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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/10333-0.txt b/10333-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f65004 --- /dev/null +++ b/10333-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2803 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10333 *** + +THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY + +By G. Lowes Dickinson + + + +1916 + + +CONTENTS + + 1. INTRODUCTION + Europe since the Fifteenth Century--Machiavellianism--Empire and the + Balance of Power + + 2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE ENTENTE + Belgian Dispatches of 1905-14. + + 3. GREAT BRITAIN + The Policy of Great Britain--Essentially an Overseas Power + + 4. FRANCE + The Policy of France since 1870--Peace and Imperialism--Conflicting + Elements + + 5. RUSSIA + The Policy of Russia--Especially towards Austria + + 6. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY + The Policy of Austria-Hungary--Especially towards the Balkans + + 7. GERMANY + The Policy of Germany--From 1866 to the Decade 1890-1900--A Change + + 8. OPINION IN GERMANY + German "Romanticism"--New Ambitions. + + 9. OPINION ABOUT GERMANY + Bourdon--Beyens--Cambon--Summary + +10. GERMAN POLICY FROM THE DECADE 1890-1900 + Relation to Great Britain--The Navy. + +11. VAIN ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY + Great Britain's Efforts for Arbitration--Mutual Suspicion + +12. EUROPE SINCE THE DECADE 1890-1900 + +13. GERMANY AND TURKEY + The Bagdad Railway + +14. AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS + +15. MOROCCO + +16. THE LAST YEARS + Before the War--The Outbreak of War + +17. THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL + The Pursuit of Power and Wealth + +18. THE SETTLEMENT + +19. THE CHANGE NEEDED + Change of Outlook and Change of System--An International + League--International Law and Control + + + + +THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY + + + +1. _Introduction_. + + +In the great and tragic history of Europe there is a turning-point that +marks the defeat of the ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptance +of international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of the +sovereign State at the end of the fifteenth century. And it is symbolical +of all that was to follow that at that point stands, looking down the +vista of the centuries, the brilliant and sinister figure of Machiavelli. +From that date onwards international policy has meant Machiavellianism. +Sometimes the masters of the craft, like Catherine de Medici or Napoleon, +have avowed it; sometimes, like Frederick the Great, they have disclaimed +it. But always they have practised it. They could not, indeed, practise +anything else. For it is as true of an aggregation of States as of an +aggregation of individuals that, whatever moral sentiments may prevail, if +there is no common law and no common force the best intentions will be +defeated by lack of confidence and security. Mutual fear and mutual +suspicion, aggression masquerading as defence and defence masquerading as +aggression, will be the protagonists in the bloody drama; and there will +be, what Hobbes truly asserted to be the essence of such a situation, a +chronic state of war, open or veiled. For peace itself will be a latent +war; and the more the States arm to prevent a conflict the more certainly +will it be provoked, since to one or another it will always seem a better +chance to have it now than to have it on worse conditions later. Some +one State at any moment may be the immediate offender; but the main and +permanent offence is common to all States. It is the anarchy which they +are all responsible for perpetuating. + +While this anarchy continues the struggle between States will tend to +assume a certain stereotyped form. One will endeavour to acquire supremacy +over the others for motives at once of security and of domination, the +others will combine to defeat it, and history will turn upon the two poles +of empire and the balance of power. So it has been in Europe, and so it +will continue to be, until either empire is achieved, as once it was +achieved by Rome, or a common law and a common authority is established +by agreement. In the past empire over Europe has been sought by Spain, +by Austria, and by France; and soldiers, politicians, and professors in +Germany have sought, and seek, to secure it now for Germany. On the other +hand, Great Britain has long stood, as she stands now, for the balance of +power. As ambitious, as quarrelsome, and as aggressive as other States, her +geographical position has directed her aims overseas rather than toward +the Continent of Europe. Since the fifteenth century her power has never +menaced the Continent. On the contrary, her own interest has dictated that +she should resist there the enterprise of empire, and join in the defensive +efforts of the threatened States. To any State of Europe that has conceived +the ambition to dominate the Continent this policy of England has seemed +as contrary to the interests of civilization as the policy of the Papacy +appeared in Italy to an Italian patriot like Machiavelli. He wanted Italy +enslaved, in order that it might be united. And so do some Germans now want +Europe enslaved, that it may have peace under Germany. They accuse England +of perpetuating for egotistic ends the state of anarchy. But it was not +thus that Germans viewed British policy when the Power that was to give +peace to Europe was not Germany, but France. In this long and bloody game +the partners are always changing, and as partners change so do views. +One thing only does not change, the fundamental anarchy. International +relations, it is agreed, can only turn upon force. It is the disposition +and grouping of the forces alone that can or does vary. + +But Europe is not the only scene of the conflict between empire and +the balance. Since the sixteenth century the European States have been +contending for mastery, not only over one another, but over the world. +Colonial empires have risen and fallen. Portugal, Spain, Holland, in turn +have won and lost. England and France have won, lost, and regained. In +the twentieth century Great Britain reaps the reward of her European +conflicts in the Empire (wrongly so-called) on which the sun never sets. +Next to her comes France, in Africa and the East; while Germany looks out +with discontented eyes on a world already occupied, and, cherishing the +same ambitions all great States have cherished before her, finds the +time too mature for their accomplishment by the methods that availed in +the past. Thus, not only in Europe but on the larger stage of the world +the international rivalry is pursued. But it is the same rivalry and it +proceeds from the same cause: the mutual aggression and defence of beings +living in a "state of nature." + +Without this historical background no special study of the events that led +up to the present war can be either just or intelligible. The feeling of +every nation about itself and its neighbours is determined by the history +of the past and by the way in which that history is regarded. The picture +looks different from every point of view. Indeed, a comprehension of the +causes of the war could only be fully attained by one who should know, not +only the most secret thoughts of the few men who directly brought it about, +but also the prejudices and preconceptions of the public opinion in each +nation. There is nobody who possesses these qualifications. But in the +absence of such a historian these imperfect notes are set down in the hope +that they may offer a counterpoise to some of the wilder passions that +sweep over all peoples in time of war and threaten to prepare for Europe +a future even worse than its past has been. + + + +2. _The Triple Alliance and the Entente_. + + +First, let us remind ourselves in general of the situation that prevailed +in Europe during the ten years preceding the war. It was in that period +that the Entente between France, Russia, and England was formed and +consolidated, over against the existing Triple Alliance between Germany, +Austria, and Italy. Neither of these combinations was in its origin and +purpose aggressive[1]. + +And, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the relations she entered into +with France and with Russia were directed in each case to the settlement +of long outstanding differences without special reference to the German +Powers. But it is impossible in the European anarchy that any arrangements +should be made between any States which do not arouse suspicion in others. +And the drawing together of the Powers of the Entente did in fact appear +to Germany as a menace. She believed that she was being threatened by an +aggressive combination, just as, on the other hand, she herself seemed to +the Powers of the Entente a danger to be guarded against. This apprehension +on the part of Germany, is sometimes thought to have been mere pretence, +but there is every reason to suppose it to have been genuine. The policy of +the Entente did in fact, on a number of occasions, come into collision with +that of Germany. The arming and counter-arming was continuous. And the very +fact that from the side of the Entente it seemed that Germany was always +the aggressor, should suggest to us that from the other side the opposite +impression would prevail. That, in fact, it did prevail is clear not only +from the constant assertions of German statesmen and of the German Press, +but from contemporary observations made by the representatives of a State +not itself involved in either of the opposing combinations. The dispatches +of the Belgian ambassadors at Berlin, Paris, and London during the years +1905 to 1914[2] show a constant impression that the Entente was a hostile +combination directed against Germany and engineered, in the earlier years, +for that purpose by King Edward VII. This impression of the Belgian +representatives is no proof, it is true, of the real intentions of the +Entente, but it is proof of how they did in fact appear to outsiders. And +it is irrelevant, whether or no it be true, to urge that the Belgians were +indoctrinated with the German view; since precisely the fact that they +could be so indoctrinated would show that the view was on the face of it +plausible. We see, then, in these dispatches the way in which the policy of +the Entente could appear to observers outside it. I give illustrations from +Berlin, Paris, and London. + +On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, writes as +follows:-- + + Call it an alliance, _entente_, or what you will, the grouping of the + Powers arranged by the personal intervention of the King of England + exists, and if it is not a direct and immediate threat of war against + Germany (it would be too much to say that it was that), it constitutes + none the less a diminution of her security. The necessary pacifist + declarations, which, no doubt, will be repeated at Reval, signify very + little, emanating as they do from three Powers which, like Russia and + England, have just carried through successfully, without any motive + except the desire for aggrandizement, and without even a plausible + pretext, wars of conquest in Manchuria and the Transvaal, or which, + like France, is proceeding at this moment to the conquest of Morocco, + in contempt of solemn promises, and without any title except the + cession of British rights, which never existed. + +On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador at London, +writes:-- + + A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow Press, bears to a + great extent the responsibility for the hostile feeling between the two + nations.... It is plain enough that official England is quietly pursuing + a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and that King + Edward has not hesitated to use his personal influence in the service of + this scheme. But it is certainly exceedingly dangerous to poison public + opinion in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible journals. + +Again, on July 28, 1911, in the midst of the Morocco crisis, Baron +Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, writes:-- + + I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of the Emperor William, + in spite of the too frequent exaggeration of some of his gestures. He + will not allow himself to be drawn on farther than he chooses by the + exuberant temperament and clumsy manners of his very intelligent Minister + of Foreign Affairs (Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, in general, less faith in + the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not be sorry to see the + others eat one another up.... As I thought from the beginning, it is in + London that the key to the situation lies. It is there only that it can + become grave. The French will yield on all the points for the sake of + peace. It is not the same with the English, who will not compromise on + certain principles and certain claims. + +[Footnote 1: The alliance between Germany and Austria, which dates from +1879, was formed to guarantee the two States against an attack by Russia. +Its terms are:-- + +"1. If, contrary to what is to be expected and contrary to the sincere +desire of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires +should be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are +bound reciprocally to assist one another with the whole military force +of their Empire, and further not to make peace except conjointly and +by common consent. + +"2. If one of the high contracting Powers should be attacked by another +Power, the other high contracting party engages itself, by the present act, +not only not to support the aggressor against its ally, but at least to +observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the other contracting party. +If, however, in the case supposed the attacking Power should be supported +by Russia, whether by active co-operation or by military measures which +should menace the Power attacked, then the obligation of mutual assistance +with all military forces, as stipulated in the preceding article, would +immediately come into force, and the military operations of the high +contracting parties would be in that case conducted jointly until the +conclusion of peace." + +Italy acceded to the Alliance in 1882. The engagement is defensive. Each of +the three parties is to come to the assistance of the others if attacked by +a third party. + +The treaty of Germany with Austria was supplemented in 1884 by a treaty +with Russia, known as the "Reinsurance Treaty," whereby Germany bound +herself not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. This treaty lapsed +in the year 1890, and the lapse, it is presumed, prepared the way for the +_rapprochement_ between Russia and France. + +The text of the treaty of 1894 between France and Russia has never been +published. It is supposed to be a treaty of mutual defence in case of an +aggressive attack. The Power from whom attack is expected is probably +named, as in the treaty between Germany and Austria. It is probably for +that reason that the treaty was not published. The accession of Great +Britain to what then became known as the "Triple Entente" is determined by +the treaty of 1904 with France, whereby France abandoned her opposition to +the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco; and +by the treaty of 1907 with Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated their +relations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. There is no mention in either +case of an attack, or a defence against attack, by any other Power.] + +[Footnote 2: These were published by the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,_ +and are reprinted under the title "Belgische Aktenstücke," 1905-14 (Ernst +Siegfried Mittler and Sons, Berlin). Their authenticity, as far as I know, +has not been disputed. On the other hand, it is to be assumed that they +have been very carefully "edited" by the German to make a particular +impression. My view of the policy of Germany or of the Entente is in no +sense based upon them. I adduce them as evidence of contemporary feeling +and opinion.] + + + +3. _Great Britain_. + + +Having established this general fact that a state of mutual suspicion and +fear prevailed between Germany and the Powers of the Triple Entente, let us +next consider the positions and purposes of the various States involved. +First, let us take Great Britain, of which we ought to know most. Great +Britain is the head of an Empire, and of one, in point of territory and +population, the greatest the world has ever seen. This Empire has been +acquired by trade and settlement, backed or preceded by military force. +And to acquire and hold it, it has been necessary to wage war after war, +not only overseas but on the continent of Europe. It is, however, as we +have already noticed, a fact, and a cardinal fact, that since the fifteenth +century British ambitions have not been directed to extending empire over +the continent of Europe. On the contrary, we have resisted by arms every +attempt made by other Powers in that direction. That is what we have meant +by maintaining the "balance of power." We have acted, no doubt, in our own +interest, or in what we thought to be such; but in doing so we have made +ourselves the champions of those European nations that have been threatened +by the excessive power of their neighbours. British imperialism has thus, +for four centuries, not endangered but guaranteed the independence of the +European States. Further, our Empire is so large that we can hardly extend +it without danger of being unable to administer and protect it. We claim, +therefore, that we have neither the need nor the desire to wage wars of +conquest. But we ought not to be surprised if this attitude is not accepted +without reserve by other nations. For during the last half-century we +have, in fact, waged wars to annex Egypt, the Soudan, the South African +Republics, and Burmah, to say nothing of the succession of minor wars +which have given us Zululand, Rhodesia, Nigeria, and Uganda. Odd as it +does, I believe, genuinely seem to most Englishmen, we are regarded on +the Continent as the most aggressive Power in the world, although our +aggression is not upon Europe. We cannot expect, therefore, that our +professions of peaceableness should be taken very seriously by outsiders. +Nevertheless it is, I believe, true that, at any rate during the last +fifteen-years, those professions have been genuine. Our statesmen, of both +parties, have honestly desired and intended to keep the peace of the world. +And they have been assisted in this by a genuine and increasing desire for +peace in the nation. The Liberal Government in particular has encouraged +projects of arbitration and of disarmament; and Sir Edward Grey is probably +the most pacific Minister that ever held office in a great nation. But our +past inevitably discredits, in this respect, our future. And when we +profess peace it is not unnatural that other nations should suspect a +snare. + +Moreover, this desire for peace on our part is conditional upon the +maintenance of the _status quo_ and of our naval supremacy. Our vast +interests in every part of the world make us a factor everywhere to be +reckoned with. East, west, north, and south, no other Power can take a step +without finding us in the path. Those States, therefore, which, unlike +ourselves, are desirous farther to extend their power and influence +beyond the seas, must always reckon with us, particularly if, with that +end in view, by increasing their naval strength they seem to threaten our +supremacy at sea. This attitude of ours is not to be blamed, but it must +always make difficult the maintenance of friendly relations with ambitious +Powers. In the past our difficulties have been mainly with Russia and +France. In recent years they have been with Germany. For Germany, since +1898, for the first time in her history, has been in a position, and has +made the choice, to become a World-Power. For that reason, as well as +to protect her commerce, she has built a navy. And for that reason we, +pursuing our traditional policy of opposing the strongest continental +Power, have drawn away from her and towards Russia and France. We did not, +indeed, enter upon our arrangements with these latter Powers because of +aggressive intentions towards Germany. But the growth of German sea-power +drove us more and more to rely upon the Entente in case it should be +necessary for us to defend ourselves. All this followed inevitably from +the logic of the position, given the European anarchy. I state it for the +sake of exposition, not of criticism, and I do not imagine any reader will +quarrel with my statement. + + + +4. _France_. + + +Let us turn now to France. Since 1870 we find contending there, with +varying fortunes and strength, two opposite currents of sentiment and +policy. One was that of _revanche_ against Germany, inspired by the old +traditions of glory and hegemony, associated with hopes of a monarchist +or imperialistic revolution, and directed, in the first place, to a +recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. The other policy was that of peace abroad +and socialistic transformation at home, inspired by the modern ideals of +justice and fraternity, and supported by the best of the younger generation +of philosophers, poets, and artists, as well as by the bulk of the working +class. Nowhere have these two currents of contemporary aspiration met +and contended as fiercely as in France. The Dreyfus case was the most +striking act in the great drama. But it was not the concluding one. French +militarism, in that affair, was scotched but not killed, and the contest +was never fiercer than in the years immediately preceding the war. The +fighters for peace were the Socialists, under their leader, Jaurès, the one +great man in the public life of Europe. While recognizing the urgent need +for adequate national defence, Jaurès laboured so to organize it that it +could not be mistaken for nor converted into aggression. He laboured, at +the same time, to remove the cause of the danger. In the year 1913, under +Swiss auspices, a meeting of French and German pacifists was arranged at +Berne. To this meeting there proceeded 167 French deputies and 48 senators. +The Baron d'Estournelles de Constant was president of the French bureau, +and Jaurès one of the vice-presidents. The result was disappointing. The +German participation was small and less influential than the French, and +no agreement could be reached on the burning question of Alsace-Lorraine. +But the French Socialists continued, up to the eve of the war, to fight +for peace with an energy, an intelligence, and a determination shown +in no other country. The assassination of Jaurès was a symbol of the +assassination of peace; but the assassin was a Frenchman. + +For if, in France, the current for peace ran strong in these latter +years, so did the current for war. French chauvinism had waxed and +waned, but it was never extinguished. After 1870 it centred not only +about Alsace-Lorraine, but also about the colonial expansion which took +from that date a new lease of life in France, as it had done in England +after the loss of the American colonies. Directly encouraged by Bismarck, +France annexed Tunis in 1881. The annexation of Tunis led up at last to +that of Morocco. Other territory had been seized in the Far East, and +France became, next to ourselves, the greatest colonial Power. This policy +could not be pursued without friction, and the principal friction at the +beginning was with ourselves. Once at least, in the Fashoda crisis, the two +countries were on the verge of war, and it was not till the Entente of 1904 +that their relations were adjusted on a basis of give-and-take. But by that +time Germany had come into the colonial field, and the Entente with England +meant new friction with Germany, turning upon French designs in Morocco. In +this matter Great Britain supported her ally, and the incident of Agadir +in 1911 showed the solidity of the Entente. This demonstration no doubt +strengthened the hands of the aggressive elements in France, and later +on the influence of M. Delcassé and M. Poincaré was believed in certain +quarters to have given new energy to this direction of French policy. This +tendency to chauvinism was recognized as a menace to peace, and we find +reflections of that feeling in the Belgian dispatches. Thus, for instance, +Baron Guillaume, Belgian minister at Paris, writes on February, 21, 1913, +of M. Poincaré:-- + + It is under his Ministry that the military and slightly chauvinistic + instincts of the French people have awakened. His hand can be seen in + this modification; it is to be hoped that his political intelligence, + practical and cool, will save him from all exaggeration in this course. + The notable increase of German armaments which supervenes at the moment + of M. Poincaré's entrance at the Elysée will increase the danger of a + too nationalistic orientation of the policy of France. + +Again, on March 3, 1913:-- + + The German Ambassador said to me on Saturday: "The political situation + is much improved in the last forty-eight hours; the tension is generally + relaxed; one may hope for a return to peace in the near future. But what + does not improve is the state of public opinion in France and Germany + with regard to the relations between the two countries. We are persuaded + in Germany that a spirit of chauvinism having revived, we have to fear an + attack by the Republic. In France they express the same fear with regard + to us. The consequence of these misunderstandings is to ruin us both. I + do not know where we are going on this perilous route. Will not a man + appear of sufficient goodwill and prestige to recall every one to reason? + All this is the more ridiculous because, during the crisis we are + traversing, the two Governments have given proof of the most pacific + sentiments, and have continually relied upon one another to avoid + conflicts." + +On this Baron Guillaume comments:-- + + Baron Schoen is perfectly right, I am not in a position to examine German + opinion, but I note every day how public opinion in France becomes more + suspicious and chauvinistic. One meets people who assure one that a war + with Germany in the near future is certain and inevitable. People regret + it, but make up their minds to it.... They demand, almost by acclamation, + an immediate vote for every means of increasing the defensive power of + France. The most reasonable men assert that it is necessary to arm to the + teeth to frighten the enemy and prevent war. + +On April 16th he reports a conversation with M. Pichon, in which the latter +says:-- + + Among us, too, there is a spirit of chauvinism which is increasing, + which I deplore, and against which we ought to react. Half the theatres + in Paris now play chauvinistic and nationalistic pieces. + +The note of alarm becomes more urgent as the days go on. On January 16, +1914, the Baron writes:-- + + I have already had the honour to tell you that it is MM. Poincaré, + Delcassé, Millerand and their friends who have invented and pursued the + nationalistic and chauvinistic policy which menaces to-day the peace of + Europe, and of which we have noted the renaissance. It is a danger for + Europe and for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril, which menaces the + peace of Europe to-day; not that I have the right to suppose that the + Government of the Republic is disposed deliberately to trouble the peace, + rather I believe the contrary; but the attitude that the Barthou Cabinet + has taken up is, in my judgment, the determining cause of an excess of + militaristic tendencies in Germany. + +It is clear from these quotations, and it is for this reason alone that +I give them, that France, supported by the other members of the Triple +Entente, could appear, and did appear, as much a menace to Germany as +Germany appeared a menace to France; that in France, as in other countries, +there was jingoism as well as pacifism; and that the inability of French +public opinion to acquiesce in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was an active +factor in the unrest of Europe. Once more I state these facts, I do +not criticize them. They are essential to the comprehension of the +international situation. + + + +5. _Russia_. + + +We have spoken so far of the West. But the Entente between France and +Russia, dating from 1894, brought the latter into direct contact with +Eastern policy. The motives and even the terms of the Dual Alliance are +imperfectly known. Considerations of high finance are supposed to have +been an important factor in it. But the main intention, no doubt, was to +strengthen both Powers in the case of a possible conflict with Germany. The +chances of war between Germany and France were thus definitely increased, +for now there could hardly be an Eastern war without a Western one. Germany +must therefore regard herself as compelled to wage war, if war should come, +on both fronts; and in all her fears or her ambitions this consideration +must play a principal part. Friction in the East must involve friction in +the West, and vice versa. What were the causes of friction in the West we +have seen. Let us now consider the cause of friction in the East. + +The relations of Russia to Germany have been and are of a confused and +complicated character, changing as circumstances and personalities change. +But one permanent factor has been the sympathy between the governing +elements in the two countries. The governing class in Russia, indeed, has +not only been inspired by German ideas, it has been largely recruited +from men of German stock; and it has manifested all the contempt and +hatred which is characteristic of the German bureaucracy for the ideals of +democracy, liberty, and free thought. The two Governments have always been +ready to combine against popular insurrections, and in particular against +every attempt of the Poles to recover their liberty. They have been drawn +and held together by a common interest in tyranny, and the renewal of that +co-operation is one of the dangers of the future. On the other hand, apart +from and in opposition to this common political interest, there exists +between the two nations a strong racial antagonism. The Russian temperament +is radically opposed to the German. The one expresses itself in Panslavism, +the other in Pangermanism. And this opposition of temperament is likely +to be deeper and more enduring than the sympathy of the one autocracy with +the other. But apart from this racial factor, there is in the south-east +an opposition of political ambition. Primarily, the Balkan question is +an Austro-Russian rather than a Russo-German one. Bismarck professed +himself indifferent to the fate of the Balkan peoples, and even avowed a +willingness to see Russia at Constantinople. But recent years have seen, +in this respect, a great change. The alliance between Germany and Austria, +dating from 1879, has become closer and closer as the Powers of the Entente +have drawn together in what appeared to be a menacing combination. It has +been, for some time past, a cardinal principle of German policy to support +her ally in the Balkans, and this determination has been increased by +German ambitions in the East. The ancient dream of Russia to possess +Constantinople has been countered by the new German dream of a hegemony +over the near East based upon the through route from Berlin via Vienna and +Constantinople to Bagdad; and this political opposition has been of late +years the determining factor in the relationship of the two Powers. The +danger of a Russo-German conflict has thus been very great, and since the +Russo-French Entente Germany, as we have already pointed out, has seen +herself menaced on either front by a war which would immediately endanger +both. + +Turning once more to the Belgian dispatches, we find such hints as the +following. On October 24, 1912, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador +to London, writes as follows:-- + + The French Ambassador, who must have special reasons for speaking + thus, has repeated to me several times that the greatest danger for + the maintenance of the peace of Europe consists in the indiscipline and + the personal policy of the Russian agents. They are almost all ardent + Panslavists, and it is to them that must be imputed the responsibility + for the events that are occurring. Beyond a doubt they will make + themselves the secret instigators for an intervention of their country + in the Balkan conflict. + +On November 30, 1912, Baron de Beyens writes from Berlin:-- + + At the end of last week a report was spread in the chancelleries of + Europe that M. Sazonov had abandoned the struggle against the Court + party which wishes to drag Russia into war. + +On June 9, 1914, Baron Guillaume writes from Paris:-- + + Is it true that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has imposed upon this + country [France] the adoption of the law of three years, and would + now bring to bear the whole weight of its influence to ensure its + maintenance? I have not been able to obtain light upon this delicate + point, but it would be all the more serious, inasmuch as the men who + direct the Empire of the Tsars cannot be unaware that the effort thus + demanded of the French nation is excessive, and cannot be long sustained. + Is, then, the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based upon the + conviction that events are so imminent that it will be possible to use + the tool it intends to put into the hands of its ally? + +What a sinister vista is opened up by this passage! I have no wish to +insinuate that the suspicion here expressed was justified. It is the +suspicion itself that is the point. Dimly we see, as through a mist, the +figures of the architects of war. We see that the forces they wield are +ambition and pride, jealousy and fear; that these are all-pervasive; that +they affect all Governments and all nations, and are fostered by conditions +for which all alike are responsible. + +It will be understood, of course, that in bringing out the fact that there +was national chauvinism in Russia and that this found its excuse in the +unstable equilibrium of Europe, I am making no attack on Russian policy. +I do not pretend to know whether these elements of opinion actually +influenced the policy of the Government. But they certainly influenced +German fears, and without a knowledge of them it is impossible to +understand German policy. The reader must bear in mind this source of +friction along with the others when we come to consider that policy in +detail. + + + +6. _Austria-Hungary_. + + +Turning now to Austria-Hungary, we find in her the Power to whom the +immediate occasion of the war was due, the Power, moreover, who contributed +in large measure to its remoter causes. Austria-Hungary is a State, but not +a nation. It has no natural bond to hold its populations together, and it +continues its political existence by force and fraud, by the connivance and +the self-interest of other States, rather than by any inherent principle of +vitality. It is in relation to the Balkan States that this instability has +been most marked and most dangerous. Since the kingdom of Serbia acquired +its independent existence it has been a centre drawing to itself the +discontent and the ambitions of the Slav populations under the Dual +Monarchy. The realization of those ambitions implies the disruption of the +Austro-Hungarian State. But behind the Southern Slavs stands Russia, and +any attempt to change the political status in the Balkans has thus meant, +for years past, acute risk of war between the two Empires that border them. +This political rivalry has accentuated the racial antagonism between German +and Slav, and was the immediate origin of the war which presents itself to +Englishmen as one primarily between Germany and the Western Powers. + +On the position of Italy it is not necessary to dwell. It had long been +suspected that she was a doubtful factor in the Triple Alliance, and the +event has proved that this suspicion was correct. But though Italy has +participated in the war, her action had no part in producing it. And we +need not here indicate the course and the motives of her policy. + + + +7. _Germany_. + + +Having thus indicated briefly the position, the perils, and the ambitions +of the other Great Powers of Europe, let us turn to consider the proper +subject of this essay, the policy of Germany. And first let us dwell on the +all-important fact that Germany, as a Great Power, is a creation of the +last fifty years. Before 1866 there was a loose confederation of German +States, after 1870 there was an Empire of the Germans. The transformation +was the work of Bismarck, and it was accomplished by "blood and iron." +Whether it could have been accomplished otherwise is matter of speculation. +That it was accomplished so is a fact, and a fact of tragic significance. +For it established among Germans the prestige of force and fraud, and gave +them as their national hero the man whose most characteristic act was the +falsification of the Ems telegram. If the unification could have been +achieved in 1848 instead of in 1870, if the free and generous idealism of +that epoch could have triumphed, as it deserved to, if Germans had not +bartered away their souls for the sake of the kingdom of this world, we +might have been spared this last and most terrible act in the bloody drama +of European history. If even, after 1866, 1870 had not been provoked, the +catastrophe that is destroying Europe before our eyes might never have +overwhelmed us. In the crisis of 1870 the French minister who fought so +long and with such tenacity, for peace saw and expressed, with the lucidity +of his nation, what the real issue was for Germany and for Europe:-- + + There exists, it is true, a barbarous Germany, greedy of battles and + conquest, the Germany of the country squires; there exists a Germany + pharisaic and iniquitous, the Germany of all the unintelligible pedants + whose empty lucubrations and microscopic researches have been so unduly + vaunted. But these two Germanies are not the great Germany, that of + the artists, the poets, the thinkers, that of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, + Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Liebig. This latter + Germany is good, generous, humane, pacific; it finds expression in the + touching phrase of Goethe, who when asked to write against us replied + that he could not find it in his heart to hate the French. If we do not + oppose the natural movement of German unity, if we allow it to complete + itself quietly by successive stages, it will not give supremacy to the + barbarous and sophistical Germany, it will assure it to the Germany of + intellect and culture. War, on the other hand, would establish, during + a time impossible to calculate, the domination of the Germany of the + squires and the pedants.[1] + +The generous dream was not to be realized. French chauvinism fell into +the trap Bismarck had prepared for it. Yet even at the last moment his war +would have escaped him had he not recaptured it by fraud. The publication +of the Ems telegram made the conflict inevitable, and one of the most +hideous and sinister scenes in all history is that in which the three +conspirators, Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, "suddenly recovered their +pleasure in eating and drinking," because, by publishing a lie, they +had secured the certain death in battle of hundreds and thousands of +young men. The spirit of Bismarck has infected the whole public life +of Germany and of Europe. It has given a new lease to the political +philosophy of Machiavelli; and made of every budding statesman and +historian a solemn or a cynical defender of the gospel of force. But, +though this be true, we have no right therefore to assume that there is +some peculiar wickedness which marks off German policy from that of all +other nations. Machiavellianism is the common heritage of Europe. It is +the translation into idea of the fact of international anarchy. Germans +have been more candid and brutal than others in their expression and +application of it, but statesmen, politicians, publicists, and historians +in every nation accept it, under a thicker or thinner veil of plausible +sophisms. It is everywhere the iron hand within the silken glove. It is +the great European tradition. + +Although, moreover, it was by these methods that Bismarck accomplished +the unification of Germany, his later policy was, by common consent, a +policy of peace. War had done its part, and the new Germany required all +its energies to build up its internal prosperity and strength. In 1875, +it is true, Bismarck was credited with the intention to fall once more +upon France. The fact does not seem to be clearly established. At any +rate, if such was his intention, it was frustrated by the intervention of +Russia and of Great Britain. During the thirty-nine years that followed +Germany kept the peace. + +While France, England, and Russia waged wars on a great scale, and while +the former Powers acquired enormous extensions of territory, the only +military operations undertaken by Germany were against African natives +in her dependencies and against China in 1900. The conduct of the German +troops appears, it is true, to have been distinguished, in this latter +expedition, by a brutality which stood out in relief even in that orgy of +slaughter and loot. But we must remember that they were specially ordered +by their Imperial master, in the name of Jesus Christ, to show no mercy +and give no quarter. Apart from this, it will not be disputed, by any one +who knows the facts, that during the first twenty years or so after 1875 +Germany was the Power whose diplomacy was the least disturbing to Europe. +The chief friction during that period was between Russia and France and +Great Britain, and it was one or other of these Powers, according to the +angle of vision, which was regarded as offering the menace of aggression. +If there has been a German plot against the peace of the world, it does +not date from before the decade 1890-1900. The close of that decade +marks, in fact, a new epoch in German policy. The years of peace had +been distinguished by the development of industry and trade and internal +organization. The population increased from forty millions in 1870 to over +sixty-five millions at the present date. Foreign trade increased more than +ten-fold. National pride and ambition grew with the growth of prosperity +and force, and sentiment as well as need impelled German policy to claim +a share of influence outside Europe in that greater world for the control +of which the other nations were struggling. Already Bismarck, though with +reluctance and scepticism, had acquired for his country by negotiation +large areas in Africa. But that did not satisfy the ambitions of the +colonial party. The new Kaiser put himself at the head of the new movement, +and announced that henceforth nothing must be done in any part of the world +without the cognizance and acquiescence of Germany. + +Thus there entered a new competitor upon the stage of the world, and +his advent of necessity was disconcerting and annoying to the earlier +comers. But is there reason to suppose that, from that moment, German +policy was definitely aiming at empire, and was prepared to provoke war +to achieve it? Strictly, no answer can be given to this question. The +remoter intentions of statesmen are rarely avowed to others, and, perhaps, +rarely to themselves. Their policy is, indeed, less continuous, less +definite, and more at the mercy of events than observers or critics are +apt to suppose. It is not probable that Germany, any more than any other +country in Europe, was pursuing during those years a definite plan, +thought out and predetermined in every point. + +In Germany, as elsewhere, both in home and foreign affairs, there was an +intense and unceasing conflict of competing forces and ideas. In Germany, +as elsewhere, policy must have adapted itself to circumstances, different +personalities must have given it different directions at different times. +We have not the information at our disposal which would enable us to trace +in detail the devious course of diplomacy in any of the countries of +Europe. What we know something about is the general situation, and the +action, in fact, taken at certain moments. The rest must be, for the +present, mainly matter of conjecture. With this word of caution, let +us now proceed to examine the policy of Germany. + +The general situation we have already indicated. We have shown how the +armed peace, which is the chronic malady of Europe, had assumed during the +ten years from 1904 to 1914 that specially dangerous form which grouped the +Great Powers in two opposite camps--the Triple Alliance and the Triple +Entente. We have seen, in the case of Great Britain, France, Russia, and +Austria-Hungary, how they came to take their places in that constellation. +We have now to put Germany in its setting in the picture. + +Germany, then, in the first place, like the other Powers, had occasion +to anticipate war. It might be made from the West, on the question of +Alsace-Lorraine; it might be made from the East, on the question of the +Balkans. In either case, the system of alliances was likely to bring into +play other States than those immediately involved, and the German Powers +might find themselves attacked on all fronts, while they knew in the +latter years that they could not count upon the support of Italy. + +A reasonable prudence, if nothing else, must keep Germany armed and +apprehensive. But besides the maintenance of what she had, Germany was +now ambitious to secure her share of "world-power." Let us examine in +what spirit and by what acts she endeavoured to make her claim good. + +First, what was the tone of public opinion in Germany during these +critical years? + +[Footnote 1: Emile Ollivier, "L'Empire Libéral."] + + + +8. _Opinion in Germany_. + + +Since the outbreak of the war the pamphlet literature in the countries of +the Entente has been full of citations from German political writers. In +England, in particular, the names and works of Bernhardi and of Treitschke +have become more familiar than they appear to have been in Germany prior to +the war. This method of selecting for polemical purposes certain tendencies +of sentiment and theory, and ignoring all others, is one which could be +applied, with damaging results, to any country in the world. Mr. Angell has +shown in his "Prussianism in England" how it might be applied to ourselves; +and a German, no doubt, into whose hands that book might fall would draw +conclusions about public opinion here similar to those which we have drawn +about public opinion in Germany. There is jingoism in all countries, as +there is pacifism in all countries. Nevertheless, I think it is true to +say that the jingoism of Germany has been peculiar both in its intensity +and in its character. This special quality appears to be due both to the +temperament and to the recent history of the German nation. The Germans are +romantic, as the French are impulsive, the English sentimental, and the +Russians religious. There is some real meaning in these generalisations. +They are easily to be felt when one comes into contact with a nation, +though they may be hard to establish or define. When I say that the Germans +are romantic, I mean that they do not easily or willingly see things as +they are. Their temperament is like a medium of coloured glass. It +magnifies, distorts, conceals, transmutes. And this is as true when their +intellectual attitude is realistic as when it is idealistic. In the Germany +of the past, the Germany of small States, to which all non-Germans look +back with such sympathy and such regret, their thinkers and poets were +inspired by grandiose intellectual abstractions. They saw ideas, like gods, +moving the world, and actual men and women, actual events and things, were +but the passing symbols of these supernatural powers; 1866 and 1870 ended +all that. The unification of Germany, in the way we have discussed, +diverted all their interest from speculation about the universe, life, and +mankind, to the material interests of their new country. Germany became the +preoccupation of all Germans. From abstractions they turned with a new +intoxication to what they conceived to be the concrete. Entering thus late +upon the stage of national politics, they devoted themselves, with their +accustomed thoroughness, to learning and bettering what they conceived +to be the principles and the practice which had given success to other +nations. In this quest no scruples should deter them, no sentimentality +hamper, no universal ideals distract. Yet this, after all, was but German +romanticism assuming another form. The objects, it is true, were different. +"Actuality" had taken the place of ideals, Germany of Humanity. But by +the German vision the new objects were no less distorted than the old. +In dealing with "Real-politik" (which is the German translation of +Machiavellianism), with "expansion," with "survival of the fittest," +and all the other shibboleths of world-policy, their outlook remained +as absolute and abstract as before, as contemptuous of temperament and +measure, as blind to those compromises and qualifications, those decencies, +so to speak, of nature, by which reality is constituted. The Germans now +saw men instead of gods, but they saw them as trees walking. + +German imperialism, then, while it involves the same intellectual +presuppositions, the same confusions, the same erroneous arguments, the +same short-sighted ambitions, as the imperialism of other countries, +exhibits them all in an extreme degree. All peoples admire themselves. But +the self-adoration of Germans is so naive, so frank, so unqualified, as to +seem sheerly ridiculous to more experienced nations.[1] The English and the +French, too, believe their civilization to be the best in the world. But +English common-sense and French sanity would prevent them from announcing +to other peoples that they proposed to conquer them, morally or materially, +for their good. All Jingoes admire and desire war. But nowhere else in the +modern world is to be found such a debauch of "romantic" enthusiasm, such +a wilful blindness to all the realities of war, as Germany has manifested +both before and since the outbreak of this world-catastrophe. A reader +of German newspapers and tracts gets at last a feeling of nausea at the +very words _Wir Deutsche_, followed by the eternal _Helden, Heldenthum, +Heldenthat_, and is inclined to thank God if he indeed belong to a nation +sane enough to be composed of _Händler_. + +The very antithesis between _Helden_ (heroes) and _Händler_ (hucksters), +with which all Germany is ringing, is an illustration of the romantic +quality that vitiates their intelligence. In spite of the fact that they +are one of the greatest trading and manufacturing nations of the world, and +that precisely the fear of losing their trade and markets has been, as they +constantly assert, a chief cause that has driven them to war, they speak +as though Germany were a kind of knight-errant, innocent of all material +ambitions, wandering through the world in the pure, disinterested service +of God and man. On the other hand, because England is a great commercial +Power, they suppose that no Englishman lives for anything but profit. +Because they themselves have conscription, and have to fight or be shot, +they infer that every German is a noble warrior. Because the English +volunteer, they assume that they only volunteer for their pay. Germany, +to them, is a hero clad in white armour, magnanimous, long-suffering, and +invincible. Other nations are little seedy figures in black coats, inspired +exclusively by hatred and jealousy of the noble German, incapable of a +generous emotion or an honourable act, and destined, by the judgment of +history, to be saved, if they can be saved at all, by the great soul and +dominating intellect of the Teuton. + +It is in this intoxicating atmosphere of temperament and mood that +the ideas and ambitions of German imperialists work and move. They are +essentially the same as those of imperialists in other countries. Their +philosophy of history assumes an endless series of wars, due to the +inevitable expansion of rival States. Their ethics means a belief in force +and a disbelief in everything else. Their science is a crude misapplication +of Darwinism, combined with invincible ignorance of the true bearings of +science upon life, and especially of those facts and deductions about +biological heredity which, once they are understood, will make it plain +that war degrades the stock of all nations, victorious and vanquished +alike, and that the decline of civilizations is far more plausibly to be +attributed to this cause than to the moral decadence of which history +is always ready, after the event, to accuse the defeated Power. One +peculiarity, perhaps, there is in the outlook of German imperialism, +and that is its emphasis on an unintelligible and unreal abstraction of +"race." Germans, it is thought, are by biological quality the salt of +the earth. Every really great man in Europe, since the break-up of the +Roman Empire, has been a German, even though it might appear, at first +sight, to an uninstructed observer, that he was an Italian or a Frenchman +or a Spaniard. Not all Germans, however, are, they hold, as yet included +in the German Empire, or even in the German-Austrian combination. The +Flemish are Germans, the Dutch are Germans, the English even are Germans, +or were before the war had made them, in Germany's eyes, the offscouring +of mankind. Thus, a great task lies before the German Empire: on the one +hand, to bring within its fold the German stocks that have strayed from +it in the wanderings of history; on the other, to reduce under German +authority those other stocks that are not worthy to share directly in the +citizenship of the Fatherland. The dreams of conquest which are the real +essence of all imperialism are thus supported in Germany by arguments +peculiar to Germans. But the arguments put forward are not the real +determinants of the attitude. The attitude, in any country, whatever it +may be called, rests at bottom on sheer national vanity. It is the belief +in the inherent superiority of one's own civilization, and the desire to +extend it, by force if need be, throughout the world. It matters little +what arguments in its support this passion to dominate may garner from +that twilight region in which the advanced guard of science is labouring +patiently to comprehend Nature and mankind. Men take from the treasury of +truth what they are able to take. And what imperialists take is a mirror +to their own ambition and pride. + +Now, as to the ambitions of this German jingoism there is no manner of +doubt. Germans are nothing if not frank. And this kind of German does +want to conquer and annex, not only outside Europe but within it. We must +not, however, infer that the whole of Germany has been infected with this +virus. The summary I have set down in the last few pages represents the +impression made on an unsympathetic mind by the literature of Pangermanism. +Emerging from such reading--and it is the principal reading of German +origin which has been offered to the British public since the war--there +is a momentary illusion, "That is Germany!" Of course it is not, any more +than the _Morning Post_ or the _National Review_ is England. Germans, in +fact, during recent years have taken a prominent place in pacifism as well +as in imperialism. Men like Schücking and Quidde and Fried are at least as +well known as men like Treitschke and Bernhardi. Opinion in Germany, as in +every other country, has been various and conflicting. And the pacific +tendencies have been better organized, if not more active, there than +elsewhere, for they have been associated with the huge and disciplined +forces of the Social-Democrats. Indeed, the mass of the people, left +alone, is everywhere pacific. I do not forget the very important fact +that German education, elementary and higher, has been deliberately +directed to inculcate patriotic feeling, that the doctrine of armed +force as the highest manifestation of the State has been industriously +propagated by the authorities, and that the unification of Germany by +force has given to the cult of force a meaning and a popularity probably +unknown in any other country. But in most men, for good or for evil, the +lessons of education can be quickly obliterated by the experience of life. +In particular, the mass of the people everywhere, face to face with the +necessities of existence, knowing what it is to work and to struggle, to +co-operate and to compete, to suffer and to relieve suffering, though they +may be less well-informed than the instructed classes, are also less liable +to obsession by abstractions. They see little, but they see it straight. +And though, being men, with the long animal inheritance of men behind them, +their passions may be roused by any cry of battle, though they are the +fore-ordained dupes of those who direct the policy of nations, yet it is +not their initiative that originates wars. They do not desire conquest, +they do not trouble about "race" or chatter about the "survival of the +fittest." It is their own needs, which are also the vital needs of society, +that preoccupy their thoughts; and it is real goods that direct and inspire +their genuine idealism. + +We must, then, disabuse ourselves of the notion so naturally produced by +reading, and especially by reading in time of war, that the German Jingoes +are typical of Germany. They are there, they are a force, they have to be +reckoned with. But exactly how great a force? Exactly how influential on +policy? That is a question which I imagine can only be answered by guesses. +Would the reader, for instance, undertake to estimate the influence during +the last fifteen years on British policy and opinion of the imperialist +minority in this country? No two men, I think, would agree about it. And +few men would agree with themselves from one day or one week to another. +We are reduced to conjecture. But the conjectures of some people are of +more value than those of others, for they are based on a wider converse. +I think it therefore not without importance to recall to the reader the +accounts of the state of opinion in Germany given by well-qualified foreign +observers in the years immediately preceding the war. + +[Footnote 1: As I write I come across the following, cited from a book of +songs composed for German combatants under the title "Der deutsche Zorn":-- + + Wir sind die Meister aller Welt + In allen ernsten Dingen, + * * * * * + Was Man als fremd euch höchlichst preist + Um eurer Einfalt Willen, + Ist deutschen Ursprungs allermeist, + Und trägt nur fremde Hüllen.] + + + +9. _Opinion about Germany_. + + +After the crisis of Agadir, M. Georges Bourdon visited Germany to make an +inquiry for the _Figaro_ newspaper into the state of opinion there. His +mission belongs to the period between Agadir and the outbreak of the first +Balkan war. He interviewed a large number of people, statesmen, publicists, +professors, politicians. He does not sum up his impressions, and such +summary as I can give here is no doubt affected by the emphasis of my +own mind. His book,[1] however, is now translated into English, and the +reader has the opportunity of correcting the impression I give him. + +Let us begin with Pangermanism, on which M. Bourdon has a very interesting +chapter. He feels for the propaganda of that sect the repulsion that must +be felt by every sane and liberal-minded man:-- + + Wretched, choleric Pangermans, exasperated and unbalanced, brothers + of all the exasperated, wretched windbags whose tirades, in all + countries, answer to yours, and whom you are wrong to count your + enemies! Pangermans of the Spree and the Main, who, on the other side + of the frontier, receive the fraternal effusions of Russian Pan-Slavism, + Italian irredentism, English imperialism, French nationalism! What is it + that you want? + +They want, he replies, part of Austria, Switzerland, Flanders, Luxemburg, +Denmark, Holland, for all these are "Germanic" countries! They want +colonies. They want a bigger army and a bigger navy. "An execrable race, +these Pangermans!" "They have the yellow skin, the dry mouth, the green +complexion of the bilious. They do not live under the sky, they avoid the +light. Hidden in their cellars, they pore over treaties, cite newspaper +articles, grow pale over maps, measure angles, quibble over texts or traces +of frontiers." "The Pangerman is a propagandist and a revivalist." "But," +M. Bourdon adds, "when he shouts we must not think we hear in his tones the +reverberations of the German soul." The organs of the party seemed few and +unimportant. The party itself was spoken of with contempt. "They talk +loud," M. Bourdon was told, "but have no real following; it is only in +France that people attend to them." Nevertheless, M. Bourdon concluded +they were not negligible. For, in the first place, they have power to +evoke the jingoism of the German public--a jingoism which the violent +patriotism of the people, their tradition of victorious force, their +education, their dogma of race, continually keep alive. And, secondly, +the Government, when it thinks it useful, turns to the Pangermans for +assistance, and lets loose their propaganda in the press. Their influence +thus waxes and wanes, as it is favoured, or not, by authority. "Like the +giant Antaeus," a correspondent wrote to M. Bourdon, "Pangermanism loses +its force when it quits the soil of government." + +It is interesting to note, however, that the Pangerman propaganda purports +to be based upon fear. If they urge increased armaments, it is with a +view to defence. "I considered it a patriotic duty," wrote General Keim, +"in my quality of president of the German League for Defence, to demand +an increase of effectives such that France should find it out of the +question to dream of a victorious war against us, even with the help of +other nations." "To the awakening of the national sentiment in France +there is only one reply--the increase of the German forces." "I have the +impression," said Count Reventlow, "that a warlike spirit which is new is +developing in France. There is the danger." Thus in Germany, as elsewhere, +even jingoism took the mask of necessary precaution. And so it must be, and +will be everywhere, as long as the European anarchy continues. For what +nation has ever admitted an intention or desire to make aggressive war? +M. Bourdon, then, takes full account of Pangermanism. Nor does he neglect +the general militaristic tendencies of German opinion. He found pride +in the army, a determination to be strong, and that belief that it is in +war that the State expresses itself at the highest and the best, which is +part of the tradition of German education since the days of Treitschke. +Yet, in spite of all this, to which M. Bourdon does full justice, the +general impression made by the conversations he records is that the bulk +of opinion in Germany was strongly pacific. There was apprehension indeed, +apprehension of France and apprehension of England. "England certainly +preoccupies opinion more than France. People are alarmed by her movements +and her armaments." "The constant interventions of England have undoubtedly +irritated the public." Germany, therefore, must arm and arm again. "A great +war may be delayed, but not prevented, unless German armaments are such as +to put fear into the heart of every possible adversary." + +Germany feared that war might come, but she did not want it--that, in sum, +was M. Bourdon's impression. From soldiers, statesmen, professors, business +men, again and again, the same assurance. "The sentiment you will find most +generally held is undoubtedly that of peace." "Few think about war. We need +peace too much." "War! War between us! What an idea! Why, it would mean a +European war, something monstrous, something which would surpass in horror +anything the world has ever seen! My dear sir, only madmen could desire or +conceive such a calamity! It must be avoided at all costs." "What counts +above all here is commercial interest. All who live by it are, here as +elsewhere, almost too pacific." "Under the economic conditions prevailing +in Germany, the most glorious victory she can aspire to--it is a soldier +who says it--is peace!" + +The impression thus gathered from M. Bourdon's observations is confirmed +at every point by those of Baron Beyens, who went to Berlin as Belgian +minister after the crisis of Agadir.[2] Of the world of business he says:-- + + All these gentlemen appeared to be convinced partisans of peace.... + According to them, the tranquillity of Europe had not been for a moment + seriously menaced during the crisis of Agadir.... Industrial Germany + required to live on good terms with France. Peace was necessary to + business, and German finance in particular had every interest in the + maintenance of its profitable relations with French finance.