroused amazement and indignation. It was evident that it +was to be a "dictated peace" and not a "negotiated peace," a peace +dictated by the Great Powers not only to the enemy, but also to their +fellow belligerents. Some of the delegates spoke openly in criticism of +the furtive methods that were being employed, but the majority held +their peace. It can hardly be doubted, however, that the body of +delegates were practically unanimous in disapproving the secrecy of the +proceedings, and this disapproval was to be found even among the +delegations of the Great Powers. It was accepted by the lesser nations +because it seemed impolitic and useless to oppose the united will of the +controlling oligarchy. It was natural that the delegates of the less +influential states should feel that their countries would suffer in the +terms of peace if they openly denounced the treatment accorded them as +violative of the dignity of representatives of independent +sovereignties. In any event no formal protest was entered against their +being deprived of a knowledge to which they were entitled, a deprivation +which placed them and their countries in a subordinate, and, to an +extent, a humiliating, position. + +The climax of this policy of secrecy toward the body of delegates came +on the eve of the delivery of the Treaty of Peace to the German +representatives who were awaiting that event at Versailles. By a +decision of the Council of the Heads of States, reached three weeks +before the time, only a digest or summary of the Treaty was laid before +the plenary session of the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on +the day preceding the delivery of the full text of the Treaty to the +Germans. The delegates of the smaller belligerent nations were not +permitted to examine the actual text of the document before it was seen +by their defeated adversaries. Nations, which had fought valiantly and +suffered agonies during the war, were treated with no more consideration +than their enemies so far as knowledge of the exact terms of peace were +concerned. The arguments, which could be urged on the ground of the +practical necessity of a small group dealing with the questions and +determining the settlements, seem insufficient to justify the +application of the rule of secrecy to the delegates who sat in the +Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace. It is not too severe to say +that it outraged the equal rights of independent and sovereign states +and under less critical conditions would have been resented as an insult +by the plenipotentiaries of the lesser nations. Even within the +delegations of the Great Powers there were indignant murmurings against +this indefensible and unheard-of treatment of allies. No man, whose mind +was not warped by prejudice or dominated by political expediency, could +give it his approval or become its apologist. Secrecy, and intrigues +which were only possible through secrecy, stained nearly all the +negotiations at Paris, but in this final act of withholding knowledge of +the actual text of the Treaty from the delegates of most of the nations +represented in the Conference the spirit of secretiveness seems to +have gone mad. + +The psychological effects of secrecy on those who are kept in ignorance +are not difficult to analyze. They follow normal processes and may be +thus stated: Secrecy breeds suspicion; suspicion, doubt; doubt, +distrust; and distrust produces lack of frankness, which is closely akin +to secrecy. The result is a vicious circle, of which deceit and intrigue +are the very essence. Secrecy and its natural consequences have given to +diplomacy a popular reputation for trickery, for double-dealing, and in +a more or less degree for unscrupulous and dishonest methods of +obtaining desired ends, a reputation that has found expression in the +ironic definition of a diplomat as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for +the good of his country." + +The time had arrived when the bad name which diplomacy had so long borne +could and should have been removed. "Open covenants openly arrived at" +appealed to the popular feeling of antipathy toward secret diplomacy, of +which the Great War was generally believed to be the product. The Paris +Conference appeared to offer an inviting opportunity to turn the page +and to begin a new and better chapter in the annals of international +intercourse. To do this required a fixed purpose to abandon the old +methods, to insist on openness and candor, to refuse to be drawn into +whispered agreements. The choice between the old and the new ways had to +be definite and final. It had to be made at the very beginning of the +negotiations. It was made. Secrecy was adopted. Thus diplomacy, in spite +of the announced intention to reform its practices, has retained the +evil taint which makes it out of harmony with the spirit of good faith +and of open dealing which is characteristic of the best thought of the +present epoch. There is little to show that diplomacy has been raised to +a higher plane or has won a better reputation in the world at large than +it possessed before the nations assembled at Paris to make peace. This +failure to lift the necessary agency of international relations out of +the rut worn deep by centuries of practice is one of the deplorable +consequences of the peace negotiations. So much might have been done; +nothing was done. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT + + +The Shantung Settlement was not so evidently chargeable to secret +negotiations as the crisis over the disposition of Fiume, but the +decision was finally reached through that method. The controversy +between Japan and China as to which country should become the possessor +of the former German property and rights in the Shantung Peninsula was +not decided until almost the last moment before the Treaty with Germany +was completed. Under pressure of the necessity of making the document +ready for delivery to the German delegates, President Wilson, M. +Clemenceau, and Mr. Lloyd George, composing the Council of the Heads of +States in the absence of Signor Orlando in Rome, issued an order +directing the Drafting Committee of the Conference to prepare articles +for the Treaty embodying the decision that the Council had made. This +decision, which was favorable to the Japanese claims, was the result of +a confidential arrangement with the Japanese delegates by which, in the +event of their claims being granted, they withdrew their threat to +decline to sign the Treaty of Peace, agreed not to insist on a proposed +amendment to the Covenant declaring for racial equality, and orally +promised to restore to China in the near future certain rights of +sovereignty over the territory, which promise failed of confirmation in +writing or by formal public declaration. + +It is fair to presume that, if the conflicting claims of Japan and China +to the alleged rights of Germany in Chinese territory had been settled +upon the merits through the medium of an impartial commission named by +the Conference, the Treaty provisions relating to the disposition of +those rights would have been very different from those which "The Three" +ordered to be drafted. Before a commission of the Conference no +persuasive reasons for conceding the Japanese claims could have been +urged on the basis of an agreement on the part of Japan to adhere to the +League of Nations or to abandon the attempt to have included in the +Covenant a declaration of equality between races. It was only through +secret interviews and secret agreements that the threat of the Japanese +delegates could be successfully made. An adjustment on such a basis had +nothing to do with the justice of the case or with the legal rights and +principles involved. The threat was intended to coerce the arbiters of +the treaty terms by menacing the success of the plan to establish a +League of Nations--to use an ugly word, it was a species of "blackmail" +not unknown to international relations in the past. It was made possible +because the sessions of the Council of the Heads of States and the +conversations concerning Shantung were secret. + +It was a calamity for the Republic of China and unfortunate for the +presumed justice written into the Treaty that President Wilson was +convinced that the Japanese delegates would decline to accept the +Covenant of the League of Nations if the claims of Japan to the German +rights were denied. It was equally unfortunate that the President felt +that without Japan's adherence to the Covenant the formation of the +League would be endangered if not actually prevented. And it was +especially unfortunate that the President considered the formation of +the League in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant to be +superior to every other consideration and that to accomplish this object +almost any sacrifice would be justifiable. It is my impression that the +departure of Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino from Paris and the +uncertainty of their return to give formal assent to the Treaty with +Germany, an uncertainty which existed at the time of the decision of the +Shantung Question, had much to do with the anxiety of the President as +to Japan's attitude. He doubtless felt that to have two of the Five +Great Powers decline at the last moment to accept the Treaty containing +the Covenant would jeopardize the plan for a League and would greatly +encourage his opponents in the United States. His line of reasoning was +logical, but in my judgment was based on the false premise that the +Japanese would carry out their threat to refuse to accept the Treaty and +enter the League of Nations unless they obtained a cession of the German +rights. I did not believe at the time, and I do not believe now, that +Japan would have made good her threat. The superior international +position, which she held as one of the Five Great Powers in the +Conference, and which she would hold in the League of Nations as one of +the Principal Powers in the constitution of the Executive Council, would +never have been abandoned by the Tokio Government. The Japanese +delegates would not have run the risk of losing this position by +adopting the course pursued by the Italians. + +The cases were different. No matter what action was taken by Italy she +would have continued to be a Great Power in any organization of the +world based on a classification of the nations. If she did not enter the +League under the German Treaty, she certainly would later and would +undoubtedly hold an influential position in the organization whether her +delegates signed the Covenant or accepted it in another treaty or by +adherence. It was not so with Japan. There were reasons to believe that, +if she failed to become one of the Principal Powers at the outset, +another opportunity might never be given her to obtain so high a place +in the concert of the nations. The seats that her delegates had in the +Council of Ten had caused criticism and dissatisfaction in certain +quarters, and the elimination of a Japanese from the Council of the +Heads of States showed that the Japanese position as an equal of the +other Great Powers was by no means secure. These indications of Japan's +place in the international oligarchy must have been evident to her +plenipotentiaries at Paris, who in all probability reported the +situation to Tokio. From the point of view of policy the execution of +the threat of withdrawal presented dangers to Japan's prestige which the +diplomats who represented her would never have incurred if they were as +cautious and shrewd as they appeared to be. The President did not hold +this opinion. We differed radically in our judgment as to the sincerity +of the Japanese threat. He showed that he believed it would be carried +out. I believed that it would not be. + +It has not come to my knowledge what the attitude of the British and +French statesmen was concerning the disposition of the Shantung rights, +although I have read the views of certain authors on the subject, but I +do know that the actual decision lay with the President. If he had +declined to recognize the Japanese claims, they would never have been +granted nor would the grant have been written into the Treaty. +Everything goes to show that he realized this responsibility and that +the cession to Japan was not made through error or misconception of the +rights of the parties, but was done deliberately and with a full +appreciation that China was being denied that which in other +circumstances would have been awarded to her. If it had not been for +reasons wholly independent and outside of the question in dispute, the +President would not have decided as he did. + +It is not my purpose to enter into the details of the origin of the +German lease of Kiao-Chau (the port of Tsingtau) and of the economic +concessions in the Province of Shantung acquired by Germany. Suffice it +to say that, taking advantage of a situation caused by the murder of +some missionary priests in the province, the German Government in 1898 +forced the Chinese Government to make treaties granting for the period +of ninety-nine years the lease and concessions, by which the sovereign +authority over this "Holy Land" of China was to all intents ceded to +Germany, which at once improved the harbor, fortified the leased area, +and began railway construction and the exploitation of the Shantung +Peninsula. + +The outbreak of the World War found Germany in possession of the leased +area and in substantial control of the territory under the concession. +On August 15, 1914, the Japanese Government presented an _ultimatum_ to +the German Government, in which the latter was required "to deliver on a +date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, +without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of +Kiao-Chau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." + +On the German failure to comply with these demands the Japanese +Government landed troops and, in company with a small British +contingent, took possession of the leased port and occupied the +territory traversed by the German railway, even to the extent of +establishing a civil government in addition to garrisoning the line with +Japanese troops. Apparently the actual occupation of this Chinese +territory induced a change in the policy of the Imperial Government at +Tokio, for in December, 1914, Baron Kato, the Minister of Foreign +Affairs, declared that the restoration of Tsingtau to China "is to be +settled in the future" and that the Japanese Government had made no +promises to do so. + +This statement, which seemed in contradiction of the _ultimatum_ to +Germany, was made in the Japanese Diet. It was followed up in January, +1915, by the famous "Twenty-one Demands" made upon the Government at +Peking. It is needless to go into these demands further than to quote +the first to which China was to subscribe. + + "The Chinese Government agrees that when the Japanese Government + hereafter approaches the German Government for the transfer of all + rights and privileges of whatsoever nature enjoyed by Germany in the + Province of Shantung, whether secured by treaty or in any other + manner, China shall give her full assent thereto." + +The important point to be noted in this demand is that Japan did not +consider that the occupation of Kiao-Chau and the seizure of the German +concessions transferred title to her, but looked forward to a future +transfer by treaty. + +The "Twenty-one Demands" were urged with persistency by the Japanese +Government and finally took the form of an _ultimatum_ as to all but +Group V of the "Demands." The Peking Government was in no political or +military condition to resist, and, in order to avoid an open rupture +with their aggressive neighbor, entered into a treaty granting the +Japanese demands. + +China, following the action which the United States had taken on +February 3, 1917, severed diplomatic relations with Germany on March 14, +and five months later declared war against her announcing at the same +time that the treaties, conventions, and agreements between the two +countries were by the declaration abrogated. As to whether a state of +war does in fact abrogate a treaty of the character of the Sino-German +Treaty of 1898 some question may be raised under the accepted rules of +international law, on the ground that it was a cession of sovereign +rights and constituted an international servitude in favor of Germany +over the territory affected by it. But in this particular case the +indefensible duress employed by the German Government to compel China to +enter into the treaty introduces another factor into the problem and +excepts it from any general rule that treaties of that nature are merely +suspended and not abrogated by war between the parties. It would seem as +if no valid argument could be made in favor of suspension because the +effect of the rule would be to revive and perpetuate an inequitable and +unjustifiable act. Morally and legally the Chinese Government was right +in denouncing the treaty and agreements with Germany and in treating the +territorial rights acquired by coercion as extinguished. + +It would appear, therefore, that, as the Japanese Government recognized +that the rights in the Province of Shantung had not passed to Japan by +the forcible occupation of Kiao-Chau and the German concessions, those +rights ceased to exist when China declared war against Germany, and that +China was, therefore, entitled to resume full sovereignty over the area +where such rights previously existed. + +It is true that subsequently, on September 24, 1918, the Chinese and +Japanese Governments by exchange of notes at Tokio entered into +agreements affecting the Japanese occupation of the Kiao-Chau Tsinan +Railway and the adjoining territory, but the governmental situation at +Peking was too precarious to refuse any demands made by the Japanese +Government. In fact the action of the Japanese Government