[3] At the + end of a few months I had the impression that these pacifists personified + then--in 1912--the most common, the most widely spread, though the least + noisy, opinion, the opinion of the majority, understanding by the + majority, not that of the governing classes but that of the nation + as a whole (p. 172). + +The mass of the people, Beyens held, loved peace, and dreaded war. That was +the case, not only with all the common people, but also with the managers +and owners of businesses and the wholesale and retail merchants. Even in +Berlin society and among the ancient German nobility there were to be found +sincere pacifists. On the other hand, there was certainly a bellicose +minority. It was composed largely of soldiers, both active and retired; +the latter especially looking with envy and disgust on the increasing +prosperity of the commercial classes, and holding that a "blood-letting +would be wholesome to purge and regenerate the social body"--a view not +confined to Germany, and one which has received classical expression in +Tennyson's "Maud." To this movement belonged also the high officials, the +Conservative parties, patriots and journalists, and of course the armament +firms, deliberate fomenters of war in Germany, as everywhere else, in order +to put money into their pockets. To these must be added the "intellectual +flower of the universities and the schools." "The professors at the +universities, taken _en bloc_, were one of the most violent elements in +the nation." "Almost all the young people from one end of the Empire to +the other have had brought before them in the course of their studies +the dilemma which Bernhardi summed up to his readers in the three words +'world-power or decadence.' Yet with all this, the resolute partisans of +war formed as I thought a very small minority in the nation. That is the +impression I obstinately retain of my sojourn in Berlin and my excursions +into the provinces of the Empire, rich or poor. When I recall the image +of this peaceful population, journeying to business every week-day with a +movement so regular, or seated at table on Sundays in the cafés in the open +air before a glass of beer, I can find in my memories nothing but placid +faces where there was no trace of violent passions, no thought hostile to +foreigners, not even that feverish concern with the struggle for existence +which the spectacle of the human crowd has sometimes shown me elsewhere." + +A similar impression is given by the dispatch from M. Cambon, French +Ambassador to Berlin, written on July 30, 1913.[4] He, too, finds elements +working for war, and analyses them much as Baron Beyens does. There are +first the "junkers," or country squires, naturally military by all their +traditions, but also afraid of the death-duties "which are bound to come +if peace continues." Secondly, the "higher bourgeoisie"--that is, the +great manufacturers and financiers, and, of course, in particular the +armament firms. Both these social classes are influenced, not only by +direct pecuniary motives but by the fear of the rising democracy, which +is beginning to swamp their representatives in the Reichstag. Thirdly, +the officials, the "party of the pensioned." Fourthly, the universities, +the "historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists +of German Kultur." Fifthly, rancorous diplomatists, with a sense that they +had been duped. On the other hand, there were, as M. Cambon insists, other +forces in the country making for peace. What were these? In numbers the +great bulk, in Germany as in all countries. "The mass of the workmen, +artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct." Such of the great +nobles as were intelligent enough to recognize the "disastrous political +and social consequences of war." "Numerous manufacturers, merchants, and +financiers in a moderate way of business." The non-German elements of the +Empire. Finally, the Government and the governing classes in the large +southern States. A goodly array of peace forces! According to M. Cambon, +however, all these latter elements "are only a sort of make-weight in +political matters with limited influence on public opinion, or they are +silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of +a wave of warlike feeling." This last sentence is pregnant. It describes +the state of affairs existing, more or less, in all countries; a few +individuals, a few groups or cliques, making for war more or less +deliberately; the mass of the people ignorant and unconcerned, but also +defenceless against suggestion, and ready to respond to the call to war, +with submission or with enthusiasm, as soon as the call is made by their +Government. + +On the testimony, then, of these witnesses, all shrewd and competent +observers, it may be permitted to sum up somewhat as follows:-- + +In the years immediately preceding the war the mass of the people in +Germany, rich and poor, were attached to peace and dreaded war. But there +was there also a powerful minority either desiring war or expecting it, +and, in either case, preparing it by their agitation. And this minority +could appeal to the peculiarly aggressive form of patriotism inculcated by +the public schools and universities. The war party based its appeal for +ever fresh armaments on the hostile preparations of the Powers of the +Entente. Its aggressive ambition masqueraded, perhaps even to itself, +as a patriotism apprehensively concerned with defence. It was supported +by powerful moneyed interests; and the mass of the people, passive, +ill-informed, preoccupied, were defenceless against its agitation. The +German Government found the Pangermans embarrassing or convenient according +as the direction of its policy and the European situation changed from +crisis to crisis. They were thus at one moment negligible, at another +powerful. For long they agitated vainly, and they might long have continued +to do so. But if the moment should come at which the Government should make +the fatal plunge, their efforts would have contributed to the result, their +warnings would seem to have been justified, and they would triumph as +the party of patriots that had foretold in vain the coming crash to an +unbelieving nation. + +[Footnote 1: "L'Enigme Allemande," 1914.] + +[Footnote 2: See "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 97 seq. and 170 seq. +Bruxelles, 1915.] + +[Footnote 3: A Frenchman, M. Maurice Ajam, who made an inquiry among +business men in 1913 came to the same conclusion. "Peace! I write that all +the Germans without exception, when they belong to the world of business, +are fanatical partisans of the maintenance of European peace." See Yves +Guyot, "Les causes et les conséquences de la guerre," p. 226.] + +[Footnote 4: See French Yellow Book, No. 5.] + + + +10. _German Policy, from 1890-1900_. + + +Having thus examined the atmosphere of opinion in which the German +Government moved, let us proceed to consider the actual course of their +policy during the critical years, fifteen or so, that preceded the war. +The policy admittedly and openly was one of "expansion." But "expansion" +where? It seems to be rather widely supposed that Germany was preparing war +in order to annex territory in Europe. The contempt of German imperialists, +from Treitschke onward, for the rights of small States, the racial theories +which included in "German" territory Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the +Scandinavian countries, may seem to give colour to this idea. But it would +be hazardous to assume that German statesmen were seriously influenced +for years by the lucubrations of Mr. Houston Stewart Chamberlain and +his followers. Nor can a long-prepared policy of annexation in Europe +be inferred from the fact that Belgium and France were invaded after the +war broke out, or even from the present demand among German parties that +the territories occupied should be retained. If it could be maintained +that the seizure of territory during war, or even its retention after +it, is evidence that the territory was the object of the war, it would +be legitimate also to infer that the British Empire has gone to war +to annex German colonies, a conclusion which Englishmen would probably +reject with indignation. In truth, before the war, the view that it was +the object of German policy to annex European territory would have found, +I think, few, if any, supporters among well-informed and unprejudiced +observers. I note, for instance, that Mr. Dawson, whose opinion on such +a point is probably better worth having than that of any other Englishman, +in his book, "The Evolution of Modern Germany,"[1] when discussing the aims +of German policy does not even refer to the idea that annexations in Europe +are contemplated. + +So far as the evidence at present goes, I do not think a case can be +made out for the view that German policy was aiming during these years +at securing the hegemony of Europe by annexing European territory. The +expansion Germany was seeking was that of trade and markets. And her +statesmen and people, like those of other countries, were under the +belief that, to secure this, it was necessary to acquire colonies. This +ambition, up to a point, she was able, in fact, to fulfil, not by force +but by agreement with the other Powers. The Berlin Act of 1885 was one +of the wisest and most far-seeing achievements of European policy. By it +the partition of a great part of the African continent between the Powers +was peaceably accomplished, and Germany emerged with possessions to the +extent of 377,000 square miles and an estimated population of 1,700,000. +By 1906 her colonial domain had been increased to over two and a half +million square miles, and its population to over twelve millions; and all +of this had been acquired without war with any civilized nation. In spite +of her late arrival on the scene as a colonial Power, Germany had thus +secured without war an empire overseas, not comparable, indeed, to that +of Great Britain or of France, but still considerable in extent and +(as Germans believed) in economic promise, and sufficient to give them +the opportunity they desired to show their capacity as pioneers of +civilization. How they have succeeded or failed in this we need not here +consider. But when Germans demand a "place in the sun," the considerable +place they have in fact acquired, with the acquiescence of the other +colonial Powers, should, in fairness to those Powers, be remembered. +But, notoriously, they were not satisfied, and the extent of their +dissatisfaction was shown by their determination to create a navy. This +new departure, dating from the close of the decade 1890-1900, marks the +beginning of that friction between Great Britain and Germany which was a +main cause of the war. It is therefore important to form some just idea +of the motives that inspired German policy to take this momentous step. +The reasons given by Prince Bülow, the founder of the policy, and often +repeated by German statesmen and publicists,[2] are, first, the need of a +strong navy, to protect German commerce; secondly, the need, as well as the +ambition, of Germany to play a part proportional to her real strength in +the determination of policy beyond the seas. These reasons, according to +the ideas that govern European statesmanship, are valid and sufficient. +They are the same that have influenced all great Powers; and if Germany +was influenced by them we need not infer any specially sinister intentions +on her part. The fact that during the present war German trade has been +swept from the seas, and that she is in the position of a blockaded Power, +will certainly convince any German patriot, not that she did not need a +navy, but that she needed a much stronger one; and the retort that there +need have been no war if Germany had not provoked it by building a fleet +is not one that can be expected to appeal to any nation so long as the +European anarchy endures. For, of course, every nation regards itself +as menaced perpetually by aggression from some other Power. Defence was +certainly a legitimate motive for the building of the fleet, even if +there had been no other. There was, however, in fact, another reason +avowed. Germany, as we have said, desired to have a voice in policy +beyond the seas. Here, too, the reason is good, as reasons go in a +world of competing States. A great manufacturing and trading Power +cannot be indifferent to the parcelling out of the world among its +rivals. Wherever, in countries economically undeveloped, there were +projects of protectorates or annexations, or of any kind of monopoly +to be established in the interest of any Power, there German interests +were directly affected. She had to speak, and to speak with a loud voice, +if she was to be attended to. And a loud voice meant a navy. So, at least, +the matter naturally presented itself to German imperialists, as, indeed, +it would to imperialists of any other country. + +The reasons given by German statesmen for building their fleet were in +this sense valid. But were they the only reasons? In the beginning most +probably they were. But the formation and strengthening of the Entente, +and Germany's consequent fear that war might be made upon her jointly by +France and Great Britain, gave a new stimulus to her naval ambition. She +could not now be content with a navy only as big as that of France, for she +might have to meet those of France and England conjoined. This defensive +reason is good. But no doubt, as always, there must have lurked behind it +ideas of aggression. Ambition, in the philosophy of States, goes hand in +hand with fear. "The war may come," says one party. "Yes," says the other; +and secretly mutters, "May the war come!" To ask whether armaments are for +offence or for defence must always be an idle inquiry. They will be for +either, or both, according to circumstances, according to the personalities +that are in power, according to the mood that politicians and journalists, +and the interests that suborn them, have been able to infuse into a nation. +But what may be said with clear conviction is, that to attempt to account +for the clash of war by the ambition and armaments of a single Power is +to think far too simply of how these catastrophes originate. The truth, +in this case, is that German ambition developed in relation to the whole +European situation, and that, just as on land their policy was conditioned +by their relation to France and Russia, so at sea it was conditioned by +their relation to Great Britain. They knew that their determination to +become a great Power at sea would arouse the suspicion and alarm of the +English. Prince Bülow is perfectly frank about that. He says that the +difficulty was to get on with the shipbuilding programme without giving +Great Britain an opportunity to intervene by force and nip the enterprise +in the bud. He attributes here to the British Government a policy which +is all in the Bismarckian tradition. It was, in fact, a policy urged by +some voices here, voices which, as is always the case, were carried to +Germany and magnified by the mega-phone of the Press.[3] That no British +Government, in fact, contemplated picking a quarrel with Germany in order +to prevent her becoming a naval Power I am myself as much convinced as any +other Englishman, and I count the fact as righteousness to our statesmen. +On the other hand, I think it an unfounded conjecture that Prince Bülow was +deliberately building with a view to attacking the British Empire. I see +no reason to doubt his sincerity when he says that he looked forward to a +peaceful solution of the rivalry between Germany and ourselves, and that +France, in his view, not Great Britain, was the irreconcilable enemy.[4] +In building her navy, no doubt, Germany deliberately took the risk of +incurring a quarrel with England in the pursuit of a policy which she +regarded as essential to her development. It is quite another thing, +and would require much evidence to prove that she was working up to a +war with the object of destroying the British Empire. + +What we have to bear in mind, in estimating the meaning of the German +naval policy, is a complex series of motives and conditions: the genuine +need of a navy, and a strong one, to protect trade in the event of war, +and to secure a voice in overseas policy; the genuine fear of an attack by +the Powers of the Entente, an attack to be provoked by British jealousy; +and also that indeterminate ambition of any great Power which may be +influencing the policy of statesmen even while they have not avowed it to +themselves, and which, expressed by men less responsible and less discreet, +becomes part of that "public opinion" of which policy takes account. + +[Footnote 1: Published in 1908.] + +[Footnote 2: See, e.g., Dawson, "Evolution of Modern Germany," p. 348.] + +[Footnote 3: Some of these are cited in Bülow's "Imperial Germany," p. 36.] + +[Footnote 4: See "Imperial Germany," pp. 48, 71, English translation.] + + + +11. _Vain Attempts at Harmony_. + + +It may, however, be reasonably urged that unless the Germans had had +aggressive ambitions they would have agreed to some of the many proposals +made by Great Britain to arrest on both sides the constantly expanding +programmes of naval constructions. It is true that Germany has always +opposed the policy of limiting armaments, whether on land or sea. This is +consonant with that whole militarist view of international politics which, +as I have already indicated, is held in a more extreme and violent form +in Germany than in any other country, but which is the creed of jingoes +and imperialists everywhere. If the British Government had succeeded in +coming to an agreement with Germany on this question, they would have been +bitterly assailed by that party at home. Still, the Government did make the +attempt. It was comparatively easy for them, for any basis to which they +could have agreed must have left intact, legitimately and necessarily, as +we all agree, the British supremacy at sea. The Germans would not assent +to this. They did not choose to limit beforehand their efforts to rival +us at sea. Probably they did not think it possible to equal, still less +to outstrip us. But they wanted to do all they could. And that of course +could have only one meaning. They thought a war with England possible, +and they wanted to be as well prepared as they could be. It is part of +the irony that attaches to the whole system of the armed peace that the +preparations made against war are themselves the principal cause of war. +For if there had been no rival shipbuilding, there need have been no +friction between the two countries. + +"But why did Germany fear war? It must have been because she meant to make +it." So the English argue. But imagine the Germans saying to us, "Why do +you fear war? There will be no war unless you provoke it. We are quite +pacific. You need not be alarmed about us." Would such a promise have +induced us to relax our preparations for a moment? No! Under the armed +peace there can be no confidence. And that alone is sufficient to account +for the breakdown of the Anglo-German negotiations, without supposing on +either side a wish or an intention to make war. Each suspected, and was +bound to suspect, the purpose of the other. Let us take, for example, the +negotiations of 1912, and put them back in their setting. + +The Triple Alliance was confronting the Triple Entente. On both sides +were fear and suspicion. Each believed in the possibility of the others +springing a war upon them. Each suspected the others of wanting to lull +them into a false security, and then take them unprepared. In that +atmosphere, what hope was there of successful negotiations? The essential +condition--mutual confidence--was lacking. What, accordingly, do we find? +The Germans offer to reduce their naval programme, first, if England will +promise an unconditional neutrality; secondly, when that was rejected, if +England will promise neutrality in a war which should be "forced upon" +Germany. Thereupon the British Foreign Office scents a snare. Germany +will get Austria to provoke a war, while making it appear that the war +was provoked by Russia, and she will then come in under the terms of her +alliance with Austria, smash France, and claim that England must look +on passively under the neutrality agreement! "No, thank you!" Sir Edward +Grey, accordingly, makes a counter-proposal. England will neither make +nor participate in an "unprovoked" attack upon Germany. This time it is +the German Chancellor's turn to hang back. "Unprovoked! Hm! What does +that mean? Russia, let us suppose, makes war upon Austria, while making +it appear that Austria is the aggressor. France comes in on the side of +Russia. And England? Will she admit that the war was 'unprovoked' and +remain neutral? Hardly, we think!" The Chancellor thereupon proposes the +addition: "England, of course, will remain neutral if war is forced upon +Germany? That follows, I presume?" "No!" from the British Foreign Office. +Reason as before. And the negotiations fall through. How should they not +under the conditions? There could be no understanding, because there was +no confidence. There could be no confidence because there was mutual fear. +There was mutual fear because the Triple Alliance stood in arms against +the Triple Entente. What was wrong? Germany? England? No. The European +tradition and system. + +The fact, then, that those negotiations broke down is no more evidence +of sinister intentions on the part of Germany than it is on the part of +Great Britain. Baron Beyens, to my mind the most competent and the most +impartial, as well as one of the best-informed, of those who have written +on the events leading up to the war, says explicitly of the policy of the +German Chancellor:-- + + A practicable _rapprochement_ between his country and Great Britain + was the dream with which M. de Bethmann-Hollweg most willingly soothed + himself, without the treacherous _arrière-pensèe_ which the Prince von + Bülow perhaps would have had of finishing later on, at an opportune + moment, with the British Navy. Nothing authorizes us to believe that + there was not a basis of sincerity in the language of M. de Jagow when he + expressed to Sir E. Goschen in the course of their last painful interview + his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the + Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then + through Great Britain to get closer to France.[1] + +Meantime the considerations I have here laid before the reader, in relation +to this general question of Anglo-German rivalry, are, I submit, all +relevant, and must be taken into fair consideration in forming a judgment. +The facts show clearly that Germany was challenging as well as she could +the British supremacy at sea; that she was determined to become a naval +as well as a military Power; and that her policy was, on the face of it, +a menace to this country; just as the creation on our part of a great +conscript army would have been taken by Germany as a menace to her. The +British Government was bound to make counter-preparations. I, for my own +part, have never disputed it. I have never thought, and do not now think, +that while the European anarchy continues, a single Power can disarm in the +face of the others. All this is beyond dispute. What is disputable, and a +matter of speculative inference, is the further assumption that in pursuing +this policy Germany was making a bid to destroy the British Empire. The +facts can certainly be accounted for without that assumption. I myself +think the assumption highly improbable. So much I may say, but I cannot +say more. Possibly some day we may be able to check conjecture by facts. +Until then, argument must be inconclusive. + +This question of the naval rivalry between Germany and Great Britain +is, however, part of the general question of militarism. And it may be +urged that while during the last fifteen years the British Government has +shown itself favourable to projects of arbitration and of limitation of +armaments, the German Government has consistently opposed them. There is +much truth in this; and it is a good illustration of what I hold to be +indisputable, that the militaristic view of international politics is +much more deeply rooted in Germany than in Great Britain. It is worth +while, however, to remind ourselves a little in detail what the facts +were since they are often misrepresented or exaggerated. + +The question of international arbitration was brought forward at the first +Hague Conference in 1899.[2] From the beginning it was recognized on all +sides that it would be idle to propose general compulsory arbitration for +all subjects. No Power would have agreed to it, not Great Britain or +America any more than Germany. On the other hand, projects for creating +an arbitration tribunal, to which nations willing to use it should have +recourse, were brought forward by both the British and the American +representatives. From the beginning, however, it became clear that Count +Münster, the head of the German delegation, was opposed to any scheme +for encouraging arbitration. "He did not say that he would oppose a +moderate plan of voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that arbitration +must be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no +other country is, or can be; that she can mobilize her army in ten +days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other Power can do this. +Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival Powers time to put themselves +in readiness, and would, therefore, be a great disadvantage to Germany." +Here is what I should call the militarist view in all its simplicity and +purity, the obstinate, unquestioning belief that war is inevitable, and +the determination to be ready for it at all costs, even at the cost of +rejecting machinery which if adopted might obviate war. The passage has +often been cited as evidence of the German determination to have war. But +I have not so often seen quoted the exactly parallel declaration made by +Sir John (now Lord) Fisher. "He said that the Navy of Great Britain was +and would remain in a state of complete preparation for war; that a vast +deal depended on prompt action by the Navy; and that the truce afforded by +arbitration proceedings would give other Powers time, which they would not +otherwise have, to put themselves into complete readiness."[3] So far the +"militarist" and the "marinist" adopt exactly the same view. And we may be +sure that if proposals are made after the war to strengthen the machinery +for international arbitration, there will be opposition in this country of +the same kind, and based on the same grounds, as the opposition in Germany. +We cannot on this point condemn Count Münster without also condemning Lord +Fisher. + +Münster's opposition, however, was only the beginning. As the days went on +it became clear that the Kaiser himself had become actively opposed to the +whole idea of arbitration, and was influencing Austria and Italy and Turkey +in that sense. The delegates of all the other countries were in favour of +the very mild application of it which was under consideration. So, however, +be it noted, were all the delegates from Germany, except Count Münster. +And even he was, by now, so far converted that when orders were received +from Germany definitely to refuse co-operation, he postponed the critical +sitting of the committee, and dispatched Professor Zorn to Berlin to lay +the whole matter before the Chancellor. Professor Zorn was accompanied +by the American Dr. Holls, bearing an urgent private letter to Prince +Hohenlohe from Mr. White. The result was that the German attitude was +changed, and the arbitration tribunal was finally established with the +consent and co-operation of the German Government. + +I have thought it worth while to dwell thus fully upon this episode because +it illustrates how misleading it really is to talk of "Germany" and the +"German" attitude. There is every kind of German attitude. The Kaiser is +an unstable and changeable character. His ministers do not necessarily +agree with him, and he does not always get his way. As a consequence of +discussion and persuasion the German opposition, on this occasion, was +overcome. There was nothing, in fact, fixed and final about it. It was +the militarist prejudice, and the prejudice this time yielded to humanity +and reason. + +The subject was taken up again in the Conference of 1907, and once more +Germany was in opposition. The German delegate, Baron Marschall von +Bieberstein, while he was not against compulsory arbitration for certain +selected topics, was opposed to any general treaty. It seems clear that it +was this attitude of Germany that prevented any advance being made beyond +the Convention of 1899. Good reasons, of course, could be given for this +attitude; but they are the kind of reasons that goodwill could have +surmounted. It seems clear that there was goodwill in other Governments, +but not in that of Germany, and the latter lies legitimately under the +prejudice resulting from the position she then took. German critics have +recognized this as freely as critics of other countries. I myself feel no +desire to minimize the blame that attaches to Germany. But Englishmen who +criticize her policy must always ask themselves whether they would support +a British Government that should stand for a general treaty of compulsory +arbitration. + +On the question of limitation of armaments the German Government has +been equally intransigeant. At the Conference of 1899, indeed, no serious +effort was made by any Power to achieve the avowed purpose of the meeting. +And, clearly, if anything was intended to be done, the wrong direction +was taken from the beginning. When the second Conference was to meet it +is understood that the German Government refused participation if the +question of armaments was to be discussed, and the subject did not appear +on the official programme. Nevertheless the British, French, and American +delegates took occasion to express a strong sense of the burden of +armaments, and the urgent need of lessening it. + +The records of the Hague Conferences do, then, clearly show that the German +Government was more obstinately sceptical of any advance in the direction +of international arbitration or disarmament than that of any other Great +Power, and especially of Great Britain or the United States. Whether, in +fact, much could or would have been done, even in the absence of German +opposition, may be doubted. There would certainly have been, in every +country, very strong opposition to any effective measures, and it is only +those who would be willing to see their own Government make a radical +advance in the directions in question who can honestly attack the German +Government. As one of those who believe that peaceable procedure may and +can, and, if civilization is to be preserved, must be substituted for war, +I have a right to express my own condemnation of the German Government, +and I unhesitatingly do so. But I do not infer that therefore Germany was +all the time working up to an aggressive war. It is interesting, in this +connection, to note the testimony given by Sir Edwin Pears to the desire +for good relations between Great Britain and Germany felt and expressed +later by the same Baron Marschall von Bieberstein who was so unyielding +in 1907 on the question of arbitration. When he came to take up the post +of German Ambassador to Great Britain, Sir Edwin reports him as saying:-- + + I have long wanted to be Ambassador to England, because, as you know, + for years I have considered it a misfortune to the world that our two + countries are not really in harmony. I consider that I am here as a man + with a mission, my mission being to bring about a real understanding + between our two nations. + +On this Sir Edwin comments (1915):-- + + I unhesitatingly add that I am convinced he was sincere in what he said. + Of that I have no doubt.[4] + +It must, in fact, be recognized that in the present state of international +relations, the general suspicion and the imminent danger, it requires more +imagination and faith than most public men possess, and more idealism than +most nations have shown themselves to be capable of, to take any radical +step towards reorganization. The armed peace, as we have so often had to +insist, perpetuates itself by the mistrust which it establishes. + +Every move by one Power is taken to be a menace to another, and is +countered by a similar move, which in turn produces a reply. And it is +not easy to say "Who began it?" since the rivalry goes so far back into +the past. What, for instance, is the real truth about the German, French, +and Russian military laws of 1913? Were any or all of them aggressive? Or +were they all defensive? I do not believe it is possible to answer that +question. Looking back from the point of view of 1914, it is natural to +suppose that Germany was already intending war. But that did not seem +evident at the time to a neutral observer, nor even, it would seem, to +the British Foreign Office. Thus the Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister +in London, writes as follows on February 24, 1913:-- + + The English Press naturally wants to throw upon Germany the + responsibility for the new tension which results from its proposals, + and which may bring to Europe fresh occasions of unrest. Many journals + consider that the French Government, in declaring itself ready to impose + three years' service, and in nominating M. Delcassé to St. Petersburg, + has adopted the only attitude worthy of the great Republic in presence + of a German provocation. At the Foreign Office I found a more just and + calm appreciation of the position. They see in the reinforcement of + the German armies less a provocation than the admission of a military + situation weakened by events and which it is necessary to strengthen. + The Government of Berlin sees itself obliged to recognize that it cannot + count, as before, on the support of all the forces of its Austrian ally, + since the appearance in South-east Europe of a new Power, that of the + Balkan allies, established on the very flank of the Dual Empire. Far + from being able to count, in case of need, on the full support of the + Government of Vienna, it is probable that Germany will have to support + Vienna herself. In the case of a European war she would have to make + head against her enemies on two frontiers, the Russian and the French, + and diminish perhaps her own forces to aid the Austrian army. In these + conditions they do not find it surprising that the German Empire should + have felt it necessary to increase the number of its Army Corps. They add + at the Foreign Office that the Government of Berlin had frankly explained + to the Cabinet of Paris the precise motives of its action. + +Whether this is a complete account of the motives of the German Government +in introducing the law of 1913 cannot be definitely established. But the +motives suggested are adequate by themselves to account for the facts. +On the other hand, a part of the cost of the new law was to be defrayed +by a tax on capital. And those who believe that by this year Germany was +definitely waiting an occasion to make war have a right to dwell upon that +fact. I find, myself, nothing conclusive in these speculations. But what +is certain, and to my mind much more important, is the fact that military +preparations evoke counter-preparations, until at last the strain becomes +unbearable. By 1913 it was already terrific. The Germans knew well that +by January 1917 the French and Russian preparations would have reached +their culminating point. But those preparations were themselves almost +unendurable to the French. + +I may recall here the passage already cited from a dispatch of Baron +Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, written in June 1914 (p. 34). +He suspected, as we saw, that the hand of Russia had imposed the three +years' service upon France. + +What Baron Guillaume thought plausible must not the Germans have thought +plausible? Must it not have confirmed their belief in the "inevitability" +of a war--that belief which, by itself, has been enough to produce war +after war, and, in particular, the war of 1870? Must there not have been +strengthened in their minds that particular current among the many that +were making for war? And must not similar suspicions have been active, +with similar results, on the side of France and Russia? The armaments +engender fear, the fear in turn engenders armaments, and in that vicious +circle turns the policy of Europe, till this or that Power precipitates the +conflict, much as a man hanging in terror over the edge of a cliff ends by +losing his nerve and throwing himself over. That is the real lesson of the +rivalry in armaments. That is certain. The rest remains conjecture. + +[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 75, and British White Paper, +No. 160.] + +[Footnote 2: The account that follows is taken from the "Autobiography" of +Andrew D. White, the chairman of the American delegation. See vol. ii., +chap. xiv. and following.] + +[Footnote 3: Mr. Arthur Lee, late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, at +Eastleigh:-- + +"If war should unhappily break out under existing conditions the British +Navy would get its blow in first, before the other nation had time even to +read in the papers that war had been declared" (_The Times_, February 4, +1905). + +"The British fleet is now prepared strategically for every possible +emergency, for we must assume that all foreign naval Powers are possible +enemies" (_The Times_, February 7, 1905).] + +[Footnote 4: Sir Edwin Pears, "Forty Years in Constantinople," p.330.] + + + +12. _Europe since the Decade 1890-1900_. + + +Let us now, endeavouring to bear in our minds the whole situation we have +been analysing, consider a little more particularly the various episodes +and crises of international policy from the year 1890 onwards. I take that +date, the date of Bismarck's resignation, for the reason already given (p. +42). It was not until then that it would have occurred to any competent +observer to accuse Germany of an aggressive policy calculated to disturb +the peace of Europe. A closer _rapprochement_ with England was, indeed, +the first idea of the Kaiser when he took over the reins of power in 1888. +And during the ten years that followed British sympathies were actually +drawn towards Germany and alienated from France.[1] It is well known that +Mr. Chamberlain favoured an alliance with Germany,[2] and that when the +Anglo-Japanese treaty was being negotiated the inclusion of Germany was +seriously considered by Lord Lansdowne. The telegram of the Kaiser to +Kruger in 1895 no doubt left an unpleasant impression in England, and +German feeling, of course, at the time of the Boer War, ran strongly +against England, but so did feeling in France and America, and, indeed, +throughout the civilized world. It was certainly the determination +of Germany to build a great navy that led to the tension between her +and England, and finally to the formation of the Triple Entente, as +a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance. It is 1900, not 1888, still +less 1870, that marks the period at which German policy began to be +a disturbing element in Europe. During the years that followed, the +principal storm-centres in international policy were the Far and Near +East, the Balkans, and Morocco. Events in the Far East, important though +they were, need not detain us here, for their contribution to the present +war was remote and indirect, except so far as concerns the participation of +Japan. Of the situation in the other areas, the tension and its causes and +effects, we must try to form some clear general idea. This can be done even +in the absence of that detailed information of what was going on behind the +scenes for which a historian will have to wait. + +[Footnote 1: The columns of _The Times_ for 1899 are full of attacks upon +France. Once more we may cite from the dispatch of the Comte de Lalaing, +Belgian Minister in London, dated May 24, 1907, commenting on current +or recalling earlier events: "A certain section of the Press, known here +under the name of the Yellow Press, is in great part responsible for the +hostility that exists between the two nations (England and Germany). What, +in fact, can one expect from a journalist like Mr. Harmsworth, now Lord +Northcliffe, proprietor of the _Daily Mail_, _Daily Mirror_, _Daily +Graphic_, _Daily Express_, _Evening News_, and _Weekly Dispatch_, who +in an interview given to the _Matin_ says, 'Yes, we detest the Germans +cordially. They make themselves odious to all Europe. I will never allow +the least thing to be printed in my journal which might wound France, +but I would not let anything be printed which might be agreeable to +Germany.' Yet, in 1899, this same man was attacking the French with the +same violence, wanted to boycott the Paris Exhibition, and wrote: 'The +French have succeeded in persuading John Bull that they are his deadly +enemies. England long hesitated between France and Germany, but she has +always respected the German character, while she has come to despise +France. A cordial understanding cannot exist between England and her +nearest neighbour. We have had enough of France, who has neither courage +nor political sense.'" Lalaing does not give his references, and I +cannot therefore verify his quotations. But they hardly require it. +The _volte-face_ of _The Times_ sufficiently well known. And only too +well known is the way in which the British nation allows its sentiments +for other nations to be dictated to it by a handful of cantankerous +journalists.] + +[Footnote 2: "I may point out to you that, at bottom, the character, the +main character, of the Teuton race differs very slightly indeed from the +character of the Anglo-Saxon (_cheers_), and the same sentiments which +bring us into a close sympathy with the United States of America may be +invoked to bring us into closer sympathy with the Empire of Germany." He +goes on to advocate "a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and +the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race" (see _The Times_, December +1, 1899). This was at the beginning of the Boer war. Two years later, in +October, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain was attacking Germany at Edinburgh. This +date is clearly about the turning-point in British sentiment and policy +towards Germany.] + + + +13. _Germany, and Turkey_. + + +Let us begin with the Near East. The situation there, when Germany began +her enterprise, is thus summed up by a French writer[1]:-- + + Astride across Europe and Asia, the Ottoman Empire represented, for + all the nations of the old continent, the cosmopolitan centre where + each had erected, by dint of patience and ingenuity, a fortress of + interests, influences, and special rights. Each fortress watched + jealously to maintain its particular advantages in face of the rival + enemy. If one of them obtained a concession, or a new favour, immediately + the commanders of the others were seen issuing from their walls to claim + from the Grand Turk concessions or favours which should maintain the + existing balance of power or prestige.... France acted as protector of + the Christians; England, the vigilant guardian of the routes to India, + maintained a privileged political and economic position; Austria-Hungary + mounted guard over the route to Salonica; Russia, protecting the + Armenians and Slavs of the South of Europe, watched over the fate of + the Orthodox. There was a general understanding among them all, tacit + or express, that none should better its situation at the expense of + the others. + +When into this precariously balanced system of conflicting interests +Germany began to throw her weight, the necessary result was a disturbance +of equilibrium. As early as 1839 German ambition had been directed towards +this region by Von Moltke; but it was not till 1873 that the process of +"penetration" began. In that year the enterprise of the Anatolian railway +was launched by German financiers. In the succeeding years it extended +itself as far as Konia; and in 1899 and 1902 concessions were obtained +for an extension to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. It was at this point that +the question became one of international politics. Nothing could better +illustrate the lamentable character of the European anarchy than the +treatment of this matter by the interests and the Powers affected. Here +had been launched on a grandiose scale a great enterprise of civilization. +The Mesopotamian plain, the cradle of civilization, and for centuries +the granary of the world, was to be redeemed by irrigation from the +encroachment of the desert, order and security were to be restored, +labour to be set at work, and science and power to be devoted on a +great scale to their only proper purpose, the increase of life. Here +was an idea fit to inspire the most generous imagination. Here, for all +the idealism of youth and the ambition of maturity, for diplomatists, +engineers, administrators, agriculturists, educationists, an opportunity +for the work of a lifetime, a task to appeal at once to the imagination, +the intellect, and the organizing capacity of practical men, a scheme in +which all nations might be proud to participate, and by which Europe might +show to the backward populations that the power she had won over Nature +was to be used for the benefit of man, and that the science and the arms +of the West were destined to recreate the life of the East. What happened, +in fact? No sooner did the Germans approach the other nations for financial +and political support to their scheme than there was an outcry of jealousy, +suspicion, and rage. All the vested interests of the other States were +up in arms. The proposed railway, it was said, would compete with the +Trans-Siberian, with the French railways, with the ocean route to India, +with the steamboats on the Tigris. Corn in Mesopotamia would bring down +the price of corn in Russia. German trade would oust British and French +and Russian trade. Nor was that all. Under cover of an economic enterprise, +Germany was nursing political ambitions. She was aiming at Egypt and the +Suez Canal, at the control of the Persian Gulf, at the domination of +Persia, at the route to India. Were these fears and suspicions justified? +In the European anarchy, who can say? Certainly the entry of a new economic +competitor, the exploitation of new areas, the opening out of new trade +routes, must interfere with interests already established. That must always +be so in a changing world. But no one would seriously maintain that that is +a reason for abandoning new enterprises. But, it was urged, in fact Germany +will take the opportunity to squeeze out the trade of other nations and +to constitute a German monopoly. Germany, it is true, was ready to give +guarantees of the "open door." But then, what was the value of these +guarantees? She asserted that her enterprise was economic, and had no +ulterior political gains. But who would believe her? Were not German +Jingoes already rejoicing at the near approach of German armies to the +Egyptian frontiers? In the European anarchy all these fears, suspicions, +and rivalries were inevitable. But the British Government at least was +not carried away by them. They were willing that British capital should +co-operate on condition that the enterprise should be under international +control. They negotiated for terms which would give equal control to +Germany, England, and France. They failed to get these terms, why has not +been made public. But Lord Cranborne, then Under-Secretary of State, said +in the House of Commons that "the outcry which was made in this matter--I +think it a very ill-informed outcry--made it exceedingly difficult for us +to get the terms we required."[2] And Sir Clinton Dawkins wrote in a letter +to Herr Gwinner, the chief of the Deutsche Bank: "The fact is that the +business has become involved in politics here, and has been sacrificed +to the very violent and bitter feeling against Germany exhibited by the +majority of newspapers and shared in by a large number of people."[3] +British co-operation, therefore, failed, as French and Russian had failed. +The Germans, however, persevered with their enterprise, now a purely +German one, and ultimately with success. Their differences with Russia +were arranged by an agreement about the Turko-Persian railways signed in +1911. An agreement with France, with regard to the railways of Asiatic +Turkey, was signed in February 1914, and one with England (securing our +interests on the Persian Gulf) in June of the same year. Thus just before +the war broke out this thorny question had, in fact, been settled to the +satisfaction of all the Powers concerned. And on this two comments may be +made. First, that the long friction, the press campaign, the rivalry of +economic and political interests, had contributed largely to the European +tension. Secondly, that in spite of that, the question did get settled, +and by diplomatic means. On this subject, at any rate, war was not +"inevitable." Further, it seems clear that the British Government, +so far from "hemming-in" Germany in this matter, were ready from the +first to accept, if not to welcome, her enterprise, subject to their +quite legitimate and necessary preoccupation with their position on +the Persian Gulf. It was the British Press and what lay behind it that +prevented the co-operation of British capital. Meantime the economic +penetration of Asia Minor by Germany had been accompanied by a political +penetration at Constantinople. Already, as early as 1898, the Kaiser had +announced at Damascus that the "three hundred millions of Mussulmans who +live scattered over the globe may be assured that the German Emperor will +be at all times their friend." + +This speech, made immediately after the Armenian massacres, has been very +properly reprobated by all who are revolted at such atrocities. But the +indignation of Englishmen must be tempered by shame when they remember +that it was their own minister, still the idol of half the nation, who +reinstated Turkey after the earlier massacres in Bulgaria and put back +the inhabitants of Macedonia for another generation under the murderous +oppression of the Turks. The importance of the speech in the history of +Europe is that it signalled the advent of German influence in the Near +East. That influence was strengthened on the Bosphorus after the Turkish +revolution of 1908, in spite of the original Anglophil bias of the Young +Turks, and as some critics maintain, in consequence of the blundering +of the British representatives. The mission of Von der Goltz in 1908 +and that of Liman von Sanders in 1914 put the Turkish army under German +command, and by the outbreak of the war German influence was predominant +in Constantinople. This political influence was, no doubt, used, and +intended to be used, to further German economic schemes. Germany, in +fact, had come in to play the same game as the other Powers, and had +played it with more skill and determination. She was, of course, here as +elsewhere, a new and disturbing force in a system of forces which already +had difficulty in maintaining a precarious equilibrium. But to be a new and +disturbing force is not to commit a crime. Once more the real culprit was +not Germany nor any other Power. The real culprit was the European anarchy. + +[Footnote 1: Pierre Albin, "D'Agadir à Serajevo," p. 81.] + +[Footnote 2: _Hansard_, 1903, vol. 126, p. 120.] + +[Footnote 3: _Nineteenth Century_, June 1909, vol. 65, p. 1090.] + + + +14. _Austria and the Balkans_. + + +I turn now to the Balkan question. This is too ancient and too complicated +to be even summarized here. But we must remind ourselves of the main +situation. Primarily, the Balkan question is, or rather was, one between +subject Christian populations and the Turks. But it has been complicated, +not only by the quarrels of the subject populations among themselves, but +by the rival ambitions and claims of Russia and Austria. The interest of +Russia in the Balkans is partly one of racial sympathy, partly one of +territorial ambition, for the road to Constantinople lies through Rumania +and Bulgaria. It is this territorial ambition of Russia that has given +occasion in the past to the intervention of the Western Powers, for until +recently it was a fixed principle, both of French and British policy, to +keep Russia out of the Mediterranean. Hence the Crimean War, and hence +the disastrous intervention of Disraeli after the treaty of San Stefano +in 1878--an intervention which perpetuated for years the Balkan hell. +The interest of Austria in the peninsula depends primarily on the fact +that the Austrian Empire contains a large Slav population desiring its +independence, and that this national ambition of the Austrian Slavs finds +in the independent kingdom of Serbia its natural centre of attraction. The +determination of Austria to retain her Slavs as unwilling citizens of her +Empire brings her also into conflict with Russia, so far as Russia is the +protector of the Slavs. The situation, and the danger with which it is +pregnant, may be realized by an Englishman if he will suppose St. George's +Channel and the Atlantic to be annihilated, and Ireland to touch, by a land +frontier, on the one side Great Britain, on the other the United States. +The friction and even the warfare which might have arisen between these two +great Powers from the plots of American Fenians may readily be imagined. +Something of that kind is the situation of Austria in relation to Serbia +and her protector, Russia. Further, Austria fears the occupation by any +Slav State of any port on the coast line of the Adriatic, and herself +desires a port on the Aegean. Add to this the recent German dream of the +route from Berlin to Bagdad, and the European importance of what would +otherwise be local disputes among the Balkan States becomes apparent. + +During the period we are now considering the Balkan factor first came into +prominence with the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina in +1908. Those provinces, it will be remembered, were handed over to Austrian +protection at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Austria went in and policed +the country, much as England went in and policed Egypt, and, from the +material point of view, with similarly successful results. But, like +England in Egypt, Austria was not sovereign there. Formal sovereignty +still rested with the Turk. In 1909, during the Turkish revolution, +Austria took the opportunity to throw off that nominal suzerainty. +Russia protested, Austria mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro, +and war seemed imminent. But the dramatic intervention of Germany "in +shining armour" on the side of her ally resulted in a diplomatic victory +for the Central Powers. Austria gained her point, and war, for the moment, +was avoided. But such diplomatic victories are dangerous. Russia did not +forget, and the events of 1909 were an operative cause in the catastrophe +of 1914. In acting as she did in this matter Austria-Hungary defied the +public law of Europe, and Germany supported her in doing so. + +The motives of Germany in taking this action are thus described, and +probably with truth, by Baron Beyens: "She could not allow the solidity +of the Triple Alliance to be shaken: she had a debt of gratitude to pay +to her ally, who had supported her at the Congress of Algeciras. Finally, +she believed herself to be the object of an attempt at encirclement by +France, England, and Russia, and was anxious to show that the gesture of +putting her hand to the sword was enough to dispel the illusions of her +adversaries."[1] These are the kind of reasons that all Powers consider +adequate where what they conceive to be their interests are involved. From +any higher, more international point of view, they are no reasons at all. +But in such a matter no Power is in a position to throw the first stone. +The whole episode is a classical example for the normal working of the +European anarchy. Austria-Hungary was primarily to blame, but Germany, who +supported her, must take her share. The other Powers of Europe acquiesced +for the sake of peace, and they could probably do no better. There will +never be any guarantee for the public law of Europe until there is a public +tribunal and a public force to see that its decisions are carried out. + +The next events of importance in this region were the two Balkan wars. +We need not here go into the causes and results of these, except so far +as to note that, once more, the rivalry of Russia and Austria played a +disastrous part. It was the determination of Austria not to give Serbia +access to the Adriatic that led Serbia to retain territories assigned by +treaty to Bulgaria, and so precipitated the second Balkan war; for that war +was due to the indignation caused in Bulgaria by the breach of faith, and +is said to have been directly prompted by Austria. The bad part played by +Austria throughout this crisis is indisputable. But it must be observed +that, by general admission, Germany throughout worked hand in hand with +Sir Edward Grey to keep the peace of Europe, which, indeed, otherwise +could not have been kept. And nothing illustrates this better than that +episode of 1913 which is sometimes taken to throw discredit upon Germany. +The episode was thus described by the Italian minister, Giolitti: "On the +9th of August, 1913, about a year before the war broke out, I, being then +absent from Rome, received from my colleague, San Giuliano, the following +telegram: 'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention to +act against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to apply +the _casus foederis_ of the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable. +I intend to join forces with Germany to prevent any such action by Austria, +but it will be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider such +eventual action as defensive, and therefore do not believe that the +_casus foederis_ exists. Please telegraph to Rome if you approve.' + +"I replied that, 'if Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is evident that +the _casus foederis_ does not arise. It is an action that she undertakes on +her own account, since there is no question of defence, as no one thinks +of attacking her. It is necessary to make a declaration in this sense to +Austria in the most formal way, and it is to be wished that German action +may dissuade Austria from her most perilous adventure.'"[2] + +Now this statement shows upon the face of it two things. One, that Austria +was prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European war; the other, +that the Italian ministers joined with Germany to dissuade her. They were +successful. Austria abandoned her project, and war was avoided. The episode +is as discreditable as you like to Austria. But, on the face of it, how +does it discredit Germany? More, of course, may lie behind; but no evidence +has been produced, so far as I am aware, to show that the Austrian project +was approved or supported by her ally. + +The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded the second Balkan War, left +all the parties concerned dissatisfied. But, in particular, it left the +situation between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia more +strained than ever. It was this situation that was the proximate cause of +the present war. For, as we have seen, a quarrel between Austria and Russia +over the Balkans must, given the system of alliances, unchain a European +war. For producing that situation Austria-Hungary was mainly responsible. +The part played by Germany was secondary, and throughout the Balkan wars +German diplomacy was certainly working, with England, for peace. "The +diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse," says Baron Beyens, "applied itself, +above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire for intervention at +the Ballplatz." "The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of Vienna in +its tortuous policy of intrigues at Sofia and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann +said to me at the time, the Imperial Government contented itself with +maintaining its neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from +any intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their quarrels. There is +no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement."[3] + +[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 240.] + +[Footnote 2: It is characteristic of the way history is written in time of +war that M. Yves Guyot, citing Giolitti's statement, omits the references +to Germany. _See_ "Les causes et les consequences de la guerre," p. 101.] + +[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 248, 262.] + + + +15. _Morocco_. + + +Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, Morocco. The salient features +here were, first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the Great Powers, +including, of course, Germany, were parties, and which guaranteed to +the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment; secondly, the interest of +Great Britain to prevent a strong Power from establishing itself opposite +Gibraltar and threatening British control over the Straits; thirdly, the +interest of France to annex Morocco and knit it up with the North African +Empire; fourthly, the new colonial and trading interests of Germany, which, +as she had formally announced, could not leave her indifferent to any new +dispositions of influence or territory in undeveloped countries. For many +years French ambitions in Morocco had been held in check by the British +desire to maintain the _status quo_. But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 +gave France a free hand there in return for the abandonment of French +opposition to the British position in Egypt. The Anglo-French treaty of +1904 affirmed, in the clauses made public, the independence and integrity +of Morocco; but there were secret clauses looking to its partition. By +these the British interest in the Straits was guaranteed by an arrangement +which gave to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibraltar and a +strip on the north-west coast, while leaving the rest of the country to +fall to France. Germany was not consulted while these arrangements were +being made, and the secret clauses of the treaty were, of course, not +communicated to her. But it seems reasonable to suppose that they became +known to, or at least were suspected by, the German Government shortly +after they were adopted.[1] And probably it was this that led to the +dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier,[2] when he announced +that the independence of Morocco was under German protection. The result +was the Conference of Algeciras, at which the independence and integrity of +Morocco was once more affirmed (the clauses looking to its partition being +still kept secret by the three Powers privy to them), and equal commercial +facilities were guaranteed to all the Powers. Germany thereby obtained what +she most wanted, what she had a right to by the treaty of 1880, and what +otherwise might have been threatened by French occupation--the maintenance +of the open door. But the French enterprise was not abandoned. Disputes +with the natives such as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases, +led to fresh military intervention. At the same time, it was difficult to +secure the practical application of the principle of equal commercial +opportunity. An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby +both Powers were to share equally in contracts for public works, was +found in practice not to work. The Germans pressed for its application +to the new railways projected in Morocco. The French delayed, temporized, +and postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position +in Morocco. The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez. +Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the capital +(a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it +clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the country. The patience +of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir. +There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the +Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby Germany recognized a +French protectorate in Morocco in return for concessions of territory +in the French Congo. These are the bare facts of the Moroccan episode. +Much, of course, is still unrevealed, particularly as to the motives and +intentions of the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for instance, intend to +seize a share of Morocco when she sent the _Panther_ to Agadir? And was +that the reason of the vigour of the British intervention? Possibly, but +by no means certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Germany +had that intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between +France and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption +of Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of +Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the +French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy, +but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such +a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in +all the parties concerned. + +The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length, +with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book "Morocco in Diplomacy." +The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various +Powers. But I do not believe that any instructed and impartial student +will accept what appears to be the current English view, that the action +of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without excuse, +and that the other Powers were acting throughout justly, honestly, and +straightforwardly. + +The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a painful +impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war. Thus Baron +Beyens writes:-- + + The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard another + war as a necessary evil.[4] + +And again:-- + + The pacific settlement of the conflict of 1911 gave a violent impulse to + the war party in Germany, to the propaganda of the League of Defence and + the Navy League, and a greater force to their demands. To their dreams + of hegemony and domination the desire for revenge against France now + mingled its bitterness. A diplomatic success secured in an underground + struggle signified nothing. War, war in the open, that alone, in the eyes + of this rancorous tribe, could settle definitely the Moroccan question by + incorporating Morocco and all French Africa in the colonial empire they + hoped to create on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the heart of + the Black Continent.[5] + +This we may take to be a correct description of the attitude of the +Pangermans. But there is no evidence that it was that of the nation. +We have seen also that Baron Beyens' impression of the attitude of the +German people, even after the Moroccan affair, was of a general desire +for peace.[6] The crisis had been severe, but it had been tided over, and +the Governments seem to have made renewed efforts to come into friendly +relations. In this connection the following dispatch of Baron Beyens (June +1912) is worth quoting:-- + + After the death of Edward VII, the Kaiser, as well as the Crown Prince, + when they returned from England, where they had been courteously + received, were persuaded that the coldness in the relations of the + preceding years was going to yield to a cordial intimacy between the + two Courts and that the causes of the misunderstanding between the two + peoples would vanish with the past. His disillusionment, therefore, was + cruel when he saw the Cabinet of London range itself last year on the + side of France. But the Kaiser is obstinate, and has not abandoned the + hope of reconquering the confidence of the English.[7] + +This dispatch is so far borne out by the facts that in the year succeeding +the Moroccan crisis a serious attempt was made to improve Anglo-German +relations, and there is no reason to doubt that on both sides there was +a genuine desire for an understanding. How that understanding failed has +already been indicated.[8] But even that failure did not ruin the relations +between the two Powers. In the Balkan crisis, as we have seen and as is +admitted on both sides, England and Germany worked together for peace. And +the fact that a European conflagration was then avoided, in spite of the +tension between Russia and Austria, is a strong proof that the efforts of +Sir Edward Grey were sincerely and effectively seconded by Germany.[9] + +[Footnote 1: See "Morocco in Diplomacy," Chap. XVI. A dispatch written by +M. Leghait, the Belgian minister in Paris, on May 7, 1905, shows that +rumour was busy on the subject. The secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish +treaty were known to him, and these provided for an eventual partition of +Morocco between France and Spain. He doubted whether there were secret +clauses in the Anglo-French treaty--"but it is supposed that there is a +certain tacit understanding by which England would leave France sufficient +liberty of action in Morocco under the reserve of the secret clauses of the +Franco-Spanish arrangement, clauses if not imposed yet at least strongly +supported by the London Cabinet." + +We know, of course, now, that the arrangement for the partition was +actually embodied in secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty.] + +[Footnote 2: According to M. Yves Guyot, when the Kaiser was actually on +his way to Tangier, he telegraphed from Lisbon to Prince Bülow abandoning +the project. Prince Bülow telegraphed back insisting, and the Kaiser +yielded.] + +[Footnote 3: See Bourdon, "L'Enigme Allemande," Chap. II. This account, by +a Frenchman, will not be suspected of anti-French or pro-German bias, and +it is based on French official records.] + +[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 216.] + +[Footnote 5: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 235.] + +[Footnote 6: See above, p. 63.] + +[Footnote 7: This view is reaffirmed by Baron Beyens in "L'Allemagne avant +la guerre," p. 29.] + +[Footnote 8: See above, p. 79.] + +[Footnote 9: Above, p. 111.] + + + +16. _The Last Years_. + + +We have reached, then, the year 1913, and the end of the Balkan wars, +without discovering in German policy any clear signs of a determination +to produce a European war. We have found all the Powers, Germany included, +contending for territory and trade at the risk of the peace of Europe; we +have found Germany successfully developing her interests in Turkey; we have +found England annexing the South African republics, France Morocco, Italy +Tripoli; we have found all the Powers stealing in China, and in all these +transactions we have found them continually on the point of being at one +another's throats. Nevertheless, some last instinct of self-preservation +has enabled them, so far, to pull up in time. The crises had been overcome +without a war. Yet they had, of course, produced their effects. Some +statesmen probably, like Sir Edward Grey, had had their passion for +peace confirmed by the dangers encountered. In others, no doubt, an +opposite effect had been produced, and very likely by 1913 there were +prominent men in Europe convinced that war must come, and manoeuvring +only that it should come at the time and occasion most favourable to +their country. That, according to M. Cambon, was now the attitude of +the German Emperor. M. Cambon bases this view on an alleged conversation +between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians.[1] The conversation has +been denied by the German official organ, but that, of course, is no +proof that it did not take place, and there is nothing improbable in +what M. Cambon narrates. + +The conversation is supposed to have occurred in November 1913, at a +time when, as we have seen,[2] there was a distinct outburst in France +of anti-German chauvinism, and when the arming and counter-arming of that +year had exasperated opinion to an extreme degree. The Kaiser is reported +to have said that war between Germany and France was inevitable. If he did, +it is clear from the context that he said it in the belief that French +chauvinism would produce war. For the King of the Belgians, in replying, +is stated to have said that it was "a travesty, of the French Government +to interpret it in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the +sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible +spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators." It should be observed +also that this supposed attitude on the part of the Kaiser is noted as a +change, and that he is credited with having previously stood for peace +against the designs of the German Jingoes. His personal influence, says +the dispatch, "had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of +peace." The fact of a change of mind in the Kaiser is accepted also by +Baron Beyens. + +Whatever may be the truth in this matter, neither the German nor the French +nor our own Government can then have abandoned the effort at peaceable +settlement. For, in fact, by the summer of 1914, agreements had been made +between the Great Powers which settled for the time being the questions +immediately outstanding. It is understood that a new partition of African +territory had been arranged to meet the claims and interests of Germany, +France, and England alike. The question of the Bagdad railway had been +settled, and everything seemed to favour the maintenance of peace, when, +suddenly, the murder of the Archduke sprang upon a dismayed Europe the +crisis that was at last to prove fatal. The events that followed, so far +as they can be ascertained from published documents, have been so fully +discussed that it would be superfluous for me to go over the ground again +in all its detail. But I will indicate briefly what appear to me to be the +main points of importance in fixing the responsibility for what occurred. + +First, the German view, that England is responsible for the war because she +did not prevent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as childish, if it +is not simply sophistical. The German Powers deliberately take an action +which the whole past history of Europe shows must almost certainly lead to +a European war, and they then turn round upon Sir Edward Grey and put the +blame on him because he did not succeed in preventing the consequences of +their own action. "He might have kept Russia out." Who knows whether he +might? What we do know is that it was Austria and Germany who brought her +in. The German view is really only intelligible upon the assumption that +Germany has a right to do what she pleases and that the Powers that stand +in her way are by definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordinary +attitude that has been one of the factors for making war in Europe. + +Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward +Grey. It is, indeed, possible, as it is always possible after the event, to +suggest that some other course might have been more successful in avoiding +war. But that is conjecture, I, at any rate, am convinced, as I believe +every one outside Germany is convinced, that Sir Edward Grey throughout the +negotiations had one object only--to avoid, if he could, the catastrophe of +war. + +Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is perfectly clear. She was determined +now, as in 1913, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, at the risk of a +European war. Her guilt is clear and definite, and it is only the fact that +we are not directly fighting her with British troops that has prevented +British opinion from fastening upon it as the main occasion of the war. + +But this time, quite clearly, Austria was backed by Germany. Why this +change in German policy? So far as the Kaiser himself is concerned, +there can be little doubt that a main cause was the horror he felt +at the assassination of the Archduke. The absurd system of autocracy +gives to the emotional reactions of an individual a preposterous weight +in determining world-policy; and the almost insane feeling of the Kaiser +about the sanctity of crowned heads was no doubt a main reason why Germany +backed Austria in sending her ultimatum to Serbia. According to Baron +Beyens, on hearing the news of the murder of the Archduke the Kaiser +changed colour, and exclaimed: "All the effort of my life for twenty-five +years must be begun over again!"[3] A tragic cry which indicates, what I +personally believe to be the case, that it has been the constant effort of +the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe, and that he foresaw now that he +would no longer be able to resist war. + +So far, however, it would only be the war between Austria and Serbia +that the Kaiser would be prepared to sanction. He might hope to avoid +the European war. And, in fact, there is good reason to suppose that +both he and the German Foreign Office did cherish that hope or delusion. +They had bluffed Russia off in 1908. They had the dangerous idea that +they might bluff her off again. In this connection Baron Beyens records +a conversation with his colleague, M. Bollati, the Italian Ambassador +at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that + + at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of + the official assurances exchanged quite recently between the Tsar and + M. Poincaré, as to the complete preparations of the armies of the two + allies, was not in a position to sustain a European war and would not + dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure. + +Baron Beyens continues:-- + + At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face a European war + prevailed not only in the official world and in society, but among + all the manufacturers who specialized in the construction of armaments. + M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an opinion, announced + on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the + Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of the German + army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly on the + part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to make war + on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4] + +But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am inclined +to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just suggested, +there were other and more important factors to be considered. It appears +almost certain that at some point in the crisis the control of the +situation was taken out of the hands of the civilians by the military. +The position of the military is not difficult to understand. They believed, +as professional soldiers usually do, in the "inevitability" of war, and +they had, of course, a professional interest in making war. Their attitude +may be illustrated from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince +Lichnowsky in 1912[5]: "The soldiers think about war. It is their business +and their duty. They tell us that the German army, is in good order, that +the Russian army has not completed its organization, that it would be a +good moment ... but for twenty years they have been saying the same thing," +The passage is significant. It shows us exactly what it is we have to dread +in "militarism." The danger in a military State is always that when a +crisis comes the soldiers will get control, as they seem to have done on +this occasion. From their point of view there was good reason. They knew +that France and Russia, on a common understanding, were making enormous +military preparations; they knew that these preparations would mature by +the beginning of 1917; they knew that Germany would fight then at a less +advantage; they believed she would then have to fight, and they said, +"Better fight now." The following dispatch of Baron Beyens, dated July +26th, may probably be taken as fairly representing their attitude:-- + + To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which + prevails in the German General Staff, that war with France and Russia is + unavoidable and near, an _opinion which the Emperor has been induced to + share_. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and Pangerman party, + might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which + are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again + present themselves for some time. Germany has finished the strengthening + of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the other hand, + she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments + with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The Wehrbeitrag + has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has + demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the + mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her + military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for several + years: at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its + deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency + in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is this arm that will decide + the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two + years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from + France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish + quarrels.[6] + +It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have been in +the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other hand, as +late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign Office had +been working throughout for peace. Describing an interview he had had +on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:-- + + From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann + spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department for + Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had been + on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that + its views and counsels had not prevailed... A superior power intervened + to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to + Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet + was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the + war.[7] + +Why was that ultimatum sent? According to the German apologists, it +was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the +critical moment, and so made war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt +that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by +mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed +out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at +Petrograd to his Government:-- + + As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian + troops, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the + Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that + nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of + diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military consideration + of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that + button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of + control.[8] + +On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized +against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had +mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case. Moreover, +in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe +that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to +Germany. However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his +soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger. We do not +definitely know. What we do know is, that it was the German ultimatum that +precipitated the war. + +We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last moment the +German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:-- + + As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg by noon the next day + [after the dispatch of the German ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann + (I have it from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the Kaiser to + prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, and to persuade + his Majesty to wait till the following day. It was the last effort of + their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. Their + efforts were broken against the irreducible obstinacy of the Minister of + War and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the disastrous + consequences of a delay of twenty-four hours.[10] + +[Footnote 1: French Yellow Book, No. 6. In "L'Allemagne avant la guerre" +(p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this conversation was held at Potsdam on +November 5th or 6th; the Kaiser said that war between Germany and France +was "inevitable and near." Baron Beyens, presumably, is the authority from +whom M. Cambon derives his information.] + +[Footnote 2: Above, p. 25.] + +[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 273.] + +[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 280 seq.] + +[Footnote 5: See "L'Enigme Allemande," p. 96.] + +[Footnote 6: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8.] + +[Footnote 7: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52.] + +[Footnote 8: Austrian Red Book, No. 28.] + +[Footnote 9: See Chapter 14.] + +[Footnote 10: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 301.] + + + +17. _The Responsibility and the Moral_. + + +It will be seen from this brief account that so far as the published +evidence goes I agree with the general view outside Germany that the +responsibility for the war at the last moment rests with the Powers of +Central Europe. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which there can be +no reasonable doubt was known to and approved by the German Government, +was the first crime. And it is hardly palliated by the hope, which no +well-informed men ought to have entertained, that Russia could be kept +out and the war limited to Austria and Serbia. The second crime was the +German ultimatum to Russia and to France. I have no desire whatever to +explain away or palliate these clear facts. But it was not my object in +writing this pamphlet to reiterate a judgment which must already be that +of all my readers. What I have wanted to do is to set the tragic events of +those few days of diplomacy in their proper place in the whole complex of +international politics. And what I do dispute with full conviction is the +view which seems to be almost universally held in England, that Germany +had been pursuing for years past a policy of war, while all the other +Powers had been pursuing a policy of peace. The war finally provoked by +Germany was, I am convinced, conceived as a "preventive war." And that +means that it was due to the belief that if Germany did not fight then +she would be compelled to fight at a great disadvantage later. I have +written in vain if I have not convinced the reader that the European +anarchy inevitably provokes that state of mind in the Powers, and that +they all live constantly under the threat of war. To understand the +action of those who had power in Germany during the critical days it +is necessary to bear in mind all that I have brought into relief in +the preceding pages: the general situation, which grouped the Powers +of the Entente against those of the Triple Alliance; the armaments and +counter-armaments; the colonial and economic rivalry; the racial and +national problems in South-East Europe; and the long series of previous +crises, in each case tided over, but leaving behind, every one of them, +a legacy of fresh mistrust and fear, which made every new crisis worse +than the one before. I do not palliate the responsibility of Germany for +the outbreak of war. But that responsibility is embedded in and conditioned +by a responsibility deeper and more general--the responsibility of all the +Powers alike for the European anarchy. + +If I have convinced the reader of this he will, I think, feel no difficulty +in following me to a further conclusion. Since the causes of this war, and +of all wars, lie so deep in the whole international system, they cannot be +permanently removed by the "punishment" or the "crushing" or any other +drastic treatment of any Power, let that Power be as guilty as you please. +Whatever be the issue of this war, one thing is certain: it will bring no +lasting peace to Europe unless it brings a radical change both in the +spirit and in the organization of international politics. + +What that change must be may be deduced from the foregoing discussion of +the causes of the war. The war arose from the rivalry of States in the +pursuit of power and wealth. This is universally admitted. Whatever be the +diversities of opinion that prevail in the different countries concerned, +nobody pretends that the war arose out of any need of civilization, out of +any generous impulse or noble ambition. It arose, according to the popular +view in England, solely and exclusively out of the ambition of Germany to +seize territory and power. It arose, according to the popular German view, +out of the ambition of England to attack and destroy the rising power and +wealth of Germany. Thus to each set of belligerents the war appears as one +forced upon them by sheer wickedness, and from neither point of view has +it any kind of moral justification. These views, it is true, are both +too simple for the facts. But the account given in the preceding pages, +imperfect as it is, shows clearly, what further knowledge will only make +more explicit, that the war proceeded out of rivalry for empire between all +the Great Powers in every part of the world. The contention between France +and Germany for the control of Morocco, the contention between Russia and +Austria for the control of the Balkans, the contention between Germany and +the other Powers for the control of Turkey--these were the causes of the +war. And this contention for control is prompted at once by the desire for +power and the desire for wealth. In practice the two motives are found +conjoined. But to different minds they appeal in different proportions. +There is such a thing as the love of power for its own sake. It is known in +individuals, and it is known in States, and it is the most disastrous, if +not the most evil, of the human passions. The modern German philosophy of +the State turns almost exclusively upon this idea; and here, as elsewhere, +by giving to a passion an intellectual form, the Germans have magnified +its force and enhanced its monstrosity. But the passion itself is not +peculiar to Germans, nor is it only they to whom it is and has been a +motive of State. Power has been the fetish of kings and emperors from the +beginning of political history, and it remains to be seen whether it will +not continue to inspire democracies. The passion for empire ruined the +Athenian democracy, no less than the Spartan or the Venetian oligarchy, +or the Spain of Philip II, or the France of the Monarchy and the Empire. +But it still makes its appeal to the romantic imagination. Its intoxication +has lain behind this war, and it will prompt many others if it survives, +when the war is over, either in the defeated or the conquering nations. +It is not only the jingoism of Germany that Europe has to fear. It is +the jingoism that success may make supreme in any country that may be +victorious. + +But while power may be sought for its own sake, it is commonly sought +by modern States as a means to wealth. It is the pursuit of markets and +concessions and outlets for capital that lies behind the colonial policy +that leads to wars. States compete for the right to exploit the weak, and +in this competition Governments are prompted or controlled by financial +interests. The British went to Egypt for the sake of the bondholders, the +French to Morocco for the sake of its minerals and wealth. In the Near East +and the Far it is commerce, concessions, loans that have led to the rivalry +of the Powers, to war after war, to "punitive expeditions" and--irony of +ironies!--to "indemnities" exacted as a new and special form of robbery +from peoples who rose in the endeavour to defend themselves against +robbery. The Powers combine for a moment to suppress the common victim, +the next they are at one another's throats over the spoil. That really is +the simple fact about the quarrels of States over colonial and commercial +policy. So long as the exploitation of undeveloped countries is directed by +companies having no object in view except dividends, so long as financiers +prompt the policy of Governments, so long as military expeditions, leading +up to annexations, are undertaken behind the back of the public for reasons +that cannot be avowed, so long will the nations end with war, where they +have begun by theft, and so long will thousands and millions of innocent +and generous lives, the best of Europe, be thrown away to no purpose, +because, in the dark, sinister interests have been risking the peace +of the world for the sake of money in their pockets. + +It is these tremendous underlying facts and tendencies that suggest the +true moral of this war. It is these that have to be altered if we are to +avoid future wars on a scale as great. + + + +18. _The Settlement_. + + +And now, with all this in our minds, let us turn to consider the vexed +question of the settlement after the war. There lies before the Western +world the greatest of all choices, the choice between destruction and +salvation. But that choice does not depend merely on the issue of the +war. It depends upon what is done or left undone by the co-operation of +all when the war does at last stop. Two conceptions of the future are +contending in all nations. One is the old bad one, that which has presided +hitherto at every peace and prepared every new war. It assumes that the +object of war is solely to win victory, and the object of victory solely +to acquire more power and territory. On this view, if the Germans win, they +are to annex territory east and west: Belgium and half France, say the more +violent; the Baltic provinces of Russia, strategic points of advantage, say +the more moderate. On the other hand, if the Allies win, the Allies are to +divide the German colonies, the French are to regain Alsace-Lorraine, and, +as the jingoes add, they are to take the whole of the German provinces on +the left bank of the Rhine, and even territory beyond it. The Italians are +to have not only Italia Irredenta but hundreds of thousands of reluctant +Slavs in Dalmatia; the Russians Constantinople, and perhaps Posen and +Galicia. Further, such money indemnities are to be taken as it may prove +possible to exact from an already ruined foe; trade and commerce with +the enemy is to be discouraged or prohibited; and, above all, a bitter +and unforgiving hatred is to reign for ever between the victor and the +vanquished. This is the kind of view of the settlement of Europe that is +constantly appearing in the articles and correspondence of the Press of all +countries. Ministers are not as careful as they should be to repudiate it. +The nationalist and imperialist cliques of all nations endorse it. It is, +one could almost fear, for something like this that the peoples are being +kept at war, and the very existence of civilization jeopardized. + +Now, whether anything of this kind really can be achieved by the war, +whether there is the least probability that either group of Powers can +win such a victory as would make the programme on either side a reality, +I will not here discuss. The reader will have his own opinion. What I am +concerned with is the effect any such solution would have upon the future +of Europe. Those who desire such a close may be divided into two classes. +The one frankly believes in war, in domination, and in power. It accepts +as inevitable, and welcomes as desirable, the perpetual armed conflict of +nations for territory and trade. It does not believe in, and it does not +want, a durable peace. It holds that all peace is, must be, and ought to +be, a precarious and regrettable interval between wars. I do not discuss +this view. Those who hold it are not accessible to argument, and can only +be met by action. There are others, however, who do think war an evil, who +do want a durable peace, but who genuinely believe that the way indicated +is the best way to achieve it. With them it is permitted to discuss, and it +should be possible to do so without bitterness or rage on either side. For +as to the end, there is agreement; the difference of opinion is as to the +means. The position taken is this: The enemy deliberately made this war of +aggression against us, without provocation, in order to destroy us. If it +had not been for this wickedness there would have been no war. The enemy, +therefore, must be punished; and his punishment must make him permanently +impotent to repeat the offence. That having been done, Europe will have +durable peace, for there will be no one left able to break it who will +also want to break it. Now, I believe all this to be demonstrably a +miscalculation. It is contradicted both by our knowledge of the way +human nature works and by the evidence of history. In the first place, +wars do not arise because only one nation or group of nations is wicked, +the others being good. For the actual outbreak of this war, I believe, as +I have already said, that a few powerful individuals in Austria and in +Germany were responsible. But the ultimate causes of war lie much deeper. +In them all States are implicated. And the punishment, or even the +annihilation, of any one nation would leave those causes still subsisting. +Wipe out Germany from the map, and, if you do nothing else, the other +nations will be at one another's throats in the old way, for the old +causes. They would be quarrelling, if about nothing else, about the +division of the spoil. While nations continue to contend for power, +while they refuse to substitute law for force, there will continue to +be wars. And while they devote the best of their brains and the chief +of their resources to armaments and military and naval organization, +each war will become more terrible, more destructive, and more ruthless +than the last. This is irrefutable truth. I do not believe there is a +man or woman able to understand the statement who will deny it. + +In the second place, the enemy nation cannot, in fact, be annihilated, +nor even so far weakened, relatively to the rest, as to be incapable of +recovering and putting up another fight. The notions of dividing up Germany +among the Allies, or of adding France and the British Empire to Germany, +are sheerly fantastic. There will remain, when all is done, the defeated +nations--if, indeed, any nation be defeated. Their territories cannot be +permanently occupied by enemy troops; they themselves cannot be permanently +prevented by physical force from building up new armaments. So long as they +want their revenge, they will be able sooner or later to take it. If +evidence of this were wanted, the often-quoted case of Prussia after +Jena will suffice. + +And, in the third place, the defeated nations, so treated, will, in fact, +want their revenge. There seems to be a curious illusion abroad, among the +English and their allies, that not only is Germany guilty of the war, but +that all Germans know it in their hearts; that, being guilty, they will +fully accept punishment, bow patiently beneath the yoke, and become in +future good, harmonious members of the European family. The illusion is +grotesque. There is hardly a German who does not believe that the war was +made by Russia and by England; that Germany is the innocent victim; that +all right is on her side, and all wrong on that of the Allies. If, indeed, +she were beaten, and treated as her "punishers" desire, this belief would +be strengthened, not weakened. In every German heart would abide, deep and +strong, the sense of an iniquitous triumph of what they believe to be wrong +over right, and of a duty to redress that iniquity. Outraged national pride +would be reinforced by the sense of injustice; and the next war, the war of +revenge, would be prepared for, not only by every consideration of interest +and of passion, but by every cogency of righteousness. The fact that the +Germans are mistaken in their view of the origin of the war has really +nothing to do with the case. It is not the truth, it is what men believe +to be the truth, that influences their action. And I do not think any +study of dispatches is going to alter the German view of the facts. + +But it is sometimes urged that the war was made by the German militarists, +that it is unpopular with the mass of the people, and that if Germany is +utterly defeated the people will rise and depose their rulers, become a +true democracy, and join fraternal hands with the other nations of Europe. +That Germany should become a true democracy might, indeed, be as great a +guarantee of peace as it might be that other nations, called democratic, +should really become so in their foreign policy as well as in their +domestic affairs. But what proud nation will accept democracy as a +gift from insolent conquerors? One thing that the war has done, and +one of the worst, is to make of the Kaiser, to every German, a symbol +of their national unity and national force. Just because we abuse their +militarism, they affirm and acclaim it; just because we attack their +governing class, they rally round it. Nothing could be better calculated +than this war to strengthen the hold of militarism in Germany, unless it +be the attempt of her enemies to destroy her militarism by force. For +consider--! In the view we are examining it is proposed, first to kill +the greater part of her combatants, next to invade her territory, destroy +her towns and villages, and exact (for there are those who demand it) +penalties in kind, actual tit for tat, for what Germans have done in +Belgium. It is proposed to enter the capital in triumph. It is proposed +to shear away huge pieces of German territory. And then, when all this +has been done, the conquerors are to turn to the German nation and say: +"Now, all this we have done for your good! Depose your wicked rulers! +Become a democracy! Shake hands and be a good fellow!" Does it not +sound grotesque? But, really, that is what is proposed. + +I have spoken about British and French proposals for the treatment of +Germany. But all that I have said applies, of course, equally to German +proposals of the same kind for the treatment of the conquered Allies. That +way is no way towards a durable peace. If it be replied that a durable +peace is not intended or desired, I have no more to say. If it be replied +that punishment for its own sake is more important than civilization, and +must be performed at all costs--_fiat justitia, ruat coelum_--then, once +more, I have nothing to say. I speak to those, and to those only, who do +desire a durable peace, and who have the courage and the imagination to +believe it to be possible, and the determination to work for it. And to +them I urge that the course I have been discussing cannot lead to their +goal. What can? + + + +19. _The Change Needed_. + + +First, a change of outlook. We must give up, in all nations, this habit +of dwelling on the unique and peculiar wickedness of the enemy. We must +recognize that behind the acts that led up to the immediate outbreak of +war, behind the crimes and atrocities to which the war has led, as wars +always have led, and always will lead--behind all that lies a great complex +of feeling, prejudice, tradition, false theory, in which all nations and +all individuals of all nations are involved. Most men believe, feel, or +passively accept that power and wealth are the objects States ought +to pursue; that in pursuing these objects they are bound by no code of +right in their relations to one another; that law between them is, and +must be, as fragile as a cobweb stretched before the mouth of a cannon; +that force is the only rule and the only determinant of their differences, +and that the only real question is when and how the appeal to force may +most advantageously be made. This philosophy has been expressed with +peculiar frankness and brutality by Germans. But most honest and candid +men, I believe, will agree that that is the way they, too, have been +accustomed to think of international affairs. And if illustration were +wanted, let them remember the kind of triumphant satisfaction with which +the failure of the Hague conferences to achieve any radical results was +generally greeted, and the contemptuous and almost abhorring pity meted +out to the people called "pacifists." Well, the war has come! We see now, +not only guess, what it means. If that experience has not made a deep +impression on every man and woman, if something like a conversion is not +being generally operated, then, indeed, nothing can save mankind from the +hell of their own passions and imbecilities. + +But if otherwise, if that change is going on, then the way to deliverance +is neither difficult nor obscure. It does not lie in the direction of +crushing anybody. It lies in the taking of certain determinations, and +the embodying of them in certain institutions. + +First, the nations must submit to law and to right in the settlement of +their disputes. + +Secondly, they must reserve force for the coercion of the law-breaker; +and that implies that they should construct rules to determine who the +law-breaker is. Let him be defined as the one who appeals to force, instead +of appealing to law and right by machinery duly provided for that purpose, +and the aggressor is immediately under the ban of the civilized world, and +met by an overwhelming force to coerce him into order. In constructing +machinery of this kind there is no intellectual difficulty greater than +that which has confronted every attempt everywhere to substitute order +for force. The difficulty is moral, and lies in the habits, passions, +and wills of men. But it should not be concluded that, if such a moral +change could be operated, there would be no need for the machinery. It +would be as reasonable to say that Governments, law-courts, and police +were superfluous, since, if men were good, they would not require them, +and if they are bad they will not tolerate them. Whatever new need, desire, +and conviction comes up in mankind, needs embodiment in forms before it +can become operative. And, as the separate colonies of America could not +effectively unite until they had formed a Constitution, so will the States +of Europe and the world be unable to maintain the peace, even though all +of them should wish to maintain it, unless they will construct some kind +of machinery for settling their disputes and organizing their common +purposes, and will back that machinery by force. If they will do that +they may construct a real and effective counterpoise to aggression from +any Power in the future. If they will not do it, their precautions against +any one Power will be idle, for it will be from some other Power that the +danger will come. I put it to the reader at the end of this study, which +I have made with all the candour and all the honesty at my disposal, and +which I believe to represent essentially the truth, whether or no he agrees +that the European anarchy is the real cause of European wars, and if he +does, whether he is ready for his part to support a serious effort to end +it. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The European Anarchy, by G. Lowes Dickinson + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10333 *** diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3dca6ff --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #10333 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10333) diff --git a/old/10333-8.txt b/old/10333-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..feba1f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10333-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3221 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The European Anarchy, by G. Lowes Dickinson + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The European Anarchy + +Author: G. Lowes Dickinson + +Release Date: November 29, 2003 [EBook #10333] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY *** + + + + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Tony Towers and PG Distributed Proofreaders + + + + +THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY + +By G. Lowes Dickinson + + + +1916 + + +CONTENTS + + 1. INTRODUCTION + Europe since the Fifteenth Century--Machiavellianism--Empire and the + Balance of Power + + 2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE ENTENTE + Belgian Dispatches of 1905-14. + + 3. GREAT BRITAIN + The Policy of Great Britain--Essentially an Overseas Power + + 4. FRANCE + The Policy of France since 1870--Peace and Imperialism--Conflicting + Elements + + 5. RUSSIA + The Policy of Russia--Especially towards Austria + + 6. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY + The Policy of Austria-Hungary--Especially towards the Balkans + + 7. GERMANY + The Policy of Germany--From 1866 to the Decade 1890-1900--A Change + + 8. OPINION IN GERMANY + German "Romanticism"--New Ambitions. + + 9. OPINION ABOUT GERMANY + Bourdon--Beyens--Cambon--Summary + +10. GERMAN POLICY FROM THE DECADE 1890-1900 + Relation to Great Britain--The Navy. + +11. VAIN ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY + Great Britain's Efforts for Arbitration--Mutual Suspicion + +12. EUROPE SINCE THE DECADE 1890-1900 + +13. GERMANY AND TURKEY + The Bagdad Railway + +14. AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS + +15. MOROCCO + +16. THE LAST YEARS + Before the War--The Outbreak of War + +17. THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL + The Pursuit of Power and Wealth + +18. THE SETTLEMENT + +19. THE CHANGE NEEDED + Change of Outlook and Change of System--An International + League--International Law and Control + + + + +THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY + + + +1. _Introduction_. + + +In the great and tragic history of Europe there is a turning-point that +marks the defeat of the ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptance +of international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of the +sovereign State at the end of the fifteenth century. And it is symbolical +of all that was to follow that at that point stands, looking down the +vista of the centuries, the brilliant and sinister figure of Machiavelli. +From that date onwards international policy has meant Machiavellianism. +Sometimes the masters of the craft, like Catherine de Medici or Napoleon, +have avowed it; sometimes, like Frederick the Great, they have disclaimed +it. But always they have practised it. They could not, indeed, practise +anything else. For it is as true of an aggregation of States as of an +aggregation of individuals that, whatever moral sentiments may prevail, if +there is no common law and no common force the best intentions will be +defeated by lack of confidence and security. Mutual fear and mutual +suspicion, aggression masquerading as defence and defence masquerading as +aggression, will be the protagonists in the bloody drama; and there will +be, what Hobbes truly asserted to be the essence of such a situation, a +chronic state of war, open or veiled. For peace itself will be a latent +war; and the more the States arm to prevent a conflict the more certainly +will it be provoked, since to one or another it will always seem a better +chance to have it now than to have it on worse conditions later. Some +one State at any moment may be the immediate offender; but the main and +permanent offence is common to all States. It is the anarchy which they +are all responsible for perpetuating. + +While this anarchy continues the struggle between States will tend to +assume a certain stereotyped form. One will endeavour to acquire supremacy +over the others for motives at once of security and of domination, the +others will combine to defeat it, and history will turn upon the two poles +of empire and the balance of power. So it has been in Europe, and so it +will continue to be, until either empire is achieved, as once it was +achieved by Rome, or a common law and a common authority is established +by agreement. In the past empire over Europe has been sought by Spain, +by Austria, and by France; and soldiers, politicians, and professors in +Germany have sought, and seek, to secure it now for Germany. On the other +hand, Great Britain has long stood, as she stands now, for the balance of +power. As ambitious, as quarrelsome, and as aggressive as other States, her +geographical position has directed her aims overseas rather than toward +the Continent of Europe. Since the fifteenth century her power has never +menaced the Continent. On the contrary, her own interest has dictated that +she should resist there the enterprise of empire, and join in the defensive +efforts of the threatened States. To any State of Europe that has conceived +the ambition to dominate the Continent this policy of England has seemed +as contrary to the interests of civilization as the policy of the Papacy +appeared in Italy to an Italian patriot like Machiavelli. He wanted Italy +enslaved, in order that it might be united. And so do some Germans now want +Europe enslaved, that it may have peace under Germany. They accuse England +of perpetuating for egotistic ends the state of anarchy. But it was not +thus that Germans viewed British policy when the Power that was to give +peace to Europe was not Germany, but France. In this long and bloody game +the partners are always changing, and as partners change so do views. +One thing only does not change, the fundamental anarchy. International +relations, it is agreed, can only turn upon force. It is the disposition +and grouping of the forces alone that can or does vary. + +But Europe is not the only scene of the conflict between empire and +the balance. Since the sixteenth century the European States have been +contending for mastery, not only over one another, but over the world. +Colonial empires have risen and fallen. Portugal, Spain, Holland, in turn +have won and lost. England and France have won, lost, and regained. In +the twentieth century Great Britain reaps the reward of her European +conflicts in the Empire (wrongly so-called) on which the sun never sets. +Next to her comes France, in Africa and the East; while Germany looks out +with discontented eyes on a world already occupied, and, cherishing the +same ambitions all great States have cherished before her, finds the +time too mature for their accomplishment by the methods that availed in +the past. Thus, not only in Europe but on the larger stage of the world +the international rivalry is pursued. But it is the same rivalry and it +proceeds from the same cause: the mutual aggression and defence of beings +living in a "state of nature." + +Without this historical background no special study of the events that led +up to the present war can be either just or intelligible. The feeling of +every nation about itself and its neighbours is determined by the history +of the past and by the way in which that history is regarded. The picture +looks different from every point of view. Indeed, a comprehension of the +causes of the war could only be fully attained by one who should know, not +only the most secret thoughts of the few men who directly brought it about, +but also the prejudices and preconceptions of the public opinion in each +nation. There is nobody who possesses these qualifications. But in the +absence of such a historian these imperfect notes are set down in the hope +that they may offer a counterpoise to some of the wilder passions that +sweep over all peoples in time of war and threaten to prepare for Europe +a future even worse than its past has been. + + + +2. _The Triple Alliance and the Entente_. + + +First, let us remind ourselves in general of the situation that prevailed +in Europe during the ten years preceding the war. It was in that period +that the Entente between France, Russia, and England was formed and +consolidated, over against the existing Triple Alliance between Germany, +Austria, and Italy. Neither of these combinations was in its origin and +purpose aggressive[1]. + +And, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the relations she entered into +with France and with Russia were directed in each case to the settlement +of long outstanding differences without special reference to the German +Powers. But it is impossible in the European anarchy that any arrangements +should be made between any States which do not arouse suspicion in others. +And the drawing together of the Powers of the Entente did in fact appear +to Germany as a menace. She believed that she was being threatened by an +aggressive combination, just as, on the other hand, she herself seemed to +the Powers of the Entente a danger to be guarded against. This apprehension +on the part of Germany, is sometimes thought to have been mere pretence, +but there is every reason to suppose it to have been genuine. The policy of +the Entente did in fact, on a number of occasions, come into collision with +that of Germany. The arming and counter-arming was continuous. And the very +fact that from the side of the Entente it seemed that Germany was always +the aggressor, should suggest to us that from the other side the opposite +impression would prevail. That, in fact, it did prevail is clear not only +from the constant assertions of German statesmen and of the German Press, +but from contemporary observations made by the representatives of a State +not itself involved in either of the opposing combinations. The dispatches +of the Belgian ambassadors at Berlin, Paris, and London during the years +1905 to 1914[2] show a constant impression that the Entente was a hostile +combination directed against Germany and engineered, in the earlier years, +for that purpose by King Edward VII. This impression of the Belgian +representatives is no proof, it is true, of the real intentions of the +Entente, but it is proof of how they did in fact appear to outsiders. And +it is irrelevant, whether or no it be true, to urge that the Belgians were +indoctrinated with the German view; since precisely the fact that they +could be so indoctrinated would show that the view was on the face of it +plausible. We see, then, in these dispatches the way in which the policy of +the Entente could appear to observers outside it. I give illustrations from +Berlin, Paris, and London. + +On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, writes as +follows:-- + + Call it an alliance, _entente_, or what you will, the grouping of the + Powers arranged by the personal intervention of the King of England + exists, and if it is not a direct and immediate threat of war against + Germany (it would be too much to say that it was that), it constitutes + none the less a diminution of her security. The necessary pacifist + declarations, which, no doubt, will be repeated at Reval, signify very + little, emanating as they do from three Powers which, like Russia and + England, have just carried through successfully, without any motive + except the desire for aggrandizement, and without even a plausible + pretext, wars of conquest in Manchuria and the Transvaal, or which, + like France, is proceeding at this moment to the conquest of Morocco, + in contempt of solemn promises, and without any title except the + cession of British rights, which never existed. + +On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador at London, +writes:-- + + A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow Press, bears to a + great extent the responsibility for the hostile feeling between the two + nations.... It is plain enough that official England is quietly pursuing + a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and that King + Edward has not hesitated to use his personal influence in the service of + this scheme. But it is certainly exceedingly dangerous to poison public + opinion in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible journals. + +Again, on July 28, 1911, in the midst of the Morocco crisis, Baron +Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, writes:-- + + I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of the Emperor William, + in spite of the too frequent exaggeration of some of his gestures. He + will not allow himself to be drawn on farther than he chooses by the + exuberant temperament and clumsy manners of his very intelligent Minister + of Foreign Affairs (Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, in general, less faith in + the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not be sorry to see the + others eat one another up.... As I thought from the beginning, it is in + London that the key to the situation lies. It is there only that it can + become grave. The French will yield on all the points for the sake of + peace. It is not the same with the English, who will not compromise on + certain principles and certain claims. + +[Footnote 1: The alliance between Germany and Austria, which dates from +1879, was formed to guarantee the two States against an attack by Russia. +Its terms are:-- + +"1. If, contrary to what is to be expected and contrary to the sincere +desire of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires +should be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are +bound reciprocally to assist one another with the whole military force +of their Empire, and further not to make peace except conjointly and +by common consent. + +"2. If one of the high contracting Powers should be attacked by another +Power, the other high contracting party engages itself, by the present act, +not only not to support the aggressor against its ally, but at least to +observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the other contracting party. +If, however, in the case supposed the attacking Power should be supported +by Russia, whether by active co-operation or by military measures which +should menace the Power attacked, then the obligation of mutual assistance +with all military forces, as stipulated in the preceding article, would +immediately come into force, and the military operations of the high +contracting parties would be in that case conducted jointly until the +conclusion of peace." + +Italy acceded to the Alliance in 1882. The engagement is defensive. Each of +the three parties is to come to the assistance of the others if attacked by +a third party. + +The treaty of Germany with Austria was supplemented in 1884 by a treaty +with Russia, known as the "Reinsurance Treaty," whereby Germany bound +herself not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. This treaty lapsed +in the year 1890, and the lapse, it is presumed, prepared the way for the +_rapprochement_ between Russia and France. + +The text of the treaty of 1894 between France and Russia has never been +published. It is supposed to be a treaty of mutual defence in case of an +aggressive attack. The Power from whom attack is expected is probably +named, as in the treaty between Germany and Austria. It is probably for +that reason that the treaty was not published. The accession of Great +Britain to what then became known as the "Triple Entente" is determined by +the treaty of 1904 with France, whereby France abandoned her opposition to +the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco; and +by the treaty of 1907 with Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated their +relations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. There is no mention in either +case of an attack, or a defence against attack, by any other Power.] + +[Footnote 2: These were published by the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,_ +and are reprinted under the title "Belgische Aktenstücke," 1905-14 (Ernst +Siegfried Mittler and Sons, Berlin). Their authenticity, as far as I know, +has not been disputed. On the other hand, it is to be assumed that they +have been very carefully "edited" by the German to make a particular +impression. My view of the policy of Germany or of the Entente is in no +sense based upon them. I adduce them as evidence of contemporary feeling +and opinion.] + + + +3. _Great Britain_. + + +Having established this general fact that a state of mutual suspicion and +fear prevailed between Germany and the Powers of the Triple Entente, let us +next consider the positions and purposes of the various States involved. +First, let us take Great Britain, of which we ought to know most. Great +Britain is the head of an Empire, and of one, in point of territory and +population, the greatest the world has ever seen. This Empire has been +acquired by trade and settlement, backed or preceded by military force. +And to acquire and hold it, it has been necessary to wage war after war, +not only overseas but on the continent of Europe. It is, however, as we +have already noticed, a fact, and a cardinal fact, that since the fifteenth +century British ambitions have not been directed to extending empire over +the continent of Europe. On the contrary, we have resisted by arms every +attempt made by other Powers in that direction. That is what we have meant +by maintaining the "balance of power." We have acted, no doubt, in our own +interest, or in what we thought to be such; but in doing so we have made +ourselves the champions of those European nations that have been threatened +by the excessive power of their neighbours. British imperialism has thus, +for four centuries, not endangered but guaranteed the independence of the +European States. Further, our Empire is so large that we can hardly extend +it without danger of being unable to administer and protect it. We claim, +therefore, that we have neither the need nor the desire to wage wars of +conquest. But we ought not to be surprised if this attitude is not accepted +without reserve by other nations. For during the last half-century we +have, in fact, waged wars to annex Egypt, the Soudan, the South African +Republics, and Burmah, to say nothing of the succession of minor wars +which have given us Zululand, Rhodesia, Nigeria, and Uganda. Odd as it +does, I believe, genuinely seem to most Englishmen, we are regarded on +the Continent as the most aggressive Power in the world, although our +aggression is not upon Europe. We cannot expect, therefore, that our +professions of peaceableness should be taken very seriously by outsiders. +Nevertheless it is, I believe, true that, at any rate during the last +fifteen-years, those professions have been genuine. Our statesmen, of both +parties, have honestly desired and intended to keep the peace of the world. +And they have been assisted in this by a genuine and increasing desire for +peace in the nation. The Liberal Government in particular has encouraged +projects of arbitration and of disarmament; and Sir Edward Grey is probably +the most pacific Minister that ever held office in a great nation. But our +past inevitably discredits, in this respect, our future. And when we +profess peace it is not unnatural that other nations should suspect a +snare. + +Moreover, this desire for peace on our part is conditional upon the +maintenance of the _status quo_ and of our naval supremacy. Our vast +interests in every part of the world make us a factor everywhere to be +reckoned with. East, west, north, and south, no other Power can take a step +without finding us in the path. Those States, therefore, which, unlike +ourselves, are desirous farther to extend their power and influence +beyond the seas, must always reckon with us, particularly if, with that +end in view, by increasing their naval strength they seem to threaten our +supremacy at sea. This attitude of ours is not to be blamed, but it must +always make difficult the maintenance of friendly relations with ambitious +Powers. In the past our difficulties have been mainly with Russia and +France. In recent years they have been with Germany. For Germany, since +1898, for the first time in her history, has been in a position, and has +made the choice, to become a World-Power. For that reason, as well as +to protect her commerce, she has built a navy. And for that reason we, +pursuing our traditional policy of opposing the strongest continental +Power, have drawn away from her and towards Russia and France. We did not, +indeed, enter upon our arrangements with these latter Powers because of +aggressive intentions towards Germany. But the growth of German sea-power +drove us more and more to rely upon the Entente in case it should be +necessary for us to defend ourselves. All this followed inevitably from +the logic of the position, given the European anarchy. I state it for the +sake of exposition, not of criticism, and I do not imagine any reader will +quarrel with my statement. + + + +4. _France_. + + +Let us turn now to France. Since 1870 we find contending there, with +varying fortunes and strength, two opposite currents of sentiment and +policy. One was that of _revanche_ against Germany, inspired by the old +traditions of glory and hegemony, associated with hopes of a monarchist +or imperialistic revolution, and directed, in the first place, to a +recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. The other policy was that of peace abroad +and socialistic transformation at home, inspired by the modern ideals of +justice and fraternity, and supported by the best of the younger generation +of philosophers, poets, and artists, as well as by the bulk of the working +class. Nowhere have these two currents of contemporary aspiration met +and contended as fiercely as in France. The Dreyfus case was the most +striking act in the great drama. But it