was very +similar to that of the German Government in 1898. An examination of +these notes discloses the fact that the Japanese were in possession of +the denounced German rights, but nothing in the notes indicates that +they were there as a matter of legal right, or that the Chinese +Government conceded their right of occupation. + +This was the state of affairs when the Peace Conference assembled at +Paris. Germany had by force compelled China in 1898 to cede to her +certain rights in the Province of Shantung. Japan had seized these +rights by force in 1914 and had by threats forced China in 1915 to agree +to accept her disposition of them when they were legally transferred by +treaty at the end of the war. China in 1917 had, on entering the war +against Germany, denounced all treaties and agreements with Germany, so +that the ceded rights no longer existed and could not legally be +transferred by Germany to Japan by the Treaty of Peace, since the title +was in China. In fact any transfer or disposition of the rights in +Shantung formerly belonging to Germany was a transfer or disposition of +rights belonging wholly to China and would deprive that country of a +portion of its full sovereignty over the territory affected. + +While this view of the extinguishment of the German rights in Shantung +was manifestly the just one and its adoption would make for the +preservation of permanent peace in the Far East, the Governments of the +Allied Powers had, early in 1917, and prior to the severance of +diplomatic relations between China and Germany, acceded to the request +of Japan to support, "on the occasion of the Peace Conference," her +claims in regard to these rights which then existed. The representatives +of Great Britain, France, and Italy at Paris were thus restricted, or at +least embarrassed, by the promises which their Governments had made at a +time when they were in no position to refuse Japan's request. They might +have stood on the legal ground that the Treaty of 1898 having been +abrogated by China no German rights in Shantung were in being at the +time of the Peace Conference, but they apparently were unwilling to take +that position. Possibly they assumed that the ground was one which they +could not take in view of the undertakings of their Governments; or +possibly they preferred to let the United States bear the brunt of +Japanese resentment for interfering with the ambitious schemes of the +Japanese Government in regard to China. There can be little doubt that +political, and possibly commercial, interests influenced the attitude of +the European Powers in regard to the Shantung Question. + +President Wilson and the American Commissioners, unhampered by previous +commitments, were strongly opposed to acceding to the demands of the +Japanese Government. The subject had been frequently considered during +the early days of the negotiations and there seemed to be no divergence +of views as to the justice of the Chinese claim of right to the +resumption of full sovereignty over the territory affected by the lease +and the concessions to Germany. These views were further strengthened by +the presentation of the question before the Council of Ten. On January +27 the Japanese argued their case before the Council, the Chinese +delegates being present; and on the 28th Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo spoke +on behalf of China. In a note on the meeting I recorded that "he simply +overwhelmed the Japanese with his argument." I believe that that opinion +was common to all those who heard the two presentations. In fact it made +such an impression on the Japanese themselves, that one of the delegates +called upon me the following day and attempted to offset the effect by +declaring that the United States, since it had not promised to support +Japan's contention, would be blamed if Kiao-Chau was returned directly +to China. He added that there was intense feeling in Japan in regard to +the matter. It was an indirect threat of what would happen to the +friendly relations between the two countries if Japan's claim +was denied. + +The sessions of the Commission on the League of Nations and the absence +of President Wilson from Paris interrupted further consideration of the +Shantung Question until the latter part of March, when the Council of +Four came into being. As the subject had been fully debated in January +before the Council of Ten, final decision lay with the Council of Four. +What discussions took place in the latter council I do not know on +account of the secrecy which was observed as to their deliberations. But +I presume that the President stood firmly for the Chinese rights, as the +matter remained undecided until the latter part of April. + +On the 21st of April Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda called upon me in +regard to the question, and I frankly told them that they ought to prove +the justice of the Japanese claim, that they had not done it and that I +doubted their ability to do so. I found, too, that the President had +proposed that the Five Powers act as trustees of the former German +rights in Shantung, but that the Japanese delegates had declared that +they could not consent to the proposition, which was in the nature of a +compromise intended to bridge over the existing situation that, on +account of the near approach of the completion of the Treaty, was +becoming more and more acute. + +On April 26 the President, at a conference with the American +Commissioners, showed deep concern over the existing state of the +controversy, and asked me to see the Japanese delegates again and +endeavor to dissuade them from insisting on their demands and to induce +them to consider the international trusteeship proposed. The evening of +the same day the two Japanese came by request to my office and conferred +with Professor E.T. Williams, the Commission's principal adviser on Far +Eastern affairs, and with me. After an hour's conversation Viscount +Chinda made it very clear that Japan intended to insist on her "pound of +flesh." It was apparent both to Mr. Williams and to me that nothing +could be done to obtain even a compromise, though it was on the face +favorable to Japan, since it recognized the existence of the German +rights, which China claimed were annulled. + +On April 28 I gave a full report of the interview to Mr. White and +General Bliss at our regular morning meeting. Later in the morning the +President telephoned me and I informed him of the fixed determination of +the Japanese to insist upon their claims. What occurred between the time +of my conversation with the President and the plenary session of the +Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace in the afternoon, at which the +Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted, I do not actually know, +but the presumption is that the Japanese were promised a satisfactory +settlement in regard to Shantung, since they announced that they would +not press an amendment on "racial equality" at the session, an amendment +upon which they had indicated they intended to insist. + +After the meeting of the Conference I made the following memorandum of +the situation: + + "At the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference this afternoon Baron + Makino spoke of his proposed amendment to the Covenant declaring + 'racial equality,' but said he would not press it. + + "I concluded from what the President said to me that he was disposed + to accede to Japan's claims in regard to Kiao-Chau and Shantung. He + also showed me a letter from ---- to Makino saying he was sorry their + claims had not been finally settled before the Session. + + "From all this I am forced to the conclusion that a bargain has been + struck by which the Japanese agree to sign the Covenant in exchange + for admission of their claims. If so, it is an iniquitous agreement. + + "Apparently the President is going to do this to avoid Japan's + declining to enter the League of Nations. It is a surrender of the + principle of self-determination, a transfer of millions of Chinese + from one foreign master to another. This is another of those secret + arrangements which have riddled the 'Fourteen Points' and are + wrecking a just peace. + + "In my opinion it would be better to let Japan stay out of the League + than to abandon China and surrender our prestige in the Far East for + 'a mess of pottage'--and a mess it is. I fear that it is too late to + do anything to save the situation." + +Mr. White, General Bliss, and I, at our meeting that morning before the +plenary session, and later when we conferred as to what had taken place +at the session, were unanimous in our opinions that China's rights +should be sustained even if Japan withdrew from the Peace Conference. We +were all indignant at the idea of submitting to the Japanese demands and +agreed that the President should be told of our attitude, because we +were unwilling to have it appear that we in any way approved of acceding +to Japan's claims or even of compromising them. + +General Bliss volunteered to write the President a letter on the +subject, a course which Mr. White and I heartily endorsed. + +The next morning the General read the following letter to us and with +our entire approval sent it to Mr. Wilson: + + "_Hotel de Crillon, Paris_ + + "_April 29, 1919_ + + "MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: + + "Last Saturday morning you told the American Delegation that you + desired suggestions, although not at that moment, in regard to the + pending matter of certain conflicting claims between Japan and China + centering about the alleged German rights. My principal interest in + the matter is with sole reference to the question of the moral right + or wrong involved. From this point of view I discussed the matter + this morning with Mr. Lansing and Mr. White. They concurred with me + and requested me to draft a hasty note to you on the subject. + + "Since your conference with us last Saturday, I have asked myself + three or four Socratic questions the answers to which make me, + personally, quite sure on which side the moral right lies. + + "_First._ Japan bases certain of her claims on the right acquired by + conquest. I asked myself the following questions: Suppose Japan had + not succeeded in her efforts to force the capitulation of the Germans + at Tsing-Tsau; suppose that the armistice of November 11th had found + her still fighting the Germans at that place, just as the armistice + found the English still fighting the Germans in South-East Africa. We + would then oblige Germany to dispose of her claims in China by a + clause in the Treaty of Peace. Would it occur to any one that, as a + matter of right, we should force Germany to cede her claims to Japan + rather than to China? It seems to me that it would occur to every + American that we would then have the opportunity that we have long + desired to force Germany to correct, in favor of China, the great + wrong which she began to do to the latter in 1898. What moral right + has Japan acquired by her conquest of Shantung assisted by the + British? If Great Britain and Japan secured no moral right to + sovereignty over various savages inhabiting islands in the Pacific + Ocean, but, on the other hand, we held that these peoples shall be + governed by mandates under the League of Nations, what moral right + has Japan acquired to the suzerainty (which she would undoubtedly + eventually have) over 30,000,000 Chinese in the sacred province + of Shantung? + + "_Second._ Japan must base her claims either on the Convention with + China or on the right of conquest, or on both. Let us consider her + moral right under either of these points. + + "_a)_ If the United States has not before this recognized the + validity of the rights claimed by Japan under her Convention with + China, what has happened since the Armistice that would justify us in + recognizing their validity now? + + "_b)_ If Germany had possessed territory, in full sovereignty, on the + east coast of Asia, a right to this territory, under international + law, could have been obtained by conquest. But Germany possessed no + such territory. What then was left for Japan to acquire by conquest? + Apparently nothing but a lease extorted under compulsion from China + by Germany. I understand that international lawyers hold that such a + lease, or the rights acquired, justly or unjustly, under it, cannot + be acquired by conquest. + + "_Third._ Suppose Germany says to us, 'We will cede our lease and all + rights under it, but we will cede them back to China.' Will we + recognize the justice of Japan's claims to such an extent that we + will threaten Germany with further war unless she cedes these rights + to Japan rather than to China? + + "Again, suppose that Germany, in her hopelessness of resistance to + our demands, should sign without question a clause ceding these + rights to Japan, even though we know that this is so wrong that we + would not fight in order to compel Germany to do it, what moral + justification would we have in making Germany do this? + + "_Fourth._ Stripped of all words that befog the issue, would we not, + under the guise of making a treaty with Germany, really be making a + treaty with Japan by which we compel one of our Allies (China) to + cede against her will these things to Japan? Would not this action be + really more unjustifiable than the one which you have refused to be a + party to on the Dalmatian Coast? Because, in the latter case, the + territory in dispute did not belong to one of the Allies, but to one + of the Central Powers; the question in Dalmatia is as to which of two + friendly powers we shall give territory taken from an enemy power; in + China the question is, shall we take certain claimed rights from one + friendly power in order to give them to another friendly power. + + "It would seem to be advisable to call particular attention to what + the Japanese mean when they say that they will return Kiao-chow to + China. They _do not_ offer to return the railway, the mines or the + port, i.e., Tsingtau. The leased territory included a portion of land + on the north-east side of the entrance of the Bay and another on the + south-west and some islands. It is a small territory. The 50 + Kilometer Zone was not included. That was a _limitation_ put upon the + movement of German troops. They could not go beyond the boundary of + the zone. Within this zone China enjoyed all rights of sovereignty + and administration. + + "Japan's proposal to abandon the zone is somewhat of an impertinence, + since she has violated it ever since she took possession. She kept + troops all along the railway line until recently and insists on + maintaining in the future a guard at Tsinan, 254 miles away. The zone + would restrict her military movements, consequently she gives it up. + + "The proposals she makes are (1) to open the whole bay. It is from 15 + to 20 miles from the entrance to the northern shore of the bay. (2) + To have a Japanese exclusive concession _at a-place_ to be designated + by her, i.e., she can take just as much as she likes of the territory + around the bay. It may be as large as the present leased territory, + but more likely it will include only the best part of Tsingtau. What + then does she give up? Nothing but such parts of the leased territory + as are of no value. + + "The operation then would amount chiefly to an exchange of two pieces + of paper--one cancelling the lease for 78 years, the other granting a + more valuable concession which would amount to a permanent title to + the port. Why take two years to go through this operation? + + "If it be right for a policeman, who recovers your purse, to keep the + contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in returning the + empty purse, then Japan's conduct may be tolerated. + + "If it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an Ally, then it + cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from the enemy. + + "If we support Japan's claim, we abandon the democracy of China to + the domination of the Prussianized militarism of Japan. + + "We shall be sowing dragons' teeth. + + "It can't be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is + desirable, but there are things dearer than peace, justice + and freedom. + + "Sincerely yours + + "THE PRESIDENT + + "T.H. BLISS" + +I have not discussed certain modifications proposed by the Japanese +delegates, since, as is clear from General Bliss's letter, they amounted +to nothing and were merely a pretense of concession and without +substantial value. + +The day following the delivery of this letter to the President (April +30), by which he was fully advised of the attitude of General Bliss, Mr. +White, and myself in regard to the Japanese claims, the Council of Four +reached its final decision of the matter, in which necessarily Mr. +Wilson acquiesced. I learned of this decision the same evening. The +memorandum which I made the next morning in regard to the matter is +as follows: + + "China has been abandoned to Japanese rapacity. A democratic + territory has been given over to an autocratic government. The + President has conceded to Japan all that, if not more than, she ever + hoped to obtain. This is the information contained in a memorandum + handed by Ray Stannard Baker under the President's direction to the + Chinese delegation last evening, a copy of which reached me through + Mr. ---- [of the Chinese delegation]. + + "Mr. ---- also said that Mr. Baker stated that the President desired + him to say that the President was very sorry that he had not been + able to do more for China but that he had been compelled to accede to + Japan's demand 'in order _to save the League of Nations._' + + "The memorandum was most depressing. Though I had anticipated + something of the sort three days ago [see note of April 28 previously + quoted], I had unconsciously cherished a hope that the President + would stand to his guns and champion