was not the concluding one. French +militarism, in that affair, was scotched but not killed, and the contest +was never fiercer than in the years immediately preceding the war. The +fighters for peace were the Socialists, under their leader, Jaurès, the one +great man in the public life of Europe. While recognizing the urgent need +for adequate national defence, Jaurès laboured so to organize it that it +could not be mistaken for nor converted into aggression. He laboured, at +the same time, to remove the cause of the danger. In the year 1913, under +Swiss auspices, a meeting of French and German pacifists was arranged at +Berne. To this meeting there proceeded 167 French deputies and 48 senators. +The Baron d'Estournelles de Constant was president of the French bureau, +and Jaurès one of the vice-presidents. The result was disappointing. The +German participation was small and less influential than the French, and +no agreement could be reached on the burning question of Alsace-Lorraine. +But the French Socialists continued, up to the eve of the war, to fight +for peace with an energy, an intelligence, and a determination shown +in no other country. The assassination of Jaurès was a symbol of the +assassination of peace; but the assassin was a Frenchman. + +For if, in France, the current for peace ran strong in these latter +years, so did the current for war. French chauvinism had waxed and +waned, but it was never extinguished. After 1870 it centred not only +about Alsace-Lorraine, but also about the colonial expansion which took +from that date a new lease of life in France, as it had done in England +after the loss of the American colonies. Directly encouraged by Bismarck, +France annexed Tunis in 1881. The annexation of Tunis led up at last to +that of Morocco. Other territory had been seized in the Far East, and +France became, next to ourselves, the greatest colonial Power. This policy +could not be pursued without friction, and the principal friction at the +beginning was with ourselves. Once at least, in the Fashoda crisis, the two +countries were on the verge of war, and it was not till the Entente of 1904 +that their relations were adjusted on a basis of give-and-take. But by that +time Germany had come into the colonial field, and the Entente with England +meant new friction with Germany, turning upon French designs in Morocco. In +this matter Great Britain supported her ally, and the incident of Agadir +in 1911 showed the solidity of the Entente. This demonstration no doubt +strengthened the hands of the aggressive elements in France, and later +on the influence of M. Delcassé and M. Poincaré was believed in certain +quarters to have given new energy to this direction of French policy. This +tendency to chauvinism was recognized as a menace to peace, and we find +reflections of that feeling in the Belgian dispatches. Thus, for instance, +Baron Guillaume, Belgian minister at Paris, writes on February, 21, 1913, +of M. Poincaré:-- + + It is under his Ministry that the military and slightly chauvinistic + instincts of the French people have awakened. His hand can be seen in + this modification; it is to be hoped that his political intelligence, + practical and cool, will save him from all exaggeration in this course. + The notable increase of German armaments which supervenes at the moment + of M. Poincaré's entrance at the Elysée will increase the danger of a + too nationalistic orientation of the policy of France. + +Again, on March 3, 1913:-- + + The German Ambassador said to me on Saturday: "The political situation + is much improved in the last forty-eight hours; the tension is generally + relaxed; one may hope for a return to peace in the near future. But what + does not improve is the state of public opinion in France and Germany + with regard to the relations between the two countries. We are persuaded + in Germany that a spirit of chauvinism having revived, we have to fear an + attack by the Republic. In France they express the same fear with regard + to us. The consequence of these misunderstandings is to ruin us both. I + do not know where we are going on this perilous route. Will not a man + appear of sufficient goodwill and prestige to recall every one to reason? + All this is the more ridiculous because, during the crisis we are + traversing, the two Governments have given proof of the most pacific + sentiments, and have continually relied upon one another to avoid + conflicts." + +On this Baron Guillaume comments:-- + + Baron Schoen is perfectly right, I am not in a position to examine German + opinion, but I note every day how public opinion in France becomes more + suspicious and chauvinistic. One meets people who assure one that a war + with Germany in the near future is certain and inevitable. People regret + it, but make up their minds to it.... They demand, almost by acclamation, + an immediate vote for every means of increasing the defensive power of + France. The most reasonable men assert that it is necessary to arm to the + teeth to frighten the enemy and prevent war. + +On April 16th he reports a conversation with M. Pichon, in which the latter +says:-- + + Among us, too, there is a spirit of chauvinism which is increasing, + which I deplore, and against which we ought to react. Half the theatres + in Paris now play chauvinistic and nationalistic pieces. + +The note of alarm becomes more urgent as the days go on. On January 16, +1914, the Baron writes:-- + + I have already had the honour to tell you that it is MM. Poincaré, + Delcassé, Millerand and their friends who have invented and pursued the + nationalistic and chauvinistic policy which menaces to-day the peace of + Europe, and of which we have noted the renaissance. It is a danger for + Europe and for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril, which menaces the + peace of Europe to-day; not that I have the right to suppose that the + Government of the Republic is disposed deliberately to trouble the peace, + rather I believe the contrary; but the attitude that the Barthou Cabinet + has taken up is, in my judgment, the determining cause of an excess of + militaristic tendencies in Germany. + +It is clear from these quotations, and it is for this reason alone that +I give them, that France, supported by the other members of the Triple +Entente, could appear, and did appear, as much a menace to Germany as +Germany appeared a menace to France; that in France, as in other countries, +there was jingoism as well as pacifism; and that the inability of French +public opinion to acquiesce in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was an active +factor in the unrest of Europe. Once more I state these facts, I do +not criticize them. They are essential to the comprehension of the +international situation. + + + +5. _Russia_. + + +We have spoken so far of the West. But the Entente between France and +Russia, dating from 1894, brought the latter into direct contact with +Eastern policy. The motives and even the terms of the Dual Alliance are +imperfectly known. Considerations of high finance are supposed to have +been an important factor in it. But the main intention, no doubt, was to +strengthen both Powers in the case of a possible conflict with Germany. The +chances of war between Germany and France were thus definitely increased, +for now there could hardly be an Eastern war without a Western one. Germany +must therefore regard herself as compelled to wage war, if war should come, +on both fronts; and in all her fears or her ambitions this consideration +must play a principal part. Friction in the East must involve friction in +the West, and vice versa. What were the causes of friction in the West we +have seen. Let us now consider the cause of friction in the East. + +The relations of Russia to Germany have been and are of a confused and +complicated character, changing as circumstances and personalities change. +But one permanent factor has been the sympathy between the governing +elements in the two countries. The governing class in Russia, indeed, has +not only been inspired by German ideas, it has been largely recruited +from men of German stock; and it has manifested all the contempt and +hatred which is characteristic of the German bureaucracy for the ideals of +democracy, liberty, and free thought. The two Governments have always been +ready to combine against popular insurrections, and in particular against +every attempt of the Poles to recover their liberty. They have been drawn +and held together by a common interest in tyranny, and the renewal of that +co-operation is one of the dangers of the future. On the other hand, apart +from and in opposition to this common political interest, there exists +between the two nations a strong racial antagonism. The Russian temperament +is radically opposed to the German. The one expresses itself in Panslavism, +the other in Pangermanism. And this opposition of temperament is likely +to be deeper and more enduring than the sympathy of the one autocracy with +the other. But apart from this racial factor, there is in the south-east +an opposition of political ambition. Primarily, the Balkan question is +an Austro-Russian rather than a Russo-German one. Bismarck professed +himself indifferent to the fate of the Balkan peoples, and even avowed a +willingness to see Russia at Constantinople. But recent years have seen, +in this respect, a great change. The alliance between Germany and Austria, +dating from 1879, has become closer and closer as the Powers of the Entente +have drawn together in what appeared to be a menacing combination. It has +been, for some time past, a cardinal principle of German policy to support +her ally in the Balkans, and this determination has been increased by +German ambitions in the East. The ancient dream of Russia to possess +Constantinople has been countered by the new German dream of a hegemony +over the near East based upon the through route from Berlin via Vienna and +Constantinople to Bagdad; and this political opposition has been of late +years the determining factor in the relationship of the two Powers. The +danger of a Russo-German conflict has thus been very great, and since the +Russo-French Entente Germany, as we have already pointed out, has seen +herself menaced on either front by a war which would immediately endanger +both. + +Turning once more to the Belgian dispatches, we find such hints as the +following. On October 24, 1912, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador +to London, writes as follows:-- + + The French Ambassador, who must have special reasons for speaking + thus, has repeated to me several times that the greatest danger for + the maintenance of the peace of Europe consists in the indiscipline and + the personal policy of the Russian agents. They are almost all ardent + Panslavists, and it is to them that must be imputed the responsibility + for the events that are occurring. Beyond a doubt they will make + themselves the secret instigators for an intervention of their country + in the Balkan conflict. + +On November 30, 1912, Baron de Beyens writes from Berlin:-- + + At the end of last week a report was spread in the chancelleries of + Europe that M. Sazonov had abandoned the struggle against the Court + party which wishes to drag Russia into war. + +On June 9, 1914, Baron Guillaume writes from Paris:-- + + Is it true that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has imposed upon this + country [France] the adoption of the law of three years, and would + now bring to bear the whole weight of its influence to ensure its + maintenance? I have not been able to obtain light upon this delicate + point, but it would be all the more serious, inasmuch as the men who + direct the Empire of the Tsars cannot be unaware that the effort thus + demanded of the French nation is excessive, and cannot be long sustained. + Is, then, the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based upon the + conviction that events are so imminent that it will be possible to use + the tool it intends to put into the hands of its ally? + +What a sinister vista is opened up by this passage! I have no wish to +insinuate that the suspicion here expressed was justified. It is the +suspicion itself that is the point. Dimly we see, as through a mist, the +figures of the architects of war. We see that the forces they wield are +ambition and pride, jealousy and fear; that these are all-pervasive; that +they affect all Governments and all nations, and are fostered by conditions +for which all alike are responsible. + +It will be understood, of course, that in bringing out the fact that there +was national chauvinism in Russia and that this found its excuse in the +unstable equilibrium of Europe, I am making no attack on Russian policy. +I do not pretend to know whether these elements of opinion actually +influenced the policy of the Government. But they certainly influenced +German fears, and without a knowledge of them it is impossible to +understand German policy. The reader must bear in mind this source of +friction along with the others when we come to consider that policy in +detail. + + + +6. _Austria-Hungary_. + + +Turning now to Austria-Hungary, we find in her the Power to whom the +immediate occasion of the war was due, the Power, moreover, who contributed +in large measure to its remoter causes. Austria-Hungary is a State, but not +a nation. It has no natural bond to hold its populations together, and it +continues its political existence by force and fraud, by the connivance and +the self-interest of other States, rather than by any inherent principle of +vitality. It is in relation to the Balkan States that this instability has +been most marked and most dangerous. Since the kingdom of Serbia acquired +its independent existence it has been a centre drawing to itself the +discontent and the ambitions of the Slav populations under the Dual +Monarchy. The realization of those ambitions implies the disruption of the +Austro-Hungarian State. But behind the Southern Slavs stands Russia, and +any attempt to change the political status in the Balkans has thus meant, +for years past, acute risk of war between the two Empires that border them. +This political rivalry has accentuated the racial antagonism between German +and Slav, and was the immediate origin of the war which presents itself to +Englishmen as one primarily between Germany and the Western Powers. + +On the position of Italy it is not necessary to dwell. It had long been +suspected that she was a doubtful factor in the Triple Alliance, and the +event has proved that this suspicion was correct. But though Italy has +participated in the war, her action had no part in producing it. And we +need not here indicate the course and the motives of her policy. + + + +7. _Germany_. + + +Having thus indicated briefly the position, the perils, and the ambitions +of the other Great Powers of Europe, let us turn to consider the proper +subject of this essay, the policy of Germany. And first let us dwell on the +all-important fact that Germany, as a Great Power, is a creation of the +last fifty years. Before 1866 there was a loose confederation of German +States, after 1870 there was an Empire of the Germans. The transformation +was the work of Bismarck, and it was accomplished by "blood and iron." +Whether it could have been accomplished otherwise is matter of speculation. +That it was accomplished so is a fact, and a fact of tragic significance. +For it established among Germans the prestige of force and fraud, and gave +them as their national hero the man whose most characteristic act was the +falsification of the Ems telegram. If the unification could have been +achieved in 1848 instead of in 1870, if the free and generous idealism of +that epoch could have triumphed, as it deserved to, if Germans had not +bartered away their souls for the sake of the kingdom of this world, we +might have been spared this last and most terrible act in the bloody drama +of European history. If even, after 1866, 1870 had not been provoked, the +catastrophe that is destroying Europe before our eyes might never have +overwhelmed us. In the crisis of 1870 the French minister who fought so +long and with such tenacity, for peace saw and expressed, with the lucidity +of his nation, what the real issue was for Germany and for Europe:-- + + There exists, it is true, a barbarous Germany, greedy of battles and + conquest, the Germany of the country squires; there exists a Germany + pharisaic and iniquitous, the Germany of all the unintelligible pedants + whose empty lucubrations and microscopic researches have been so unduly + vaunted. But these two Germanies are not the great Germany, that of + the artists, the poets, the thinkers, that of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, + Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Liebig. This latter + Germany is good, generous, humane, pacific; it finds expression in the + touching phrase of Goethe, who when asked to write against us replied + that he could not find it in his heart to hate the French. If we do not + oppose the natural movement of German unity, if we allow it to complete + itself quietly by successive stages, it will not give supremacy to the + barbarous and sophistical Germany, it will assure it to the Germany of + intellect and culture. War, on the other hand, would establish, during + a time impossible to calculate, the domination of the Germany of the + squires and the pedants.[1] + +The generous dream was not to be realized. French chauvinism fell into +the trap Bismarck had prepared for it. Yet even at the last moment his war +would have escaped him had he not recaptured it by fraud. The publication +of the Ems telegram made the conflict inevitable, and one of the most +hideous and sinister scenes in all history is that in which the three +conspirators, Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, "suddenly recovered their +pleasure in eating and drinking," because, by publishing a lie, they +had secured the certain death in battle of hundreds and thousands of +young men. The spirit of Bismarck has infected the whole public life +of Germany and of Europe. It has given a new lease to the political +philosophy of Machiavelli; and made of every budding statesman and +historian a solemn or a cynical defender of the gospel of force. But, +though this be true, we have no right therefore to assume that there is +some peculiar wickedness which marks off German policy from that of all +other nations. Machiavellianism is the common heritage of Europe. It is +the translation into idea of the fact of international anarchy. Germans +have been more candid and brutal than others in their expression and +application of it, but statesmen, politicians, publicists, and historians +in every nation accept it, under a thicker or thinner veil of plausible +sophisms. It is everywhere the iron hand within the silken glove. It is +the great European tradition. + +Although, moreover, it was by these methods that Bismarck accomplished +the unification of Germany, his later policy was, by common consent, a +policy of peace. War had done its part, and the new Germany required all +its energies to build up its internal prosperity and strength. In 1875, +it is true, Bismarck was credited with the intention to fall once more +upon France. The fact does not seem to be clearly established. At any +rate, if such was his intention, it was frustrated by the intervention of +Russia and of Great Britain. During the thirty-nine years that followed +Germany kept the peace. + +While France, England, and Russia waged wars on a great scale, and while +the former Powers acquired enormous extensions of territory, the only +military operations undertaken by Germany were against African natives +in her dependencies and against China in 1900. The conduct of the German +troops appears, it is true, to have been distinguished, in this latter +expedition, by a brutality which stood out in relief even in that orgy of +slaughter and loot. But we must remember that they were specially ordered +by their Imperial master, in the name of Jesus Christ, to show no mercy +and give no quarter. Apart from this, it will not be disputed, by any one +who knows the facts, that during the first twenty years or so after 1875 +Germany was the Power whose diplomacy was the least disturbing to Europe. +The chief friction during that period was between Russia and France and +Great Britain, and it was one or other of these Powers, according to the +angle of vision, which was regarded as offering the menace of aggression. +If there has been a German plot against the peace of the world, it does +not date from before the decade 1890-1900. The close of that decade +marks, in fact, a new epoch in German policy. The years of peace had +been distinguished by the development of industry and trade and internal +organization. The population increased from forty millions in 1870 to over +sixty-five millions at the present date. Foreign trade increased more than +ten-fold. National pride and ambition grew with the growth of prosperity +and force, and sentiment as well as need impelled German policy to claim +a share of influence outside Europe in that greater world for the control +of which the other nations were struggling. Already Bismarck, though with +reluctance and scepticism, had acquired for his country by negotiation +large areas in Africa. But that did not satisfy the ambitions of the +colonial party. The new Kaiser put himself at the head of the new movement, +and announced that henceforth nothing must be done in any part of the world +without the cognizance and acquiescence of Germany. + +Thus there entered a new competitor upon the stage of the world, and +his advent of necessity was disconcerting and annoying to the earlier +comers. But is there reason to suppose that, from that moment, German +policy was definitely aiming at empire, and was prepared to provoke war +to achieve it? Strictly, no answer can be given to this question. The +remoter intentions of statesmen are rarely avowed to others, and, perhaps, +rarely to themselves. Their policy is, indeed, less continuous, less +definite, and more at the mercy of events than observers or critics are +apt to suppose. It is not probable that Germany, any more than any other +country in Europe, was pursuing during those years a definite plan, +thought out and predetermined in every point. + +In Germany, as elsewhere, both in home and foreign affairs, there was an +intense and unceasing conflict of competing forces and ideas. In Germany, +as elsewhere, policy must have adapted itself to circumstances, different +personalities must have given it different directions at different times. +We have not the information at our disposal which would enable us to trace +in detail the devious course of diplomacy in any of the countries of +Europe. What we know something about is the general situation, and the +action, in fact, taken at certain moments. The rest must be, for the +present, mainly matter of conjecture. With this word of caution, let +us now proceed to examine the policy of Germany. + +The general situation we have already indicated. We have shown how the +armed peace, which is the chronic malady of Europe, had assumed during the +ten years from 1904 to 1914 that specially dangerous form which grouped the +Great Powers in two opposite camps--the Triple Alliance and the Triple +Entente. We have seen, in the case of Great Britain, France, Russia, and +Austria-Hungary, how they came to take their places in that constellation. +We have now to put Germany in its setting in the picture. + +Germany, then, in the first place, like the other Powers, had occasion +to anticipate war. It might be made from the West, on the question of +Alsace-Lorraine; it might be made from the East, on the question of the +Balkans. In either case, the system of alliances was likely to bring into +play other States than those immediately involved, and the German Powers +might find themselves attacked on all fronts, while they knew in the +latter years that they could not count upon the support of Italy. + +A reasonable prudence, if nothing else, must keep Germany armed and +apprehensive. But besides the maintenance of what she had, Germany was +now ambitious to secure her share of "world-power." Let us examine in +what spirit and by what acts she endeavoured to make her claim good. + +First, what was the tone of public opinion in Germany during these +critical years? + +[Footnote 1: Emile Ollivier, "L'Empire Libéral."] + + + +8. _Opinion in Germany_. + + +Since the outbreak of the war the pamphlet literature in the countries of +the Entente has been full of citations from German political writers. In +England, in particular, the names and works of Bernhardi and of Treitschke +have become more familiar than they appear to have been in Germany prior to +the war. This method of selecting for polemical purposes certain tendencies +of sentiment and theory, and ignoring all others, is one which could be +applied, with damaging results, to any country in the world. Mr. Angell has +shown in his "Prussianism in England" how it might be applied to ourselves; +and a German, no doubt, into whose hands that book might fall would draw +conclusions about public opinion here similar to those which we have drawn +about public opinion in Germany. There is jingoism in all countries, as +there is pacifism in all countries. Nevertheless, I think it is true to +say that the jingoism of Germany has been peculiar both in its intensity +and in its character. This special quality appears to be due both to the +temperament and to the recent history of the German nation. The Germans are +romantic, as the French are impulsive, the English sentimental, and the +Russians religious. There is some real meaning in these generalisations. +They are easily to be felt when one comes into contact with a nation, +though they may be hard to establish or define. When I say that the Germans +are romantic, I mean that they do not easily or willingly see things as +they are. Their temperament is like a medium of coloured glass. It +magnifies, distorts, conceals, transmutes. And this is as true when their +intellectual attitude is realistic as when it is idealistic. In the Germany +of the past, the Germany of small States, to which all non-Germans look +back with such sympathy and such regret, their thinkers and poets were +inspired by grandiose intellectual abstractions. They saw ideas, like gods, +moving the world, and actual men and women, actual events and things, were +but the passing symbols of these supernatural powers; 1866 and 1870 ended +all that. The unification of Germany, in the way we have discussed, +diverted all their interest from speculation about the universe, life, and +mankind, to the material interests of their new country. Germany became the +preoccupation of all Germans. From abstractions they turned with a new +intoxication to what they conceived to be the concrete. Entering thus late +upon the stage of national politics, they devoted themselves, with their +accustomed thoroughness, to learning and bettering what they conceived +to be the principles and the practice which had given success to other +nations. In this quest no scruples should deter them, no sentimentality +hamper, no universal ideals distract. Yet this, after all, was but German +romanticism assuming another form. The objects, it is true, were different. +"Actuality" had taken the place of ideals, Germany of Humanity. But by +the German vision the new objects were no less distorted than the old. +In dealing with "Real-politik" (which is the German translation of +Machiavellianism), with "expansion," with "survival of the fittest," +and all the other shibboleths of world-policy, their outlook remained +as absolute and abstract as before, as contemptuous of temperament and +measure, as blind to those compromises and qualifications, those decencies, +so to speak, of nature, by which reality is constituted. The Germans now +saw men instead of gods, but they saw them as trees walking. + +German imperialism, then, while it involves the same intellectual +presuppositions, the same confusions, the same erroneous arguments, the +same short-sighted ambitions, as the imperialism of other countries, +exhibits them all in an extreme degree. All peoples admire themselves. But +the self-adoration of Germans is so naive, so frank, so unqualified, as to +seem sheerly ridiculous to more experienced nations.[1] The English and the +French, too, believe their civilization to be the best in the world. But +English common-sense and French sanity would prevent them from announcing +to other peoples that they proposed to conquer them, morally or materially, +for their good. All Jingoes admire and desire war. But nowhere else in the +modern world is to be found such a debauch of "romantic" enthusiasm, such +a wilful blindness to all the realities of war, as Germany has manifested +both before and since the outbreak of this world-catastrophe. A reader +of German newspapers and tracts gets at last a feeling of nausea at the +very words _Wir Deutsche_, followed by the eternal _Helden, Heldenthum, +Heldenthat_, and is inclined to thank God if he indeed belong to a nation +sane enough to be composed of _Händler_. + +The very antithesis between _Helden_ (heroes) and _Händler_ (hucksters), +with which all Germany is ringing, is an illustration of the romantic +quality that vitiates their intelligence. In spite of the fact that they +are one of the greatest trading and manufacturing nations of the world, and +that precisely the fear of losing their trade and markets has been, as they +constantly assert, a chief cause that has driven them to war, they speak +as though Germany were a kind of knight-errant, innocent of all material +ambitions, wandering through the world in the pure, disinterested service +of God and man. On the other hand, because England is a great commercial +Power, they suppose that no Englishman lives for anything but profit. +Because they themselves have conscription, and have to fight or be shot, +they infer that every German is a noble warrior. Because the English +volunteer, they assume that they only volunteer for their pay. Germany, +to them, is a hero clad in white armour, magnanimous, long-suffering, and +invincible. Other nations are little seedy figures in black coats, inspired +exclusively by hatred and jealousy of the noble German, incapable of a +generous emotion or an honourable act, and destined, by the judgment of +history, to be saved, if they can be saved at all, by the great soul and +dominating intellect of the Teuton. + +It is in this intoxicating atmosphere of temperament and mood that +the ideas and ambitions of German imperialists work and move. They are +essentially the same as those of imperialists in other countries. Their +philosophy of history assumes an endless series of wars, due to the +inevitable expansion of rival States. Their ethics means a belief in force +and a disbelief in everything else. Their science is a crude misapplication +of Darwinism, combined with invincible ignorance of the true bearings of +science upon life, and especially of those facts and deductions about +biological heredity which, once they are understood, will make it plain +that war degrades the stock of all nations, victorious and vanquished +alike, and that the decline of civilizations is far more plausibly to be +attributed to this cause than to the moral decadence of which history +is always ready, after the event, to accuse the defeated Power. One +peculiarity, perhaps, there is in the outlook of German imperialism, +and that is its emphasis on an unintelligible and unreal abstraction of +"race." Germans, it is thought, are by biological quality the salt of +the earth. Every really great man in Europe, since the break-up of the +Roman Empire, has been a German, even though it might appear, at first +sight, to an uninstructed observer, that he was an Italian or a Frenchman +or a Spaniard. Not all Germans, however, are, they hold, as yet included +in the German Empire, or even in the German-Austrian combination. The +Flemish are Germans, the Dutch are Germans, the English even are Germans, +or were before the war had made them, in Germany's eyes, the offscouring +of mankind. Thus, a great task lies before the German Empire: on the one +hand, to bring within its fold the German stocks that have strayed from +it in the wanderings of history; on the other, to reduce under German +authority those other stocks that are not worthy to share directly in the +citizenship of the Fatherland. The dreams of conquest which are the real +essence of all imperialism are thus supported in Germany by arguments +peculiar to Germans. But the arguments put forward are not the real +determinants of the attitude. The attitude, in any country, whatever it +may be called, rests at bottom on sheer national vanity. It is the belief +in the inherent superiority of one's own civilization, and the desire to +extend it, by force if need be, throughout the world. It matters little +what arguments in its support this passion to dominate may garner from +that twilight region in which the advanced guard of science is labouring +patiently to comprehend Nature and mankind. Men take from the treasury of +truth what they are able to take. And what imperialists take is a mirror +to their own ambition and pride. + +Now, as to the ambitions of this German jingoism there is no manner of +doubt. Germans are nothing if not frank. And this kind of German does +want to conquer and annex, not only outside Europe but within it. We must +not, however, infer that the whole of Germany has been infected with this +virus. The summary I have set down in the last few pages represents the +impression made on an unsympathetic mind by the literature of Pangermanism. +Emerging from such reading--and it is the principal reading of German +origin which has been offered to the British public since the war--there +is a momentary illusion, "That is Germany!" Of course it is not, any more +than the _Morning Post_ or the _National Review_ is England. Germans, in +fact, during recent years have taken a prominent place in pacifism as well +as in imperialism. Men like Schücking and Quidde and Fried are at least as +well known as men like Treitschke and Bernhardi. Opinion in Germany, as in +every other country, has been various and conflicting. And the pacific +tendencies have been better organized, if not more active, there than +elsewhere, for they have been associated with the huge and disciplined +forces of the Social-Democrats. Indeed, the mass of the people, left +alone, is everywhere pacific. I do not forget the very important fact +that German education, elementary and higher, has been deliberately +directed to inculcate patriotic feeling, that the doctrine of armed +force as the highest manifestation of the State has been industriously +propagated by the authorities, and that the unification of Germany by +force has given to the cult of force a meaning and a popularity probably +unknown in any other country. But in most men, for good or for evil, the +lessons of education can be quickly obliterated by the experience of life. +In particular, the mass of the people everywhere, face to face with the +necessities of existence, knowing what it is to work and to struggle, to +co-operate and to compete, to suffer and to relieve suffering, though they +may be less well-informed than the instructed classes, are also less liable +to obsession by abstractions. They see little, but they see it straight. +And though, being men, with the long animal inheritance of men behind them, +their passions may be roused by any cry of battle, though they are the +fore-ordained dupes of those who direct the policy of nations, yet it is +not their initiative that originates wars. They do not desire conquest, +they do not trouble about "race" or chatter about the "survival of the +fittest." It is their own needs, which are also the vital needs of society, +that preoccupy their thoughts; and it is real goods that direct and inspire +their genuine idealism. + +We must, then, disabuse ourselves of the notion so naturally produced by +reading, and especially by reading in time of war, that the German Jingoes +are typical of Germany. They are there, they are a force, they have to be +reckoned with. But exactly how great a force? Exactly how influential on +policy? That is a question which I imagine can only be answered by guesses. +Would the reader, for instance, undertake to estimate the influence during +the last fifteen years on British policy and opinion of the imperialist +minority in this country? No two men, I think, would agree about it. And +few men would agree with themselves from one day or one week to another. +We are reduced to conjecture. But the conjectures of some people are of +more value than those of others, for they are based on a wider converse. +I think it therefore not without importance to recall to the reader the +accounts of the state of opinion in Germany given by well-qualified foreign +observers in the years immediately preceding the war. + +[Footnote 1: As I write I come across the following, cited from a book of +songs composed for German combatants under the title "Der deutsche Zorn":-- + + Wir sind die Meister aller Welt + In allen ernsten Dingen, + * * * * * + Was Man als fremd euch höchlichst preist + Um eurer Einfalt Willen, + Ist deutschen Ursprungs allermeist, + Und trägt nur fremde Hüllen.] + + + +9. _Opinion about Germany_. + + +After the crisis of Agadir, M. Georges Bourdon visited Germany to make an +inquiry for the _Figaro_ newspaper into the state of opinion there. His +mission belongs to the period between Agadir and the outbreak of the first +Balkan war. He interviewed a large number of people, statesmen, publicists, +professors, politicians. He does not sum up his impressions, and such +summary as I can give here is no doubt affected by the emphasis of my +own mind. His book,[1] however, is now translated into English, and the +reader has the opportunity of correcting the impression I give him. + +Let us begin with Pangermanism, on which M. Bourdon has a very interesting +chapter. He feels for the propaganda of that sect the repulsion that must +be felt by every sane and liberal-minded man:-- + + Wretched, choleric Pangermans, exasperated and unbalanced, brothers + of all the exasperated, wretched windbags whose tirades, in all + countries, answer to yours, and whom you are wrong to count your + enemies! Pangermans of the Spree and the Main, who, on the other side + of the frontier, receive the fraternal effusions of Russian Pan-Slavism, + Italian irredentism, English imperialism, French nationalism! What is it + that you want? + +They want, he replies, part of Austria, Switzerland, Flanders, Luxemburg, +Denmark, Holland, for all these are "Germanic" countries! They want +colonies. They want a bigger army and a bigger navy. "An execrable race, +these Pangermans!" "They have the yellow skin, the dry mouth, the green +complexion of the bilious. They do not live under the sky, they avoid the +light. Hidden in their cellars, they pore over treaties, cite newspaper +articles, grow pale over maps, measure angles, quibble over texts or traces +of frontiers." "The Pangerman is a propagandist and a revivalist." "But," +M. Bourdon adds, "when he shouts we must not think we hear in his tones the +reverberations of the German soul." The organs of the party seemed few and +unimportant. The party itself was spoken of with contempt. "They talk +loud," M. Bourdon was told, "but have no real following; it is only in +France that people attend to them." Nevertheless, M. Bourdon concluded +they were not negligible. For, in the first place, they have power to +evoke the jingoism of the German public--a jingoism which the violent +patriotism of the people, their tradition of victorious force, their +education, their dogma of race, continually keep alive. And, secondly, +the Government, when it thinks it useful, turns to the Pangermans for +assistance, and lets loose their propaganda in the press. Their influence +thus waxes and wanes, as it is favoured, or not, by authority. "Like the +giant Antaeus," a correspondent wrote to M. Bourdon, "Pangermanism loses +its force when it quits the soil of government." + +It is interesting to note, however, that the Pangerman propaganda purports +to be based upon fear. If they urge increased armaments, it is with a +view to defence. "I considered it a patriotic duty," wrote General Keim, +"in my quality of president of the German League for Defence, to demand +an increase of effectives such that France should find it out of the +question to dream of a victorious war against us, even with the help of +other nations." "To the awakening of the national sentiment in France +there is only one reply--the increase of the German forces." "I have the +impression," said Count Reventlow, "that a warlike spirit which is new is +developing in France. There is the danger." Thus in Germany, as elsewhere, +even jingoism took the mask of necessary precaution. And so it must be, and +will be everywhere, as long as the European anarchy continues. For what +nation has ever admitted an intention or desire to make aggressive war? +M. Bourdon, then, takes full account of Pangermanism. Nor does he neglect +the general militaristic tendencies of German opinion. He found pride +in the army, a determination to be strong, and that belief that it is in +war that the State expresses itself at the highest and the best, which is +part of the tradition of German education since the days of Treitschke. +Yet, in spite of all this, to which M. Bourdon does full justice, the +general impression made by the conversations he records is that the bulk +of opinion in Germany was strongly pacific. There was apprehension indeed, +apprehension of France and apprehension of England. "England certainly +preoccupies opinion more than France. People are alarmed by her movements +and her armaments." "The constant interventions of England have undoubtedly +irritated the public." Germany, therefore, must arm and arm again. "A great +war may be delayed, but not prevented, unless German armaments are such as +to put fear into the heart of every possible adversary." + +Germany feared that war might come, but she did not want it--that, in sum, +was M. Bourdon's impression. From soldiers, statesmen, professors, business +men, again and again, the same assurance. "The sentiment you will find most +generally held is undoubtedly that of peace." "Few think about war. We need +peace too much." "War! War between us! What an idea! Why, it would mean a +European war, something monstrous, something which would surpass in horror +anything the world has ever seen! My dear sir, only madmen could desire or +conceive such a calamity! It must be avoided at all costs." "What counts +above all here is commercial interest. All who live by it are, here as +elsewhere, almost too pacific." "Under the economic conditions prevailing +in Germany, the most glorious victory she can aspire to--it is a soldier +who says it--is peace!" + +The impression thus gathered from M. Bourdon's observations is confirmed +at every point by those of Baron Beyens, who went to Berlin as Belgian +minister after the crisis of Agadir.[2] Of the world of business he says:-- + + All these gentlemen appeared to be convinced partisans of peace.... + According to them, the tranquillity of Europe had not been for a moment + seriously menaced during the crisis of Agadir.... Industrial Germany + required to live on good terms with France. Peace was necessary to + business, and German finance in particular had every interest in the + maintenance of its profitable relations with French finance.[3] At the + end of a few months I had the impression that these pacifists personified + then--in 1912--the most common, the most widely spread, though the least + noisy, opinion, the opinion of the majority, understanding by the + majority, not that of the governing classes but that of the nation + as a whole (p. 172). + +The mass of the people, Beyens held, loved peace, and dreaded war. That was +the case, not only with all the common people, but also with the managers +and owners of businesses and the wholesale and retail merchants. Even in +Berlin society and among the ancient German nobility there were to be found +sincere pacifists. On the other hand, there was certainly a bellicose +minority. It was composed largely of soldiers, both active and retired; +the latter especially looking with envy and disgust on the increasing +prosperity of the commercial classes, and holding that a "blood-letting +would be wholesome to purge and regenerate the social body"--a view not +confined to Germany, and one which has received classical expression in +Tennyson's "Maud." To this movement belonged also the high officials, the +Conservative parties, patriots and journalists, and of course the armament +firms, deliberate fomenters of war in Germany, as everywhere else, in order +to put money into their pockets. To these must be added the "intellectual +flower of the universities and the schools." "The professors at the +universities, taken _en bloc_, were one of the most violent elements in +the nation." "Almost all the young people from one end of the Empire to +the other have had brought before them in the course of their studies +the dilemma which Bernhardi summed up to his readers in the three words +'world-power or decadence.' Yet with all this, the resolute partisans of +war formed as I thought a very small minority in the nation. That is the +impression I obstinately retain of my sojourn in Berlin and my excursions +into the provinces of the Empire, rich or poor. When I recall the image +of this peaceful population, journeying to business every week-day with a +movement so regular, or seated at table on Sundays in the cafés in the open +air before a glass of beer, I can find in my memories nothing but placid +faces where there was no trace of violent passions, no thought hostile to +foreigners, not even that feverish concern with the struggle for existence +which the spectacle of the human crowd has sometimes shown me elsewhere." + +A similar impression is given by the dispatch from M. Cambon, French +Ambassador to Berlin, written on July 30, 1913.[4] He, too, finds elements +working for war, and analyses them much as Baron Beyens does. There are +first the "junkers," or country squires, naturally military by all their +traditions, but also afraid of the death-duties "which are bound to come +if peace continues." Secondly, the "higher bourgeoisie"--that is, the +great manufacturers and financiers, and, of course, in particular the +armament firms. Both these social classes are influenced, not only by +direct pecuniary motives but by the fear of the rising democracy, which +is beginning to swamp their representatives in the Reichstag. Thirdly, +the officials, the "party of the pensioned." Fourthly, the universities, +the "historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists +of German Kultur." Fifthly, rancorous diplomatists, with a sense that they +had been duped. On the other hand, there were, as M. Cambon insists, other +forces in the country making for peace. What were these? In numbers the +great bulk, in Germany as in all countries. "The mass of the workmen, +artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct." Such of the great +nobles as were intelligent enough to recognize the "disastrous political +and social consequences of war." "Numerous manufacturers, merchants, and +financiers in a moderate way of business." The non-German elements of the +Empire. Finally, the Government and the governing classes in the large +southern States. A goodly array of peace forces! According to M. Cambon, +however, all these latter elements "are only a sort of make-weight in +political matters with limited influence on public opinion, or they are +silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of +a wave of warlike feeling." This last sentence is pregnant. It describes +the state of affairs existing, more or less, in all countries; a few +individuals, a few groups or cliques, making for war more or less +deliberately; the mass of the people ignorant and unconcerned, but also +defenceless against suggestion, and ready to respond to the call to war, +with submission or with enthusiasm, as soon as the call is made by their +Government. + +On the testimony, then, of these witnesses, all shrewd and competent +observers, it may be permitted to sum up somewhat as follows:-- + +In the years immediately preceding the war the mass of the people in +Germany, rich and poor, were attached to peace and dreaded war. But there +was there also a powerful minority either desiring war or expecting it, +and, in either case, preparing it by their agitation. And this minority +could appeal to the peculiarly aggressive form of patriotism inculcated by +the public schools and universities. The war party based its appeal for +ever fresh armaments on the hostile preparations of the Powers of the +Entente. Its aggressive ambition masqueraded, perhaps even to itself, +as a patriotism apprehensively concerned with defence. It was supported +by powerful moneyed interests; and the mass of the people, passive, +ill-informed, preoccupied, were defenceless against its agitation. The +German Government found the Pangermans embarrassing or convenient according +as the direction of its policy and the European situation changed from +crisis to crisis. They were thus at one moment negligible, at another +powerful. For long they agitated vainly, and they might long have continued +to do so. But if the moment should come at which the Government should make +the fatal plunge, their efforts would have contributed to the result, their +warnings would seem to have been justified, and they would triumph as +the party of patriots that had foretold in vain the coming crash to an +unbelieving nation. + +[Footnote 1: "L'Enigme Allemande," 1914.] + +[Footnote 2: See "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 97 seq. and 170 seq. +Bruxelles, 1915.] + +[Footnote 3: A Frenchman, M. Maurice Ajam, who made an inquiry among +business men in 1913 came to the same conclusion. "Peace! I write that all +the Germans without exception, when they belong to the world of business, +are fanatical partisans of the maintenance of European peace." See Yves +Guyot, "Les causes et les conséquences de la guerre," p. 226.] + +[Footnote 4: See French Yellow Book, No. 5.] + + + +10. _German Policy, from 1890-1900_. + + +Having thus examined the atmosphere of opinion in which the German +Government moved, let us proceed to consider the actual course of their +policy during the critical years, fifteen or so, that preceded the war. +The policy admittedly and openly was one of "expansion." But "expansion" +where? It seems to be rather widely supposed that Germany was preparing war +in order to annex territory in Europe. The contempt of German imperialists, +from Treitschke onward, for the rights of small States, the racial theories +which included in "German" territory Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the +Scandinavian countries, may seem to give colour to this idea. But it would +be hazardous to assume that German statesmen were seriously influenced +for years by the lucubrations of Mr. Houston Stewart Chamberlain and +his followers. Nor can a long-prepared policy of annexation in Europe +be inferred from the fact that Belgium and France were invaded after the +war broke out, or even from the present demand among German parties that +the territories occupied should be retained. If it could be maintained +that the seizure of territory during war, or even its retention after +it, is evidence that the territory was the object of the war, it would +be legitimate also to infer that the British Empire has gone to war +to annex German colonies, a conclusion which Englishmen would probably +reject with indignation. In truth, before the war, the view that it was +the object of German policy to annex European territory would have found, +I think, few, if any, supporters among well-informed and unprejudiced +observers. I note, for instance, that Mr. Dawson, whose opinion on such +a point is probably better worth having than that of any other Englishman, +in his book, "The Evolution of Modern Germany,"[1] when discussing the aims +of German policy does not even refer to the idea that annexations in Europe +are contemplated. + +So far as the evidence at present goes, I do not think a case can be +made out for the view that German policy was aiming during these years +at securing the hegemony of Europe by annexing European territory. The +expansion Germany was seeking was that of trade and markets. And her +statesmen and people, like those of other countries, were under the +belief that, to secure this, it was necessary to acquire colonies. This +ambition, up to a point, she was able, in fact, to fulfil, not by force +but by agreement with the other Powers. The Berlin Act of 1885 was one +of the wisest and most far-seeing achievements of European policy. By it +the partition of a great part of the African continent between the Powers +was peaceably accomplished, and Germany emerged with possessions to the +extent of 377,000 square miles and an estimated population of 1,700,000. +By 1906 her colonial domain had been increased to over two and a half +million square miles, and its population to over twelve millions; and all +of this had been acquired without war with any civilized nation. In spite +of her late arrival on the scene as a colonial Power, Germany had thus +secured without war an empire overseas, not comparable, indeed, to that +of Great Britain or of France, but still considerable in extent and +(as Germans believed) in economic promise, and sufficient to give them +the opportunity they desired to show their capacity as pioneers of +civilization. How they have succeeded or failed in this we need not here +consider. But when Germans demand a "place in the sun," the considerable +place they have in fact acquired, with the acquiescence of the other +colonial Powers, should, in fairness to those Powers, be remembered. +But, notoriously, they were not satisfied, and the extent of their +dissatisfaction was shown by their determination to create a navy. This +new departure, dating from the close of the decade 1890-1900, marks the +beginning of that friction between Great Britain and Germany which was a +main cause of the war. It is therefore important to form some just idea +of the motives that inspired German policy to take this momentous step. +The reasons given by Prince Bülow, the founder of the policy, and often +repeated by German statesmen and publicists,[2] are, first, the need of a +strong navy, to protect German commerce; secondly, the need, as well as the +ambition, of Germany to play a part proportional to her real strength in +the determination of policy beyond the seas. These reasons, according to +the ideas that govern European statesmanship, are valid and sufficient. +They are the same that have influenced all great Powers; and if Germany +was influenced by them we need not infer any specially sinister intentions +on her part. The fact that during the present war German trade has been +swept from the seas, and that she is in the position of a blockaded Power, +will certainly convince any German patriot, not that she did not need a +navy, but that she needed a much stronger one; and the retort that there +need have been no war if Germany had not provoked it by building a fleet +is not one that can be expected to appeal to any nation so long as the +European anarchy endures. For, of course, every nation regards itself +as menaced perpetually by aggression from some other Power. Defence was +certainly a legitimate motive for the building of the fleet, even if +there had been no other. There was, however, in fact, another reason +avowed. Germany, as we have said, desired to have a voice in policy +beyond the seas. Here, too, the reason is good, as reasons go in a +world of competing States. A great manufacturing and trading Power +cannot be indifferent to the parcelling out of the world among its +rivals. Wherever, in countries economically undeveloped, there were +projects of protectorates or annexations, or of any kind of monopoly +to be established in the interest of any Power, there German interests +were directly affected. She had to speak, and to speak with a loud voice, +if she was to be attended to. And a loud voice meant a navy. So, at least, +the matter naturally presented itself to German imperialists, as, indeed, +it would to imperialists of any other country. + +The reasons given by German statesmen for building their fleet were in +this sense valid. But were they the only reasons? In the beginning most +probably they were. But the formation and strengthening of the Entente, +and Germany's consequent fear that war might be made upon her jointly by +France and Great Britain, gave a new stimulus to her naval ambition. She +could not now be content with a navy only as big as that of France, for she +might have to meet those of France and England conjoined. This defensive +reason is good. But no doubt, as always, there must have lurked behind it +ideas of aggression. Ambition, in the philosophy of States, goes hand in +hand with fear. "The war may come," says one party. "Yes," says the other; +and secretly mutters, "May the war come!" To ask whether armaments are for +offence or for defence must always be an idle inquiry. They will be for +either, or both, according to circumstances, according to the personalities +that are in power, according to the mood that politicians and journalists, +and the interests that suborn them, have been able to infuse into a nation. +But what may be said with clear conviction is, that to attempt to account +for the clash of war by the ambition and armaments of a single Power is +to think far too simply of how these catastrophes originate. The truth, +in this case, is that German ambition developed in relation to the whole +European situation, and that, just as on land their policy was conditioned +by their relation to France and Russia, so at sea it was conditioned by +their relation to Great Britain. They knew that their determination to +become a great Power at sea would arouse the suspicion and alarm of the +English. Prince Bülow is perfectly frank about that. He says that the +difficulty was to get on with the shipbuilding programme without giving +Great Britain an opportunity to intervene by force and nip the enterprise +in the bud. He attributes here to the British Government a policy which +is all in the Bismarckian tradition. It was, in fact, a policy urged by +some voices here, voices which, as is always the case, were carried to +Germany and magnified by the mega-phone of the Press.[3] That no British +Government, in fact, contemplated picking a quarrel with Germany in order +to prevent her becoming a naval Power I am myself as much convinced as any +other Englishman, and I count the fact as righteousness to our statesmen. +On the other hand, I think it an unfounded conjecture that Prince Bülow was +deliberately building with a view to attacking the British Empire. I see +no reason to doubt his sincerity when he says that he looked forward to a +peaceful solution of the rivalry between Germany and ourselves, and that +France, in his view, not Great Britain, was the irreconcilable enemy.[4] +In building her navy, no doubt, Germany deliberately took the risk of +incurring a quarrel with England in the pursuit of a policy which she +regarded as essential to her development. It is quite another thing, +and would require much evidence to prove that she was working up to a +war with the object of destroying the British Empire. + +What we have to bear in mind, in estimating the meaning of the German +naval policy, is a complex series of motives and conditions: the genuine +need of a navy, and a strong one, to protect trade in the event of war, +and to secure a voice in overseas policy; the genuine fear of an attack by +the Powers of the Entente, an attack to be provoked by British jealousy; +and also that indeterminate ambition of any great Power which may be +influencing the policy of statesmen even while they have not avowed it to +themselves, and which, expressed by men less responsible and less discreet, +becomes part of that "public opinion" of which policy takes account. + +[Footnote 1: Published in 1908.] + +[Footnote 2: See, e.g., Dawson, "Evolution of Modern Germany," p. 348.] + +[Footnote 3: Some of these are cited in Bülow's "Imperial Germany," p. 36.] + +[Footnote 4: See "Imperial Germany," pp. 48, 71, English translation.] + + + +11. _Vain Attempts at Harmony_. + + +It may, however, be reasonably urged that unless the Germans had had +aggressive ambitions they would have agreed to some of the many proposals +made by Great Britain to arrest on both sides the constantly expanding +programmes of naval constructions. It is true that Germany has always +opposed the policy of limiting armaments, whether on land or sea. This is +consonant with that whole militarist view of international politics which, +as I have already indicated, is held in a more extreme and violent form +in Germany than in any other country, but which is the creed of jingoes +and imperialists everywhere. If the British Government had succeeded in +coming to an agreement with Germany on this question, they would have been +bitterly assailed by that party at home. Still, the Government did make the +attempt. It was comparatively easy for them, for any basis to which they +could have agreed must have left intact, legitimately and necessarily, as +we all agree, the British supremacy at sea. The Germans would not assent +to this. They did not choose to limit beforehand their efforts to rival +us at sea. Probably they did not think it possible to equal, still less +to outstrip us. But they wanted to do all they could. And that of course +could have only one meaning. They thought a war with England possible, +and they wanted to be as well prepared as they could be. It is part of +the irony that attaches to the whole system of the armed peace that the +preparations made against war are themselves the principal cause of war. +For if there had been no rival shipbuilding, there need have been no +friction between the two countries. + +"But why did Germany fear war? It must have been because she meant to make +it." So the English argue. But imagine the Germans saying to us, "Why do +you fear war? There will be no war unless you provoke it. We are quite +pacific. You need not be alarmed about us." Would such a promise have +induced us to relax our preparations for a moment? No! Under the armed +peace there can be no confidence. And that alone is sufficient to account +for the breakdown of the Anglo-German negotiations, without supposing on +either side a wish or an intention to make war. Each suspected, and was +bound to suspect, the purpose of the other. Let us take, for example, the +negotiations of 1912, and put them back in their setting. + +The Triple Alliance was confronting the Triple Entente. On both sides +were fear and suspicion. Each believed in the possibility of the others +springing a war upon them. Each suspected the others of wanting to lull +them into a false security, and then take them unprepared. In that +atmosphere, what hope was there of successful negotiations? The essential +condition--mutual confidence--was lacking. What, accordingly, do we find? +The Germans offer to reduce their naval programme, first, if England will +promise an unconditional neutrality; secondly, when that was rejected, if +England will promise neutrality in a war which should be "forced upon" +Germany. Thereupon the British Foreign Office scents a snare. Germany +will get Austria to provoke a war, while making it appear that the war +was provoked by Russia, and she will then come in under the terms of her +alliance with Austria, smash France, and claim that England must look +on passively under the neutrality agreement! "No, thank you!" Sir Edward +Grey, accordingly, makes a counter-proposal. England will neither make +nor participate in an "unprovoked" attack upon Germany. This time it is +the German Chancellor's turn to hang back. "Unprovoked! Hm! What does +that mean? Russia, let us suppose, makes war upon Austria, while making +it appear that Austria is the aggressor. France comes in on the side of +Russia. And England? Will she admit that the war was 'unprovoked' and +remain neutral? Hardly, we think!" The Chancellor thereupon proposes the +addition: "England, of course, will remain neutral if war is forced upon +Germany? That follows, I presume?" "No!" from the British Foreign Office. +Reason as before. And the negotiations fall through. How should they not +under the conditions? There could be no understanding, because there was +no confidence. There could be no confidence because there was mutual fear. +There was mutual fear because the Triple Alliance stood in arms against +the Triple Entente. What was wrong? Germany? England? No. The European +tradition and system. + +The fact, then, that those negotiations broke down is no more evidence +of sinister intentions on the part of Germany than it is on the part of +Great Britain. Baron Beyens, to my mind the most competent and the most +impartial, as well as one of the best-informed, of those who have written +on the events leading up to the war, says explicitly of the policy of the +German Chancellor:-- + + A practicable _rapprochement_ between his country and Great Britain + was the dream with which M. de Bethmann-Hollweg most willingly soothed + himself, without the treacherous _arrière-pensèe_ which the Prince von + Bülow perhaps would have had of finishing later on, at an opportune + moment, with the British Navy. Nothing authorizes us to believe that + there was not a basis of sincerity in the language of M. de Jagow when he + expressed to Sir E. Goschen in the course of their last painful interview + his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the + Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then + through Great Britain to get closer to France.[1] + +Meantime the considerations I have here laid before the reader, in relation +to this general question of Anglo-German rivalry, are, I submit, all +relevant, and must be taken into fair consideration in forming a judgment. +The facts show clearly that Germany was challenging as well as she could +the British supremacy at sea; that she was determined to become a naval +as well as a military Power; and that her policy was, on the face of it, +a menace to this country; just as the creation on our part of a great +conscript army would have been taken by Germany as a menace to her. The +British Government was bound to make counter-preparations. I, for my own +part, have never disputed it. I have never thought, and do not now think, +that while the European anarchy continues, a single Power can disarm in the +face of the others. All this is beyond dispute. What is disputable, and a +matter of speculative inference, is the further assumption that in pursuing +this policy Germany was making a bid to destroy the British Empire. The +facts can certainly be accounted for without that assumption. I myself +think the assumption highly improbable. So much I may say, but I cannot +say more. Possibly some day we may be able to check conjecture by facts. +Until then, argument must be inconclusive. + +This question of the naval rivalry between Germany and Great Britain +is, however, part of the general question of militarism. And it may be +urged that while during the last fifteen years the British Government has +shown itself favourable to projects of arbitration and of limitation of +armaments, the German Government has consistently opposed them. There is +much truth in this; and it is a good illustration of what I hold to be +indisputable, that the militaristic view of international politics is +much more deeply rooted in Germany than in Great Britain. It is worth +while, however, to remind ourselves a little in detail what the facts +were since they are often misrepresented or exaggerated. + +The question of international arbitration was brought forward at the first +Hague Conference in 1899.[2] From the beginning it was recognized on all +sides that it would be idle to propose general compulsory arbitration for +all subjects. No Power would have agreed to it, not Great Britain or +America any more than Germany. On the other hand, projects for creating +an arbitration tribunal, to which nations willing to use it should have +recourse, were brought forward by both the British and the American +representatives. From the beginning, however, it became clear that Count +Münster, the head of the German delegation, was opposed to any scheme +for encouraging arbitration. "He did not say that he would oppose a +moderate plan of voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that arbitration +must be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no +other country is, or can be; that she can mobilize her army in ten +days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other Power can do this. +Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival Powers time to put themselves +in readiness, and would, therefore, be a great disadvantage to Germany." +Here is what I should call the militarist view in all its simplicity and +purity, the obstinate, unquestioning belief that war is inevitable, and +the determination to be ready for it at all costs, even at the cost of +rejecting machinery which if adopted might obviate war. The passage has +often been cited as evidence of the German determination to have war. But +I have not so often seen quoted the exactly parallel declaration made by +Sir John (now Lord) Fisher. "He said that the Navy of Great Britain was +and would remain in a state of complete preparation for war; that a vast +deal depended on prompt action by the Navy; and that the truce afforded by +arbitration proceedings would give other Powers time, which they would not +otherwise have, to put themselves into complete readiness."[3] So far the +"militarist" and the "marinist" adopt exactly the same view. And we may be +sure that if proposals are made after the war to strengthen the machinery +for international arbitration, there will be opposition in this country of +the same kind, and based on the same grounds, as the opposition in Germany. +We cannot on this point condemn Count Münster without also condemning Lord +Fisher. + +Münster's opposition, however, was only the beginning. As the days went on +it became clear that the Kaiser himself had become actively opposed to the +whole idea of arbitration, and was influencing Austria and Italy and Turkey +in that sense. The delegates of all the other countries were in favour of +the very mild application of it which was under consideration. So, however, +be it noted, were all the delegates from Germany, except Count Münster. +And even he was, by now, so far converted that when orders were received +from Germany definitely to refuse co-operation, he postponed the critical +sitting of the committee, and dispatched Professor Zorn to Berlin to lay +the whole matter before the Chancellor. Professor Zorn was accompanied +by the American Dr. Holls, bearing an urgent private letter to Prince +Hohenlohe from Mr. White. The result was that the German attitude was +changed, and the arbitration tribunal was finally established with the +consent and co-operation of the German Government. + +I have thought it worth while to dwell thus fully upon this episode because +it illustrates how misleading it really is to talk of "Germany" and the +"German" attitude. There is every kind of German attitude. The Kaiser is +an unstable and changeable character. His ministers do not necessarily +agree with him, and he does not always get his way. As a consequence of +discussion and persuasion the German opposition, on this occasion, was +overcome. There was nothing, in fact, fixed and final about it. It was +the militarist prejudice, and the prejudice this time yielded to humanity +and reason. + +The subject was taken up again in the Conference of 1907, and once more +Germany was in opposition. The German delegate, Baron Marschall von +Bieberstein, while he was not against compulsory arbitration for certain +selected topics, was opposed to any general treaty. It seems clear that it +was this attitude of Germany that prevented any advance being made beyond +the Convention of 1899. Good reasons, of course, could be given for this +attitude; but they are the kind of reasons that goodwill could have +surmounted. It seems clear that there was goodwill in other Governments, +but not in that of Germany, and the latter lies legitimately under the +prejudice resulting from the position she then took. German critics have +recognized this as freely as critics of other countries. I myself feel no +desire to minimize the blame that attaches to Germany. But Englishmen who +criticize her policy must always ask themselves whether they would support +a British Government that should stand for a general treaty of compulsory +arbitration. + +On the question of limitation of armaments the German Government has +been equally intransigeant. At the Conference of 1899, indeed, no serious +effort was made by any Power to achieve the avowed purpose of the meeting. +And, clearly, if anything was intended to be done, the wrong direction +was taken from the beginning. When the second Conference was to meet it +is understood that the German Government refused participation if the +question of armaments was to be discussed, and the subject did not appear +on the official programme. Nevertheless the British, French, and American +delegates took occasion to express a strong sense of the burden of +armaments, and the urgent need of lessening it. + +The records of the Hague Conferences do, then, clearly show that the German +Government was more obstinately sceptical of any advance in the direction +of international arbitration or disarmament than that of any other Great +Power, and especially of Great Britain or the United States. Whether, in +fact, much could or would have been done, even in the absence of German +opposition, may be doubted. There would certainly have been, in every +country, very strong opposition to any effective measures, and it is only +those who would be willing to see their own Government make a radical +advance in the directions in question who can honestly attack the German +Government. As one of those who believe that peaceable procedure may and +can, and, if civilization is to be preserved, must be substituted for war, +I have a right to express my own condemnation of the German Government, +and I unhesitatingly do so. But I do not infer that therefore Germany was +all the time working up to an aggressive war. It is interesting, in this +connection, to note the testimony given by Sir Edwin Pears to the desire +for good relations between Great Britain and Germany felt and expressed +later by the same Baron Marschall von Bieberstein who was so unyielding +in 1907 on the question of arbitration. When he came to take up the post +of German Ambassador to Great Britain, Sir Edwin reports him as saying:-- + + I have long wanted to be Ambassador to England, because, as you know, + for years I have considered it a misfortune to the world that our two + countries are not really in harmony. I consider that I am here as a man + with a mission, my mission being to bring about a real understanding + between our two nations. + +On this Sir Edwin comments (1915):-- + + I unhesitatingly add that I am convinced he was sincere in what he said. + Of that I have no doubt.[4] + +It must, in fact, be recognized that in the present state of international +relations, the general suspicion and the imminent danger, it requires more +imagination and faith than most public men possess, and more idealism than +most nations have shown themselves to be capable of, to take any radical +step towards reorganization. The armed peace, as we have so often had to +insist, perpetuates itself by the mistrust which it establishes. + +Every move by one Power is taken to be a menace to another, and is +countered by a similar move, which in turn produces a reply. And it is +not easy to say "Who began it?" since the rivalry goes so far back into +the past. What, for instance, is the real truth about the German, French, +and Russian military laws of 1913? Were any or all of them aggressive? Or +were they all defensive? I do not believe it is possible to answer that +question. Looking back from the point of view of 1914, it is natural to +suppose that Germany was already intending war. But that did not seem +evident at the time to a neutral observer, nor even, it would seem, to +the British Foreign Office. Thus the Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister +in London, writes as follows on February 24, 1913:-- + + The English Press naturally wants to throw upon Germany the + responsibility for the new tension which results from its proposals, + and which may bring to Europe fresh occasions of unrest. Many journals + consider that the French Government, in declaring itself ready to impose + three years' service, and in nominating M. Delcassé to St. Petersburg, + has adopted the only attitude worthy of the great Republic in presence + of a German provocation. At the Foreign Office I found a more just and + calm appreciation of the position. They see in the reinforcement of + the German armies less a provocation than the admission of a military + situation weakened by events and which it is necessary to strengthen. + The Government of Berlin sees itself obliged to recognize that it cannot + count, as before, on the support of all the forces of its Austrian ally, + since the appearance in South-east Europe of a new Power, that of the + Balkan allies, established on the very flank of the Dual Empire. Far + from being able to count, in case of need, on the full support of the + Government of Vienna, it is probable that Germany will have to support + Vienna herself. In the case of a European war she would have to make + head against her enemies on two frontiers, the Russian and the French, + and diminish perhaps her own forces to aid the Austrian army. In these + conditions they do not find it surprising that the German Empire should + have felt it necessary to increase the number of its Army Corps. They add + at the Foreign Office that the Government of Berlin had frankly explained + to the Cabinet of Paris the precise motives of its action. + +Whether this is a complete account of the motives of the German Government +in introducing the law of 1913 cannot be definitely established. But the +motives suggested are adequate by themselves to account for the facts. +On the other hand, a part of the cost of the new law was to be defrayed +by a tax on capital. And those who believe that by this year Germany was +definitely waiting an occasion to make war have a right to dwell upon that +fact. I find, myself, nothing conclusive in these speculations. But what +is certain, and to my mind much more important, is the fact that military +preparations evoke counter-preparations, until at last the strain becomes +unbearable. By 1913 it was already terrific. The Germans knew well that +by January 1917 the French and Russian preparations would have reached +their culminating point. But those preparations were themselves almost +unendurable to the French. + +I may recall here the passage already cited from a dispatch of Baron +Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, written in June 1914 (p. 34). +He suspected, as we saw, that the hand of Russia had imposed the three +years' service upon France. + +What Baron Guillaume thought plausible must not the Germans have thought +plausible? Must it not have confirmed their belief in the "inevitability" +of a war--that belief which, by itself, has been enough to produce war +after war, and, in particular, the war of 1870? Must there not have been +strengthened in their minds that particular current among the many that +were making for war? And must not similar suspicions have been active, +with similar results, on the side of France and Russia? The armaments +engender fear, the fear in turn engenders armaments, and in that vicious +circle turns the policy of Europe, till this or that Power precipitates the +conflict, much as a man hanging in terror over the edge of a cliff ends by +losing his nerve and throwing himself over. That is the real lesson of the +rivalry in armaments. That is certain. The rest remains conjecture. + +[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 75, and British White Paper, +No. 160.] + +[Footnote 2: The account that follows is taken from the "Autobiography" of +Andrew D. White, the chairman of the American delegation. See vol. ii., +chap. xiv. and following.] + +[Footnote 3: Mr. Arthur Lee, late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, at +Eastleigh:-- + +"If war should unhappily break out under existing conditions the British +Navy would get its blow in first, before the other nation had time even to +read in the papers that war had been declared" (_The Times_, February 4, +1905). + +"The British fleet is now prepared strategically for every possible +emergency, for we must assume that all foreign naval Powers are possible +enemies" (_The Times_, February 7, 1905).] + +[Footnote 4: Sir Edwin Pears, "Forty Years in Constantinople," p.330.] + + + +12. _Europe since the Decade 1890-1900_. + + +Let us now, endeavouring to bear in our minds the whole situation we have +been analysing, consider a little more particularly the various episodes +and crises of international policy from the year 1890 onwards. I take that +date, the date of Bismarck's resignation, for the reason already given (p. +42). It was not until then that it would have occurred to any competent +observer to accuse Germany of an aggressive policy calculated to disturb +the peace of Europe. A closer _rapprochement_ with England was, indeed, +the first idea of the Kaiser when he took over the reins of power in 1888. +And during the ten years that followed British sympathies were actually +drawn towards Germany and alienated from France.[1] It is well known that +Mr. Chamberlain favoured an alliance with Germany,[2] and that when the +Anglo-Japanese treaty was being negotiated the inclusion of Germany was +seriously considered by Lord Lansdowne. The telegram of the Kaiser to +Kruger in 1895 no doubt left an unpleasant impression in England, and +German feeling, of course, at the time of the Boer War, ran strongly +against England, but so did feeling in France and America, and, indeed, +throughout the civilized world. It was certainly the determination +of Germany to build a great navy that led to the tension between her +and England, and finally to the formation of the Triple Entente, as +a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance. It is 1900, not 1888, still +less 1870, that marks the period at which German policy began to be +a disturbing element in Europe. During the years that followed, the +principal storm-centres in international policy were the Far and Near +East, the Balkans, and Morocco. Events in the Far East, important though +they were, need not detain us here, for their contribution to the present +war was remote and indirect, except so far as concerns the participation of +Japan. Of the situation in the other areas, the tension and its causes and +effects, we must try to form some clear general idea. This can be done even +in the absence of that detailed information of what was going on behind the +scenes for which a historian will have to wait. + +[Footnote 1: The columns of _The Times_ for 1899 are full of attacks upon +France. Once more we may cite from the dispatch of the Comte de Lalaing, +Belgian Minister in London, dated May 24, 1907, commenting on current +or recalling earlier events: "A certain section of the Press, known here +under the name of the Yellow Press, is in great part responsible for the +hostility that exists between the two nations (England and Germany). What, +in fact, can one expect from a journalist like Mr. Harmsworth, now Lord +Northcliffe, proprietor of the _Daily Mail_, _Daily Mirror_, _Daily +Graphic_, _Daily Express_, _Evening News_, and _Weekly Dispatch_, who +in an interview given to the _Matin_ says, 'Yes, we detest the Germans +cordially. They make themselves odious to all Europe. I will never allow +the least thing to be printed in my journal which might wound France, +but I would not let anything be printed which might be agreeable to +Germany.' Yet, in 1899, this same man was attacking the French with the +same violence, wanted to boycott the Paris Exhibition, and wrote: 'The +French have succeeded in persuading John Bull that they are his deadly +enemies. England long hesitated between France and Germany, but she has +always respected the German character, while she has come to despise +France. A cordial understanding cannot exist between England and her +nearest neighbour. We have had enough of France, who has neither courage +nor political sense.'" Lalaing does not give his references, and I +cannot therefore verify his quotations. But they hardly require it. +The _volte-face_ of _The Times_ sufficiently well known. And only too +well known is the way in which the British nation allows its sentiments +for other nations to be dictated to it by a handful of cantankerous +journalists.] + +[Footnote 2: "I may point out to you that, at bottom, the character, the +main character, of the Teuton race differs very slightly indeed from the +character of the Anglo-Saxon (_cheers_), and the same sentiments which +bring us into a close sympathy with the United States of America may be +invoked to bring us into closer sympathy with the Empire of Germany." He +goes on to advocate "a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and +the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race" (see _The Times_, December +1, 1899). This was at the beginning of the Boer war. Two years later, in +October, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain was attacking Germany at Edinburgh. This +date is clearly about the turning-point in British sentiment and policy +towards Germany.] + + + +13. _Germany, and Turkey_. + + +Let us begin with the Near East. The situation there, when Germany began +her enterprise, is thus summed up by a French writer[1]:-- + + Astride across Europe and Asia, the Ottoman Empire represented, for + all the nations of the old continent, the cosmopolitan centre where + each had erected, by dint of patience and ingenuity, a fortress of + interests, influences, and special rights. Each fortress watched + jealously to maintain its particular advantages in face of the rival + enemy. If one of them obtained a concession, or a new favour, immediately + the commanders of the others were seen issuing from their walls to claim + from the Grand Turk concessions or favours which should maintain the + existing balance of power or prestige.... France acted as protector of + the Christians; England, the vigilant guardian of the routes to India, + maintained a privileged political and economic position; Austria-Hungary + mounted guard over the route to Salonica; Russia, protecting the + Armenians and Slavs of the South of Europe, watched over the fate of + the Orthodox. There was a general understanding among them all, tacit + or express, that none should better its situation at the expense of + the others. + +When into this precariously balanced system of conflicting interests +Germany began to throw her weight, the necessary result was a disturbance +of equilibrium. As early as 1839 German ambition had been directed towards +this region by Von Moltke; but it was not till 1873 that the process of +"penetration" began. In that year the enterprise of the Anatolian railway +was launched by German financiers. In the succeeding years it extended +itself as far as Konia; and in 1899 and 1902 concessions were obtained +for an extension to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. It was at this point that +the question became one of international politics. Nothing could better +illustrate the lamentable character of the European anarchy than the +treatment of this matter by the interests and the Powers affected. Here +had been launched on a grandiose scale a great enterprise of civilization. +The Mesopotamian plain, the cradle of civilization, and for centuries +the granary of the world, was to be redeemed by irrigation from the +encroachment of the desert, order and security were to be restored, +labour to be set at work, and science and power to be devoted on a +great scale to their only proper purpose, the increase of life. Here +was an idea fit to inspire the most generous imagination. Here, for all +the idealism of youth and the ambition of maturity, for diplomatists, +engineers, administrators, agriculturists, educationists, an opportunity +for the work of a lifetime, a task to appeal at once to the imagination, +the intellect, and the organizing capacity of practical men, a scheme in +which all nations might be proud to participate, and by which Europe might +show to the backward populations that the power she had won over Nature +was to be used for the benefit of man, and that the science and the arms +of the West were destined to recreate the life of the East. What happened, +in fact? No sooner did the Germans approach the other nations for financial +and political support to their scheme than there was an outcry of jealousy, +suspicion, and rage. All the vested interests of the other States were +up in arms. The proposed railway, it was said, would compete with the +Trans-Siberian, with the French railways, with the ocean route to India, +with the steamboats on the Tigris. Corn in Mesopotamia would bring down +the price of corn in Russia. German trade would oust British and French +and Russian trade. Nor was that all. Under cover of an economic enterprise, +Germany was nursing political ambitions. She was aiming at Egypt and the +Suez Canal, at the control of the Persian Gulf, at the domination of +Persia, at the route to India. Were these fears and suspicions justified? +In the European anarchy, who can say? Certainly the entry of a new economic +competitor, the exploitation of new areas, the opening out of new trade +routes, must interfere with interests already established. That must always +be so in a changing world. But no one would seriously maintain that that is +a reason for abandoning new enterprises. But, it was urged, in fact Germany +will take the opportunity to squeeze out the trade of other nations and +to constitute a German monopoly. Germany, it is true, was ready to give +guarantees of the "open door." But then, what was the value of these +guarantees? She asserted that her enterprise was economic, and had no +ulterior political gains. But who would believe her? Were not German +Jingoes already rejoicing at the near approach of German armies to the +Egyptian frontiers? In the European anarchy all these fears, suspicions, +and rivalries were inevitable. But the British Government at least was +not carried away by them. They were willing that British capital should +co-operate on condition that the enterprise should be under international +control. They negotiated for terms which would give equal control to +Germany, England, and France. They failed to get these terms, why has not +been made public. But Lord Cranborne, then Under-Secretary of State, said +in the House of Commons that "the outcry which was made in this matter--I +think it a very ill-informed outcry--made it exceedingly difficult for us +to get the terms we required."[2] And Sir Clinton Dawkins wrote in a letter +to Herr Gwinner, the chief of the Deutsche Bank: "The fact is that the +business has become involved in politics here, and has been sacrificed +to the very violent and bitter feeling against Germany exhibited by the +majority of newspapers and shared in by a large number of people."[3] +British co-operation, therefore, failed, as French and Russian had failed. +The Germans, however, persevered with their enterprise, now a purely +German one, and ultimately with success. Their differences with Russia +were arranged by an agreement about the Turko-Persian railways signed in +1911. An agreement with France, with regard to the railways of Asiatic +Turkey, was signed in February 1914, and one with England (securing our +interests on the Persian Gulf) in June of the same year. Thus just before +the war broke out this thorny question had, in fact, been settled to the +satisfaction of all the Powers concerned. And on this two comments may be +made. First, that the long friction, the press campaign, the rivalry of +economic and political interests, had contributed largely to the European +tension. Secondly, that in spite of that, the question did get settled, +and by diplomatic means. On this subject, at any rate, war was not +"inevitable." Further, it seems clear that the British Government, +so far from "hemming-in" Germany in this matter, were ready from the +first to accept, if not to welcome, her enterprise, subject to their +quite legitimate and necessary preoccupation with their position on +the Persian Gulf. It was the British Press and what lay behind it that +prevented the co-operation of British capital. Meantime the economic +penetration of Asia Minor by Germany had been accompanied by a political +penetration at Constantinople. Already, as early as 1898, the Kaiser had +announced at Damascus that the "three hundred millions of Mussulmans who +live scattered over the globe may be assured that the German Emperor will +be at all times their friend." + +This speech, made immediately after the Armenian massacres, has been very +properly reprobated by all who are revolted at such atrocities. But the +indignation of Englishmen must be tempered by shame when they remember +that it was their own minister, still the idol of half the nation, who +reinstated Turkey after the earlier massacres in Bulgaria and put back +the inhabitants of Macedonia for another generation under the murderous +oppression of the Turks. The importance of the speech in the history of +Europe is that it signalled the advent of German influence in the Near +East. That influence was strengthened on the Bosphorus after the Turkish +revolution of 1908, in spite of the original Anglophil bias of the Young +Turks, and as some critics maintain, in consequence of the blundering +of the British representatives. The mission of Von der Goltz in 1908 +and that of Liman von Sanders in 1914 put the Turkish army under German +command, and by the outbreak of the war German influence was predominant +in Constantinople. This political influence was, no doubt, used, and +intended to be used, to further German economic schemes. Germany, in +fact, had come in to play the same game as the other Powers, and had +played it with more skill and determination. She was, of course, here as +elsewhere, a new and disturbing force in a system of forces which already +had difficulty in maintaining a precarious equilibrium. But to be a new and +disturbing force is not to commit a crime. Once more the real culprit was +not Germany nor any other Power. The real culprit was the European anarchy. + +[Footnote 1: Pierre Albin, "D'Agadir à Serajevo," p. 81.] + +[Footnote 2: _Hansard_, 1903, vol. 126, p. 120.] + +[Footnote 3: _Nineteenth Century_, June 1909, vol. 65, p. 1090.] + + + +14. _Austria and the Balkans_. + + +I turn now to the Balkan question. This is too ancient and too complicated +to be even summarized here. But we must remind ourselves of the main +situation. Primarily, the Balkan question is, or rather was, one between +subject Christian populations and the Turks. But it has been complicated, +not only by the quarrels of the subject populations among themselves, but +by the rival ambitions and claims of Russia and Austria. The interest of +Russia in the Balkans is partly one of racial sympathy, partly one of +territorial ambition, for the road to Constantinople lies through Rumania +and Bulgaria. It is this territorial ambition of Russia that has given +occasion in the past to the intervention of the Western Powers, for until +recently it was a fixed principle, both of French and British policy, to +keep Russia out of the Mediterranean. Hence the Crimean War, and hence +the disastrous intervention of Disraeli after the treaty of San Stefano +in 1878--an intervention which perpetuated for years the Balkan hell. +The interest of Austria in the peninsula depends primarily on the fact +that the Austrian Empire contains a large Slav population desiring its +independence, and that this national ambition of the Austrian Slavs finds +in the independent kingdom of Serbia its natural centre of attraction. The +determination of Austria to retain her Slavs as unwilling citizens of her +Empire brings her also into conflict with Russia, so far as Russia is the +protector of the Slavs. The situation, and the danger with which it is +pregnant, may be realized by an Englishman if he will suppose St. George's +Channel and the Atlantic to be annihilated, and Ireland to touch, by a land +frontier, on the one side Great Britain, on the other the United States. +The friction and even the warfare which might have arisen between these two +great Powers from the plots of American Fenians may readily be imagined. +Something of that kind is the situation of Austria in relation to Serbia +and her protector, Russia. Further, Austria fears the occupation by any +Slav State of any port on the coast line of the Adriatic, and herself +desires a port on the Aegean. Add to this the recent German dream of the +route from Berlin to Bagdad, and the European importance of what would +otherwise be local disputes among the Balkan States becomes apparent. + +During the period we are now considering the Balkan factor first came into +prominence with the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina in +1908. Those provinces, it will be remembered, were handed over to Austrian +protection at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Austria went in and policed +the country, much as England went in and policed Egypt, and, from the +material point of view, with similarly successful results. But, like +England in Egypt, Austria was not sovereign there. Formal sovereignty +still rested with the Turk. In 1909, during the Turkish revolution, +Austria took the opportunity to throw off that nominal suzerainty. +Russia protested, Austria mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro, +and war seemed imminent. But the dramatic intervention of Germany "in +shining armour" on the side of her ally resulted in a diplomatic victory +for the Central Powers. Austria gained her point, and war, for the moment, +was avoided. But such diplomatic victories are dangerous. Russia did not +forget, and the events of 1909 were an operative cause in the catastrophe +of 1914. In acting as she did in this matter Austria-Hungary defied the +public law of Europe, and Germany supported her in doing so. + +The motives of Germany in taking this action are thus described, and +probably with truth, by Baron Beyens: "She could not allow the solidity +of the Triple Alliance to be shaken: she had a debt of gratitude to pay +to her ally, who had supported her at the Congress of Algeciras. Finally, +she believed herself to be the object of an attempt at encirclement by +France, England, and Russia, and was anxious to show that the gesture of +putting her hand to the sword was enough to dispel the illusions of her +adversaries."[1] These are the kind of reasons that all Powers consider +adequate where what they conceive to be their interests are involved. From +any higher, more international point of view, they are no reasons at all. +But in such a matter no Power is in a position to throw the first stone. +The whole episode is a classical example for the normal working of the +European anarchy. Austria-Hungary was primarily to blame, but Germany, who +supported her, must take her share. The other Powers of Europe acquiesced +for the sake of peace, and they could probably do no better. There will +never be any guarantee for the public law of Europe until there is a public +tribunal and a public force to see that its decisions are carried out. + +The next events of importance in this region were the two Balkan wars. +We need not here go into the causes and results of these, except so far +as to note that, once more, the rivalry of Russia and Austria played a +disastrous part. It was the determination of Austria not to give Serbia +access to the Adriatic that led Serbia to retain territories assigned by +treaty to Bulgaria, and so precipitated the second Balkan war; for that war +was due to the indignation caused in Bulgaria by the breach of faith, and +is said to have been directly prompted by Austria. The bad part played by +Austria throughout this crisis is indisputable. But it must be observed +that, by general admission, Germany throughout worked hand in hand with +Sir Edward Grey to keep the peace of Europe, which, indeed, otherwise +could not have been kept. And nothing illustrates this better than that +episode of 1913 which is sometimes taken to throw discredit upon Germany. +The episode was thus described by the Italian minister, Giolitti: "On the +9th of August, 1913, about a year before the war broke out, I, being then +absent from Rome, received from my colleague, San Giuliano, the following +telegram: 'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention to +act against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to apply +the _casus foederis_ of the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable. +I intend to join forces with Germany to prevent any such action by Austria, +but it will be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider such +eventual action as defensive, and therefore do not believe that the +_casus foederis_ exists. Please telegraph to Rome if you approve.' + +"I replied that, 'if Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is evident that +the _casus foederis_ does not arise. It is an action that she undertakes on +her own account, since there is no question of defence, as no one thinks +of attacking her. It is necessary to make a declaration in this sense to +Austria in the most formal way, and it is to be wished that German action +may dissuade Austria from her most perilous adventure.'"[2] + +Now this statement shows upon the face of it two things. One, that Austria +was prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European war; the other, +that the Italian ministers joined with Germany to dissuade her. They were +successful. Austria abandoned her project, and war was avoided. The episode +is as discreditable as you like to Austria. But, on the face of it, how +does it discredit Germany? More, of course, may lie behind; but no evidence +has been produced, so far as I am aware, to show that the Austrian project +was approved or supported by her ally. + +The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded the second Balkan War, left +all the parties concerned dissatisfied. But, in particular, it left the +situation between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia more +strained than ever. It was this situation that was the proximate cause of +the present war. For, as we have seen, a quarrel between Austria and Russia +over the Balkans must, given the system of alliances, unchain a European +war. For producing that situation Austria-Hungary was mainly responsible. +The part played by Germany was secondary, and throughout the Balkan wars +German diplomacy was certainly working, with England, for peace. "The +diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse," says Baron Beyens, "applied itself, +above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire for intervention at +the Ballplatz." "The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of Vienna in +its tortuous policy of intrigues at Sofia and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann +said to me at the time, the Imperial Government contented itself with +maintaining its neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from +any intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their quarrels. There is +no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement."[3] + +[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 240.] + +[Footnote 2: It is characteristic of the way history is written in time of +war that M. Yves Guyot, citing Giolitti's statement, omits the references +to Germany. _See_ "Les causes et les consequences de la guerre," p. 101.] + +[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 248, 262.] + + + +15. _Morocco_. + + +Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, Morocco. The salient features +here were, first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the Great Powers, +including, of course, Germany, were parties, and which guaranteed to +the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment; secondly, the interest of +Great Britain to prevent a strong Power from establishing itself opposite +Gibraltar and threatening British control over the Straits; thirdly, the +interest of France to annex Morocco and knit it up with the North African +Empire; fourthly, the new colonial and trading interests of Germany, which, +as she had formally announced, could not leave her indifferent to any new +dispositions of influence or territory in undeveloped countries. For many +years French ambitions in Morocco had been held in check by the British +desire to maintain the _status quo_. But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 +gave France a free hand there in return for the abandonment of French +opposition to the British position in Egypt. The Anglo-French treaty of +1904 affirmed, in the clauses made public, the independence and integrity +of Morocco; but there were secret clauses looking to its partition. By +these the British interest in the Straits was guaranteed by an arrangement +which gave to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibraltar and a +strip on the north-west coast, while leaving the rest of the country to +fall to France. Germany was not consulted while these arrangements were +being made, and the secret clauses of the treaty were, of course, not +communicated to her. But it seems reasonable to suppose that they became +known to, or at least were suspected by, the German Government shortly +after they were adopted.[1] And probably it was this that led to the +dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier,[2] when he announced +that the independence of Morocco was under German protection. The result +was the Conference of Algeciras, at which the independence and integrity of +Morocco was once more affirmed (the clauses looking to its partition being +still kept secret by the three Powers privy to them), and equal commercial +facilities were guaranteed to all the Powers. Germany thereby obtained what +she most wanted, what she had a right to by the treaty of 1880, and what +otherwise might have been threatened by French occupation--the maintenance +of the open door. But the French enterprise was not abandoned. Disputes +with the natives such as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases, +led to fresh military intervention. At the same time, it was difficult to +secure the practical application of the principle of equal commercial +opportunity. An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby +both Powers were to share equally in contracts for public works, was +found in practice not to work. The Germans pressed for its application +to the new railways projected in Morocco. The French delayed, temporized, +and postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position +in Morocco. The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez. +Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the capital +(a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it +clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the country. The patience +of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir. +There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the +Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby Germany recognized a +French protectorate in Morocco in return for concessions of territory +in the French Congo. These are the bare facts of the Moroccan episode. +Much, of course, is still unrevealed, particularly as to the motives and +intentions of the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for instance, intend to +seize a share of Morocco when she sent the _Panther_ to Agadir? And was +that the reason of the vigour of the British intervention? Possibly, but +by no means certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Germany +had that intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between +France and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption +of Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of +Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the +French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy, +but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such +a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in +all the parties concerned. + +The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length, +with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book "Morocco in Diplomacy." +The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various +Powers. But I do not believe that any instructed and impartial student +will accept what appears to be the current English view, that the action +of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without excuse, +and that the other Powers were acting throughout justly, honestly, and +straightforwardly. + +The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a painful +impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war. Thus Baron +Beyens writes:-- + + The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard another + war as a necessary evil.[4] + +And again:-- + + The pacific settlement of the conflict of 1911 gave a violent impulse to + the war party in Germany, to the propaganda of the League of Defence and + the Navy League, and a greater force to their demands. To their dreams + of hegemony and domination the desire for revenge against France now + mingled its bitterness. A diplomatic success secured in an underground + struggle signified nothing. War, war in the open, that alone, in the eyes + of this rancorous tribe, could settle definitely the Moroccan question by + incorporating Morocco and all French Africa in the colonial empire they + hoped to create on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the heart of + the Black Continent.[5] + +This we may take to be a correct description of the attitude of the +Pangermans. But there is no evidence that it was that of the nation. +We have seen also that Baron Beyens' impression of the attitude of the +German people, even after the Moroccan affair, was of a general desire +for peace.[6] The crisis had been severe, but it had been tided over, and +the Governments seem to have made renewed efforts to come into friendly +relations. In this connection the following dispatch of Baron Beyens (June +1912) is worth quoting:-- + + After the death of Edward VII, the Kaiser, as well as the Crown Prince, + when they returned from England, where they had been courteously + received, were persuaded that the coldness in the relations of the + preceding years was going to yield to a cordial intimacy between the + two Courts and that the causes of the misunderstanding between the two + peoples would vanish with the past. His disillusionment, therefore, was + cruel when he saw the Cabinet of London range itself last year on the + side of France. But the Kaiser is obstinate, and has not abandoned the + hope of reconquering the confidence of the English.[7] + +This dispatch is so far borne out by the facts that in the year succeeding +the Moroccan crisis a serious attempt was made to improve Anglo-German +relations, and there is no reason to doubt that on both sides there was +a genuine desire for an understanding. How that understanding failed has +already been indicated.[8] But even that failure did not ruin the relations +between the two Powers. In the Balkan crisis, as we have seen and as is +admitted on both sides, England and Germany worked together for peace. And +the fact that a European conflagration was then avoided, in spite of the +tension between Russia and Austria, is a strong proof that the efforts of +Sir Edward Grey were sincerely and effectively seconded by Germany.[9] + +[Footnote 1: See "Morocco in Diplomacy," Chap. XVI. A dispatch written by +M. Leghait, the Belgian minister in Paris, on May 7, 1905, shows that +rumour was busy on the subject. The secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish +treaty were known to him, and these provided for an eventual partition of +Morocco between France and Spain. He doubted whether there were secret +clauses in the Anglo-French treaty--"but it is supposed that there is a +certain tacit understanding by which England would leave France sufficient +liberty of action in Morocco under the reserve of the secret clauses of the +Franco-Spanish arrangement, clauses if not imposed yet at least strongly +supported by the London Cabinet." + +We know, of course, now, that the arrangement for the partition was +actually embodied in secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty.] + +[Footnote 2: According to M. Yves Guyot, when the Kaiser was actually on +his way to Tangier, he telegraphed from Lisbon to Prince Bülow abandoning +the project. Prince Bülow telegraphed back insisting, and the Kaiser +yielded.] + +[Footnote 3: See Bourdon, "L'Enigme Allemande," Chap. II. This account, by +a Frenchman, will not be suspected of anti-French or pro-German bias, and +it is based on French official records.] + +[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 216.] + +[Footnote 5: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 235.] + +[Footnote 6: See above, p. 63.] + +[Footnote 7: This view is reaffirmed by Baron Beyens in "L'Allemagne avant +la guerre," p. 29.] + +[Footnote 8: See above, p. 79.] + +[Footnote 9: Above, p. 111.] + + + +16. _The Last Years_. + + +We have reached, then, the year 1913, and the end of the Balkan wars, +without discovering in German policy any clear signs of a determination +to produce a European war. We have found all the Powers, Germany included, +contending for territory and trade at the risk of the peace of Europe; we +have found Germany successfully developing her interests in Turkey; we have +found England annexing the South African republics, France Morocco, Italy +Tripoli; we have found all the Powers stealing in China, and in all these +transactions we have found them continually on the point of being at one +another's throats. Nevertheless, some last instinct of self-preservation +has enabled them, so far, to pull up in time. The crises had been overcome +without a war. Yet they had, of course, produced their effects. Some +statesmen probably, like Sir Edward Grey, had had their passion for +peace confirmed by the dangers encountered. In others, no doubt, an +opposite effect had been produced, and very likely by 1913 there were +prominent men in Europe convinced that war must come, and manoeuvring +only that it should come at the time and occasion most favourable to +their country. That, according to M. Cambon, was now the attitude of +the German Emperor. M. Cambon bases this view on an alleged conversation +between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians.[1] The conversation has +been denied by the German official organ, but that, of course, is no +proof that it did not take place, and there is nothing improbable in +what M. Cambon narrates. + +The conversation is supposed to have occurred in November 1913, at a +time when, as we have seen,[2] there was a distinct outburst in France +of anti-German chauvinism, and when the arming and counter-arming of that +year had exasperated opinion to an extreme degree. The Kaiser is reported +to have said that war between Germany and France was inevitable. If he did, +it is clear from the context that he said it in the belief that French +chauvinism would produce war. For the King of the Belgians, in replying, +is stated to have said that it was "a travesty, of the French Government +to interpret it in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the +sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible +spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators." It should be observed +also that this supposed attitude on the part of the Kaiser is noted as a +change, and that he is credited with having previously stood for peace +against the designs of the German Jingoes. His personal influence, says +the dispatch, "had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of +peace." The fact of a change of mind in the Kaiser is accepted also by +Baron Beyens. + +Whatever may be the truth in this matter, neither the German nor the French +nor our own Government can then have abandoned the effort at peaceable +settlement. For, in fact, by the summer of 1914, agreements had been made +between the Great Powers which settled for the time being the questions +immediately outstanding. It is understood that a new partition of African +territory had been arranged to meet the claims and interests of Germany, +France, and England alike. The question of the Bagdad railway had been +settled, and everything seemed to favour the maintenance of peace, when, +suddenly, the murder of the Archduke sprang upon a dismayed Europe the +crisis that was at last to prove fatal. The events that followed, so far +as they can be ascertained from published documents, have been so fully +discussed that it would be superfluous for me to go over the ground again +in all its detail. But I will indicate briefly what appear to me to be the +main points of importance in fixing the responsibility for what occurred. + +First, the German view, that England is responsible for the war because she +did not prevent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as childish, if it +is not simply sophistical. The German Powers deliberately take an action +which the whole past history of Europe shows must almost certainly lead to +a European war, and they then turn round upon Sir Edward Grey and put the +blame on him because he did not succeed in preventing the consequences of +their own action. "He might have kept Russia out." Who knows whether he +might? What we do know is that it was Austria and Germany who brought her +in. The German view is really only intelligible upon the assumption that +Germany has a right to do what she pleases and that the Powers that stand +in her way are by definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordinary +attitude that has been one of the factors for making war in Europe. + +Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward +Grey. It is, indeed, possible, as it is always possible after the event, to +suggest that some other course might have been more successful in avoiding +war. But that is conjecture, I, at any rate, am convinced, as I believe +every one outside Germany is convinced, that Sir Edward Grey throughout the +negotiations had one object only--to avoid, if he could, the catastrophe of +war. + +Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is perfectly clear. She was determined +now, as in 1913, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, at the risk of a +European war. Her guilt is clear and definite, and it is only the fact that +we are not directly fighting her with British troops that has prevented +British opinion from fastening upon it as the main occasion of the war. + +But this time, quite clearly, Austria was backed by Germany. Why this +change in German policy? So far as the Kaiser himself is concerned, +there can be little doubt that a main cause was the horror he felt +at the assassination of the Archduke. The absurd system of autocracy +gives to the emotional reactions of an individual a preposterous weight +in determining world-policy; and the almost insane feeling of the Kaiser +about the sanctity of crowned heads was no doubt a main reason why Germany +backed Austria in sending her ultimatum to Serbia. According to Baron +Beyens, on hearing the news of the murder of the Archduke the Kaiser +changed colour, and exclaimed: "All the effort of my life for twenty-five +years must be begun over again!"[3] A tragic cry which indicates, what I +personally believe to be the case, that it has been the constant effort of +the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe, and that he foresaw now that he +would no longer be able to resist war. + +So far, however, it would only be the war between Austria and Serbia +that the Kaiser would be prepared to sanction. He might hope to avoid +the European war. And, in fact, there is good reason to suppose that +both he and the German Foreign Office did cherish that hope or delusion. +They had bluffed Russia off in 1908. They had the dangerous idea that +they might bluff her off again. In this connection Baron Beyens records +a conversation with his colleague, M. Bollati, the Italian Ambassador +at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that + + at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of + the official assurances exchanged quite recently between the Tsar and + M. Poincaré, as to the complete preparations of the armies of the two + allies, was not in a position to sustain a European war and would not + dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure. + +Baron Beyens continues:-- + + At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face a European war + prevailed not only in the official world and in society, but among + all the manufacturers who specialized in the construction of armaments. + M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an opinion, announced + on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the + Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of the German + army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly on the + part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to make war + on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4] + +But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am inclined +to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just suggested, +there were other and more important factors to be considered. It appears +almost certain that at some point in the crisis the control of the +situation was taken out of the hands of the civilians by the military. +The position of the military is not difficult to understand. They believed, +as professional soldiers usually do, in the "inevitability" of war, and +they had, of course, a professional interest in making war. Their attitude +may be illustrated from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince +Lichnowsky in 1912[5]: "The soldiers think about war. It is their business +and their duty. They tell us that the German army, is in good order, that +the Russian army has not completed its organization, that it would be a +good moment ... but for twenty years they have been saying the same thing," +The passage is significant. It shows us exactly what it is we have to dread +in "militarism." The danger in a military State is always that when a +crisis comes the soldiers will get control, as they seem to have done on +this occasion. From their point of view there was good reason. They knew +that France and Russia, on a common understanding, were making enormous +military preparations; they knew that these preparations would mature by +the beginning of 1917; they knew that Germany would fight then at a less +advantage; they believed she would then have to fight, and they said, +"Better fight now." The following dispatch of Baron Beyens, dated July +26th, may probably be taken as fairly representing their attitude:-- + + To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which + prevails in the German General Staff, that war with France and Russia is + unavoidable and near, an _opinion which the Emperor has been induced to + share_. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and Pangerman party, + might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which + are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again + present themselves for some time. Germany has finished the strengthening + of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the other hand, + she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments + with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The Wehrbeitrag + has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has + demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the + mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her + military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for several + years: at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its + deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency + in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is this arm that will decide + the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two + years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from + France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish + quarrels.[6] + +It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have been in +the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other hand, as +late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign Office had +been working throughout for peace. Describing an interview he had had +on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:-- + + From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann + spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department for + Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had been + on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that + its views and counsels had not prevailed... A superior power intervened + to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to + Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet + was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the + war.[7] + +Why was that ultimatum sent? According to the German apologists, it +was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the +critical moment, and so made war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt +that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by +mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed +out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at +Petrograd to his Government:-- + + As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian + troops, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the + Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that + nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of + diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military consideration + of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that + button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of + control.[8] + +On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized +against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had +mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case. Moreover, +in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe +that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to +Germany. However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his +soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger. We do not +definitely know. What we do know is, that it was the German ultimatum that +precipitated the war. + +We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last moment the +German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:-- + + As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg by noon the next day + [after the dispatch of the German ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann + (I have it from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the Kaiser to + prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, and to persuade + his Majesty to wait till the following day. It was the last effort of + their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. Their + efforts were broken against the irreducible obstinacy of the Minister of + War and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the disastrous + consequences of a delay of twenty-four hours.[10] + +[Footnote 1: French Yellow Book, No. 6. In "L'Allemagne avant la guerre" +(p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this conversation was held at Potsdam on +November 5th or 6th; the Kaiser said that war between Germany and France +was "inevitable and near." Baron Beyens, presumably, is the authority from +whom M. Cambon derives his information.] + +[Footnote 2: Above, p. 25.] + +[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 273.] + +[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 280 seq.] + +[Footnote 5: See "L'Enigme Allemande," p. 96.] + +[Footnote 6: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8.] + +[Footnote 7: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52.] + +[Footnote 8: Austrian Red Book, No. 28.] + +[Footnote 9: See Chapter 14.] + +[Footnote 10: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 301.] + + + +17. _The Responsibility and the Moral_. + + +It will be seen from this brief account that so far as the published +evidence goes I agree with the general view outside Germany that the +responsibility for the war at the last moment rests with the Powers of +Central Europe. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which there can be +no reasonable doubt was known to and approved by the German Government, +was the first crime. And it is hardly palliated by the hope, which no +well-informed men ought to have entertained, that Russia could be kept +out and the war limited to Austria and Serbia. The second crime was the +German ultimatum to Russia and to France. I have no desire whatever to +explain away or palliate these clear facts. But it was not my object in +writing this pamphlet to reiterate a judgment which must already be that +of all my readers. What I have wanted to do is to set the tragic events of +those few days of diplomacy in their proper place in the whole complex of +international politics. And what I do dispute with full conviction is the +view which seems to be almost universally held in England, that Germany +had been pursuing for years past a policy of war, while all the other +Powers had been pursuing a policy of peace. The war finally provoked by +Germany was, I am convinced, conceived as a "preventive war." And that +means that it was due to the belief that if Germany did not fight then +she would be compelled to fight at a great disadvantage later. I have +written in vain if I have not convinced the reader that the European +anarchy inevitably provokes that state of mind in the Powers, and that +they all live constantly under the threat of war. To understand the +action of those who had power in Germany during the critical days it +is necessary to bear in mind all that I have brought into relief in +the preceding pages: the general situation, which grouped the Powers +of the Entente against those of the Triple Alliance; the armaments and +counter-armaments; the colonial and economic rivalry; the racial and +national problems in South-East Europe; and the long series of previous +crises, in each case tided over, but leaving behind, every one of them, +a legacy of fresh mistrust and fear, which made every new crisis worse +than the one before. I do not palliate the responsibility of Germany for +the outbreak of war. But that responsibility is embedded in and conditioned +by a responsibility deeper and more general--the responsibility of all the +Powers alike for the European anarchy. + +If I have convinced the reader of this he will, I think, feel no difficulty +in following me to a further conclusion. Since the causes of this war, and +of all wars, lie so deep in the whole international system, they cannot be +permanently removed by the "punishment" or the "crushing" or any other +drastic treatment of any Power, let that Power be as guilty as you please. +Whatever be the issue of this war, one thing is certain: it will bring no +lasting peace to Europe unless it brings a radical change both in the +spirit and in the organization of international politics. + +What that change must be may be deduced from the foregoing discussion of +the causes of the war. The war arose from the rivalry of States in the +pursuit of power and wealth. This is universally admitted. Whatever be the +diversities of opinion that prevail in the different countries concerned, +nobody pretends that the war arose out of any need of civilization, out of +any generous impulse or noble ambition. It arose, according to the popular +view in England, solely and exclusively out of the ambition of Germany to +seize territory and power. It arose, according to the popular German view, +out of the ambition of England to attack and destroy the rising power and +wealth of Germany. Thus to each set of belligerents the war appears as one +forced upon them by sheer wickedness, and from neither point of view has +it any kind of moral justification. These views, it is true, are both +too simple for the facts. But the account given in the preceding pages, +imperfect as it is, shows clearly, what further knowledge will only make +more explicit, that the war proceeded out of rivalry for empire between all +the Great Powers in every part of the world. The contention between France +and Germany for the control of Morocco, the contention between Russia and +Austria for the control of the Balkans, the contention between Germany and +the other Powers for the control of Turkey--these were the causes of the +war. And this contention for control is prompted at once by the desire for +power and the desire for wealth. In practice the two motives are found +conjoined. But to different minds they appeal in different proportions. +There is such a thing as the love of power for its own sake. It is known in +individuals, and it is known in States, and it is the most disastrous, if +not the most evil, of the human passions. The modern German philosophy of +the State turns almost exclusively upon this idea; and here, as elsewhere, +by giving to a passion an intellectual form, the Germans have magnified +its force and enhanced its monstrosity. But the passion itself is not +peculiar to Germans, nor is it only they to whom it is and has been a +motive of State. Power has been the fetish of kings and emperors from the +beginning of political history, and it remains to be seen whether it will +not continue to inspire democracies. The passion for empire ruined the +Athenian democracy, no less than the Spartan or the Venetian oligarchy, +or the Spain of Philip II, or the France of the Monarchy and the Empire. +But it still makes its appeal to the romantic imagination. Its intoxication +has lain behind this war, and it will prompt many others if it survives, +when the war is over, either in the defeated or the conquering nations. +It is not only the jingoism of Germany that Europe has to fear. It is +the jingoism that success may make supreme in any country that may be +victorious. + +But while power may be sought for its own sake, it is commonly sought +by modern States as a means to wealth. It is the pursuit of markets and +concessions and outlets for capital that lies behind the colonial policy +that leads to wars. States compete for the right to exploit the weak, and +in this competition Governments are prompted or controlled by financial +interests. The British went to Egypt for the sake of the bondholders, the +French to Morocco for the sake of its minerals and wealth. In the Near East +and the Far it is commerce, concessions, loans that have led to the rivalry +of the Powers, to war after war, to "punitive expeditions" and--irony of +ironies!--to "indemnities" exacted as a new and special form of robbery +from peoples who rose in the endeavour to defend themselves against +robbery. The Powers combine for a moment to suppress the common victim, +the next they are at one another's throats over the spoil. That really is +the simple fact about the quarrels of States over colonial and commercial +policy. So long as the exploitation of undeveloped countries is directed by +companies having no object in view except dividends, so long as financiers +prompt the policy of Governments, so long as military expeditions, leading +up to annexations, are undertaken behind the back of the public for reasons +that cannot be avowed, so long will the nations end with war, where they +have begun by theft, and so long will thousands and millions of innocent +and generous lives, the best of Europe, be thrown away to no purpose, +because, in the dark, sinister interests have been risking the peace +of the world for the sake of money in their pockets. + +It is these tremendous underlying facts and tendencies that suggest the +true moral of this war. It is these that have to be altered if we are to +avoid future wars on a scale as great. + + + +18. _The Settlement_. + + +And now, with all this in our minds, let us turn to consider the vexed +question of the settlement after the war. There lies before the Western +world the greatest of all choices, the choice between destruction and +salvation. But that choice does not depend merely on the issue of the +war. It depends upon what is done or left undone by the co-operation of +all when the war does at last stop. Two conceptions of the future are +contending in all nations. One is the old bad one, that which has presided +hitherto at every peace and prepared every new war. It assumes that the +object of war is solely to win victory, and the object of victory solely +to acquire more power and territory. On this view, if the Germans win, they +are to annex territory east and west: Belgium and half France, say the more +violent; the Baltic provinces of Russia, strategic points of advantage, say +the more moderate. On the other hand, if the Allies win, the Allies are to +divide the German colonies, the French are to regain Alsace-Lorraine, and, +as the jingoes add, they are to take the whole of the German provinces on +the left bank of the Rhine, and even territory beyond it. The Italians are +to have not only Italia Irredenta but hundreds of thousands of reluctant +Slavs in Dalmatia; the Russians Constantinople, and perhaps Posen and +Galicia. Further, such money indemnities are to be taken as it may prove +possible to exact from an already ruined foe; trade and commerce with +the enemy is to be discouraged or prohibited; and, above all, a bitter +and unforgiving hatred is to reign for ever between the victor and the +vanquished. This is the kind of view of the settlement of Europe that is +constantly appearing in the articles and correspondence of the Press of all +countries. Ministers are not as careful as they should be to repudiate it. +The nationalist and imperialist cliques of all nations endorse it. It is, +one could almost fear, for something like this that the peoples are being +kept at war, and the very existence of civilization jeopardized. + +Now, whether anything of this kind really can be achieved by the war, +whether there is the least probability that either group of Powers can +win such a victory as would make the programme on either side a reality, +I will not here discuss. The reader will have his own opinion. What I am +concerned with is the effect any such solution would have upon the future +of Europe. Those who desire such a close may be divided into two classes. +The one frankly believes in war, in domination, and in power. It accepts +as inevitable, and welcomes as desirable, the perpetual armed conflict of +nations for territory and trade. It does not believe in, and it does not +want, a durable peace. It holds that all peace is, must be, and ought to +be, a precarious and regrettable interval between wars. I do not discuss +this view. Those who hold it are not accessible to argument, and can only +be met by action. There are others, however, who do think war an evil, who +do want a durable peace, but who genuinely believe that the way indicated +is the best way to achieve it. With them it is permitted to discuss, and it +should be possible to do so without bitterness or rage on either side. For +as to the end, there is agreement; the difference of opinion is as to the +means. The position taken is this: The enemy deliberately made this war of +aggression against us, without provocation, in order to destroy us. If it +had not been for this wickedness there would have been no war. The enemy, +therefore, must be punished; and his punishment must make him permanently +impotent to repeat the offence. That having been done, Europe will have +durable peace, for there will be no one left able to break it who will +also want to break it. Now, I believe all this to be demonstrably a +miscalculation. It is contradicted both by our knowledge of the way +human nature works and by the evidence of history. In the first place, +wars do not arise because only one nation or group of nations is wicked, +the others being good. For the actual outbreak of this war, I believe, as +I have already said, that a few powerful individuals in Austria and in +Germany were responsible. But the ultimate causes of war lie much deeper. +In them all States are implicated. And the punishment, or even the +annihilation, of any one nation would leave those causes still subsisting. +Wipe out Germany from the map, and, if you do nothing else, the other +nations will be at one another's throats in the old way, for the old +causes. They would be quarrelling, if about nothing else, about the +division of the spoil. While nations continue to contend for power, +while they refuse to substitute law for force, there will continue to +be wars. And while they devote the best of their brains and the chief +of their resources to armaments and military and naval organization, +each war will become more terrible, more destructive, and more ruthless +than the last. This is irrefutable truth. I do not believe there is a +man or woman able to understand the statement who will deny it. + +In the second place, the enemy nation cannot, in fact, be annihilated, +nor even so far weakened, relatively to the rest, as to be incapable of +recovering and putting up another fight. The notions of dividing up Germany +among the Allies, or of adding France and the British Empire to Germany, +are sheerly fantastic. There will remain, when all is done, the defeated +nations--if, indeed, any nation be defeated. Their territories cannot be +permanently occupied by enemy troops; they themselves cannot be permanently +prevented by physical force from building up new armaments. So long as they +want their revenge, they will be able sooner or later to take it. If +evidence of this were wanted, the often-quoted case of Prussia after +Jena will suffice. + +And, in the third place, the defeated nations, so treated, will, in fact, +want their revenge. There seems to be a curious illusion abroad, among the +English and their allies, that not only is Germany guilty of the war, but +that all Germans know it in their hearts; that, being guilty, they will +fully accept punishment, bow patiently beneath the yoke, and become in +future good, harmonious members of the European family. The illusion is +grotesque. There is hardly a German who does not believe that the war was +made by Russia and by England; that Germany is the innocent victim; that +all right is on her side, and all wrong on that of the Allies. If, indeed, +she were beaten, and treated as her "punishers" desire, this belief would +be strengthened, not weakened. In every German heart would abide, deep and +strong, the sense of an iniquitous triumph of what they believe to be wrong +over right, and of a duty to redress that iniquity. Outraged national pride +would be reinforced by the sense of injustice; and the next war, the war of +revenge, would be prepared for, not only by every consideration of interest +and of passion, but by every cogency of righteousness. The fact that the +Germans are mistaken in their view of the origin of the war has really +nothing to do with the case. It is not the truth, it is what men believe +to be the truth, that influences their action. And I do not think any +study of dispatches is going to alter the German view of the facts. + +But it is sometimes urged that the war was made by the German militarists, +that it is unpopular with the mass of the people, and that if Germany is +utterly defeated the people will rise and depose their rulers, become a +true democracy, and join fraternal hands with the other nations of Europe. +That Germany should become a true democracy might, indeed, be as great a +guarantee of peace as it might be that other nations, called democratic, +should really become so in their foreign policy as well as in their +domestic affairs. But what proud nation will accept democracy as a +gift from insolent conquerors? One thing that the war has done, and +one of the worst, is to make of the Kaiser, to every German, a symbol +of their national unity and national force. Just because we abuse their +militarism, they affirm and acclaim it; just because we attack their +governing class, they rally round it. Nothing could be better calculated +than this war to strengthen the hold of militarism in Germany, unless it +be the attempt of her enemies to destroy her militarism by force. For +consider--! In the view we are examining it is proposed, first to kill +the greater part of her combatants, next to invade her territory, destroy +her towns and villages, and exact (for there are those who demand it) +penalties in kind, actual tit for tat, for what Germans have done in +Belgium. It is proposed to enter the capital in triumph. It is proposed +to shear away huge pieces of German territory. And then, when all this +has been done, the conquerors are to turn to the German nation and say: +"Now, all this we have done for your good! Depose your wicked rulers! +Become a democracy! Shake hands and be a good fellow!" Does it not +sound grotesque? But, really, that is what is proposed. + +I have spoken about British and French proposals for the treatment of +Germany. But all that I have said applies, of course, equally to German +proposals of the same kind for the treatment of the conquered Allies. That +way is no way towards a durable peace. If it be replied that a durable +peace is not intended or desired, I have no more to say. If it be replied +that punishment for its own sake is more important than civilization, and +must be performed at all costs--_fiat justitia, ruat coelum_--then, once +more, I have nothing to say. I speak to those, and to those only, who do +desire a durable peace, and who have the courage and the imagination to +believe it to be possible, and the determination to work for it. And to +them I urge that the course I have been discussing cannot lead to their +goal. What can? + + + +19. _The Change Needed_. + + +First, a change of outlook. We must give up, in all nations, this habit +of dwelling on the unique and peculiar wickedness of the enemy. We must +recognize that behind the acts that led up to the immediate outbreak of +war, behind the crimes and atrocities to which the war has led, as wars +always have led, and always will lead--behind all that lies a great complex +of feeling, prejudice, tradition, false theory, in which all nations and +all individuals of all nations are involved. Most men believe, feel, or +passively accept that power and wealth are the objects States ought +to pursue; that in pursuing these objects they are bound by no code of +right in their relations to one another; that law between them is, and +must be, as fragile as a cobweb stretched before the mouth of a cannon; +that force is the only rule and the only determinant of their differences, +and that the only real question is when and how the appeal to force may +most advantageously be made. This philosophy has been expressed with +peculiar frankness and brutality by Germans. But most honest and candid +men, I believe, will agree that that is the way they, too, have been +accustomed to think of international affairs. And if illustration were +wanted, let them remember the kind of triumphant satisfaction with which +the failure of the Hague conferences to achieve any radical results was +generally greeted, and the contemptuous and almost abhorring pity meted +out to the people called "pacifists." Well, the war has come! We see now, +not only guess, what it means. If that experience has not made a deep +impression on every man and woman, if something like a conversion is not +being generally operated, then, indeed, nothing can save mankind from the +hell of their own passions and imbecilities. + +But if otherwise, if that change is going on, then the way to deliverance +is neither difficult nor obscure. It does not lie in the direction of +crushing anybody. It lies in the taking of certain determinations, and +the embodying of them in certain institutions. + +First, the nations must submit to law and to right in the settlement of +their disputes. + +Secondly, they must reserve force for the coercion of the law-breaker; +and that implies that they should construct rules to determine who the +law-breaker is. Let him be defined as the one who appeals to force, instead +of appealing to law and right by machinery duly provided for that purpose, +and the aggressor is immediately under the ban of the civilized world, and +met by an overwhelming force to coerce him into order. In constructing +machinery of this kind there is no intellectual difficulty greater than +that which has confronted every attempt everywhere to substitute order +for force. The difficulty is moral, and lies in the habits, passions, +and wills of men. But it should not be concluded that, if such a moral +change could be operated, there would be no need for the machinery. It +would be as reasonable to say that Governments, law-courts, and police +were superfluous, since, if men were good, they would not require them, +and if they are bad they will not tolerate them. Whatever new need, desire, +and conviction comes up in mankind, needs embodiment in forms before it +can become operative. And, as the separate colonies of America could not +effectively unite until they had formed a Constitution, so will the States +of Europe and the world be unable to maintain the peace, even though all +of them should wish to maintain it, unless they will construct some kind +of machinery for settling their disputes and organizing their common +purposes, and will back that machinery by force. If they will do that +they may construct a real and effective counterpoise to aggression from +any Power in the future. If they will not do it, their precautions against +any one Power will be idle, for it will be from some other Power that the +danger will come. I put it to the reader at the end of this study, which +I have made with all the candour and all the honesty at my disposal, and +which I believe to represent essentially the truth, whether or no he agrees +that the European anarchy is the real cause of European wars, and if he +does, whether he is ready for his part to support a serious effort to end +it. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The European Anarchy, by G. 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For +example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at: + + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234 + +or filename 24689 would be found at: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689 + +An alternative method of locating eBooks: + https://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL + + diff --git a/old/10333-8.zip b/old/10333-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f950651 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10333-8.zip diff --git a/old/10333.txt b/old/10333.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3bb589 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10333.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3221 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The European Anarchy, by G. Lowes Dickinson + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The European Anarchy + +Author: G. Lowes Dickinson + +Release Date: November 29, 2003 [EBook #10333] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY *** + + + + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Tony Towers and PG Distributed Proofreaders + + + + +THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY + +By G. Lowes Dickinson + + + +1916 + + +CONTENTS + + 1. INTRODUCTION + Europe since the Fifteenth Century--Machiavellianism--Empire and the + Balance of Power + + 2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE ENTENTE + Belgian Dispatches of 1905-14. + + 3. GREAT BRITAIN + The Policy of Great Britain--Essentially an Overseas Power + + 4. FRANCE + The Policy of France since 1870--Peace and Imperialism--Conflicting + Elements + + 5. RUSSIA + The Policy of Russia--Especially towards Austria + + 6. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY + The Policy of Austria-Hungary--Especially towards the Balkans + + 7. GERMANY + The Policy of Germany--From 1866 to the Decade 1890-1900--A Change + + 8. OPINION IN GERMANY + German "Romanticism"--New Ambitions. + + 9. OPINION ABOUT GERMANY + Bourdon--Beyens--Cambon--Summary + +10. GERMAN POLICY FROM THE DECADE 1890-1900 + Relation to Great Britain--The Navy. + +11. VAIN ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY + Great Britain's Efforts for Arbitration--Mutual Suspicion + +12. EUROPE SINCE THE DECADE 1890-1900 + +13. GERMANY AND TURKEY + The Bagdad Railway + +14. AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS + +15. MOROCCO + +16. THE LAST YEARS + Before the War--The Outbreak of War + +17. THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL + The Pursuit of Power and Wealth + +18. THE SETTLEMENT + +19. THE CHANGE NEEDED + Change of Outlook and Change of System--An International + League--International Law and Control + + + + +THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY + + + +1. _Introduction_. + + +In the great and tragic history of Europe there is a turning-point that +marks the defeat of the ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptance +of international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of the +sovereign State at the end of the fifteenth century. And it is symbolical +of all that was to follow that at that point stands, looking down the +vista of the centuries, the brilliant and sinister figure of Machiavelli. +From that date onwards international policy has meant Machiavellianism. +Sometimes the masters of the craft, like Catherine de Medici or Napoleon, +have avowed it; sometimes, like Frederick the Great, they have disclaimed +it. But always they have practised it. They could not, indeed, practise +anything else. For it is as true of an aggregation of States as of an +aggregation of individuals that, whatever moral sentiments may prevail, if +there is no common law and no common force the best intentions will be +defeated by lack of confidence and security. Mutual fear and mutual +suspicion, aggression masquerading as defence and defence masquerading as +aggression, will be the protagonists in the bloody drama; and there will +be, what Hobbes truly asserted to be the essence of such a situation, a +chronic state of war, open or veiled. For peace itself will be a latent +war; and the more the States arm to prevent a conflict the more certainly +will it be provoked, since to one or another it will always seem a better +chance to have it now than to have it on worse conditions later. Some +one State at any moment may be the immediate offender; but the main and +permanent offence is common to all States. It is the anarchy which they +are all responsible for perpetuating. + +While this anarchy continues the struggle between States will tend to +assume a certain stereotyped form. One will endeavour to acquire supremacy +over the others for motives at once of security and of domination, the +others will combine to defeat it, and history will turn upon the two poles +of empire and the balance of power. So it has been in Europe, and so it +will continue to be, until either empire is achieved, as once it was +achieved by Rome, or a common law and a common authority is established +by agreement. In the past empire over Europe has been sought by Spain, +by Austria, and by France; and soldiers, politicians, and professors in +Germany have sought, and seek, to secure it now for Germany. On the other +hand, Great Britain has long stood, as she stands now, for the balance of +power. As ambitious, as quarrelsome, and as aggressive as other States, her +geographical position has directed her aims overseas rather than toward +the Continent of Europe. Since the fifteenth century her power has never +menaced the Continent. On the contrary, her own interest has dictated that +she should resist there the enterprise of empire, and join in the defensive +efforts of the threatened States. To any State of Europe that has conceived +the ambition to dominate the Continent this policy of England has seemed +as contrary to the interests of civilization as the policy of the Papacy +appeared in Italy to an Italian patriot like Machiavelli. He wanted Italy +enslaved, in order that it might be united. And so do some Germans now want +Europe enslaved, that it may have peace under Germany. They accuse England +of perpetuating for egotistic ends the state of anarchy. But it was not +thus that Germans viewed British policy when the Power that was to give +peace to Europe was not Germany, but France. In this long and bloody game +the partners are always changing, and as partners change so do views. +One thing only does not change, the fundamental anarchy. International +relations, it is agreed, can only turn upon force. It is the disposition +and grouping of the forces alone that can or does vary. + +But Europe is not the only scene of the conflict between empire and +the balance. Since the sixteenth century the European States have been +contending for mastery, not only over one another, but over the world. +Colonial empires have risen and fallen. Portugal, Spain, Holland, in turn +have won and lost. England and France have won, lost, and regained. In +the twentieth century Great Britain reaps the reward of her European +conflicts in the Empire (wrongly so-called) on which the sun never sets. +Next to her comes France, in Africa and the East; while Germany looks out +with discontented eyes on a world already occupied, and, cherishing the +same ambitions all great States have cherished before her, finds the +time too mature for their accomplishment by the methods that availed in +the past. Thus, not only in Europe but on the larger stage of the world +the international rivalry is pursued. But it is the same rivalry and it +proceeds from the same cause: the mutual aggression and defence of beings +living in a "state of nature." + +Without this historical background no special study of the events that led +up to the present war can be either just or intelligible. The feeling of +every nation about itself and its neighbours is determined by the history +of the past and by the way in which that history is regarded. The picture +looks different from every point of view. Indeed, a comprehension of the +causes of the war could only be fully attained by one who should know, not +only the most secret thoughts of the few men who directly brought it about, +but also the prejudices and preconceptions of the public opinion in each +nation. There is nobody who possesses these qualifications. But in the +absence of such a historian these imperfect notes are set down in the hope +that they may offer a counterpoise to some of the wilder passions that +sweep over all peoples in time of war and threaten to prepare for Europe +a future even worse than its past has been. + + + +2. _The Triple Alliance and the Entente_. + + +First, let us remind ourselves in general of the situation that prevailed +in Europe during the ten years preceding the war. It was in that period +that the Entente between France, Russia, and England was formed and +consolidated, over against the existing Triple Alliance between Germany, +Austria, and Italy. Neither of these combinations was in its origin and +purpose aggressive[1]. + +And, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the relations she entered into +with France and with Russia were directed in each case to the settlement +of long outstanding differences without special reference to the German +Powers. But it is impossible in the European anarchy that any arrangements +should be made between any States which do not arouse suspicion in others. +And the drawing together of the Powers of the Entente did in fact appear +to Germany as a menace. She believed that she was being threatened by an +aggressive combination, just as, on the other hand, she herself seemed to +the Powers of the Entente a danger to be guarded against. This apprehension +on the part of Germany, is sometimes thought to have been mere pretence, +but there is every reason to suppose it to have been genuine. The policy of +the Entente did in fact, on a number of occasions, come into collision with +that of Germany. The arming and counter-arming was continuous. And the very +fact that from the side of the Entente it seemed that Germany was always +the aggressor, should suggest to us that from the other side the opposite +impression would prevail. That, in fact, it did prevail is clear not only +from the constant assertions of German statesmen and of the German Press, +but from contemporary observations made by the representatives of a State +not itself involved in either of the opposing combinations. The dispatches +of the Belgian ambassadors at Berlin, Paris, and London during the years +1905 to 1914[2] show a constant impression that the Entente was a hostile +combination directed against Germany and engineered, in the earlier years, +for that purpose by King Edward VII. This impression of the Belgian +representatives is no proof, it is true, of the real intentions of the +Entente, but it is proof of how they did in fact appear to outsiders. And +it is irrelevant, whether or no it be true, to urge that the Belgians were +indoctrinated with the German view; since precisely the fact that they +could be so indoctrinated would show that the view was on the face of it +plausible. We see, then, in these dispatches the way in which the policy of +the Entente could appear to observers outside it. I give illustrations from +Berlin, Paris, and London. + +On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, writes as +follows:-- + + Call it an alliance, _entente_, or what you will, the grouping of the + Powers arranged by the personal intervention of the King of England + exists, and if it is not a direct and immediate threat of war against + Germany (it would be too much to say that it was that), it constitutes + none the less a diminution of her security. The necessary pacifist + declarations, which, no doubt, will be repeated at Reval, signify very + little, emanating as they do from three Powers which, like Russia and + England, have just carried through successfully, without any motive + except the desire for aggrandizement, and without even a plausible + pretext, wars of conquest in Manchuria and the Transvaal, or which, + like France, is proceeding at this moment to the conquest of Morocco, + in contempt of solemn promises, and without any title except the + cession of British rights, which never existed. + +On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador at London, +writes:-- + + A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow Press, bears to a + great extent the responsibility for the hostile feeling between the two + nations.... It is plain enough that official England is quietly pursuing + a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and that King + Edward has not hesitated to use his personal influence in the service of + this scheme. But it is certainly exceedingly dangerous to poison public + opinion in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible journals. + +Again, on July 28, 1911, in the midst of the Morocco crisis, Baron +Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, writes:-- + + I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of the Emperor William, + in spite of the too frequent exaggeration of some of his gestures. He + will not allow himself to be drawn on farther than he chooses by the + exuberant temperament and clumsy manners of his very intelligent Minister + of Foreign Affairs (Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, in general, less faith in + the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not be sorry to see the + others eat one another up.... As I thought from the beginning, it is in + London that the key to the situation lies. It is there only that it can + become grave. The French will yield on all the points for the sake of + peace. It is not the same with the English, who will not compromise on + certain principles and certain claims. + +[Footnote 1: The alliance between Germany and Austria, which dates from +1879, was formed to guarantee the two States against an attack by Russia. +Its terms are:-- + +"1. If, contrary to what is to be expected and contrary to the sincere +desire of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires +should be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are +bound reciprocally to assist one another with the whole military force +of their Empire, and further not to make peace except conjointly and +by common consent. + +"2. If one of the high contracting Powers should be attacked by another +Power, the other high contracting party engages itself, by the present act, +not only not to support the aggressor against its ally, but at least to +observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the other contracting party. +If, however, in the case supposed the attacking Power should be supported +by Russia, whether by active co-operation or by military measures which +should menace the Power attacked, then the obligation of mutual assistance +with all military forces, as stipulated in the preceding article, would +immediately come into force, and the military operations of the high +contracting parties would be in that case conducted jointly until the +conclusion of peace." + +Italy acceded to the Alliance in 1882. The engagement is defensive. Each of +the three parties is to come to the assistance of the others if attacked by +a third party. + +The treaty of Germany with Austria was supplemented in 1884 by a treaty +with Russia, known as the "Reinsurance Treaty," whereby Germany bound +herself not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. This treaty lapsed +in the year 1890, and the lapse, it is presumed, prepared the way for the +_rapprochement_ between Russia and France. + +The text of the treaty of 1894 between France and Russia has never been +published. It is supposed to be a treaty of mutual defence in case of an +aggressive attack. The Power from whom attack is expected is probably +named, as in the treaty between Germany and Austria. It is probably for +that reason that the treaty was not published. The accession of Great +Britain to what then became known as the "Triple Entente" is determined by +the treaty of 1904 with France, whereby France abandoned her opposition to +the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco; and +by the treaty of 1907 with Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated their +relations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. There is no mention in either +case of an attack, or a defence against attack, by any other Power.] + +[Footnote 2: These were published by the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,_ +and are reprinted under the title "Belgische Aktenstuecke," 1905-14 (Ernst +Siegfried Mittler and Sons, Berlin). Their authenticity, as far as I know, +has not been disputed. On the other hand, it is to be assumed that they +have been very carefully "edited" by the German to make a particular +impression. My view of the policy of Germany or of the Entente is in no +sense based upon them. I adduce them as evidence of contemporary feeling +and opinion.] + + + +3. _Great Britain_. + + +Having established this general fact that a state of mutual suspicion and +fear prevailed between Germany and the Powers of the Triple Entente, let us +next consider the positions and purposes of the various States involved. +First, let us take Great Britain, of which we ought to know most. Great +Britain is the head of an Empire, and of one, in point of territory and +population, the greatest the world has ever seen. This Empire has been +acquired by trade and settlement, backed or preceded by military force. +And to acquire and hold it, it has been necessary to wage war after war, +not only overseas but on the continent of Europe. It is, however, as we +have already noticed, a fact, and a cardinal fact, that since the fifteenth +century British ambitions have not been directed to extending empire over +the continent of Europe. On the contrary, we have resisted by arms every +attempt made by other Powers in that direction. That is what we have meant +by maintaining the "balance of power." We have acted, no doubt, in our own +interest, or in what we thought to be such; but in doing so we have made +ourselves the champions of those European nations that have been threatened +by the excessive power of their neighbours. British imperialism has thus, +for four centuries, not endangered but guaranteed the independence of the +European States. Further, our Empire is so large that we can hardly extend +it without danger of being unable to administer and protect it. We claim, +therefore, that we have neither the need nor the desire to wage wars of +conquest. But we ought not to be surprised if this attitude is not accepted +without reserve by other nations. For during the last half-century we +have, in fact, waged wars to annex Egypt, the Soudan, the South African +Republics, and Burmah, to say nothing of the succession of minor wars +which have given us Zululand, Rhodesia, Nigeria, and Uganda. Odd as it +does, I believe, genuinely seem to most Englishmen, we are regarded on +the Continent as the most aggressive Power in the world, although our +aggression is not upon Europe. We cannot expect, therefore, that our +professions of peaceableness should be taken very seriously by outsiders. +Nevertheless it is, I believe, true that, at any rate during the last +fifteen-years, those professions have been genuine. Our statesmen, of both +parties, have honestly desired and intended to keep the peace of the world. +And they have been assisted in this by a genuine and increasing desire for +peace in the nation. The Liberal Government in particular has encouraged +projects of arbitration and of disarmament; and Sir Edward Grey is probably +the most pacific Minister that ever held office in a great nation. But our +past inevitably discredits, in this respect, our future. And when we +profess peace it is not unnatural that other nations should suspect a +snare. + +Moreover, this desire for peace on our part is conditional upon the +maintenance of the _status quo_ and of our naval supremacy. Our vast +interests in every part of the world make us a factor everywhere to be +reckoned with. East, west, north, and south, no other Power can take a step +without finding us in the path. Those States, therefore, which, unlike +ourselves, are desirous farther to extend their power and influence +beyond the seas, must always reckon with us, particularly if, with that +end in view, by increasing their naval strength they seem to threaten our +supremacy at sea. This attitude of ours is not to be blamed, but it must +always make difficult the maintenance of friendly relations with ambitious +Powers. In the past our difficulties have been mainly with Russia and +France. In recent years they have been with Germany. For Germany, since +1898, for the first time in her history, has been in a position, and has +made the choice, to become a World-Power. For that reason, as well as +to protect her commerce, she has built a navy. And for that reason we, +pursuing our traditional policy of opposing the strongest continental +Power, have drawn away from her and towards Russia and France. We did not, +indeed, enter upon our arrangements with these latter Powers because of +aggressive intentions towards Germany. But the growth of German sea-power +drove us more and more to rely upon the Entente in case it should be +necessary for us to defend ourselves. All this followed inevitably from +the logic of the position, given the European anarchy. I state it for the +sake of exposition, not of criticism, and I do not imagine any reader will +quarrel with my statement. + + + +4. _France_. + + +Let us turn now to France. Since 1870 we find contending there, with +varying fortunes and strength, two opposite currents of sentiment and +policy. One was that of _revanche_ against Germany, inspired by the old +traditions of glory and hegemony, associated with hopes of a monarchist +or imperialistic revolution, and directed, in the first place, to a +recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. The other policy was that of peace abroad +and socialistic transformation at home, inspired by the modern ideals of +justice and fraternity, and supported by the best of the younger generation +of philosophers, poets, and artists, as well as by the bulk of the working +class. Nowhere have these two currents of contemporary aspiration met +and contended as fiercely as in France. The Dreyfus case was the most +striking act in the great drama. But it was not the concluding one. French +militarism, in that affair, was scotched but not killed, and the contest +was never fiercer than in the years immediately preceding the war. The +fighters for peace were the Socialists, under their leader, Jaures, the one +great man in the public life of Europe. While recognizing the urgent need +for adequate national defence, Jaures laboured so to organize it that it +could not be mistaken for nor converted into aggression. He laboured, at +the same time, to remove the cause of the danger. In the year 1913, under +Swiss auspices, a meeting of French and German pacifists was arranged at +Berne. To this meeting there proceeded 167 French deputies and 48 senators. +The Baron d'Estournelles de Constant was president of the French bureau, +and Jaures one of the vice-presidents. The result was disappointing. The +German participation was small and less influential than the French, and +no agreement could be reached on the burning question of Alsace-Lorraine. +But the French Socialists continued, up to the eve of the war, to fight +for peace with an energy, an intelligence, and a determination shown +in no other country. The assassination of Jaures was a symbol of the +assassination of peace; but the assassin was a Frenchman. + +For if, in France, the current for peace ran strong in these latter +years, so did the current for war. French chauvinism had waxed and +waned, but it was never extinguished. After 1870 it centred not only +about Alsace-Lorraine, but also about the colonial expansion which took +from that date a new lease of life in France, as it had done in England +after the loss of the American colonies. Directly encouraged by Bismarck, +France annexed Tunis in 1881. The annexation of Tunis led up at last to +that of Morocco. Other territory had been seized in the Far East, and +France became, next to ourselves, the greatest colonial Power. This policy +could not be pursued without friction, and the principal friction at the +beginning was with ourselves. Once at least, in the Fashoda crisis, the two +countries were on the verge of war, and it was not till the Entente of 1904 +that their relations were adjusted on a basis of give-and-take. But by that +time Germany had come into the colonial field, and the Entente with England +meant new friction with Germany, turning upon French designs in Morocco. In +this matter Great Britain supported her ally, and the incident of Agadir +in 1911 showed the solidity of the Entente. This demonstration no doubt +strengthened the hands of the aggressive elements in France, and later +on the influence of M. Delcasse and M. Poincare was believed in certain +quarters to have given new energy to this direction of French policy. This +tendency to chauvinism was recognized as a menace to peace, and we find +reflections of that feeling in the Belgian dispatches. Thus, for instance, +Baron Guillaume, Belgian minister at Paris, writes on February, 21, 1913, +of M. Poincare:-- + + It is under his Ministry that the military and slightly chauvinistic + instincts of the French people have awakened. His hand can be seen in + this modification; it is to be hoped that his political intelligence, + practical and cool, will save him from all exaggeration in this course. + The notable increase of German armaments which supervenes at the moment + of M. Poincare's entrance at the Elysee will increase the danger of a + too nationalistic orientation of the policy of France. + +Again, on March 3, 1913:-- + + The German Ambassador said to me on Saturday: "The political situation + is much improved in the last forty-eight hours; the tension is generally + relaxed; one may hope for a return to peace in the near future. But what + does not improve is the state of public opinion in France and Germany + with regard to the relations between the two countries. We are persuaded + in Germany that a spirit of chauvinism having revived, we have to fear an + attack by the Republic. In France they express the same fear with regard + to us. The consequence of these misunderstandings is to ruin us both. I + do not know where we are going on this perilous route. Will not a man + appear of sufficient goodwill and prestige to recall every one to reason? + All this is the more ridiculous because, during the crisis we are + traversing, the two Governments have given proof of the most pacific + sentiments, and have continually relied upon one another to avoid + conflicts." + +On this Baron Guillaume comments:-- + + Baron Schoen is perfectly right, I am not in a position to examine German + opinion, but I note every day how public opinion in France becomes more + suspicious and chauvinistic. One meets people who assure one that a war + with Germany in the near future is certain and inevitable. People regret + it, but make up their minds to it.... They demand, almost by acclamation, + an immediate vote for every means of increasing the defensive power of + France. The most reasonable men assert that it is necessary to arm to the + teeth to frighten the enemy and prevent war. + +On April 16th he reports a conversation with M. Pichon, in which the latter +says:-- + + Among us, too, there is a spirit of chauvinism which is increasing, + which I deplore, and against which we ought to react. Half the theatres + in Paris now play chauvinistic and nationalistic pieces. + +The note of alarm becomes more urgent as the days go on. On January 16, +1914, the Baron writes:-- + + I have already had the honour to tell you that it is MM. Poincare, + Delcasse, Millerand and their friends who have invented and pursued the + nationalistic and chauvinistic policy which menaces to-day the peace of + Europe, and of which we have noted the renaissance. It is a danger for + Europe and for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril, which menaces the + peace of Europe to-day; not that I have the right to suppose that the + Government of the Republic is disposed deliberately to trouble the peace, + rather I believe the contrary; but the attitude that the Barthou Cabinet + has taken up is, in my judgment, the determining cause of an excess of + militaristic tendencies in Germany. + +It is clear from these quotations, and it is for this reason alone that +I give them, that France, supported by the other members of the Triple +Entente, could appear, and did appear, as much a menace to Germany as +Germany appeared a menace to France; that in France, as in other countries, +there was jingoism as well as pacifism; and that the inability of French +public opinion to acquiesce in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was an active +factor in the unrest of Europe. Once more I state these facts, I do +not criticize them. They are essential to the comprehension of the +international situation. + + + +5. _Russia_. + + +We have spoken so far of the West. But the Entente between France and +Russia, dating from 1894, brought the latter into direct contact with +Eastern policy. The motives and even the terms of the Dual Alliance are +imperfectly known. Considerations of high finance are supposed to have +been an important factor in it. But the main intention, no doubt, was to +strengthen both Powers in the case of a possible conflict with Germany. The +chances of war between Germany and France were thus definitely increased, +for now there could hardly be an Eastern war without a Western one. Germany +must therefore regard herself as compelled to wage war, if war should come, +on both fronts; and in all her fears or her ambitions this consideration +must play a principal part. Friction in the East must involve friction in +the West, and vice versa. What were the causes of friction in the West we +have seen. Let us now consider the cause of friction in the East. + +The relations of Russia to Germany have been and are of a confused and +complicated character, changing as circumstances and personalities change. +But one permanent factor has been the sympathy between the governing +elements in the two countries. The governing class in Russia, indeed, has +not only been inspired by German ideas, it has been largely recruited +from men of German stock; and it has manifested all the contempt and +hatred which is characteristic of the German bureaucracy for the ideals of +democracy, liberty, and free thought. The two Governments have always been +ready to combine against popular insurrections, and in particular against +every attempt of the Poles to recover their liberty. They have been drawn +and held together by a common interest in tyranny, and the renewal of that +co-operation is one of the dangers of the future. On the other hand, apart +from and in opposition to this common political interest, there exists +between the two nations a strong racial antagonism. The Russian temperament +is radically opposed to the German. The one expresses itself in Panslavism, +the other in Pangermanism. And this opposition of temperament is likely +to be deeper and more enduring than the sympathy of the one autocracy with +the other. But apart from this racial factor, there is in the south-east +an opposition of political ambition. Primarily, the Balkan question is +an Austro-Russian rather than a Russo-German one. Bismarck professed +himself indifferent to the fate of the Balkan peoples, and even avowed a +willingness to see Russia at Constantinople. But recent years have seen, +in this respect, a great change. The alliance between Germany and Austria, +dating from 1879, has become closer and closer as the Powers of the Entente +have drawn together in what appeared to be a menacing combination. It has +been, for some time past, a cardinal principle of German policy to support +her ally in the Balkans, and this determination has been increased by +German ambitions in the East. The ancient dream of Russia to possess +Constantinople has been countered by the new German dream of a hegemony +over the near East based upon the through route from Berlin via Vienna and +Constantinople to Bagdad; and this political opposition has been of late +years the determining factor in the relationship of the two Powers. The +danger of a Russo-German conflict has thus been very great, and since the +Russo-French Entente Germany, as we have already pointed out, has seen +herself menaced on either front by a war which would immediately endanger +both. + +Turning once more to the Belgian dispatches, we find such hints as the +following. On October 24, 1912, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador +to London, writes as follows:-- + + The French Ambassador, who must have special reasons for speaking + thus, has repeated to me several times that the greatest danger for + the maintenance of the peace of Europe consists in the indiscipline and + the personal policy of the Russian agents. They are almost all ardent + Panslavists, and it is to them that must be imputed the responsibility + for the events that are occurring. Beyond a doubt they will make + themselves the secret instigators for an intervention of their country + in the Balkan conflict. + +On November 30, 1912, Baron de Beyens writes from Berlin:-- + + At the end of last week a report was spread in the chancelleries of + Europe that M. Sazonov had abandoned the struggle against the Court + party which wishes to drag Russia into war. + +On June 9, 1914, Baron Guillaume writes from Paris:-- + + Is it true that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has imposed upon this + country [France] the adoption of the law of three years, and would + now bring to bear the whole weight of its influence to ensure its + maintenance? I have not been able to obtain light upon this delicate + point, but it would be all the more serious, inasmuch as the men who + direct the Empire of the Tsars cannot be unaware that the effort thus + demanded of the French nation is excessive, and cannot be long sustained. + Is, then, the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based upon the + conviction that events are so imminent that it will be possible to use + the tool it intends to put into the hands of its ally? + +What a sinister vista is opened up by this passage! I have no wish to +insinuate that the suspicion here expressed was justified. It is the +suspicion itself that is the point. Dimly we see, as through a mist, the +figures of the architects of war. We see that the forces they wield are +ambition and pride, jealousy and fear; that these are all-pervasive; that +they affect all Governments and all nations, and are fostered by conditions +for which all alike are responsible. + +It will be understood, of course, that in bringing out the fact that there +was national chauvinism in Russia and that this found its excuse in the +unstable equilibrium of Europe, I am making no attack on Russian policy. +I do not pretend to know whether these elements of opinion actually +influenced the policy of the Government. But they certainly influenced +German fears, and without a knowledge of them it is impossible to +understand German policy. The reader must bear in mind this source of +friction along with the others when we come to consider that policy in +detail. + + + +6. _Austria-Hungary_. + + +Turning now to Austria-Hungary, we find in her the Power to whom the +immediate occasion of the war was due, the Power, moreover, who contributed +in large measure to its remoter causes. Austria-Hungary is a State, but not +a nation. It has no natural bond to hold its populations together, and it +continues its political existence by force and fraud, by the connivance and +the self-interest of other States, rather than by any inherent principle of +vitality. It is in relation to the Balkan States that this instability has +been most marked and most dangerous. Since the kingdom of Serbia acquired +its independent existence it has been a centre drawing to itself the +discontent and the ambitions of the Slav populations under the Dual +Monarchy. The realization of those ambitions implies the disruption of the +Austro-Hungarian State. But behind the Southern Slavs stands Russia, and +any attempt to change the political status in the Balkans has thus meant, +for years past, acute risk of war between the two Empires that border them. +This political rivalry has accentuated the racial antagonism between German +and Slav, and was the immediate origin of the war which presents itself to +Englishmen as one primarily between Germany and the Western Powers. + +On the position of Italy it is not necessary to dwell. It had long been +suspected that she was a doubtful factor in the Triple Alliance, and the +event has proved that this suspicion was correct. But though Italy has +participated in the war, her action had no part in producing it. And we +need not here indicate the course and the motives of her policy. + + + +7. _Germany_. + + +Having thus indicated briefly the position, the perils, and the ambitions +of the other Great Powers of Europe, let us turn to consider the proper +subject of this essay, the policy of Germany. And first let us dwell on the +all-important fact that Germany, as a Great Power, is a creation of the +last fifty years. Before 1866 there was a loose confederation of German +States, after 1870 there was an Empire of the Germans. The transformation +was the work of Bismarck, and it was accomplished by "blood and iron." +Whether it could have been accomplished otherwise is matter of speculation. +That it was accomplished so is a fact, and a fact of tragic significance. +For it established among Germans the prestige of force and fraud, and gave +them as their national hero the man whose most characteristic act was the +falsification of the Ems telegram. If the unification could have been +achieved in 1848 instead of in 1870, if the free and generous idealism of +that epoch could have triumphed, as it deserved to, if Germans had not +bartered away their souls for the sake of the kingdom of this world, we +might have been spared this last and most terrible act in the bloody drama +of European history. If even, after 1866, 1870 had not been provoked, the +catastrophe that is destroying Europe before our eyes might never have +overwhelmed us. In the crisis of 1870 the French minister who fought so +long and with such tenacity, for peace saw and expressed, with the lucidity +of his nation, what the real issue was for Germany and for Europe:-- + + There exists, it is true, a barbarous Germany, greedy of battles and + conquest, the Germany of the country squires; there exists a Germany + pharisaic and iniquitous, the Germany of all the unintelligible pedants + whose empty lucubrations and microscopic researches have been so unduly + vaunted. But these two Germanies are not the great Germany, that of + the artists, the poets, the thinkers, that of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, + Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Liebig. This latter + Germany is good, generous, humane, pacific; it finds expression in the + touching phrase of Goethe, who when asked to write against us replied + that he could not find it in his heart to hate the French. If we do not + oppose the natural movement of German unity, if we allow it to complete + itself quietly by successive stages, it will not give supremacy to the + barbarous and sophistical Germany, it will assure it to the Germany of + intellect and culture. War, on the other hand, would establish, during + a time impossible to calculate, the domination of the Germany of the + squires and the pedants.