China's cause. He has failed to + do so. It is true that China is given the shell called 'sovereignty,' + but the economic control, the kernel, is turned over to Japan. + + "However logical may appear the argument that China's political + integrity is preserved and will be maintained under the guaranty of + the League of Nations, the fact is that Japan will rule over millions + of Chinese. Furthermore it is still a matter of conjecture how + valuable the guaranty of the League will prove to be. It has, of + course, never been tried, and Japan's representation on the Council + will possibly thwart any international action in regard to China. + + "Frankly my policy would have been to say to the Japanese, 'If you do + not give back to China what Germany stole from her, we don't want you + in the League of Nations.' If the Japanese had taken offense and + gone, I would have welcomed it, for we would have been well rid of a + government with such imperial designs. But she would not have gone. + She would have submitted. She has attained a high place in world + councils. Her astute statesmen would never have abandoned her present + exalted position even for the sake of Kiao-Chau. The whole affair + assumes a sordid and sinister character, in which the President, + acting undoubtedly with the best of motives, became the cat's-paw. + + "I have no doubt that the President fully believed that the League of + Nations was in jeopardy and that to save it he was compelled to + subordinate every other consideration. The result was that China was + offered up as a sacrifice to propitiate the threatening Moloch of + Japan. When you get down to facts the threats were nothing + but 'bluff.' + + "I do not think that anything that has happened here has caused more + severe or more outspoken criticism than this affair. I am heartsick + over it, because I see how much good-will and regard the President is + bound to lose. I can offer no adequate explanation to the critics. + There seems to be none." + +It is manifest, from the foregoing recital of events leading up to the +decision in regard to the Shantung Question and the apparent reasons for +the President's agreement to support the Japanese claims, that we +radically differed as to the decision which was embodied in Articles +156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles (see Appendix VI, p. 318). +I do not think that we held different opinions as to the justice of the +Chinese position, though probably the soundness of the legal argument in +favor of the extinguishment of the German rights appealed more strongly +to me than it did to Mr. Wilson. Our chief differences were, first, that +it was more important to insure the acceptance of the Covenant of the +League of Nations than to do strict justice to China; second, that the +Japanese withdrawal from the Conference would prevent the formation of +the League; and, third, that Japan would have withdrawn if her claims +had been denied. As to these differences our opposite views remained +unchanged after the Treaty of Versailles was signed. + +When I was summoned before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on +August 6, 1919, I told the Committee that, in my opinion, the Japanese +signatures would have been affixed to the Treaty containing the Covenant +even though Shantung had not been delivered over to Japan, and that the +only reason that I had yielded was because it was my duty to follow the +decision of the President of the United States. + +About two weeks later, August 19, the President had a conference at the +White House with the same Committee. In answer to questions regarding +the Shantung Settlement, Mr. Wilson said concerning my statement that +his judgment was different from mine, that in his judgment the +signatures could not have been obtained if he had not given Shantung to +Japan, and that he had been notified that the Japanese delegates had +been instructed not to sign the Treaty unless the cession of the German +rights in Shantung to Japan was included. + +Presumably the opinion which Mr. Wilson held in the summer of 1919 he +continues to hold, and for my part my views and feelings remain the same +now as they were then, with possibly the difference that the indignation +and shame that I felt at the time in being in any way a participant in +robbing China of her just rights have increased rather than lessened. + +So intense was the bitterness among the American Commissioners over the +flagrant wrong being perpetrated that, when the decision of the Council +of Four was known, some of them considered whether or not they ought to +resign or give notice that they would not sign the Treaty if the +articles concerning Shantung appeared. The presence at Versailles of the +German plenipotentiaries, the uncertainty of the return of the Italian +delegates then in Rome, and the murmurs of dissatisfaction among the +delegates of the lesser nations made the international situation +precarious. To have added to the serious conditions and to have possibly +precipitated a crisis by openly rebelling against the President was to +assume a responsibility which no Commissioner was willing to take. With +the greatest reluctance the American Commissioners submitted to the +decision of the Council of Four; and, when the Chinese delegates refused +to sign the Treaty after they had been denied the right to sign it with +reservations to the Shantung articles, the American Commissioners, who +had so strongly opposed the settlement, silently approved their conduct +as the only patriotic and statesmanlike course to take. So far as China +was concerned the Shantung Question remained open, and the Chinese +Government very properly refused, after the Treaty of Versailles was +signed, to enter into any negotiations with Japan looking toward its +settlement upon the basis of the treaty provisions. + +There was one exception to the President's usual practice which is +especially noticeable in connection with the Shantung controversy, and +that was the greater participation which he permitted the members of the +American Commission in negotiating with both the Japanese and the +Chinese. It is true he did not disclose his intentions to the +Commissioners, but he did express a wish for their advice and he +directed me to confer with the Japanese and obtain their views. Just why +he adopted this course, for him unusual, I do not know unless he felt +that so far as the equity of China's claim was concerned we were all in +agreement, and if there was to be a departure from strict justice he +desired to have his colleagues suggest a way to do so. It is possible, +too, that he felt the question was in large measure a legal one, and +decided that the illegality of transferring the German rights to Japan +could be more successfully presented to the Japanese delegates by a +lawyer. In any event, in this particular case he adopted a course more +in accord with established custom and practice than he did in any other +of the many perplexing and difficult problems which he was called upon +to solve during the Paris negotiations, excepting of course the subjects +submitted to commissions of the Conference. As has been shown, Mr. +Wilson did not follow the advice of the three Commissioners given him in +General Bliss's letter, but that does not detract from the +noteworthiness of the fact that in the case of Shantung he sought advice +from his Commissioners. + +This ends the account of the Shantung Settlement and the negotiations +which led up to it. The consequences were those which were bound to +follow so indefensible a decision as the one that was reached. Public +opinion in the United States was almost unanimous in condemning it and +in denouncing those responsible for so evident a departure from legal +justice and the principles of international morality. No plea of +expediency or of necessity excused such a flagrant denial of undoubted +right. The popular recognition that a great wrong had been done to a +nation weak because of political discord and an insufficient military +establishment, in order to win favor with a nation strong because of its +military power and national unity, had much to do with increasing the +hostility to the Treaty and preventing its acceptance by the Senate of +the United States. The whole affair furnishes another example of the +results of secret diplomacy, for the arguments which prevailed with the +President were those to which he listened when he sat in secret council +with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +THE BULLITT AFFAIR + + +The foregoing chapters have related to subjects which were known to +President Wilson to be matters of difference between us while we were +together in Paris and which are presumably referred to in his letter of +February 11, 1920, extracts from which are quoted in the opening +chapter. The narration might be concluded with our difference of opinion +as to the Shantung Settlement, but in view of subsequent information +which the President received I am convinced that he felt that my +objections to his decisions in regard to the terms of the peace with +Germany extended further than he knew at the time, and that he resented +the fact that my mind did not go along with his as to these decisions. +This undoubtedly added to the reasons for his letter and possibly +influenced him to write as he did in February, 1920, even more than our +known divergence of judgment during the negotiations. + +I do not feel, therefore, that the story is complete without at least a +brief reference to my views concerning the Treaty of Versailles at the +time of its delivery to the German delegates, which were imperfectly +disclosed in a statement made by William C. Bullitt on September 12, +1919, at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign +Relations. As to the conduct of Mr. Bullitt, who had held a responsible +position with the American Commission at Paris, in voluntarily repeating +a conversation which was from its nature highly confidential, I make +no comment. + +The portion of the statement, which I have no doubt deeply incensed the +President because it was published while he was in the West making his +appeals to the people in behalf of the Treaty and especially of the +League of Nations, is as follows: + + "Mr. Lansing said that he, too, considered many parts of the Treaty + thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the + League of Nations. He said: 'I consider that the League of Nations at + present is entirely useless. The Great Powers have simply gone ahead + and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France have + gotten out of the Treaty everything that they wanted, and the League + of Nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the + Treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the League, and + the Great Powers will never give their consent to changes in the + interests of weaker peoples.' + + "We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. + Mr. Lansing said: 'I believe that if the Senate could only understand + what this Treaty means, and if the American people could really + understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they + will ever understand what it lets them in for.'" (Senate Doc. 106, + 66th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1276.) + +It does not seem an unwarranted conjecture that the President believed +that this statement, which was asserted by Mr. Bullitt to be from a +memorandum made at the time, indicated that I had been unfaithful to +him. He may even have concluded that I had been working against the +League of Nations with the intention of bringing about the rejection of +the Covenant by the Senate. If he did believe this, I cannot feel that +it was other than natural in the circumstances, especially if I did not +at once publicly deny the truth of the Bullitt statement. That I could +not do because there was sufficient truth in it to compel me to show +how, by slight variations and by omissions in the conversation, my words +were misunderstood or misinterpreted. + +In view of the fact that I found it impossible to make an absolute +denial, I telegraphed the President stating the facts and offering to +make them public if he considered it wise to do so. The important part +of the telegram, which was dated September 16, 1919, is as follows: + + "On May 17th Bullitt resigned by letter giving his reasons, with + which you are familiar. I replied by letter on the 18th without any + comment on his reasons. Bullitt on the 19th asked to see me to say + good-bye and I saw him. He elaborated on the reasons for his + resignation and said that he could not conscientiously give + countenance to a treaty which was based on injustice. I told him that + I would say nothing against his resigning since he put it on + conscientious grounds, and that I recognized that certain features of + the Treaty were bad, as I presumed most every one did, but that was + probably unavoidable in view of conflicting claims and that nothing + ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace by + signing the Treaty. Bullitt then discussed the numerous European + commissions provided for by the Treaty on which the United States was + to be represented. I told him that I was disturbed by this fact + because I was afraid the Senate and possibly the people, if they + understood this, would refuse ratification, and that anything which + was an obstacle to ratification was unfortunate because we ought to + have peace as soon as possible." + +It is very easy to see how by making a record of one side of this +conversation without reference to the other side and by an omission here +and there, possibly unintentionally, the sense was altered. Thus Mr. +Bullitt, by repeating only a part of my words and by omitting the +context, entirely changed the meaning of what was said. My attitude was, +and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signed +and ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration of +peace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which might +delay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification, +was to be deplored. + +Having submitted to the President the question of making a public +explanation of my interview with Mr. Bullitt which would in a measure at +least correct the impression caused by his statement, I could not do so +until I received the President's approval. That was never received. The +telegram, which was sent to Mr. Wilson, through the Department of State, +was never answered. It was not even acknowledged. The consequence was +that the version of the conversation given by Mr. Bullitt was the only +one that up to the present time has been published. + +The almost unavoidable conclusion from the President's silence is that +he considered my explanation was insufficient to destroy or even to +weaken materially the effect of Mr. Bullitt's account of what had taken +place, and that the public would believe in spite of it that I was +opposed to the Treaty and hostile to the League of Nations. I am not +disposed to blame the President for holding this opinion considering +what had taken place at Paris. From his point of view a statement, such +as I was willing to make, would in no way help the situation. I would +still be on record as opposed to certain provisions of the Treaty, +provisions which he was so earnestly defending in his addresses. While +Mr. Bullitt had given an incomplete report of our conversation, there +was sufficient truth in it to make anything but a flat denial seem of +little value to the President; and, as I could not make such a denial, +his point of view seemed to be that the damage was done and could not be +undone. I am inclined to think that he was right. + +My views concerning the Treaty at the time of the conversation with Mr. +Bullitt are expressed in a memorandum of May 8, 1919, which is +as follows: + + "The terms of peace were yesterday delivered to the German + plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in these days of feverish + rush of preparation there is time to consider the Treaty as a + complete document. + + "The impression made by it is one of disappointment, of regret, and + of depression. The terms of peace appear immeasurably harsh and + humiliating, while many of them seem to me impossible of performance. + + "The League of Nations created by the Treaty is relied upon to + preserve the artificial structure which has been erected by + compromise of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers and to + prevent the germination of the seeds of war which are sown in so many + articles and which under normal conditions would soon bear fruit. The + League might as well attempt to prevent the growth of plant life in a + tropical jungle. Wars will come sooner or later. + + "It must be admitted in honesty that the League is an instrument of + the mighty to check the normal growth of national power and national + aspirations among those who have been rendered impotent by defeat. + Examine the Treaty and you will find peoples delivered against their + wills into the hands of those whom they hate, while their economic + resources are torn from them and given to others. Resentment and + bitterness, if not desperation, are bound to be the consequences of + such provisions. It may be years before these oppressed peoples are + able to throw off the yoke, but as sure as day follows night the time + will come when they will make the effort. + + "This war was fought by the United States to destroy forever the + conditions which produced it. Those conditions have not been + destroyed. They have been supplanted by other conditions equally + productive of hatred, jealousy, and suspicion. In place of the Triple + Alliance and the Entente has arisen the Quintuple Alliance which is + to rule the world. The victors in this war intend to impose their + combined will upon the vanquished and to subordinate all interests to + their own. + + "It is