[1] + +The generous dream was not to be realized. French chauvinism fell into +the trap Bismarck had prepared for it. Yet even at the last moment his war +would have escaped him had he not recaptured it by fraud. The publication +of the Ems telegram made the conflict inevitable, and one of the most +hideous and sinister scenes in all history is that in which the three +conspirators, Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, "suddenly recovered their +pleasure in eating and drinking," because, by publishing a lie, they +had secured the certain death in battle of hundreds and thousands of +young men. The spirit of Bismarck has infected the whole public life +of Germany and of Europe. It has given a new lease to the political +philosophy of Machiavelli; and made of every budding statesman and +historian a solemn or a cynical defender of the gospel of force. But, +though this be true, we have no right therefore to assume that there is +some peculiar wickedness which marks off German policy from that of all +other nations. Machiavellianism is the common heritage of Europe. It is +the translation into idea of the fact of international anarchy. Germans +have been more candid and brutal than others in their expression and +application of it, but statesmen, politicians, publicists, and historians +in every nation accept it, under a thicker or thinner veil of plausible +sophisms. It is everywhere the iron hand within the silken glove. It is +the great European tradition. + +Although, moreover, it was by these methods that Bismarck accomplished +the unification of Germany, his later policy was, by common consent, a +policy of peace. War had done its part, and the new Germany required all +its energies to build up its internal prosperity and strength. In 1875, +it is true, Bismarck was credited with the intention to fall once more +upon France. The fact does not seem to be clearly established. At any +rate, if such was his intention, it was frustrated by the intervention of +Russia and of Great Britain. During the thirty-nine years that followed +Germany kept the peace. + +While France, England, and Russia waged wars on a great scale, and while +the former Powers acquired enormous extensions of territory, the only +military operations undertaken by Germany were against African natives +in her dependencies and against China in 1900. The conduct of the German +troops appears, it is true, to have been distinguished, in this latter +expedition, by a brutality which stood out in relief even in that orgy of +slaughter and loot. But we must remember that they were specially ordered +by their Imperial master, in the name of Jesus Christ, to show no mercy +and give no quarter. Apart from this, it will not be disputed, by any one +who knows the facts, that during the first twenty years or so after 1875 +Germany was the Power whose diplomacy was the least disturbing to Europe. +The chief friction during that period was between Russia and France and +Great Britain, and it was one or other of these Powers, according to the +angle of vision, which was regarded as offering the menace of aggression. +If there has been a German plot against the peace of the world, it does +not date from before the decade 1890-1900. The close of that decade +marks, in fact, a new epoch in German policy. The years of peace had +been distinguished by the development of industry and trade and internal +organization. The population increased from forty millions in 1870 to over +sixty-five millions at the present date. Foreign trade increased more than +ten-fold. National pride and ambition grew with the growth of prosperity +and force, and sentiment as well as need impelled German policy to claim +a share of influence outside Europe in that greater world for the control +of which the other nations were struggling. Already Bismarck, though with +reluctance and scepticism, had acquired for his country by negotiation +large areas in Africa. But that did not satisfy the ambitions of the +colonial party. The new Kaiser put himself at the head of the new movement, +and announced that henceforth nothing must be done in any part of the world +without the cognizance and acquiescence of Germany. + +Thus there entered a new competitor upon the stage of the world, and +his advent of necessity was disconcerting and annoying to the earlier +comers. But is there reason to suppose that, from that moment, German +policy was definitely aiming at empire, and was prepared to provoke war +to achieve it? Strictly, no answer can be given to this question. The +remoter intentions of statesmen are rarely avowed to others, and, perhaps, +rarely to themselves. Their policy is, indeed, less continuous, less +definite, and more at the mercy of events than observers or critics are +apt to suppose. It is not probable that Germany, any more than any other +country in Europe, was pursuing during those years a definite plan, +thought out and predetermined in every point. + +In Germany, as elsewhere, both in home and foreign affairs, there was an +intense and unceasing conflict of competing forces and ideas. In Germany, +as elsewhere, policy must have adapted itself to circumstances, different +personalities must have given it different directions at different times. +We have not the information at our disposal which would enable us to trace +in detail the devious course of diplomacy in any of the countries of +Europe. What we know something about is the general situation, and the +action, in fact, taken at certain moments. The rest must be, for the +present, mainly matter of conjecture. With this word of caution, let +us now proceed to examine the policy of Germany. + +The general situation we have already indicated. We have shown how the +armed peace, which is the chronic malady of Europe, had assumed during the +ten years from 1904 to 1914 that specially dangerous form which grouped the +Great Powers in two opposite camps--the Triple Alliance and the Triple +Entente. We have seen, in the case of Great Britain, France, Russia, and +Austria-Hungary, how they came to take their places in that constellation. +We have now to put Germany in its setting in the picture. + +Germany, then, in the first place, like the other Powers, had occasion +to anticipate war. It might be made from the West, on the question of +Alsace-Lorraine; it might be made from the East, on the question of the +Balkans. In either case, the system of alliances was likely to bring into +play other States than those immediately involved, and the German Powers +might find themselves attacked on all fronts, while they knew in the +latter years that they could not count upon the support of Italy. + +A reasonable prudence, if nothing else, must keep Germany armed and +apprehensive. But besides the maintenance of what she had, Germany was +now ambitious to secure her share of "world-power." Let us examine in +what spirit and by what acts she endeavoured to make her claim good. + +First, what was the tone of public opinion in Germany during these +critical years? + +[Footnote 1: Emile Ollivier, "L'Empire Liberal."] + + + +8. _Opinion in Germany_. + + +Since the outbreak of the war the pamphlet literature in the countries of +the Entente has been full of citations from German political writers. In +England, in particular, the names and works of Bernhardi and of Treitschke +have become more familiar than they appear to have been in Germany prior to +the war. This method of selecting for polemical purposes certain tendencies +of sentiment and theory, and ignoring all others, is one which could be +applied, with damaging results, to any country in the world. Mr. Angell has +shown in his "Prussianism in England" how it might be applied to ourselves; +and a German, no doubt, into whose hands that book might fall would draw +conclusions about public opinion here similar to those which we have drawn +about public opinion in Germany. There is jingoism in all countries, as +there is pacifism in all countries. Nevertheless, I think it is true to +say that the jingoism of Germany has been peculiar both in its intensity +and in its character. This special quality appears to be due both to the +temperament and to the recent history of the German nation. The Germans are +romantic, as the French are impulsive, the English sentimental, and the +Russians religious. There is some real meaning in these generalisations. +They are easily to be felt when one comes into contact with a nation, +though they may be hard to establish or define. When I say that the Germans +are romantic, I mean that they do not easily or willingly see things as +they are. Their temperament is like a medium of coloured glass. It +magnifies, distorts, conceals, transmutes. And this is as true when their +intellectual attitude is realistic as when it is idealistic. In the Germany +of the past, the Germany of small States, to which all non-Germans look +back with such sympathy and such regret, their thinkers and poets were +inspired by grandiose intellectual abstractions. They saw ideas, like gods, +moving the world, and actual men and women, actual events and things, were +but the passing symbols of these supernatural powers; 1866 and 1870 ended +all that. The unification of Germany, in the way we have discussed, +diverted all their interest from speculation about the universe, life, and +mankind, to the material interests of their new country. Germany became the +preoccupation of all Germans. From abstractions they turned with a new +intoxication to what they conceived to be the concrete. Entering thus late +upon the stage of national politics, they devoted themselves, with their +accustomed thoroughness, to learning and bettering what they conceived +to be the principles and the practice which had given success to other +nations. In this quest no scruples should deter them, no sentimentality +hamper, no universal ideals distract. Yet this, after all, was but German +romanticism assuming another form. The objects, it is true, were different. +"Actuality" had taken the place of ideals, Germany of Humanity. But by +the German vision the new objects were no less distorted than the old. +In dealing with "Real-politik" (which is the German translation of +Machiavellianism), with "expansion," with "survival of the fittest," +and all the other shibboleths of world-policy, their outlook remained +as absolute and abstract as before, as contemptuous of temperament and +measure, as blind to those compromises and qualifications, those decencies, +so to speak, of nature, by which reality is constituted. The Germans now +saw men instead of gods, but they saw them as trees walking. + +German imperialism, then, while it involves the same intellectual +presuppositions, the same confusions, the same erroneous arguments, the +same short-sighted ambitions, as the imperialism of other countries, +exhibits them all in an extreme degree. All peoples admire themselves. But +the self-adoration of Germans is so naive, so frank, so unqualified, as to +seem sheerly ridiculous to more experienced nations.[1] The English and the +French, too, believe their civilization to be the best in the world. But +English common-sense and French sanity would prevent them from announcing +to other peoples that they proposed to conquer them, morally or materially, +for their good. All Jingoes admire and desire war. But nowhere else in the +modern world is to be found such a debauch of "romantic" enthusiasm, such +a wilful blindness to all the realities of war, as Germany has manifested +both before and since the outbreak of this world-catastrophe. A reader +of German newspapers and tracts gets at last a feeling of nausea at the +very words _Wir Deutsche_, followed by the eternal _Helden, Heldenthum, +Heldenthat_, and is inclined to thank God if he indeed belong to a nation +sane enough to be composed of _Haendler_. + +The very antithesis between _Helden_ (heroes) and _Haendler_ (hucksters), +with which all Germany is ringing, is an illustration of the romantic +quality that vitiates their intelligence. In spite of the fact that they +are one of the greatest trading and manufacturing nations of the world, and +that precisely the fear of losing their trade and markets has been, as they +constantly assert, a chief cause that has driven them to war, they speak +as though Germany were a kind of knight-errant, innocent of all material +ambitions, wandering through the world in the pure, disinterested service +of God and man. On the other hand, because England is a great commercial +Power, they suppose that no Englishman lives for anything but profit. +Because they themselves have conscription, and have to fight or be shot, +they infer that every German is a noble warrior. Because the English +volunteer, they assume that they only volunteer for their pay. Germany, +to them, is a hero clad in white armour, magnanimous, long-suffering, and +invincible. Other nations are little seedy figures in black coats, inspired +exclusively by hatred and jealousy of the noble German, incapable of a +generous emotion or an honourable act, and destined, by the judgment of +history, to be saved, if they can be saved at all, by the great soul and +dominating intellect of the Teuton. + +It is in this intoxicating atmosphere of temperament and mood that +the ideas and ambitions of German imperialists work and move. They are +essentially the same as those of imperialists in other countries. Their +philosophy of history assumes an endless series of wars, due to the +inevitable expansion of rival States. Their ethics means a belief in force +and a disbelief in everything else. Their science is a crude misapplication +of Darwinism, combined with invincible ignorance of the true bearings of +science upon life, and especially of those facts and deductions about +biological heredity which, once they are understood, will make it plain +that war degrades the stock of all nations, victorious and vanquished +alike, and that the decline of civilizations is far more plausibly to be +attributed to this cause than to the moral decadence of which history +is always ready, after the event, to accuse the defeated Power. One +peculiarity, perhaps, there is in the outlook of German imperialism, +and that is its emphasis on an unintelligible and unreal abstraction of +"race." Germans, it is thought, are by biological quality the salt of +the earth. Every really great man in Europe, since the break-up of the +Roman Empire, has been a German, even though it might appear, at first +sight, to an uninstructed observer, that he was an Italian or a Frenchman +or a Spaniard. Not all Germans, however, are, they hold, as yet included +in the German Empire, or even in the German-Austrian combination. The +Flemish are Germans, the Dutch are Germans, the English even are Germans, +or were before the war had made them, in Germany's eyes, the offscouring +of mankind. Thus, a great task lies before the German Empire: on the one +hand, to bring within its fold the German stocks that have strayed from +it in the wanderings of history; on the other, to reduce under German +authority those other stocks that are not worthy to share directly in the +citizenship of the Fatherland. The dreams of conquest which are the real +essence of all imperialism are thus supported in Germany by arguments +peculiar to Germans. But the arguments put forward are not the real +determinants of the attitude. The attitude, in any country, whatever it +may be called, rests at bottom on sheer national vanity. It is the belief +in the inherent superiority of one's own civilization, and the desire to +extend it, by force if need be, throughout the world. It matters little +what arguments in its support this passion to dominate may garner from +that twilight region in which the advanced guard of science is labouring +patiently to comprehend Nature and mankind. Men take from the treasury of +truth what they are able to take. And what imperialists take is a mirror +to their own ambition and pride. + +Now, as to the ambitions of this German jingoism there is no manner of +doubt. Germans are nothing if not frank. And this kind of German does +want to conquer and annex, not only outside Europe but within it. We must +not, however, infer that the whole of Germany has been infected with this +virus. The summary I have set down in the last few pages represents the +impression made on an unsympathetic mind by the literature of Pangermanism. +Emerging from such reading--and it is the principal reading of German +origin which has been offered to the British public since the war--there +is a momentary illusion, "That is Germany!" Of course it is not, any more +than the _Morning Post_ or the _National Review_ is England. Germans, in +fact, during recent years have taken a prominent place in pacifism as well +as in imperialism. Men like Schuecking and Quidde and Fried are at least as +well known as men like Treitschke and Bernhardi. Opinion in Germany, as in +every other country, has been various and conflicting. And the pacific +tendencies have been better organized, if not more active, there than +elsewhere, for they have been associated with the huge and disciplined +forces of the Social-Democrats. Indeed, the mass of the people, left +alone, is everywhere pacific. I do not forget the very important fact +that German education, elementary and higher, has been deliberately +directed to inculcate patriotic feeling, that the doctrine of armed +force as the highest manifestation of the State has been industriously +propagated by the authorities, and that the unification of Germany by +force has given to the cult of force a meaning and a popularity probably +unknown in any other country. But in most men, for good or for evil, the +lessons of education can be quickly obliterated by the experience of life. +In particular, the mass of the people everywhere, face to face with the +necessities of existence, knowing what it is to work and to struggle, to +co-operate and to compete, to suffer and to relieve suffering, though they +may be less well-informed than the instructed classes, are also less liable +to obsession by abstractions. They see little, but they see it straight. +And though, being men, with the long animal inheritance of men behind them, +their passions may be roused by any cry of battle, though they are the +fore-ordained dupes of those who direct the policy of nations, yet it is +not their initiative that originates wars. They do not desire conquest, +they do not trouble about "race" or chatter about the "survival of the +fittest." It is their own needs, which are also the vital needs of society, +that preoccupy their thoughts; and it is real goods that direct and inspire +their genuine idealism. + +We must, then, disabuse ourselves of the notion so naturally produced by +reading, and especially by reading in time of war, that the German Jingoes +are typical of Germany. They are there, they are a force, they have to be +reckoned with. But exactly how great a force? Exactly how influential on +policy? That is a question which I imagine can only be answered by guesses. +Would the reader, for instance, undertake to estimate the influence during +the last fifteen years on British policy and opinion of the imperialist +minority in this country? No two men, I think, would agree about it. And +few men would agree with themselves from one day or one week to another. +We are reduced to conjecture. But the conjectures of some people are of +more value than those of others, for they are based on a wider converse. +I think it therefore not without importance to recall to the reader the +accounts of the state of opinion in Germany given by well-qualified foreign +observers in the years immediately preceding the war. + +[Footnote 1: As I write I come across the following, cited from a book of +songs composed for German combatants under the title "Der deutsche Zorn":-- + + Wir sind die Meister aller Welt + In allen ernsten Dingen, + * * * * * + Was Man als fremd euch hoechlichst preist + Um eurer Einfalt Willen, + Ist deutschen Ursprungs allermeist, + Und traegt nur fremde Huellen.] + + + +9. _Opinion about Germany_. + + +After the crisis of Agadir, M. Georges Bourdon visited Germany to make an +inquiry for the _Figaro_ newspaper into the state of opinion there. His +mission belongs to the period between Agadir and the outbreak of the first +Balkan war. He interviewed a large number of people, statesmen, publicists, +professors, politicians. He does not sum up his impressions, and such +summary as I can give here is no doubt affected by the emphasis of my +own mind. His book,[1] however, is now translated into English, and the +reader has the opportunity of correcting the impression I give him. + +Let us begin with Pangermanism, on which M. Bourdon has a very interesting +chapter. He feels for the propaganda of that sect the repulsion that must +be felt by every sane and liberal-minded man:-- + + Wretched, choleric Pangermans, exasperated and unbalanced, brothers + of all the exasperated, wretched windbags whose tirades, in all + countries, answer to yours, and whom you are wrong to count your + enemies! Pangermans of the Spree and the Main, who, on the other side + of the frontier, receive the fraternal effusions of Russian Pan-Slavism, + Italian irredentism, English imperialism, French nationalism! What is it + that you want? + +They want, he replies, part of Austria, Switzerland, Flanders, Luxemburg, +Denmark, Holland, for all these are "Germanic" countries! They want +colonies. They want a bigger army and a bigger navy. "An execrable race, +these Pangermans!" "They have the yellow skin, the dry mouth, the green +complexion of the bilious. They do not live under the sky, they avoid the +light. Hidden in their cellars, they pore over treaties, cite newspaper +articles, grow pale over maps, measure angles, quibble over texts or traces +of frontiers." "The Pangerman is a propagandist and a revivalist." "But," +M. Bourdon adds, "when he shouts we must not think we hear in his tones the +reverberations of the German soul." The organs of the party seemed few and +unimportant. The party itself was spoken of with contempt. "They talk +loud," M. Bourdon was told, "but have no real following; it is only in +France that people attend to them." Nevertheless, M. Bourdon concluded +they were not negligible. For, in the first place, they have power to +evoke the jingoism of the German public--a jingoism which the violent +patriotism of the people, their tradition of victorious force, their +education, their dogma of race, continually keep alive. And, secondly, +the Government, when it thinks it useful, turns to the Pangermans for +assistance, and lets loose their propaganda in the press. Their influence +thus waxes and wanes, as it is favoured, or not, by authority. "Like the +giant Antaeus," a correspondent wrote to M. Bourdon, "Pangermanism loses +its force when it quits the soil of government." + +It is interesting to note, however, that the Pangerman propaganda purports +to be based upon fear. If they urge increased armaments, it is with a +view to defence. "I considered it a patriotic duty," wrote General Keim, +"in my quality of president of the German League for Defence, to demand +an increase of effectives such that France should find it out of the +question to dream of a victorious war against us, even with the help of +other nations." "To the awakening of the national sentiment in France +there is only one reply--the increase of the German forces." "I have the +impression," said Count Reventlow, "that a warlike spirit which is new is +developing in France. There is the danger." Thus in Germany, as elsewhere, +even jingoism took the mask of necessary precaution. And so it must be, and +will be everywhere, as long as the European anarchy continues. For what +nation has ever admitted an intention or desire to make aggressive war? +M. Bourdon, then, takes full account of Pangermanism. Nor does he neglect +the general militaristic tendencies of German opinion. He found pride +in the army, a determination to be strong, and that belief that it is in +war that the State expresses itself at the highest and the best, which is +part of the tradition of German education since the days of Treitschke. +Yet, in spite of all this, to which M. Bourdon does full justice, the +general impression made by the conversations he records is that the bulk +of opinion in Germany was strongly pacific. There was apprehension indeed, +apprehension of France and apprehension of England. "England certainly +preoccupies opinion more than France. People are alarmed by her movements +and her armaments." "The constant interventions of England have undoubtedly +irritated the public." Germany, therefore, must arm and arm again. "A great +war may be delayed, but not prevented, unless German armaments are such as +to put fear into the heart of every possible adversary." + +Germany feared that war might come, but she did not want it--that, in sum, +was M. Bourdon's impression. From soldiers, statesmen, professors, business +men, again and again, the same assurance. "The sentiment you will find most +generally held is undoubtedly that of peace." "Few think about war. We need +peace too much." "War! War between us! What an idea! Why, it would mean a +European war, something monstrous, something which would surpass in horror +anything the world has ever seen! My dear sir, only madmen could desire or +conceive such a calamity! It must be avoided at all costs." "What counts +above all here is commercial interest. All who live by it are, here as +elsewhere, almost too pacific." "Under the economic conditions prevailing +in Germany, the most glorious victory she can aspire to--it is a soldier +who says it--is peace!" + +The impression thus gathered from M. Bourdon's observations is confirmed +at every point by those of Baron Beyens, who went to Berlin as Belgian +minister after the crisis of Agadir.[2] Of the world of business he says:-- + + All these gentlemen appeared to be convinced partisans of peace.... + According to them, the tranquillity of Europe had not been for a moment + seriously menaced during the crisis of Agadir.... Industrial Germany + required to live on good terms with France. Peace was necessary to + business, and German finance in particular had every interest in the + maintenance of its profitable relations with French finance.[3] At the + end of a few months I had the impression that these pacifists personified + then--in 1912--the most common, the most widely spread, though the least + noisy, opinion, the opinion of the majority, understanding by the + majority, not that of the governing classes but that of the nation + as a whole (p. 172). + +The mass of the people, Beyens held, loved peace, and dreaded war. That was +the case, not only with all the common people, but also with the managers +and owners of businesses and the wholesale and retail merchants. Even in +Berlin society and among the ancient German nobility there were to be found +sincere pacifists. On the other hand, there was certainly a bellicose +minority. It was composed largely of soldiers, both active and retired; +the latter especially looking with envy and disgust on the increasing +prosperity of the commercial classes, and holding that a "blood-letting +would be wholesome to purge and regenerate the social body"--a view not +confined to Germany, and one which has received classical expression in +Tennyson's "Maud." To this movement belonged also the high officials, the +Conservative parties, patriots and journalists, and of course the armament +firms, deliberate fomenters of war in Germany, as everywhere else, in order +to put money into their pockets. To these must be added the "intellectual +flower of the universities and the schools." "The professors at the +universities, taken _en bloc_, were one of the most violent elements in +the nation." "Almost all the young people from one end of the Empire to +the other have had brought before them in the course of their studies +the dilemma which Bernhardi summed up to his readers in the three words +'world-power or decadence.' Yet with all this, the resolute partisans of +war formed as I thought a very small minority in the nation. That is the +impression I obstinately retain of my sojourn in Berlin and my excursions +into the provinces of the Empire, rich or poor. When I recall the image +of this peaceful population, journeying to business every week-day with a +movement so regular, or seated at table on Sundays in the cafes in the open +air before a glass of beer, I can find in my memories nothing but placid +faces where there was no trace of violent passions, no thought hostile to +foreigners, not even that feverish concern with the struggle for existence +which the spectacle of the human crowd has sometimes shown me elsewhere." + +A similar impression is given by the dispatch from M. Cambon, French +Ambassador to Berlin, written on July 30, 1913.[4] He, too, finds elements +working for war, and analyses them much as Baron Beyens does. There are +first the "junkers," or country squires, naturally military by all their +traditions, but also afraid of the death-duties "which are bound to come +if peace continues." Secondly, the "higher bourgeoisie"--that is, the +great manufacturers and financiers, and, of course, in particular the +armament firms. Both these social classes are influenced, not only by +direct pecuniary motives but by the fear of the rising democracy, which +is beginning to swamp their representatives in the Reichstag. Thirdly, +the officials, the "party of the pensioned." Fourthly, the universities, +the "historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists +of German Kultur." Fifthly, rancorous diplomatists, with a sense that they +had been duped. On the other hand, there were, as M. Cambon insists, other +forces in the country making for peace. What were these? In numbers the +great bulk, in Germany as in all countries. "The mass of the workmen, +artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct." Such of the great +nobles as were intelligent enough to recognize the "disastrous political +and social consequences of war." "Numerous manufacturers, merchants, and +financiers in a moderate way of business." The non-German elements of the +Empire. Finally, the Government and the governing classes in the large +southern States. A goodly array of peace forces! According to M. Cambon, +however, all these latter elements "are only a sort of make-weight in +political matters with limited influence on public opinion, or they are +silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of +a wave of warlike feeling." This last sentence is pregnant. It describes +the state of affairs existing, more or less, in all countries; a few +individuals, a few groups or cliques, making for war more or less +deliberately; the mass of the people ignorant and unconcerned, but also +defenceless against suggestion, and ready to respond to the call to war, +with submission or with enthusiasm, as soon as the call is made by their +Government. + +On the testimony, then, of these witnesses, all shrewd and competent +observers, it may be permitted to sum up somewhat as follows:-- + +In the years immediately preceding the war the mass of the people in +Germany, rich and poor, were attached to peace and dreaded war. But there +was there also a powerful minority either desiring war or expecting it, +and, in either case, preparing it by their agitation. And this minority +could appeal to the peculiarly aggressive form of patriotism inculcated by +the public schools and universities. The war party based its appeal for +ever fresh armaments on the hostile preparations of the Powers of the +Entente. Its aggressive ambition masqueraded, perhaps even to itself, +as a patriotism apprehensively concerned with defence. It was supported +by powerful moneyed interests; and the mass of the people, passive, +ill-informed, preoccupied, were defenceless against its agitation. The +German Government found the Pangermans embarrassing or convenient according +as the direction of its policy and the European situation changed from +crisis to crisis. They were thus at one moment negligible, at another +powerful. For long they agitated vainly, and they might long have continued +to do so. But if the moment should come at which the Government should make +the fatal plunge, their efforts would have contributed to the result, their +warnings would seem to have been justified, and they would triumph as +the party of patriots that had foretold in vain the coming crash to an +unbelieving nation. + +[Footnote 1: "L'Enigme Allemande," 1914.] + +[Footnote 2: See "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 97 seq. and 170 seq. +Bruxelles, 1915.] + +[Footnote 3: A Frenchman, M. Maurice Ajam, who made an inquiry among +business men in 1913 came to the same conclusion. "Peace! I write that all +the Germans without exception, when they belong to the world of business, +are fanatical partisans of the maintenance of European peace." See Yves +Guyot, "Les causes et les consequences de la guerre," p. 226.] + +[Footnote 4: See French Yellow Book, No. 5.] + + + +10. _German Policy, from 1890-1900_. + + +Having thus examined the atmosphere of opinion in which the German +Government moved, let us proceed to consider the actual course of their +policy during the critical years, fifteen or so, that preceded the war. +The policy admittedly and openly was one of "expansion." But "expansion" +where? It seems to be rather widely supposed that Germany was preparing war +in order to annex territory in Europe. The contempt of German imperialists, +from Treitschke onward, for the rights of small States, the racial theories +which included in "German" territory Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the +Scandinavian countries, may seem to give colour to this idea. But it would +be hazardous to assume that German statesmen were seriously influenced +for years by the lucubrations of Mr. Houston Stewart Chamberlain and +his followers. Nor can a long-prepared policy of annexation in Europe +be inferred from the fact that Belgium and France were invaded after the +war broke out, or even from the present demand among German parties that +the territories occupied should be retained. If it could be maintained +that the seizure of territory during war, or even its retention after +it, is evidence that the territory was the object of the war, it would +be legitimate also to infer that the British Empire has gone to war +to annex German colonies, a conclusion which Englishmen would probably +reject with indignation. In truth, before the war, the view that it was +the object of German policy to annex European territory would have found, +I think, few, if any, supporters among well-informed and unprejudiced +observers. I note, for instance, that Mr. Dawson, whose opinion on such +a point is probably better worth having than that of any other Englishman, +in his book, "The Evolution of Modern Germany,"[1] when discussing the aims +of German policy does not even refer to the idea that annexations in Europe +are contemplated. + +So far as the evidence at present goes, I do not think a case can be +made out for the view that German policy was aiming during these years +at securing the hegemony of Europe by annexing European territory. The +expansion Germany was seeking was that of trade and markets. And her +statesmen and people, like those of other countries, were under the +belief that, to secure this, it was necessary to acquire colonies. This +ambition, up to a point, she was able, in fact, to fulfil, not by force +but by agreement with the other Powers. The Berlin Act of 1885 was one +of the wisest and most far-seeing achievements of European policy. By it +the partition of a great part of the African continent between the Powers +was peaceably accomplished, and Germany emerged with possessions to the +extent of 377,000 square miles and an estimated population of 1,700,000. +By 1906 her colonial domain had been increased to over two and a half +million square miles, and its population to over twelve millions; and all +of this had been acquired without war with any civilized nation. In spite +of her late arrival on the scene as a colonial Power, Germany had thus +secured without war an empire overseas, not comparable, indeed, to that +of Great Britain or of France, but still considerable in extent and +(as Germans believed) in economic promise, and sufficient to give them +the opportunity they desired to show their capacity as pioneers of +civilization. How they have succeeded or failed in this we need not here +consider. But when Germans demand a "place in the sun," the considerable +place they have in fact acquired, with the acquiescence of the other +colonial Powers, should, in fairness to those Powers, be remembered. +But, notoriously, they were not satisfied, and the extent of their +dissatisfaction was shown by their determination to create a navy. This +new departure, dating from the close of the decade 1890-1900, marks the +beginning of that friction between Great Britain and Germany which was a +main cause of the war. It is therefore important to form some just idea +of the motives that inspired German policy to take this momentous step. +The reasons given by Prince Buelow, the founder of the policy, and often +repeated by German statesmen and publicists,[2] are, first, the need of a +strong navy, to protect German commerce; secondly, the need, as well as the +ambition, of Germany to play a part proportional to her real strength in +the determination of policy beyond the seas. These reasons, according to +the ideas that govern European statesmanship, are valid and sufficient. +They are the same that have influenced all great Powers; and if Germany +was influenced by them we need not infer any specially sinister intentions +on her part. The fact that during the present war German trade has been +swept from the seas, and that she is in the position of a blockaded Power, +will certainly convince any German patriot, not that she did not need a +navy, but that she needed a much stronger one; and the retort that there +need have been no war if Germany had not provoked it by building a fleet +is not one that can be expected to appeal to any nation so long as the +European anarchy endures. For, of course, every nation regards itself +as menaced perpetually by aggression from some other Power. Defence was +certainly a legitimate motive for the building of the fleet, even if +there had been no other. There was, however, in fact, another reason +avowed. Germany, as we have said, desired to have a voice in policy +beyond the seas. Here, too, the reason is good, as reasons go in a +world of competing States. A great manufacturing and trading Power +cannot be indifferent to the parcelling out of the world among its +rivals. Wherever, in countries economically undeveloped, there were +projects of protectorates or annexations, or of any kind of monopoly +to be established in the interest of any Power, there German interests +were directly affected. She had to speak, and to speak with a loud voice, +if she was to be attended to. And a loud voice meant a navy. So, at least, +the matter naturally presented itself to German imperialists, as, indeed, +it would to imperialists of any other country. + +The reasons given by German statesmen for building their fleet were in +this sense valid. But were they the only reasons? In the beginning most +probably they were. But the formation and strengthening of the Entente, +and Germany's consequent fear that war might be made upon her jointly by +France and Great Britain, gave a new stimulus to her naval ambition. She +could not now be content with a navy only as big as that of France, for she +might have to meet those of France and England conjoined. This defensive +reason is good. But no doubt, as always, there must have lurked behind it +ideas of aggression. Ambition, in the philosophy of States, goes hand in +hand with fear. "The war may come," says one party. "Yes," says the other; +and secretly mutters, "May the war come!" To ask whether armaments are for +offence or for defence must always be an idle inquiry. They will be for +either, or both, according to circumstances, according to the personalities +that are in power, according to the mood that politicians and journalists, +and the interests that suborn them, have been able to infuse into a nation. +But what may be said with clear conviction is, that to attempt to account +for the clash of war by the ambition and armaments of a single Power is +to think far too simply of how these catastrophes originate. The truth, +in this case, is that German ambition developed in relation to the whole +European situation, and that, just as on land their policy was conditioned +by their relation to France and Russia, so at sea it was conditioned by +their relation to Great Britain. They knew that their determination to +become a great Power at sea would arouse the suspicion and alarm of the +English. Prince Buelow is perfectly frank about that. He says that the +difficulty was to get on with the shipbuilding programme without giving +Great Britain an opportunity to intervene by force and nip the enterprise +in the bud. He attributes here to the British Government a policy which +is all in the Bismarckian tradition. It was, in fact, a policy urged by +some voices here, voices which, as is always the case, were carried to +Germany and magnified by the mega-phone of the Press.[3] That no British +Government, in fact, contemplated picking a quarrel with Germany in order +to prevent her becoming a naval Power I am myself as much convinced as any +other Englishman, and I count the fact as righteousness to our statesmen. +On the other hand, I think it an unfounded conjecture that Prince Buelow was +deliberately building with a view to attacking the British Empire. I see +no reason to doubt his sincerity when he says that he looked forward to a +peaceful solution of the rivalry between Germany and ourselves, and that +France, in his view, not Great Britain, was the irreconcilable enemy.[4] +In building her navy, no doubt, Germany deliberately took the risk of +incurring a quarrel with England in the pursuit of a policy which she +regarded as essential to her development. It is quite another thing, +and would require much evidence to prove that she was working up to a +war with the object of destroying the British Empire. + +What we have to bear in mind, in estimating the meaning of the German +naval policy, is a complex series of motives and conditions: the genuine +need of a navy, and a strong one, to protect trade in the event of war, +and to secure a voice in overseas policy; the genuine fear of an attack by +the Powers of the Entente, an attack to be provoked by British jealousy; +and also that indeterminate ambition of any great Power which may be +influencing the policy of statesmen even while they have not avowed it to +themselves, and which, expressed by men less responsible and less discreet, +becomes part of that "public opinion" of which policy takes account. + +[Footnote 1: Published in 1908.] + +[Footnote 2: See, e.g., Dawson, "Evolution of Modern Germany," p. 348.] + +[Footnote 3: Some of these are cited in Buelow's "Imperial Germany," p. 36.] + +[Footnote 4: See "Imperial Germany," pp. 48, 71, English translation.] + + + +11. _Vain Attempts at Harmony_. + + +It may, however, be reasonably urged that unless the Germans had had +aggressive ambitions they would have agreed to some of the many proposals +made by Great Britain to arrest on both sides the constantly expanding +programmes of naval constructions. It is true that Germany has always +opposed the policy of limiting armaments, whether on land or sea. This is +consonant with that whole militarist view of international politics which, +as I have already indicated, is held in a more extreme and violent form +in Germany than in any other country, but which is the creed of jingoes +and imperialists everywhere. If the British Government had succeeded in +coming to an agreement with Germany on this question, they would have been +bitterly assailed by that party at home. Still, the Government did make the +attempt. It was comparatively easy for them, for any basis to which they +could have agreed must have left intact, legitimately and necessarily, as +we all agree, the British supremacy at sea. The Germans would not assent +to this. They did not choose to limit beforehand their efforts to rival +us at sea. Probably they did not think it possible to equal, still less +to outstrip us. But they wanted to do all they could. And that of course +could have only one meaning. They thought a war with England possible, +and they wanted to be as well prepared as they could be. It is part of +the irony that attaches to the whole system of the armed peace that the +preparations made against war are themselves the principal cause of war. +For if there had been no rival shipbuilding, there need have been no +friction between the two countries. + +"But why did Germany fear war? It must have been because she meant to make +it." So the English argue. But imagine the Germans saying to us, "Why do +you fear war? There will be no war unless you provoke it. We are quite +pacific. You need not be alarmed about us." Would such a promise have +induced us to relax our preparations for a moment? No! Under the armed +peace there can be no confidence. And that alone is sufficient to account +for the breakdown of the Anglo-German negotiations, without supposing on +either side a wish or an intention to make war. Each suspected, and was +bound to suspect, the purpose of the other. Let us take, for example, the +negotiations of 1912, and put them back in their setting. + +The Triple Alliance was confronting the Triple Entente. On both sides +were fear and suspicion. Each believed in the possibility of the others +springing a war upon them. Each suspected the others of wanting to lull +them into a false security, and then take them unprepared. In that +atmosphere, what hope was there of successful negotiations? The essential +condition--mutual confidence--was lacking. What, accordingly, do we find? +The Germans offer to reduce their naval programme, first, if England will +promise an unconditional neutrality; secondly, when that was rejected, if +England will promise neutrality in a war which should be "forced upon" +Germany. Thereupon the British Foreign Office scents a snare. Germany +will get Austria to provoke a war, while making it appear that the war +was provoked by Russia, and she will then come in under the terms of her +alliance with Austria, smash France, and claim that England must look +on passively under the neutrality agreement! "No, thank you!" Sir Edward +Grey, accordingly, makes a counter-proposal. England will neither make +nor participate in an "unprovoked" attack upon Germany. This time it is +the German Chancellor's turn to hang back. "Unprovoked! Hm! What does +that mean? Russia, let us suppose, makes war upon Austria, while making +it appear that Austria is the aggressor. France comes in on the side of +Russia. And England? Will she admit that the war was 'unprovoked' and +remain neutral? Hardly, we think!" The Chancellor thereupon proposes the +addition: "England, of course, will remain neutral if war is forced upon +Germany? That follows, I presume?" "No!" from the British Foreign Office. +Reason as before. And the negotiations fall through. How should they not +under the conditions? There could be no understanding, because there was +no confidence. There could be no confidence because there was mutual fear. +There was mutual fear because the Triple Alliance stood in arms against +the Triple Entente. What was wrong? Germany? England? No. The European +tradition and system. + +The fact, then, that those negotiations broke down is no more evidence +of sinister intentions on the part of Germany than it is on the part of +Great Britain. Baron Beyens, to my mind the most competent and the most +impartial, as well as one of the best-informed, of those who have written +on the events leading up to the war, says explicitly of the policy of the +German Chancellor:-- + + A practicable _rapprochement_ between his country and Great Britain + was the dream with which M. de Bethmann-Hollweg most willingly soothed + himself, without the treacherous _arriere-pensee_ which the Prince von + Buelow perhaps would have had of finishing later on, at an opportune + moment, with the British Navy. Nothing authorizes us to believe that + there was not a basis of sincerity in the language of M. de Jagow when he + expressed to Sir E. Goschen in the course of their last painful interview + his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the + Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then + through Great Britain to get closer to France.[1] + +Meantime the considerations I have here laid before the reader, in relation +to this general question of Anglo-German rivalry, are, I submit, all +relevant, and must be taken into fair consideration in forming a judgment. +The facts show clearly that Germany was challenging as well as she could +the British supremacy at sea; that she was determined to become a naval +as well as a military Power; and that her policy was, on the face of it, +a menace to this country; just as the creation on our part of a great +conscript army would have been taken by Germany as a menace to her. The +British Government was bound to make counter-preparations. I, for my own +part, have never disputed it. I have never thought, and do not now think, +that while the European anarchy continues, a single Power can disarm in the +face of the others. All this is beyond dispute. What is disputable, and a +matter of speculative inference, is the further assumption that in pursuing +this policy Germany was making a bid to destroy the British Empire. The +facts can certainly be accounted for without that assumption. I myself +think the assumption highly improbable. So much I may say, but I cannot +say more. Possibly some day we may be able to check conjecture by facts. +Until then, argument must be inconclusive. + +This question of the naval rivalry between Germany and Great Britain +is, however, part of the general question of militarism. And it may be +urged that while during the last fifteen years the British Government has +shown itself favourable to projects of arbitration and of limitation of +armaments, the German Government has consistently opposed them. There is +much truth in this; and it is a good illustration of what I hold to be +indisputable, that the militaristic view of international politics is +much more deeply rooted in Germany than in Great Britain. It is worth +while, however, to remind ourselves a little in detail what the facts +were since they are often misrepresented or exaggerated. + +The question of international arbitration was brought forward at the first +Hague Conference in 1899.[2] From the beginning it was recognized on all +sides that it would be idle to propose general compulsory arbitration for +all subjects. No Power would have agreed to it, not Great Britain or +America any more than Germany. On the other hand, projects for creating +an arbitration tribunal, to which nations willing to use it should have +recourse, were brought forward by both the British and the American +representatives. From the beginning, however, it became clear that Count +Muenster, the head of the German delegation, was opposed to any scheme +for encouraging arbitration. "He did not say that he would oppose a +moderate plan of voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that arbitration +must be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no +other country is, or can be; that she can mobilize her army in ten +days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other Power can do this. +Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival Powers time to put themselves +in readiness, and would, therefore, be a great disadvantage to Germany." +Here is what I should call the militarist view in all its simplicity and +purity, the obstinate, unquestioning belief that war is inevitable, and +the determination to be ready for it at all costs, even at the cost of +rejecting machinery which if adopted might obviate war. The passage has +often been cited as evidence of the German determination to have war. But +I have not so often seen quoted the exactly parallel declaration made by +Sir John (now Lord) Fisher. "He said that the Navy of Great Britain was +and would remain in a state of complete preparation for war; that a vast +deal depended on prompt action by the Navy; and that the truce afforded by +arbitration proceedings would give other Powers time, which they would not +otherwise have, to put themselves into complete readiness."[3] So far the +"militarist" and the "marinist" adopt exactly the same view. And we may be +sure that if proposals are made after the war to strengthen the machinery +for international arbitration, there will be opposition in this country of +the same kind, and based on the same grounds, as the opposition in Germany. +We cannot on this point condemn Count Muenster without also condemning Lord +Fisher. + +Muenster's opposition, however, was only the beginning. As the days went on +it became clear that the Kaiser himself had become actively opposed to the +whole idea of arbitration, and was influencing Austria and Italy and Turkey +in that sense. The delegates of all the other countries were in favour of +the very mild application of it which was under consideration. So, however, +be it noted, were all the delegates from Germany, except Count Muenster. +And even he was, by now, so far converted that when orders were received +from Germany definitely to refuse co-operation, he postponed the critical +sitting of the committee, and dispatched Professor Zorn to Berlin to lay +the whole matter before the Chancellor. Professor Zorn was accompanied +by the American Dr. Holls, bearing an urgent private letter to Prince +Hohenlohe from Mr. White. The result was that the German attitude was +changed, and the arbitration tribunal was finally established with the +consent and co-operation of the German Government. + +I have thought it worth while to dwell thus fully upon this episode because +it illustrates how misleading it really is to talk of "Germany" and the +"German" attitude. There is every kind of German attitude. The Kaiser is +an unstable and changeable character. His ministers do not necessarily +agree with him, and he does not always get his way. As a consequence of +discussion and persuasion the German opposition, on this occasion, was +overcome. There was nothing, in fact, fixed and final about it. It was +the militarist prejudice, and the prejudice this time yielded to humanity +and reason. + +The subject was taken up again in the Conference of 1907, and once more +Germany was in opposition. The German delegate, Baron Marschall von +Bieberstein, while he was not against compulsory arbitration for certain +selected topics, was opposed to any general treaty. It seems clear that it +was this attitude of Germany that prevented any advance being made beyond +the Convention of 1899. Good reasons, of course, could be given for this +attitude; but they are the kind of reasons that goodwill could have +surmounted. It seems clear that there was goodwill in other Governments, +but not in that of Germany, and the latter lies legitimately under the +prejudice resulting from the position she then took. German critics have +recognized this as freely as critics of other countries. I myself feel no +desire to minimize the blame that attaches to Germany. But Englishmen who +criticize her policy must always ask themselves whether they would support +a British Government that should stand for a general treaty of compulsory +arbitration. + +On the question of limitation of armaments the German Government has +been equally intransigeant. At the Conference of 1899, indeed, no serious +effort was made by any Power to achieve the avowed purpose of the meeting. +And, clearly, if anything was intended to be done, the wrong direction +was taken from the beginning. When the second Conference was to meet it +is understood that the German Government refused participation if the +question of armaments was to be discussed, and the subject did not appear +on the official programme. Nevertheless the British, French, and American +delegates took occasion to express a strong sense of the burden of +armaments, and the urgent need of lessening it. + +The records of the Hague Conferences do, then, clearly show that the German +Government was more obstinately sceptical of any advance in the direction +of international arbitration or disarmament than that of any other Great +Power, and especially of Great Britain or the United States. Whether, in +fact, much could or would have been done, even in the absence of German +opposition, may be doubted. There would certainly have been, in every +country, very strong opposition to any effective measures, and it is only +those who would be willing to see their own Government make a radical +advance in the directions in question who can honestly attack the German +Government. As one of those who believe that peaceable procedure may and +can, and, if civilization is to be preserved, must be substituted for war, +I have a right to express my own condemnation of the German Government, +and I unhesitatingly do so. But I do not infer that therefore Germany was +all the time working up to an aggressive war. It is interesting, in this +connection, to note the testimony given by Sir Edwin Pears to the desire +for good relations between Great Britain and Germany felt and expressed +later by the same Baron Marschall von Bieberstein who was so unyielding +in 1907 on the question of arbitration. When he came to take up the post +of German Ambassador to Great Britain, Sir Edwin reports him as saying:-- + + I have long wanted to be Ambassador to England, because, as you know, + for years I have considered it a misfortune to the world that our two + countries are not really in harmony. I consider that I am here as a man + with a mission, my mission being to bring about a real understanding + between our two nations. + +On this Sir Edwin comments (1915):-- + + I unhesitatingly add that I am convinced he was sincere in what he said. + Of that I have no doubt.[4] + +It must, in fact, be recognized that in the present state of international +relations, the general suspicion and the imminent danger, it requires more +imagination and faith than most public men possess, and more idealism than +most nations have shown themselves to be capable of, to take any radical +step towards reorganization. The armed peace, as we have so often had to +insist, perpetuates itself by the mistrust which it establishes. + +Every move by one Power is taken to be a menace to another, and is +countered by a similar move, which in turn produces a reply. And it is +not easy to say "Who began it?" since the rivalry goes so far back into +the past. What, for instance, is the real truth about the German, French, +and Russian military laws of 1913? Were any or all of them aggressive? Or +were they all defensive? I do not believe it is possible to answer that +question. Looking back from the point of view of 1914, it is natural to +suppose that Germany was already intending war. But that did not seem +evident at the time to a neutral observer, nor even, it would seem, to +the British Foreign Office. Thus the Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister +in London, writes as follows on February 24, 1913:-- + + The English Press naturally wants to throw upon Germany the + responsibility for the new tension which results from its proposals, + and which may bring to Europe fresh occasions of unrest. Many journals + consider that the French Government, in declaring itself ready to impose + three years' service, and in nominating M. Delcasse to St. Petersburg, + has adopted the only attitude worthy of the great Republic in presence + of a German provocation. At the Foreign Office I found a more just and + calm appreciation of the position. They see in the reinforcement of + the German armies less a provocation than the admission of a military + situation weakened by events and which it is necessary to strengthen. + The Government of Berlin sees itself obliged to recognize that it cannot + count, as before, on the support of all the forces of its Austrian ally, + since the appearance in South-east Europe of a new Power, that of the + Balkan allies, established on the very flank of the Dual Empire. Far + from being able to count, in case of need, on the full support of the + Government of Vienna, it is probable that Germany will have to support + Vienna herself. In the case of a European war she would have to make + head against her enemies on two frontiers, the Russian and the French, + and diminish perhaps her own forces to aid the Austrian army. In these + conditions they do not find it surprising that the German Empire should + have felt it necessary to increase the number of its Army Corps. They add + at the Foreign Office that the Government of Berlin had frankly explained + to the Cabinet of Paris the precise motives of its action. + +Whether this is a complete account of the motives of the German Government +in introducing the law of 1913 cannot be definitely established. But the +motives suggested are adequate by themselves to account for the facts. +On the other hand, a part of the cost of the new law was to be defrayed +by a tax on capital. And those who believe that by this year Germany was +definitely waiting an occasion to make war have a right to dwell upon that +fact. I find, myself, nothing conclusive in these speculations. But what +is certain, and to my mind much more important, is the fact that military +preparations evoke counter-preparations, until at last the strain becomes +unbearable. By 1913 it was already terrific. The Germans knew well that +by January 1917 the French and Russian preparations would have reached +their culminating point. But those preparations were themselves almost +unendurable to the French. + +I may recall here the passage already cited from a dispatch of Baron +Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, written in June 1914 (p. 34). +He suspected, as we saw, that the hand of Russia had imposed the three +years' service upon France. + +What Baron Guillaume thought plausible must not the Germans have thought +plausible? Must it not have confirmed their belief in the "inevitability" +of a war--that belief which, by itself, has been enough to produce war +after war, and, in particular, the war of 1870? Must there not have been +strengthened in their minds that particular current among the many that +were making for war? And must not similar suspicions have been active, +with similar results, on the side of France and Russia? The armaments +engender fear, the fear in turn engenders armaments, and in that vicious +circle turns the policy of Europe, till this or that Power precipitates the +conflict, much as a man hanging in terror over the edge of a cliff ends by +losing his nerve and throwing himself over. That is the real lesson of the +rivalry in armaments. That is certain. The rest remains conjecture. + +[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 75, and British White Paper, +No. 160.] + +[Footnote 2: The account that follows is taken from the "Autobiography" of +Andrew D. White, the chairman of the American delegation. See vol. ii., +chap. xiv. and following.] + +[Footnote 3: Mr. Arthur Lee, late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, at +Eastleigh:-- + +"If war should unhappily break out under existing conditions the British +Navy would get its blow in first, before the other nation had time even to +read in the papers that war had been declared" (_The Times_, February 4, +1905). + +"The British fleet is now prepared strategically for every possible +emergency, for we must assume that all foreign naval Powers are possible +enemies" (_The Times_, February 7, 1905).] + +[Footnote 4: Sir Edwin Pears, "Forty Years in Constantinople," p.330.] + + + +12. _Europe since the Decade 1890-1900_. + + +Let us now, endeavouring to bear in our minds the whole situation we have +been analysing, consider a little more particularly the various episodes +and crises of international policy from the year 1890 onwards. I take that +date, the date of Bismarck's resignation, for the reason already given (p. +42). It was not until then that it would have occurred to any competent +observer to accuse Germany of an aggressive policy calculated to disturb +the peace of Europe. A closer _rapprochement_ with England was, indeed, +the first idea of the Kaiser when he took over the reins of power in 1888. +And during the ten years that followed British sympathies were actually +drawn towards Germany and alienated from France.[1] It is well known that +Mr. Chamberlain favoured an alliance with Germany,[2] and that when the +Anglo-Japanese treaty was being negotiated the inclusion of Germany was +seriously considered by Lord Lansdowne. The telegram of the Kaiser to +Kruger in 1895 no doubt left an unpleasant impression in England, and +German feeling, of course, at the time of the Boer War, ran strongly +against England, but so did feeling in France and America, and, indeed, +throughout the civilized world. It was certainly the determination +of Germany to build a great navy that led to the tension between her +and England, and finally to the formation of the Triple Entente, as +a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance. It is 1900, not 1888, still +less 1870, that marks the period at which German policy began to be +a disturbing element in Europe. During the years that followed, the +principal storm-centres in international policy were the Far and Near +East, the Balkans, and Morocco. Events in the Far East, important though +they were, need not detain us here, for their contribution to the present +war was remote and indirect, except so far as concerns the participation of +Japan. Of the situation in the other areas, the tension and its causes and +effects, we must try to form some clear general idea. This can be done even +in the absence of that detailed information of what was going on behind the +scenes for which a historian will have to wait. + +[Footnote 1: The columns of _The Times_ for 1899 are full of attacks upon +France. Once more we may cite from the dispatch of the Comte de Lalaing, +Belgian Minister in London, dated May 24, 1907, commenting on current +or recalling earlier events: "A certain section of the Press, known here +under the name of the Yellow Press, is in great part responsible for the +hostility that exists between the two nations (England and Germany). What, +in fact, can one expect from a journalist like Mr. Harmsworth, now Lord +Northcliffe, proprietor of the _Daily Mail_, _Daily Mirror_, _Daily +Graphic_, _Daily Express_, _Evening News_, and _Weekly Dispatch_, who +in an interview given to the _Matin_ says, 'Yes, we detest the Germans +cordially. They make themselves odious to all Europe. I will never allow +the least thing to be printed in my journal which might wound France, +but I would not let anything be printed which might be agreeable to +Germany.' Yet, in 1899, this same man was attacking the French with the +same violence, wanted to boycott the Paris Exhibition, and wrote: 'The +French have succeeded in persuading John Bull that they are his deadly +enemies. England long hesitated between France and Germany, but she has +always respected the German character, while she has come to despise +France. A cordial understanding cannot exist between England and her +nearest neighbour. We have had enough of France, who has neither courage +nor political sense.'" Lalaing does not give his references, and I +cannot therefore verify his quotations. But they hardly require it. +The _volte-face_ of _The Times_ sufficiently well known. And only too +well known is the way in which the British nation allows its sentiments +for other nations to be dictated to it by a handful of cantankerous +journalists.] + +[Footnote 2: "I may point out to you that, at bottom, the character, the +main character, of the Teuton race differs very slightly indeed from the +character of the Anglo-Saxon (_cheers_), and the same sentiments which +bring us into a close sympathy with the United States of America may be +invoked to bring us into closer sympathy with the Empire of Germany." He +goes on to advocate "a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and +the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race" (see _The Times_, December +1, 1899). This was at the beginning of the Boer war. Two years later, in +October, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain was attacking Germany at Edinburgh. This +date is clearly about the turning-point in British sentiment and policy +towards Germany.] + + + +13. _Germany, and Turkey_. + + +Let us begin with the Near East. The situation there, when Germany began +her enterprise, is thus summed up by a French writer[1]:-- + + Astride across Europe and Asia, the Ottoman Empire represented, for + all the nations of the old continent, the cosmopolitan centre where + each had erected, by dint of patience and ingenuity, a fortress of + interests, influences, and special rights. Each fortress watched + jealously to maintain its particular advantages in face of the rival + enemy. If one of them obtained a concession, or a new favour, immediately + the commanders of the others were seen issuing from their walls to claim + from the Grand Turk concessions or favours which should maintain the + existing balance of power or prestige.... France acted as protector of + the Christians; England, the vigilant guardian of the routes to India, + maintained a privileged political and economic position; Austria-Hungary + mounted guard over the route to Salonica; Russia, protecting the + Armenians and Slavs of the South of Europe, watched over the fate of + the Orthodox. There was a general understanding among them all, tacit + or express, that none should better its situation at the expense of + the others. + +When into this precariously balanced system of conflicting interests +Germany began to throw her weight, the necessary result was a disturbance +of equilibrium. As early as 1839 German ambition had been directed towards +this region by Von Moltke; but it was not till 1873 that the process of +"penetration" began. In that year the enterprise of the Anatolian railway +was launched by German financiers. In the succeeding years it extended +itself as far as Konia; and in 1899 and 1902 concessions were obtained +for an extension to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. It was at this point that +the question became one of international politics. Nothing could better +illustrate the lamentable character of the European anarchy than the +treatment of this matter by the interests and the Powers affected. Here +had been launched on a grandiose scale a great enterprise of civilization. +The Mesopotamian plain, the cradle of civilization, and for centuries +the granary of the world, was to be redeemed by irrigation from the +encroachment of the desert, order and security were to be restored, +labour to be set at work, and science and power to be devoted on a +great scale to their only proper purpose, the increase of life. Here +was an idea fit to inspire the most generous imagination. Here, for all +the idealism of youth and the ambition of maturity, for diplomatists, +engineers, administrators, agriculturists, educationists, an opportunity +for the work of a lifetime, a task to appeal at once to the imagination, +the intellect, and the organizing capacity of practical men, a scheme in +which all nations might be proud to participate, and by which Europe might +show to the backward populations that the power she had won over Nature +was to be used for the benefit of man, and that the science and the arms +of the West were destined to recreate the life of the East. What happened, +in fact? No sooner did the Germans approach the other nations for financial +and political support to their scheme than there was an outcry of jealousy, +suspicion, and rage. All the vested interests of the other States were +up in arms. The proposed railway, it was said, would compete with the +Trans-Siberian, with the French railways, with the ocean route to India, +with the steamboats on the Tigris. Corn in Mesopotamia would bring down +the price of corn in Russia. German trade would oust British and French +and Russian trade. Nor was that all. Under cover of an economic enterprise, +Germany was nursing political ambitions. She was aiming at Egypt and the +Suez Canal, at the control of the Persian Gulf, at the domination of +Persia, at the route to India. Were these fears and suspicions justified? +In the European anarchy, who can say? Certainly the entry of a new economic +competitor, the exploitation of new areas, the opening out of new trade +routes, must interfere with interests already established. That must always +be so in a changing world. But no one would seriously maintain that that is +a reason for abandoning new enterprises. But, it was urged, in fact Germany +will take the opportunity to squeeze out the trade of other nations and +to constitute a German monopoly. Germany, it is true, was ready to give +guarantees of the "open door." But then, what was the value of these +guarantees? She asserted that her enterprise was economic, and had no +ulterior political gains. But who would believe her? Were not German +Jingoes already rejoicing at the near approach of German armies to the +Egyptian frontiers? In the European anarchy all these fears, suspicions, +and rivalries were inevitable. But the British Government at least was +not carried away by them. They were willing that British capital should +co-operate on condition that the enterprise should be under international +control. They negotiated for terms which would give equal control to +Germany, England, and France. They failed to get these terms, why has not +been made public. But Lord Cranborne, then Under-Secretary of State, said +in the House of Commons that "the outcry which was made in this matter--I +think it a very ill-informed outcry--made it exceedingly difficult for us +to get the terms we required."[2] And Sir Clinton Dawkins wrote in a letter +to Herr Gwinner, the chief of the Deutsche Bank: "The fact is that the +business has become involved in politics here, and has been sacrificed +to the very violent and bitter feeling against Germany exhibited by the +majority of newspapers and shared in by a large number of people."[3] +British co-operation, therefore, failed, as French and Russian had failed. +The Germans, however, persevered with their enterprise, now a purely +German one, and ultimately with success. Their differences with Russia +were arranged by an agreement about the Turko-Persian railways signed in +1911. An agreement with France, with regard to the railways of Asiatic +Turkey, was signed in February 1914, and one with England (securing our +interests on the Persian Gulf) in June of the same year. Thus just before +the war broke out this thorny question had, in fact, been settled to the +satisfaction of all the Powers concerned. And on this two comments may be +made. First, that the long friction, the press campaign, the rivalry of +economic and political interests, had contributed largely to the European +tension. Secondly, that in spite of that, the question did get settled, +and by diplomatic means. On this subject, at any rate, war was not +"inevitable." Further, it seems clear that the British Government, +so far from "hemming-in" Germany in this matter, were ready from the +first to accept, if not to welcome, her enterprise, subject to their +quite legitimate and necessary preoccupation with their position on +the Persian Gulf. It was the British Press and what lay behind it that +prevented the co-operation of British capital. Meantime the economic +penetration of Asia Minor by Germany had been accompanied by a political +penetration at Constantinople. Already, as early as 1898, the Kaiser had +announced at Damascus that the "three hundred millions of Mussulmans who +live scattered over the globe may be assured that the German Emperor will +be at all times their friend." + +This speech, made immediately after the Armenian massacres, has been very +properly reprobated by all who are revolted at such atrocities. But the +indignation of Englishmen must be tempered by shame when they remember +that it was their own minister, still the idol of half the nation, who +reinstated Turkey after the earlier massacres in Bulgaria and put back +the inhabitants of Macedonia for another generation under the murderous +oppression of the Turks. The importance of the speech in the history of +Europe is that it signalled the advent of German influence in the Near +East. That influence was strengthened on the Bosphorus after the Turkish +revolution of 1908, in spite of the original Anglophil bias of the Young +Turks, and as some critics maintain, in consequence of the blundering +of the British representatives. The mission of Von der Goltz in 1908 +and that of Liman von Sanders in 1914 put the Turkish army under German +command, and by the outbreak of the war German influence was predominant +in Constantinople. This political influence was, no doubt, used, and +intended to be used, to further German economic schemes. Germany, in +fact, had come in to play the same game as the other Powers, and had +played it with more skill and determination. She was, of course, here as +elsewhere, a new and disturbing force in a system of forces which already +had difficulty in maintaining a precarious equilibrium. But to be a new and +disturbing force is not to commit a crime. Once more the real culprit was +not Germany nor any other Power. The real culprit was the European anarchy. + +[Footnote 1: Pierre Albin, "D'Agadir a Serajevo," p. 81.] + +[Footnote 2: _Hansard_, 1903, vol. 126, p. 120.] + +[Footnote 3: _Nineteenth Century_, June 1909, vol. 65, p. 1090.] + + + +14. _Austria and the Balkans_. + + +I turn now to the Balkan question. This is too ancient and too complicated +to be even summarized here. But we must remind ourselves of the main +situation. Primarily, the Balkan question is, or rather was, one between +subject Christian populations and the Turks. But it has been complicated, +not only by the quarrels of the subject populations among themselves, but +by the rival ambitions and claims of Russia and Austria. The interest of +Russia in the Balkans is partly one of racial sympathy, partly one of +territorial ambition, for the road to Constantinople lies through Rumania +and Bulgaria. It is this territorial ambition of Russia that has given +occasion in the past to the intervention of the Western Powers, for until +recently it was a fixed principle, both of French and British policy, to +keep Russia out of the Mediterranean. Hence the Crimean War, and hence +the disastrous intervention of Disraeli after the treaty of San Stefano +in 1878--an intervention which perpetuated for years the Balkan hell. +The interest of Austria in the peninsula depends primarily on the fact +that the Austrian Empire contains a large Slav population desiring its +independence, and that this national ambition of the Austrian Slavs finds +in the independent kingdom of Serbia its natural centre of attraction. The +determination of Austria to retain her Slavs as unwilling citizens of her +Empire brings her also into conflict with Russia, so far as Russia is the +protector of the Slavs. The situation, and the danger with which it is +pregnant, may be realized by an Englishman if he will suppose St. George's +Channel and the Atlantic to be annihilated, and Ireland to touch, by a land +frontier, on the one side Great Britain, on the other the United States. +The friction and even the warfare which might have arisen between these two +great Powers from the plots of American Fenians may readily be imagined. +Something of that kind is the situation of Austria in relation to Serbia +and her protector, Russia. Further, Austria fears the occupation by any +Slav State of any port on the coast line of the Adriatic, and herself +desires a port on the Aegean. Add to this the recent German dream of the +route from Berlin to Bagdad, and the European importance of what would +otherwise be local disputes among the Balkan States becomes apparent. + +During the period we are now considering the Balkan factor first came into +prominence with the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina in +1908. Those provinces, it will be remembered, were handed over to Austrian +protection at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Austria went in and policed +the country, much as England went in and policed Egypt, and, from the +material point of view, with similarly successful results. But, like +England in Egypt, Austria was not sovereign there. Formal sovereignty +still rested with the Turk. In 1909, during the Turkish revolution, +Austria took the opportunity to throw off that nominal suzerainty. +Russia protested, Austria mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro, +and war seemed imminent. But the dramatic intervention of Germany "in +shining armour" on the side of her ally resulted in a diplomatic victory +for the Central Powers. Austria gained her point, and war, for the moment, +was avoided. But such diplomatic victories are dangerous. Russia did not +forget, and the events of 1909 were an operative cause in the catastrophe +of 1914. In acting as she did in this matter Austria-Hungary defied the +public law of Europe, and Germany supported her in doing so. + +The motives of Germany in taking this action are thus described, and +probably with truth, by Baron Beyens: "She could not allow the solidity +of the Triple Alliance to be shaken: she had a debt of gratitude to pay +to her ally, who had supported her at the Congress of Algeciras. Finally, +she believed herself to be the object of an attempt at encirclement by +France, England, and Russia, and was anxious to show that the gesture of +putting her hand to the sword was enough to dispel the illusions of her +adversaries."[1] These are the kind of reasons that all Powers consider +adequate where what they conceive to be their interests are involved. From +any higher, more international point of view, they are no reasons at all. +But in such a matter no Power is in a position to throw the first stone. +The whole episode is a classical example for the normal working of the +European anarchy. Austria-Hungary was primarily to blame, but Germany, who +supported her, must take her share. The other Powers of Europe acquiesced +for the sake of peace, and they could probably do no better. There will +never be any guarantee for the public law of Europe until there is a public +tribunal and a public force to see that its decisions are carried out. + +The next events of importance in this region were the two Balkan wars. +We need not here go into the causes and results of these, except so far +as to note that, once more, the rivalry of Russia and Austria played a +disastrous part. It was the determination of Austria not to give Serbia +access to the Adriatic that led Serbia to retain territories assigned by +treaty to Bulgaria, and so precipitated the second Balkan war; for that war +was due to the indignation caused in Bulgaria by the breach of faith, and +is said to have been directly prompted by Austria. The bad part played by +Austria throughout this crisis is indisputable. But it must be observed +that, by general admission, Germany throughout worked hand in hand with +Sir Edward Grey to keep the peace of Europe, which, indeed, otherwise +could not have been kept. And nothing illustrates this better than that +episode of 1913 which is sometimes taken to throw discredit upon Germany. +The episode was thus described by the Italian minister, Giolitti: "On the +9th of August, 1913, about a year before the war broke out, I, being then +absent from Rome, received from my colleague, San Giuliano, the following +telegram: 'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention to +act against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to apply +the _casus foederis_ of the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable. +I intend to join forces with Germany to prevent any such action by Austria, +but it will be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider such +eventual action as defensive, and therefore do not believe that the +_casus foederis_ exists. Please telegraph to Rome if you approve.' + +"I replied that, 'if Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is evident that +the _casus foederis_ does not arise. It is an action that she undertakes on +her own account, since there is no question of defence, as no one thinks +of attacking her. It is necessary to make a declaration in this sense to +Austria in the most formal way, and it is to be wished that German action +may dissuade Austria from her most perilous adventure.'"[2] + +Now this statement shows upon the face of it two things. One, that Austria +was prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European war; the other, +that the Italian ministers joined with Germany to dissuade her. They were +successful. Austria abandoned her project, and war was avoided. The episode +is as discreditable as you like to Austria. But, on the face of it, how +does it discredit Germany? More, of course, may lie behind; but no evidence +has been produced, so far as I am aware, to show that the Austrian project +was approved or supported by her ally. + +The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded the second Balkan War, left +all the parties concerned dissatisfied. But, in particular, it left the +situation between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia more +strained than ever. It was this situation that was the proximate cause of +the present war. For, as we have seen, a quarrel between Austria and Russia +over the Balkans must, given the system of alliances, unchain a European +war. For producing that situation Austria-Hungary was mainly responsible. +The part played by Germany was secondary, and throughout the Balkan wars +German diplomacy was certainly working, with England, for peace. "The +diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse," says Baron Beyens, "applied itself, +above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire for intervention at +the Ballplatz." "The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of Vienna in +its tortuous policy of intrigues at Sofia and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann +said to me at the time, the Imperial Government contented itself with +maintaining its neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from +any intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their quarrels. There is +no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement."[3] + +[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 240.] + +[Footnote 2: It is characteristic of the way history is written in time of +war that M. Yves Guyot, citing Giolitti's statement, omits the references +to Germany. _See_ "Les causes et les consequences de la guerre," p. 101.] + +[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 248, 262.] + + + +15. _Morocco_. + + +Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, Morocco. The salient features +here were, first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the Great Powers, +including, of course, Germany, were parties, and which guaranteed to +the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment; secondly, the interest of +Great Britain to prevent a strong Power from establishing itself opposite +Gibraltar and threatening British control over the Straits; thirdly, the +interest of France to annex Morocco and knit it up with the North African +Empire; fourthly, the new colonial and trading interests of Germany, which, +as she had formally announced, could not leave her indifferent to any new +dispositions of influence or territory in undeveloped countries. For many +years French ambitions in Morocco had been held in check by the British +desire to maintain the _status quo_. But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 +gave France a free hand there in return for the abandonment of French +opposition to the British position in Egypt. The Anglo-French treaty of +1904 affirmed, in the clauses made public, the independence and integrity +of Morocco; but there were secret clauses looking to its partition. By +these the British interest in the Straits was guaranteed by an arrangement +which gave to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibraltar and a +strip on the north-west coast, while leaving the rest of the country to +fall to France. Germany was not consulted while these arrangements were +being made, and the secret clauses of the treaty were, of course, not +communicated to her. But it seems reasonable to suppose that they became +known to, or at least were suspected by, the German Government shortly +after they were adopted.[1] And probably it was this that led to the +dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier,[2] when he announced +that the independence of Morocco was under German protection. The result +was the Conference of Algeciras, at which the independence and integrity of +Morocco was once more affirmed (the clauses looking to its partition being +still kept secret by the three Powers privy to them), and equal commercial +facilities were guaranteed to all the Powers. Germany thereby obtained what +she most wanted, what she had a right to by the treaty of 1880, and what +otherwise might have been threatened by French occupation--the maintenance +of the open door. But the French enterprise was not abandoned. Disputes +with the natives such as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases, +led to fresh military intervention. At the same time, it was difficult to +secure the practical application of the principle of equal commercial +opportunity. An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby +both Powers were to share equally in contracts for public works, was +found in practice not to work. The Germans pressed for its application +to the new railways projected in Morocco. The French delayed, temporized, +and postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position +in Morocco. The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez. +Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the capital +(a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it +clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the country. The patience +of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir. +There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the +Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby Germany recognized a +French protectorate in Morocco in return for concessions of territory +in the French Congo. These are the bare facts of the Moroccan episode. +Much, of course, is still unrevealed, particularly as to the motives and +intentions of the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for instance, intend to +seize a share of Morocco when she sent the _Panther_ to Agadir? And was +that the reason of the vigour of the British intervention? Possibly, but +by no means certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Germany +had that intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between +France and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption +of Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of +Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the +French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy, +but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such +a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in +all the parties concerned. + +The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length, +with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book "Morocco in Diplomacy." +The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various +Powers. But I do not believe that any instructed and impartial student +will accept what appears to be the current English view, that the action +of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without excuse, +and that the other Powers were acting throughout justly, honestly, and +straightforwardly. + +The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a painful +impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war. Thus Baron +Beyens writes:-- + + The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard another + war as a necessary evil.[4] + +And again:-- + + The pacific settlement of the conflict of 1911 gave a violent impulse to + the war party in Germany, to the propaganda of the League of Defence and + the Navy League, and a greater force to their demands. To their dreams + of hegemony and domination the desire for revenge against France now + mingled its bitterness. A diplomatic success secured in an underground + struggle signified nothing. War, war in the open, that alone, in the eyes + of this rancorous tribe, could settle definitely the Moroccan question by + incorporating Morocco and all French Africa in the colonial empire they + hoped to create on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the heart of + the Black Continent.[5] + +This we may take to be a correct description of the attitude of the +Pangermans. But there is no evidence that it was that of the nation. +We have seen also that Baron Beyens' impression of the attitude of the +German people, even after the Moroccan affair, was of a general desire +for peace.[6] The crisis had been severe, but it had been tided over, and +the Governments seem to have made renewed efforts to come into friendly +relations. In this connection the following dispatch of Baron Beyens (June +1912) is worth quoting:-- + + After the death of Edward VII, the Kaiser, as well as the Crown Prince, + when they returned from England, where they had been courteously + received, were persuaded that the coldness in the relations of the + preceding years was going to yield to a cordial intimacy between the + two Courts and that the causes of the misunderstanding between the two + peoples would vanish with the past. His disillusionment, therefore, was + cruel when he saw the Cabinet of London range itself last year on the + side of France. But the Kaiser is obstinate, and has not abandoned the + hope of reconquering the confidence of the English.[7] + +This dispatch is so far borne out by the facts that in the year succeeding +the Moroccan crisis a serious attempt was made to improve Anglo-German +relations, and there is no reason to doubt that on both sides there was +a genuine desire for an understanding. How that understanding failed has +already been indicated.[8] But even that failure did not ruin the relations +between the two Powers. In the Balkan crisis, as we have seen and as is +admitted on both sides, England and Germany worked together for peace. And +the fact that a European conflagration was then avoided, in spite of the +tension between Russia and Austria, is a strong proof that the efforts of +Sir Edward Grey were sincerely and effectively seconded by Germany.[9] + +[Footnote 1: See "Morocco in Diplomacy," Chap. XVI. A dispatch written by +M. Leghait, the Belgian minister in Paris, on May 7, 1905, shows that +rumour was busy on the subject. The secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish +treaty were known to him, and these provided for an eventual partition of +Morocco between France and Spain. He doubted whether there were secret +clauses in the Anglo-French treaty--"but it is supposed that there is a +certain tacit understanding by which England would leave France sufficient +liberty of action in Morocco under the reserve of the secret clauses of the +Franco-Spanish arrangement, clauses if not imposed yet at least strongly +supported by the London Cabinet." + +We know, of course, now, that the arrangement for the partition was +actually embodied in secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty.] + +[Footnote 2: According to M. Yves Guyot, when the Kaiser was actually on +his way to Tangier, he telegraphed from Lisbon to Prince Buelow abandoning +the project. Prince Buelow telegraphed back insisting, and the Kaiser +yielded.] + +[Footnote 3: See Bourdon, "L'Enigme Allemande," Chap. II. This account, by +a Frenchman, will not be suspected of anti-French or pro-German bias, and +it is based on French official records.] + +[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 216.] + +[Footnote 5: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 235.] + +[Footnote 6: See above, p. 63.] + +[Footnote 7: This view is reaffirmed by Baron Beyens in "L'Allemagne avant +la guerre," p. 29.] + +[Footnote 8: See above, p. 79.] + +[Footnote 9: Above, p. 111.] + + + +16. _The Last Years_. + + +We have reached, then, the year 1913, and the end of the Balkan wars, +without discovering in German policy any clear signs of a determination +to produce a European war. We have found all the Powers, Germany included, +contending for territory and trade at the risk of the peace of Europe; we +have found Germany successfully developing her interests in Turkey; we have +found England annexing the South African republics, France Morocco, Italy +Tripoli; we have found all the Powers stealing in China, and in all these +transactions we have found them continually on the point of being at one +another's throats. Nevertheless, some last instinct of self-preservation +has enabled them, so far, to pull up in time. The crises had been overcome +without a war. Yet they had, of course, produced their effects. Some +statesmen probably, like Sir Edward Grey, had had their passion for +peace confirmed by the dangers encountered. In others, no doubt, an +opposite effect had been produced, and very likely by 1913 there were +prominent men in Europe convinced that war must come, and manoeuvring +only that it should come at the time and occasion most favourable to +their country. That, according to M. Cambon, was now the attitude of +the German Emperor. M. Cambon bases this view on an alleged conversation +between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians.[1] The conversation has +been denied by the German official organ, but that, of course, is no +proof that it did not take place, and there is nothing improbable in +what M. Cambon narrates. + +The conversation is supposed to have occurred in November 1913, at a +time when, as we have seen,[2] there was a distinct outburst in France +of anti-German chauvinism, and when the arming and counter-arming of that +year had exasperated opinion to an extreme degree. The Kaiser is reported +to have said that war between Germany and France was inevitable. If he did, +it is clear from the context that he said it in the belief that French +chauvinism would produce war. For the King of the Belgians, in replying, +is stated to have said that it was "a travesty, of the French Government +to interpret it in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the +sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible +spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators." It should be observed +also that this supposed attitude on the part of the Kaiser is noted as a +change, and that he is credited with having previously stood for peace +against the designs of the German Jingoes. His personal influence, says +the dispatch, "had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of +peace." The fact of a change of mind in the Kaiser is accepted also by +Baron Beyens. + +Whatever may be the truth in this matter, neither the German nor the French +nor our own Government can then have abandoned the effort at peaceable +settlement. For, in fact, by the summer of 1914, agreements had been made +between the Great Powers which settled for the time being the questions +immediately outstanding. It is understood that a new partition of African +territory had been arranged to meet the claims and interests of Germany, +France, and England alike. The question of the Bagdad railway had been +settled, and everything seemed to favour the maintenance of peace, when, +suddenly, the murder of the Archduke sprang upon a dismayed Europe the +crisis that was at last to prove fatal. The events that followed, so far +as they can be ascertained from published documents, have been so fully +discussed that it would be superfluous for me to go over the ground again +in all its detail. But I will indicate briefly what appear to me to be the +main points of importance in fixing the responsibility for what occurred. + +First, the German view, that England is responsible for the war because she +did not prevent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as childish, if it +is not simply sophistical. The German Powers deliberately take an action +which the whole past history of Europe shows must almost certainly lead to +a European war, and they then turn round upon Sir Edward Grey and put the +blame on him because he did not succeed in preventing the consequences of +their own action. "He might have kept Russia out." Who knows whether he +might? What we do know is that it was Austria and Germany who brought her +in. The German view is really only intelligible upon the assumption that +Germany has a right to do what she pleases and that the Powers that stand +in her way are by definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordinary +attitude that has been one of the factors for making war in Europe. + +Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward +Grey. It is, indeed, possible, as it is always possible after the event, to +suggest that some other course might have been more successful in avoiding +war. But that is conjecture, I, at any rate, am convinced, as I believe +every one outside Germany is convinced, that Sir Edward Grey throughout the +negotiations had one object only--to avoid, if he could, the catastrophe of +war. + +Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is perfectly clear. She was determined +now, as in 1913, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, at the risk of a +European war. Her guilt is clear and definite, and it is only the fact that +we are not directly fighting her with British troops that has prevented +British opinion from fastening upon it as the main occasion of the war. + +But this time, quite clearly, Austria was backed by Germany. Why this +change in German policy? So far as the Kaiser himself is concerned, +there can be little doubt that a main cause was the horror he felt +at the assassination of the Archduke. The absurd system of autocracy +gives to the emotional reactions of an individual a preposterous weight +in determining world-policy; and the almost insane feeling of the Kaiser +about the sanctity of crowned heads was no doubt a main reason why Germany +backed Austria in sending her ultimatum to Serbia. According to Baron +Beyens, on hearing the news of the murder of the Archduke the Kaiser +changed colour, and exclaimed: "All the effort of my life for twenty-five +years must be begun over again!"[3] A tragic cry which indicates, what I +personally believe to be the case, that it has been the constant effort of +the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe, and that he foresaw now that he +would no longer be able to resist war. + +So far, however, it would only be the war between Austria and Serbia +that the Kaiser would be prepared to sanction. He might hope to avoid +the European war. And, in fact, there is good reason to suppose that +both he and the German Foreign Office did cherish that hope or delusion. +They had bluffed Russia off in 1908. They had the dangerous idea that +they might bluff her off again. In this connection Baron Beyens records +a conversation with his colleague, M. Bollati, the Italian Ambassador +at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that + + at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of + the official assurances exchanged quite recently between the Tsar and + M. Poincare, as to the complete preparations of the armies of the two + allies, was not in a position to sustain a European war and would not + dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure. + +Baron Beyens continues:-- + + At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face a European war + prevailed not only in the official world and in society, but among + all the manufacturers who specialized in the construction of armaments. + M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an opinion, announced + on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the + Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of the German + army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly on the + part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to make war + on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4] + +But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am inclined +to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just suggested, +there were other and more important factors to be considered. It appears +almost certain that at some point in the crisis the control of the +situation was taken out of the hands of the civilians by the military. +The position of the military is not difficult to understand. They believed, +as professional soldiers usually do, in the "inevitability" of war, and +they had, of course, a professional interest in making war. Their attitude +may be illustrated from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince +Lichnowsky in 1912[5]: "The soldiers think about war. It is their business +and their duty. They tell us that the German army, is in good order, that +the Russian army has not completed its organization, that it would be a +good moment ... but for twenty years they have been saying the same thing," +The passage is significant. It shows us exactly what it is we have to dread +in "militarism." The danger in a military State is always that when a +crisis comes the soldiers will get control, as they seem to have done on +this occasion. From their point of view there was good reason. They knew +that France and Russia, on a common understanding, were making enormous +military preparations; they knew that these preparations would mature by +the beginning of 1917; they knew that Germany would fight then at a less +advantage; they believed she would then have to fight, and they said, +"Better fight now." The following dispatch of Baron Beyens, dated July +26th, may probably be taken as fairly representing their attitude:-- + + To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which + prevails in the German General Staff, that war with France and Russia is + unavoidable and near, an _opinion which the Emperor has been induced to + share_. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and Pangerman party, + might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which + are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again + present themselves for some time. Germany has finished the strengthening + of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the other hand, + she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments + with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The Wehrbeitrag + has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has + demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the + mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her + military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for several + years: at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its + deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency + in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is this arm that will decide + the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two + years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from + France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish + quarrels.[6] + +It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have been in +the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other hand, as +late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign Office had +been working throughout for peace. Describing an interview he had had +on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:-- + + From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann + spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department for + Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had been + on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that + its views and counsels had not prevailed... A superior power intervened + to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to + Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet + was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the + war.[7] + +Why was that ultimatum sent? According to the German apologists, it +was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the +critical moment, and so made war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt +that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by +mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed +out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at +Petrograd to his Government:-- + + As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian + troops, Count Pourtales [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the + Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that + nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of + diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military consideration + of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that + button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of + control.[8] + +On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized +against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had +mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case. Moreover, +in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe +that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to +Germany. However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his +soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger. We do not +definitely know. What we do know is, that it was the German ultimatum that +precipitated the war. + +We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last moment the +German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:-- + + As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg by noon the next day + [after the dispatch of the German ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann + (I have it from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the Kaiser to + prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, and to persuade + his Majesty to wait till the following day. It was the last effort of + their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. Their + efforts were broken against the irreducible obstinacy of the Minister of + War and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the disastrous + consequences of a delay of twenty-four hours.[10] + +[Footnote 1: French Yellow Book, No. 6. In "L'Allemagne avant la guerre" +(p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this conversation was held at Potsdam on +November 5th or 6th; the Kaiser said that war between Germany and France +was "inevitable and near." Baron Beyens, presumably, is the authority from +whom M. Cambon derives his information.] + +[Footnote 2: Above, p. 25.] + +[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 273.] + +[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 280 seq.] + +[Footnote 5: See "L'Enigme Allemande," p. 96.] + +[Footnote 6: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8.] + +[Footnote 7: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52.] + +[Footnote 8: Austrian Red Book, No. 28.] + +[Footnote 9: See Chapter 14.] + +[Footnote 10: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 301.] + + + +17. _The Responsibility and the Moral_. + + +It will be seen from this brief account that so far as the published +evidence goes I agree with the general view outside Germany that the +responsibility for the war at the last moment rests with the Powers of +Central Europe. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which there can be +no reasonable doubt was known to and approved by the German Government, +was the first crime. And it is hardly palliated by the hope, which no +well-informed men ought to have entertained, that Russia could be kept +out and the war limited to Austria and Serbia. The second crime was the +German ultimatum to Russia and to France. I have no desire whatever to +explain away or palliate these clear facts. But it was not my object in +writing this pamphlet to reiterate a judgment which must already be that +of all my readers. What I have wanted to do is to set the tragic events of +those few days of diplomacy in their proper place in the whole complex of +international politics. And what I do dispute with full conviction is the +view which seems to be almost universally held in England, that Germany +had been pursuing for years past a policy of war, while all the other +Powers had been pursuing a policy of peace. The war finally provoked by +Germany was, I am convinced, conceived as a "preventive war." And that +means that it was due to the belief that if Germany did not fight then +she would be compelled to fight at a great disadvantage later. I have +written in vain if I have not convinced the reader that the European +anarchy inevitably provokes that state of mind in the Powers, and that +they all live constantly under the threat of war. To understand the +action of those who had power in Germany during the critical days it +is necessary to bear in mind all that I have brought into relief in +the preceding pages: the general situation, which grouped the Powers +of the Entente against those of the Triple Alliance; the armaments and +counter-armaments; the colonial and economic rivalry; the racial and +national problems in South-East Europe; and the long series of previous +crises, in each case tided over, but leaving behind, every one of them, +a legacy of fresh mistrust and fear, which made every new crisis worse +than the one before. I do not palliate the responsibility of Germany for +the outbreak of war. But that responsibility is embedded in and conditioned +by a responsibility deeper and more general--the responsibility of all the +Powers alike for the European anarchy. + +If I have convinced the reader of this he will, I think, feel no difficulty +in following me to a further conclusion. Since the causes of this war, and +of all wars, lie so deep in the whole international system, they cannot be +permanently removed by the "punishment" or the "crushing" or any other +drastic treatment of any Power, let that Power be as guilty as you please. +Whatever be the issue of this war, one thing is certain: it will bring no +lasting peace to Europe unless it brings a radical change both in the +spirit and in the organization of international politics. + +What that change must be may be deduced from the foregoing discussion of +the causes of the war. The war arose from the rivalry of States in the +pursuit of power and wealth. This is universally admitted. Whatever be the +diversities of opinion that prevail in the different countries concerned, +nobody pretends that the war arose out of any need of civilization, out of +any generous impulse or noble ambition. It arose, according to the popular +view in England, solely and exclusively out of the ambition of Germany to +seize territory and power. It arose, according to the popular German view, +out of the ambition of England to attack and destroy the rising power and +wealth of Germany. Thus to each set of belligerents the war appears as one +forced upon them by sheer wickedness, and from neither point of view has +it any kind of moral justification. These views, it is true, are both +too simple for the facts. But the account given in the preceding pages, +imperfect as it is, shows clearly, what further knowledge will only make +more explicit, that the war proceeded out of rivalry for empire between all +the Great Powers in every part of the world. The contention between France +and Germany for the control of Morocco, the contention between Russia and +Austria for the control of the Balkans, the contention between Germany and +the other Powers for the control of Turkey--these were the causes of the +war. And this contention for control is prompted at once by the desire for +power and the desire for wealth. In practice the two motives are found +conjoined. But to different minds they appeal in different proportions. +There is such a thing as the love of power for its own sake. It is known in +individuals, and it is known in States, and it is the most disastrous, if +not the most evil, of the human passions. The modern German philosophy of +the State turns almost exclusively upon this idea; and here, as elsewhere, +by giving to a passion an intellectual form, the Germans have magnified +its force and enhanced its monstrosity. But the passion itself is not +peculiar to Germans, nor is it only they to whom it is and has been a +motive of State. Power has been the fetish of kings and emperors from the +beginning of political history, and it remains to be seen whether it will +not continue to inspire democracies. The passion for empire ruined the +Athenian democracy, no less than the Spartan or the Venetian oligarchy, +or the Spain of Philip II, or the France of the Monarchy and the Empire. +But it still makes its appeal to the romantic imagination. Its intoxication +has lain behind this war, and it will prompt many others if it survives, +when the war is over, either in the defeated or the conquering nations. +It is not only the jingoism of Germany that Europe has to fear. It is +the jingoism that success may make supreme in any country that may be +victorious. + +But while power may be sought for its own sake, it is commonly sought +by modern States as a means to wealth. It is the pursuit of markets and +concessions and outlets for capital that lies behind the colonial policy +that leads to wars. States compete for the right to exploit the weak, and +in this competition Governments are prompted or controlled by financial +interests. The British went to Egypt for the sake of the bondholders, the +French to Morocco for the sake of its minerals and wealth. In the Near East +and the Far it is commerce, concessions, loans that have led to the rivalry +of the Powers, to war after war, to "punitive expeditions" and--irony of +ironies!--to "indemnities" exacted as a new and special form of robbery +from peoples who rose in the endeavour to defend themselves against +robbery. The Powers combine for a moment to suppress the common victim, +the next they are at one another's throats over the spoil. That really is +the simple fact about the quarrels of States over colonial and commercial +policy. So long as the exploitation of undeveloped countries is directed by +companies having no object in view except dividends, so long as financiers +prompt the policy of Governments, so long as military expeditions, leading +up to annexations, are undertaken behind the back of the public for reasons +that cannot be avowed, so long will the nations end with war, where they +have begun by theft, and so long will thousands and millions of innocent +and generous lives, the best of Europe, be thrown away to no purpose, +because, in the dark, sinister interests have been risking the peace +of the world for the sake of money in their pockets. + +It is these tremendous underlying facts and tendencies that suggest the +true moral of this war. It is these that have to be altered if we are to +avoid future wars on a scale as great. + + + +18. _The Settlement_. + + +And now, with all this in our minds, let us turn to consider the vexed +question of the settlement after the war. There lies before the Western +world the greatest of all choices, the choice between destruction and +salvation. But that choice does not depend merely on the issue of the +war. It depends upon what is done or left undone by the co-operation of +all when the war does at last stop. Two conceptions of the future are +contending in all nations. One is the old bad one, that which has presided +hitherto at every peace and prepared every new war. It assumes that the +object of war is solely to win victory, and the object of victory solely +to acquire more power and territory. On this view, if the Germans win, they +are to annex territory east and west: Belgium and half France, say the more +violent; the Baltic provinces of Russia, strategic points of advantage, say +the more moderate. On the other hand, if the Allies win, the Allies are to +divide the German colonies, the French are to regain Alsace-Lorraine, and, +as the jingoes add, they are to take the whole of the German provinces on +the left bank of the Rhine, and even territory beyond it. The Italians are +to have not only Italia Irredenta but hundreds of thousands of reluctant +Slavs in Dalmatia; the Russians Constantinople, and perhaps Posen and +Galicia. Further, such money indemnities are to be taken as it may prove +possible to exact from an already ruined foe; trade and commerce with +the enemy is to be discouraged or prohibited; and, above all, a bitter +and unforgiving hatred is to reign for ever between the victor and the +vanquished. This is the kind of view of the settlement of Europe that is +constantly appearing in the articles and correspondence of the Press of all +countries. Ministers are not as careful as they should be to repudiate it. +The nationalist and imperialist cliques of all nations endorse it. It is, +one could almost fear, for something like this that the peoples are being +kept at war, and the very existence of civilization jeopardized. + +Now, whether anything of this kind really can be achieved by the war, +whether there is the least probability that either group of Powers can +win such a victory as would make the programme on either side a reality, +I will not here discuss. The reader will have his own opinion. What I am +concerned with is the effect any such solution would have upon the future +of Europe. Those who desire such a close may be divided into two classes. +The one frankly believes in war, in domination, and in power. It accepts +as inevitable, and welcomes as desirable, the perpetual armed conflict of +nations for territory and trade. It does not believe in, and it does not +want, a durable peace. It holds that all peace is, must be, and ought to +be, a precarious and regrettable interval between wars. I do not discuss +this view. Those who hold it are not accessible to argument, and can only +be met by action. There are others, however, who do think war an evil, who +do want a durable peace, but who genuinely believe that the way indicated +is the best way to achieve it. With them it is permitted to discuss, and it +should be possible to do so without bitterness or rage on either side. For +as to the end, there is agreement; the difference of opinion is as to the +means. The position taken is this: The enemy deliberately made this war of +aggression against us, without provocation, in order to destroy us. If it +had not been for this wickedness there would have been no war. The enemy, +therefore, must be punished; and his punishment must make him permanently +impotent to repeat the offence. That having been done, Europe will have +durable peace, for there will be no one left able to break it who will +also want to break it. Now, I believe all this to be demonstrably a +miscalculation. It is contradicted both by our knowledge of the way +human nature works and by the evidence of history. In the first place, +wars do not arise because only one nation or group of nations is wicked, +the others being good. For the actual outbreak of this war, I believe, as +I have already said, that a few powerful individuals in Austria and in +Germany were responsible. But the ultimate causes of war lie much deeper. +In them all States are implicated. And the punishment, or even the +annihilation, of any one nation would leave those causes still subsisting. +Wipe out Germany from the map, and, if you do nothing else, the other +nations will be at one another's throats in the old way, for the old +causes. They would be quarrelling, if about nothing else, about the +division of the spoil. While nations continue to contend for power, +while they refuse to substitute law for force, there will continue to +be wars. And while they devote the best of their brains and the chief +of their resources to armaments and military and naval organization, +each war will become more terrible, more destructive, and more ruthless +than the last. This is irrefutable truth. I do not believe there is a +man or woman able to understand the statement who will deny it. + +In the second place, the enemy nation cannot, in fact, be annihilated, +nor even so far weakened, relatively to the rest, as to be incapable of +recovering and putting up another fight. The notions of dividing up Germany +among the Allies, or of adding France and the British Empire to Germany, +are sheerly fantastic. There will remain, when all is done, the defeated +nations--if, indeed, any nation be defeated. Their territories cannot be +permanently occupied by enemy troops; they themselves cannot be permanently +prevented by physical force from building up new armaments. So long as they +want their revenge, they will be able sooner or later to take it. If +evidence of this were wanted, the often-quoted case of Prussia after +Jena will suffice. + +And, in the third place, the defeated nations, so treated, will, in fact, +want their revenge. There seems to be a curious illusion abroad, among the +English and their allies, that not only is Germany guilty of the war, but +that all Germans know it in their hearts; that, being guilty, they will +fully accept punishment, bow patiently beneath the yoke, and become in +future good, harmonious members of the European family. The illusion is +grotesque. There is hardly a German who does not believe that the war was +made by Russia and by England; that Germany is the innocent victim; that +all right is on her side, and all wrong on that of the Allies. If, indeed, +she were beaten, and treated as her "punishers" desire, this belief would +be strengthened, not weakened. In every German heart would abide, deep and +strong, the sense of an iniquitous triumph of what they believe to be wrong +over right, and of a duty to redress that iniquity. Outraged national pride +would be reinforced by the sense of injustice; and the next war, the war of +revenge, would be prepared for, not only by every consideration of interest +and of passion, but by every cogency of righteousness. The fact that the +Germans are mistaken in their view of the origin of the war has really +nothing to do with the case. It is not the truth, it is what men believe +to be the truth, that influences their action. And I do not think any +study of dispatches is going to alter the German view of the facts. + +But it is sometimes urged that the war was made by the German militarists, +that it is unpopular with the mass of the people, and that if Germany is +utterly defeated the people will rise and depose their rulers, become a +true democracy, and join fraternal hands with the other nations of Europe. +That Germany should become a true democracy might, indeed, be as great a +guarantee of peace as it might be that other nations, called democratic, +should really become so in their foreign policy as well as in their +domestic affairs. But what proud nation will accept democracy as a +gift from insolent conquerors? One thing that the war has done, and +one of the worst, is to make of the Kaiser, to every German, a symbol +of their national unity and national force. Just because we abuse their +militarism, they affirm and acclaim it; just because we attack their +governing class, they rally round it. Nothing could be better calculated +than this war to strengthen the hold of militarism in Germany, unless it +be the attempt of her enemies to destroy her militarism by force. For +consider--! In the view we are examining it is proposed, first to kill +the greater part of her combatants, next to invade her territory, destroy +her towns and villages, and exact (for there are those who demand it) +penalties in kind, actual tit for tat, for what Germans have done in +Belgium. It is proposed to enter the capital in triumph. It is proposed +to shear away huge pieces of German territory. And then, when all this +has been done, the conquerors are to turn to the German nation and say: +"Now, all this we have done for your good! Depose your wicked rulers! +Become a democracy! Shake hands and be a good fellow!" Does it not +sound grotesque? But, really, that is what is proposed. + +I have spoken about British and French proposals for the treatment of +Germany. But all that I have said applies, of course, equally to German +proposals of the same kind for the treatment of the conquered Allies. That +way is no way towards a durable peace. If it be replied that a durable +peace is not intended or desired, I have no more to say. If it be replied +that punishment for its own sake is more important than civilization, and +must be performed at all costs--_fiat justitia, ruat coelum_--then, once +more, I have nothing to say. I speak to those, and to those only, who do +desire a durable peace, and who have the courage and the imagination to +believe it to be possible, and the determination to work for it. And to +them I urge that the course I have been discussing cannot lead to their +goal. What can? + + + +19. _The Change Needed_. + + +First, a change of outlook. We must give up, in all nations, this habit +of dwelling on the unique and peculiar wickedness of the enemy. We must +recognize that behind the acts that led up to the immediate outbreak of +war, behind the crimes and atrocities to which the war has led, as wars +always have led, and always will lead--behind all that lies a great complex +of feeling, prejudice, tradition, false theory, in which all nations and +all individuals of all nations are involved. Most men believe, feel, or +passively accept that power and wealth are the objects States ought +to pursue; that in pursuing these objects they are bound by no code of +right in their relations to one another; that law between them is, and +must be, as fragile as a cobweb stretched before the mouth of a cannon; +that force is the only rule and the only determinant of their differences, +and that the only real question is when and how the appeal to force may +most advantageously be made. This philosophy has been expressed with +peculiar frankness and brutality by Germans. But most honest and candid +men, I believe, will agree that that is the way they, too, have been +accustomed to think of international affairs. And if illustration were +wanted, let them remember the kind of triumphant satisfaction with which +the failure of the Hague conferences to achieve any radical results was +generally greeted, and the contemptuous and almost abhorring pity meted +out to the people called "pacifists." Well, the war has come! We see now, +not only guess, what it means. If that experience has not made a deep +impression on every man and woman, if something like a conversion is not +being generally operated, then, indeed, nothing can save mankind from the +hell of their own passions and imbecilities. + +But if otherwise, if that change is going on, then the way to deliverance +is neither difficult nor obscure. It does not lie in the direction of +crushing anybody. It lies in the taking of certain determinations, and +the embodying of them in certain institutions. + +First, the nations must submit to law and to right in the settlement of +their disputes. + +Secondly, they must reserve force for the coercion of the law-breaker; +and that implies that they should construct rules to determine who the +law-breaker is. Let him be defined as the one who appeals to force, instead +of appealing to law and right by machinery duly provided for that purpose, +and the aggressor is immediately under the ban of the civilized world, and +met by an overwhelming force to coerce him into order. In constructing +machinery of this kind there is no intellectual difficulty greater than +that which has confronted every attempt everywhere to substitute order +for force. The difficulty is moral, and lies in the habits, passions, +and wills of men. But it should not be concluded that, if such a moral +change could be operated, there would be no need for the machinery. It +would be as reasonable to say that Governments, law-courts, and police +were superfluous, since, if men were good, they would not require them, +and if they are bad they will not tolerate them. Whatever new need, desire, +and conviction comes up in mankind, needs embodiment in forms before it +can become operative. And, as the separate colonies of America could not +effectively unite until they had formed a Constitution, so will the States +of Europe and the world be unable to maintain the peace, even though all +of them should wish to maintain it, unless they will construct some kind +of machinery for settling their disputes and organizing their common +purposes, and will back that machinery by force. If they will do that +they may construct a real and effective counterpoise to aggression from +any Power in the future. If they will not do it, their precautions against +any one Power will be idle, for it will be from some other Power that the +danger will come. I put it to the reader at the end of this study, which +I have made with all the candour and all the honesty at my disposal, and +which I believe to represent essentially the truth, whether or no he agrees +that the European anarchy is the real cause of European wars, and if he +does, whether he is ready for his part to support a serious effort to end +it. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The European Anarchy, by G. 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