true that to please the aroused public opinion of mankind and + to respond to the idealism of the moralist they have surrounded the + new alliance with a halo and called it 'The League of Nations,' but + whatever it may be called or however it may be disguised it is an + alliance of the Five Great Military Powers. + + "It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that the power to compel + obedience by the exercise of the united strength of 'The Five' is the + fundamental principle of the League. Justice is secondary. Might + is primary. + + "The League as now constituted will be the prey of greed and + intrigue; and the law of unanimity in the Council, which may offer a + restraint, will be broken or render the organization powerless. It is + called upon to stamp as just what is unjust. + + "We have a treaty of peace, but it will not bring permanent peace + because it is founded on the shifting sands of self-interest." + +In the views thus expressed I was not alone. A few days after they were +written I was in London where I discussed the Treaty with several of the +leading British statesmen. I noted their opinions thus: "The consensus +was that the Treaty was unwise and unworkable, that it was conceived in +intrigue and fashioned in cupidity, and that it would produce rather +than prevent wars." One of these leaders of political thought in Great +Britain said that "the only apparent purpose of the League of Nations +seems to be to perpetuate the series of unjust provisions which were +being imposed." + +The day following my return from London, which was on May 17, I received +Mr. Bullitt's letter of resignation and also letters from five of our +principal experts protesting against the terms of peace and stating that +they considered them to be an abandonment of the principles for which +Americans had fought. One of the officials, whose relations with the +President were of a most intimate nature, said that he was in a quandary +about resigning; that he did not think that the conditions in the Treaty +would make for peace because they were too oppressive; that the +obnoxious things in the Treaty were due to secret diplomacy; and that +the President should have stuck rigidly to his principles, which he had +not. This official was evidently deeply incensed, but in the end he did +not resign, nor did the five experts who sent letters, because they were +told that it would seriously cripple the American Commission in the +preparation of the Austrian Treaty if they did not continue to serve. +Another and more prominent adviser of the President felt very bitterly +over the terms of peace. In speaking of his disapproval of them he told +me that he had found the same feeling among the British in Paris, who +were disposed to blame the President since "they had counted upon him to +stand firmly by his principles and face down the intriguers." + +It is needless to cite other instances indicating the general state of +mind among the Americans and British at Paris to show the views that +were being exchanged and the frank comments that were being made at the +time of my interview with Mr. Bullitt. In truth I said less to him in +criticism of the Treaty than I did to some others, but they have seen +fit to respect the confidential nature of our conversations. + +It is not pertinent to the present subject to recite the events between +the delivery of the Treaty to the Germans on May 7 and its signature on +June 28. In spite of the dissatisfaction, which even went so far that +some of the delegates of the Great Powers threatened to decline to sign +the Treaty unless certain of its terms were modified, the supreme +necessity of restoring peace as soon as possible overcame all obstacles. +It was the appreciation of this supreme necessity which caused many +Americans to urge consent to ratification when the Treaty was laid +before the Senate. + +My own position was paradoxical. I was opposed to the Treaty, but signed +it and favored its ratification. The explanation is this: Convinced +after conversations with the President in July and August, 1919, that he +would not consent to any effective reservations, the politic course +seemed to be to endeavor to secure ratification without reservations. It +appeared to be the only possible way of obtaining that for which all the +world longed and which in the months succeeding the signature appeared +absolutely essential to prevent the widespread disaster resulting from +political and economic chaos which seemed to threaten many nations if +not civilization itself. Even if the Treaty was bad in certain +provisions, so long as the President remained inflexible and insistent, +its ratification without change seemed a duty to humanity. At least that +was my conviction in the summer and autumn of 1919, and I am not yet +satisfied that it was erroneous. My views after January, 1920, are not +pertinent to the subject under consideration. The consequences of the +failure to ratify promptly the Treaty of Versailles are still uncertain. +They may be more serious or they may be less serious than they appeared +in 1919. Time alone will disclose the truth and fix the responsibility +for what occurred after the Treaty of Versailles was laid before the +Senate of the United States. + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +The narration of my relations to the peace negotiations as one of the +American Commissioners to the Paris Conference, which has been confined +within the limits laid down in the opening chapter of this volume, +concludes with the recital of the views which I held concerning the +terms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and which were brought to the +attention of Mr. Wilson through the press reports of William C. +Bullitt's statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on +September 12, 1919. + +The endeavor has been to present, as fully as possible in the +circumstances, a review of my association with President Wilson in +connection with the negotiations at Paris setting forth our differences +of opinion and divergence of judgment upon the subjects coming before +the Peace Conference, the conduct of the proceedings, and the terms of +peace imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. + +It is evident from this review that, from a time prior to Mr. Wilson's +departure from the United States on December 4, 1918, to attend the +Peace Conference up to the delivery of the text of the Treaty to the +German plenipotentiaries on May 7, 1919, there were many subjects of +disagreement between the President and myself; that he was disposed to +reject or ignore the advice and suggestions which I volunteered; and +that in consequence of my convictions I followed his guidance and obeyed +his instructions unwillingly. + +While there were other matters of friction between us they were of a +personal nature and of minor importance. Though they may have +contributed to the formality of our relations they played no real part +in the increasing difficulty of the situation. The matters narrated +were, in my opinion, the principal causes for the letters written by +President Wilson in February, 1920; at least they seem sufficient to +explain the origin of the correspondence, while the causes specifically +stated by him--my calling together of the heads of the executive +departments for consultation during his illness and my attempts to +anticipate his judgment--are insufficient. + +The reasons given in the President's letter of February 11, the +essential portions of which have been quoted, for stating that my +resignation as Secretary of State would be acceptable to him, are the +embarrassment caused him by my "reluctance and divergence of judgment" +and the implication that my mind did not "willingly go along" with his. +As neither of these reasons applies to the calling of Cabinet meetings +or to the anticipation of his judgment in regard to foreign affairs, the +unavoidable conclusion is that these grounds of complaint were not the +real causes leading up to the severance of our official association. + +The real causes--which are the only ones worthy of consideration--are to +be found in the record of the relations between President Wilson and +myself in connection with the peace negotiations. Upon that record must +rest the justification or the refutation of Mr. Wilson's implied charge +that I was not entirely loyal to him as President and that I failed to +perform my full duty to my country as Secretary of State and as a +Commissioner to Negotiate Peace by opposing the way in which he +exercised his constitutional authority to conduct the foreign affairs of +the United States. + + +THE END + + + + +APPENDIX I + + +THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, +LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION ON JANUARY 10, 1919 + +PREAMBLE + +In order to secure peace, security, and orderly government by the +prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by +the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the +actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of +justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the +dealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to +this covenant and agreement jointly and severally adopt this +constitution of the League of Nations. + +ARTICLE I + +The action of the Signatory Powers under the terms of this agreement +shall be effected through the instrumentality of a Body of Delegates +which shall consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contracting +Powers accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. The +meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the seat of +government of H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. shall be the +presiding officer of the Body. + +Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meet +temporarily at the seat of government of B. or of S., in which case the +Ambassador or Minister to H. of the country in which the meeting is held +shall be the presiding officer _pro tempore_. + +It shall be the privilege of any of the contracting Powers to assist its +representative in the Body of Delegates by any method of conference, +counsel, or advice that may seem best to it, and also to substitute upon +occasion a special representative for its regular diplomatic +representative accredited to H. + + +ARTICLE II + +The Body of Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and shall have +power to appoint such committees as they may deem necessary to inquire +into and report upon any matters that lie within the field of +their action. + +It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the initiative of +any member, to discuss, either publicly or privately as it may deem +best, any matter lying within the jurisdiction of the League of Nations +as defined in this Covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace of +the world; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the +exercise of the functions and powers granted to them under this Covenant +shall be first formulated and agreed upon by an Executive Council, which +shall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and which shall +consist of the representatives of the Great Powers together with +representatives drawn in annual rotation from two panels, one of which +shall be made up of the representatives of the States ranking next after +the Great Powers and the other of the representatives of the minor +States (a classification which the Body of Delegates shall itself +establish and may from time to time alter), such a number being drawn +from these panels as will be but one less than the representatives of +the Great Powers; and three or more negative votes in the Council shall +operate as a veto upon any action or resolution proposed. + +All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Body of Delegates upon +the recommendation of the Executive Council, except those adopted in +execution of any direct powers herein granted to the Body of Delegates +themselves, shall have the effect of recommendations to the several +governments of the League. + +The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent Secretariat and staff +and may appoint joint committees chosen from the Body of Delegates or +consisting of specially qualified persons outside of that Body, for the +study and systematic consideration of the international questions with +which the Council may have to deal, or of questions likely to lead to +international complications or disputes. It shall also take the +necessary steps to establish and maintain proper liaison both with the +foreign offices of the signatory powers and with any governments or +agencies which may be acting as mandatories of the League of Nations in +any part of the world. + + +ARTICLE III + +The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political +independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between +them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future +become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and +aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to +the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial +readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates +be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples +concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that +territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The +Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the +peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of +political jurisdiction or boundary. + + +ARTICLE IV + +The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that the establishment +and maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national +armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the +enforcement by common action of international obligations; and the +Delegates are directed to formulate at once plans by which such a +reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall be binding +when, and only when, unanimously approved by the Governments signatory +to this Covenant. + +As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the Powers +subscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant constitutes a +part hereby agree to abolish conscription and all other forms of +compulsory military service, and also agree that their future forces of +defence and of international action shall consist of militia or +volunteers, whose numbers and methods of training shall be fixed, after +expert inquiry, by the agreements with regard to the reduction of +armaments referred to in the last preceding paragraph. + +The Body of Delegates shall also determine for the consideration and +action of the several governments what direct military equipment and +armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces +laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when +adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body of +Delegates. + +The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions and implements of +war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise or for private +profit, and that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all +national armaments and military or naval programmes. + + +ARTICLE V + +The Contracting Powers jointly and severally agree that, should disputes +or difficulties arise between or among them which cannot be +satisfactorily settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes of +diplomacy, they will in no case resort to armed force without previously +submitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration or +to inquiry by the Executive Council of the Body of Delegates or until +there has been an award by the arbitrators or a decision by the +Executive Council; and that they will not even then resort to armed +force as against a member of the League of Nations who complies with the +award of the arbitrators or the decision of the Executive Council. + +The Powers signatory to this Covenant undertake and agree that whenever +any dispute or difficulty shall arise between or among them with regard +to any questions of the law of nations, with regard to the +interpretation of a treaty, as to any fact which would, if established, +constitute a breach of international obligation, or as to any alleged +damage and the nature and measure of the reparation to be made therefor, +if such dispute or difficulty cannot be satisfactorily settled by the +ordinary processes of negotiation, to submit the whole subject-matter to +arbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award or decision +that may be rendered. + +In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue shall be referred +to three arbitrators, one of the three to be selected by each of the +parties to the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and the +third by the two thus selected. When there are more than two parties to +the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the several +parties, and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their number others +of their own choice, the number thus added to be limited to the number +which will suffice to give a deciding voice to the arbitrators thus +added in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the +contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending +parties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, the +additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Body of +Delegates. + +On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of the arbitrators +may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths of the Delegates, in case +the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, or by a vote of +two-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators was +not unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and +conclusive. + +When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside, the +dispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators chosen as heretofore +provided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted as +arbitrators in the dispute in question, and the decision of the +arbitrators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding +and conclusive without right of appeal. + +If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer any matter in +dispute to arbitration, the parties to the dispute shall apply to the +Executive Council to take the matter under consideration for such +mediatory action or recommendation as it may deem wise in the +circumstances. The Council shall immediately accept the reference and +give notice to the other party or parties, and shall make the necessary +arrangements for a full hearing, investigation, and consideration. It +shall ascertain all the facts involved in the dispute and shall make +such recommendations as it may deem wise and practicable based on the +merits of the controversy and calculated to secure a just and lasting +settlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of +the Executive Council any and all information that may be in their +possession which in any way bears upon the facts or merits of the +controversy; and the Executive Council shall do everything in its power +by way of mediation or conciliation to bring about a peaceful +settlement. The decisions of the Executive Council shall be addressed to +the disputants, and shall not have the force of a binding verdict. +Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall +be the privilege of the members of the Executive Council to publish +their several conclusions or recommendations; and such publications +shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of the +disputants. + + +ARTICLE VI + +Should any contracting Power break or disregard its covenants under +ARTICLE V, it shall thereby _ipso facto_ commit an act of war with all +the members of the League, which shall immediately subject it to a +complete economic and financial boycott, including the severance of all +trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between +their subjects and the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and the +prevention, so far as possible, of all financial, commercial, or +personal intercourse between the subjects of the covenant-breaking State +and the subjects of any other State, whether a member of the League of +Nations or not. + +It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive Council of the Body +of Delegates in such a case to recommend what effective military or +naval force the members of the League of Nations shall severally +contribute, and to advise, if it should think best, that the smaller +members of the League be excused from making any contribution to the +armed forces to be used against the covenant-breaking State. + +The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restoration of peace, be +subject to perpetual disarmament and to the regulations with regard to a +peace establishment provided for new States under the terms of +SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE IV. + + +ARTICLE VII + +If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile +step short of war, against another Power before submitting the dispute +involved to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council as +herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any +hostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has been +decided adversely to it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as herein +provided, the Contracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only to +cease all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to unite in +blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to commerce or +intercourse with any part of the world and to use any force that may be +necessary to accomplish that object. + + +ARTICLE VIII + +Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the +Contracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the +League of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and those +Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed +wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. + +It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each +of the nations signatory or adherent to this Covenant to draw the +attention of the Body of Delegates to any circumstances anywhere which +threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding +between nations upon which peace depends. + +The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace whenever war is +rumored or threatened, and also whenever the Delegate of any Power shall +inform the Delegates that a meeting and conference in the interest of +peace is advisable. + +The Delegates may also meet at such other times and upon such other +occasions as they shall from time to time deem best and determine. + + +ARTICLE IX + +In the event of a dispute arising between one of the Contracting Powers +and a Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involved +hereby binds itself to endeavour to obtain the submission of the dispute +to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other Power will not +agree to submit the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration, the +Contracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention of the Body of +Delegates. The Delegates shall in such a case, in the name of the League +of Nations, invite the Power not a party to this Covenant to become _ad +hoc_ a party and to submit its case to judicial decision or to +arbitration, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed that the +provisions hereinbefore contained and applicable to the submission of +disputes to arbitration or discussion shall be in all respects +applicable to the dispute both in favour of and against such Power as if +it were a party to this Covenant. + +In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall not accept the +invitation of the Delegates to become _ad hoc_ a party, it shall be the +duty of the Executive Council immediately to institute an inquiry into +the circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to recommend +such joint action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and most +effectual in the circumstances disclosed. + + +ARTICLE X + +If hostilities should be begun or any hostile action taken against the +Contracting Power by the Power not a party to this Covenant before a +decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, report +and recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, or +contrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers shall thereupon +cease all commerce and communication with that Power and shall also +unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to all +commerce or intercourse with any part of the world, employing jointly +any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object. The +Contracting Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance of the +Contracting Power against which hostile action has been taken, combining +their armed forces in its behalf. + + +ARTICLE XI + +In case of a dispute between states not parties to this Covenant, any +Contracting Power may bring the matter to the attention of the +Delegates, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the League of +Nations with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute. + +If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and agree to +submit its interests and causes of action wholly to the control and +decision of the League of Nations, that state shall _ad hoc_ be deemed a +Contracting Power. If no one of the states, parties to the dispute, +shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall, through the Executive +Council, of their own motion take such action and make such +recommendation to their governments as will prevent hostilities and +result in the settlement of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE XII + +Any Power not a party to this Covenant, whose government is based upon +the principle of popular self-government, may apply to the Body of +Delegates for leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard the +granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order, and security of +the World, they may act favourably on the application, and their +favourable action shall operate to constitute the Power so applying in +all respects a full signatory party to this Covenant. This action shall +require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Delegates. + + +ARTICLE XIII + +The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Covenant and +Convention is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations _inter se_ +which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly engage that +they will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the +terms hereof. + +In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to +the League of Nations shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant, +have undertaken any treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the +terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take +immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. + + + + +_SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS_ + +I + +In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to +Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerly +under the dominion of the German Empire, the League of Nations shall be +regarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimate +disposal or of continued administration in accordance with certain +fundamental principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion and +control shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation on the part +of any Power. + +These principles are, that there shall in no case be any annexation of +any of these territories by any State either within the League or +outside of it, and that in the future government of these peoples and +territories the rule of self-determination, or the consent of the +governed to their form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably +applied, and all policies of administration or economic development be +based primarily upon the well-considered interests of the people +themselves. + +II + +Any authority, control, or administration which may be necessary in +respect of these peoples or territories other than their own +self-determined and self-organized autonomy shall be the exclusive +function of and shall be vested in the League of Nations and exercised +or undertaken by or on behalf of it. + +It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate its authority, +control, or administration of any such people or territory to some +single State or organized agency which it may designate and appoint as +its agent or mandatory; but whenever or wherever possible or feasible +the agent or mandatory so appointed shall be nominated or approved by +the autonomous people or territory. + +III + +The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by +the mandatary State or agency shall in each case be explicitly defined +by the League in a special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the +League complete power of supervision and of intimate control, and which +shall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental +unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of +any breach of the mandate by the mandatary State or agency or for the +substitution of some other State or agency, as mandatary. + +The mandatary State or agency shall in all cases be bound and required +to maintain the policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for all +the signatories to this Covenant, in respect of the use and development +of the economic resources of such people or territory. + +The mandatary State or agency shall in no case form or maintain any +military or naval force in excess of definite standards laid down by the +League itself for the purposes of internal police. + +IV + +No new State arising or created from the old Empires of Austria-Hungary, +or Turkey shall be recognized by the League or admitted into its +membership except on condition that its military and naval forces and +armaments shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in respect +of it from time to time. + +As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, +directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations +_inter se_ of all new independent States arising or created out of the +Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating and +composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance of +settled order and the general peace. + +V + +The Powers signatory or adherent to this Covenant agree that they will +themselves seek to establish and maintain fair hours and humane +conditions of labour for all those within their several jurisdictions +who are engaged in manual labour and that they will exert their +influence in favour of the adoption and maintenance of a similar policy +and like safeguards wherever their industrial and commercial +relations extend. + +VI + +The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as +a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous +States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their +several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in +law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of +their people. + + + + +APPENDIX II + +LEAGUE OF NATIONS + + +(_Plan of Lord Robert Cecil_[1]) + +I + +ORGANIZATION + + +The general treaty setting up the league of nations will explicitly +provide for regular conferences between the responsible representatives +of the contracting powers. + +These conferences would review the general conditions of international +relations and would naturally pay special attention to any difficulty +which might seem to threaten the peace of the world. They would also +receive and as occasion demanded discuss reports as to the work of any +international administrative or investigating bodies working under +the League. + +These conferences would constitute the pivot of the league. They would +be meetings of statesmen responsible to their own sovereign parliaments, +and any decisions taken would therefore, as in the case of the various +allied conferences during the war, have to be unanimous. + +The following form of organization is suggested: + +I. _The conference_. Annual meeting of prime ministers and foreign +secretaries of British Empire, United States, France, Italy, Japan, and +any other States recognized by them as great powers. Quadrennial meeting +of representatives of all States included in the league. There should +also be provision for the summoning of special conferences on the demand +of any one of the great powers or, if there were danger of an outbreak +of war, of any member of the league. (The composition of the league will +be determined at the peace conference. Definitely untrustworthy and +hostile States, e.g., Russia, should the Bolshevist government remain in +power, should be excluded. Otherwise it is desirable not to be too rigid +in scrutinizing qualifications, since the small powers will in any case +not exercise any considerable influence.) + +2. For the conduct of its work the interstate conference will require a +permanent secretariat. The general secretary should be appointed by the +great powers, if possible choosing a national of some other country. + +3. _International bodies_. The secretariat would be the responsible +channel of communication between the interstate conference and all +international bodies functioning under treaties guaranteed by the +league. These would fall into three classes: + +_(a)_ Judicial; i.e., the existing Hague organization with any additions +or modifications made by the league. + +_(b)_ International administrative bodies. Such as the suggested transit +commission. To these would be added bodies already formed under existing +treaties (which are very numerous and deal with very important +interests, e.g., postal union, international labor office, etc.). + +_(c)_ International commissions of enquiry: e.g., commission on industrial +conditions (labor legislation), African commission, armaments +commission. + +4. In addition to the above arrangements guaranteed by or arising out of +the general treaty, there would probably be a periodical congress of +delegates of the parliaments of the States belonging to the league, as a +development out of the existing Interparliamentary Union. A regular +staple of discussion for this body would be afforded by the reports of +the interstate conference and of the different international bodies. The +congress would thus cover the ground that is at present occupied by the +periodical Hague Conference and also the ground claimed by the Socialist +International. + +For the efficient conduct of all these activities it is essential that +there should be a permanent central meeting-place, where the officials +and officers of the league would enjoy the privileges of +extra-territoriality. Geneva is suggested as the most suitable place. + + +II + +PREVENTION OF WAR + +The covenants for the prevention of war which would be embodied in the +general treaty would be as follows: + +(1) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war +until they had submitted the questions at issue to an international +conference or an arbitral court, and until the conference or court had +issued a report or handed down an award. + +(2) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war +with any member of the league complying with the award of a court or +with the report of a conference. For the purpose of this clause, the +report of the conference must be unanimous, excluding the litigants. + +(3) The members of the league would undertake to regard themselves, as +_ipso facto_, at war with any one of them acting contrary to the above +covenants, and to take, jointly and severally, appropriate military, +economic and other measure against the recalcitrant State. + +(4) The members of the league would bind themselves to take similar +action, in the sense of the above clause, against any State not being a +member of the league which is involved in a dispute with a member of +the league. + +(This is a stronger provision than that proposed in the Phillimore +Report.) + +The above covenants mark an advance upon the practice of international +relations previous to the war in two respects: (i) In insuring a +necessary period of delay before war can break out (except between two +States which are neither of them members of the league); (2) In securing +public discussion and probably a public report upon matters in dispute. + +It should be observed that even in cases where the conference report is +not unanimous, and therefore in no sense binding, a majority report may +be issued and that this would be likely to carry weight with the public +opinion of the States in the league. + + + + +APPENDIX III + +THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES + + +ARTICLE I + +The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the +Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such +of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without +reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a +Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the +coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all +other Members of the League. + +Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the +Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by +two thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective +guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international +obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by +the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and +armaments. + +Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention +so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international +obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been +fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. + + +ARTICLE 2 + +The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through +the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent +Secretariat. + + +ARTICLE 3 + +The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the +League. + +The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as +occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as +may be decided upon. + +The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere +of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. + +At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one +vote, and may have not more than three Representatives. + + +ARTICLE 4 + +The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and +Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members +of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the +Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of +the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by +the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece +shall be members of the Council. + +With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name +additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be +members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the +number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for +representation on the Council. + +The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at +least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as +may be decided upon. + +The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere +of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. + +Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited +to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the +Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the +interests of that Member of the League. + +At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the +Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one +Representative. + + +ARTICLE 5 + +Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the +terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or +of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the +League represented at the meeting. + +All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, +including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular +matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be +decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at +the meeting. + +The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council +shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. + + +ARTICLE 6 + +The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the +League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such +secretaries and staff as may be required. + +The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex; +thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with +the approval of the majority of the Assembly. + +The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the +Secretary General with the approval of the Council. + +The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the +Assembly and of the Council. + +The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the +League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the +International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. + + +ARTICLE 7 + +The Seat of the League is established at Geneva. + +The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be +established elsewhere. + +All positions under or in connection with the League, including the +Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. + +Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League +when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic +privileges and immunities. + +The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials +or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable. + + +ARTICLE 8 + +The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace +requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point +consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of +international obligations. + +The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and +circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction +for the consideration and action of the several Governments. + +Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least +every ten years. + +After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, +the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the +concurrence of the Council. + +The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private +enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave +objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon +such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the +necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to +manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for +their safety. + +The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank +information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval +and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are +adaptable to warlike purposes. + + +ARTICLE 9 + +A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the +execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval +and air questions generally. + + +ARTICLE 10 + +The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against +external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political +independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such +aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the +Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be +fulfilled. + + +ARTICLE 11 + +Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the +Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to +the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be +deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any +such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request +of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. + +It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the +League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any +circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens +to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations +upon which peace depends. + + +ARTICLE 12 + +The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them +any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter +either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no +case to resort to war until three months after the award by the +arbitrators or the report by the Council. + +In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be +made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be +made within six months after the submission of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 13 + +The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise +between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to +arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, +they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration. + +Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of +international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established +would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the +extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are +declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission +to arbitration. + +For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to +which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties +to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. + +The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good +faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to +war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the +event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall +propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. + + +ARTICLE 14 + +The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for +adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of +International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and +determine any dispute of an international character which the parties +thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon +any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by +the Assembly. + + +ARTICLE 15 + +If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely +to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in +accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they +will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may +effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute +to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a +full investigation and consideration thereof. + +For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the +Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case +with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith +direct the publication thereof. + +The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and +if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving +such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of +settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate. + +If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by +a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement +of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed +just and proper in regard thereto. + +Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a +statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions +regarding the same. + +If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members +thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to +the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to +war with any party to the dispute which complies with the +recommendations of the report. + +If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by +the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of +the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to +themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider +necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. + +If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is +found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international +law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the +Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its +settlement. + +The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the +Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either +party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen +days after the submission of the dispute to the Council. + +In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article +and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall +apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report +made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those +Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of +the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the +Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force +as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other +than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 16 + +Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its +covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed +to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, +which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all +trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between +their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and +the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse +between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals +of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. + +It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the +several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air +force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed +forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. + +The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually +support one another in the financial and economic measures which are +taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and +inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will +mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at +one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will +take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to +the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to +protect the covenants of the League. + +Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League +may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the +Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of +the League represented thereon. + + +ARTICLE 17 + +In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State +which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of +the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be +invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the +purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem +just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to +16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed +necessary by the Council. + +Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute +an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such +action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. + +If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of +membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall +resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article +16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. + +If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the +obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such +dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such +recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the +settlement of the dispute. + + +ARTICLE 18 + +Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any +Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat +and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or +international engagement shall be binding until so registered. + + +ARTICLE 19 + +The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members +of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the +consideration of international conditions whose continuance might +endanger the peace of the world. + + +ARTICLE 20 + +The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted +as abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_ which are +inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they +will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the +terms thereof. + +In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the +League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of +this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate +steps to procure its release from such obligations. + + +ARTICLE 21 + +Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of +international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional +understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance +of peace. + + +ARTICLE 22 + +To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war +have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly +governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand +by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there +should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of +such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for +the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. + +The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the +tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by +reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical +position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to +accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as +Mandatories on behalf of the League. + +The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the +development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, +its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. + +Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have +reached a stage of development where their existence as independent +nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of +administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as +they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a +principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. + +Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage +that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the +territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience +and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and +morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms +traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment +of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training +of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of +territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and +commerce of other Members of the League. + +There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the +South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their +population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of +civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the +Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the +laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to +the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous +population. + +In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an +annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. + +The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by +the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the +League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council. + +A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the +annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all +matters relating to the observance of the mandates. + + +ARTICLE 23 + +Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international +conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of +the League: + +_(a)_ will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions +of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and +in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations +extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary +international organisations; + +_(b)_ undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of +territories under their control; + +_(c)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision over the +execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and +children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; + +_(d)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade +in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this +traffic is necessary in the common interest; + +_(e)_ will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of +communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce +of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special +necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall +be borne in mind; + +_(f)_ will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern +for the prevention and control of disease. + + +ARTICLE 24 + +There shall be placed under the direction of the League all +international bureaux already established by general treaties if the +parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all +commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest +hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League. + +In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general +conventions but which are not placed under the control of international +bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to +the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and +distribute all relevant information and shall render any other +assistance which may be necessary or desirable. + +The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the +expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction +of the League. + + +ARTICLE 25 + +The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the +establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red +Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the +prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout +the world. + + +ARTICLE 26 + +Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the +Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a +majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the +Assembly. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which +signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a +Member of the League. + + + + +APPENDIX IV + +THE FOURTEEN POINTS[2] + +The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that +program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this: + +I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall +be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy +shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. + +II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial +waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in +whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of +international covenants. + +III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the +establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations +consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. + +IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be +reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. + +V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all +colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in +determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the +populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims +of the government whose title is to be determined. + +VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all +questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest +cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an +unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent +determination of her own political development and national policy and +assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under +institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance +also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The +treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come +will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her +needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their +intelligent and unselfish sympathy. + +VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and +restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys +in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as +this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws +which they have themselves set and determined for the government of +their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole +structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. + +VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions +restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter +of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for +nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more +be made secure in the interest of all. + +IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along +clearly recognizable lines of nationality. + +X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish +to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest +opportunity of autonomous development. + +XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied +territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; +and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined +by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance +and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and +economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan +states should be entered into. + +XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be +assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now +under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and +an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the +Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships +and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. + +XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include +the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which +should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose +political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be +guaranteed by international covenant. + +XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific +covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political +independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. + + + + +APPENDIX V + +PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 11, +1918 + + +The principles to be applied are these: + +_First_, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the +essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as +are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent; + +_Second_, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from +sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a +game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of +power; but that + +_Third_, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made +in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and +not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst +rival states; and + +_Fourth_, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded +the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing +new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be +likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of +the world. + + + + +APPENDIX VI + +THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG + + +ARTICLE 156 + +Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and +privileges--particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, +railways, mines, and submarine cables--which she acquired in virtue of +the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all +other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung. + +All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch +lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, +shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the +exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together +with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. + +The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from +Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties +attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of +all charges and encumbrances. + + +ARTICLE 157 + +The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the +territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might +claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the +expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with +this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all +charges and encumbrances. + + +ARTICLE 158 + +Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming +into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, +title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating +to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or +other, of the territory of Kiaochow. + +Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all +treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or +privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles. + + +[Footnote 1: Reprinted from Senate Doc. No. 106, 66th Congress, 1st +Session, p. 1163.] + +[Footnote 2: From the address of President Wilson delivered at a Joint +Session of Congress on January 8, 1918.] + + + + +INDEX + + +Abrogation of treaties contrary to the League, in Wilson's original + draft; in Treaty, + +Affirmative guaranty of territory and independence, plan; Wilson adopts, + in Fourteen Points; Lansing's opposition; constitutional and + political arguments against; Lansing's "self-denying covenant" as + substitute; in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty; as continuing + balance of power; Wilson adheres to; not in Cecil plan; in Lansing's + resolution of principles; other substitute; as reason for rejection + of Treaty by Senate; retained in reported Covenant; and dominance of + Great Powers. _See also_ Equality of nations; League; + Self-denying covenant. + +Albania, disposition. + +Alliances. _See_ French alliance. + +Alsace-Lorraine, to be restored to France. + +Amendment of League, provision for. + +American Bar Association, Lansing's address. + +American Commission, members; ignored in League negotiations; conference + of January 10; ignorant of preliminary negotiations; question of + resignation over Shantung settlement; shares in Shantung + negotiations. _See also_ Bliss; House; Lansing; White; Wilson. + +American Peace Society. + +American programme, lack of definite, as subject of disagreement; + Fourteen Points announced; not worked out; insufficiency of Fourteen + Points; Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; effect of + President's attendance at Conference; embarrassment to delegates of + lack; _projet_ of treaty prepared for Lansing; President resents it; + no system or team-work in American Commission; reason for President's + attitude; no instructions during President's absence; results of + lack; and Preliminary Treaty; influence of lack on Wilson's + leadership; text of Fourteen Points. + +Annunzio, Gabriele d', at Fiume. + +Arabia, disposition. _See also_ Near East. + +Arbitral Tribunal, in Lansing's plan. + +Arbitration, as form of peace promotion; in Lansing's plan; in Wilson's + original draft; in Cecil plan; in Treaty. _See also_ Diplomatic + adjustment; Judicial settlement. + +Armenia, mandate for; protectorate. _See also_ Near East. + +Armistice, American conference on. + +Article X. _See_ Affirmative guaranty. + +Assembly (Body of Delegates), in Wilson's original draft; analogous body + in Cecil plan; in Treaty. + +Auchincloss, Gordon, and drafting of League. + +Austria, Archduchy and union with Germany, outlet to sea. + +Austria-Hungary, dissolution; Fourteen Points on subject people. + +Azerbaidjan, Wilson and. + +Baker, Ray Stannard, and Shantung. + +Balance of power, Clemenceau advocates; Wilson denounces; and Cecil + plan; League and. _See also_ Affirmative guaranty; Equality of + nations. + +Balfour, Arthur, signs French alliance. + +Balkans, Fourteen Points on. _See also_ states by names. + +Belgium, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, full sovereignty, + +Bessarabia disposition, + +Bliss, Tasker H. American delegate, opposes affirmative guaranty, and + Covenant as reported, and proposed French alliance, and Shantung, + letter to President, _See also_ American Commission; American + programme. + +Body of Delegates. _See_ Assembly. + +Boers, and self-determination, + +Bohemia, disposition, + +Bolshevism, peace as check to spread, + +Bosnia, disposition, + +Boundaries, principles in drawing, + +Bowman, Isaiah, Commission of Inquiry + +Brest-Litovsk Treaty, to be abrogated, + +Bucharest Treaty, to be abrogated, + +Buffer state on the Rhine, + +Bulgaria, boundaries, + +Bullitt, William C., on revision of Covenant, testimony on Lansing + interview, Lansing's telegram to President on testimony, no reply + received, and Wilson's western speeches, + +Canada, Papineau Rebellion and self-determination, + +Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, + +Cecil, Lord Robert, plan for League, Wilson opposes it, text of plan, + +Central Powers, Wilson and need of defeat, hope in Wilson's attitude, + peace or Bolshevism, _See also_ Mandates, and states by name. + +China. _See_ Shantung. + +Chinda, Viscount, and Shantung, + +Civil War, and self-determination, + +Clemenceau, Georges, Supreme War Council, advocates balance of power, + and Cecil plan, and Franco-American alliance, _See also_ Council of + Four. + +Codification of international law, in Lansing's plan, + +Colonies, disposition of, in Lansing's plan, Fourteen Points on, _See + also_ Mandates. + +Commerce. _See_ Non-intercourse; Open Door. + +Commission of Inquiry, work, + +Commission on the League of Nations, appointed, and Wilson's return to + United States, meets, Wilson's draft as groundwork, meetings and + report, Wilson's address, character of report and work, secrecy, + Wilson's domination, + +Constantinople, disposition, + +Constitutional objections, to affirmative guaranty, and to Cecil plan, + +Council of Foreign Ministers, established, nickname, + +Council of Four, self-constituted, secrecy, "Olympians," gives only + digest of Treaty to other delegates, Shantung bargain, _See also_ + Secret diplomacy. + +Council of Ten, and Lansing's substitute resolution on League, during + Wilson's absence, self-constituted organization, and Supreme War + Council, divided, and secrecy, + +Council of the Heads of States. _See_ Council of Four. + +Council (Executive Council) of the League, in Wilson's original draft, + analogous body in Cecil plan, in Treaty, + +Covenant. _See_ League of Nations. + +Croatia, disposition, + +Czecho-Slovakia, erection, + +Dalmatia, in Pact of London, + +Danzig, for Poland, + +Dardanelles, Fourteen Points on, + +Declaration of war, affirmative guaranty and power over, + +Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Heligoland, + +Diplomacy. _See_ Secret diplomacy. + +Diplomatic adjustment, as basis of Covenant, exalted, Lansing on + judicial settlement and, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, _See + also_ Judicial settlement. + +Disarmament, not touched in Lansing's plan; in Lansing's resolution of + principles; in Wilson's original draft; in Treaty. + +Dobrudja, disposition. + +East Indians, and self-determination. + +Economic influence on boundary lines. + +Economic interdependence, importance in peace negotiations. + +Economic pressure. _See_ Non-intercourse. + +Egypt, and self-determination; disposition. + +Election of 1918, as rebuke to Wilson. + +Entangling alliances. _See_ Isolation. + +Equality of nations, sacrifice in Wilson's draft of League; in Lansing's + form for League; ignored in Cecil plan; primacy of Great Powers + retained in reported Covenant; violation by Treaty; and secret + diplomacy at Conference. + +Esthonia, Wilson and; autonomy. + +Ethnic influence on boundary lines. _See also_ Racial minorities; + Self-determination. + +Finland, question of independence. + +Fiume affair, Lansing's attitude; Pact of London in light of dissolution + of Austria-Hungary; resulting increase in Italian claims as basis for + compromise; attitude of Italy toward Jugo-Slavia; commercial + importance of Fiume to Jugo-Slavia; campaign of Italian delegates for + Fiume; Italian public sentiment; character of population, + self-determination question; efforts to get Wilson's approval; threat + to retire from Conference; Wilson's statement against Italian claim; + withdrawal of delegation; Italian resentment against Wilson; as + lesson on secret diplomacy; delegation returns; and Shantung. + +Fourteen Points, announced; affirmative guaranty in; insufficient as + programme; text. + +France, Alsace-Lorraine; restoration. _See also_ Clemenceau; French + alliance; Great Powers. + +Freedom of the seas, in Fourteen Points. + +French alliance, as subject of disagreement; provisions of treaty; + relation to League; and removal of certain French demands from Treaty + of Peace; and French adherence to League; Lansing's opposition; + drafted, signed; Lansing and signing; arguments for. + +Geographic influence on boundary lines. + +Georgia, Wilson and. + +Germany, buffer state on the Rhine; and Russian route to the East; + Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; military impotence. + _See also_ Central Powers; French alliance; Mandates. + +Ginn Peace Foundation. + +Great Britain, and clause on self-determination; Egypt. _See also_ + French alliance; Great Powers; Lloyd George. + +Great Powers, and mandates. _See also_ Balance of power; Council of + Four; Equality of nations. + +Greece, territory. + +Gregory, Thomas W., and Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea. + +Guaranty. _See_ Affirmative; Self-denying. + +Hague Conventions, and international peace. + +Hague Tribunal, and Lansing's plan; Wilson's contempt; recognition in + Cecil plan. + +Hands Off, as basis of Lansing's plan. + +Health, promotion in Treaty. + +Heligoland, dismantlement, disposition. + +Herzegovina, disposition. + +Historic influence on boundary lines. + +Hostilities. _See_ Prevention of war. + +House, Edward M., joins Supreme War Council; conference on armistice + terms; selection as peace negotiator and President as delegate, + Commission of Inquiry, and drafting of League, and international + court, and "self-denying covenant," and balance of power, of + Commission on the League of Nations, and mandates, and data, ignorant + of Wilson's programme, and Preliminary Treaty with detailed Covenant, + and private consultations, _See also_ American Commission. + +Hungary, separation from Austria. + +Immoral traffic, prevention in Treaty, + +Immunities of League representatives, + +Indemnities, and mandates, + +India, German routes to, + +International commissions, in Cecil plan, in Treaty, + +International court. _See_ Judicial settlement. + +International enforcement. _See_ Affirmative guaranty. + +International military force, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, + +International military staff, proposal, + +Interparliamentary Congress, in Cecil plan, + +Inviolability of League property, + +Irish, and self-determination, + +Isolation, policy, and affirmative guaranty, and mandates, and French + alliance, + +Italy, and Cecil plan, territory, _See also_ Fiume; Great Powers. + +Japan, and Cecil plan, in Council of Ten, _See also_ Great Powers; + Shantung. + +Judicial settlement of international disputes, Lansing's plan, + subordinated in Wilson's draft, Lansing on diplomatic adjustment and, + Lansing urges as nucleus of League, in Lansing's resolution of + principles, Lansing's appeal for, in Covenant, arbitrators of + litigant nations, difficulties in procedure, cost, elimination from + Covenant of appeal from arbitral awards, how effected, Lansing's + appeal ignored, in Cecil plan, _See also_ Arbitration; Diplomatic + adjustment. + +Jugo-Slavia, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, port, erected, _See + also_ Fiume. + +Kato, Baron, and Shantung, + +Kiao-Chau. _See_ Shantung. + +Kiel Canal, internationalization, + +Koo, V.K. Wellington, argument on Shantung, + +Labor article, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, + +Lansing, Robert, resignation asked and given, divergence of judgment + from President, reasons for retaining office, reasons for narrative, + imputation of faithlessness, personal narrative, subjects of + disagreement, attitude toward duty as negotiator, policy as to advice + to President, President's attitude towards opinions, method of + treatment of subject, conference on armistice terms, selected as a + negotiator, opposition to President being a delegate, President's + attitude toward this opposition, and Commission of Inquiry, arrival + in Paris, and balance of power, and paramount need of speedy peace, + opposition to mandates, opposition to French alliance treaty, signs + it, personal relations with President, memorandum on American + programme (1918), has _projet_ of treaty prepared, Wilson resents it, + on lack of organization in American Commission, and lack of + programme, and American Commission during President's absence, on + Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea, opposition to secret diplomacy, effect + on Wilson, and Fiume, and Shantung, Bullitt affair, views on Treaty + when presented to Germans, and ratification of Treaty _See also_ + American Commission; League; Wilson. + +Latvia Wilson and autonomy + +League of Nations principles as subject of disagreement as object of + peace negotiations as reason for President's participation in + Conference Wilson's belief in necessity American support of idea, + earlier plans and associations divergence of opinion on form + political and juridical forms of organization Wilson's belief in + international force and affirmative guaranty affirmative guaranty in + Fourteen Points Phillimore's report preparation of Wilson's original + draft, House as author Lansing not consulted, reason Lansing's + opposition to affirmative guaranty Lansing and non-intercourse peace + plan draft impracticable and equality of nations Lansing's + "self-denying covenant" Lansing accepts guaranty as matter of + expediency diplomatic adjustment as basis of Wilson's draft guaranty + in first draft, later draft, and Treaty Lansing's substitute, his + communications not acknowledged, incorporation of detailed Covenant + in Treaty irreconcilable differences between Wilson's and Lansing's + plans Lansing on diplomatic adjustment versus judicial settlement + Lansing urges international court as nucleus three doctrines of + Lansing's plan Lansing's first view of Wilson's draft his opinion of + its form of its principles Wilson considers affirmative guaranty + essential, effect on Treaty American Commission ignored on matters + concerning Cecil plan Wilson's opposition to it question of + self-determination Lansing's proposed resolution of principles in + Treaty and later detailing detailed Covenant or speedy peace Wilson + utilizes desire for peace to force acceptance of League Lansing + proposes resolution to Wilson and to Council of Ten drafted + resolution of principles Commission on the League of Nations + appointed, American members resolution and Wilson's return to United + States Wilson's draft before Commission Wilson pigeonholes resolution + revision of Wilson's draft Lansing's appeal for international court + it is ignored elimination of appeal from arbitral awards, how + effected report of Commission, Wilson's address character of report + and work of Commission, main principles unaltered Wilson and American + opposition (Feb.) American Commission and report amendments to + placate American opinion reaction in Europe due to American + opposition change in character and addition of functions to preserve + it summary of Lansing's objections and French alliance in a + preliminary treaty as a _modus vivendi_ as subject of Wilson's + private consultations secrecy in negotiations and Shantung bargain + Bullitt's report of Lansing's attitude and carrying out of the Treaty + as merely a name for the Quintuple Alliance text of Wilson's original + draft of Cecil plan in Treaty _See also_ Mandates. + +League to Enforce Peace Wilson's address + +Lithuania Wilson and autonomy + +Lloyd George, David, Supreme War Council, 14 and French alliance _See + also_ Council of Four. + +Log-rolling at Conference + +London, Pact of + +Makino, Baron and Shantung + +Mandates, in Smuts plan, Wilson adopts it Lansing's criticism retained + in reported Covenant political difficulties Wilson's attitude legal + difficulties usefulness questioned as means of justifying the League + and indemnities altruistic, to be share of United States in Wilson's + original draft in Treaty. + +Meeting-place of League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in + Treaty. + +Membership in League in Wilson's original draft in Treaty withdrawal. + +Mezes, Sidney E., Commission of Inquiry and data. + +Miller, David Hunter and drafting of Covenant and _projet_ of a treaty. + +_Modus vivendi_, Wilson and a preliminary treaty as + +Monroe Doctrine and affirmative covenant preservation in Treaty + +Montenegro in Jugo-Slavia Fourteen Points on + +Moravia, disposition + +Munitions regulation of manufacture and trade in Wilson's original draft + in Treaty + +National safety, dominance of principle + +Near East United States and mandates Lansing's memorandum on territorial + settlements mandates in Wilson's original draft mandates in Treaty + Fourteen points on + +Negative guaranty. _See_ Self-denying covenant. + +Non-intercourse as form of peace promotion constitutionality in Wilson's + original draft in Treaty + +Norway, Spitzbergen + +Open Door in Lansing's plan in Near East in former German colonies + principle in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty in Fourteen Points + +Outlet to the sea for each nation + +Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele + +Palestine autonomy _See also_ Near East. + +Pan-America, proposed mutual guaranty treaty + +Papineau Rebellion, and self-determination + +Peace, Treaty of inclusion of detailed Covenant as subject of + disagreement expected preliminary treaty speedy restoration of peace + versus detailed Covenant Wilson employs desire for, to force + acceptance of League, resulting delay, delay, delay on League causes + definitive rather than preliminary treaty subjects for a preliminary + treaty influence of lack of American programme Wilson's decision for + a definitive treaty Lansing's views of finished treaty British + opinion protests of experts and officials of American Commission + Lansing and ratification _See also_ League. + +Persia, disposition + +Phillimore, Lord, report on League of Nations + +Poland and Anglo-Franco-American alliance independence Danzig + +Postponement of hostilities as form of peace promotion in Wilson's + original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty + +President as delegate as subject of disagreement Lansing's opposition + origin of Wilson's intention influence of belligerency on plan + influence of presence on domination of situation personal reasons for + attending decision to go to Paris decision to be a delegate attitude + of House League as reason for decision + +Prevention of war in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty + _Sec also_ Arbitration; League. + +Publication of treaties in Lansing's plan in Treaty + +Publicity as basis of Lansing's plan _See also_ Secret diplomacy. + +Quintuple Alliance, League of Nations as name for + +Racial equality issue in Shantung bargain + +Racial minorities protection, in Wilson's original draft + +Ratification of Treaty Lansing's attitude + +Red Cross promotion in Treaty + +Rhenish Republic as buffer state + +Roumania Bucharest Treaty to be abrogated territory Fourteen Points on + +Russia Wilson's policy and route for Germany to the East Lansing's notes + on territorial settlement Fourteen Points on + +Ruthenians and Ukraine + +Schleswig-Holstein disposition + +Scott, James Brown drafts French alliance treaty and _projet_ of a + treaty + +Secret diplomacy as subject of disagreement in negotiation of League as + evil at Conference Lansing's opposition, its effect on Wilson + Wilson's consultations and Wilson's "open diplomacy" in Council of + Four public resentment Fiume affair as lesson on perfunctory open + plenary sessions of Conference Council of Ten effect on Wilson's + prestige responsibility effect on delegates of smaller nations + climax, text of Treaty withheld from delegates psychological effect + great opportunity for reform missed and Shantung Fourteen Points on + _See also_ Publicity + +Secretariat of the League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in + Treaty + +"Self-denying covenant" for guaranty of territory and independence + Lansing's advocacy House and Wilson rejects suggested by others to + Wilson + +Self-determination in Wilson's draft of Covenant why omitted from treaty + in theory and in practice Wilson abandons violation in the treaties + and Civil War and Fiume colonial, in Fourteen Points Wilson's + statement (Feb. 1918) + +Senate of United States and affirmative guaranty opposition and Wilson's + threat plan to check opposition by a _modus vivendi_ + +Separation of powers Wilson's attitude + +Serbia Jugo-Slavia territory Fourteen Points on + +Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes _See_ Jugoslavia + +Shantung Settlement as subject of disagreement and secret diplomacy + bargain injustice, blackmail influence of Japanese bluff not to agree + to the League German control Japanese occupation moral effect Chinese + agreement to Japanese demands, resulting legal and moral status + status after China's declaration of war on Germany attitude of Allied + delegates attitude of American Commission, letter to Wilson argument + before Council of Ten Japanese threat to American Commission before + Council of Four value of Japanese promises questioned and Fiume + question of resignation of American Commission over China refuses to + sign Treaty Wilson permits American Commission to share in + negotiations American public opinion text of Treaty articles on + +Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia + +Slavonia disposition + +Slovakia disposition + +Small nations _See_ Equality. + +Smuts, General and disarmament plan for mandates + +Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes + +Sonnino, Baron Sidney _See_ Fiume + +Sovereignty question in system of mandates + +Spitzbergen disposition + +Strategic influence on boundary lines + +Straus, Oscar S. favors League as reported + +Supreme War Council, American members added, 14; and Cecil plan; and + Council of Ten. + +Syria, protectorate. _See also_ Near East. + +Taft, William H., supports League as reported. + +Transylvania, disposition, + +Treaty of Peace. _See_ Peace. + +Treaty-making power, President's responsibility, duties of negotiators, + and affirmative guaranty, + +Trieste, disposition; importance, + +Turkey, dismemberment and mandates, _See also_ Near East. + +Ukraine, Wilson and; autonomy, and Ruthenians. + +Unanimity, requirement in League. + +Violation of the League, action concerning, in Wilson's original draft, + in Cecil plan; in Treaty, + +War. _See_ Arbitration; League of Nations; Prevention. + +White, Henry, arrival in Paris; opposes affirmative guaranty; and + Covenant as reported and later amendments; and proposed French + alliance; and Shantung question. _See also_ American programme; + American Commission. + +Wickersham, George W., supports League as reported. + +Williams, E. T., and Shantung question, + +Wilson, Woodrow, responsibility for foreign relations; duties of + negotiators to, and opposition, presumption of self-assurance, + conference on armistice terms; disregard of precedent; and need of + defeat of enemy; and Commission of Inquiry; open-mindedness; and + advice on personal conduct; positiveness and indecision; and election + of 1918; prejudice against legal attitude; prefers written advice, + arrives in Paris, reception abroad, on equality of nations, and + separation of powers, denounces balance of power, and + self-determination, conference of Jan. 10, contempt for Hague + Tribunal, fidelity to convictions, return to United States, return to + Paris, and mandates, and French alliance, and open rupture with + Lansing, and team-work, decides for a definitive treaty only, + rigidity of mind, secretive nature, and Fiume, Italian resentment and + Shantung, and Bullitt affair, Treaty as abandonment of his + principles, Fourteen Points, principles of peace (Feb. 1918), _See + also_ American programme; Commission on the League; Council of Four; + Lansing; League; Peace; President as delegate; Secret diplomacy. + +Withdrawal from League, provision in Treaty, through failure to approve + amendments. + +World Peace Foundation, + +Zionism, and self-determination, + +Zone system in mutual guaranty plan, + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS*** + + +******* This file should be named 10444.txt or 10444.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/4/4/10444 + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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